Mass and Elite Views on Nuclear Security   US National Security Surveys 1993-1999 Volume II: Policy Elites  (894k)

Kerry G. Herron, Ph.D., Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Ph.D., Scott D. Hughes, Ph.D., Dennis M. Gormley, and Thomas G. Mahnken, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT:

As the first decade of the post-Cold War era comes to a close, policy makers and citizens can take stock of the lessons learned and continuing uncertainties that characterize this new international security environment. In this volume we provide a resource for “taking stock” through analyzing the results of in-depth interviews with fifty members of the US security policy community conducted between June 3, 1999 and March 1, 2000. Participants were chosen for their expertise in nuclear security policy and to illuminate a wide range of relevant policy perspectives. This is Volume II of the fourth report in an ongoing series of studies begun in 1993 to examine how mass and elite perspectives about nuclear security are evolving in the post-Cold War era.

Areas of investigation in this volume include elite perceptions of the following: (a) key attributes and implications of the contemporary international security environment; (b) the evolving nature and requirements of nuclear security; (c) nuclear arms control; (d) US nuclear force structure, posture, and infrastructure; (d) missile defenses; (e) integrated beliefs about nuclear security; and (f) the role of the US general public in security policy processes.

Qualitative cross-sectional analysis of verbatim transcripts of the fifty interviews provides comparisons of the views of these policy elites in their own words. We employ cluster analysis to identify four groups of respondents exhibiting similar within group views about nuclear security and large differences in policy perspectives between groups. We compare these patterns to the results of cluster analysis of a national sample of the US general public.

Volume II:  Executive Guide for the Reader

This is the second volume of a two-volume report summarizing findings from an ongoing research project to study mass and elite views about nuclear security in the post-Cold War environment. This Executive Guide provides an overview of topics by chapter and a quick reference to key points of interest for the reader. In Volume I of the report, we analyze results from a nationwide survey of the general public conducted between September 13 and October 14, 1999. We compare findings with those from three previous surveys of the general public conducted in 1993, 1995, and 1997. In Volume II we comparatively analyze views about nuclear security expressed during in-depth interviews with fifty members of the US security policy community between June 3, 1999 and March 1, 2000.  

Chapter One: Introduction and Overview 

Project Goal (p. 1): The goal of this project is to measure and better understand the evolution of public and elite attitudes about security in the post-Cold War era, with a special emphasis on how views about nuclear security are changing. 

Conceptual Approach (p. 2): Our approach incorporates the following: (a) trend analysis of general public views about nuclear security (Volume I); (b) data from new questions about precision guided munitions, response to mass casualty terrorism, and national missile defenses (Volume I); and (c) qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews with members of the US security policy community (Volume II). 

Analytic Model (p. 3): We provide a model of the analytical framework used to help identify areas of investigation, hypothesize relationships among key variables, and design the survey questionnaire and interview outline. 

Research Design (p. 5): We describe the integration of the qualitative re-search methods used in Volume II with the quantitative methods employed in Volume I. Also we discuss the purposive sampling methods used to identify the fifty policy elites we interviewed. 

Data Collection (p. 6): We identify the individuals who participated in our in-depth interviews and provide brief comments about their qualifications. 

Data Analysis (p. 12): We describe how the interview data were coded, and we discuss the organizing principles used in structuring the qualitative analysis. Also we discuss the cluster analysis technique used to group elites for inter-group analysis and for comparing elite groups to public groups. 

Organization of Volume II (p. 17): We provide a brief overview of each of the chapters and appendices in Volume II.  

Chapter Two: International Security Environment 

Characterizing Today’s Security Environment (p. 20): Respondents identify the defining attributes of today’s international security environment. Two of the characteristics discussed are (a) the absence of great power and associated alliance rivalry, and (b) the absence of a system-wide organizing principle around which international security can be structured. 

Implications for Managing Security (p. 23): Participants assess some of the key implications of today’s security environment for national and inter-national security. Key topics include the following: (a) how international security and US national security have changed since the end of the Cold War; (b) evolving international norms; (c) concerns about the potential for balancing actions to counter US influence; (d) the rise of asymmetric threats; and (e) predictions about future implications. 

Assessing Russia (p. 29): Respondents discuss the changing nature of threats to US and international security deriving from Russian nuclear capabilities and limitations, and they assess US policy towards Russia. 

Assessing China (p. 34): Participants assess current and projected security challenges associated with China. Perspectives are organized into those more optimistic about China’s potential role and those more cautious about the implications for US security. 

Nuclear Proliferation (p. 39): The likelihood and implications of further nuclear proliferation are discussed, to include (a) motivations for nuclear proliferation, (b) the outlook for future proliferation, and (c) nonproliferation policies. 

Mass Casualty Terrorism (p. 46): Respondents assess the following: (a) the threat of mass terrorism in which biological or chemical weapons are used; (b) the implications of technology diffusion for terrorism; and (c) what should be done to meet the threat of mass casualty terrorism. 

Characterizing Group Views About the Security Environment (p. 53): Employing cluster analysis to identify four groups of respondents characterized by highly differentiated intergroup views and similar intragroup perspectives, we compare and contrast the views of each of the four elite groups regarding the international security environment.  

Chapter Three: Evolving Nature of Nuclear Security 

Risks and Benefits of Nuclear Weapons (p. 59): We summarize participants’ views about the risks and benefits associated with US nuclear weapons and how respondents weigh associated tradeoffs. 

Nuclear Deterrence and the Cold War (p. 63): In this section we contrast elite perspectives about the role of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War. 

Nuclear Deterrence Today (p. 67): Discussants compare the role of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War with that perceived to exist in the current security environment and discuss the efficacy of nuclear deterrence today. 

The Future Efficacy of Nuclear Deterrence (p. 73): Respondents present their assessments of the future efficacy of nuclear deterrence. 

Extended Nuclear Deterrence (p. 76): Participants discuss the extended deterrence concept and its role in the post-Cold War security environment, to include its relationship to nuclear proliferation. 

Existential Nuclear Deterrence (p. 80): We present evolving interpretations of existential nuclear deterrence, and our respondents discuss the validity of the concept and its implications for future policy. 

Deterring Biological and Chemical Attacks (p. 84): We present respondents’ arguments for and against attempting to use US nuclear weapons to deter other mass casualty weapons, and we summarize their views about the advantages and disadvantages of overtly declaring such a policy. 

The Role of Precision Guided Munitions (p. 96): Participants discuss the substitutability of conventionally armed PGMs for nuclear weapons for denial missions and for deterrence. 

Characterizing Group Views About the Evolving Nature of Nuclear Security (p. 104): We compare and contrast in summary form the views of our four groups of experts about how nuclear security is evolving.  

Chapter Four: Nuclear Arms Control 

Viability of Strategic Arms Control (p. 109): Participants evaluate the continued viability of formal arms control processes and discuss the utility of START I and START II. 

Views About Unilateral Nuclear Initiatives (p. 116): Respondents assess the utility of unilateral initiatives for reducing nuclear forces and alert postures, and they compare the advantages and disadvantages of unilateral reductions to those associated with formal arms control processes. 

Shape of START III (p. 119): Discussants present their views about the objectives for START III negotiations, to include (a) the need to focus on limiting warheads rather than delivery vehicles, and (b) the relationship between deep reductions and improved transparency and verification. 

Transparency and Verification (p. 122): We provide further discussion of transparency and verification issues in light of previous experience with negotiated agreements between the US and the USSR/Russia. 

Future Arms Control Directions (p. 124): Respondents assess requirements for the long-term future of nuclear arms control, to include (a) transitioning from bilateral processes to multilateral processes, and (b) including nonstrategic nuclear forces. 

Views About the CTBT (p. 127): Senate rejection of the CTBT occurred during the course of our interviews, and in this section we present a discussion of the following: (a) the advantages and disadvantages of the CTBT; (b) its relationship to nonproliferation and other international norms; (c) treaty verification; (d) implications of the CTBT for the US nuclear arsenal; and (e) the outlook for the CTBT. 

Characterizing Group Views About Nuclear Arms Control (p. 138): We summarize the views of our four groups about the role of nuclear arms control.  

Chapter Five: Nuclear Forces and Infrastructure 

US Nuclear Force Structure (p. 143): We present an extensive range of views about sizing and structuring US nuclear forces, to include the following: (a) traditional rationale for, and changing relevance of, the number of nuclear weapons; (b) sizing considerations for the future; and (c) the need for tailoring nuclear capabilities to meet new threats. 

US Nuclear Force Posture (p. 157): Discussants assess the viability of the triad basing concept and present considerations for future basing options. Also they discuss the pros and cons of de-alerting concepts. 

US Nuclear Infrastructure (p. 172): In this section, participants discuss nuclear infrastructure requirements and how they relate to nuclear security. Also they discuss stockpile stewardship and provide their views about future infrastructure considerations. 

Characterizing Group Views About US Nuclear Forces and Infrastructure (p. 184): We compare group perspectives about nuclear force structure, posture, and infrastructure.  

Chapter Six: Missile Defenses 

Perspectives on the Ballistic Missile Threat (p. 189): We present contrasting perspectives about the threat to the US posed by long-range ballistic missiles. 

Perspectives on Theater Missile Defenses (p. 192): Participants discuss the need for theater missile defenses and how they relate to the debate over national missile defenses. 

National Missile Defense and Nuclear Deterrence (p. 194): Discussants assess the degree to which strategic deterrence is sufficient to protect against ballistic missile attacks in the absence of missile defenses. 

Relationship Between Offensive and Defensive Forces (p. 196): In this section, respondents discuss the implications of national missile defenses for•xv arms reductions prospects and the need for considering the relationship be-tween strategic offensive and defensive forces.

Effectiveness of National Missile Defenses (p. 199): We contrast views about the likelihood that national missile defenses will be effective. 

Implications for the ABM Treaty (p. 201): Discussants assess implications of national missile defenses for continued viability of the ABM Treaty. 

Responses to Deploying National Missile Defenses (p. 203): Participants discuss the potential for an offense—defense spiral and speculate on potential reactions from Russia and China if the US deploys national missile defenses. 

Characterizing Group Views About Missile Defenses (p. 205): We com-pare the views of our four groups about the prospects for and implications of deploying US ballistic missile defenses.  

Chapter Seven: Beliefs About Nuclear Security 

Conceptualizing Nuclear Abolition (p. 209): In this section we provide an extensive discussion of participants’ views about the desirability and feasibility of eliminating all nuclear weapons worldwide. 

Reconciling Nuclear Weapons and US Values (p. 225): Respondents pro-vide their views about whether nuclear weapons are compatible with US principles and values such as freedom, democracy, individual rights, and justice. 

Justifying the Employment of Nuclear Weapons (p. 230): Participants discuss whether or not and under what circumstances they could justify using US nuclear weapons to attack an adversary. 

Characterizing Group Beliefs Regarding Nuclear Security (p. 235): We contrast the beliefs of our participants about nuclear security according to group identity.  

Chapter Eight: Elite Views of the Public and Nuclear Security 

Traditional Role of the Public in Nuclear Security Policy (p. 240): In this section we summarize respondents’ perspectives about the traditional role of the US general public in nuclear security, and the policy relationships between the general public, interest groups, policy elites, and the news media. 

Public Capacity to Understand and Participate (p. 252): Participants discuss their views about the capacity for the US general public to understand nuclear security issues and policy options and to effectively participate in nuclear security policy processes. 

Elite Preferences About the Role of the General Public (p. 256): We contrast respondents’ preferences for populist and delegated forms of public participation in the evolution of US nuclear security policies. 

Characterizing Group Views About the Public and Nuclear Security (p. 261): We compare the views among our four groups about public participation in nuclear security policy.  

Chapter Nine: Comparing Mass and Elite Perspectives 

Comparing Expectations About Publics (p. 265): We examine common expectations about the capacities and roles of elite and mass publics in nuclear security policy processes. 

Characterizing Mass and Elite Views (p. 267): Based on our cluster analysis of the general public (described in Volume I) and of the fifty policy elites who participated in our personal interviews, we summarize and compare overall group views and characteristics. 

Relating Patterns Among Mass and Elite Publics (p. 272): We identify and discuss relationships between the four mass public and four elite groups, and we situate them on a spectrum ranging from most critical to most supportive of traditional tenets of deterrence-based nuclear security. We discuss the implications of polar positions and intermediate positions for the evolution of future nuclear security policy. Also we discuss the conceptual relationship between the saliency of nuclear security issues and public valuation of US nuclear weapons. 

Implications for Security Policy Processes (p. 278): We discuss the relevance of the "knowledge gap" between mass and elite publics and analyze key dynamics of security policy processes, to include systemic resistance to change and the dynamics of nuclear risk and benefit perceptions. 

Bottom Lines (p. 282): In this final section, we list key findings and conclusions about relationships between mass and elite publics and their implications for nuclear security policy.  

Appendix 1: Research Methodology 

Sampling (p. 285): We discuss our purposive sampling method for deter-mining the fifty policy elites who participated in our in-depth interviews. 

Respondent Protections (p. 287): We summarize the protections afforded participants under applicable federal regulations and institutional guidelines. 

Initial Contact and Scheduling (p. 287): We identify the procedures we used for contacting and interacting with participants in the interviews. 

Data Collection (p. 288): We discuss the interview techniques, recording methods, transcription, and transcript review processes employed during data collection. 

Data Coding and Analysis (p. 297): We describe our analytical model and discuss the two complementary coding plans and the organizing concepts we employed in coding and structuring the data. Also we describe the cluster analysis technique used to group respondents.  

Appendix 2: Elite Focus Group 

Participants (p. 312): We identify the policy analysts who participated in our focus group discussion that was used to help design our interview guide. 

Security Environment and Threats to US Security (p. 313): Focus group participants discuss the changing nature of the international security environment, Russian nuclear resources, Chinese nuclear modernization, and threats of nuclear proliferation and mass casualty terrorism. 

Relevance of Nuclear Weapons (p. 319): Discussants assess today’s relevance of nuclear weapons for strategic deterrence and for deterring biological and chemical terrorism. Also they discuss the emerging role of precision guided munitions and the relationship of PGMs to nuclear weapons. 

US Nuclear Force Structure and Posture (p. 324): Participants discuss nuclear force size and alert posture, strategic arms control, nuclear infra-structure, and national missile defenses. 

Security Policy Processes and the Public (p. 331): The group discusses the traditional role of the US general public in security policy processes and prospects for future participation. 

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Public Perspectives on Nuclear Security   US National Security Surveys 1993-1997   (2.8M)
   Chapters 1-4 (1.4M)   Chapters 5-7 with Appendices (1.4M) 
 Both documents contain Table of Contents & Executive Summary

Kerry G. Herron, Ph.D. and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Ph.D.  

ABSTRACT:

This is the third report in a series of studies to examine how US attitudes about nuclear security are evolving in the post-Cold War era and to identify trends in public perceptions and preferences relevant to the evolution of US nuclear security policy.  It presents findings from three surveys: a nationwide telephone survey of randomly selected members of the US general public; a written survey of randomly selected members of American Men and Women of Science; and a written survey of randomly selected state legislators from all fifty US states.  The surveys were conducted between June and November 1997.  They are comparative with each other and with previous surveys conducted in 1993 and 1995.

Key areas of investigation included nuclear security, cooperation between US and Russian scientists about nuclear issues, vulnerabilities of critical US infrastructures and responsibilities for their protection, and broad areas of US national science policy.

While international and US national security were seen to be slowly improving,the primary nuclear threat to the US was perceived to have shifted from Russia to China.  Support was found for nuclear arms control measures, including mutual reductions in stockpiles.  However respondents were pessimistic about eliminating nuclear armaments, and nuclear deterrence continued to be highly valued.  Participants favored decreasing funding for developing and testing new nuclear weapons, but supported increased investments in nuclear weapons infrastructure.  Strong concerns were expressed about nuclear proliferation and the potential for nuclear terrorism.  Support was evident for US scientific cooperation with Russia to strengthen security of Russian nuclear assets.  Elite and general public perceptions of external and domestic nuclear weapons risks and external and domestic nuclear weapons benefits were statistically significantly related to nuclear weapons policy options and investment preferences.  Demographic variables and individual belief systems were systematically related both to risk and benefit perceptions and to policy and spending preferences.  

Executive Summary

Chapter One: Introduction and Overview

This report summarizes the third phase in an ongoing series of studies to examine how US attitudes about nuclear security are evolving in the post-Cold War environment and to identify trends in public perceptions and preferences relevant to the evolution of US nuclear security policy. Groups surveyed in 1997 included the US general public, members of American Men and Women of Science, and state legislators from all 50 US states. The following table outlines the study series.  

Chapter Two: Perceptions of Nuclear Weapons Risks

A majority of each of our three respondent groups in 1997 thought that US national security and international security had improved since the end of the Cold War. However, public perceptions of external nuclear risks to the US, measured in terms of the effect of the soviet breakup on the likelihood of nuclear war, nuclear proliferation, and nuclear terrorism, have not appreciably declined since our first measurements in 1993. Mean combined external nuclear risk perceptions were higher among the general public (6.3 on a scale where zero meant no risk, and ten meant extreme risk) than among either of two elite groups (scientists: 5.7; state legislators: 6.0) . All three groups considered China to have replaced Russia as the primary nuclear threat to the US today and for the foreseeable future. 

Perceptions of domestic nuclear risks associated with managing and controlling the US nuclear arsenal also were higher among respondents from the general public (5.1 on the same zero to ten scale) than among scientists (3.6) or state legislators (3.9) . However, perceptions of domestic nuclear risk among the general public were significantly lower than those measured among the general public in 1993 (6.2) .  

Chapter Three: Perceptions of Nuclear Weapons Benefits

Respondents in 1997 continued to attribute substantial value to US nuclear weapons for purposes of US influence, international leadership, and national security. On a scale where zero meant not at all beneficial, and ten meant extremely beneficial, respondents from the general public rated combined external nuclear weapons benefits, on average, significantly higher than did respondents from American Men and Women of Science (6.5) , and slightly lower (6.9) than did participating state legislators (7.1) . All three groups indicated that they thought nuclear deterrence not only was important during the Cold W r, but that it remained important today and for the foreseeable future. Public views of external nuclear benefits have remained relatively level since 1993. 

As to domestic benefits, respondents thought that defense expenditures in general were important for jobs, the economy, and for technology transfers, but we were not able to isolate and differentiate those defense expenditures that were only for nuclear capabilities from those that were only for conventional capabilities. Using the same zero to ten scale, domestic benefits were rated at 6.6 by the general public group, 6.4 by participating state legislators, and 5.7 by the scientist group. Public assessments of domestic benefits have been steady since 1993.  

Chapter Four: Policy and Spending Implications

Respondents from each of the three 1997 groups were supportive of mutual and verifiable reductions in nuclear weapons, but they were skeptical about the potential for completely eliminating all nuclear weapons. When asked to what minimum levels the US should consider reducing its nuclear arsenal in the context of mutual reductions with Russia, the median range suggested by participating scientists was 1,000 —1,500 nuclear weapons, while the median range among participating state legislators was 2,500 —3,000, and respondents from the general public suggested a median range of 1,500 —2,000. A majority of each group considered it important to carefully consider Chinese as well as Russian nuclear capabilities in determining the extent to which the US should denuclearize. 

Each of the groups in 1997 preferred reducing spending for developing and testing new nuclear weapons, but sizable support was reported for increasing funding for each of the following: (1) maintaining existing nuclear weapons in reliable condition; (2) improving the safety of existing nuclear weapons; (3) training those who manage nuclear weapons; and (4) maintaining nuclear weapons infrastructure. One of the most clear trends was among public views about investments in maintaining the ability to develop and improve nuclear weapons in the future. In 1993, two years after the end of the Cold War, only 38 percent supported increasing funding for nuclear weapons infrastructure; in 1995, 46 percent favored increasing such spending; and in 1997, six years into the post-Cold War era, a 53 percent majority recommended that investments to insure future nuclear weapons capabilities be increased. 

As in previous years, very large majorities approaching unanimous consensus among all three groups thought that spending for preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism should be increased. 

All three 1997 groups also reported strong support for providing US technical assistance to help insure the following: (1) safeguarding Russian nuclear materials; (2) safely disposing of nuclear materials from disassembled Russian nuclear warheads; and (3) redirecting Russian nuclear weapons research to other areas. Less (but still substantial) support was reported for helping to fund efforts to achieve all three objectives. Support for such initiatives was stronger among the scientist group than among the other two respondent groups. 

Nuclear weapons risk and benefit perceptions were statistically significantly related to nuclear security policy and spending issues among all three groups. Though such relationships were strongest among the scientists, we found ample evidence that multiple publics, including the lay public, made systematic connections between perceptions of external and domestic nuclear weapons risks and benefits and their implications for nuclear weapons policies and investment strategies. These findings reinforce those from each of our two previous studies, and they support the contention that Americans (with and without specialized nuclear expertise) are capable of contributing to public policy processes about the evolving nature of US nuclear security.  

Chapter Five: Demographic Implications

As age increased among most groups, perceptions of nuclear weapons risks tended to decline, and perceptions of nuclear weapons benefits tended to increase, as did support for most policy options related to maintaining US nuclear weapons capabilities. However, age was not a strong predictor of preferences for most nuclear security policy and spending issues. Increasing age was positively and significantly related to perceived importance of retaining nuclear weapons and preferences for increasing investments in nuclear infrastructure. 

Strong, consistent, and highly significant differences were found in each of our three studies regarding the ways in which women and men perceive the risks from our own nuclear weapons. Regardless of education, training, or other differences, women in each of our seven respondent groups since 1993 perceived significantly higher risks to be associated with the US nuclear arsenal than did men. Gender differences in perceptions of external nuclear risks from others ’nuclear weapons and perceptions of benefits derived from US nuclear weapons were much smaller and less systematic. However, women were significantly more likely to consider the worldwide elimination of nuclear weapons to be feasible than were men, and women rated the importance of retaining nuclear weapons lower, on average, than did men. 

Education, household income, and region of residence have not been strong predictors of nuclear weapons risk or benefit perceptions or of nuclear security policy and investment strategies in our three studies. Statistically significant relationships have been found among respondents from the general public, but they have not shown substantial explanatory powers. Generally, perceptions of nuclear weapons risks tended to increase slightly as formal education and household income increased among respondents from the general public. Among the same groups, perceptions of nuclear weapons benefits tended to decrease as education and income increased. 

Considering all three studies in this series, perceptions of nuclear weapons risks and benefits have not differed significantly by region among elites. Some differences have been noted among respondents from the general public, but they have generally been weak and inconsistent. The only consistent trend has been for general public respondents from the South to rate the benefits of nuclear weapons somewhat higher than respondents from other regions.  

Chapter Six: Belief Systems and Nuclear Security

We found multiple dimensions of belief systems to be importantly related to views about nuclear security. 

Political Beliefs: Political ideology exhibited a strong and consistent relationship to nuclear weapons policy and spending issues among each of the seven groups surveyed since 1993. For all groups, as self-identified political conservatism increased, perceptions of nuclear weapons risks tended to decrease, and perceptions of nuclear weapons benefits tended to increase. Greater conservatism also was related to higher valuations of nuclear weapons capabilities and greater support for a variety of nuclear weapons policies and investments. 

Social Beliefs: We created a social index reflecting a spectrum of social policy preferences ranging from more individualistic to more communitarian. As communitarian preferences increased, perceptions of nuclear risks tended to increase and perceptions of nuclear benefits tended to decrease. Support for arms control and concurrence with the premise that it is feasible to eliminate all nuclear weapons increased with communitarian beliefs, while support for investments in nuclear infrastructure increased with individualistic beliefs. 

Economic Beliefs: As preferences for income redistribution increased, and as preferences for greater trade restrictions increased, perceptions of nuclear risks tended to increase. Perceptions of nuclear benefits tended to decrease with increasing preferences for income redistribution and to increase with preferences for trade restrictions. 

Beliefs About Internationalism: As preferences for international political integration increased, perceptions of nuclear weapons risks tended to increase and perceptions of nuclear weapons benefits tended to decrease. Support for retaining US nuclear weapons and for investments in nuclear infrastructure decreased with stronger internationalist views. Support for fewer nuclear weapons and for nuclear arms control measures (fissile material cutoff and comprehensive test ban) increased with preferences for greater international integration. 

Moral Beliefs: As concurrence increased with assertions that (1) the world would have been safer if nuclear weapons had never been invented, and (2) that the use of nuclear weapons can never be justified, agreement also increased with the premise that it is feasible to eliminate all nuclear weapons, while perceived importance of US nuclear weapons and support for nuclear weapons investments decreased. 

Integration of Beliefs: We found that each of the individual dimensions of beliefs were correlated with one another, and that each was systematically related to the broader measure of political ideology.  

Chapter Seven: Other Strategic Considerations

Critical Infrastructures: Eight critical US infrastructures were assessed in terms of the following: (1) sources of threats to critical infrastructures as a group; (2) specific vulnerabilities to terrorism; and (3) apportionment of responsibilities for protection. 

All three respondent groups perceived US critical infrastructures to be vulnerable to foreign and domestic terrorism. Respondents from the general public perceived higher levels of vulnerability than did either elite group. Water supplies, telecommunications, electrical systems, and gas and oil supply systems were considered to be the most vulnerable. Transportation and banking and finance were rated as the next most vulnerable, and emergency services and continuity of government were ranked least at risk by all three groups. 

The scientist and legislator groups were more willing to assign higher levels of responsibility for protecting critical infrastructures to private industry, while respondents from the general public assigned more responsibility to the federal government. Highest levels of responsibility at the local government level were assigned to protecting water supply systems. Highest levels of responsibility at the state government level were assigned for water supplies and transportation systems. For most infrastructures, the federal government and private industry received the highest apportionments, though no single assignment was much above 40 percent, which implied an expectation of integrated responsibilities for protective measures. 

Science and Policy: Respondents evidenced substantial faith in science as the best source of reliable knowledge about the world, but legislator and general public groups reported considerable skepticism about scientific objectivity. Sixty-three percent of respondents from the general public and 47 percent of responding legislators agreed with the assertion that the same scientific evidence can be interpreted to fit opposing views; only 22 percent of the scientist group agreed with that statement. Fully 72 percent of the general public group, 56 percent of the legislator group, and 36 percent of the scientist group agreed that scientific research is almost always affected by the values held by researchers. Forty percent of respondents from the general public thought that technology has become dangerous and unmanageable, but both elite groups differed strongly with that assertion. Scientists working in colleges and universities and those working in national laboratories were more highly trusted to provide unbiased information about the risks and benefits of new technologies than were scientists working in business and industry. 

In a series of specialized inquiries asked only of the two elite groups, scientists working in academic settings were considered by the scientist group to be best suited for accomplishing basic research, while the legislator group preferred the national laboratories. Both groups thought that scientists working in business and industry were best suited for conducting applied research and development as well as application and production. Both groups agreed that post-Cold War competition for federal funding is increasing among different sectors of science (academe, government supported research facilities, and private industry). The legislator group considered such competition to be beneficial, while the scientist group thought it was more harmful.  

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Evolving Perceptions of Security   US National Security Surveys 1993-1995   (1.7M)

Kerry G. Herron, Ph.D. and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Ph.D.  

ABSTRACT:

This study analyzes findings from a national survey of 2,490 randomly selected members of the US public conducted between September 30 and November 14,1995.  It provides an over time comparison of public perceptions about nuclear weapons risks and benefits and key nuclear policy issues between 1993 and 1995.  Other areas of investigation include policy preferences regarding nuclear proliferation, terrorism, US/Russian nuclear cooperation, and personal security.  Public perceptions of post-cold war security were found to be evolving in unexpected ways.  The perceived threat of nuclear conflict involving the US had not declined, and the threat of nuclear conflict between other countries and fears of nuclear proliferation and terrorism had increased.  Perceived risks associated with managing the US nuclear arsenal were also higher.  Perceptions of external and domestic benefits from US nuclear weapons were not declining.  Support was found for increasing funding for nuclear weapons safety, training, and maintenance, but most respondents favored decreasing funding for developing and testing new nuclear weapons.  Strong support was evident for programs and funding to prevent nuclear proliferation and terrorism.

Though skeptical that nuclear weapons can be eliminated,most respondents supported reducing the US nuclear arsenal,banning nuclear test explosions, and ending production of fissile materials to make nuclear weapons.

Statistically significant relationships were found between perceptions of nuclear weapons risks and benefits and policy and spending preferences.  Demographic variables and basic social and political beliefs were systematically related both to risk and benefit perceptions and policy and spending options.  

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Public Perspectives of Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War Environment    National Security Survey: 1993-1994   (522k)

Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Richard P. Barke, and Kerry G. Herron   

ABSTRACT:

This report summarizes the findings of a nation-wide survey of public perceptions of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War environment. Participants included 1,301 members of the general public, 1,155 randomly selected members of the Union of Concerned Scientists, and 1,226 employees randomly selected from the technical staffs of four DOE national laboratories.  A majority of respondents from all three samples perceived the post-Cold War security environment to pose increased likelihood of nuclear war, nuclear proliferation; and nuclear terrorism. Public perceptions of nuclear weapons threats, risks, utilities, and benefits were found to systematically affect nuclear weapons policy preferences in predictable ways. Highly significant relationships were also found between public trust and nuclear weapons policy preferences. As public trust in official government information about nuclear weapons increased, perceptions of nuclear weapons management risks decreased and perceptions of nuclear weapons utilities and benefits increased. A majority of respondents favored decreasing funding for: (1) developing and testing new nuclear weapons (2) maintaining existing nuclear weapons; and (3) maintaining the ability to develop and improve nuclear weapons. Substantial support was found among all three groups for increasing funding for: (1) enhancing nuclear weapons safety; (2) training nuclear weapons personnel; (3) preventing nuclear proliferation; and (4) preventing nuclear terrorism.  Most respondents considered nuclear weapons to be a persistent feature of the post-Cold War security environment.  

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Risk Perception

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Attitudes and Preferences of Residents of the Middle Rio Grande Water Planning Region Regarding Water Issues  (323k)

 John R. Brown, Nancy Carrillo, and Hank Jenkins-Smith 

 
  Background and Purposes of the Survey

   The University of New Mexico Institute for Public Policy (IPP) conducted its most recent semiannual statewide Public Opinion Profile survey of New Mexico residents between March 21 and May 15, 2000. The major focus of the survey was water issues. The Action Committee (AC) of the Middle Rio Grande Water Assembly (WA), recognizing that the survey could be a vehicle for accomplishing one of its own objectives, agreed in December 1999 to participate in the IPP’s survey. The Middle Rio Grande (MRG) Council of Governments, the WA’s partner in the regional water planning process, contracted with the IPP to administer the survey to an “oversample” of residents of the MRG water planning region, in addition to its statewide sample.  This was thought necessary in order to obtain a large enough sample of the adult population of the region to permit statistical analysis of responses from subgroups within the entire sample.  Funding for the oversample and additional design and analysis efforts came from regional water planning funds appropriated by the New Mexico legislature to the Interstate Stream Commission. 

   IPP staff worked with a team representing the Action Committee (AC) of the Water Assembly, who provided advice in constructing the survey instrument to ensure the inclusion of questions of concern and relevance to the regional water planning process. The team consisted of Mary Murnane and Frank Robinson (co-chairs, Alternatives Working Group), Frank Titus (El Grúpo Tecnico), Sterling Grogan (vice-chair of the AC), and Jim Gross (MRG Council of Governments). The team also solicited ideas for questions from other members of the AC through the MRG water planners’ “listserv.”  

What this Report Contains 

   This report presents the most significant survey results, cross-tabulated to compare MRG responses with the “Rest of state” (ROS) responses. Where there are significant differences, the report also compares urban, suburban and rural responses within the MRG region. One simplification we usually employ in the analyses discussed in the text is to exclude “don’t know / no answer” (DK/NA) responses. Usually, fewer than one in twenty respondents (5%) spontaneously give what amounts to a DK/NA response, and the survey results are usually easier to interpret when the DK/NAs are set aside. This is particularly true when comparing the average (or mean) responses to a series of questions. However, in some cases DK/NA responses may be more frequent. When a large percentage of respondents are unable (or choose not) to answer a question, that fact may be important as an indicator about the public’s level of awareness about an issue. In such cases, we do report and discuss those responses. For readers interested in the DK/NA responses for every question, Appendix A to this report, “Question Wording, Response Frequencies and Descriptive Statistics” provides those data.

   To simplify the presentation of survey results, this report relies extensively on means, frequencies, cross-tabulations and other simple, descriptive and associational statistics.  Underlying these straightforward presentations, however, are slightly more advanced statistical techniques, such as correlation and regression, which provide significance tests of the differences between the results for different sub-samples. Thus, when we refer to a difference in percentages or mean values as being “significant,” we mean that it is literally “statistically significant.”  Where differences may be important but either the difference is not large enough to be statistically significant or the sub-sample is too small to allow us to generalize from their responses, we refer to the difference as “nominal.”

   This summary report is divided into the following sections, which generally follow the order of the questions in the survey. Section 1 deals with respondents’ “Initial views about water and the environment.” Section 2 reports on respondents’ “Knowledge and perceptions about water issues,” ranked in order of their importance to respondents within in the MRG region. Section 3 discusses our findings about respondents’ “Values in relation to water,” ranking various possible uses of water in order of the “value you personally place on that use.” The fourth and final section covers a range of “Policy preferences” on a variety of issues, from preservation of the bosque, to rules for behavior during a drought, to Indian water rights, instream flow, and water rights transfers.

   Following the body of the report is Appendix A, which provides the wording of all the water-related questions and the demographic questions used in this analysis. Appendix A also shows the response frequencies and in many cases descriptive statistics for each question broken out into “MRG region,” “Rest of state” and “Statewide” sample categories. Appendix B reports on and summarizes actual verbatim responses to Question 92 on drought-related behavior changes. Appendix C provides a technical summary on response rates for this survey. Appendix D is a map showing distribution of responses by Zip Code. Finally, the IPP is providing a release data set in electronic format to the MRGWA and the MRGCOG to enable them to perform additional analyses of the survey data.

   This report provides an introduction to the survey data. It tries to show what may be possible in the way of further exploration and use of the data by MRG water planners and others.  It is offered in the hope that such additional analyses and explorations will take place, that the data will be used in public forums to stimulate further dialogue, and that the water planning process will be enhanced by the use of these findings.  

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