Online Exogamy Reconsidered: Estimating the Internet's Effects on Racial, Educational, Religious, Political and Age Assortative Mating

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As the Internet's role in creating new couples continues to expand, now accounting for over a third of recently-formed U.S. couples, its impact on endogamy is increasingly consequential. While there are good reasons to expect greater diversity from online romantic sources, there are also good sociological reasons to predict greater assortativity online. Increases in the rates of interracial and interreligious couples within the U.S. have occurred seemingly in tandem with the rise of online dating, but the evidence connecting online romances and couple heterogeneity have been limited and mixed. Using a unique nationally-representative dataset collected in 2009 and 2017 on how U.S. couples met, and controlling for the diversity of their local geographies, I find that couples who met online are more likely to be interracial, interreligious, and of different college degree status, but also more similar in age. Couples who met online are not more nor less likely to cross political boundaries, however, and not more nor less likely to have educationally different mothers. These exogamy differences can vary by where on the Internet couples met. Population-level estimates suggest that only a small part of the recent changes in couple diversity can be directly attributed to couples meeting online, but there is the potential for more Internet-induced change if it continues to expand as the modal source of romance.

The potential for the Internet to change the structure of social relationships seems profound, yet the social impact of technological transformations can often be underwhelming, with stratification and social boundaries largely reproduced across technological epochs. A seemingly very straightforward and direct way that the Internet is altering social relationships is through

online dating, the creation of new couples from strangers who otherwise might never have had the opportunity to meet one another. Now that Internet sources account for over a fifth of new U.S. couples, and most new same sex couples (Rosenfeld and Thomas 2012), the structure of online romantic interactions is of growing importance in determining the kinds of couples and families that are formed within the U.S. If the Internet is bringing together people from different social groups and class positions, resulting in more families that blend together multiple groups, then those social boundaries could be substantially weakened in a world of increasing online dating. However, there are also reasons to expect that the ways people meet online may actually reinforce some group boundaries, creating more homogenous couples and families than would result otherwise.

What we know about the diversity of couples that result from meeting online has so far been very limited. National probability samples that include both data on how couples met and are recent enough to capture the rise of online dating have been rare: studies using one survey of the U.S. (Potarca 2017; Rosenfeld and Thomas 2012) and one of Germany (Potarca 2017) found mixed results on the impact of the Internet on couple assortativity. Both found that couples who met online had greater odds of being interreligious, but otherwise found that, controlling for other factors, online meetings differed only from specific offline settings that are exceptionally segregated on a social dimension: Potarca (2017, 295) found that online dating is related to less educational endogamy than are school-formed romances in both countries, and related to less racial endogamy than familial introductions in Germany. Using non-probability samples from opt-in online survey panels, Dutton et al. (2009) found that couples in Spain and the UK who met online were more dissimilar in age and education than those who met offline. None of these previous studies controlled for the diversity of the cities and neighborhoods the respondents were

embedded within, however, which is a potentially major confounding factor in determining couple composition.

Evidence from profiles and messaging within online dating websites has been more plentiful (Hitsch, Hortaçsu, and Ariely 2010; Huber and Malhrota 2017; Lewis 2016; Lin and Lundquist 2013; Robnett and Feliciano 2011; Skopek, Schulz, and Blossfeld 2011), but this kind of evidence only offers a limited window into an early phase of couple formation, within specific websites. While these have consistently shown that online interactions are segregated by most social dimensions, it is not clear that the extent is greater or less than what occurs in early-stage interactions in offline romantic markets. This evidence also doesn't connect online interaction patterns to the couples that result (one exception is Lee's [2015] study of an online dating website in South Korea, which found increased age and educational endogamy in the resulting marriages, but less occupational endogamy). Assortativity can change significantly between different online stages in relationship progression (Bruch, Feinberg, and Lee 2016), and it is reasonable to assume it likewise can change in the transition to offline stages. And while dating websites are the most common way couples meet online, a significant proportion of couples find each other through other online sources (Rosenfeld and Thomas 2012), which likely have very different interaction patterns within them. While studies that only look at online dating interactions do shed light on important early processes in couple formation, they can't really tell us about the Internet's effects on the endogamy of couples in a population.

This is the first nationally representative study of couples to demonstrate a general and robust effect of meeting online on the racial/ethnic, educational and age composition of the couples that result, compared to all other couples, as well as the first to control for the diversity of daters' local geography. I also offer here estimates of the population changes in exogamy from meeting

online, which has largely been a matter of speculation. I begin by discussing the core structural differences between online and offline sources of romance, and how these have different implications for different endogamy-producing mechanisms. I then discuss self-selection into online searches for romance and between different online venues, followed by a discussion of how user interfaces may affect endogamy. The analyses that follow will not test each of the potential endogamy mechanisms I discuss, but will show that in the aggregate couples who met online are more diverse by race/ethnicity, religion, and education than those who met offline, but more similar in age.

Expanded Opportunities for Romance

Perhaps the clearest and most powerful effect of the Internet on romance formation is that it greatly expands opportunities for contact between potential partners in a society (Rosenfeld and Thomas 2012), substantially increasing the number of options for romance seekers, which likely increases the diversity of those options as well. While this may be the core difference between online and offline sources of romance, its impact on endogamy is not entirely straightforward. Similarity in pairings can be generated by different mechanisms, and these may yield different predicted changes in endogamy when opportunity structures grow larger. The key endogamy producing mechanisms I consider here are 1) structurally-induced homophily/endogamy (Blau 1977), in which social structures create similarity in pairings regardless of individual agency and preferences, 2) choice homophily/endogamy, in which similar pairings result directly from people's preferences for similarity (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001), and 3) mating market dynamics, in which competition for the most desirable partners can result in matches

between similars (Xie, Chang, and Zhou 2015).

Weakened Structurally-Induced Endogamy?

The initial barrier to the creation of diverse couples in most societies is the lack of opportunities for contact between people from different groups. If the spaces, groups and networks through which people find their romantic partners are already highly segregated on a social dimension, then the resulting couples will also tend to be highly segregated on that dimension, regardless of other factors (Blau 1977; Feld 1982). Early-to-mid 20th century U.S. marriages typically occurred between those who lived within the same or nearby neighborhoods (Bossard 1932), and couple endogamy mirrored residential segregation. In the mid-to-late 20th century U.S., introductions through friends was the most common romantic source (Rosenfeld and Thomas 2012), creating couples that represented the homogeneity of friendship networks. The late 20th century rise in educational endogamy can be partly explained by the expansion of higher education, and an increased tendency to meet partners in educationally homogeneous settings (Blossfeld 2009; Mare 1991). Interactions online, on the other hand, can potentially occur between any two people who share a common language, and even at very long distances. Most Internet spaces for meeting new people are radically less exclusive than traditional sources of romance, expanding both the scope and the diversity of the pools of potential partners that people interact with. This increases the baseline probability of a diverse match for most social characteristics, in such a profound way that it might drown out any and all endogamy-encouraging mechanisms online.

Larger dating pools can have greater structural differentiation within them, however, as subgroups and subnetworks tend to proliferate within social units as they grow in size (Mayhew

et al. 1972). Subunits tend to be more segregated on salient social dimensions than the unit they are nested within, resulting in fewer opportunities for intergroup contact than the diversity of the larger unit would suggest (Blau 1977). Whether this occurs in online spaces depends upon how user interaction is structured within them. Online dating websites and apps may not have significant substructures smaller than geographic areas, as they typically lack internal groups of users or networks between the users, other than the dyadic communication between potential partners. Online communities and games do typically have internal groups and networks of users, and their internal structural differentiation is likely related to their population size, though the salient social characteristics that subunits segregate upon may vary greatly. In general, dating-specific sites may be unique among romantic venues in combining large dating pools with minimal internal structural differentiation, allowing for a maximal impact of their diversity of users in a geographic area.

An additional structural uniqueness of finding romance online that may affect endogamy is its separateness from offline social networks, and other people in general. This may weaken what Kalmijn (1998) calls "third party interference," the involvement of family and friends in the vetting and approval of mates. While this certainly still occurs when people find partners online, it can be delayed until a later stage than when partners are found through offline introductions. When strangers meet online, their interactions can initially exist as an independent dyad, without any overlapping ties between their personal networks, potentially shielding the relationship from the influence of others during its most unstable early stages. Just as physical distance from family can increase the likelihood of racial/ethnic exogamy (Rosenfeld and Kim 2005), this independence and privacy in early relationships may increase the survival chances of non-traditional romances initiated online.

Endogamy Preferences Set Free?

While larger and more diverse dating pools expand the possibilities for diverse romances, this can also counter-intuitively lead to increased endogamy. By reducing the constraints of limited options, they increase freedom of choice, including the freedom to enact homophily biases. Larger and more diverse schools, for instance, tend to exhibit greater racial friendship segregation than smaller schools (Moody 2001), and minority ethnic and racial groups are more likely to marry endogamously when they have larger numbers locally (Choi and Tienda 2016). When homogeneity and small population size are combined, this constrains the choice homophily of minority group members more so than the majority group. Greater diversity and number of options reduces the constraints on satisfying endogamy preferences for all groups. If endogamy is largely driven by personal preferences, then the Internet may be expected to increase endogamy on any social dimensions that have such offline constraints.

Larger dating pools can also increase the ability of daters to find a match that is endogamous on multiple characteristics. When social dimensions are not strongly correlated (i.e. intersecting), a homophily bias on one dimension can conflict with a bias on another dimension (Blau 1977), particularly when options are limited. Occupational endogamy and racial endogamy can conflict in a small dating market where occupations are racially integrated, such that selecting a partner based on either race or occupation makes it more difficult to also satisfy the other bias. By expanding the size of dating markets, online dating can have the consequence of making it easier for daters to satisfy all of their various endogamy preferences, by increasingly the likelihood that they can find a partner with that very specific combination of traits that match themselves.

Increased Mating Market Competition?

Expanded opportunities can also alter market dynamics, which has important implications if couple formation online behaves like a market. Mating market theories emphasize the hypergamy principle (Davis 1941), that there exists a widely agreed upon hierarchy of desirable characteristics and/or group memberships, and that everyone seeks partners of the highest desirability/status possible, rather than the homophily principle. Competition for desirable mates may nonetheless result in a pattern of pairings between similars, through a combination of striving and settling (Xie, Cheng, and Zhou 2015), particularly when mating market value is correlated with social categories. Larger dating pools, fast and efficient opportunities for contact, and the weakening of the "structural friction" (Hitsch, Hortaçsu, and Ariely 2010) of offline barriers between groups may be expected to create a freer and more competitive marketplace, which may in turn increase sorting by status characteristics such as race and education (Bruch and Newman 2018). On the other hand, freer and more efficient dating markets can also be expected to increase status exchanges (Davis 1941), in which people effectively trade upon their higher status on one dimension for a partner with higher status on another dimension, such as a higher educated member of a lower status ethnic group pairing with a less educated member of a higher status ethnicity. There are good reasons to doubt whether status exchange actually occurs between social class and racial categories (Rosenfeld 2005) or between attractiveness and social status (McClintock 2014). Yet if online dating markets exhibit hypergamy on multiple dimensions, they may make status exchange more prevalent, by reducing the barriers to such exchanges and by heightening status competition. This would have the effect of increasing exogamy on all of the exchanged social dimensions. Given these potentially offsetting

mechanisms, the overall expected endogamy effect from increased mating market competition online isn't immediately clear.

Selecting into Online Romantic Sources

Who Looks for Love Online

There may be important differences between the kinds of people who look for love online and the people who don't. This can be considered a potential source of spuriousness for any claims of the Internet's transformative effects: if those more open to diverse relationships are more likely to search online, for instance, then any online-versus-offline difference in exogamy could be largely due to this self-selection. Yet this may also facilitate a transformative effect: the Internet may be creating more diverse couples from open-minded daters than would have been possible offline, by making it easier for them to find each other. The interplay between selection into diverse dating pools and the structural effects of that diversity (as well as self-selection into homogenous dating venues and the structural effects of homogenous options) is not only difficult to disentangle empirically, but may be entangled causally. Preferences can be malleable, shifting in response to changes in opportunities and other contextual factors (Kurzban, Tooby and Cosmides 2001). Online daters have been shown to alter their racial preferences in response to expressed interest from out-group members (Lewis 2013), if only temporarily. Selection into online dating might be partly driven by openness to diverse outcomes, but the greater diversity of online dating pools may not only facilitate exogamous outcomes among those already open to them, it may also alter perceptions of what is romantically possible, and desirable.

A different source of self-selection into online dating is by those people who find themselves in "thin markets" for mates, and this almost certainly occurs (Rosenfeld and Thomas 2012). For those who find limited options for partners in their offline social lives, the larger dating pools offered by online dating are particularly valuable. Thin markets affect those seeking same-sex partners, middle-aged people and divorcees (Rosenfeld and Thomas 2012), most women past middle-age (England and McClintock 2009), and most Black women in the U.S. (Crowder and Tolnay 2000). Those facing thin markets may be expected to forgo some demographic homophily preferences to improve their opportunities for a match that is desirable on other dimensions. If online dating disproportionately represents these thin markets, then it may create more exogamous couples partly because of this, though such effects can be statistically accounted for by the demographic differences between online and offline daters.

Difficulty in finding mates can also be due to non-demographic factors that are under-valued within dating markets, such as personality quirks and non-normative expressions of gender and beauty norms. This fits with an early and popular characterization of online daters as those who have failed at offline dating (Ansari and Klinenberg 2015, 86-7), as well as an argument that dating services in general may be "markets for lemons" unless they become legitimized and widely used (Bearman 2005, 45). As online dating has become normal in romantic searches, something that over a third of single Americans have used (Smith and Duggan 2013), and one of the most common sources of couples (Rosenfeld and Thomas 2012), it has become less plausible that the population of online daters represents an unusually disadvantaged slice of the U.S. dating market. Still, if there is an exogamy effect from self-selection by limited dating options that isn't correlated with demographic characteristics, then it should be stronger from the earlier years of online dating, when it was less commonly used and more stigmatized.

Sorting Between Online Venues

Just as there is likely self-selection into online searching in general, there is likely self-sorting between different online venues for romance. The majority of U.S. online dating activity occurs within sites that are very large and intended for the entire population of singles, but a substantial minority use dating websites that are exclusive to specific social groups (Smith and Duggan 2013). Yet even these intentionally-homogenous sites likely contain more diversity than most people's offline lives, because they specifically select upon only one social dimension, whereas offline social networks and settings are typically segregated upon many. A dating website for a specific ethnic group may be very ethnically homogenous, but it likely contains more socioeconomic diversity than the members typically encounter through their families, friends, neighborhoods, and religious organizations. Nonetheless, widespread sorting of users into dating sites based upon one or more social dimensions could cause online opportunity structures to be less diverse on those dimensions.

Couples who find each other online, but not through dating sites, tend to meet through online communities, chat rooms, games and social networking websites (Rosenfeld and Thomas 2012). Online games and communities are voluntary organizations self-selected upon shared interests. Much like offline voluntary organizations, this may result in groups homogenous by gender, social class and race (McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987). Chat rooms and message boards may also function as interest-segregated communities, though they can also be very open public spaces that facilitate general social interaction between strangers. Access to online voluntary groups is nonetheless far more open than offline groups, and the geographic areas they recruit from far broader, creating greater potential diversity within them. Social media and network apps

and websites, by contrast, tend to recruit new members through offline social connections, with those pre-existing relationships typically the focus of interaction on the sites. Though social media/network usage is concentrated in a small number of popular sites that encompass most of the market for users (Smith and Anderson 2018), the sub-communities within them tend to be segregated by race and ethnicity (Wimmer and Lewis 2010), political ideology (Adamic and Glance 2005) and other cultural factors (Lewis et al. 2008). It isn't entirely clear, however, how different this segregation is from what occurs within offline communities.

Interface-Induced Endogamy

Once users have entered online spaces, the interfaces through which they interact and perceive each other can affect assortativity within venues. The prescient New Yorker cartoon insight that "On the Internet, nobody knows you're a dog," (Steiner 1993) is truer for some interfaces than for others. In some, demographic characteristics of users are prominently featured, but in others they are obscured and underemphasized. Users of an online game may spend many hours together without guessing each other's age, ethnicity or education, but online dating profiles typically display this information front and center. This may encouraging a check-list approach to sizing up potential mates in dating sites (Heino, Ellison, and Gibbs 2010), which could trigger discriminatory preferences that would otherwise be less immediate and more easily overcome by other personal characteristics in face-to-face interactions. Some online interfaces may also heighten the salience of cultural tastes and preferences, which are correlated with a number of other social distinctions. Sorting on cultural similarity tends to result in sorting on ethnicity, social class, religion, etc., to varying degrees (Stark and Flache 2012). Many online dating sites explicitly encourage cultural homophily, their profile options prompting for lists of activities and

consumables that daters like and dislike, which explicitly signal their specific positions within the larger cultural and demographic space (Mark 1998). Even when apps and websites don't prompt for that, the presentation of self through the writing of profiles and selection of images conveys a wealth of cultural information about the online dater (Rudder 2014). The presumed goals and intentions behind most user interactions within an online space may also influence the assortativity of the ties that result. When romance is the explicit goal of a space, interactions are perceived through that lens from the onset, which may heighten a shopping mentality and check-list sorting. When other activities are the focus, friendship can come first, and people can later be surprised by an emerging romance.

Most dating websites and apps also suggest matches to their users. This can range from very explicit suggestions to more subtle "nudging," such as simply how search results are ordered. The algorithms that govern these suggestions can induce endogamy or exogamy, depending upon whether similarity by social dimensions predicts a match, or whether they are designed to ignore social boundaries or even encourage matches across them. Even algorithms that only match on personality and attitudinal dimensions may encourage social group endogamy, if those constructs correlate with social categories. Most of these algorithms are trade secrets, but what evidence there is suggests that they typically match on various measurements of similarity (Finkel et al. 2012). How much online daters are actually influenced by these suggestions is unclear. If there are matching-algorithm effects on endogamy, they may be strongest in large local dating markets, and perhaps minimal in small metro- and micropolitan areas. When the pool of local potential online dates is small enough that an online dater can browse through all of them in one sitting, then the decision of whom to pay attention to is largely in the hands of the users. In local

dating markets with overwhelming numbers, online daters may rely more heavily upon the sites' suggestions to navigate large pools.

Online spaces have considerable variance in the above factors between them, but as a collection of opportunities for romance formation they represent a distinct structural shift from offline sources of romance: greatly increased opportunities for contact between people, greater diversity of potential contacts on many if not all social dimensions, and a reduced impact of offline social structures. Yet it is not clear *a priori* what the effect of this should be on endogamy, as this depends upon which kinds of online romantic sources are most responsible for couple formation, and which endogamy-producing mechanisms have the greatest impact on couples both on- and offline.

Data and Methods

The How Couples Meet and Stay Together survey (HCMST) (Rosenfeld, Thomas, and Falcon 2015) was gathered using GfK/Knowledge Networks' (GfK/KN) panel of respondents, with an initial sample surveyed in 2009, five follow-up waves with those same respondents over the next several years, and then a second sample of new respondents in 2017. My analyses here focus on the initial wave in 2009 and the new sample in 2017. GfK/KN altered its sampling method between these years, with the 2009 subjects selected by a random digit dial of the 50 U.S. states and Washington D.C, the 2017 subjects by address-based sampling. The GfK/KN panel consisted of over 40,000 members in 2009 and over 55,000 in 2017, of which 4,002 and 3,510 were included in the HCMST study, respectively, with response rates from the panel of 71% and 50%.

The cumulative response rate through all of the steps from the initial recruitment into the panel, to attrition within the panel, to screening for and then completion of the HCMST survey, was only in the teens. However, such a rate isn't directly comparable to traditional surveys, as GfK/KN partially controls for potential attrition bias by using demographic information collected at each survey stage (Couper 2000). GfK/KN panel surveys have been shown to perform better than traditional random-digit-dial samples (Baker et al. 2010, p. 743; Chang & Krosnick 2009; Fricker et al. 2005), and are used by a number of prominent social science research projects, such as the American National Election Survey (2017). Both samples only cover the English-speaking population. Surveys were conducted through a web interface, and GfK/KN provided the necessary equipment and Internet access to those who did not already have it, through television set-top devices in 2009, and through tablet computers in 2017.

Sampling Couples

From the initial samples of 4,002 and 3,510 respondents (in 2009 and 2017 respectively), the survey asked if they were currently in a relationship, of which 3,009 (75.2%) and 2,862 (81.5%) responded that they were. This was defined as either being married, or answering positively to the question, "Do you have a boyfriend, a girlfriend, a sexual partner or a romantic partner? By sexual partner we mean someone you have intimate physical contact with, beyond kissing and holding hands." The 993 un-partnered respondents in 2009 were not asked any further questions, but the 648 un-partnered respondents in 2017 were instead asked about their most recent relationship ("Have you EVER had a boyfriend, a girlfriend, or a sexual or romantic partner?"), of which 541 (83.5%) reported that they had one. To account for differences between current versus retrospective relationship sampling, I control for both whether the couple was still

together at the time of the survey, as well as the duration of the relationship in years. I limit the analyses here to only couples who met after 1995, to ensure that comparisons are within the era that Internet usage was at least somewhat common, reducing the sample to 3,036 couples. This data includes a purposive oversampling of same sex couples, which I control for with a binary indicator as well as survey weights. Analyses without same sex couples produced very similar results. See Table 1 for sample means and proportions of all of the variables described below.

Detecting Internet-Created Couples

I use two approaches towards classifying couples as having met online versus not. The first is a simple indicator of those who identified any role of the Internet in their first meeting. The second classification compares those who met strictly online as otherwise-strangers, those who met purely offline, and those who met through a combination of online and offline sources. This second scheme also breaks down the strictly-online meetings into dating websites and apps versus all other online spaces.

The HCMST data contains highly detailed information about how couples first met, uniquely so for a national sample. The survey included an open-ended question asking respondents to tell their story in detail in a large text box, prompting them to add more after their initial submission, then prompting them a second time if their story was less than 100 characters. The median story was 185 characters, with an interquartile range of 100 to 353. The first wave of these stories was inductively coded by two of the data authors and two research assistants, creating non-mutually-exclusive categories of how the couples met. The second wave of the data was coded by a research assistant using these categories, who also recoded a sample from the first wave for reliability testing. The resulting inter-coder agreement was very high (all Kappas > .81 [Landis and Koch 1977]). After writing their story, a question asked if they met their partner through “an

Internet dating or matchmaking site (like eHarmony or match.com)," "a social networking site (like Facebook or Myspace)," "an Internet classified advertising site (like Craigslist)," a chat room, another kind of Internet service, or not on the Internet at all. The 2017 survey also included the option "an app on my phone (like Tinder or Grindr)." If there was any indication of an online meeting from either this question or in the open-ended story, I classified the couple as having met online in the first, more inclusive measure of Internet-created couples, following Rosenfeld and Thomas (2012).

To distinguish between couples that met as previously-unconnected strangers online and those that met through a combination of online and offline introductions, I first use two questions in the HCMST that identify prior social network overlap. If a respondent classified as having met online also identified that their parents or friends knew each other beforehand, I code that couple as having a combination online/offline origin. I further recoded the stories of those who met online to identify any offline brokerage. With the indication of dating site/app usage, this results in four categories of couple-formation: purely offline-formed couples, purely online-formed couples who met through a dating site/app, purely online-formed couples who met elsewhere online (Other Online), and couples who met through a combination of online and offline sources. This last on/offline category includes couples who knew each other in a previous life stage, lost touch, and then reconnected online. It also includes couples who met offline friends-of-friends online. The Other Online category includes a wide variety of venues such as chat rooms, online games, online organizations and interest-oriented communities. While these may have different effects on exogamy, the number of cases that met in each is too small to analyze separately here (see Table 1). There are also not enough app-formed couples in the data to analyze separately, but the results below are robust to removing them from the online dating category.

Measuring Couple Characteristics

The HCMST survey asked about respondents' partners' race and Hispanic ethnicity separately, which I combined into a single variable that codes all Hispanic partners into that category, and also includes White, Black, Asian/Pacific-Islander, and Other. Respondents had already identified their own race to GfK/KN, which could include multiple answers: I coded anyone who identified as Hispanic into that category, and anyone who identified as Black but not Hispanic into the Black category, and all other multiracial respondents into the Other category. As a robustness check, I replicated the findings below with alternate race/ethnicity coding schemes and found similar results to those presented here (see Appendix A5). Education was measured on a 14 point scale for both the respondent (in the GfK/KN panel survey) and their partner, as well as for the mothers of both, as reported by the respondent. I use a dichotomized indicator of college graduate status in the analyses below. The 2009 HCMST survey included questions about the respondent's partner's religious identity, at age 16 and when surveyed, but the 2017 survey did not. The options included Baptist, Other Protestant, Catholic, Mormon, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Pentecostal, Eastern Orthodox, Other Christian, Other Non-Christian, and None. I recoded these into a 4 category scheme: Catholic, Protestant/Other Christian, Other Religion, and None. I replicated the analyses below using the original 13 categories, which produced only minor differences in the results. Similar results are also found when examining exogamy by religious identity at age 16. Both surveys included information about the respondents' and partners' political identification. As the scales changed between the two surveys, I simplify both to three categories here: Republican, Democrat and Other. I also examine age assortativity below, operationalized as the absolute age difference in years between partner and respondent.

Local Diversity Measures

A major threat of spuriousness to any claim of the Internet's effect on exogamy lies in potential differences in the diversity of places where online dating is popular versus places where people less often find romance online. If people in more diverse urban areas are more likely to find long term partners online, for instance, then it could spuriously appear that the Internet is creating more heterogeneous couples even if couples within the same geographic units are on average no different if they meet online versus offline. Despite this concern, this is the first study to compare online and offline endogamy that controls for the local diversity the respondents are embedded within.

I matched respondents to information about their current zip code and metro/micropolitan area (MSA), as well as the MSA they lived in when they met their partner, including the proportions different from the respondent on race/ethnicity and college degree status at both levels, and religion at the MSA level. I also control for MSA population size and median income, zip code per capita income, and the political polarization of their congressional district. See Appendix A3 for more information about how these measures were constructed, and how respondents were matched to geographic units. In the models below I control for information about where the respondents lived when surveyed, but the results are robust to instead using information on where they lived when they met their partner (Appendix Table A3). Models that don't control for local area diversity show similar results (see Appendix A6).

Other Controls.

I include additional covariates in the multivariate models to control for potentially confounding factors, including the duration of the relationship, when the couple first met, marital status, coresidency, the respondent's gender, a same sex indicator, respondent's household income

scale, the number of children in the respondent's household, and the region the respondent lived in at the time of the survey. Note that some of these are outcomes that likely occurred after the couples met. I include these to err on the side of over-controlling for potential sources of spuriousness: if people who find partners online were already predisposed to getting married, having large families, and/or on track towards high paying careers, then not controlling for these factors could bias the results. Models without these post-meeting outcomes show very similar results (see Appendix A6). Effects sizes are similar for models that only include married couples, though standard errors are larger, rendering some effects reported below insignificant.

Models

To test whether the Internet is leading people into more or less diverse relationships than they otherwise would have been in requires controlling for a variety of other potentially confounding factors. While log-linear models are often used when modeling endogamy, logistic regression is more appropriate when controlling for many covariates (Long 1997). I use OLS regression models to predict years of age difference between respondents and their partners. Instead of analyzing the data from 2009 and 2017 separately, I pool the samples in the analyses below; see Appendix A2 for a discussion and tests of the statistical justification for doing so. There are a small proportion of cases with missing data, but their exclusion or inclusion in the analyses does not meaningfully alter the results. Over 94% of the respondents who gave any information at all about their current or most recent relationship gave full information on all of the covariates used here. Two percent of the respondents lacked geographic identifiers. The remaining cases with missing data did not answer one or more questions in the survey, most often information about their partner. The models presented here listwise delete missing data, but models using multiple imputation found very similar results.

Results

A Surge in Couples from Online Dating

The role of the Internet in U.S. couple formation has not simply continued to be significant, it has surged. Figure 1 illustrates local-regression-smoothed survey-weighted rates of three mutually-exclusive types of online-formed couples: those that met through dating sites/apps, those that met through other Internet venues, and those that met by a hybrid of offline and online sources. Taken together, online sources of romance have risen dramatically since their invention: the Internet was only responsible for creating 4.4% of U.S. couples in the last half of the 1990s, which rose to 17.7% of couples in the 2000s, and 31% of couples formed thus far in the 2010s, including 38.9% of U.S. couples formed from 2015 to the summer of 2017. Non-dating online venues were once more common sources of couples than dating websites, but their rise tapered off in the mid-2000s, while dating websites and apps became very popular very quickly. Hybrid online/offline introductions have grown at a steady but much slower rate, and may track the rise in social networking sites that make reconnections and introductions through mutual friends easier. Of the three online categories, only online dating sites and apps exhibit a clearly upward trajectory that is suggestive of continued rapid growth, creating 24% of new U.S. couples from 2015 to 2017. While only 42 couples in this sample identified as having met through a smartphone dating app, I estimate that such apps accounted for a little over 15% of the couples who met through either dating sites or apps alone from 2010 to 2017, or about 2.8% of all couples who met during that period.

Demographic Differences in Who Meets Online

Respondents who found their partners online exhibit some important differences from those who found a partner purely offline (Table 2), which not only reinforces the need for multivariate controls in estimating the Internet's exogamy effects, but also speaks to which subpopulations may be more likely to find love online. Those in demographically thin markets have more often found their partners online, including the previously married, the middle-aged, and those in same sex relationships. One group with thin markets shows the opposite pattern, however: Black Americans met their partner online less often than other racial/ethnic groups, which is true even comparing Black women to other U.S. women: 10.7% of partnered Black women met their partner online from 1996-2017, compared to 19.4% of White women ($p<.01$). Those who found their partner online also tend to have home Internet access and live in higher income zip codes. Online formed relationships were also almost three years newer on average. Online formed couples are less often married and coresident, but are actually more likely to be both once relationship length is taken into account, and previous research has shown that couples who meet online transition into marriage faster (Rosenfeld 2017). Yet on many social dimensions, there are fewer differences than popular imagination may have it. There are not significant differences in household income, religion, or political affiliation between those who found their partners online versus offline. Nor are there significant differences in region, MSA population size, or local area racial and religious diversity, for both where the respondents lived when surveyed and where they lived when they met their partners.

There are also some notable differences between people who find partners through online dating websites and apps compared to those who find partners elsewhere online (not shown). Though there aren't significant differences in education between couples who met online versus offline

in general, dating sites have been creating couples from a disproportionately educated slice of the population, while couples who meet elsewhere online are less educated. Roughly half of the Americans who found a partner through a dating site have a college degree, compared to only about 23.5% of the those who found romance in other online sources ($p<.001$). Dating site users also report that their mothers were college educated at a higher rate than other online sources, 29.1% versus 17.7% ($p<.01$). Those who met through dating sites were also on average over 8 years older when they met than those who used other online sources ($p<.001$), and their relationships over two years newer at the time of the survey ($p<.001$). The respondents who met in hybrid online/offline ways met their partners at a younger age than all other types of couples, over 12 years younger on average than those who met through dating sites ($p<.001$), and over 4 years younger than purely offline formed couples ($p<.001$).

Meeting Online and Exogamy

Finding a partner online is related to greater exogamy on race/ethnicity, education, and religion. Couples who met online since 1996 are 7 percent more often interracial than couples who met offline (Table 3), ignoring potentially confounding factors. From the multivariate models in Table 4, I estimate that couples who met online have over one and a half times greater odds of being interracial, or an average 6% greater probability across the observed values of the covariates ($p<.01$). This effect is strongest when comparing non-dating online sources of romance to offline couples (Table 5), and only marginally significant when comparing online dating sites to purely-offline sources. Note, however, that the difference between the coefficients for dating sites and other online sources is not itself statistically significant. Online sources other

than dating websites/apps predict over 1.7 times greater odds of an interracial union than do purely offline origins, or on average a 8.4% higher probability ($p<.05$).

While there's not a difference between online and offline-formed couples in their closeness on the educational scale (not shown), couples who met online are more likely to include both a college graduate and a non-graduate, bivariately (Table 3) and with controls (Table 4). Online formed couples have over 1.5 times greater odds of this kind of educational exogamy, or a 7.5% increased probability on average ($p<.01$). Among online romantic sources (Table 5), this effect is only clearly detectable between the couples that meet through dating websites versus offline couples, though again the differences between online sources' effects are not significant.

As reported in previous studies (Potarca 2017; Rosenfeld and Thomas 2012), couples who met online are more likely to be interreligious, 13% more often in simple bivariate terms (Table 3). Controlling for other factors, online-formed couples to have over 1.8 greater odds of being of different religions (Table 4), or on average a 12.5% increased probability ($p<.01$). The effects of dating sites and other online spaces are nearly identical on religious exogamy (Table 5), with over double the odds versus couples who met offline, on average a 14% higher probability. Note that there are not statistically significant effects of meeting online on political or mother's education exogamy.

Couples who met through the Internet are more endogamous in one regard: they are more similar in age than those who met offline. While the bivariate difference is small and not statistically significant (Table 3), once other factors are controlled for I estimate that those who met online are more than six tenths of a year closer in age than those who met offline (Table 4). This effect seems to be confined to dating websites and apps (Table 5), which produce more age-similar couples than offline sources by almost 1 year, while couples from other online sources are very

similar to offline formed couples in their age gaps. Age is a demographic characteristic that is typically diverse in people's offline social foci and networks, such that online sources of romance may not be diversifying their age options much. While dating sites may be age diverse, most emphasis age as a primary search and sorting criterion, perhaps inducing greater age assortativity within them.

Across all of these types of exogamy, there aren't detectable differences between couples who meet through a combination of offline and online sources versus those who meet purely offline. The hybrid off/online category includes people who knew each other offline and later reconnected online, as well as those who were introduced by people they knew offline through an online venue. Unsurprisingly, these semi-online meetings differ the least from offline sources of romance.

There isn't evidence in this data that any of these Internet effects on exogamy differ by the characteristics examined here: two-way interaction effects between meeting online and race, education, age, political party, mother's education, and religion were not statistically significant for any of these exogamies (not shown). There are also no significant differences in the effects of meeting online between local areas of different population size, nor different effects for areas of different diversity levels (not shown). This includes the more specific breakdown of online sources, so there is not a detectably different exogamy effect from online dating sites as local population size increases, as would be expected from a strong matching-algorithm-induced endogamy effect. I also do not find higher order moderating effects between respondent characteristics, local heterogeneity, and meeting online on exogamy, though effects dependent upon local dating market characteristics not measured here should not be ruled out. Models using metropolitan area fixed effects show results very similar to the ones presented here (see

Appendix A4). The endogamy effects of meeting online also hold when comparing to a variety of offline sources: see Appendix A1 for detailed comparisons of online-formed couples with those who met in specific offline venues and networks.

There is not clear evidence here that the earlier era of online dating disproportionately included people more open to exogamy, as there is not clear evidence that the Internet's effects on assortativity have changed. Interaction effects between the year the couple met and meeting online (not shown) are not significant for any of the types of exogamy examined here. However, there is suggestive evidence that one should not dismiss this possibility for educational exogamy (see Appendix Table A2b). Similarly, while previous research using the 2009 HCMST data didn't find most of these effects (Potarca 2017; Rosenfeld and Thomas 2012), interactions between the sample year indicator and meeting online are insignificant, and the coefficients are not statistically different between separate models for each sample. Instead, it appears that the increase in the sample size of couples who met within the relevant time window has reduced the statistical uncertainty around these effects, allowing them to be clearly detected with the new sample. See Appendix A2 for a more detailed breakdown of online effects on exogamy over time and between samples.

Estimating the Internet's Effects on Population-Level Changes in Exogamy

How much, if at all, is finding romantic partners online directly causing population level changes in rates of exogamy? This is a question about a counterfactual, comparing the observed rates to a hypothetical similar population that didn't develop and widely adopt online dating. A simple and straightforward way to estimate this is to ask: how different would the population look if we

replaced the partners of those who met their mates online with the kinds of partners we would predict them to have met offline? This is a reasonable counterfactual because the overall heterosexual coupling rate has been very flat since well before the rise of online dating (Rosenfeld and Thomas 2012, 542-3), suggesting that an Internet-less version of the present would have had roughly the same rate of adults in long term relationships as in our reality, just formed in different settings. I estimate the heterogeneity of couples in this hypothetical Internet-less world by comparing the predicted values from the models with significant Internet effects in Table 4 to the predicted values with the respondents who met their partner online switched to offline-met. Note that this is equivalent to calculating average marginal effects. I also consider a second set of counterfactual predictions: a hypothetical U.S. in which online dating has increased at a faster rate, closer to how it has increased in the same-sex couple population. Instead of a U.S. that saw online sources increase from less than 1% of new couples in 1992 to roughly a third by 2016, this counterfactual supposes that online-formed couples rose twice as high over that time period. I simulate this by doubling each case's estimated probability of having met their partner online, calculated from a logit model with the same covariates as in Table 4, and then calculate their predicted exogamies from this inflated met-online probability, using the models in Table 4. I also calculate the hypothetical upper limit of intergroup mixing without any within-MSA assortativity, labeled "Random Mixing," from the proportion of the MSA not in the same group as the respondent. This baseline represents the predicted cross-group coupling rates if every respondent chose a partner at random from their current MSA. I don't include this for age assortativity, as it is so far outside of the range of the other predictions as to not be helpful. Note that the interreligious predictions are limited to 2009 and earlier by the available data. I exclude

the 2017 data points, which were couples who had met no more than several months before the survey.

Figure 2 displays these predicted rates of interracial couples, interreligious couples, college degree diverse couples (Cross-BA), and predicted absolute age difference, averaged with survey weights by the year the couples met. I also include a shaded region indicating the confidence interval around the predictions from the observed rates. This exercise suggests that the Internet's impact on exogamy by these four dimensions is not determinant of their long term trends, though not unimportant. The rise in interracial and interreligious couples are predicted to still have occurred even if the online couples had met offline instead, but with a less steep increase, amounting to on average 1.8% fewer couples interracial each year in the 2010s, and 2.2% fewer couples of different religions each year in the 2000s. On the other hand, the hypothetical U.S. with a majority of the couples meeting online would see somewhat steeper increases in these kinds of couple diversity, roughly 1.7% more couples crossing racial boundaries each year in the 2010's, and 2.0% more couples interreligious each year in the 2000s. College-education heterogeneity in couples has been fairly flat over this time period, but these models predict a modest increase in this kind of educational exogamy in a U.S. with more online dating, 2.3% more cross-BA couples each year in the 2010s, or a decrease in a U.S. without online dating of about 2.5% per year. For age assortativity, the counterfactuals estimate that couples would be a little less age similar in a world without Internet romances, by about one sixth of a year in the 2010s, or a sixth of a year more similar on average in a world in which more couples met online. Note that all of these predicted changes are within the confidence intervals of the predictions from the observed rates. Even though the individual level effects of meeting online on exogamy are clear from this data, the predicted population level effects are uncertain, with limited degrees

of freedom spread out across this time frame. Still, these predictions serve as an exercise in counterfactual reasoning, rather than a typical statistical test, illustrating just how much direct population level change in exogamy we can logically attribute to the rise of couples meeting online.

These estimates come with some caveats, as they rest on a number of assumptions, including that there are not substantial confounding factors causing both interracial dating and online dating that have been omitted from the models, and zero-to-minimal reverse causation. These estimates also do not account for potential indirect effects of the Internet on couple diversity. For instance, interracial friendships and relationships begun online may in turn introduce new interracial couples offline who wouldn't otherwise meet (Ortega and Hergovich 2017). Second-order and nth-order network effects can't be estimated with this data, nor is there clear evidence of this elsewhere, but this is a credible social mechanism that may be augmenting the Internet's effects on assortativity in the population.

Discussion and Conclusion

Online sources of romance are related to greater couple diversity than offline-formed romances, but not in all social characteristics. Couples who first met online are more likely to be different in race/ethnicity, religion and college degree status than those who met offline, but more similar in age. Despite concerns that online interactions increase sorting by politics and social class, couples who met online are not more nor less likely to identify with different political parties than those who met offline, nor are they more similar in their mothers' education levels. The specific online venues through which couples meet may matter for some of these types of

exogamy, with online dating most clearly related to age similarity and educational diversity in couples compared to offline sources, while other online sources are more clearly related to greater racial diversity. Couples who met through a hybrid of offline and online sources are not significantly different in any of these dimensions from purely offline-formed couples, which suggests that the connection of socially-distant strangers may lie at the heart of the Internet's effects on exogamy. The predicted rates of population level exogamy without Internet-formed couples illustrate that while meeting online quite significantly increases the odds of couple heterogeneity for any given respondent, the Internet has had a more limited (but not necessarily unimportant) direct impact on exogamy in the population as a whole. On the other hand, the predicted rates for a hypothetical U.S. with more online-formed couples illustrate that the Internet's potential to impact exogamy can be more consequential, though perhaps not the sea change that some have envisioned. That these effects hold when controlling for the local diversity surrounding respondents is compelling evidence of a transformative effect of the Internet on exogamy. The lack of detectable decreases in these effects as online dating became more common casts doubt on the possibility that self-selection by weak dating-market position is spuriously causing the effects observed here, though self-selection by other unmeasured factors that affect exogamy cannot be ruled out.

These findings suggest that the expansion of romantic opportunities that online dating affords largely reduces endogamy, most likely through the simple mechanism of changing the baseline probabilities of a diverse pairing. Faced with larger and more diverse pools of potential partners online, it may very well be that users act more on choice homophily biases than they do offline, and/ or they may engage in more intense hypergamous competition, but the results are still less segregated outcomes. Segregation is certainly almost always present online, on all of the

dimensions discussed here, but if the Internet is simply less highly-segregated than the offline world it can act as an integrating force in society. Social activity and communication in general have shifted from more traditional venues and media to the Internet, and that may continue to increase across a wide range of activities. To understand how this alters the segregation of social life in the U.S. and around the world, we need to more often find ways to compare online assortativity to what people experience offline. For instance, while it may be that interaction on social media is segregated by many social characteristics, it is not entirely clear whether online "bubbles" are exposing people to more or less homogeneous viewpoints than what they get from their offline social lives.

The closer age similarity of couples who meet through dating websites and apps, and the lack of an effect of meeting elsewhere online, shows that the Internet can create more homogenous relationships when interface and intentionality interact to heighten sorting on a social dimension. The rise of smartphone dating apps, potentially replacing dating websites as the primary source of finding mates online, may represent a significant change in interface-induced endogamy. Unlike most dating sites, apps typically steer users to make quick initial decisions based primarily on photos and taglines, rather than more in depth perusal of essays and lists of tastes and personal details (Ansari and Klinenberg 2015). This may reduce the cultural homophily of online dating, and the endogamy of social characteristics that are correlated with culture. On the other hand, dating apps often sort users based upon their phones' moment-by-moment geographic proximity, which may segregate users by geographies at a smaller scale than dating websites typically do. With too few app-created couples detectable in this data to generalize from, the effects of this shift in dating technology remain to be seen.

The popularity of online dating can be viewed as a remarkable breech of social closure, moving the initiation of romances out of exclusive settings and social circles into a very public arena. While other assortativity mechanisms may be at work online to bias couple formation towards occurring within social groups, the evidence here shows that this is less effective than offline romantic social closure, as racial, religious and educational boundaries are more often crossed online. Increasingly routine transgression of these boundaries threatens their salience, as well as the "groupness" of the corresponding social class, religious, ethnic and racial groups (Wimmer 2008). This may still turn out to be a brief and unusual period of unsequestered romantic opportunities, to be followed by a reinvention of romantic social closure online. Or this may very well be the beginning of a new openness in the market for mates.

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Figure 1. Proportions of Couples who Met Online, by Year and Online Source



Survey-weighted lowess regression-smoothed lines (bandwidth=.8), 1991 to 2016

Figure 2. Estimated Population Level Exogamy Given Observed and Hypothetical Rates of Online Romance Formation, by Year Met



Predicted values from models in Table 4, survey-weighted lowess regression-smoothed lines (bandwidth=.8)

Table 1. Sample Descriptives

	N	Proportion	Mean	Std. Dev.
Couple Characteristics				
Met Online At All	688	0.23		
Met Through Online Dating Only	356	0.12		
Met Through a Dating Website	314	0.10		
Met Through a Smartphone Dating App	42	0.01		
Met Through Other Online Source Only	191	0.06		
Met in a Chatroom	68	0.02		
Met in an Online Game	19	0.01		
Met in an Online Org./Community	16	0.01		
Met Through a Social Networking Site	23	0.01		
Met Elsewhere/Unspecified Online	65	0.02		
Met Both On- and Offline	133	0.04		
Met Purely Offline	2356	0.78		
Different Race/Ethnicity	741	0.24		
Different Religion (2009 sample only)	576	0.43		
Different Political Party	1340	0.44		
Different College Degree Status	786	0.26		
Different Mother's College Degree Status	820	0.27		
Absolute Age Difference			4.98	(5.83)
Same Sex Couple	482	0.16		
Married	1353	0.45		
Coresident	2007	0.66		
Year Met			2005.58	(5.94)
Age Met			30.45	(12.95)
Relationship Length, in years			7.42	(5.60)
Retrospective Relationship Subsample	285	0.09		
Respondent Characteristics				
Age			38.33	(13.37)
College Graduate	1199	0.39		
Mother a College Graduate	744	0.25		
Previously Married	875	0.29		
Home Internet Prior to Survey Panel	2800	0.92		
Race/Ethnicity				
White Non-Hispanic	2086	0.69		
Hispanic	395	0.13		
Black Non-Hispanic	337	0.11		
Asian Non-Hispanic	96	0.03		
Other Race	122	0.04		
Political Party Identification				
Republican	1110	0.37		
Democrat	1847	0.61		
Other	79	0.03		

Religious Identification (2009 sample only)				
Catholic	293	0.22		
Protestant or Other Christian	672	0.50		
Other Religion	121	0.09		
No Religious Identification	253	0.19		
# of Children in Household			0.60	(1.02)
Household Income Scale			12.18 ($50k's)	(4.55)
Local Geography				
% of Zip Code R's Race/Ethnicity			0.60	(0.30)
% of MSA/County R's Race/Ethnicity			0.54	(0.27)
% of Zip Code R's College Degree Status			0.59	(0.24)
% of MSA/County R's College Degree Status			0.56	(0.21)
% of MSA/County R's Religion (2009 only)			0.30	(0.18)
Congressional District Partisan Voting Index			12.59	(9.20)
Zip Code Per Capita Income, in $1000's			15.60	(15.59)
MSA/County Median Income, in $1000's			27.71	(4.81)
Region				
Northeast	562	0.19		
Midwest	675	0.22		
South	1043	0.34		
West	756	0.25		
Sample				
2009	1342	0.44		
2017	1694	0.56		
Total N	3036			

Notes: This subsample only includes respondents who met their partners in 1996 or later.

Table 2. Survey-Weighted Proportions and Means of Covariates, by How Couples Met (Since 1996)

	Met Purely Offline	Met Online or Both	Total	
Age Met	28.07	32.15	28.84	***
Years Known	8.76	5.77	8.20	***
Married	0.49	0.41	0.48	**
Coresident	0.68	0.60	0.66	**
Unmarried Non-Coresident	0.39	0.30	0.32	***
Household Income Scale	12.07	11.96	12.05	
College Graduate R	0.32	0.37	0.33	+
R's Mother a College Grad.	0.23	0.23	0.23	
R's Age at Survey	36.84	37.93	37.04	+
R Previously Married	0.26	0.37	0.28	***
R Had Home Internet	0.91	0.96	0.92	***
R's Race				
White NH	0.61	0.64	0.61	
Black	0.14	0.10	0.14	*
Hispanic	0.17	0.17	0.17	
Asian	0.05	0.06	0.05	
Other	0.03	0.03	0.03	
R's Party				
Republican	0.40	0.40	0.40	
Democrat	0.57	0.58	0.57	
Other	0.03	0.02	0.03	
R's Religion				
Catholic	0.23	0.21	0.23	
Other Christian	0.53	0.52	0.53	
Other Religion	0.07	0.07	0.07	
Non-Religious	0.17	0.19	0.18	
Region				
Northeast	0.18	0.19	0.18	
Midwest	0.21	0.22	0.21	
South	0.37	0.37	0.37	
West	0.24	0.23	0.24	
MSA Population	3,715,235	3,839,577	3,738,551	
Zip Code Pr. R's Race	0.58	0.58	0.58	
MSA Pr. R's Race	0.51	0.51	0.51	
Zip Code Pr. R's BA	0.63	0.60	0.62	*
MSA Pr. R's BA	0.59	0.57	0.59	*
MSA Pr. R's Religion	0.31	0.33	0.31	
District Republicanness	-0.74	-1.08	-0.81	
District Partisan Index	12.78	12.97	12.81	
Zip Code Income Per Capita	16,607.30	19,096.86	17,074.13	**
MSA Median Income	27,443.84	27,717.78	27,495.21	
N	2348	688	3036	

Survey-weighted estimates from a subsample of couples who met after 1995, with T-tests and Chi-square tests within rows: + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Table 3. Survey-Weighted Proportions and Means of Couple Differentiation, by How Couples Met (Since 1996)

	Different Race/ Ethnicity	Different Religion	Different College Degree	Different Mother's College	Different Party	Age Difference
Met Online	0.30	0.51	0.30	0.27	0.49	4.46
Met Purely Offline	0.23 **	0.38 *	0.22 ***	0.25	0.45	4.63
Online Sub-Categories						
Dating Site/App	0.27	0.51	0.34	0.33	0.45	4.50
Other Online	0.32	0.57	0.25	0.17	0.55	5.31
Both On/Offline	0.34	0.29	0.26	0.26	0.50	3.50
Purely Offline	0.23 *	0.38 *	0.22 **	0.25 *	0.45	4.63
Total	0.25	0.40	0.23	0.25	0.46	4.60
Sample Years	Both	2009	Both	Both	Both	Both
N	3030	1335	3032	2989	3015	3017

Survey-weighted estimates from a subsample of couples who met after 1995.
Chi-square tests within columns: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Table 4. Logistic and OLS Regression Coefficients Predicting Exogamy by Meeting Online (Since 1996)

	Different Race/ Ethnicity	Different Religion	Different College Degree Status	Different Mother's College Graduate Status	Different Political Party	Absolute Age Difference
Model	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	OLS
Met Online At All	0.42**	0.61**	0.44**	0.02	0.11	-0.62*
Local Proportion Same as R:						
Zip Code – Race	-1.70***	-0.00	0.05	0.05	0.01	-0.87
MSA – Race	-1.67**	0.14	-0.37	-0.77+	0.27	-0.56
Zip Code – BA Status	0.12	-0.92	-1.91***	-0.36	0.28	0.02
MSA – BA Status	-0.55	0.39	0.59	0.06	-0.24	1.52
MSA – Religion		-2.23**				
District Partisan Index	0.01	0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.01
R^2						0.13
McFarland's Psuedo-R^2	0.23	0.13	0.08	0.13	0.05	
Sample Years	Both	2009	Both	Both	Both	Both
N	3030	1335	3032	2989	3015	3017

+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Survey-weighted estimates from a subsample of couples who met after 1995. Covariates not shown: Race, Age, Education Scale, Income, Political Party, Married, Coresident, Years Known, Number of Children in Household, Same Sex, Year Sampled, Relationship Duration, Still Together, Previously Married, Home Internet Access, Region, MSA/County Population and Median Income, and Zip Code Per Capita Income. Religion models include R's Religion. For full model coefficients, see Appendix Table B1.

Table 5. Logistic and OLS Regression Coefficients Predicting Exogamy by Online Source (Since 1996)

	Different Race/ Ethnicity	Different Religion	Different College Degree Status	Different Mother's College Graduate Status	Different Political Party	Absolute Age Difference
Model	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	OLS
Source of Introduction (vs Purely Offline)						
Dating Site/App	0.36+	0.71*	0.43*	0.17	-0.02	-0.93*
Other Online	0.58*	0.71*	0.30	-0.19	0.37+	-0.05
Both Off- & Online	0.27	-0.46	0.47+	-0.20	0.06	-0.61
R^2						0.13
McFarland's Psuedo-R^2	0.23	0.14	0.08	0.13	0.05	
Sample Years	Both	2009	Both	Both	Both	Both
N	3030	1335	3032	2989	3015	3017

+ p<.1, * p<.05

Survey-weighted estimates from a subsample of couples who met after 1995. Covariates not shown: Race, Age, Education Scale, Income, Political Party, Married, Coresident, Years Known, Number of Children in Household, Same Sex, Year Sampled, Relationship Duration, Still Together, Previously Married, Home Internet Access, Region, MSA/County Population and Median Income, and Zip Code Per Capita Income, Racial/Ethnic and College Degree Diversity for both Zip Code and MSA, and Political Partisanness for the respondent's congressional district. Religion models include R's Religion and MSA Religion Diversity. For full model coefficients, see Appendix Table B2.

"Online Exogamy Reconsidered" Appendix A: Supplementary Analyses

Section A1. Comparing Online-Formed Couples with Specific Offline Romantic Sources

Table A1 compares couples who met online in any way with those who met through a variety of offline sources without any detectable role of the Internet (similarly to Potarca [2017]). This division of the offline meetings are based on the data authors' coding of the respondent's stories of how they met their partner. Those codes are not mutually exclusive, so I apply the following rules to categorize cases that identify multiple of these codes: any case that identifies family brokerage are always classified as Family, and any remaining cases that identify a religious setting is classified as Religious, and then any remaining cases that identify a school setting are classified as a School meeting. Then I continue this process for Work, Voluntary Organizations, Friend Introductions, and lastly Neighbors, in that order. Remaining cases that identify none of these fall into the Other category, which includes bars and restaurants, pre-Internet singles services, vacations, and meetings in public. Thus an introduction through friends at a bar would be classified as a Friend introduction, while introduction through friends at church would be a Religious introduction. Work meetings include business trips, customer service encounters, and military service. The Friend category includes private parties and introductions through a prior significant other.

The Internet's effects on exogamy can vary by the offline source it is being compared to. Online-formed couples are more likely to be interracial than those met in educational settings, through family, or in the Other Offline settings category. Couples who met online rather than through schooling have a one and two thirds greater odds of an interracial relationship, or on average a 6.4% higher probability across the observed covariates ($p<.05$). Compared to meeting through

family and Other Offline sources (largely public spaces), online couples have twice as high odds of cross racial\ethnic lines, or an average 8.4% higher probability ($p<.01$). Online-formed couples aren't more interracial than neighbor-brokered romances, and the differences between online and friend introductions, work or voluntary organizations are statistically insignificant. Unsurprisingly, couples who meet in educational settings have half the odds of being different in college degree status than those who meet online (or an average 12% lower probability, $p<.001$), but there are also strong educational exogamy effects from meeting online versus family and friendship brokered romances. Family introductions are the only romantic source that differs from online sources in terms of parental education exogamy: online-formed couples have one and a half times greater odds of having one mother with a college degree and one without, or on average a 7.5% higher probability ($p<.05$). Neighbors, workplaces, and settings in the Other category produce more age disparate couples than meeting online, but school romances are more similar in age than Internet-formed couples. Religious settings are the only offline romantic source that predicts different political exogamy than Internet sources, less than two thirds the odds of producing couples of different political affiliations than meeting online, or on average a 12.7% lower probability ($p<.05$). Couples who meet through religious settings are also far less likely to be of different religions than online couples (less than one eighth the odds, or a 31.7% average lower probability, $p<.001$), as are, to a lesser extent, those who meet through schooling, family, and voluntary organizations.

Section A1 References:

Potarca, Gina. 2017. "Does the Internet Affect Assortative Mating? Evidence from the U.S. and Germany." *Social Science Research* 61: 278-97.

Table A1. Odds Ratios and OLS Regression Coefficients Predicting Exogamy by Romantic Source (Since 1996)

Coefficient Type	Different Race/ Ethnicity Odds Ratios	Different Religion Odds Ratios	Different College Degree Status Odds Ratios	Different Mother's College Degree Status Odds Ratios	Different Political Party Odds Ratios	Absolute Age Difference OLS Coefficients
Source of Introduction (vs Online)						
Friends	0.68^{+}	0.69	0.65*	1.00	1.13	0.31
Family	0.50**	0.48*	0.58*	0.60*	0.83	0.56
Neighbors	1.81	1.73	0.58	0.73	0.88	5.12***
Work	0.79	0.65	0.74^{+}	1.18	0.92	1.35***
School/College	0.60*	0.52*	0.48***	1.03	0.87	-0.70*
Religious Org.	0.65	0.12***	0.61^{+}	1.03	0.56*	-0.42
Voluntary Org.	0.96	0.37*	1.67	1.65	0.52^{+}	1.82
Other Source	0.49**	0.67	0.76	0.84	0.72	1.61**
R^2						0.15
McFarland's Psuedo-R^2	0.23	0.15	0.08	0.13	0.06	
Sample Years	Both	2009	Both	Both	Both	Both
N	2896	1309	2898	2860	2884	2885

+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Survey-weighted estimates from a subsample of couples who met after 1995. Covariates not shown: Race, Age, Education Scale, Income, Political Party, Married, Coresident, Years Known, Number of Children in Household, Same Sex, Year Sampled, Relationship Duration, Still Together, Previously Married, Home Internet Access, Region, MSA/County Population and Median Income, and Zip Code Per Capita Income, and Racial and Educational Diversity for MSA and Zip Code, and Congressional District Political Partisanness. Religion models include R's Religion and MSA Religion Diversity. For full model coefficients, see Appendix Table B3.

Section A2. Why Haven't We Seen These Effects Before? Comparing the Samples and Looking for Changes over Time

While previous research found limited evidence of the Internet's effect on exogamy when controlling for other factors (Potarca 2017; Rosenfeld and Thomas 2012), I find robust effects of meeting online on exogamy by multiple social dimensions. Did the Internet's effects on couples change, or were these effects always there but undetectable with the data available at the time? Table A2a compares results from the 2009 HCMST sample used by previous studies to results that only use the new 2017 HCMST sample. Even though the total sample of couples who met in any time period was smaller in 2017, the subsample of couples who met within the timeframe that online dating existed (the Ns in Table A2a) is a few hundred cases greater in 2017 than in 2009. There are likewise many more couples who met online in the 2017 sample, 431 compared to 257 in the 2009 sample. As a result, the standard errors for the 2017 met-online coefficients are substantially smaller. The effect sizes of meeting online in the full models in Table A2a are not significantly different between the two samples for any of these three types of exogamy, using Chow tests. As it can be problematic to compare coefficients across non-linear models like logistic regressions (Allison 1999, but see Kuha and Mills 2018), I additionally compared the changes in predicted probabilities of exogamy from meeting online vs offline (the average discrete change) between the two samples, using modified versions of models 3 in Table A2a that included interactions between every covariate and the sample indicator (following Long and Mustillo 2018), and likewise found no statistically significant differences in the Internet's effects on these exogamies between the samples. Furthermore, interaction effects between the sample indicator and meeting online in the pooled models (not shown) are not significant for any of the types of exogamy examined here.

Interactions between the year a couple met and meeting online are not significant for any of the exogamies here, so there is not clear evidence here of a change in the Internet's effects on exogamy, only of a change in the size and statistical power of the samples. However, modeling different "eras" of online dating separately does suggest that there might be patterns of change that aren't clearly discernable with this data, though the differences in coefficients between these models are not significant. Contrary to expectations that early adopters of online dating were more likely to be open to exogamy, meeting online seems to have a somewhat stronger effect on racial exogamy in the most recent period. The Internet's effect on age endogamy is similarly strongest in the most recent couples' models. However, the trend is in the opposite direction for college degree exogamy, and more pronounced, suggesting that there might be an ongoing decrease in meeting online's effect on educational exogamy as online dating markets have become more widely used. But again note that the coefficient differences between the models in Table A2b are not statistically significant, nor are the corresponding interaction effects, so the evidence for this remains unclear.

Section A2 References:

Allison, Paul D. 1999. "Comparing Logit and Probit Coefficients Across Groups." *Sociological Methods & Research* 28(2): 186-208.

Kuha, Jouni and Colin Mills. 2018. "On Group Comparisons with Logistic Regression Models." *Sociological Methods & Research* (online preview, https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124117747306)

Long, J. Scott and Sarah A. Mustillo. 2018. "Using Predictions to Compare Groups in Regression Models for Binary Outcomes." Working Paper, Retrieved 5/31/2018 from (http://www.indiana.edu/~jslsoc/files_research/groupdif/long-mustillo-comparing-groups-brm-2018-03-05.pdf)

Potarca, Gina. 2017. "Does the Internet Affect Assortative Mating? Evidence from the U.S. and Germany." *Social Science Research* 61: 278-97.

Rosenfeld, Michael J. and Reuben J. Thomas. 2012. "Searching for a Mate: The Rise of the Internet as a Social Intermediary." *American Sociological Review* 77(4): 523-47.

Table A2a: Effects of Meeting Online on Couple Exogamy, by Sample and Controls

	2009 Sample			2017 Sample		
	1	2	3	1	2	3
	Minimal Controls	Full Respondent Controls	Full Respondent Controls + Geo Controls	Minimal Controls	Full Respondent Controls	Full Respondent Controls + Geo Controls
Effect of Meeting Online on:						
Interracial Log Odds	0.12	0.26	0.37	0.34*	0.39*	0.42*
	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.18)
N	1404	1400	1340	1748	1739	1693
Pseudo R^2	0.32	0.33	0.37	0.11	0.12	0.17
Different College Dgr. Log Odds	0.29	0.38+	0.45+	0.37*	0.38*	0.42*
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.17)
N	1405	1402	1342	1749	1739	1693
Pseudo R^2	0.05	0.07	0.10	0.05	0.06	0.07
Age Difference	-0.32	-0.38	-0.48	-0.41	-0.62+	-0.74*
	(0.50)	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.35)
N	1402	1398	1338	1737	1728	1682
Adjusted R^2	0.09	0.11	0.13	0.12	0.13	0.13

+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Survey-weighted estimates from a subsample of couples who met after 1995. Standard errors are in parentheses. Minimal controls include the respondent's characteristic in question, respondent age, years since the couple met, and home internet access prior to joining the survey panel. Full respondent controls additionally include race, education scale, income, political party, married, coresident, years known, number of children in household, same sex, year sampled, relationship duration, still together, previously married, home internet access and region. Geo controls include MSA/county population and median income, zip code per capita income, racial/ethnic and college degree diversity for both zip code and MSA, and political partisanness for the respondent's congressional district. For full model coefficients, see Appendix Tables B4a-c.

Table A2b: Effects of Meeting Online on Couple Exogamy, by Era of Internet Dating

	Early Era <20% couples met online 1996-2004	Middle Era 20%-25% met online 2005-2010	Recent Era >25% couples met online 2011-2017	Mid + Recent 20+% couples met online 2005-2017
Effect of Meeting Online on:				
Interracial Log Odds	0.46	0.36	0.65*	0.48**
	(0.29)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.18)
N	1361	1003	666	1669
Pseudo R^2	0.27	0.29	0.22	0.23
Interreligious Log Odds	0.91**	0.56+		
	(0.34)	(0.29)		
N	815	520		
Pseudo R^2	0.10	0.10		
Diff. College Dgr. Log Odds	0.90***	0.37	0.15	0.25
	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.16)
N	1362	1003	667	1670
Pseudo R^2	0.09	0.12	0.12	0.10
Age Difference	-0.29	-0.52	-1.46**	-0.88**
	(0.58)	(0.40)	(0.49)	(0.32)
N	1356	999	662	1661
R^2	0.11	0.20	0.23	0.19

+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Standard errors are in parentheses. Models include controls for race/ethnicity, education scale, income, political party, religion (interreligious models only), married, coresident, years known, number of children in household, same sex, year sampled, relationship duration, still together, previously married, home internet access, region, MSA/county population and median income, zip code per capita income, racial/ethnic and college degree diversity for both zip code and MSA, religious diversity of MSA (interreligious models only), and political partisanness for the respondent's congressional district. For full model coefficients, see Appendix Tables B5a-d.

Section A3. Local Diversity's Impact on Exogamy, and Comparing Effects of MSA When Met versus MSA When Surveyed

Constructing Measures of the Respondents' Local Areas

There are two different sets of geographic identifiers available in the HCMST data: where the respondent lived at the time they met their partner, and where the respondent lived at the time of the survey. The first directly and clearly reflects the demographics of the local opportunities for mates that the respondent was embedded in at the time they found their partner, but has two major drawbacks. First, the measurement is based on the respondent naming the place they lived, and thus can only be matched to metro/micro-politan areas or counties (MSAs) rather than more precise local geographic units. The second drawback is that this question was only asked of the 2017 sample, which both limits the N of the analyses that use it and precludes its use in the religious exogamy analyses, which is only possible with the 2009 data. Gfk/KN collected the zip codes of respondents at the time of both surveys, which allows for more specific measures of racial and educational diversity in additional to MSA level measures, as well as the inclusion of the 2009 cases. Segregation tends to be recreated across geographic relocations (Sampson and Sharkey 2008), such that current local area diversity is typically a good proxy for the diversity that people were exposed to in the past as well. I find that this assumption holds for the analyses here: see below for a comparison of results using both sets of local diversity measures. In the results in the main text I use data about the respondents' location when surveyed. Also see Appendix Section A6 for coefficients from models that don't control for local area diversity.

I matched respondents to information about their current zip code and their current and past metro/micro-politan area (MSA). Some rural zip codes and places-previously-lived were not within an MSA, so I include information about their county instead. Some respondent's lived in zip codes that could be matched to multiple MSAs or counties; for these I calculated a weighted average of the MSA/county measures by the distribution of their zip code between them, as apportioned by the MABLE/Geocorr12 Geographic Correspondence Engine (Missouri Census Data Center 2012).

I use data from the Decennial Census in 2000 and the American Community Survey's (ACS) 5-year estimates in 2010 and 2015 (United States Census Bureau 2015), to measure the racial/ethnic, educational and income composition of the respondent's zip codes and their larger metro-/micro-politan area (MSA). The year of the survey or the year the couple met determines which of these three sources is used, such that the greatest temporal mismatch is no more than five years (e.g. a 2005 meeting matched to the 2010 ACS data). Diversity can be measured in a number of different ways; for race/ethnicity and college degree status, I simply control for the proportion of the geographic unit of the same group as the respondent. This ego-centric way of coding diversity is the most directly determinant of the dependent variables in the analyses, whether the respondents matched with a partner different from themselves. The ACS race/ethnicity categories treat Hispanic as a separate non-racial category, and only separate out non-Hispanic respondents for one racial category, White. This yields 7 categories: White Non-Hispanic, Hispanic, Black, Asian, Pacific Islander, Native American, Other, and Multiracial. Despite the double counting of many non-White Hispanics, these are nonetheless good indicators of the proportion of people in respondent's local areas that identify as the same category as themselves.

I measure the respondents' local political context using Cook's Partisan Voting Index (Wasserman and Flinn 2017) for their congressional district (or Washington D.C.). I match respondents' zip codes to congressional districts for their location when surveyed, but I match their MSA to congressional districts for their location when they met their partner, averaged for places in multiple districts weighted by the districts' geographic share of the places. As this measures voting in previous elections, I use the closest PVI moving forward in time. For instance, for the 2009 sample I use the 2010 PVI for their current zip code. These scores represent the Democrat or Republican advantage in the district based on the most recent two presidential elections, in terms of vote percentage (e.g. "D+5"). I recoded these into absolute values to create a scale of partisanship, ignoring which party had the advantage in the district, such that D+10 and R+10 both become scores of 10, with zeroes representing evenly split districts.

I measure local religious diversity at the MSA/county level using the 2010 U.S. Religion Census: Religious Congregations and Membership Study (Grammich et al. 2012), a survey of the 236 major religious organizations in the U.S. as identified by the Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies. Note that this is information about religious groups' official membership counts in each geographic area, not a sample of people. As such, it cannot tell us about rates of self-identification or private religious identity (e.g. what proportion of the MSA identifies as Baptist, or Agnostic), only about the rates of the formal identity of congregation membership. I calculated the proportion of the MSA/county population that are the same religious group as the respondent based on the estimated membership of 3 broad types of congregations (Catholic, other Christian, other religion), as well as a 4th category that is the inferred proportion of the population that are not members of any congregation.

Local Diversity Effects on Exogamy

The effects of respondents' local area diversity are displayed in Table 4 in the main text, including the independent effects of zip code diversity and metropolitan area diversity (where the respondents lived when surveyed). For both the respondents' MSA and zip code, a 10% increase in the proportion of either geographic unit that is the same race as the respondent is associated with an average 2.2% decrease in the probability of a different race partner, across observed covariate values ($p<.01$). For educational exogamy, it is the zip code level of diversity that is important, predicting on average a 3% decrease in the probability of a college degree diverse couple for each 10% increase in the proportion with the same degree status as the respondent ($p<.001$). Religious diversity is only measured here at the MSA level, and has the strongest of the local diversity effects: for every 10% increase in the proportion of a metro area that is the same religious category as the respondent, the model predicts on average a 4.4% lower probability of an interreligious couple ($p<.01$). The partisan voting index does not have a statistically significant impact on any of the types of exogamy examined here. Despite these local diversity effects, the exogamy effects of meeting online are robust to not controlling for local area diversity (see Appendix A6).

Comparing MSA When Met versus MSA When Surveyed Effects

I argued above that one could use the diversity of respondents' local areas when interviewed as a good proxy for the diversity they were embedded in when they met their partners, and I do so in the models I present in the main text. Focusing on the 2017 respondents, for whom the MSA they lived in when they met their partner is know, I can test here whether this assumption holds for these analyses, and it does. The diversity measures of where the respondents currently live

bivariately account for over 85% of the variance in the racial diversity of where they lived when they met their partner ($r=0.93$, $p<.001$), and over 90% of the variance in college degree diversity ($r=0.95$, $p<.001$), but only 12% of the political partisan voting index ($r=0.34$, $p<.001$). Table A3 below compares models predicting interracial, inter-educational, and age diversity in couples, with some using information about the respondents' current metropolitan area, and others using information about the metro area they lived in when they met their partner. As the later data is only available in the 2017 sample, this reduces the N and statistical power of the models, so I compare these "MSA When Met" results (models 3) to the both full sample models that use current MSA (models 1) and the same current-MSA models with the smaller 2017-only sample (models 2). I exclude the zip code level data used in the models in Table 4, as zip code level information was not deducible from respondents' answers about where they used to live.

The findings are consistent regardless of which geographic diversity measures are used. The differences between models 2 and models 3, which only differ in whether the current or former MSA information is being used, are minimal. The fit statistics are nearly the same, as is the strong effect of MSA level racial diversity on racial exogamy, and the other MSA diversity measures have mostly similar effects across models. The coefficient for meeting online becomes a little stronger in predicting racial exogamy in models 3, crossing the boundary between marginal and statistical significance, while changing little in predicting educational and age exogamy. Information about the MSA where the couple met should generally be preferred over the MSA when the respondent was surveyed, but here that decision doesn't affect the results, and the benefits of a more accurate estimate of local geographic diversity at the time of couple formation are outweighed by the benefits of a larger sample size, as well as the benefits of the more locally-scaled zip code level diversity data.

Section A3 References

Grammich, Clifford, Kirk Hadaway, Richard Houseal, Dale E. Jones, Alexei Krindatch, Richie Stanley, and Richard H. Taylor. 2012. *2010 U.S. Religion Census: Religious Congregations & Membership Study.* Lenexa, KS: Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies.

Missouri Census Data Center. 2012. MABLE/Geocorr12, Version 1.2: Geographic Correspondence Engine. Web application accessed October 2017 (http://mcdc.missouri.edu/websas/geocorr12.html)

Sampson, Robert J. and Patrick Sharkey. 2008. "Neighborhood Selection and the Social Reproduction of Concentrated Racial Inequality." *Demography* 45(1): 1-29.

U.S. Census Bureau. 2015. American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, Table S0601 generated using American FactFinder. Retrieved October 2017. (http://factfinder.census.gov)

Wasserman, David and Ally Flinn. 2017. "Introducing the 2017 Cook Political Report Partisan Voter Index." *The Cook Political Report.* Retrieved April 7, 2017. (http://cookpolitical.com/introducing-2017-cook-political-report-partisan-voter-index)

Table A3: Effects of Meeting Online on Couple Exogamy: Current MSA vs. MSA When Met

	Different Race/Ethnicity (Logit Coefficients)			Different College Degree (Logit Coefficients)			Absolute Age Difference (OLS Coefficients)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Sample Years	Both	2017	2017	Both	2017	2017	Both	2017	2017
Met Online At All	0.41**	0.35+	0.40*	0.39**	0.42*	0.44*	-0.63*	-0.85*	-0.85*
	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.28)	(0.35)	(0.34)
Local Proportion Same as R:									
Current MSA – Race	-3.27***	-3.54***		-0.36	0.16		-1.35	-0.19	
MSA When Met – Race			-3.57***			0.15			-0.66
Current MSA – BA Status	-0.38	-0.29		-1.19**	-0.65		1.56+	1.06	
MSA When Met – BA Status			0.08			0.07			1.77+
Current District Partisan Index	0.00	0.00		-0.01	-0.00		0.01	0.02	
District When Met Partisan Index			0.01			-0.01			0.03
R^2							0.12	0.15	0.15
McFarland's Psuedo-R^2	0.22	0.18	0.18	0.07	0.07	0.07			
N	3030	1579	1579	3032	1579	1579	3017	1571	1571

+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Survey-weighted estimates from a subsample of couples who met after 1995. Standard errors for Met Online are in parentheses. Covariates not shown: Race, Age, Education Scale, Income, Political Party, Married, Coresident, Years Known, Number of Children in Household, Same Sex, Year Sampled, Relationship Duration, Still Together, Previously Married, Home Internet Access, Region, and MSA/County Population and Median Income. For full model coefficients, see Appendix Tables B6a-c.

Section A4. Metropolitan Area Fixed Effects as a Robustness Test

A potential source of spuriousness in the results above is an unnaccounted for correlation between places where people are both more likely to engage in online searches for romance and also more likely to find exogamous partners. While the models above control for differences in the diversity, population size, and typical income of the places the respodents live and met their partner in, there may still be unmeasured differences here between places that are creating spurious effects. To further control for this possibility, in this appendix I use fixed effects models by the metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) the respondents resided in when surveyed, which has the effect of statistically controlling for the area where the respondents live, and all of the unmeasured differences between these places. As the HCMST data was not a cluster sample, but instead sampled respondents at a more-or-less even rate across the U.S., many respondents were the only case sampled from their MSA or rural county. I limit the sample here to respondents in MSAs with at least two observations, ranging from 2 to 100 respondents within each MSA, with an interquartile range of 5 to 27. Analyses using only larger within-MSA samples, such as 5 or more cases, or only using MSAs larger than half a million people, were consistent with the results presented here. Models using the MSA where the respondent lived when they met their partner produced similar results, but with less statistical significance, as these models were limited to the 2017 sample data. The unadjusted MSA intra-class correlation coefficients are not large for any of the exogamy outcomes examined here: 7% of the unadjusted variance in interracial exogamy is accounted for by differences between metropolitan areas, compared to between 1% and 2% for religious, political party, and both couple and couple's parents' college degree exogamy, as well as less than 1% for age exogamy.

The results of these models are displayed in Table A4 below (see Appendix Table B7 for full model coefficients), and are largely consistent with those from Table 4 in the main text, with one notable exception. The strongest online exogamy effect from the full models in Table 4 is insignificant in the fixed effects model, religious exogamy, which is also the only effect clearly found in previous research (Potarca 2017; Rosenfeld and Thomas 2012). This is likely due to the much smaller N for that fixed effects model compared to the others, a consequence of the religion data only being available in the 2009 sample. Fixed effects models sacrifice a good deal of statistical power for the stronger inferential claims they can make (Allison 2009), and typically require larger samples to detect effects compared to similar regression models.

Section A4 References:

Allison, Paul D. 2009. *Fixed Effects Regression Models.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Potarca, Gina. 2017. "Does the Internet Affect Assortative Mating? Evidence from the U.S. and Germany." *Social Science Research* 61: 278-97.

Rosenfeld, Michael J. and Reuben J. Thomas. 2012. "Searching for a Mate: The Rise of the Internet as a Social Intermediary." *American Sociological Review* 77(4): 523-47.

Table A4. Logistic and OLS Regression Coefficients Predicting Exogamy by Meeting Online, with Metropolitan Area Fixed Effects (Since 1996)

	Different Race/ Ethnicity	Different Religion	Different College Degree Status	Different Mother's College Graduate Status	Different Political Party	Absolute Age Difference
Model	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	OLS
Met Online At All	0.49***	0.23	0.37**	0.25+	0.09	-0.92**
R^2						0.13
McFarland's Psuedo-R^2	0.21	0.08	0.08	0.13	0.06	
Sample Years	Both	2009	Both	Both	Both	Both
MSA N	198	118	227	224	254	343
Couple N	2015	972	2166	2125	2233	2446

+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Survey-weighted estimates from a subsample of couples who met after 1995. Covariates not shown: Race, Age, Education Scale, Income, Political Party, Married, Coresident, Years Known, Number of Children in Household, Same Sex, Year Sampled, Relationship Duration, Still Together, Previously Married, Home Internet Access. Religion models include R's Religion. For full model coefficients, see Appendix Table B7.

Section A5. Alternate Measures of Interracial-ness: A Robustness Test

There are many ways that one could operationalize the concept of interracial-ness, and while I believe the measure I use in the main text is the best affordable from the data, it is important to be sure that the results are robust to other versions as well. Table A5 below displays coefficients from models predicting a racial/ethnically diverse couple by different operationalizations, starting with the model presented in Table 4 of the main text. That measure from the main text codes all Hispanics respondents or partners into a Hispanic (any race) category, and also includes White, Black, Asian/Pacific-Islander, and Other. Some respondents chose multiple racial categories for themselves, so of these I coded anyone who identified as Black but not Hispanic into the Black category, and all other multiracial respondents into the Other category.

The second model presented in Table A5 uses a much more finely-diced coding of interracial-ness, which includes a separate category for each combination of Hispanic-ness and five racial categories (White, Black, Asian/Pacific Islander, Native American, Other), yielding ten categories total (e.g. Hispanic-Native-American, Non-Hispanic-Native-American, etc). Couples were counted as interracial if they weren't both in the same of these ten categories. The logit model predicting this measure shows a somewhat weaker effect of meeting online on interracial coupling than the first model, but that difference is not statistically significant.

The next three models take a simpler approach to defining couples that cross racial boundaries, focusing only on whether a couple crosses a specific boundary of one of the three largest racial/ethnic groups in the U.S.: White, Black, and Hispanic. The White/Non-White and Black/Non-Black models ignore Hispanic-ness entirely, and simply code a couple as crossing that boundary if only one of them identifies as that group, even if one also identifies with multiple races. Similarly, the Hispanic/Non-Hispanic model ignores race entirely. Meeting

online does predict significantly greater likelihood that a couple includes only one White member (1.4 greater odds, or a 4.1% average predicted probability increase), or only one Black member (1.8 greater odds, or 3.6% greater probability on average). Meeting online does not have a detectable effect on crossing the Hispanic-Non-Hispanic boundary, however. The final model in Table A5 focuses only on the most salient and historically contentious type of racial exogamy in U.S. history (Rosenfeld 2008), couples that cross the Black-White boundary (limiting the model to only Black and White respondents). Here meeting online has a clear and particularly strong effect, predicting 2.5 greater odds of Black-White exogamy when Black or White Americans find a partner online. This entails a predicted 2.5% greater probability for White Americans, on average across observed values, and a 11.6% increased probability for Black Americans.

Section A5 References:

Rosenfeld, Michael J. 2008. "Racial, Educational and Religious Endogamy in the United States: A Comparative Historical Perspective." *Social Forces* 87(1): 1-31.

Table A5. Logistic and OLS Regression Coefficients Predicting Interracial by Meeting Online, by Multiple Measures of Interracial-ness (Since 1996)

	Interracial (main text)	Micro-Interracial (All Race* Hispanic Combos)	White & Non-White (Ignoring Ethnicity)	Black & Non-Black (Ignoring Ethnicity)	Hispanic & Non-Hispanic (Ignoring Race)	Black & White (Ignoring Ethnicity)
Met Online At All	0.42** (0.15)	0.36* (0.16)	0.35* (0.17)	0.62* (0.25)	0.24 (0.20)	0.92** (0.30)
BIC	$1.64x10^8$	$1.58 x10^8$	$1.39x10^8$	$0.74x10^8$	$1.17x10^8$	$0.41x10^8$
McFarland's Psuedo-R^2	0.23	0.29	0.10	0.20	0.29	0.12
N	3030	3009	3017	3017	3031	2419

+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Survey-weighted estimates from a subsample of couples who met after 1995. Standard errors in parenthesis. Covariates not shown: Race, Age, Education Scale, Income, Political Party, Married, Coresident, Years Known, Number of Children in Household, Same Sex, Year Sampled, Relationship Duration, Still Together, Previously Married, Home Internet Access, Region, and MSA/County Population and Median Income. For full model coefficients, see Appendix Table B8.

Section A6. Models without Controls for Post-Meeting Couple Outcomes and Local Area Diversity: Robustness Tests

There are good arguments for excluding some of the controls used in the main text models, and this appendix serves to test the robustness of the results to doing so. One such set of controls measures family status and household-level outcomes that likely occurred after the couple first met. These include household income, home Internet access, number of children, marital status, coresidency, and whether the couple is still together. All may partly be consequences of the kind of relationship that meeting online-versus-not creates, and thus arguably should not be included in the models. I include them anyway in the main text models because I suspect that they act as indicators of life trajectories and intentions that existed prior to finding a partner. If the kinds of people who turn to online dating are disproportionately "ready" to settle down (Rosenfeld 2017), not only will they disproportionately marry, have children, and/or achieve financial stability, regardless of meeting online or not, they may also form more or less diverse partnerships, regardless. Still, it is also important to establish that the reported effects are robust to not controlling for them, and they are. The first set of models in Table A6 replicate the models from Table 4 of the main text without the controls for household income, home Internet access, number of children, marital status, coresidency, and whether the couple is still together. All of the effects reported in the text remain statistically significant and similar in coefficient size.

I control for local area diversity in the main text models because I see this as a critical potential source of spuriousness on endogamy. If the people finding love online disproportionately live in more diverse areas (or more homogeous) on a social dimension, then a difference in endogamy may appear to exist on that dimensions even if the online daters find diverse partners at the same rate as those who do so offline in similar places. But controlling for local area diversity has the

downside of masking a potentially important mechanism through which the Internet might be affecting endogamy: by creating couples that connect people from different areas. This could plausibly increase or decrease endogamy: the Internet may be offering people more diverse options than their neighborhoods and cities offer them, increasing their baseline probability of a diverse match, but it also may be increasing people's capability to purposefully find a homogenous match, by showing them a larger pool of homogenous partners, even if their local area lacks them. The second set of models in Table A6 replicate the models from Table 4 without the control variables for local area diversity (zipcode and MSA level), but do still include controls for region and MSA population size. The effects of meeting online remain significant and similar in size without the local diversity controls, with one notable exception: meeting online's effect on age assortativity is only marginally significant when not controlling for local area diversity. Note, however, that this effect is significant when only comparing the online dating sites and apps to purely offline meetings (not shown), which is the only specific online source to show an effect on age assortativity on its own.

Section A6 References:

Rosenfeld, Michael J. 2017. "Marriage, Choice, and Couplehood in the Age of the Internet." *Sociological Science* 4: 490-510.

Table A6. Logistic and OLS Regression Coefficients Predicting Exogamy by Meeting Online, Without Post-Meeting and Local Geography Control (Since 1996)

	Different Race/ Ethnicity	Different Religion	Different College Degree Status	Different Mother's College Degree Status	Different Political Party	Absolute Age Difference
Model Type	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	OLS
No Post-Meeting Controls:						
Met Online At All	0.36*	0.53*	0.44**	0.00	0.10	-0.70*
	(0.15)	(0.21)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.28)
R^2						0.12
McFarland's Psuedo-R^2	0.22	0.12	0.08	0.12	0.05	
Sample Years	Both	2009	Both	Both	Both	Both
N	3068	1335	3070	3026	3053	3055
No Local Diversity Controls:						
Met Online At All	0.42**	0.62**	0.41**	0.02	0.11	-0.55+
	(0.15)	(0.22)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.28)
R^2						0.12
McFarland's Psuedo-R^2	0.18	0.13	0.06	0.13	0.05	
Sample Years	Both	2009	Both	Both	Both	Both
N	3066	1335	3068	3025	3051	3053

+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01

Survey-weighted estimates from a subsample of couples who met after 1995. Covariates not shown: Race, Age, Education Scale, Income, Political Party, Married, Coresident, Years Known, Number of Children in Household, Same Sex, Year Sampled, Relationship Duration, Still Together, Previously Married, Home Internet Access, Region, MSA/County Population and Median Income, and Zip Code Per Capita Income, and Racial and Educational Diversity for MSA and Zip Code, and Congressional District Political Partisanness. Religion models include R's Religion and MSA Religion Diversity, except where explictly excluded from the model. For full model coefficients, see Appendix Tables B9a-b.

"Online Exogamy Reconsidered" Appendix B: Full Regression Model Coefficients

Table B1: Exogamy by Online-vs-Offline (see Table 4 in main text)

	(1) Interracial	(2) Different BA Status	(3) Different Mother's BA	(4) Age Difference	(5) Different Political Party	(6) Interreligious
Met Online	0.4196**	0.4352**	0.0233	-0.6186*	0.1140	0.6105**
	(0.1545)	(0.1364)	(0.1411)	(0.2824)	(0.1184)	(0.2187)
Female	-0.0636	0.1299	0.1154	0.1131	0.1313	-0.0369
	(0.1263)	(0.1095)	(0.1097)	(0.2206)	(0.0938)	(0.1706)
Married	-0.3535*	-0.0266	0.0989	0.3092	-0.1791	-0.6543**
	(0.1706)	(0.1487)	(0.1633)	(0.3294)	(0.1341)	(0.2246)
Coresident	0.0241	0.0150	-0.2262	0.4247	-0.1179	-0.1167
	(0.1700)	(0.1502)	(0.1605)	(0.3315)	(0.1301)	(0.2208)
Age	0.0005	0.0162**	-0.0112+	0.1170***	-0.0029	0.0028
	(0.0065)	(0.0059)	(0.0064)	(0.0194)	(0.0052)	(0.0094)
Years Since First Met	-0.0386	0.0425	0.0887**	-0.1397+	0.0497+	-0.0113
	(0.0461)	(0.0326)	(0.0334)	(0.0840)	(0.0285)	(0.0251)
Mother's Education	0.0382	0.0104	0.2763***	-0.0445	-0.0340	0.0124
	(0.0262)	(0.0247)	(0.0391)	(0.0664)	(0.0213)	(0.0376)
# of Children in HH	-0.0239	-0.0668	-0.0168	-0.1082	-0.0361	0.0784
	(0.0647)	(0.0577)	(0.0556)	(0.1089)	(0.0471)	(0.0877)
Race (vs White)						
Black	-0.3167	0.6314**	-0.1409	-0.9431+	-0.4642*	-0.6783+
	(0.2589)	(0.2407)	(0.2564)	(0.5599)	(0.2251)	(0.3994)
Hispanic	1.2110***	-0.0786	-0.0809	-0.2204	0.3446+	-0.1299
	(0.2038)	(0.2138)	(0.2096)	(0.4968)	(0.1827)	(0.3559)
Asian-Pac. Isl.	-0.0246	-0.4529	0.0589	0.4750	0.2465	-0.7849
	(0.3204)	(0.3628)	(0.3374)	(0.7840)	(0.2901)	(0.5551)
Other Race	1.5283***	-0.3765	-0.3726	-0.5799	-0.0057	0.6304
	(0.4260)	(0.4684)	(0.4329)	(0.9133)	(0.3491)	(0.6245)

Education	-0.0773	0.1166**	0.1781***	0.0834	-0.0258	-0.0442
	(0.0512)	(0.0437)	(0.0514)	(0.1248)	(0.0384)	(0.0722)
Household Income	0.0068	0.0293+	0.0269+	-0.1032**	-0.0614***	-0.0013
	(0.0161)	(0.0151)	(0.0142)	(0.0320)	(0.0122)	(0.0231)
Same-Sex Couple	-0.1017	0.0965	-0.0274	1.0881**	-0.7221***	-0.1808
	(0.1944)	(0.1753)	(0.1954)	(0.4062)	(0.1696)	(0.2703)
MSA Population	-0.0000*	-0.0000	-0.0000	0.0000+	-0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
% of MSA R's Race	-1.6699**	-0.3713	-0.7665+	-0.5554	0.2663	0.1371
	(0.5155)	(0.4439)	(0.4581)	(1.0397)	(0.4027)	(0.7084)
% of MSA R's BA	-0.5495	0.5863	0.0639	1.5203	-0.2430	0.3856
	(0.6155)	(0.5522)	(0.5598)	(1.2311)	(0.4641)	(0.8255)
MSA Median Inc.	0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0001*	0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
% of Zipcode R's Race	-1.7039***	0.0407	0.0518	-0.8694	0.0086	-0.0033
	(0.3436)	(0.2974)	(0.3164)	(0.6843)	(0.2767)	(0.4809)
% of Zipcode R's BA Status	0.1184	-1.9107***	-0.3630	0.0213	0.2771	-0.9161
	(0.4430)	(0.4067)	(0.4021)	(0.8847)	(0.3499)	(0.6509)
Zipcode Mean Income for Age 15+	-0.0000	-0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	-0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0001)
District Partisanness	0.0075	-0.0045	-0.0067	0.0071	-0.0074	0.0062
	(0.0066)	(0.0061)	(0.0062)	(0.0130)	(0.0054)	(0.0102)
Retrospective Relationship	0.1598	-0.5861*	-0.3369	0.5166	-0.0674	
	(0.2775)	(0.2528)	(0.2445)	(0.5452)	(0.2152)	
Sample Year=2017	0.0360	-0.1743	0.0019	-0.1044	0.1719	
	(0.1812)	(0.1614)	(0.1619)	(0.3265)	(0.1401)	
Region (vs NE)						
Midwest	-0.1848	-0.1946	-0.1613	-0.3935	-0.3088*	-0.1572
	(0.2237)	(0.1817)	(0.1811)	(0.3630)	(0.1566)	(0.2567)

South	-0.4538*	-0.1573	-0.1420	-0.2890	-0.2831+	0.0038
	(0.2100)	(0.1744)	(0.1753)	(0.3602)	(0.1569)	(0.2573)
West	-0.0930	-0.0052	-0.2226	-0.1834	-0.2276	-0.3993
	(0.2031)	(0.1811)	(0.1829)	(0.3646)	(0.1603)	(0.2563)
Relationship Duration	0.0242	-0.0568+	-0.1010**	0.0438	-0.0616*	0.0000
	(0.0472)	(0.0335)	(0.0345)	(0.0838)	(0.0293)	(.)
Party (vs Repub.)						
Other	-0.0019	-0.2306	-0.8514	1.7828+	-1.3890***	1.1951*
	(0.3839)	(0.3634)	(0.5185)	(1.0126)	(0.3635)	(0.5209)
Democrat	-0.1236	-0.1457	-0.0423	0.2604	-0.2760**	0.2995+
	(0.1401)	(0.1219)	(0.1180)	(0.2674)	(0.1016)	(0.1788)
Home Internet	0.2636	-0.0808	0.5992*	-1.3240*	0.2118	0.0556
	(0.3038)	(0.2330)	(0.2588)	(0.6451)	(0.2013)	(0.2314)
Previously Married	-0.2074	0.0384	0.1985	0.5152	-0.0951	-0.2872
	(0.1788)	(0.1519)	(0.1552)	(0.4237)	(0.1308)	(0.2369)
Religion (vs Protestant/Other Christian)						
Catholic						0.9386***
						(0.2144)
Other Religion						0.9364**
						(0.3428)
No Religion						1.7476***
						(0.2954)
% of MSA R's Religion						-2.2345**
						(0.7097)
Constant	1.1306	-1.8895*	-4.8322***	3.7567+	1.0815	0.2210
	(0.9967)	(0.8901)	(0.9841)	(2.0881)	(0.7800)	(1.4654)
Observations	3030	3032	2989	3017	3015	1335
R^2				0.129		
Pseudo R^2	0.229	0.079	0.130		0.051	0.134

BIC	1.6404e+08	1.9031e+08	1.8574e+08	18775.4127	2.4708e+08	84748604.8660

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B2: Exogamy by Specific Online Source (see Table 5 in main text)

	(1) Interracial	(2) Different BA Status	(3) Different Mother's BA	(4) Age Difference	(5) Different Political Party	(6) Interreligious
How Met (vs Offline)						
Online Dating	0.3579^{+}	0.4253*	0.1734	-0.9317*	-0.0171	0.7122*
	(0.2023)	(0.1757)	(0.1858)	(0.3931)	(0.1534)	(0.2976)
Other Online	0.5790*	0.3009	-0.1856	-0.0469	0.3680^{+}	0.7148*
	(0.2700)	(0.2434)	(0.2623)	(0.5392)	(0.2156)	(0.3287)
Both Off & Online	0.2651	0.4737^{+}	-0.1972	-0.6115	0.0640	-0.4623
	(0.2872)	(0.2643)	(0.2587)	(0.4780)	(0.2262)	(0.5390)
Female	-0.0622	0.1274	0.1123	0.1194	0.1351	-0.0215
	(0.1262)	(0.1094)	(0.1097)	(0.2206)	(0.0938)	(0.1711)
Married	-0.3579*	-0.0255	0.0960	0.3091	-0.1803	-0.6571**
	(0.1702)	(0.1488)	(0.1641)	(0.3296)	(0.1346)	(0.2258)
Coresident	0.0329	0.0188	-0.2257	0.4238	-0.1156	-0.1226
	(0.1698)	(0.1501)	(0.1609)	(0.3309)	(0.1303)	(0.2216)
Age	0.0005	0.0163**	-0.0121^{+}	0.1176***	-0.0026	0.0015
	(0.0066)	(0.0059)	(0.0065)	(0.0196)	(0.0052)	(0.0094)
Years Since First Met	-0.0401	0.0416	0.0903**	-0.1417^{+}	0.0483^{+}	-0.0123
	(0.0461)	(0.0326)	(0.0332)	(0.0837)	(0.0286)	(0.0252)
Mother's Education	0.0383	0.0093	0.2751***	-0.0420	-0.0332	0.0138
	(0.0261)	(0.0247)	(0.0391)	(0.0667)	(0.0213)	(0.0380)
# of Children in HH	-0.0232	-0.0689	-0.0177	-0.1002	-0.0335	0.0674
	(0.0646)	(0.0578)	(0.0555)	(0.1097)	(0.0472)	(0.0869)
Race (vs White)						
Black	-0.3329	0.6266**	-0.1439	-0.9478^{+}	-0.4699*	-0.7378^{+}
	(0.2593)	(0.2403)	(0.2573)	(0.5607)	(0.2249)	(0.4001)
Hispanic	1.2090***	-0.0870	-0.0888	-0.2034	0.3528^{+}	-0.1156
	(0.2032)	(0.2140)	(0.2099)	(0.4956)	(0.1822)	(0.3575)
Asian-Pac. Isl.	-0.0274	-0.4649	0.0626	0.4851	0.2502	-0.8102
	(0.3214)	(0.3631)	(0.3366)	(0.7859)	(0.2885)	(0.5562)

Other Race	1.5214***	-0.3698	-0.3745	-0.5947	-0.0095	0.5701
	(0.4255)	(0.4645)	(0.4333)	(0.9195)	(0.3511)	(0.6234)
Education	-0.0747	0.1158**	0.1751***	0.0896	-0.0229	-0.0391
	(0.0513)	(0.0439)	(0.0514)	(0.1253)	(0.0383)	(0.0722)
Household Income	0.0075	0.0290+	0.0267+	-0.1017**	-0.0606***	-0.0014
	(0.0161)	(0.0152)	(0.0143)	(0.0319)	(0.0122)	(0.0230)
Same-Sex Couple	-0.1002	0.1091	-0.0271	1.0840**	-0.7224***	-0.1479
	(0.1934)	(0.1745)	(0.1961)	(0.4082)	(0.1705)	(0.2776)
MSA Population	-0.0000*	-0.0000	-0.0000	0.0000+	-0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
% of MSA R's Race	-1.6913**	-0.3786	-0.7849+	-0.5609	0.2597	0.0230
	(0.5151)	(0.4434)	(0.4584)	(1.0442)	(0.4023)	(0.7104)
% of MSA R's BA	-0.5483	0.5925	0.0898	1.4671	-0.2588	0.4514
	(0.6144)	(0.5533)	(0.5614)	(1.2324)	(0.4642)	(0.8257)
MSA Median Inc.	0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0001*	0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
% of Zipcode R's Race	-1.6881***	0.0480	0.0458	-0.8536	0.0254	0.0333
	(0.3442)	(0.2976)	(0.3161)	(0.6851)	(0.2764)	(0.4802)
% of Zipcode R's BA Status	0.1160	-1.9150***	-0.3748	0.0355	0.2809	-0.9163
	(0.4402)	(0.4076)	(0.4045)	(0.8851)	(0.3492)	(0.6491)
Zipcode Mean Income for Age 15+	-0.0000	-0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	-0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0001)
District Partisanness	0.1671	-0.5837*	-0.3333	0.5105	-0.0657	0.0065
	(0.2767)	(0.2530)	(0.2443)	(0.5474)	(0.2168)	(0.0103)
Retrospective Relationship	0.0498	-0.1765	-0.0071	-0.0748	0.1870	
	(0.1811)	(0.1614)	(0.1627)	(0.3262)	(0.1406)	
Sample Year=2017	0.0073	-0.0046	-0.0064	0.0067	-0.0076	
	(0.0066)	(0.0061)	(0.0063)	(0.0131)	(0.0054)	
Region (vs NE)						

Midwest	-0.1790	-0.1898	-0.1502	-0.4100	-0.3113*	-0.1581
	(0.2232)	(0.1815)	(0.1817)	(0.3647)	(0.1563)	(0.2567)
South	-0.4506*	-0.1514	-0.1429	-0.2973	-0.2818+	0.0013
	(0.2099)	(0.1745)	(0.1756)	(0.3605)	(0.1566)	(0.2574)
West	-0.0878	-0.0041	-0.2227	-0.1810	-0.2241	-0.4145
	(0.2035)	(0.1811)	(0.1835)	(0.3652)	(0.1600)	(0.2573)
Relationship Duration	0.0246	-0.0561+	-0.1008**	0.0421	-0.0620*	
	(0.0472)	(0.0335)	(0.0344)	(0.0837)	(0.0294)	
Party (vs Repub.)						
Other	0.0034	-0.2313	-0.8689+	1.8045+	-1.3792***	1.1648*
	(0.3856)	(0.3656)	(0.5197)	(1.0138)	(0.3648)	(0.5211)
Democrat	-0.1283	-0.1448	-0.0381	0.2499	-0.2828**	0.2971+
	(0.1399)	(0.1221)	(0.1180)	(0.2673)	(0.1019)	(0.1796)
Home Internet	0.2520	-0.0740	0.6070*	-1.3437*	0.2020	0.0681
	(0.3033)	(0.2335)	(0.2586)	(0.6452)	(0.2021)	(0.2329)
Previously Married	-0.2110	0.0378	0.1988	0.5219	-0.0956	-0.2878
	(0.1792)	(0.1517)	(0.1553)	(0.4244)	(0.1305)	(0.2361)
Religion (vs Protestant/Other Christian)						
Catholic						0.9264***
						(0.2152)
Other Religion						0.9283**
						(0.3447)
No Religion						1.7662***
						(0.2962)
% of MSA R's Religion						-2.1812**
						(0.7085)
Constant	1.1212	-1.8842*	-4.7383***	3.6825+	1.0395	0.2669
	(1.0009)	(0.8891)	(0.9871)	(2.0988)	(0.7801)	(1.4774)
Observations	3030	3032	2989	3017	3015	1335

R^2				0.129		
Pseudo R^2	0.229	0.078	0.131		0.052	0.136
BIC	1.6403e+08	1.9042e+08	1.8557e+08	18789.1756	2.4687e+08	84542253.4036

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B3: Exogamy by Specific Offline Sources vs Online (see Appendix Table A1)

	(1) Interracial	(2) Different BA Status	(3) Different Mother's BA	(4) Age Difference	(5) Different Political Party	(6) Interreligious
How Met (vs Online)						
Friends	-0.3789^{+}	-0.4347*	-0.0009	0.3063	0.1253	-0.3706
	(0.2082)	(0.1811)	(0.1871)	(0.4096)	(0.1576)	(0.2817)
Family	-0.6883**	-0.5387**	-0.5122*	0.5589	-0.1897	-0.7286*
	(0.2504)	(0.2077)	(0.2199)	(0.3771)	(0.1778)	(0.2976)
Neighbors	0.5942	-0.5384	-0.3113	5.1195***	-0.1250	0.5461
	(0.4857)	(0.4412)	(0.5969)	(1.4871)	(0.4575)	(0.6048)
Work	-0.2334	-0.2990^{+}	0.1624	1.3504***	-0.0863	-0.4323
	(0.1920)	(0.1753)	(0.1745)	(0.3654)	(0.1486)	(0.2677)
School	-0.5034*	-0.7332***	0.0322	-0.6974*	-0.1394	-0.6464*
	(0.2289)	(0.2089)	(0.1982)	(0.3345)	(0.1719)	(0.3128)
Religious Org.	-0.4290	-0.4914^{+}	0.0250	-0.4230	-0.5776*	-2.1367***
	(0.3489)	(0.2827)	(0.2960)	(0.4228)	(0.2748)	(0.5244)
Vol. Org.	-0.0408	0.5139	0.5026	1.1819	-0.6611^{+}	-0.9881*
	(0.4801)	(0.3858)	(0.3801)	(0.9756)	(0.3463)	(0.4819)
Other	-0.7056**	-0.2749	-0.1700	1.6107**	-0.3313	-0.4004
	(0.2732)	(0.2306)	(0.2447)	(0.5476)	(0.2029)	(0.3106)
Female	-0.1268	0.1334	0.0831	0.0305	0.1695^{+}	-0.0301
	(0.1309)	(0.1116)	(0.1130)	(0.2131)	(0.0967)	(0.1750)
Married	-0.3044^{+}	-0.0420	0.0876	0.3639	-0.1786	-0.6553**
	(0.1718)	(0.1526)	(0.1654)	(0.3285)	(0.1376)	(0.2230)
Coresident	0.0477	0.0049	-0.2061	0.3378	-0.1415	-0.1266
	(0.1746)	(0.1546)	(0.1643)	(0.3267)	(0.1337)	(0.2243)
Age	-0.0014	0.0136*	-0.0103	0.1068***	-0.0007	-0.0016
	(0.0068)	(0.0061)	(0.0068)	(0.0202)	(0.0055)	(0.0096)
Years Since First Met	-0.0247	0.0489	0.1074**	-0.1610^{+}	0.0579^{+}	-0.0115
	(0.0480)	(0.0347)	(0.0356)	(0.0869)	(0.0317)	(0.0249)
Mother's Education	0.0346	0.0074	0.2706***	-0.0219	-0.0342	0.0065

	(0.0277)	(0.0256)	(0.0390)	(0.0666)	(0.0221)	(0.0380)
# of Children in HH	-0.0061	-0.0619	-0.0320	-0.0623	-0.0228	0.1019
	(0.0665)	(0.0589)	(0.0568)	(0.1098)	(0.0482)	(0.0891)
Race (vs White)						
Black	-0.2754	0.6088*	-0.0377	-0.8507	-0.4121+	-0.8644*
	(0.2706)	(0.2496)	(0.2645)	(0.5485)	(0.2360)	(0.4137)
Hispanic	1.2090***	-0.0148	0.0166	-0.1029	0.3103+	-0.1884
	(0.2092)	(0.2180)	(0.2146)	(0.4888)	(0.1878)	(0.3625)
Asian-Pac. Isl.	-0.0570	-0.3521	0.0571	0.1207	0.2926	-0.7293
	(0.3309)	(0.3689)	(0.3453)	(0.6780)	(0.2999)	(0.5651)
Other Race	1.5736***	-0.3239	-0.3130	-0.0520	-0.0253	0.5173
	(0.4378)	(0.4633)	(0.4383)	(0.9056)	(0.3528)	(0.6228)
Education	-0.1005+	0.1148*	0.1780***	0.1559	-0.0306	-0.0172
	(0.0560)	(0.0473)	(0.0539)	(0.1229)	(0.0423)	(0.0717)
Household Income	0.0145	0.0274+	0.0267+	-0.1053**	-0.0648***	-0.0089
	(0.0169)	(0.0153)	(0.0148)	(0.0321)	(0.0126)	(0.0236)
Same-Sex Couple	-0.1162	0.0583	-0.0484	0.9704*	-0.7353***	-0.0065
	(0.2073)	(0.1759)	(0.1982)	(0.3969)	(0.1725)	(0.2800)
MSA Population	-0.0000**	-0.0000	-0.0000	0.0000*	0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
% of MSA R's Race	-1.8651***	-0.2691	-0.6557	0.2332	0.3611	-0.1073
	(0.5263)	(0.4574)	(0.4750)	(0.9914)	(0.4141)	(0.7164)
% of MSA R's BA	-0.6622	0.5203	0.1533	1.7989	-0.3214	0.6223
	(0.6340)	(0.5737)	(0.5749)	(1.1677)	(0.4826)	(0.8137)
MSA Median Inc.	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0001*	0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
% of Zipcode R's Race	-1.5233***	-0.0113	-0.0070	-1.0464	-0.0961	0.0186
	(0.3542)	(0.3071)	(0.3296)	(0.6675)	(0.2867)	(0.4744)
% of Zipcode R's BA Status	0.1399	-1.8809***	-0.4377	-0.0289	0.2327	-1.1127+
	(0.4604)	(0.4125)	(0.4092)	(0.8853)	(0.3622)	(0.6550)
Zipcode Mean	0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000

Income for Age 15+						
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0001)
District Partisanness	0.0107	-0.0048	-0.0065	0.0021	-0.0077	0.0043
	(0.0068)	(0.0063)	(0.0064)	(0.0132)	(0.0057)	(0.0103)
Retrospective Relationship	0.1753	-0.5275*	-0.4095	0.7409	0.0579	
	(0.2872)	(0.2633)	(0.2581)	(0.5681)	(0.2272)	
Sample Year=2017	0.0030	-0.1883	0.0489	0.0539	0.1004	
	(0.1857)	(0.1649)	(0.1638)	(0.3281)	(0.1448)	
Region (vs NE)						
Midwest	-0.2375	-0.1713	-0.1708	-0.3023	-0.1999	-0.0406
	(0.2306)	(0.1876)	(0.1904)	(0.3390)	(0.1613)	(0.2565)
South	-0.4997*	-0.0861	-0.1856	0.0674	-0.2162	0.0575
	(0.2147)	(0.1777)	(0.1841)	(0.3479)	(0.1605)	(0.2616)
West	-0.1181	-0.0577	-0.2915	-0.0169	-0.1737	-0.3644
	(0.2076)	(0.1870)	(0.1901)	(0.3532)	(0.1645)	(0.2598)
Relationship Duration	0.0034	-0.0565	-0.1196**	0.0661	-0.0680*	0.0000
	(0.0486)	(0.0356)	(0.0365)	(0.0861)	(0.0324)	(.)
Party (vs Repub.)						
Other	0.0332	-0.5354	-0.6057	1.8715+	-1.3136***	0.8750
	(0.4243)	(0.4214)	(0.5179)	(1.0260)	(0.3744)	(0.5356)
Democrat	-0.1171	-0.1270	-0.0694	0.3384	-0.2894**	0.1863
	(0.1455)	(0.1257)	(0.1227)	(0.2442)	(0.1061)	(0.1825)
Home Internet	0.1582	-0.0515	0.5471*	-0.7585	0.3100	0.0471
	(0.3007)	(0.2257)	(0.2595)	(0.5792)	(0.2036)	(0.2373)
Previously Married	-0.2432	0.0436	0.1651	0.3078	-0.0903	-0.2986
	(0.1839)	(0.1539)	(0.1601)	(0.4270)	(0.1361)	(0.2374)
Religion (vs Protestant/Other Christian)						
Catholic						0.9365***
						(0.2157)

Other Religion						0.8459*
						(0.3546)
No Religion						1.8662***
						(0.3004)
% of MSA R's Religion						-2.4681***
						(0.7205)
Constant	2.1687*	-1.4266	-4.7250***	1.3467	1.1844	1.1421
	(1.0558)	(0.9437)	(1.0248)	(1.8441)	(0.8295)	(1.4702)
Observations	2896	2898	2860	2885	2884	1309
R^2				0.161		
Pseudo R^2	0.232	0.080	0.130		0.056	0.151
BIC	1.5416e+08	1.8126e+08	1.7673e+08	17778.6592	2.3183e+08	81206002.2829

Standard errors in parentheses

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B4a: Racial\Ethnic Exogamy by Online-vs-Offline, by Sample and Controls (see Appendix Table A2)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Sample Year	2009	2009	2009	2017	2017	2017
Controls	Minimal Controls	Full R Controls	Full R Controls + Geo Controls	Minimal Controls	Full R Controls	Full R Controls + Geo Controls
Met Online	0.1211	0.2557	0.3676	0.3434*	0.3876*	0.4160*
	(0.2663)	(0.2760)	(0.2949)	(0.1643)	(0.1686)	(0.1795)
Home Internet	0.2905	0.2977	0.0752	0.3674	0.2675	0.3451
	(0.3258)	(0.3416)	(0.3588)	(1.2035)	(1.1472)	(1.3267)
Age	0.0001	0.0040	-0.0020	-0.0046	-0.0039	-0.0051
	(0.0097)	(0.0100)	(0.0109)	(0.0052)	(0.0054)	(0.0058)
Years Since First Met	-0.0850**	-0.0682+	-0.0626+	-0.0177	-0.0060	-0.0035
	(0.0281)	(0.0353)	(0.0350)	(0.0123)	(0.0144)	(0.0153)
Race (vs White)						
Black	1.4355***	1.4487***	0.2142	0.7844***	0.7783***	-0.6142*
	(0.3042)	(0.3066)	(0.5144)	(0.1933)	(0.2008)	(0.2828)
Hispanic	3.4012***	3.6021***	2.7364***	1.7100***	1.7789***	0.5952*
	(0.2658)	(0.2878)	(0.4105)	(0.1678)	(0.1791)	(0.2330)
Asian-Pac. Isl.	1.6084***	1.8425***	0.3780	1.4531***	1.5025***	-0.0527
	(0.4639)	(0.4891)	(0.6349)	(0.2797)	(0.2859)	(0.3731)
Other Race	4.2153***	4.3816***	2.9901***	2.7745***	2.8086***	0.8921+
	(0.6984)	(0.6773)	(0.7634)	(0.4174)	(0.4205)	(0.4951)
Female		-0.0342	-0.0323		-0.0644	-0.0472
		(0.2250)	(0.2499)		(0.1381)	(0.1449)
Married		-0.8343**	-0.7015*		-0.1391	-0.1994
		(0.3239)	(0.3323)		(0.1857)	(0.1971)
Coresident		0.6930*	0.5832+		-0.1432	-0.2081
		(0.3091)	(0.3309)		(0.1807)	(0.1974)
Age		0.0000				
		(.)				
Mother's Education		0.0793+	0.0557		0.0519+	0.0548+

		(0.0477)	(0.0482)		(0.0301)	(0.0300)
# of Children in HH		-0.0486	-0.0028		-0.0073	-0.0284
		(0.1088)	(0.1177)		(0.0698)	(0.0749)
R's Education		-0.0395	-0.2405^{+}		-0.0235	-0.0545
		(0.0824)	(0.1246)		(0.0404)	(0.0548)
Household Income		0.0238	0.0198		0.0014	-0.0031
		(0.0302)	(0.0325)		(0.0168)	(0.0180)
Same-Sex Couple		-0.6207	-0.3742		0.0414	-0.0049
		(0.4722)	(0.4120)		(0.2056)	(0.2161)
MSA Population			-0.0000^{+}			-0.0000
			(0.0000)			(0.0000)
% of MSA R's Race			-0.5426			-1.8708**
			(1.0840)			(0.5905)
% of MSA R's BA			-1.4678			-0.4798
			(1.2493)			(0.7145)
MSA Median Inc.			0.0001*			-0.0000
			(0.0000)			(0.0000)
District Partisanness			0.0085			0.0045
			(0.0132)			(0.0075)
% of Zip R's Race			-1.9981**			-1.6083***
			(0.7478)			(0.3797)
% of Zip R's BA			-0.2705			0.2217
			(0.8666)			(0.5018)
Zipcode Mean Inc.			-0.0000			0.0000
			(0.0001)			(0.0000)
Constant	-2.2043***	-3.1605**	0.8264	-1.8572	-2.0049^{+}	1.2312
	(0.5197)	(1.0663)	(2.2003)	(1.2211)	(1.1798)	(1.6527)
Observations	1404	1400	1340	1748	1739	1693
Pseudo R^2	0.318	0.333	0.374	0.110	0.117	0.167
BIC	56721760.1269	55145832.7650	49538173.7323	1.2455e+08	1.2253e+08	1.1130e+08

Standard errors in parentheses

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B4b: Educational Exogamy by Online-vs-Offline, by Sample and Controls (see Appendix Table A2)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Sample Year	2009	2009	2009	2017	2017	2017
Controls	Minimal Controls	Full R Controls	Full R Controls + Geo Controls	Minimal Controls	Full R Controls	Full R Controls + Geo Controls
Met Online	0.2947	0.3840^{+}	0.4473^{+}	0.3657*	0.3818*	0.4241*
	(0.2298)	(0.2269)	(0.2386)	(0.1573)	(0.1604)	(0.1657)
Home Internet	-0.1330	0.0351	-0.0525	-0.1449	-0.1529	-0.1174
	(0.2902)	(0.2965)	(0.3013)	(0.8104)	(0.8773)	(0.8600)
Age	0.0155^{+}	0.0187*	0.0154^{+}	0.0209***	0.0204***	0.0211***
	(0.0089)	(0.0090)	(0.0091)	(0.0047)	(0.0052)	(0.0054)
Years Since First Met	-0.0210	-0.0039	0.0024	-0.0143	-0.0224	-0.0215
	(0.0219)	(0.0257)	(0.0265)	(0.0116)	(0.0140)	(0.0144)
R's Education	0.2951***	0.2844***	0.0884	0.2202***	0.1756***	0.1366**
	(0.0480)	(0.0605)	(0.0803)	(0.0322)	(0.0424)	(0.0523)
Female		0.3700*	0.3550^{+}		-0.0652	-0.0393
		(0.1775)	(0.1859)		(0.1320)	(0.1350)
Married		-0.0829	-0.0797		0.1335	0.0419
		(0.2437)	(0.2429)		(0.1794)	(0.1859)
Coresident		-0.2446	-0.1603		0.1526	0.1874
		(0.2328)	(0.2401)		(0.1844)	(0.1904)
Age		0.0000				
		(.)				
Mother's Education		0.0158	0.0146		0.0187	0.0120
		(0.0409)	(0.0419)		(0.0296)	(0.0299)
# of Children in HH		-0.1514	-0.1753^{+}		-0.0512	-0.0097
		(0.0937)	(0.0990)		(0.0681)	(0.0698)
Race (vs White)						
Black		0.6180*	0.2729		0.6574***	0.7049*
		(0.2829)	(0.3786)		(0.1883)	(0.2801)
Hispanic		0.1174	-0.3046		0.0110	0.0557

		(0.2626)	(0.3605)		(0.2067)	(0.2559)
Asian-Pac. Isl.		-0.4775	-0.8193		-0.3448	-0.2287
		(0.6135)	(0.6731)		(0.3877)	(0.4291)
Other Race		-0.3879	-0.9134		-0.0820	0.0339
		(0.5980)	(0.6883)		(0.4865)	(0.5830)
Household Income		0.0423	0.0346		0.0319^{+}	0.0307^{+}
		(0.0265)	(0.0277)		(0.0167)	(0.0177)
Same-Sex Couple		-0.4016	-0.2117		0.1947	0.1772
		(0.2608)	(0.2527)		(0.2133)	(0.2169)
MSA Population			-0.0000			-0.0000
			(0.0000)			(0.0000)
% of MSA R's Race			-0.5185			-0.2171
			(0.7058)			(0.5433)
% of MSA R's BA			0.1770			0.9687
			(0.9004)			(0.6913)
MSA Median Inc.			0.0000			-0.0000
			(0.0000)			(0.0000)
District Partisanness			-0.0084			-0.0033
			(0.0103)			(0.0074)
% of Zip R's Race			-0.3044			0.1940
			(0.4757)			(0.3791)
% of Zip R's BA			-2.1261^{**}			-1.7378^{***}
			(0.6708)			(0.5154)
Zipcode Mean Inc.			-0.0000			-0.0000
			(0.0001)			(0.0000)
Constant	-4.5597^{***}	-5.4398^{***}	-1.3570	-4.2061^{***}	-4.4149^{***}	-3.0897^{*}
	(0.7473)	(0.8211)	(1.6222)	(0.8780)	(0.9718)	(1.2950)
Observations	1405	1402	1342	1749	1739	1693
Pseudo R^2	0.047	0.069	0.097	0.046	0.059	0.070
BIC	82541691.9803	80315690.1212	74854218.4938	1.2271e+08	1.2046e+08	1.1489e+08

Standard errors in parentheses

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B4c: Age Exogamy by Online-vs-Offline, by Sample and Controls (see Appendix Table A2a)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Sample Year	2009	2009	2009	2017	2017	2017
Controls	Minimal Controls	Full R Controls	Full R Controls + Geo Controls	Minimal Controls	Full R Controls	Full R Controls + Geo Controls
Met Online	-0.3214	-0.3767	-0.4805	-0.4100	-0.6216^{+}	-0.7384*
	(0.4967)	(0.4812)	(0.4843)	(0.3548)	(0.3462)	(0.3484)
Home Internet	-1.9704**	-1.5946*	-1.8851*	0.3578	0.7720	0.7009
	(0.7334)	(0.7203)	(0.7402)	(1.2025)	(1.2315)	(1.2389)
Age	0.0965***	0.0966***	0.0899***	0.1506***	0.1433***	0.1438***
	(0.0202)	(0.0195)	(0.0197)	(0.0158)	(0.0173)	(0.0176)
Years Since First Met	-0.0286	0.0171	0.0538	-0.1277***	-0.1511***	-0.1475***
	(0.0477)	(0.0649)	(0.0679)	(0.0297)	(0.0365)	(0.0357)
Female		0.4330	0.3469		-0.1423	-0.1247
		(0.3653)	(0.3572)		(0.2599)	(0.2654)
Married		0.1703	0.1129		0.2843	0.1844
		(0.5752)	(0.5973)		(0.3984)	(0.4036)
Coresident		-0.3924	-0.2046		0.6455^{+}	0.7083^{+}
		(0.5226)	(0.5290)		(0.3712)	(0.3841)
Age		0.0000				
		(.)				
Mother's Education		0.0222	0.0302		-0.1410^{+}	-0.1129
		(0.1317)	(0.1314)		(0.0732)	(0.0714)
# of Children in HH		-0.2539	-0.2632		-0.0878	-0.0568
		(0.2316)	(0.2358)		(0.1161)	(0.1182)
Race (vs White)						
Black		-0.1374	-2.1187*		-0.2960	-0.1661
		(0.6075)	(0.9874)		(0.3885)	(0.6149)
Hispanic		1.5249^{+}	-0.4351		0.0570	0.1161
		(0.9251)	(0.9281)		(0.4065)	(0.5676)
Asian-Pac. Isl.		3.9740*	1.3148		0.0044	0.0663
		(1.6841)	(1.7878)		(0.5749)	(0.7250)

Other Race		0.0064	-3.1043*		1.0940	1.3827
		(1.1894)	(1.4382)		(0.8953)	(1.1046)
R's Education		-0.0991	0.1887		-0.0259	-0.0018
		(0.1297)	(0.2041)		(0.1069)	(0.1466)
Household Income		-0.1533*	-0.1505*		-0.0800*	-0.0741*
		(0.0620)	(0.0648)		(0.0344)	(0.0359)
Same-Sex Couple		-0.4250	-0.2632		1.7009***	1.8079***
		(0.6591)	(0.6661)		(0.4435)	(0.4514)
MSA Population			0.0000			0.0000*
			(0.0000)			(0.0000)
% of MSA R's Race			-3.3565+			1.1250
			(1.9006)			(1.1867)
% of MSA R's BA			4.7392*			0.1835
			(2.3220)			(1.3606)
MSA Median Inc.			-0.0001*			-0.0000
			(0.0000)			(0.0000)
District Partisanness			-0.0189			0.0149
			(0.0213)			(0.0162)
% of Zip R's Race			-1.4520			-0.5863
			(1.2226)			(0.8463)
% of Zip R's BA			-1.1501			0.4938
			(1.6006)			(1.0040)
Zipcode Mean Inc.			0.0002			0.0000
			(0.0003)			(0.0000)
Constant	3.2751**	5.0190**	4.5761	-0.3067	1.9040	0.8171
	(1.0753)	(1.6274)	(3.5099)	(1.2693)	(1.5713)	(2.4744)
Observations	1402	1398	1338	1737	1728	1682
Adjusted R^2	0.085	0.111	0.134	0.120	0.132	0.131
BIC	8870.5604	8882.2956	8521.7903	10579.9851	10558.1947	10315.4897

Standard errors in parentheses
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B5a: Interracial by Online-vs-Offline, Alternate Measures (see Appendix Table A2b)

	(1) Early Era	(2) Middle Era	(3) Recent Era	(4) Mid+Recent
Met Online	0.4578	0.3576	0.6462*	0.4802**
	(0.2919)	(0.2611)	(0.2588)	(0.1786)
Years Since First Met	0.1048	-0.0884	-0.1751	-0.1426*
	(0.0866)	(0.1221)	(0.1506)	(0.0686)
Female	0.0486	-0.0092	-0.2702	-0.0767
	(0.2086)	(0.2213)	(0.2400)	(0.1587)
Married	-0.2465	-0.3375	-0.4641	-0.4036+
	(0.3149)	(0.2872)	(0.3936)	(0.2222)
Coresident	0.1948	-0.0096	0.0201	0.0292
	(0.3547)	(0.2655)	(0.3058)	(0.1947)
Age	0.0013	0.0089	-0.0065	-0.0001
	(0.0121)	(0.0124)	(0.0104)	(0.0080)
Mother's Education Scale	-0.0005	0.1543***	0.0489	0.0875**
	(0.0403)	(0.0466)	(0.0502)	(0.0336)
# of Children in HH	0.0263	-0.0840	-0.0585	-0.0723
	(0.0954)	(0.1343)	(0.1305)	(0.0921)
Race (vs White)				
Black	-0.0918	-0.5719	-0.2131	-0.4786
	(0.4341)	(0.4926)	(0.4638)	(0.3281)
Hispanic	1.5281***	1.6295***	0.8312*	1.0714***
	(0.3397)	(0.3657)	(0.3866)	(0.2575)
Asian-Pac. Isl.	-0.5901	0.2457	0.6537	0.3299
	(0.5550)	(0.5846)	(0.5840)	(0.4068)
Other Race	1.6956**	1.4169+	3.0075***	1.6477**
	(0.5938)	(0.7354)	(0.8994)	(0.6234)
Education	0.0549	-0.3925***	-0.0268	-0.1603*
	(0.0925)	(0.0873)	(0.0895)	(0.0645)
Household Income	0.0271	-0.0157	-0.0108	-0.0077
	(0.0270)	(0.0297)	(0.0292)	(0.0202)
Same-Sex Couple	-0.0097	-0.0183	-0.2513	-0.1620
	(0.3290)	(0.3595)	(0.3499)	(0.2467)
MSA Population	0.0000	-0.0000*	-0.0000+	-0.0000**
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
% of MSA R's Race	-1.9640*	-1.8185*	-0.8738	-1.5469*
	(0.9299)	(0.9122)	(0.9445)	(0.6386)
% of MSA R's BA	0.9176	-2.8377**	-0.2857	-1.3954+
	(1.0522)	(1.0962)	(1.2051)	(0.7979)
MSA Median Inc.	0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
% of Zipcode R's	-1.6556**	-1.7728**	-1.8573**	-1.7737***

Race				
	(0.5993)	(0.5790)	(0.6552)	(0.4342)
% of Zipcode R's BA	-0.7767	0.8850	0.5203	0.8140
Status				
	(0.7475)	(0.8066)	(0.8012)	(0.5468)
Zipcode Mean	-0.0000*	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Income for Age 15+				
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
District Partisanness	0.0253*	-0.0182	0.0087	-0.0016
	(0.0115)	(0.0124)	(0.0115)	(0.0082)
Retrospective	-0.9087	-0.6917	0.7080+	0.4907
Relationship				
	(1.0868)	(0.7768)	(0.3830)	(0.3123)
Sample Year=2017	0.2878	0.1107		-0.2764
	(0.4288)	(0.6239)		(0.2492)
Region (vs NE)				
Midwest	0.0729	-0.7290*	-0.0156	-0.3989
	(0.4315)	(0.3599)	(0.3956)	(0.2676)
South	-0.1277	-0.5354+	-0.7047+	-0.6693**
	(0.3950)	(0.3162)	(0.3935)	(0.2425)
West	0.0985	-0.2976	-0.0259	-0.2103
	(0.3955)	(0.3170)	(0.3602)	(0.2367)
Relationship	-0.1042	0.0406	0.1762	0.1517*
Duration				
	(0.0796)	(0.1100)	(0.1617)	(0.0726)
Party (vs Repub.)				
Other	-1.5852*	0.3352	1.6749**	1.0052*
	(0.6480)	(0.7626)	(0.6363)	(0.4624)
Democrat	-0.2570	-0.1927	0.3488	0.0200
	(0.2372)	(0.2521)	(0.2843)	(0.1821)
Home Internet	0.2370	0.1578		0.1403
	(0.4694)	(0.4129)		(0.3802)
Previously Married	-0.1041	-0.5152	0.0427	-0.2195
	(0.3042)	(0.3436)	(0.2998)	(0.2183)
Constant	-1.5448	5.0243**	0.2526	2.3429+
	(1.8337)	(1.7438)	(1.8403)	(1.2940)
Observations	1361	1003	666	1669
Pseudo R^2	0.269	0.287	0.215	0.233
BIC	63027597.0306	50969047.9155	42078135.4278	96061465.9057

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B5b: Intereligious by Online-vs-Offline, By Internet Eras
(see Appendix Table A2b)

	(1) Early Era	(2) Middle Era
Met Online	0.9078**	0.5554+
	(0.3432)	(0.2862)
Religion (vs Protestant/Other Christian)		
Catholic	0.2223	0.3507
	(0.2682)	(0.3067)
Other Religion	0.5449	0.0073
	(0.4588)	(0.5003)
No Religion	0.7965*	1.0325*
	(0.3533)	(0.4994)
Years Since First Met	-0.0178	-0.1084
	(0.0404)	(0.1046)
Female	-0.0037	-0.0577
	(0.2063)	(0.2645)
Married	-0.7950**	0.4861
	(0.2827)	(0.3813)
Coresident	0.0150	-0.4858
	(0.3246)	(0.3105)
Age	-0.0098	0.0190
	(0.0124)	(0.0146)
Mother's Education Scale	0.0329	-0.0313
	(0.0467)	(0.0627)
# of Children in HH	-0.1113	0.3345*
	(0.0961)	(0.1681)
Race (vs White)		
Black	-0.6965	-0.5698
	(0.5064)	(0.6184)
Hispanic	0.2997	-0.5225
	(0.4253)	(0.5165)
Asian-Pac. Isl.	-0.9200	-1.7313*
	(0.7142)	(0.8097)
Other Race	0.9754	-0.1586
	(0.7539)	(0.8870)
Education	0.0466	-0.0992
	(0.0924)	(0.1162)
Household Income	0.0012	0.0174
	(0.0298)	(0.0331)
Same-Sex Couple	-0.1906	-0.2501
	(0.3937)	(0.5147)

MSA Population	0.0000	-0.0000^{+}
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
% of MSA R's Race	0.0843	-0.1615
	(0.8899)	(1.1426)
% of MSA R's BA	-0.3835	0.4875
	(1.0321)	(1.2867)
MSA Median Inc.	0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
% of MSA R's Relig.	-0.7928	-2.3710*
	(0.7968)	(1.0819)
% of Zipcode R's Race	0.4114	-0.4424
	(0.5970)	(0.7628)
% of Zipcode R's BA Status	-0.7169	-1.1287
	(0.8002)	(0.9783)
Zipcode Mean Income for Age 15+	-0.0000	0.0001
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
District Partisanness	0.0053	-0.0017
	(0.0124)	(0.0156)
Region (vs NE)		
Midwest	-0.2522	-0.1121
	(0.3261)	(0.4102)
South	-0.0239	-0.1867
	(0.3395)	(0.3984)
West	-0.2600	-0.4769
	(0.3427)	(0.3884)
Party (vs Repub.)		
Other	1.0868^{+}	1.2643
	(0.6176)	(1.0714)
Democrat	0.2049	0.6067*
	(0.2191)	(0.2747)
Home Internet	0.0078	0.4238
	(0.3170)	(0.3644)
Previously Married	0.0109	-0.9410*
	(0.2896)	(0.3865)
Constant	-0.1300	1.7177
	(1.8673)	(2.4372)
Observations	815	520
Pseudo R^2	0.099	0.096
BIC	56043963.8646	33664715.4510

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B5c: Cross-BA by Online-vs-Offline, By Internet Eras (see Appendix Table A2b)

	(1) Early Era	(2) Middle Era	(3) Recent Era	(4) Mid+Recent
Met Online	0.8999***	0.3667	0.1470	0.2530
	(0.2417)	(0.2277)	(0.2409)	(0.1636)
Years Since First Met	0.0221	-0.2048+	0.0790	-0.0936
	(0.0577)	(0.1077)	(0.1466)	(0.0682)
Female	-0.1544	0.4607*	0.1047	0.3276*
	(0.1698)	(0.1977)	(0.2354)	(0.1501)
Married	-0.0432	-0.0964	0.2877	0.0047
	(0.2332)	(0.2475)	(0.3342)	(0.2012)
Coresident	-0.1517	-0.0019	-0.0185	0.0687
	(0.2609)	(0.2540)	(0.3071)	(0.1876)
Age	0.0117	0.0193+	0.0194+	0.0187*
	(0.0097)	(0.0109)	(0.0104)	(0.0075)
Mother's Education Scale	0.0225	0.0108	0.0343	0.0189
	(0.0364)	(0.0425)	(0.0488)	(0.0319)
# of Children in HH	-0.0624	0.0195	-0.1467	-0.0467
	(0.0838)	(0.1082)	(0.1330)	(0.0821)
Race (vs White)				
Black	0.3328	1.4614***	0.0689	0.8373**
	(0.3923)	(0.4375)	(0.4344)	(0.3086)
Hispanic	-0.2192	0.2594	-0.2729	0.0189
	(0.3589)	(0.3822)	(0.4333)	(0.2796)
Asian-Pac. Isl.	-1.3899*	-0.3108	0.1059	-0.0609
	(0.5976)	(0.6600)	(0.6508)	(0.4569)
Other Race	0.0817	-1.1580	-0.5057	-0.9046
	(0.5953)	(1.0659)	(0.7714)	(0.7245)
Education	0.0757	0.1028	0.2373*	0.1536*
	(0.0611)	(0.0875)	(0.0969)	(0.0620)
Household Income	0.0432+	0.0336	0.0104	0.0242
	(0.0263)	(0.0263)	(0.0259)	(0.0185)
Same-Sex Couple	-0.1627	0.4053	0.1003	0.2711
	(0.2968)	(0.3160)	(0.3585)	(0.2178)
MSA Population	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
% of MSA R's Race	-0.8379	0.8521	-0.9496	0.0681
	(0.7349)	(0.8181)	(0.8429)	(0.5757)
% of MSA R's BA	1.6543+	-0.2427	-0.1137	-0.1731
	(0.8552)	(0.9781)	(1.1421)	(0.7454)
MSA Median Inc.	0.0000	0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
% of Zipcode R's	0.3139	-0.9091	0.2646	-0.3075

Race				
	(0.4460)	(0.6237)	(0.6007)	(0.4260)
% of Zipcode R's BA	-2.8671***	-1.3995+	-1.0979	-1.2047*
Status				
	(0.6358)	(0.7175)	(0.8580)	(0.5441)
Zipcode Mean	-0.0000	-0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Income for Age 15+				
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
District Partisanness	0.0083	-0.0218+	-0.0102	-0.0138+
	(0.0093)	(0.0112)	(0.0119)	(0.0080)
Retrospective	0.1088	-0.3017	-0.4976	-0.3747
Relationship				
	(0.6109)	(0.5471)	(0.4024)	(0.2886)
Sample Year=2017	-0.0579	0.2319		-0.2286
	(0.3541)	(0.5680)		(0.2376)
Region (vs NE)				
Midwest	-0.1676	-0.3492	0.1264	-0.1959
	(0.2637)	(0.3430)	(0.3909)	(0.2553)
South	-0.1626	-0.1526	-0.0928	-0.1492
	(0.2644)	(0.3205)	(0.3704)	(0.2361)
West	-0.1320	0.0756	0.1039	0.0539
	(0.2754)	(0.3198)	(0.3887)	(0.2445)
Relationship	-0.0327	0.1531+	-0.0511	0.0690
Duration				
	(0.0493)	(0.0911)	(0.1580)	(0.0707)
Party (vs Repub.)				
Other	-0.2595	-1.2428	0.4094	-0.1750
	(0.5585)	(0.8210)	(0.6072)	(0.4891)
Democrat	-0.2300	-0.1400	0.0420	-0.0609
	(0.1855)	(0.2219)	(0.2640)	(0.1651)
Home Internet	-0.2624	0.0185		0.0507
	(0.3052)	(0.3937)		(0.3667)
Previously Married	-0.0352	-0.0866	0.1935	0.0752
	(0.2287)	(0.2967)	(0.3116)	(0.2068)
Constant	-1.3511	-2.5785	-2.8464	-2.5242*
	(1.3784)	(1.7180)	(1.8153)	(1.2214)
Observations	1362	1003	667	1670
Pseudo R^2	0.087	0.122	0.120	0.099
BIC	83910122.7921	58368306.3303	42476646.9419	1.0336e+08

Standard errors in parentheses
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B5d: Absolute Age Difference by Online-vs-Offline, By Internet Eras

	(1) Early Era	(2) Middle Era	(3) Recent Era	(4) Mid+Recent
Met Online	-0.2872	-0.5184	-1.4571**	-0.8798**
	(0.5758)	(0.3981)	(0.4937)	(0.3239)
Years Since First Met	-0.0963	-0.1751	-0.1317	-0.2739*
	(0.1576)	(0.1884)	(0.2556)	(0.1075)
Female	0.1197	0.4824	-0.7527	-0.0285
	(0.3480)	(0.3261)	(0.4671)	(0.2691)
Married	-0.6792	0.9265*	0.7495	0.9197*
	(0.5462)	(0.4340)	(0.7394)	(0.4002)
Coresident	0.5564	-0.2400	0.7029	0.1404
	(0.6933)	(0.4518)	(0.5959)	(0.3745)
Age	0.0638*	0.1488***	0.1385***	0.1444***
	(0.0276)	(0.0265)	(0.0419)	(0.0261)
Mother's Education Scale	0.0505	0.0242	-0.3166*	-0.1179
	(0.1047)	(0.0819)	(0.1364)	(0.0771)
# of Children in HH	-0.3787*	0.4381*	-0.1923	0.1261
	(0.1769)	(0.1891)	(0.2298)	(0.1437)
Race (vs White)				
Black	-1.3778	-1.3433+	-0.5261	-0.7795
	(0.9918)	(0.7590)	(0.9619)	(0.6111)
Hispanic	-0.3930	-0.2170	0.2195	-0.0241
	(0.8040)	(0.6832)	(0.9525)	(0.5927)
Asian-Pac. Isl.	0.4692	0.9450	0.7447	0.7558
	(1.5787)	(0.8162)	(1.4827)	(0.7679)
Other Race	-0.7833	-1.0622	-0.3470	-0.8136
	(1.2491)	(1.4092)	(1.7329)	(1.1994)
Education	0.0420	-0.1163	0.2719	0.0751
	(0.1743)	(0.1591)	(0.2976)	(0.1732)
Household Income	-0.0311	-0.0840+	-0.1564**	-0.1222***
	(0.0561)	(0.0451)	(0.0578)	(0.0361)
Same-Sex Couple	0.0697	1.0896+	1.9383**	1.5785***
	(0.8048)	(0.6383)	(0.6405)	(0.4551)
MSA Population	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
% of MSA R's Race	-2.4273	-1.0168	2.3145	0.6127
	(1.7219)	(1.2627)	(2.1077)	(1.1791)
% of MSA R's BA	3.4930+	-0.3047	-0.1668	0.3452
	(2.1191)	(1.6555)	(2.2965)	(1.4094)
MSA Median Inc.	-0.0001*	-0.0000	0.0000	-0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0000)
% of Zipcode R's Race	-0.5678	0.4485	-2.7717+	-1.0181

	(1.0717)	(0.8931)	(1.5720)	(0.8689)
% of Zipcode R's BA Status	-0.2195	0.8384	-0.2391	-0.0456
	(1.5940)	(1.1789)	(1.6172)	(0.9877)
Zipcode Mean Income for Age 15+	0.0000	-0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
District Partisanness	-0.0064	0.0227	0.0206	0.0182
	(0.0193)	(0.0176)	(0.0292)	(0.0173)
Retrospective Relationship	1.4217	1.3683	0.3412	0.7936
	(1.5854)	(1.1371)	(0.6969)	(0.5715)
Sample Year=2017	-0.4933	-1.4419		0.0169
	(0.6340)	(1.0695)		(0.4538)
Region (vs NE)				
Midwest	-0.2841	0.0451	-1.0691	-0.4310
	(0.6168)	(0.5333)	(0.7099)	(0.4152)
South	-0.2941	0.1798	-0.9386	-0.3221
	(0.6379)	(0.5605)	(0.6550)	(0.4161)
West	0.0603	-0.1894	-0.8193	-0.4865
	(0.6575)	(0.5301)	(0.7861)	(0.4329)
Relationship Duration	0.0655	0.2533^{+}	-0.0876	0.1494
	(0.1384)	(0.1493)	(0.2699)	(0.1097)
Party (vs Repub.)				
Other	0.3372	2.2456	3.4110	2.6607^{+}
	(1.1459)	(1.3931)	(2.5882)	(1.4976)
Democrat	0.1061	0.7290^{+}	-0.0266	0.3662
	(0.4440)	(0.3873)	(0.5235)	(0.3145)
Home Internet	-1.9601^{*}	-0.4995		-0.5419
	(0.9055)	(0.7911)		(0.8204)
Previously Married	0.4502	0.3912	0.6392	0.4148
	(0.5275)	(0.6198)	(1.0517)	(0.6178)
Constant	6.4817^{+}	1.2095	3.1090	2.2245
	(3.6261)	(2.7740)	(4.2555)	(2.4762)
Observations	1356	999	662	1661
R^2	0.105	0.204	0.230	0.189
BIC	8706.7369	6035.1512	4265.1245	10201.4666

Standard errors in parentheses

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B6a: Exogamy by Online-vs-Offline, Full Sample with Current MSA Data (see Models 1 in Appendix Table A3)

	(1) Interracial	(2) Different BA Status	(3) Age Difference
Met Online	0.4092**	0.3891**	-0.6290*
	(0.1522)	(0.1353)	(0.2831)
Female	-0.0714	0.1458	0.1079
	(0.1237)	(0.1088)	(0.2200)
Married	-0.3521*	0.0002	0.3227
	(0.1685)	(0.1470)	(0.3263)
Coresident	0.0529	-0.0020	0.4389
	(0.1662)	(0.1471)	(0.3313)
Age	0.0011	0.0152**	0.1167***
	(0.0062)	(0.0057)	(0.0195)
Years Since First Met	-0.0451	0.0339	-0.1421+
	(0.0448)	(0.0325)	(0.0843)
Mother's Education	0.0433+	0.0080	-0.0430
	(0.0259)	(0.0249)	(0.0662)
# of Children in HH	-0.0243	-0.0883	-0.1132
	(0.0638)	(0.0575)	(0.1099)
Race (vs White)			
Black	-0.4150	0.5894*	-0.9945+
	(0.2538)	(0.2389)	(0.5669)
Hispanic	1.2736***	-0.0784	-0.1666
	(0.1977)	(0.2125)	(0.4984)
Asian-Pacific Islander	-0.0113	-0.5119	0.4957
	(0.3173)	(0.3654)	(0.7899)
Other Race	1.6664***	-0.3661	-0.4757
	(0.4168)	(0.4557)	(0.9098)
Education	-0.0754	0.1244**	0.0839
	(0.0513)	(0.0432)	(0.1255)
Household Income	0.0079	0.0295+	-0.1036**
	(0.0157)	(0.0151)	(0.0319)
Same-Sex Couple	-0.0786	0.1049	1.0972**
	(0.1926)	(0.1766)	(0.4055)
MSA Median Inc.	0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0001*
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
MSA Population	-0.0000**	-0.0000	0.0000+
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
% of MSA R's Race	-3.2702***	-0.3550	-1.3476
	(0.3824)	(0.3602)	(0.8320)
% of MSA R's BA	-0.3769	-1.1858**	1.5595+
	(0.4534)	(0.3884)	(0.9048)
District Partisanness	0.0035	-0.0061	0.0057

	(0.0066)	(0.0061)	(0.0130)
Retrospective Relationship	0.1479	-0.6170*	0.4886
	(0.2664)	(0.2464)	(0.5412)
Region (vs NE)			
Midwest	-0.1927	-0.2181	-0.3944
	(0.2229)	(0.1793)	(0.3612)
South	-0.4323*	-0.1904	-0.2739
	(0.2035)	(0.1703)	(0.3525)
West	-0.1011	-0.0373	-0.1699
	(0.1981)	(0.1758)	(0.3593)
Relationship Duration	0.0301	-0.0551+	0.0439
	(0.0458)	(0.0333)	(0.0838)
Party (vs Repub.)			
Other	-0.0590	-0.2468	1.7590+
	(0.3877)	(0.3594)	(1.0130)
Democrat	-0.1217	-0.1521	0.2728
	(0.1387)	(0.1210)	(0.2656)
Home Internet	0.2998	-0.2120	-1.3468*
	(0.2892)	(0.2137)	(0.6418)
Previously Married	-0.2190	0.0462	0.5114
	(0.1762)	(0.1499)	(0.4238)
Constant	0.8897	-1.8143*	3.6701+
	(0.9975)	(0.8711)	(2.0815)
Observations	3030	3032	3017
Adjusted R^2			0.119
Pseudo R^2	0.217	0.068	
BIC	1.6654e+08	1.9267e+08	18746.0024

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B6b: Exogamy by Online-vs-Offline, 2017 Sample with Current MSA Data (see Models 2 in Appendix Table A3)

	(1) Interracial	(2) Different BA Status	(4) Age Difference
Met Online	0.3525^{+}	0.4206*	-0.8478*
	(0.1906)	(0.1711)	(0.3450)
Female	-0.0854	-0.0482	-0.0512
	(0.1547)	(0.1441)	(0.2661)
Married	-0.2572	-0.1199	0.3612
	(0.2150)	(0.1944)	(0.3988)
Coresident	-0.2573	0.1492	0.7035^{+}
	(0.2043)	(0.1990)	(0.4157)
Age	-0.0053	0.0226**	0.1435***
	(0.0070)	(0.0070)	(0.0262)
Years Since First Met	-0.0365	0.0219	-0.1908*
	(0.0444)	(0.0345)	(0.0885)
Mother's Education Scale	0.0572^{+}	0.0082	-0.0865
	(0.0316)	(0.0318)	(0.0714)
# of Children in HH	-0.0060	-0.0170	-0.0203
	(0.0779)	(0.0721)	(0.1232)
Race (vs White)			
Black	-0.6547*	0.9127**	-0.5889
	(0.3218)	(0.3188)	(0.6245)
Hispanic	0.7745**	0.0956	-0.0955
	(0.2514)	(0.2831)	(0.5599)
Asian-Pacific Islander	0.3067	0.0818	0.0469
	(0.4021)	(0.4488)	(0.7366)
Other Race	0.8420	0.0423	1.3183
	(0.5176)	(0.6242)	(1.1305)
Education	-0.0201	0.1393**	0.1031
	(0.0590)	(0.0540)	(0.1440)
Household Income	-0.0207	0.0371*	-0.1123**
	(0.0184)	(0.0186)	(0.0349)
Same-Sex Couple	0.1029	0.1541	1.6548***
	(0.2391)	(0.2277)	(0.4888)
MSA Median Inc.	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
MSA Population	-0.0000*	-0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
% of MSA R's Race	-3.5419***	0.1632	-0.1853
	(0.4894)	(0.4722)	(0.8398)
% of MSA R's BA	-0.2867	-0.6529	1.0550
	(0.5599)	(0.5131)	(1.0288)

District Partisanness	0.0005	-0.0035	0.0187
	(0.0079)	(0.0078)	(0.0170)
Retrospective Relationship	0.0845	-0.5079^{+}	0.5520
	(0.2744)	(0.2714)	(0.5887)
Region (vs NE)			
Midwest	-0.2749	0.0248	-0.8114^{+}
	(0.2730)	(0.2436)	(0.4512)
South	-0.6161*	-0.0649	-0.7428^{+}
	(0.2508)	(0.2319)	(0.4248)
West	-0.2499	0.1003	-0.6099
	(0.2502)	(0.2479)	(0.4728)
Relationship Duration	0.0389	-0.0485	0.0308
	(0.0459)	(0.0357)	(0.0865)
Party (vs Repub.)			
Other	0.5333	-0.3948	2.3632^{+}
	(0.4162)	(0.4424)	(1.3704)
Democrat	-0.1232	-0.2372	-0.1210
	(0.1831)	(0.1683)	(0.3168)
Home Internet	-0.8656	-0.3810	0.0150
	(0.8925)	(1.0008)	(1.4743)
Previously Married	-0.0448	0.0344	0.3433
	(0.2017)	(0.1916)	(0.5733)
Constant	3.0445*	-2.8424^{+}	1.1251
	(1.4118)	(1.4550)	(2.5977)
Observations	1579	1579	1571
Adjusted R^2			0.146
Pseudo R^2	0.178	0.070	
BIC	1.0184e+08	1.0670e+08	9679.2588

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B6c: Exogamy by Online-vs-Offline, 2017 Sample with MSA When Met Data (see Models 3 in Appendix Table A3)

	(1) Interracial	(2) Different BA Status	(4) Age Difference
Met Online	0.4040*	0.4379*	-0.8454*
	(0.1911)	(0.1703)	(0.3405)
Female	-0.0373	-0.0362	-0.0498
	(0.1546)	(0.1439)	(0.2654)
Married	-0.2254	-0.0991	0.3648
	(0.2138)	(0.1965)	(0.3979)
Coresident	-0.3365+	0.1361	0.6721
	(0.2010)	(0.2027)	(0.4090)
Age	-0.0056	0.0230**	0.1461***
	(0.0070)	(0.0071)	(0.0267)
Years Since First Met	-0.0239	0.0288	-0.1790*
	(0.0453)	(0.0362)	(0.0882)
Mother's Education	0.0519+	0.0121	-0.0867
	(0.0312)	(0.0322)	(0.0713)
# of Children in HH	-0.0068	-0.0156	-0.0308
	(0.0759)	(0.0716)	(0.1214)
Race (vs White)			
Black	-0.7326*	0.9190**	-0.7088
	(0.3245)	(0.3307)	(0.6375)
Hispanic	0.5897*	0.1027	-0.2329
	(0.2768)	(0.2884)	(0.5458)
Asian-Pacific Islander	0.0165	0.0499	-0.1151
	(0.4221)	(0.4720)	(0.7994)
Other Race	0.8089	0.0258	1.0954
	(0.5417)	(0.6315)	(1.1032)
Education	-0.0090	0.1939***	0.1680
	(0.0614)	(0.0581)	(0.1450)
Household Income	-0.0175	0.0370*	-0.1122**
	(0.0184)	(0.0182)	(0.0344)
Same-Sex Couple	0.1233	0.1632	1.6150**
	(0.2431)	(0.2288)	(0.4901)
MSA Median Inc.	-0.0000**	-0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
MSA Population	-3.5651***	0.1448	-0.6649
	(0.4877)	(0.4816)	(0.9051)
% of MSA R's Race	0.0795	0.0713	1.7744+
	(0.5292)	(0.5127)	(0.9100)
% of MSA R's BA	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
District Partisanness	0.0149	-0.0132	0.0316

	(0.0123)	(0.0131)	(0.0252)
Retrospective	0.1043	-0.4880^{+}	0.5557
Relationship			
	(0.2751)	(0.2692)	(0.5898)
Region (vs NE)			
Midwest	-0.3477	0.0142	-0.8676^{+}
	(0.2712)	(0.2421)	(0.4796)
South	-0.6865**	-0.0954	-0.8329^{+}
	(0.2449)	(0.2275)	(0.4649)
West	-0.2256	0.1246	-0.7017
	(0.2453)	(0.2393)	(0.5088)
Relationship Duration	0.0514	-0.0466	0.0339
	(0.0458)	(0.0353)	(0.0866)
Party (vs Repub.)			
Other	0.4136	-0.4193	2.3163^{+}
	(0.4617)	(0.4389)	(1.3609)
Democrat	-0.1474	-0.2565	-0.1073
	(0.1828)	(0.1668)	(0.3135)
Home Internet	-0.8059	-0.4761	-0.1568
	(0.9448)	(0.9583)	(1.5101)
Previously Married	-0.0439	0.0205	0.2254
	(0.2038)	(0.1913)	(0.5903)
Constant	2.2471	-3.9867**	0.5377
	(1.4349)	(1.3884)	(2.6901)
Observations	1579	1579	1571
Adjusted R^2			0.147
Pseudo R^2	0.182	0.070	
BIC	1.0138e+08	1.0678e+08	9677.2433

Standard errors in parentheses

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B7: Endogamy by Online-vs-Offline, with Metro-Area Fixed Effects (see Appendix Table A4)

	(1) Interracial	(2) Different BA Status	(3) Different Mother's BA	(4) Age Difference	(5) Different Political Party	(6) Interreligious
Met Online	0.4887***	0.3651**	0.2479+	-0.9237**	0.0874	0.2327
	(0.1463)	(0.1289)	(0.1328)	(0.3110)	(0.1185)	(0.1911)
Female	-0.2024+	0.1008	0.0619	-0.2856	0.1321	0.0095
	(0.1228)	(0.1076)	(0.1093)	(0.2537)	(0.0967)	(0.1485)
Married	-0.1461	0.0033	0.0243	0.4907	-0.3528**	-0.5048*
	(0.1662)	(0.1474)	(0.1529)	(0.3454)	(0.1326)	(0.1980)
Coresident	0.0611	0.0770	-0.2548+	-0.2049	-0.1290	-0.1179
	(0.1583)	(0.1433)	(0.1473)	(0.3347)	(0.1277)	(0.1961)
Age	-0.0010	0.0121*	-0.0071	0.1456***	0.0024	0.0046
	(0.0064)	(0.0056)	(0.0060)	(0.0133)	(0.0051)	(0.0086)
Years Since First Met	-0.0331	0.0222	0.1068***	-0.1505+	0.0133	-0.0115
	(0.0393)	(0.0331)	(0.0322)	(0.0803)	(0.0304)	(0.0226)
Mother's Education Scale	0.0238	0.0471*	0.2424***	-0.0111	-0.0438*	-0.0185
	(0.0249)	(0.0237)	(0.0277)	(0.0542)	(0.0209)	(0.0327)
# of Children in HH	-0.0854	-0.0202	0.0046	-0.0864	-0.0261	-0.0262
	(0.0629)	(0.0570)	(0.0577)	(0.1330)	(0.0500)	(0.0851)
Race (vs White)						
Black	0.3201	0.6365***	0.0135	-0.5944	-0.5173**	-0.2293
	(0.2060)	(0.1922)	(0.2058)	(0.4646)	(0.1810)	(0.2725)
Hispanic	1.4575***	0.2001	0.2103	0.0904	0.1304	0.1471
	(0.1846)	(0.1899)	(0.2008)	(0.4442)	(0.1676)	(0.2667)
Asian-Pac. Isl.	0.6550*	-0.2408	0.5680+	1.6771*	0.4569	-0.0528
	(0.2867)	(0.3223)	(0.3094)	(0.7357)	(0.2792)	(0.4726)
Other Race	2.3707***	-0.1148	0.0461	-0.3452	0.3352	0.0343
	(0.3699)	(0.3345)	(0.3352)	(0.7441)	(0.2796)	(0.3780)
Education	-0.0590	0.0470	0.1680***	-0.0319	-0.0477	-0.0711

	(0.0448)	(0.0413)	(0.0440)	(0.0930)	(0.0352)	(0.0596)
Household Income	0.0078	0.0103	0.0340*	-0.1275***	-0.0426***	-0.0013
	(0.0156)	(0.0143)	(0.0145)	(0.0329)	(0.0124)	(0.0212)
Same-Sex Couple	-0.0200	0.1543	-0.2687	1.3521**	-0.6784***	-0.0324
	(0.2002)	(0.1737)	(0.1804)	(0.4211)	(0.1638)	(0.2339)
% of Zipcode R's Race	-1.9972***	0.0287	-0.0704	-0.7146	0.2344	0.0891
	(0.2607)	(0.2447)	(0.2556)	(0.5721)	(0.2183)	(0.3326)
% of Zipcode R's BA Status	-0.1800	-1.7513***	-0.3656	-0.2877	0.0175	-0.2353
	(0.3171)	(0.2826)	(0.2879)	(0.6752)	(0.2563)	(0.3992)
Zipcode Mean Income for Age 15+	-0.0000	-0.0000*	-0.0000	-0.0000	0.0000	-0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0001)
District Partisanness	-0.0044	0.0045	0.0035	-0.0018	-0.0105+	-0.0051
	(0.0070)	(0.0067)	(0.0066)	(0.0156)	(0.0060)	(0.0093)
Retrospective Relationship	0.2458	-0.1084	-0.0353	0.7704	-0.0731	
	(0.2628)	(0.2535)	(0.2473)	(0.5882)	(0.2214)	
Relationship Duration	0.0150	-0.0262	-0.1061**	0.0581	-0.0249	
	(0.0404)	(0.0342)	(0.0334)	(0.0828)	(0.0313)	
Party (vs Repub.)						
Other	0.3378	-0.4840	-0.7418	2.5044**	-1.1715***	0.8467
	(0.3666)	(0.3940)	(0.4616)	(0.8227)	(0.3396)	(0.5191)
Democrat	0.1184	-0.1428	-0.1127	0.1770	-0.3614***	0.1268
	(0.1390)	(0.1219)	(0.1218)	(0.2868)	(0.1069)	(0.1665)
Home Internet	0.0305	-0.3699+	0.5010+	-0.0320	0.2263	0.3227
	(0.3109)	(0.2241)	(0.2707)	(0.5650)	(0.2143)	(0.2487)
Previously Married	-0.1998	0.0513	0.0272	0.0238	-0.2543+	0.0441
	(0.1703)	(0.1447)	(0.1535)	(0.3456)	(0.1330)	(0.1987)
Religion (vs Protestant/Other						

Christian)						
Catholic						0.6089**
						(0.1893)
Other Religion						1.4719***
						(0.2626)
No Religion						0.7695***
						(0.1974)
Observations	2015	2166	2125	2446	2233	972
MSA N	198	227	224	343	254	118
R^2				0.131		
Pseudo R^2	0.211	0.078	0.130		0.062	0.082
BIC	1652.6432	1997.9630	1940.1323	15184.5106	2361.8687	1119.9386

Standard errors in parentheses

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B8: Racial Endogamy by Online-vs-Offline, Alternate Measures of Interracial (see Appendix Table A5)

	(1) Interracial	(2) Micro-Interracial	(5) Black & Not	(3) White & Not	(6) Hispanic & Not	(4) Black-White
Met Online	0.4196**	0.3606*	0.6232*	0.3537*	0.2365	0.9200**
	(0.1545)	(0.1626)	(0.2547)	(0.1672)	(0.1960)	(0.2977)
Race (vs White)						
Black	-0.3167					1.9398***
	(0.2589)					(0.5641)
Hispanic	1.2110***					
	(0.2038)					
Asian-Pac. Isl.	-0.0246					
	(0.3204)					
Other Race	1.5283***					
	(0.4260)					
Race (vs White-NH)						
White-Hispanic		1.4605***				
		(0.2335)				
Black-NH		-0.0016				
		(0.2679)				
Black-Hispanic		4.6120***				
		(1.0890)				
Native Am.-NH		1.1167+				
		(0.6153)				
Native Am.-Hisp.		2.5918***				
		(0.7831)				
Asian-NH		0.1551				
		(0.3236)				
Asian-Hispanic		0.0000				
		(.)				
Other Race-NH		2.5755***				
		(0.5020)				

Other Race-Hisp.		2.6115***				
		(0.3022)				
Black at all			1.6995***			
			(0.2857)			
White at all				-0.5789**		
				(0.1958)		
Hispanic at all					2.4004***	
					(0.1841)	
Female	-0.0636	-0.0330	0.1346	0.2255+	-0.2877+	0.3353
	(0.1263)	(0.1294)	(0.2051)	(0.1356)	(0.1552)	(0.2623)
Married	-0.3535*	-0.3355+	-0.5853*	-0.1666	-0.2333	-0.1324
	(0.1706)	(0.1789)	(0.2770)	(0.1925)	(0.2095)	(0.3450)
Coresident	0.0241	-0.0206	-0.1461	0.0906	0.0208	0.0555
	(0.1700)	(0.1757)	(0.2707)	(0.1935)	(0.2093)	(0.3374)
Age	0.0005	-0.0034	-0.0103	-0.0172*	-0.0058	0.0008
	(0.0065)	(0.0069)	(0.0104)	(0.0075)	(0.0084)	(0.0140)
Years Since First Met	-0.0386	-0.0428	0.0757	-0.0280	-0.1428*	0.0682
	(0.0461)	(0.0500)	(0.0613)	(0.0541)	(0.0631)	(0.0867)
Mother's Education Scale	0.0382	0.0322	0.0076	-0.0206	0.0566+	0.0125
	(0.0262)	(0.0273)	(0.0396)	(0.0283)	(0.0319)	(0.0620)
# of Children in HH	-0.0239	-0.0620	0.0406	-0.2423**	0.0255	-0.1312
	(0.0647)	(0.0673)	(0.1080)	(0.0796)	(0.0777)	(0.1426)

Education	-0.0773	-0.0684	-0.0642	-0.0776	-0.0843	-0.0750
	(0.0512)	(0.0545)	(0.0707)	(0.0537)	(0.0646)	(0.1016)
Household Income	0.0068	0.0095	-0.0129	0.0083	-0.0008	-0.0052
	(0.0161)	(0.0171)	(0.0249)	(0.0173)	(0.0198)	(0.0353)
Same-Sex Couple	-0.1017	0.1082	-0.8223*	0.3209	-0.0301	-0.1321
	(0.1944)	(0.2062)	(0.3289)	(0.1963)	(0.2778)	(0.3854)
MSA Population	-0.0000*	-0.0000*	-0.0000	0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
% of MSA R's Race	-1.6699**	-1.2155*	-0.0085	0.4817	-0.6453	2.3789*
	(0.5155)	(0.5227)	(0.7061)	(0.5165)	(0.5741)	(1.1244)
% of MSA R's BA	-0.5495	-0.2629	-0.3643	0.1626	-0.5197	0.4004
	(0.6155)	(0.6329)	(1.0244)	(0.6947)	(0.7997)	(1.4427)
MSA Median Inc.	0.0000	0.0000	-0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
% of Zipcode R's Race	-1.7039***	-1.7258***	-1.8262***	-1.9432***	-1.7009***	-2.2041***
	(0.3436)	(0.3497)	(0.5045)	(0.3912)	(0.4682)	(0.6340)
% of Zipcode R's BA Status	0.1184	0.1025	0.8231	0.5325	-0.0163	-0.0679
	(0.4430)	(0.4652)	(0.7531)	(0.4992)	(0.5811)	(1.0279)
Zipcode Mean Income for Age 15+	-0.0000	-0.0000	0.0000	-0.0000	0.0000	-0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
District Partisanness	0.0075	0.0087	0.0164	-0.0035	0.0120	0.0207
	(0.0066)	(0.0070)	(0.0111)	(0.0078)	(0.0081)	(0.0145)
Retrospective Relationship	0.1598	0.0685	-0.5378	0.0560	0.8160*	-0.0936
	(0.2775)	(0.2924)	(0.4326)	(0.3198)	(0.3407)	(0.6037)
Sample Year=2017	0.0360	0.1597	0.1620	0.1726	-0.3247	0.3887
	(0.1812)	(0.1857)	(0.3233)	(0.1946)	(0.2250)	(0.3848)
Region (vs NE)						
Midwest	-0.1848	-0.2095	-0.9927*	-0.1138	-0.4281	-0.8893*
	(0.2237)	(0.2373)	(0.4095)	(0.2463)	(0.2712)	(0.4490)

South	-0.4538*	-0.3652	-0.4514	-0.3379	-0.3954	-0.5227
	(0.2100)	(0.2230)	(0.3025)	(0.2377)	(0.2439)	(0.4424)
West	-0.0930	0.0761	-0.8401*	0.2954	-0.1844	-0.6741
	(0.2031)	(0.2167)	(0.3319)	(0.2240)	(0.2314)	(0.4955)
Relationship Duration	0.0242	0.0408	-0.0585	0.0377	0.1417*	-0.0375
	(0.0472)	(0.0507)	(0.0626)	(0.0549)	(0.0633)	(0.0877)
Party (vs Repub.)						
Other	-0.0019	-0.0245	0.4555	0.3686	-0.3468	-0.1743
	(0.3839)	(0.3911)	(0.5402)	(0.3448)	(0.4518)	(0.8928)
Democrat	-0.1236	-0.0296	0.2107	0.0087	-0.4383**	0.0241
	(0.1401)	(0.1435)	(0.2612)	(0.1635)	(0.1679)	(0.3163)
Home Internet	0.2636	0.2040	-0.0803	-0.1433	-0.0682	-0.6288
	(0.3038)	(0.2989)	(0.4384)	(0.3021)	(0.3770)	(0.4504)
Previously Married	-0.2074	-0.2329	-0.3132	-0.1876	0.0809	-0.4376
	(0.1788)	(0.1878)	(0.3134)	(0.1996)	(0.2240)	(0.3944)
Constant	1.1306	0.6328	-1.0232	0.3701	-0.1208	-3.4147
	(0.9967)	(1.0460)	(1.5278)	(1.0437)	(1.1854)	(2.2660)
Observations	3030	3009	3017	3017	3031	2419
Pseudo R^2	0.229	0.287	0.200	0.100	0.289	0.122
BIC	1.6404e+08	1.5792e+08	74174931.7145	1.3865e+08	1.1706e+08	40788965.3807

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B9a: Endogamy by Online-vs-Offline, without Post-Couple-Meeting Controls (see Appendix Table A6)

	(1) Interracial	(2) Different BA Status	(3) Different Mother's BA	(4) Age Difference	(5) Different Political Party	(6) Interreligious
Met Online	0.3566*	0.4357**	0.0012	-0.6893*	0.1027	0.5279*
	(0.1541)	(0.1346)	(0.1369)	(0.2798)	(0.1161)	(0.2092)
Female	-0.0671	0.1329	0.0798	0.1174	0.1366	0.0039
	(0.1230)	(0.1074)	(0.1070)	(0.2247)	(0.0914)	(0.1659)
Age	0.0011	0.0168**	-0.0124*	0.1338***	0.0007	0.0039
	(0.0062)	(0.0052)	(0.0060)	(0.0182)	(0.0047)	(0.0082)
Years Since First Met	-0.0340**	-0.0098	-0.0092	-0.0975***	-0.0291**	-0.0571**
	(0.0121)	(0.0107)	(0.0107)	(0.0268)	(0.0090)	(0.0214)
Mother's Education Scale	0.0426+	0.0194	0.2641***	-0.0555	-0.0421*	0.0099
	(0.0255)	(0.0243)	(0.0388)	(0.0673)	(0.0206)	(0.0382)
Race (vs White)						
Black	-0.3047	0.5742*	-0.1762	-0.7121	-0.3860+	-0.6788+
	(0.2555)	(0.2366)	(0.2484)	(0.5602)	(0.2188)	(0.3986)
Hispanic	1.1956***	-0.0661	-0.0921	-0.2351	0.3512+	-0.1896
	(0.2021)	(0.2118)	(0.2047)	(0.5080)	(0.1798)	(0.3497)
Asian-Pac. Isl.	-0.1277	-0.3757	0.0653	0.2571	0.2522	-0.8838
	(0.3193)	(0.3563)	(0.3236)	(0.7536)	(0.2793)	(0.5396)
Other Race	1.5644***	-0.3166	-0.2980	-0.5704	0.0148	0.6906
	(0.4245)	(0.4645)	(0.4138)	(0.9060)	(0.3442)	(0.6486)
Education	-0.0688	0.1412**	0.2181***	-0.0283	-0.0785*	-0.0779
	(0.0503)	(0.0443)	(0.0503)	(0.1151)	(0.0360)	(0.0748)
Same-Sex Couple	-0.0344	0.0962	-0.0344	1.2236**	-0.5647***	-0.0060
	(0.1859)	(0.1707)	(0.1861)	(0.3963)	(0.1631)	(0.2647)
MSA Population	-0.0000*	-0.0000	0.0000	0.0000+	-0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
% of MSA R's Race	-1.6566**	-0.3152	-0.7853+	-0.5673	0.2272	0.0570

	(0.5098)	(0.4379)	(0.4478)	(1.0512)	(0.3957)	(0.7103)
% of MSA R's BA	-0.2752	0.6439	0.2246	1.1522	-0.1505	0.4329
	(0.6115)	(0.5478)	(0.5513)	(1.2345)	(0.4537)	(0.8345)
MSA Median Inc.	0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0001**	0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
% of Zipcode R's Race	-1.6922***	0.0576	0.1438	-0.9625	0.0328	0.0250
	(0.3437)	(0.2903)	(0.3103)	(0.6808)	(0.2693)	(0.4875)
% of Zipcode R's BA Status	0.0088	-1.9580***	-0.4102	0.3226	0.3055	-0.9733
	(0.4372)	(0.4000)	(0.3902)	(0.8850)	(0.3413)	(0.6384)
Zipcode Mean Income for Age 15+	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0001)
District Partisanness	0.0070	-0.0046	-0.0071	0.0078	-0.0049	0.0077
	(0.0066)	(0.0060)	(0.0061)	(0.0131)	(0.0053)	(0.0099)
Sample Year=2017	0.2499	-0.2014	0.1599	-0.4354	0.2224+	
	(0.1666)	(0.1459)	(0.1479)	(0.3301)	(0.1255)	
Region (vs NE)						
Midwest	-0.1528	-0.2149	-0.1570	-0.2797	-0.3162*	-0.1977
	(0.2212)	(0.1799)	(0.1767)	(0.3622)	(0.1514)	(0.2611)
South	-0.4322*	-0.1341	-0.0951	-0.2943	-0.3429*	-0.0298
	(0.2079)	(0.1712)	(0.1706)	(0.3614)	(0.1514)	(0.2590)
West	-0.0675	-0.0257	-0.1449	-0.2541	-0.2561+	-0.4273+
	(0.2005)	(0.1780)	(0.1758)	(0.3634)	(0.1543)	(0.2542)
Party (vs Repub.)						
Other	-0.0641	-0.1751	-0.7196	1.9354+	-1.3848***	1.0807*
	(0.3841)	(0.3565)	(0.4733)	(1.0142)	(0.3568)	(0.5122)
Democrat	-0.0635	-0.1565	-0.0321	0.2296	-0.2282*	0.3337+
	(0.1369)	(0.1203)	(0.1150)	(0.2650)	(0.0997)	(0.1765)
Previously Married	-0.2254	0.0429	0.1739	0.3340	-0.1378	-0.2686
	(0.1766)	(0.1475)	(0.1505)	(0.4214)	(0.1279)	(0.2321)
Religion (vs						

Protestant/Other Christian)						
Catholic						0.9552***
						(0.2150)
Other Religion						0.8669**
						(0.3362)
No Religion						1.7908***
						(0.2949)
% of MSA R's Religion						-2.2993**
						(0.7075)
Constant	1.1018	-2.2666**	-4.5754***	3.3247+	1.1475	0.6405
	(0.9670)	(0.8334)	(0.9647)	(1.8834)	(0.7391)	(1.5073)
Observations	3068	3070	3026	3055	3053	1335
Adjusted R^2				0.114		
Pseudo R^2	0.223	0.074	0.116		0.035	0.122
BIC	1.6870e+08	1.9447e+08	1.9166e+08	19066.6535	2.5578e+08	85948584.4559

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table B9b: Endogamy by Online-vs-Offline, without Local Diversity Controls (see Appendix Table A6)

	(1) Interracial	(2) Different BA Status	(3) Different Mother's BA	(4) Age Difference	(5) Different Political Party	(6) Interreligious
Met Online	0.4173**	0.4118**	0.0223	-0.5495+	0.1059	0.6189**
	(0.1456)	(0.1339)	(0.1384)	(0.2833)	(0.1167)	(0.2188)
Female	-0.0890	0.1315	0.0924	0.0726	0.1260	-0.0082
	(0.1201)	(0.1081)	(0.1087)	(0.2207)	(0.0928)	(0.1674)
Married	-0.3128+	0.0328	0.1134	0.3782	-0.2122	-0.6571**
	(0.1636)	(0.1466)	(0.1619)	(0.3261)	(0.1323)	(0.2242)
Coresident	0.0522	-0.0353	-0.2331	0.4090	-0.0948	-0.1323
	(0.1608)	(0.1483)	(0.1597)	(0.3273)	(0.1290)	(0.2208)
Age	0.0033	0.0160**	-0.0113+	0.1184***	-0.0033	0.0034
	(0.0061)	(0.0058)	(0.0064)	(0.0194)	(0.0051)	(0.0094)
Years Since First Met	-0.0634	0.0294	0.0812*	-0.1466+	0.0515+	-0.0115
	(0.0444)	(0.0324)	(0.0334)	(0.0845)	(0.0283)	(0.0250)
Mother's Education Scale	0.0501+	0.0117	0.2795***	-0.0655	-0.0330	0.0084
	(0.0258)	(0.0247)	(0.0390)	(0.0681)	(0.0210)	(0.0377)
# of Children in HH	-0.0191	-0.0837	-0.0170	-0.1321	-0.0331	0.0803
	(0.0610)	(0.0566)	(0.0545)	(0.1078)	(0.0465)	(0.0876)
Race (vs White)						
Black	1.0815***	0.7348***	0.1470	-0.4505	-0.6042***	-0.7162*
	(0.1917)	(0.1752)	(0.1886)	(0.3716)	(0.1718)	(0.2818)
Hispanic	2.3214***	0.0174	0.1546	0.2361	0.2501+	-0.1666
	(0.1670)	(0.1735)	(0.1719)	(0.4270)	(0.1440)	(0.2870)
Asian-Pac. Isl.	1.6249***	-0.3870	0.3522	1.0253	0.1324	-0.8548+
	(0.2601)	(0.3309)	(0.2916)	(0.7025)	(0.2499)	(0.4629)
Other Race	3.3916***	-0.2135	0.0038	0.2659	-0.1825	0.5221
	(0.3784)	(0.3999)	(0.3554)	(0.8069)	(0.2921)	(0.5086)
Education	-0.0351	0.2246***	0.1983***	-0.0224	-0.0299	0.0075

	(0.0370)	(0.0368)	(0.0375)	(0.0861)	(0.0290)	(0.0510)
Household Income	0.0099	0.0319*	0.0257+	-0.1159***	-0.0574***	0.0004
	(0.0153)	(0.0148)	(0.0138)	(0.0310)	(0.0119)	(0.0225)
Same-Sex Couple	-0.0748	0.1092	-0.0088	1.0295*	-0.7134***	-0.1925
	(0.1927)	(0.1740)	(0.1926)	(0.4025)	(0.1709)	(0.2650)
MSA Population	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	0.0000*	-0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Retrospective Relationship	0.1712	-0.5032*	-0.2777	0.4561	-0.0763	
	(0.2699)	(0.2494)	(0.2412)	(0.5408)	(0.2141)	
Sample Year=2017	0.0279	-0.2053	-0.0056	-0.0367	0.1303	
	(0.1379)	(0.1293)	(0.1266)	(0.2614)	(0.1136)	
Region (vs NE)						
Midwest	-0.2487	-0.2326	-0.1739	-0.3457	-0.3184*	-0.1674
	(0.1956)	(0.1773)	(0.1789)	(0.3583)	(0.1544)	(0.2561)
South	-0.3250+	-0.1598	-0.0955	-0.0166	-0.3676*	-0.0131
	(0.1844)	(0.1632)	(0.1674)	(0.3490)	(0.1480)	(0.2393)
West	-0.0094	-0.0428	-0.1776	-0.0063	-0.2860+	-0.4156+
	(0.1843)	(0.1703)	(0.1742)	(0.3656)	(0.1517)	(0.2464)
Relationship Duration	0.0480	-0.0449	-0.0920**	0.0476	-0.0637*	
	(0.0457)	(0.0333)	(0.0344)	(0.0840)	(0.0291)	
Party (vs Repub.)						
Other	0.0927	-0.2996	-0.6899	1.7736+	-1.4143***	1.1902*
	(0.3507)	(0.3613)	(0.4853)	(0.9772)	(0.3616)	(0.5075)
Democrat	-0.1046	-0.1532	-0.0383	0.2341	-0.2568*	0.2843
	(0.1352)	(0.1199)	(0.1171)	(0.2644)	(0.1003)	(0.1793)
Home Internet	0.3288	-0.0944	0.5813*	-1.3493*	0.2386	0.0657
	(0.2898)	(0.2348)	(0.2564)	(0.6559)	(0.2008)	(0.2310)
Previously Married	-0.2018	0.0349	0.2051	0.4795	-0.0872	-0.2908
	(0.1703)	(0.1483)	(0.1536)	(0.4270)	(0.1284)	(0.2356)
Religion (vs Protestant/Other						

Christian)						
Catholic						0.9473***
						(0.2119)
Other Religion						0.9593**
						(0.3433)
No Religion						1.7488***
						(0.2956)
% of MSA R's Religion						-2.2292**
						(0.7137)
Constant	-2.1652***	-4.2480***	-6.2457***	3.7119**	1.6968***	-0.2851
	(0.5677)	(0.4942)	(0.5672)	(1.1977)	(0.4238)	(0.7979)
Observations	3066	3068	3025	3053	3051	1335
Adjusted R^2				0.117		
Pseudo R^2	0.179	0.063	0.125		0.050	0.132
BIC	1.7757e+08	1.9674e+08	1.8934e+08	18977.0836	2.5099e+08	85026818.0785

Standard errors in parentheses

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

"Online Exogamy Reconsidered" Appendix C: Alternate Version of Figure 2.

Figure 2a. Estimated Population Level Racial/Ethnic Exogamy Given Observed and Hypothetical Rates of Online Romance Formation, by Year Met



Figure 2b. Estimated Population Level Religious Exogamy Given Observed and Hypothetical Rates of Online Romance Formation, by Year Met



Figure 2c. Estimated Population Level College Degree Exogamy Given Observed and Hypothetical Rates of Online Romance Formation, by Year Met



Figure 2d. Estimated Population Level Age Exogamy Given Observed and Hypothetical Rates of Online Romance Formation, by Year Met