

Identifying African Rivals: Refining the Operationalization of Rivalry

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Abstract

The majority of interstate wars occur between rivalrous states. As such, scholars are particularly observant of states entering and leaving rivalries. Militarized interstate disputes are the oft tested quantitative measure of rivalry maintenance. This variable only captures some of the costly economic, military, and diplomatic actions rivals take to antagonize each other. I present a theory that biased third-party intervention ought to be included in the operationalization to identify rivalries. To demonstrate rivals' practice of biased third-party intervention, I investigated Africa. Few African rivals are coded by formative rivalry scholars Bennett, Goertz, and Diehl due to the African states' normative avoidance of interstate war. Contemporary African rivals do exist. They tend to take advantage of their rivals' civil conflicts by supporting domestic opposition groups. This change to the operationalization of rivalries more subtly gages rivalry maintenance than what is captured solely by MIDs. Therefore, better reflecting the conceptual definition. With an altered list of African rivals, I ran hazard regressions to test the effects of democracy and regime change (conditions that raise the likelihood of termination). I found the tests to be insignificant due to the complexity of African rivals' histories. By revisiting the conceptual definition of rivalry and questioning the operationalization, I discovered what circumstances produce African rivalries. Future studies of rivalry can benefit from the addition of a biased third-party intervention variable.

Keywords: Biased third-party intervention, Rivalry, State-building, Shocks

Rivalries are a distinct category of conflict in which feuding states are psychologically disposed towards hostility. Most interstate rivals repeatedly combat—not due to a series of individual incidents that lead to war, but a history of aggression that grows and festers with time. When scholars understand the anatomy of rivalries, they are able to predict what conditions terminate the lethal and costly relationships. Beginning in the mid-1980s, various international studies scholars (Bennett, Thompson, Goertz and Diehl, Vasquez, Colaresi) have sought to define and measure rivalries. Sophisticated definitions of rivalry have been refined, but they have been not translated into equally sound operationalizations. Several scholars use militarized interstate disputes to measure rivalry maintenance. A MID's measurement alone is incapable of fully capturing characteristics detailed in conceptual definitions of rivalry. The addition of a biased third-party intervention variable into the operationalization of rivalry measures substantial military and economic expenditures that MID's cannot. Take for example the case of Chad and Libya.

Following the independence of Chad and Libya, border tensions rose between the two states over the uranium-rich Aozou strip in Northern Chad. Libyan executive Muammar Gaddafi asserted a claim on the territory following his seizure of power in 1969—stating the area's citizens were culturally Libyan. Gaddafi funded Chadian anti-government rebel groups, as well as, militarily intervened in the Chadian civil war. The Chadian government responded with hostility: refuting territorial claims and disparaging Gaddafi's anti-Western sentiments. Between 1970 and 1994, the two states spent substantial economic, military and diplomatic resources (in the form of air support, troops and influxes of cash to opposition groups) to weaken the other. The enmity lessened when Chadian Idriss Deby, a Libyan sympathizer, unseated 12-year president Hissene Habre. The shift of tone led to the signing of friendship treaties between the

two states. The territorial dispute was further ameliorated when the International Court of Justice ruled that Chad's sovereignty encompassed the Aouzou strip. Despite a nearly quarter of a century-long history of reciprocal and repeated aggression and twelve biased military interventions, Chad and Libya are not considered rivals by current operational measures of rivalry because only three militarized interstate disputes occurred. I argue that operational definitions of rivalry do not accurately model world events.

When academics theoretically define rivalries, they include an argument about conditions that cause rivalries to terminate. Classic operational definitions of rivalry termination are mainly temporal. Plainly, if rivalrous states stopped fighting after a certain amount of years, the rivalry is considered extinct. The most widely applied variable that measures the continuation or *maintenance* of rivalry is militarized interstate disputes (Bennett, Goertz and Diehl, Vasquez, Colaresi). In the following sections I will challenge Bennett, Goertz, Diehl, and Vasquez's reliance on MIDs by looking to Africa's history. African rivals are not accurately measured with only MIDs due to their unique history. The circumstances surrounding state-building in Africa led to a continent-wide norm of avoiding interstate wars. While wars in Africa do occur, many states exploit civil conflict by supporting domestic rebel groups. I suggest African rivals are better identified by with the addition of a biased third-party intervention variable to Bennett's operational definition of rivalry. This updated measurement recognizes the seven African rivalries detected by Bennett, along with ten additional rivalry dyads.

Firstly, I review when dyads are considered rivals, and explain the sufficiency of Bennett's theoretical definition of rivalry, followed by a discussion of African *du jure* borders. Then using Cox regressions, I determine how the character of African rivalries influences

classical termination causes. Finally, after revealing the results of my tests, I will discuss the importance of revisiting conceptual definitions of rivalry.

What is a Rivalry?

In order to grasp how rivalries terminate, it is imperative to understand how rivalries are theoretically defined. In the following paragraphs, I review five definitions of rivalry, and discuss their progression in relation to one another. In the testing section, I utilize Bennett's conceptual definition of rivalry, and several of the restrictions described in his operationalization. Bennett's definitions focus on issue lifelines during rivalries. Since I am investigating African rivalry cases, an issue-based methodology is useful.

In the most basic terms, a rivalry is composed of two or more countries that are in a state of competition and expect conflicts in the future. There was a push in early rivalry literature to standardize a certain number of years that mark the rise and fall of a rivalry. While some academics embraced temporal parameters, others shed the idea that all rivalries could have a clear expiration date. Conflict also sets strictures in rivalry definitions. Conflict is a perceivable action that allows scholars to observe states maintaining their rivalries. Many scholars solely use militarized interstate dispute data from Correlates of War databases to measure rivalry maintenance. In more recent works, the role of militarized interstate disputes as an accurate measurement of rivalry behavior is questioned.

Finding Parameters

Diehl's 1985 Sociological Review determined if states are rivals based on three criteria: severity, durability, and intensity. The severity element refers to the number of repeated conflicts between two states. In this instance, "a minimum of five to seven militarized disputes" (Goertz and Diehl 1993:160). Durability alludes to the endurance of the competition, "at least twenty or

twenty-five years between the outbreak of the first dispute and the termination of the last” (Goertz and Diehl 1993: 160). Finally, in order for a pair of rivals to be considered intense, the issues of the disputes must not be resolved in a period of ten years.

The Correlates of War rivalry boundaries¹ are one of the earliest contemporary definitions of rivalries to be used in a wide variety of analyses, rather than a specific focus on arms races, dispute-prone regions, and great power disputes. The COW definition provided a solid foundation for Goertz and Diehl’s identification of rivals (Thompson 2001: 197). The greatest criticism is that it shackles itself by depending on dispute-density (Thompson 2001: 197). Dispute-density only measures the amount of conflicts, and may fail to recognize when rivalries are using other means to maintain their hostile relationships.

Goertz and Diehl, using the COW database, created a category of rivalries known as enduring rivalries. An enduring rival has complex characteristics dependent on “competitiveness, time and spatial consistency” (Goertz and Diehl 1993: 154). In reference to competition, enduring rivals are each violently struggling to control the other’s natural resources, territory, or ideological stances. Temporally, for rivals to be classified as enduring, their disputes must last beyond single-instance phenomena. Specifically, enduring rivals need at minimum “six militarized disputes in a twenty-year threshold” (Thompson 2001: 569). This “cut off” hardly differentiates from the Correlates of War breakpoint of six to seven disputes in 20 to 25 years. Rivalries can terminate after ten years of peace. In order for rivals to remain active, only fifteen years can pass between disputes. Finally, Goertz and Diehl argue enduring rivals expect future conflicts because of their historically competitive past. Therefore, rivalrous states maintain

¹ “The main criteria of the Correlates of War (COW) enduring rivalry definition: (1) a minimum of five to seven militarized disputes involving the same two states, (2) at least 20 years between the outbreak of the first dispute and the termination of the last dispute, and (3) a maximum period of 10 years between disputes and/or identical and unresolved issues in the rivalry disputes” (Goertz and Diehl 1993: 160).

spatial consistency, even if one gains the upper hand. “Yet it is incorrect to assume that the power distribution remains constant throughout the rivalry. Furthermore, a rivalry does not end merely because one side has dramatically increased its strength” (Goertz and Diehl 1993: 156).

There are a couple of theoretical concerns that accompany this definition. Primarily, rivals that are slow to militarized conflict, but still display competition with antagonistic economic or diplomatic foreign policies may not meet the deadline of six militarized disputes in twenty years. Additionally, the decline of conflicts is rapid, considering the active deadline of fifteen years encompasses the peace deadline of ten years.

Another rivalry categorization created by Goertz and Diehl is isolated and proto rivalries. Isolated rivalries have only one or two disputes, and proto rivalries “fall in between the criteria for isolated and enduring rivalries” (Goertz and Diehl 1993: 569). The former brand of conflict refers to short competitions. Proto rivalries, however, act as the median between the extremes of isolated and enduring rivalries. “Proto-rivalries involve repeated conflict between the same states, but they never develop into full-scale enduring rivalries because they fail to achieve the duration and frequency of militarized confrontations that achieve true enduring conflicts” (Goertz et al. 2000: 1174).

Similar to Goertz and Diehl, Bennett states interstate rivalries are drawn out hostile relationships where each actor believes the other to be a consistent military threat (Bennett 1996: 161). Bennett classified interstate rivals as “a dyad in which two states disagree over the resolution of some issue(s) between states for an extended period of time, leading them to commit substantial resources (military, economic, or diplomatic) toward opposing each other” (Bennett 1996: 160). Bennett, like Goertz and Diehl, enforces strict dispute-density boundaries for rivalries: six militarized disputes over 20 years (Bennett 1998:1207). Bennett’s definition

receives similar criticisms of Goertz and Diehl (Thompson 2001: 216). However, Bennett's definition, unlike Goertz and Diehl, explores the lifeline of issues that sustain rivals' animosity. In his review of rivalries, rivalrous states challenge the status quo by conflicting over territory, ideological differences, or domestic issues that have external affects. Unlike Goertz and Diehl's early definitions of rivalries, the issues at stake can evolve throughout the competition. Rivalries end when the states no longer publicly threaten one another. This can be measured with treaties or other forms of public settlement.

Pushing the Parameters

Thompson steps away from limiting the amount of states, conflicts, and time passed with his creation of *strategic rivals*. Strategic rivals, unlike the previous definitions, are not dependent on militarized conflict. Strategic rivalries can inflect psychological conflict. Thompson identifies rivals through states' perceptions of each other. Strategic rivals must: regard each other as competitors, be a source of actual or hidden threats, a threat of militarized dispute, and transparent enemies. Thompson also describes the origin of rivalries. "One round of hostility reinforces future expectations of hostility (and rivalry) and leads to some likelihood of further exchange of hostile behavior in cyclical fashion" (Thompson 2001: 562). In measuring rivalries, Thompson depends heavily upon states' foreign policy decisions. The threat and enemy criteria are simple to discover, but it can be difficult finding evidence of competition (Thompson 2001: 564).

Thompson also suggests that scholars ought to be skeptical about rivalry termination, since some rivals can appear to be dormant. Rivalries can hibernate. Hibernation refers to periods of time when states become distracted by different threats or developments, and are not interested in trading blows with their rivals. Thompson says hibernation periods trick academics

into thinking that the rivalry terminated, but that is incorrect. The rivals erupt again when conditions allow. “Wars and disputes may come and go but rivalries can persist for generations” (Thompson 2001: 564). Strategic rivals terminate when there is an overt de-escalation of hostility and threat perception.

Thompson’s method bypasses the dispute-density problems explained in the aforementioned rivalry measurements, but it depends heavily upon researcher intuition.

Finally, Vasquez questions the assumption that militarized interstate disputes are a basic indicator of an ongoing rivalry (Vasquez 1996). Vasquez states that while several rivals engage in interstate conflict, others do not (Vasquez 1996: 532). Vasquez found geography was a statistically significant factor in whether rivals fight. Rivals that are contiguous are more likely to combat in interstate war, than rivals that do not share a border (Vasquez 1996: 539). When rivals that are noncontiguous do get to war against one another, they tend to be joining ongoing multilateral wars. “It is rare for major states whose core territory is noncontiguous to fight wars one on one” (Vasquez 1996: 555). Vasquez critiques Goertz and Diehl’s measure of enduring rivals, because only rivals with a solid pattern of military interstate disputes are identified. Nevertheless, noncontiguous rivals are difficult to recognize.

After reviewing the definition of rivalry, there is a lingering operational puzzle. The scholars who depend on militarized interstate disputes are able to identify rivalries easily and present replicable data. Yet, this measurement fails to accurately model more subtle examples of rivalry maintenance. Vasquez attempts to address this problem by changing the theoretical definition of rivalry², but he still uses military interstate disputes from the Correlates of War

² Vasquez’s revised conceptual definition of rivalry follows: “A rivalry is a competitive relationship among equals that links stakes into issues on the basis of an actor dimension. The actor dimension results from a persistent disagreement and the use of negative acts which build up negative affect (psychological hostility). Hostility reinforces the actor dimension which gradually reduces all issues to a single overarching issue. Simultaneously,

database to identify rivals. Thompson measures rivalries by measuring states' perceptions, but this manner of measurement is difficult to replicate. Neither of these proposed solutions offers a simple quantitative method of measuring rivalries beyond militarized interstate disputes. I suggest that the operational definition of rivalry can better reflect the conceptual characteristics of rivals with the addition of a biased third-party intervention against the government variable.

Changing the Operational Definition

This paper does not offer a new theoretical definition of rivalry, but rather adds a variable that improves operational definitions of rivalry. See *Table 1: Rivalry Definition Comparison*.

Bennett's theoretical definition sufficiently details the conceptual features of a rivalry

A dyad in which two states disagree over the resolution of some issue(s) between them for an extended period of time, leading them to commit substantial resources (military, economic, or diplomatic) toward opposing each other in which relatively frequent diplomatic or military challenges to the disputed status quo are made by one or both of the states (Bennett 1996:160).

As stated previously, Bennett tests for rivalry maintenance with MID's density measurement, thereby limiting the liberal range of resources that his definition permits. Biased third-party intervention data accounts for militarized disputes, but also other resources spent on military, economic, and diplomatic means used to hostilely interfere with rival governments' status quo³. Moreover, biased third-party intervention measures repetition and direction, like MID's. In addition to detecting several unidentified African rivals, adding biased third-party

concrete stakes are transformed into symbolic and transcendent ones, and proposals for the disposition of stakes and the resolution of an issue distribute costs and benefits on an unequal basis. This makes for more disagreement, greater use of negative acts, and an intensification of hostility, which in turn reinforces the actor dimension. An escalating conflict spiral results, which creates an atmosphere in which crises are likely to be born. Rivalry becomes a way of life" (Vasquez 1996: 532-533).

³ Intervention as defined by Regan is "convention breaking military, economic, or diplomatic activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country targeted at the authority structures of the government with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the government and opposition forces" (Regan 2002: 1).

intervention data to Bennett’s operationalization provides an in-depth interpretation of previously identified rivalries.

Table 1: Rivalry Definition Comparison

	Conceptual definition	Operational definition	Total number of African rivals measured
Bennett (1996,1998)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Two states disagree over resolution over issue(s). - Lasts for an extended period. - States spend substantial military, economic, and diplomatic resources to oppose the other. - States repeatedly conflict and expect conflict. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Issues must be connected over life of rivalry and must be settled with termination of rivalry. - Rivalry maintenance is measured with militarized interstate disputes. - When rivals mutually agree to a settlement, followed by ten years without a militarized dispute, the end of the rivalry is dated as the date of the agreement. 	7
Lande (2017)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - (Bennett 1996:160). - concurs with Bennett’s conceptual definition. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - (Bennett 1996:170-73). - concurs with Bennett’s operational definition. <p style="text-align: center;">EXCEPT</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rivalry maintenance is not fully measured with MIDs. The addition of a biased third-party intervention variable gauges the expenditure of some economic, diplomatic, and non-invasive military resources that MIDs cannot. 	17

To further elucidate the importance of third-party intervention as a rivalry measurement, I apply it to African rivalries. African rivalries are influenced by the historical contexts that shaped the majority of African countries’ state-building processes. Continent-wide preferences to retain European imposed borders, and the Organization of African Unity’s opposition to interstate war has created an anti-interstate conflict norm. There are instances of militarized interstate disputes,

but African states frequently intervene against their rival's government. Beyond Africa, the biased third-party intervention variable can be extended globally to better recognize and understand rivalrous relationships.

The Nature of State-building in Africa

African states' utilization of third-party interventions to maintain rivalries derives from their unique history of state consolidation. State consolidation in Africa is incomparable to conventional European models of state-building due to: inherent costs of challenging geography, colonial structural design flaws, and a continent-wide norm for border permanency. Therefore, using models of rivalry that are based on European state behavior is inefficient. By reviewing Africa's process of state consolidation, the use of militarized interstate disputes to measure rivalry becomes questionable.

Pre-colonial period

All executives that ruled and currently rule in Africa confront the same geographical puzzle of projecting power over a relatively low population across a wide expanse of land. Africa's ancient pre-colonial period answer to this problem was ignored by the colonizers. As such, evaluating Africa's pre-colonial period is necessary for understanding the political divisions that still resonate in Africa's 54 countries.

Predating the European scramble for Africa and the eventual division of Africa during the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, Africa housed approximately 10,000 polities (Meredith 2006). These polities depended on winning loyalties and forceful coercion to project power over their citizens, rather than territorial borders. Borders tended to be undefended, fluid and feudal. Capital cities acted as hubs where executives controlled trade, and attracted citizens. Leaders' sovereignty was generally extended by the number of citizens who paid homage to them. Only

the Great Lakes region and Ethiopian Highlands have been able to traditionally sustain overall control inside their borders due to their ecologically rich structures that can support large populations (Herbst 2000: 11). Land acted as a buffer between competitive nations and a political refuge for citizens who wished to flee oppressive regimes. As a consequence, pre-colonial African states did not have to endure the territorial melees young European states conducted to shape their borders. Rather, “in pre-colonial Africa the primary objects of warfare, which was continual in many places, was to capture people and treasure. Not land which was available to all” (Herbst 2000: 116).

African leaders were very aware of the geographical predicament, and understood that building roads would expand their borders. In the Fante Confederation’s (currently Ghana) Mankessim Constitution, the Fante explicitly mentioned that a developed transportation system promotes interstate diplomacy and solves internal difficulties. Article 26 of the constitution even describes the road side gutters and stipulates that the roads need to be fifteen feet wide (Sarbah 1968: 203). Due to the high cost of constructing infrastructure, however, many governments did not undertake grand projects like building national highways—relying on funds from trading ports and capital cities. “An emphasis on the political center and the relative inattention paid to the hinterland reflects the reality of power in pre-colonial Africa” (Herbst 2000: 46). Inattention to the hinterlands was heightened by European colonizers who did not want to pay for non-profitable infrastructure.

Colonial Africa

Twenty-years before the Europeans began drawing lines in Africa, the continent was perceived as a no-man’s land. Scholars have pointed to the United Kingdom and France’s bitter rivalry, a market place competition for raw resources, or a sub-imperialist movement exacerbated

by European trading routes as possible explanations for the Scramble for Africa (Pakenham 1991:xxi). What is clear is that Europe's advanced weaponry like the Maxim gun, the development of quinine prophylaxis and the need for raw materials gave the colonizers the capabilities and drive to overtake the continent.

The Europeans encountered the low population to high land density problem. Either through lack of comprehension or indifference, the Europeans were not able to accept the fluid state-lines and intricacies of population-based borders found in pre-colonial Africa. British High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria, Lord Frederick Lugard bemoaned, "Our [European] rivals were constantly encroaching on our shadowy borders" (Lugard 1965:14). The European powers did not want to defend their newly captured territories with armed conflict since they were uncertain about the lands' material worth. Instead of warring, the colonizers decided to peacefully divide up Africa in a collusion referred to as the Berlin Conference 1884-85. During this conference the European powers divided up Africa into states that resemble current African borders, derived from longitude-latitude lines. Here, colonizers also created a set of organizational rules that did not allow other states to contest territory already claimed and permitted the use of legally binding contracts with African chiefs.

The treaties signed by the colonial powers again stunted the development of infrastructure in Africa. The Berlin conference allowed Europeans to conquer Africa with indirect rule. French and British colonizers were mainly concerned with the extraction of resources and avoided the costly development of lasting bureaucracies. The colonizers appeared to be apathetic about their conquered territories—the majority of the profits made from the African colonies went to European coffers rather than local infrastructure. Europeans did slowly build roads that swiftly advanced African connectivity, but as a whole, colonizers (excluding

South Africa) failed to extend power to their borders. As Herbst oft reminds “the failure is hardly surprising given the lack of political or economic incentives to develop true state hegemony” (Herbst 2000: 84). In response to the colonizers’ brutality⁴ and weakly defended borders, many Africans migrated, establishing the structural weakness of colonial rule. Following the World Wars, Europeans no longer had the resources to support their African satellites. But they had left “a system of boundaries and frontiers new to Africa, they built infrastructure systems that still determine patterns of trade, and left their regions, languages, and cultural practices” (Herbst 2000: 58).

Independent Africa

The scramble to leave Africa from 1957 to 1968 was just as sudden and disjointed as the original scramble to enter Africa, but it sparked a trend of national identity (Pakenham 1991: 671). The African states wanted to reclaim their captured identity by shedding European imperialism. The idea of colonizing other African states and warring for territory like Europeans was ostracized. A 1963 pact signed by Organization of African Unity members states cemented an agreement to not challenge the European imposed borders. Explicitly the resolution called for member states to, “respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence” (Browlie 1964: 361). This decision led to a continent-wide norm of avoiding interstate wars. The interstate wars that have occurred in Africa since are not wars of conquest.⁵ It was also the foundation of modern African consolidation.

Like their predecessors, independent African executives had to deal with the low population density problem. The OAU decision to maintain “artificial” borders gave states a

⁴ While the colonizers’ rule tended to be indirect, it was also incredibly violent. Rather than using administrative methods, the Europeans would manipulate existing power structures to use brutal force outside of the capital cities to control populations in the hinterlands (Herbst 2000: 90-94).

⁵ The conflicts that brought forth the new states of South Sudan and Eritrea were not wars of conquest, but civil war.

legitimate method of obtaining country-wide sovereignty without bloodshed. But, it also allowed for the continuing disregard and languid development of the hinterlands. The newly independent African states inherited disjointed fiscal structures where 40 percent of private wealth is overseas (Meredith 2006). Furthermore, the young states had underdeveloped bureaucracies, and negligible infrastructure from their predecessors. Relations between African countries were well-established, but domestically the states are insecure. “Twelve of the forty-seven have been crippled since independence by civil war...forty military coups ... many of them involving the murder or execution of the head of state” (Pakenham 1991: 680). In short, modern African states have rigid borders, but are internally debilitated. And, as will be further elucidated, African rivals take advantage of their opponents’ civil conflict with a shrewd use of economic and military biased third-party intervention.

Post-Independence Africa

In the wave of independence, patriotism within pre-imposed state borders blossomed. People applying for citizenship caused the time-honored ebb and flow of migration to dry up. “The long traditional of welcoming strangers was cast aside because it was imperative that these new states, whose understanding of sovereignty was related to their territorial boundaries, give personal meaning to the contours of their states” (Herbst 2000: 228). Countries that formerly had an embedded stranger- acceptance-tradition like Ghana and Nigeria expelled thousands of “foreigners.”

Despite efforts to unify states with a sense of nationalism, the newly established governments still lacked an obligation to build infrastructure and defense in their rural lands: there were domestic migrations to cities; tax collectors generally ignored rural areas; and the OAU considered control over the capital city the minimum proof of sovereignty. The inability or

deference to address the absence of government in vast parts of African countries was carried into the 21st century. Characteristics of state-failure that are currently recognized in Africa appeared: “leaders who steal so much from the state that they kill off the productive sources. A tremendous bias in deference and the delivery of services toward the relatively small urban population” (Herbst 2000:254). In the 1980s and 1990s, a burst of hinterland-based rebel warfare launched countries into civil conflicts. Approximately 90 military coups d’états occurred during the 1980s. “From 1981 to 1996, nearly half the countries in Africa experience significant episodes of violent conflict between government and opposition groups” (Goldsmith 2001: 128). States failed either from executives unable to maintain control over capital cities or even having a clear leader at all, in the case of Somalia.

There are active rebel groups in 33 of Africa’s 54 countries (Ali-Dinar 1999). Strategic African states take advantage of endemic civil conflict in their fractured rivals by supporting a faction(s) using military or economic intervention. In a continent that discourages interstate wars, subversive tactics like funding rebel groups sends equally threatening messages. The Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo), founded in 1975 in response to a communist ruling party, was funded by Rhodesian central intelligence. South Africa used its backing of Renamo in the 1980s to force Mozambique to sign the Nkomati Accord. While neither country followed the provisions of the non-aggression agreement, its existence is evidence of the type of interstate relations that are born of biased third-party interventions against the government during civil conflict.

Traditional operationalizations of rivalry fail to encompass a primary method of rivalry maintenance in Africa. African rivals are not adequately identified with classic military interstate dispute measurements. MIDs remain a definite signifier of rivalry in Africa. But without the

inclusion of a biased third-party intervention variable, African rivals cannot be modeled accurately. Furthermore, the addition of an intervention variable coincides with Bennett's classification that rivals must "commit substantial resources (military, economic, or diplomatic) toward opposing each other" (Bennett 1996:160).

Third-Party Intervention in Civil Conflict

States employ biased third-party interventions as a tool to achieve stability in another state. Bennett's definition of rivalry shares similarities with Regan's operational definition of intervention during civil conflict:

I define third party interventions in intra-state conflicts as convention breaking military and/or economic activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country targeted at the authority structures of the government with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the government and opposition forces (Regan 2000: 2).

Both definitions identify that states use of military or economic means to influence the status quo. The expectation of affecting the balance of power must be high in order to expend resources for intervention. The majority of third-party intervention studies try to determine how actors' interventions resolve domestic conflict. Generally, there are three types of third-party intervention: diplomatic, economic, and military. Diplomatic interventions, as described by Regan, are actions that attempt to mediate an internal problem without the intention of maliciously manipulating circumstances (Regan 1998: 757). Economic interventions tend to also have a positive intention, with the exception of economic sanctions and funding of internal rebel groups. Military interventions tend to be considered manipulative rather than altruistic, depending on whom the intervener is supporting. In this paper, the only *biased* third-party interventions are being measured. African rivals are not trying to restore pre-conflict status quo ante when intervening, but rather attempting to alter status quo.

Biased third-party interventions, despite intentions, tend to extend civil conflict duration (Balch-Lindsay et al. 2008, Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000, Regan 2002). Nevertheless, the majority of post-World War II civil conflicts have had at least one third-party intervener. Therefore, scholars have determined that from an intervener's perspective, intervention is a foreign policy device that responds to the strategic interests of other states. Interveners that are seeking to destabilize a rival will give military and economic aid to opposition groups. During the Chadian Civil War, rival Libya intervened for over a decade by supporting the Muslim National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT) in the form of air support, troops and artillery. Funded opposition groups allow the intervening state to influence the political agenda of the opposition group and threaten their rival.

Biased third-party intervention against the government is comparable to military interstate disputes. Like MIDs, third-party intervention is an example of states allocating economic and/or military resources to manipulate another country's policies. Repeated third-party interventions indicate an endemic irritation between two states. Adding a third-party intervention variable to the existing MID measurement of identifying rivals expands oft-criticized limited measurement, while concurring with theoretical definitions of rivalry.

When do Rivalries End?

The literature on rivalry termination has been characterized by various searches for an event or series of events that cease rivalrous relationships. Academics in the field have pointed to both internal and external motivations such as: great dyadic wars, the adoption of liberal institutions, treaties, and the democratic peace.

Conflict and Shocks

Bennett (1996) was one of the first articles that investigated the causes of rivalry termination that were explicitly issue-based. Utilizing Goertz and Diehl's identified enduring rivals in a series of logit and hazard models, Bennett found, "external military threats and low issue salience do positively affect the probability that rivalries will end" (Bennett 1996:157). Conversely, the variables of balance of power and war between rivalries did not significantly influence the lifespan of a rivalry.

Bennett tested many rivalries that identify as democracies. In states where policies are influenced by constituents, rivalries have to be sustained by public support. Bennett's article reinforced *shocks* or the premise that abrupt changes to relatively unchanging political relations (Bennett 1998: 1203) can provoke states to terminate their rivalries. Some rivalries can survive shocks, depending on the strength and duration of the rivalry. Popular shocks in rivalry literature are great power wars (Morey 2011), national independences (Goertz et al. 1995), and democratization (Hensel et al. 2000).

Shocks upset stable rivalrous relationships. Rather than a series of small changes diffusing throughout a state and eventually causing a policy shift, shocks have an immediate impact. Great power wars have an especially rapid effect upon great power rivalries. Domestic support for further fighting lessens after great power wars. As the level of grievance rises domestically states are less likely to promote hostile foreign policy (Morey 2011: 273). In a study of great power wars shocking the termination of rivalries, Colaresi noted:

The number of great power rivalries ending in each macro-decision over time (from 1494 to 1945) has risen (0,1,4,3, and then 17 for each global war phase, and this trend continues when the number of ongoing rivalries is controlled for." (Colaresi 2001: 590).

Other dyadic wars, not necessarily great power wars attributed to World War I and World War II, can also terminate rivalries. An example provided by Morey is the case study of the Greco-Turkish rivalry from 1866 to 1925. These two rivals were threatened by territorial ambitions, and underlying tensions instigated by ethnic and religious differences— all of which stoked their feud. After a series of militarized disputes i.e. First Greco-Turkish War, Second Greco-Turkish War, and First Balkan War (Morey 2011: 272) that caused physical and psychological shocks, the public shifted away from promoting conflict. “The war itself did not solve any issues nor remove either state's ability to fight; instead, it created a desire in both parties for a lasting peace” (Morey 2011: 273). Conversely, great wars do not shock states *into* becoming rivals.

National independences act as a dramatic change in territorial sovereignty, thereby shocking rivalries into disbanding. Unlike dyadic or great war shocks, national independences can either kill pre-existing rivalries or give life to new rivalries (Goertz et al. 33). Goertz and Diehl found with descriptive statistical analysis that interstate rivalries cannot occur unless both states have achieved independence. When states enter a sovereignty shift, such as “the achievement of independence and the occurrence of civil war... [which] may affect a potential or existing rivalry involving that state” (Goertz et Al. 37). The emergence of a new order within a state changes the regional balance of power, and even acts as a shock to its neighbors who were accustomed to the previous regime. Despite the independent state’s new interests that may either promote or shy away from sustaining rivals, it can become a target to neighbors who are opposed to its independence or want a return to the status quo. (Goertz et al. 37). Ninety percent of enduring rivalries ended following a political shock. Civil wars have the strongest affect upon a

rivalry. “For example, almost half of minor power rivalries end shortly after a civil war.” (Goertz et al. 48).

Shocking Liberal Behaviors

The assumption that democratic rivalries are more likely to disband than a non-democratic rivalry is well established in rivalry termination literature (Colaesi 2001: 584). Therefore, the adoption of liberal institutions ought to dissolve rivalries between states. The establishment of a democratic regime does need time to become accepted statewide. Thus, raising the query: is democratization a subtle change that *eventually* ends the rivalry, or does the adoption of democratization cause a rapid shocking effect, like a great power war?

When commenting upon the adoption of liberal institutions, I am referring to “free-market reform, democratic institutions, membership in international organizations” (Prins and Daxecker 2008). Rivalrous relationships are embedded in mistrust, fear, and contempt. The rationalist might ask, ‘why do states maintain such costly relationships, rather than mediate?’ It boils down to trust. Rivalrous states, by definition, are expectant of future conflict with their rivals. In a rationalist explanation of liberal institutions’ effect upon rivalries, Prins and Daxecker argue, “neither state expects the other to honor future commitments if auspicious, but unexpected, circumstances arise” (Prins and Daxecker 2008:18). When rivals adopt liberal institutions (i.e. members of the same international organization) they share a platform to discuss deep-rooted issues. Trust strengthens. Moreover, once these rivals find themselves committed to the same organization, they face consequences if they renege. “Liberal institutions facilitate conflict resolution even among rival states by eliminating incentives to bluff and by increasing the transparency of political decision making” (Prins and Daxecker 2008: 18). Thus, when poorer states adopt democratic institutions they have different reactions than states that are

already democratically predisposed. The Honduran-El Salvadoran (Prins and Daxecker 2008: 35) rivalry dissolved after both states respected the International Court of Justice's decision on a long-standing boundary dispute. Prins and Daxecker found with a Cox regression that joint membership in IGOs and multilateral treaties is a statistically significant method for terminating rivalries. Adoption of liberal institutions increases transparency of rivals' interests, and citizens are able hold leaders accountable for hostile policies.

Now that the question of how the adoption of liberal institutions affects non-democratic states is answered, the shift or shock question can be re-evaluated. In Goertz and Diehl's cross-examination of rivalry behavior and the democratic peace (Hensel et al. 2000: 1187), democracy adoption almost immediate halted militarized disputes. But to say that a state's regime change towards democratization completely dissipates rivalries is presumptuous. Democratic norms need time to intensify within states, and combine with existing institutions. Once the pacifying effect of democracy is established, "rivalry is very difficult to continue." (Hensel et al. 2000: 1187). Democratization acts as both a shock and a subtle shift—once democratic institutions are conventionalized, rivalries end rapidly.

Measuring Rivalry Termination with Third-Party Intervention Data

Bennett's theoretical definition of rivalry identifies rivals as two states engaged in an issue-based dispute for an extended period of time, in which the states spend substantial amounts of military, economic and diplomatic resources. In his operational definition, Bennett limits the expenditure of resources to militarized interstate disputes. Following suit with Goertz, Diehl, and Hensel, Bennett maintains rivals can only exist after six disputes within a 20-year period with no more than 25 years between instances of rivalry maintenance. Rivals perish if there are no disputes within a decade. I integrate Bennett's theoretical definition and list of terminated rivals

with Regan's third-party intervention during civil conflict dataset to produce a more exact list of African rivals. With my measure, any combination of MIDs and biased third-party intervention that add up to six or more instances in 25 years is designated as rivalrous behavior.

I have consolidated Regan's third-party intervention data to reflect Bennett's temporal restrictions to correspond with rivalry termination data *see Table 2: African Rivals 1960-1999*. Regan's dataset is limited by its constraint to civil conflict. The majority of third-party intervention occurs during civil instability. As such, there is no easily available and replicable data on third-party interventions that occurs outside of a civil conflict. Regan's dataset ends in 1999. Bennett's most recent list of rivals includes information from the latest version of COW's MIDs dataset ending in 2010. Therefore, Regan's dataset does not completely parallel Bennett's. I run the risk of undercounting rival dyads. Furthermore, since the datasets are unable disclose third-party interventions post-1999 and MIDs post-2010, I had to predict when certain rivalries are expected to end. Dates that are capped by parentheses in the End Year column of *Table 2: African Rivals 1960-1999* are projected termination years, if there are no further instances of MIDs or interventions. For example, the last COW measured dispute between long-time rivals Ethiopia and Somalia was in 2008. In the case that Somalia and Ethiopia do not have another MID or biased third-party interventions against the government between 2008 until 2018, the rivalry will terminate.

After merging the two datasets, I found ten previously unidentified African rivals in addition to Bennett's original seven pairs. Of the 17 total rivalries, I divided them into four categories: rivalries only measured by MIDs, rivalries measured by MIDs or third-party interventions, rivalries measured only by third-party interventions, and rivalries measured by a mixture of MIDs and third-party interventions.

Eight cases of rivalries measured by MIDs are recorded. These rivals are not without third-party interventions, but the interventions did not reach the six counts of dispute cut-off. For example, rivals Uganda and Sudan experienced eight instances of militarized interstate disputes, and only one instance of a third-party intervention from 1968 until 1999.

The secondary category identifies two pairs of rivals that can be measured either solely with repeated instances of third-party interventions or MIDs.

The penultimate category identifies rivals that are only measured by third-party interventions. This category accounts for over twenty percent of cases identified. Many exclusively third-party intervention cases are found in the Southern region of Africa during the South African apartheid and Rhodesian Bush Wars. Similar to the primary category, there are unsubstantial instances of MIDs.

The final category measures rivalries that could only be identified when combining instances of both MIDs and third-party interventions. There are three cases of such rivalries: South Africa- Zimbabwe; Burundi- Tanzania; Angola-Congo.

The amount of African rivalries discovered with the third-party intervention during civil conflict variable is invigorating. Additionally, the majority of rivals discovered by Bennett were also found in the third-party intervention data. Testing for rivalry termination using more precise data will better explain the conditions that produce rivalrous relationships in Africa.

Recognizing terminated rivalries

No single event marks the end of a rivalry. Researchers have developed criteria to ascertain when a rivalry terminates. Keeping with the standards set by Bennett, rivalries are considered terminated when they are no longer exhibiting behavior to change the status quo. Goertz and Diehl measured the date of termination with a temporal measurement that was

inspired by the Correlates of War: “the endpoint of the rivalry is the date of the last militarized dispute in the rivalry sequence plus ten years” (Goertz and Diehl 1995: 42). This measurement is an approximation. Rivalries could end well before the ten-year mark following a dispute. Bennett tests for a greater level of specificity by determining if there was a mutually accepted settlement⁶. If there are no further disputes after ten years, post-settlement ratification, the date of the settlement then becomes of the end year of the rivalry. I have attempted to replicate Bennett’s termination methods.

⁶ A settlement, according to Bennett, can be de facto. Bennett, however, explicitly uses formal documents and statements from leaders to identify when the rivalry has been settled (Bennett 1996:173).

Table 2: African Rivalries 1960-1999

Rivals	Start Year	End Year
<i>Rivalries measured by MIDS</i>		
Algeria- Morocco*	1962	1989
DRC- Zaire*	1963	1997
Zambia-Zimbabwe*	1965	1979
Kenya-Uganda*	1965	(2020)
Ethiopia-Sudan*	1967	(2018)
South Africa-Zambia*	1968	1990
Sudan- Uganda	1968	2005
Libya-Sudan	1972	1989
<i>Rivalries measured by either MIDS or third-party interventions</i>		
Ethiopia-Somalia*	1960	(2018)
Tanzania-Uganda	1971	1980
<i>Rivalries measured by third-party interventions</i>		
Chad-Libya	1970	1994
Mozambique-Zimbabwe	1975	1992
Mozambique- South Africa	1975	1984
Angola- South Africa	1976	1988
<i>Rivalries measured by a mixture of MIDs and third-party interventions</i>		
Congo-Uganda	1964	2003
South Africa- Zimbabwe	1970	1992
Burundi- Tanzania	1995	2005

* Bennett identifies these rivals.

(Year) – If there are no further conflicts or interventions between start year and final interference, this is the projected year the rivalry ends.

Testing Shock Effects upon African Rivals

After a disruptive shock, the costs of maintaining a rivalry can surpass the benefits for states engaged in rivalrous behavior. Shocks can: “sever patron-client relationships and lead to less resource availability for clients to engage in conflict; remove existing patterns of international interactions; give rise to new states in the system; affect national capabilities and

subsequently states' abilities to compete with a rival or the balance of power; and/or lead states to either turn inward or outward in a search for legitimacy” (Bennett 1998: 1204). I will be testing the causes for termination on the modified list of African rivalries using two shocks: democratic adoption and regime change.

I predict the adoption of democratic values acts as a shock that shortens rivalry duration in Africa. Beginning in the early 1990s, Africa took part in a global wave of democratization. “More than half the forty-seven states of sub-Saharan Africa undertook reforms leading to more competitive and pluralist political systems after 1989 for largely conjunctural reasons” (Joseph 1997: 363). Much like African borders, however, democratization in many Sub-Saharan states tends to be in name rather than practice. Cronyism enters multiparty elections, states monopolize resources, and local grievances remain unresolved. Despite the tumultuous nature of African democracies, the adoption of liberal behaviors in formerly autocratic rival states increased the probability conflict resolution.

Hypothesis 1: Democratization acts as a shock that increases the probability of rivalry termination in Africa.

I tested my first hypothesis with a Cox regression model—looking to democratic regime change as a positive hazard coefficient that shocks the termination of the identified African rivals. A Cox regression is an appropriate model to measure rivalry termination, because of the varying time sets in which democratization influences rivalry survival. The subject group is divided into rivalry A and rivalry B of one rivalry dyad. The censored variable is rivalry termination represented with a dummy variable (0-rivalry in progress, 1- rivalry terminated). To measure the rise of democratic behavior, I utilized polity scores measured as an ordinal variable. By tracking changes in polity scores between rivalry dyads, I expect to find rivalries ending when either one or both rivals have rising polity scores.

I secondly hypothesize that regime change increases the probability of rivalry termination. Intercommunal violence sprouted from underrepresentation of minority groups leads to civil conflict. African rivals take advantage of civil disruptions to maintain their rivalries. Interference from a rivalrous third-party state deepens political factions within a state, and prolongs civil conflict. “Third-party support may enable the opposition to bid for popular support by providing a rival source of goods and services and, in turn, challenging the government's monopoly over the 'hearts and minds' of its citizens” (Balch-Lindsay et.al 2008: 349). Rebel groups that are successful at overthrowing the previous heads of state can maintain diplomatic ties with former rivals. Ameliorating the previously competitive relationships.

Hypothesis 2: Rivalrous dyads are more likely to terminate after one or both rivals experience a change in government.

I again tested for the survivability of rivals using a Cox regression test with the addition of regime change as the positive hazard coefficient. Regime change is measured as a dichotomous variable, and recognized as: a successful coup d'état, the primary election of a new regime type, or rebel groups spearheading the government. I posit that states experiencing regime changes terminate quicker than rivals that maintain equivalent regime throughout the rivalry period.

Insignificant Results

Neither test was statistically significant. Since the hazard coefficients of democratization and regime change did not produce a p-value equal to or less than 0.05, I cannot conclude that either democratization (hr=0.19, p=0.59) or regime change (hr=3.45, p=0.167) is a significant factor in African rivalry termination.

When testing the primary hypothesis, there were no cases of joint democracy found among the seventeen rival dyads. Thus, I was unable to test for democratization increasing the probability of rivalry termination. Given the historically slow and often unsuccessful adoption of

democratic values, the lack of joint democracies in Africa is unsurprising. Furthermore, testing for joint-IGO membership as a measure of democratization does not appear to be a fruitful venture since every dyad pair has similar upward projections.

Every rivalry dyad experienced two or more regime changes during their duration, perhaps explaining the insignificant results. See *Table 3: Final Regime Changes in Terminated African Rivalries*. Within the fourteen terminated rivalrous dyads tested, there were varying levels of regime change that coincided with the end of the rivalry. Five rivalrous dyads went through a regime change in which new forms of government and leaders were introduced. Many cases dealt with the shedding of European minority rule in Southern Africa. Four dyads terminated following the rise of a head of state that was supported by an opposition group funded by the government's rival. Only in the case of the Tanzanian – Ugandan rival dyad did the rivalry terminate after a new head of state entered power that was not supported by a rival-funded opposition group. The remaining four rivalries terminated due to issue salience—in which the governments had a change of heart. There was no predictable pattern of regime change, the sole exception being successful coup d'états preempted government occupation by an opposition group.

Table 3: Final Regime Changes in Terminated African Rivalries

Rivalry Dyad	Year of Final Regime Change	End Year	Summary
<i>Regime Change</i>			
Angola- South Africa	1988	1988	The Tripartite Accord barred South African troops from intervening on post-civil-war Angola.
Mozambique-Zimbabwe	1990	1992	The end of white minority rule in South Africa and Zimbabwe demolished the Mozambique Resistance Movement's (RENAMO) funding.
South Africa-Zambia	1990	1990	Newly-elected F.W. de Klerk lifted ban on the African National Congress (ANC) and released Nelson Mandela from prison.
South Africa- Zimbabwe	1990	1992	Newly-elected F.W. de Klerk lifted ban on ANC and released Nelson Mandela from prison.
Zambia-Zimbabwe	1978	1979	Prime Minister Abel Muzorewa and President Josiah Zion Gumedede were elected, marking the end of white minority rule in Zimbabwe.
<i>New Government Head, Not Supported by Rival</i>			
Tanzania-Uganda	1979	1980	Ugandan Idi Amin fled the country in 1979, and the Tanzanian military remained in Uganda until a replacement president was found.
<i>New Government Head, Supported by Rival</i>			
Burundi- Tanzania	2005	2005	In 2005, Hutu and former rebel group leader Pierre Nkurunziza was sworn into office. The Constitution of Burundi was ratified later that year
Chad-Libya	1990	1994	Chadian and Libyan relations healed when Libyan sympathizer, Idriss Deby, became Chadian head of state.

Libya-Sudan	1989	1989	Pro-Libyan Omar al-Bashir overthrew Sudanese Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi backed by the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation party. RCCNS-Sudan was a collaboration between the Sudanese military and the National Islamic Front.
Sudan-Uganda	2005	2005	In September 2005, the Ugandan funded Sudan People's Liberation Army announced an end to Sudan's state of emergency with an independent South Sudan

Same Regime, Issue Salience Lessened

Algeria- Morocco	1988	1989	Preceding the Treaty of the Arab Maghreb Union signed on February 17, 1989, the Algerian- backed Polisario Front's attacks were not causing Morocco substantial harm and Alegria's economy was in a downswing.
Congo-Uganda	1999	2003	Joseph Kabila elected president in 1999. Despite his father's assassination, Kabila sought peace between the waring states.
DRC -Zaire	1990	1997	Civil war brought forth the new state DRC. Former executive Mobutu fled after Kabila claimed power. The systemic issues of former Zaire, however, survived in the new regime.
Mozambique- South Africa	1984	1984	The Nkomati Accord ended South African aid to anti-Mozambique insurgency groups, and Mozambique aid to the ANC.

The Future of Rivalry Identification

It is necessary to question if the operationalization of rivalry properly represents the conceptual definition. Continuing to solely measure rivalries in terms of militarized interstate disputes is a practice that overlooks the full extent of rivalry maintenance allowed by conceptual definitions. I investigated African rivals as a case study to demonstrate the evident faults in the current operationalization of rivalry. Biased third-party interventions offers a new perception of

rivalry maintenance, but it is limited to civil conflict. There are other tools that rivals use to instigate conflict to be found.

I suggest further research revisits how the conceptual understanding of rivals is tested. Rivals tend to engage in conflict repeatedly, allowing states to fester in a vicious circle of hostility. Questioning: why rivals are only considered rivals after six disputes inside 25 years; why it is difficult to predict the formation of rivals; or why there is emphasis on states rather than heads-of-states, are only some of the lines of research that can aid the comprehension of the costly relationships. The better political scientists can diagnose rivalries, the quicker mediation and other policy solutions can be implemented.

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