POLS 341: Theories of International Conflict and Cooperation
Spring 2012

Course Meetings: Tuesdays and Thursdays from 2:00 to 3:15 PM in Dane Smith Hall (DSH) 234

Instructor: Christopher K. Butler, Associate Professor, Political Science
Email: ckbutler@unm.edu
Office: Social Sciences Building (SSCO) 2051
Office Hours: Tuesdays from 11:30 AM to 12:30 PM, Wednesdays from 1:30 to 3:30 PM, and by appointment.

Course Description: Surveys the political science literature on theories of conflict and cooperation.

Course Prerequisites: POLS 240 or equivalent.

Learning Objectives: Students will be able to...
...determine the predicted outcome of the international interaction game given a set of preferences.
...distinguish potential causes of war using the level-of-analysis framework.
...illustrate the bargaining theory of war.
...differentiate between predicted and actual outcomes of political interactions.
...assemble critical background information and construct a timeline of a historical conflict episode.
...apply theoretical models to the case of the Crimean War and another historical conflict episode.
...evaluate theoretical models with respect to their logical consistency and in light of historical evidence.

Student Responsibilities:
Student Technology in the Classroom. Use of technology in the classroom by students is acceptable IF it is for class reasons. Thus, activities such as taking notes, reviewing at class materials, looking up additional material underline relevant to class discussion are fine. This means that checking email, phone messages, or social media sites are usually inappropriate.
Reading. Each student is expected to complete assigned readings before its corresponding lesson.
Current Events. Students are expected to keep up on current events related to international news as such events may be used as examples in class.
Participation. Students are strongly encouraged to ask questions and join discussion during class.
Attendance. Students are expected to attend all classes.
Academic Integrity. Students are expected to comply with University policies regarding academic integrity. Academic dishonesty of any kind will not be tolerated.

Accessibility Statement: Americans with Disabilities Act: Qualified students with disabilities needing appropriate academic adjustments should contact me as soon as possible to ensure your needs are met in a timely manner. Handouts are available in alternative accessible formats upon request.

Readings:

Books (available at the bookstore):

Iklé, Fred Charles. 2005 (revised edition). *Every War Must End*. Columbia University Press.

Lake, David A. 2011. *Hierarchy in International Relations*. Cornell University Press.

Levy, Jack S. and William R. Thompson. 2010. *Causes of War*. Wiley-Blackwell.

Troubetzkoy, Alexis. 2006. *A Brief History of the Crimean War: History's Most Unnecessary Struggle*. Running Press.

Wagner, R. Harrison. 2007. *War and the State: The Theory of International Politics*. University of Michigan Press.

Articles (available at JSTOR):

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1990. "Pride of Place: The Origins of German Hegemony." *World Politics* 43(1): 28-52.

Kadera, Kelly M. & Daniel S. Morey. 2008. "The Trade-offs of Fighting and Investing: A Model of the Evolution of War and Peace." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 25(2): 152-170.

Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003. "Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties." *International Organization* 57(Autumn): 801-827.

Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, Scott Gates, & Håvard Hegre. 1999. "Evolution in Democracy-War Dynamics." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43(6): 771-792.

Smith, Alastair. 1998. "Fighting Battles, Winning Wars." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(3): 301-320.

Weeks, Jessica L. 2008. "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve." *International Organization* 62(Winter): 35-64.

Wittman, Donald. 1979. "How a War Ends: A Rational Model Approach" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 23(4): 743-763.

Assignment and Grading:

Students will be evaluated on their participation, reading and lecture comprehension, and quality of their research papers. Grades of incomplete (I) will only be given in extraordinary circumstances. Grading weight will be given to each of these areas of evaluation as follows:

Participation	10%
Reading and Lecture Comprehension	25%
Short Essays	20%
Research Paper	45%

Participation.

Classes will be a mixture of lecture and seminar discussion. Therefore, attendance and discussion are very important to the learning experience. Obviously, students can only participate if they attend class. Participation will be informally rated by the instructor on the following scale:

Outstanding:	Regular, insightful comments
Exceeds Expectations:	Comments show good understanding
Acceptable:	Comments usually good, but occasionally tangential
Poor:	Mostly tangential, irrelevant comments
Unacceptable:	Never spoke

Reading and Lecture Comprehension.

The seminar discussion portion of the class requires that students do the assigned reading *prior* to each class session. (Please follow the class reading schedule.) Various small assignments will be used to assess reading and lecture comprehension throughout the semester. These will include quizzes, worksheets, and extractions from the readings. (A typical extraction would be "questions and quotes" in which each student submits one question regarding the reading and one quote from the reading that presents a distilled insight of what the author was trying to get across.) Students should be prepared (by having done the reading AND having the assigned reading with them in class) for any kind of "comprehension check" assignment every class session.

Short Essays.

Three short essays will ask the students to apply the theories we are reading about to the Crimean War. More specific instructions for each essay will be given on the days that we formally cover the readings regarding the Crimean War (from Troubetzkoy). Due dates for each essay are on the class reading schedule.

Research Paper.

The major assignment for the class will be a research paper in which each student analyzes an international dispute or "conflict episode" (chosen from a list provided by the instructor) from its inception, through its escalation phase, to its termination. The paper will be written in phases throughout the semester with the final paper being due during finals week. Details regarding each phase are in a separate handout. Due dates for each phase are on the class reading schedule. The phases will be graded coarsely (i.e., using non-fractionalized letter grades) to give the students a sense of how they are doing. Provided that all phases were turned in, it is the quality of the final paper that will determine a student's grade for this component of the course grade.

Broad Course Outline:
1. The International Interaction Game
2. The Study of International Conflict through Levels of Analysis
3. Autocratic Decision-making and International Conflict
4. Alliance Reliability
5. Exploring the Causes of the Crimean War
6. War and the State
7. Bargaining and War
8. Fighting Battles, Winning Wars
9. The Conduct of the Crimean War
10. Enforcing Agreements
11. A World of Commonwealths
12. Evolution in Democracy-War Dynamics
13. The Trade-offs of Fighting and Investing
14. How Wars End
15. Hierarchy in International Relations

Research Paper:
The major assignment for the class will be a research paper in which each student analyzes an international dispute or "conflict episode" (chosen from a list provided by the instructor) from its inception, through its escalation phase, to its termination.

The paper will be written in five phases. The phases allow the students to complete portions of the research throughout the semester and get feedback regarding that research. It is expected that the final paper incorporate the feedback that the student has received.

Phase 1. Demonstrate understanding of the dispute you have been given. Provide a summary of your dispute episode and an initial reference list that you will use for future research. This will include identification of key leaders in each country, a detailed description of the relative capabilities of each country, why either country could not (perhaps) use their full capabilities in this dispute, whether either country was a major power, the regime type of each country (using both the Polity Score and a more descriptive identification, identification of the alliance(s) between the countries if an alliance type is listed. Provide an analysis and discussion of the predicted outcome using the international interaction game and the ordinal preferences you have been given. (2-3 pages in at least eight paragraphs, not including one page for the international interaction game worksheet and another page for the works cited list.)

An explicit outline for Phase 1 is provided as a guide:

Phase 1 Outline
    A. Opening
        1. Name of dispute
        2. Dates
        3. Between what countries
        4. Summary of "dispute information"
        5. Where did the relevant events take place?
    B. State A
        1. Regime type
        2. Major-power status
        3. Key decision-makers
    C. State B
        1. Regime type
        2. Major-power status
        3. Key decision-makers
    D. Relative capabilities
        1. Military personnel
        2. Military expenditures
        3. Energy consumption
        4. Iron & steel production
        5. Urban population
        6. Total population
        7. Percent of system capabilities
    E. Qualifiers to relative capabilities
    F. Alliance between the two countries?
    G. International interaction game
        1. Predicted outcome
        2. "Off the equilibrium path" decisions
    H. Comparison of predicted outcome and actual outcome using the "hostility-level method"

Phase 2. Timeline of the dispute.
Provide a detailed timeline accounting for the actions of the states and their leaders that make up the dispute. Include relevant third-party actions. The timeline itself should be written in prose but with dates as headers; there should be at least one paragraph per date. (See example below.) Provide citations (author or outlet and date of publication) throughout the timeline regarding where you discovered these actions and the details thereof. Add a "Works Cited" list at the end of the assignment that is alphabetized by author or outlet. (The length of the timelines will vary according to how long your dispute was and how much happened. This assignment is expected to be at least 2 pages: at least one for the timeline and at least one more for the works cited list.)

Example entries for a (fictional) timeline:

29 August 1935
Prime Minister Gordon of New Zealand makes a speech demanding that Australia cede Tasmania to New Zealand (Gordon, 1935). Later that day, Australia puts its military forces on alert (Canberra Times, 30 August 1935).

30 August 1935
New Zealand's navy (thirty ships, including two battleships) masses in the Bass Strait. Australia is caught unawares, having only three patrol boats in the area (Canberra Times, 31 August 1935; Christchurch Daily, 1 September 1935). Foreign Minister Palmer of Great Britain offers to mediate the conflict (London Gazette, 31 August 1935).

Phase 3. Historical background leading up to the dispute
What did the actors say the dispute was about? How far back in time does this conflict of interest extend between these two states? Also describe the general historical relationship between the two states and any relevant third-party actors. Cite your evidence and provide a works cited page at the end of the assignment. (Again, the length of this phase will vary according to the nature of your dispute. This assignment is expected to be at least 2 pages: at least one for the historical background and at least one more for the works cited list.

Phase 4. Make a determination of the likely stakes, costs, and probabilities of winning (objective and perceived). Cite your connecting evidence and provide a works cited page at the end of the assignment. Then make an informed estimation of what the actors' likely preferences were over the eight outcomes of the international interaction game. (These need not match the ordinal preferences given to you earlier.) Provide an analysis and discussion of the predicted outcome using the international interaction game and your ordinal preferences. (2-3 pages, not including one page for the international interaction game worksheet and another page for the works cited list.)

Phase 5. Using another theory from class (one that you think can help you the most in understanding the dispute), review the theory and what information it needs to generate predictions. Make a determination of the relevant information from your case (citing connecting evidence), and then argue what the chosen theory would predict for your case. (3-4 pages, not including the works cited list)

The final paper is a synthesis and re-write of the five phases. It also contains three new sections: an opening that argues for a theory, a compare and contrast section, and a conclusion. Your final paper should be the best written piece of work you have turned in this semester.

Final Paper Outline
I. Opening
   A. What dispute, when, between what states?
   B. Preview of findings: "I argue that X theory explains this case better..."
II. Historical background between the states, including the conflict of interest that led to the dispute
III. The dispute itself (timeline in prose form; specifically, without the date headers)
IV. International Interaction Game Analysis
V. Second Theory Analysis
VI. Compare & Contrast Theories
   A. Which of the two theories better explains the case?
   B. Why?
   C. What are the weaknesses of the better theory?
   D. What are the strengths of the weaker theory?
   E. Having done this analysis, what third theory would you want to apply to your case next? Why would you choose that third theory?
VII.   Conclusions
   A. What have you learned about theories of conflict and cooperation as a result of this research project?
   B. What have you learned about social scientific research more generally?
   C. How would you make this assignment better for future students?

Reading Schedule: Spring 2012
POLS 341: Theories of Conflict and Cooperation

Tuesday	Reading	Thursday	Reading	Due Dates
Jan 17		Jan 19	Bueno de Mesquita 1990 WP	
Jan 24	Levy and Thompson: chs. 1 & 2	Jan 26	Levy and Thompson: ch. 3	Phase 1: Jan 24
Jan 31	Levy and Thompson: ch. 4	Feb 2	Levy and Thompson: ch. 5	
Feb 7	Levy and Thompson: ch. 6 & 8	Feb 9	Weeks 2008 IO	Phase 2: Feb 7
Feb 14	Leeds 2003 IO	Feb 16	Troubetzkoy: chs. 1-8	
Feb 21	Wagner: ch. 1	Feb 23	Wagner: ch. 2	Essay 1: Feb 23
Feb 28	Wagner: ch. 3	Mar 1	Wagner: ch. 4	
Mar 6	Smith 1998 JCR	Mar 8	Troubetzkoy: chs. 9-16	Phase 3: Mar 6
Mar 13	*Spring Break*	Mar 15	*Spring Break*	
Mar 20	Wagner: ch. 5	Mar 22	Wagner: chs. 6 & 7	Essay 2: Mar 22
Mar 27	Mitchell, Gates, & Hegre 1999 JCR	Mar 29	Kadera & Morey 2008 CMPS	Phase 4: Mar 29
Apr 3	*No Class: Conference*	Apr 5	Wittman 1979 JCR	
Apr 10	Iklé: pp. vii-58	Apr 12	Iklé: pp. 59-161	
Apr 17	Troubetzkoy ch. 17	Apr 19	Lake: preface, intro., and ch. 1	Phase 5: Apr 17
Apr 24	Lake: ch. 2	Apr 26	Lake: ch. 3	Essay 3: Apr 24
May 1	Lake: ch. 4	May 3	Lake: ch. 5 and conclusion	

Final Paper: May 8

Readings

Bueno de Mesquita 1990 WP: Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1990. "Pride of Place." *World Politics* 43(1): 28-52.

Levy and Thompson: Levy, Jack S. and William R. Thompson. 2010. *Causes of War*. Wiley-Blackwell.

Weeks 2008 IO: Weeks, Jessica L. 2008. "Autocratic Audience Costs." *International Organization* 62(Winter): 35-64.

Leeds 2003 IO: Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003. "Alliance Reliability in Times of War." *International Organization* 57(Autumn): 801-827.

Troubetzkoy: Troubetzkoy, Alexis. 2006. *A Brief History of the Crimean War: History's Most Unnecessary Struggle*. Running Press.

Wagner: Wagner, R. Harrison. 2007. *War and the State: The Theory of International Politics*. University of Michigan Press.

Smith 1998 JCR: Smith, Alastair. 1998. "Fighting Battles, Winning Wars." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(3): 301-320.

Mitchell, Gates, & Hegre 1999 JCR: Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, Scott Gates, & Håvard Hegre. 1999. "Evolution in Democracy-War Dynamics." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43(6): 771-792.

Kadera & Morey 2008 CMPS: Kadera, Kelly M. & Daniel S. Morey. 2008. "The Trade-offs of Fighting and Investing." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 25(2): 152-170.

Wittman 1979 JCR: Wittman, Donald. 1979. "How a War Ends: A Rational Model Approach" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 23(4): 743-763.

Iklé: Iklé, Fred Charles. 2005 (revised edition). *Every War Must End*. Columbia University Press.

Lake: Lake, David A. 2011. *Hierarchy in International Relations*. Cornell University Press.

* Schedule subject to change.

The International Interaction Game
Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992, *War and Reason.*

A
~D / D

B (left)   **B** (right)

Left B: D / ~D
Right B: ~D / D

A (under left B, D branch)   SQ

Left A: D / ~D

B (under left A)   AcqA

Left B: ~F / F

A (~F)   **A** (F)

Left A: ~F / F
Nego   **B** (~F / F)   CapB   WarB

B: CapB / WarA

Right B (AcqB): AcqB

Right A: ~F / F

B (~F)   **B** (F)

Left B: ~F / F
Nego   **A** (~F / F)

A: CapA / WarB

Right B: ~F / F
CapB   WarA

D = Demand
~D = no Demand
F = use Force
~F = do not use Force

SQ = Status Quo
Nego = Negotiation
AcqA = Acquiescence by A
AcqB = Acquiescence by B
CapA = Capitulation by A
CapB = Capitulation by B
WarA = War started by A
WarB = War started by B

The International Interaction Game
Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992, *War and Reason.*

State A	Outcome	State B
7	SQ	7
6	Nego	5
3	AcqA	8
8	AcqB	2
2	CapA	6
5	CapB	1
4	WarA	3
1	WarB	4

Step 1. Copy ordinal preferences for state A.

A

~D

D

B

B

D

~D

~D

D

A

SQ

7

AcqB

8

A

D

~D

~F

F

B

AcqA

3

B

~F

F

~F

F

A

A

Nego

6

~F

F

CapB

5

WarA

4

~F

F

B

CapA

2

WarB

1

Nego

6

~F

F

CapA

2

WarB

1

CapB

5

WarA

4

D = Demand
~D = no Demand
F = use Force
~F = do not use Force

SQ = Status Quo
Nego = Negotiation
AcqA = Acquiescence by A
AcqB = Acquiescence by B
CapA = Capitulation by A
CapB = Capitulation by B
WarA = War started by A
WarB = War started by B

The International Interaction Game

Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992, *War and Reason.*

State A	Outcome	State B
7	SQ	7
6	Nego	5
3	AcqA	8
8	AcqB	2
2	CapA	6
5	CapB	1
4	WarA	3
1	WarB	4

Step 2. Copy ordinal preferences for state B.

$D = Demand$
$\sim D = no\ Demand$
$F = use\ Force$
$\sim F = do\ not\ use\ Force$

SQ = Status Quo
Nego = Negotiation
AcqA = Acquiescence by A
AcqB = Acquiescence by B
CapA = Capitulation by A
CapB = Capitulation by B
WarA = War started by A
WarB = War started by B

The International Interaction Game

Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992, *War and Reason.*

Step 3. Determine the best decision for the actor at the bottom of the game tree.

A

~D   D

B   B

D   ~D   ~D   D

A   A

D   ~D   SQ   AcqB   ~F   F

B   **7**   **8**   B   B

~F   F   AcqA   **7**   **2**   ~F   F   ~F   F

A   A   **3**   Nego   ~F   F   CapB   WarA

~F   F   ~F   F   **8**   **6**   A   **5**   **4**

Nego   ~F   F   CapA   WarB   **5**   CapA   ~F   F   **1**   **3**

6   B   **2**   **1**   **2**   WarB

5   ~F   F   **6**   **4**   **6**   **1**

    CapB   WarA   **4**

    5   **4**

    1   **3**

D = Demand
~D = no Demand
*F = use Force*
~F = do not use Force

SQ = Status Quo
Nego = Negotiation
AcqA = Acquiescence by A
AcqB = Acquiescence by B
CapA = Capitulation by A
CapB = Capitulation by B
WarA = War started by A
WarB = War started by B

The International Interaction Game
Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992, *War and Reason.*

We assume that the actors are predicting like we are, by looking ahead and thinking backward.

Step 4. Determine the best decision for the actor at the next highest level of the game tree.

A

~D   D

B   B

D   ~D   ~D   D

A   SQ   AcqB   A

                    7   8
D   ~D   7   2   ~F   F

B   AcqA   B   B

~F   F   3   ~F   F   ~F   F
              8

A   A   Nego ~F F CapB WarA

~F F   ~F F   6   5   4
                                5 CapA WarB 1   3
Nego ~F F CapA WarB   2   1
6   B   2   1   5 CapA WarB
5   6   4   2   1
   CapB WarA   6   4
   5   4
   1   3

D = Demand
~D = no Demand
F = use Force
*~F = do not use Force*

SQ = Status Quo
Nego = Negotiation
AcqA = Acquiescence by A
AcqB = Acquiescence by B
CapA = Capitulation by A
CapB = Capitulation by B
WarA = War started by A
WarB = War started by B

The International Interaction Game

Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992, *War and Reason.*

Step 5. Determine the best decision for the actor at the next highest level of the game tree.

D = Demand
~D = no Demand
F = use Force
~F = do not use Force

SQ = Status Quo
Nego = Negotiation
AcqA = Acquiescence by A
AcqB = Acquiescence by B
CapA = Capitulation by A
CapB = Capitulation by B
WarA = War started by A
WarB = War started by B

The International Interaction Game

Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992, *War and Reason.*

Step 6. Determine the best decision for the actor at the next highest level of the game tree.

A

~D   D

B   B

D   ~D   ~D   D

A   SQ   AcqB   A

D   ~D   7   8   ~F   F

B   AcqA   7   2   B   B

~F   F   3   ~F   F   ~F   F

A   A   8   Nego ~F F CapB WarA

~F   F   ~F   F   6   5   4

Nego ~F   F CapA WarB   5   A   1   3

6   B   2   1   ~F   F

5   ~F   F   5   CapA WarB

CapB   WarA 6   4   2   1

5   4   6   4

1   3

D = Demand
~D = no Demand
F = use Force
~F = do not use Force

SQ = Status Quo
Nego = Negotiation
AcqA = Acquiescence by A
AcqB = Acquiescence by B
CapA = Capitulation by A
CapB = Capitulation by B
WarA = War started by A
WarB = War started by B

The International Interaction Game

Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992, *War and Reason.*

Step 7. Determine the best decision for the actor at the next highest level of the game tree.

A

~D — D

B — B

D — ~D — ~D — D

A — SQ — AcqB — A

D — ~D — ~F — F

B — AcqA — B

~F — F — 3 — ~F — F

A — A — 8 — Nego — A — CapB — WarA

~F — F — ~F — F — 6 — ~F — F — 5 — 4

Nego — B — CapA — WarB — 5 — CapA — WarB — 1 — 3

6 — ~F — F — 2 — 1 — 2 — 1

5 — CapB — WarA — 6 — 4 — 6 — 4

5 — 4

1 — 3

SQ
7
7

AcqB
8
2

D = Demand
~D = no Demand
F = use Force
~F = do not use Force

SQ = Status Quo
Nego = Negotiation
AcqA = Acquiescence by A
AcqB = Acquiescence by B
CapA = Capitulation by A
CapB = Capitulation by B
WarA = War started by A
WarB = War started by B

The International Interaction Game

Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992, *War and Reason.*

Step 8. Determine the best decision for the actor at the top of the game tree.

D = Demand
~D = no Demand
F = use Force
~F = do not use Force

SQ = Status Quo
Nego = Negotiation
AcqA = Acquiescence by A
AcqB = Acquiescence by B
CapA = Capitulation by A
CapB = Capitulation by B
WarA = War started by A
WarB = War started by B

Step 9. Trace unbroken path from the top of the game tree to an outcome at the bottom. This outcome is the predicted (or equilibrium) outcome.

The International Interaction Game
Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992, *War and Reason.*

The broken paths are important "counterfactuals", a.k.a. "off the equilibrium path" decisions.

A

~D   D

B   B

D   ~D   ~D   D

A   A

D   ~D   SQ   AcqB   ~F   F

B   **7**   **8**   B   B

~F   F   AcqA   **7**   **2**   ~F   F   ~F   F

A   A   **3**   Nego   ~F   F   CapB   WarA

~F   F   ~F   F   **8**   **6**   **5**   **4**

Nego   ~F   F   CapA   WarB   **5**   CapA   WarB   **1**   **3**

6   **2**   **1**   **2**   **1**

5   CapB   WarA   **6**   **4**   **6**   **4**

5   **4**

1   **3**

D = Demand
~D = no Demand
F = use Force
~F = do not use Force

SQ = Status Quo
Nego = Negotiation
AcqA = Acquiescence by A
AcqB = Acquiescence by B
CapA = Capitulation by A
CapB = Capitulation by B
WarA = War started by A
WarB = War started by B