

Butler's Conflict and Cooperation
System-level and dyadic theories

Chapter 2: Systemic theories

I. Hegemonic theories

- a. v. balance of power theories
 - a.i. hegemony is common and stabilizing
- b. share realist assumptions (unitary, rational state as principal actor, differentiated mostly by power)
- c. deemphasize anarchy
 - c.i. still no world government
 - c.ii. but hegemon creates an order (and perhaps authority) within a hierarchical system

II. Power Transition Theory (Organski 1958)

- a. Hegemons create political and economic structures/norms that provide security, economic, and system-wide stability benefits
 - a.i. Satisfied states bandwagon with hegemon and enjoy security and economic benefits
 - a.ii. Dissatisfied states have little capability to challenge the hegemon
- b. Power transition war (which are most destructive)
 - b.i. Power shift
 - b.i.1. dissatisfied challenger approaches the strength of the hegemon (power parity)
 - b.ii. Dissatisfaction with status quo
 - b.ii.1. Has motivation to overturn order set up by hegemon
 - b.ii.2. Seeks to speed up transition to acquire hegemonic benefits
- c. Power
 - c.i. Goes beyond military power to incorporate economic productivity, population, political capacity
 - c.ii. S-shaped curve – rapid growth at industrialization, steady at top
 - c.ii.1. Power transitions are unavoidable
- d. American power and stability?
- e. Rise of China and consequences
 - e.i. Is it happening or not?
 - e.i.1. See Beckley (2011) in current *International Security*
 - e.i.2. Reading Stephen Walt's blog post and all the links will give you a good update on the state of the debate - http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/01/26/asking_the_wrong_question_about_the_us_and_china
 - e.ii. Is China satisfied or not?
- f. Timing of transition war
 - f.i. Preventative war v. preemptive action

III. Long Cycle theory

- a. Attempts to explain the emergence of global leadership of trans-regional interactions (e.g., trade)

- b. Global war is the mechanism for consolidating new leadership
 - b.i. Winners usher in new era of leadership
 - b.ii. War provides a selection mechanism
- c. Global wars are infrequent, but intense due to:
 - c.i. Regional-global dissynchronization
 - c.i.1. Global politics are about managing long-distance commerce
 - c.i.1.a. Sea powers focus on trade and industry
 - c.i.2. Regional politics are about becoming or thwarting regional hegemonies
 - c.i.2.a. Land powers focus on territorial expansion
 - c.i.3. Dissynchronization
 - c.i.3.a. Deconcentration of power in global system encourages concentration of power in regional system and vice-versa
 - c.i.3.a.i. Land powers are strongest when sea powers are weakest
 - c.i.4. Leading sea powers organize a coalition of land and sea powers to thwart the threat of rising land powers
 - c.ii. Twin peaks model
 - c.ii.1. Long-term economic growth
 - c.ii.1.a. comes in spurts
 - c.ii.1.b. is monopolized by leading global power
 - c.ii.1.c. manifested in industry
 - c.ii.1.d. tends to radically change the way the world economy works
 - c.ii.2. 2 spurts
 - c.ii.2.a. first destabilizes the pecking order
 - c.ii.2.a.i. victory in global war
 - c.ii.2.a.i.1. exhausts the losers
 - c.ii.2.a.i.2. benefits the winner (relatively)
 - c.ii.2.b. second follows victory in global war
 - c.iii. new leader doesn't last forever
 - c.iii.1. relative position begins to decay
 - c.iii.2. sets the stage for next global war

IV. Chapter 3: Dyadic interactions of states

- a.i. Are systemic theories enough to understand war?
- a.ii. How much can the system affect non-great powers?
- a.iii. What does the dyad-level mean?
 - a.iii.1. Focus on characteristics of pairs of states
 - a.iii.2. Allows for greater context, variation than system-level
- b. International rivalries
 - b.i. Emphasizes history and context of a given pairing

- b.i.1. Dyadic relevance
 - b.i.1.a. Proximity and power projection
 - b.i.1.a.i. Many states have no/little conflicting interests
 - b.i.1.a.ii. Couldn't militarily reach each other anyway if they wanted to fight
 - b.i.1.a.iii. At least one state must be able to project power on the other to be a relevant dyad
 - b.i.2. Dyadic power capabilities
 - b.i.2.a. Weak rarely take on the strong
- b.ii. War between some pairings is much more common than chance would predict
 - b.ii.1.a. Overall, war is rare and the likelihood of any two states to be at war is extremely low
 - b.ii.2. Examples: Israel and Arab neighbors; India and Pakistan; Europe for most its history (especially France and Germany; Britain and France, among others)
 - b.ii.3. States generally focus their attention, given limited resources, on a few potential enemies
 - b.ii.3.a. Build military, intelligence, diplomacy, etc. to deal with specific future threats (they are usually the same as the past threats)
 - b.ii.3.b. Why great powers have difficulty dealing with unconventional threats (like COIN, terrorism, etc.)
- b.iii. Rivalries
 - b.iii.1. Those most likely to be future antagonists
 - b.iii.2. Generally have conflicting interests
 - b.iii.2.a. Territorial disputes, water rights, access to markets, overlapping spheres of influence
 - b.iii.2.a.i. Tend to be proximate
 - b.iii.2.b. Shared history of mistrust and a security dilemma
 - b.iii.3. Identifying rivals
 - b.iii.3.a. Enduring rivalries
 - b.iii.3.a.i. Focus on militarized conflict patterns
 - b.iii.3.a.i.1. Though even rivalries rarely engage in militarized conflict
 - b.iii.3.b. Strategic rivalries
 - b.iii.3.b.i. Focus on foreign policy histories to determine who each country believes is a rival and competitor
 - b.iii.4. Empirical pattern
 - b.iii.4.a. Earlier disputes make later disputes more probable

- b.iii.4.b. More disputes from an earlier period increase the probability of escalation
 - b.iii.4.c. Why?
 - b.iii.4.c.i. Over time, most both sides feel they require a hardline approach
 - b.iii.4.c.i.1. Winner of previous dispute probably used the hardline approach
 - b.iii.4.c.i.2. Loser believes the reason they lost was taking too soft of an approach
 - b.iii.4.d. Rivalries make international processes more dangerous
 - b.iii.4.d.i. Like territorial disputes, arms races, diversionary issues
 - b.iv. Consequences of rivalry
 - b.iv.1. Affects domestic politics and investment
 - b.iv.1.a. Invest in capacity for future war
 - b.iv.1.a.i. Infrastructure, tax collection
 - b.iv.1.a.ii. May have positive payoffs in other realms
 - b.iv.1.b. may invest too heavily in military
 - b.iv.1.b.i. can hurt economic growth
- c. Steps to War model
 - c.i. Issues
 - c.i.1. Combines issues (specifically territorial disputes) with other variables like alliances, arms races, rivalries
 - c.i.1.a. Only looks at states that are roughly equal in power
 - c.i.1.b. Focus is on dispute resolution over a given issue rather than a struggle for power
 - c.ii. Begins with the occurrence of a dispute
 - c.ii.1. Disputes are likely to escalate if these “steps” are present
 - c.ii.1.a. Territorial dispute
 - c.ii.1.b. Foreign policy includes military buildups, alliances, threats, arms races - “the realist road to war”
 - c.ii.1.c. If it’s a rivalry pairing
 - c.ii.2. Cumulative effect
 - c.ii.2.a. Each of these steps reinforce the likelihood of the other responding in kind and escalating to war
 - c.iii. Tradeoff between peace and security?
 - c.iii.1. Sure realist policies may lead to war more often, but in many cases this is better than acquiescence