

Alger, C. F. (1963). "Comparison of Intranational and International Politics." The American Political Science Review **57**(2): 406-419.

Falk, R. A. and S. H. Mendlovitz (1964). "Towards A Warless World: One Legal Formula to Achieve Transition." Yale Law Journal **73**(3): 399-424.

Masters, R. D. (1964). "World Politics as a Primitive Political System." World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations **16**(4): 595-619.

Hopmann, P. T. (1978). "Asymmetrical Bargaining in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe." International Organization **32**(1, Dependence and Dependency in the Global System): 141-177.

Bargaining relationships in formal international conferences and negotiations may involve structural asymmetries. A comprehensive analysis of these asymmetries in bargaining may be found in a synthesis of literature from formal game theory, structural-manipulative approaches to bargaining, social psychology, and the study of political influence. Propositions based on this literature focus on two factors which are likely to contribute to asymmetrical outcomes in negotiations: unequal costs to the negotiators from the failure to agree, and unequal resources available to employ in bargaining or influence attempts. An analysis of bargaining in the section of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) dealing with the issues of European security gave qualified support to these propositions. Influence over the final text in the CSCE agreement is related to a rough index of losses which would have resulted for individual nations from the failure to reach agreement in the CSCE. In addition, influence over the final text is related to each nation's resources, especially military resources. More significantly, the two superpowers exerted considerable asymmetrical influence over what was not included in the CSCE agreement, thus exercising a substantial veto. Thus, the asymmetrical outcomes within the CSCE negotiations were reflective of both differences in "threat potential," that is, in the losses which actors would receive if no agreement had ensued, as well as differences in resources.

Keohane, R. O. (1982). "The Demand for International Regimes." International Organization **36**(2, International Regimes): 325-355.

International regimes can be understood as results of rational behavior by the actors--principally states--that create them. Regimes are demanded in part because they facilitate the making of agreements, by providing information and reducing transactions costs in world politics. Increased interdependence among issues--greater "issue density"--will lead to increased demand for regimes. Insofar as regimes succeed in providing high quality information, through such processes as the construction of generally accepted norms or the development of transgovernmental relations, they create demand for their own continuance, even if the structural conditions (such as hegemony) under which they were first supplied, change. Analysis of the demand for international regimes thus helps us to understand lags between structural change and regime change, as well as to assess the significance of transgovernmental policy networks. Several assertions of structural theory seem problematic in light of this analysis. Hegemony may not

be a necessary condition for stable international regimes; past patterns of institutionalized cooperation may be able to compensate, to some extent, for increasing fragmentation of power.

Axelrod, R. and R. O. Keohane (1985). "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions." World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations **38**(1): 226-254.

Cooperation and discord in world politics are explained to a considerable extent by the three factors discussed in the Introduction: mutuality of interest, the shadow of the future, and the number of players. Yet the context of interaction, perceptions, and strategies is also important. Issues are linked to one another through multilevel games, which may be compatible or incompatible. Whether reciprocity constitutes an effective strategy depends both on linkages among issues and on the institutions within which negotiations take place. Perceptions are always significant and often decisive. Decision makers often actively seek to change the contexts within which they act by linking issues, trying to alter others' perceptions, establishing institutions, and promoting new norms. This finding suggests the importance of linking the upward-looking theory of strategy with the downward-looking theory of regimes.

Haggard, S. and B. A. Simmons (1987). "Theories of International Regimes." International Organization **41**(3): 491-517.

Over the last decade, international regimes have become a major focus of empirical research and theoretical debate within international relations. This article provides a critical review of this literature. We survey contending definitions of regimes and suggest dimensions along which regimes vary over time or across cases; these dimensions might be used to operationalize "regime change." We then examine four approaches to regime analysis: structural, game-theoretic, functional, and cognitive. We conclude that the major shortcoming of the regimes literature is its failure to incorporate domestic politics adequately. We suggest a research program that begins with the central insights of the interdependence literature which have been ignored in the effort to construct "systemic" theory.

Maoz, Z. and D. S. Felsenthal (1987). "Self-Binding Commitments, the Inducement of Trust, Social Choice, and the Theory of International Cooperation." International Studies Quarterly **31**(2): 177-200.

Most game-theoretic applications to problems of international relations have focused on Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken. Despite the symmetrical properties of such games, we argue that they might oversimplify the complexities of fundamental international problems on a number of counts. This study attempts, therefore, to expand the horizon of modeling international relations through game theory by introducing three types of games whose common characteristic is that their equilibrium outcomes are Pareto-(or socially) inferior, but in which actors who have dominant strategies are harmed more than those who do not. We introduce a solution concept entitled self-binding commitment according to which harmed actors commit themselves to a dominated strategy regardless of what other actors would do. We show that if a self-binding commitment can be made

credible, the actor using it can benefit both himself and the society in general. The theoretical analysis is illustrated by two real-world cases (Sadat's initiative of 1977, and the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, 1985), as well as by more general situations such as balance of power, nuclear proliferation, and the role and effectiveness of international organizations. The implications of these ideas for international relations theory are briefly discussed.

Franck, T. M. (1988). "Legitimacy in the International System." American Journal of International Law **82**(4): 705-759.

Grieco, J. M. (1988). "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism." International Organization **42**(3): 485-507.

The newest liberal institutionalism asserts that, although it accepts a major realist proposition that international anarchy impedes cooperation among states, it can nevertheless affirm the central tenets of the liberal institutionalist tradition that states can achieve cooperation and that international institutions can help them work together. However, this essay's principal argument is that neoliberal institutionalism misconstrues the realist analysis of international anarchy and therefore it misunderstands realism's analysis of the inhibiting effects of anarchy on the willingness of states to cooperate. This essay highlights the profound divergences between realism and the newest liberal institutionalism. It also argues that the former is likely to be proven analytically superior to the latter.

Jervis, R. (1988). "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation." World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations **40**(3): 317-349.

Recent work has focused on the problem of how states cooperate in the environment of anarchy. Linked to the ideas of the Prisoners' Dilemma and public goods, that work has provided important insights and lines of research. But it also has problems and limitations, which are explored in the paper. The anarchy approach stresses individual actors' choices and slights questions of how issues are posed and constrained. It takes preferences as given without exploring either the frequency of PD situations or the ways in which preferences are formed and can change. Many of the concepts the framework uses--e.g., cooperation and defection, the distinction between offense and defense, and the nature of power--are problematical. Issues of beliefs, perceptions, norms, and values also lead to a different perspective on cooperation.

Haftendorn, H. (1991). "The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security." International Studies Quarterly **35**(1): 3-17.

The term "security" is as ambiguous in content as in format: is it a goal, an issue-area, a concept, a research program, or a discipline? There is no one concept of security; "national security," "international security," and "global security" refer to different sets of issues and have their origins in different historical and philosophical contexts. The author argues that the concept of international security might most appropriately describe current security affairs. She challenges the concept of national security as fixated on the nation-state and not taking into account the security of other states. She criticizes the notion of global security as presupposing a world-wide common definition of security and shared

sets of values, rules, and principles not yet existing. In the long term, however, the world might be moving in the direction of a global security system if institution-building continues and leads to common practices, rules, and enforcement capabilities. As all concepts yield only limited explanations and are of marginal value for theory-building, the essay identifies some assumptions and questions to be clarified in future research programs. In a closing section the field of international security studies and its relationship to international relations are discussed.

Stein, J. G. (1991). "Reassurance in International Conflict Management." Political Science Quarterly **106**(3): 431-451.

Burley, A.-M. (1992). "Law among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine." Columbia Law Review **92**(8): 1907-1996.

Miller, B. (1992). "Explaining Great Power Cooperation in Conflict Management." World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations **45**(1): 1-46.

This essay presents a theoretical model for explaining great power cooperation in conflict management. The model refines recent cooperation theory by distinguishing between types and degrees of international cooperation. It also challenges the dominance of decision-making analysis in the crisis literature and supplements it with structural factors. In brief, the model suggests that whereas crisis cooperation (crisis management) is conditioned by structural elements, cooperation in normal diplomacy (conflict resolution) depends on state attributes and cognitive factors. Such a model can account for the fact that unintended wars can break out between relatively moderate and similar actors whereas immoderate and dissimilar states can manage crises effectively. At the same time the model explains why some states are able to cooperate in normal diplomacy better than others, even when more actors are cooperating.

Zasloff, J. (1993). "Abolishing Coercion: The Jurisprudence of American Foreign Policy in the 1920's." Yale Law Journal **102**(7): 1689-1718.

Wendt, A. (1995). "Constructing International Politics." International Security **20**(1): 71-81.

Florini, A. (1996). "The Evolution of International Norms." International Studies Quarterly **40**(3, Special Issue: Evolutionary Paradigms in the Social Sciences): 363-389.

This article puts forward a theoretical explanation for why norms of international behavior change over time. It argues that the mainstream neorealist and neoliberal arguments on the static nature of state interests are implausible, as the recent empirical work of the growing constructivist school has convincingly shown. But the constructivists have not yet provided a theoretical basis for understanding why one norm rather than another becomes institutionalized, nor has learning theory yet provided an adequate explanation. An evolutionary approach that draws its hypotheses from an analogy to population genetics offers a promising alternative. This article briefly outlines the constructivist critique of neorealism and neoliberalism. It develops the evolutionary analogy, illustrating

the model with a case study on the emergence of a norm of transparency in international security and briefly discussing how the model might apply in several other issue areas.

Krause, K. and M. C. Williams (1996). "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods." Mershon International Studies Review **40**(2): 229-254.

The field of security studies has been the subject of considerable debate in recent years. Attempts to broaden and deepen the scope of the field beyond its traditional focus on states and military conflict have raised fundamental theoretical and practical issues. Yet, adherents to the prevailing neorealist approach to security studies have often reacted to these challenges in ways that preclude a recognition of the issues raised by alternative understandings. An examination of the debates over "rethinking security" in particular reveals an unfortunate tendency to foreclose debate between scholars taking critical and neorealist approaches. Coming to terms more fully with the foundations of these debates allows both a better view of the positions within the field and a clearer assessment of their relevance for understanding the dynamics of contemporary security.

Langlois, C. C. and J.-P. P. Langlois (1996). "Tacit Bargaining in International Relations: A Game Model and a Case Study." Journal of Conflict Resolution **40**(4): 569-596.

The authors develop a characterization of subgame perfect equilibrium strategies in discounted repeated games that highlights a class of strategies called countervailing. When using countervailing strategies, the players focus on manipulating the other side's payoff to induce his cooperation. These strategies do not require one player to entertain specific expectations about the strategic choice of the other. For this reason, countervailing strategies are promising vehicles for tacit bargaining. The authors test their relevance using a case of international trade--Japan's penetration of the U.S. automobile market in the early 1980s. The empirical section provides evidence of the tacit bargaining behavior that the model predicts.

Morgan, T. C. and V. L. Schwebach (1997). "Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises." International Studies Quarterly **41**(1): 27-50.

A number of recent international situations have raised again questions regarding the usefulness of economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy. Sanctions continue to be applied in a variety of contexts, yet we have not developed a sufficient understanding of the processes involved to determine when, or even if, sanctions can "work." While a great deal has been written on the subject, there have been neither attempts to subject the theoretical arguments to empirical testing nor efforts to provide systematic theoretical explanations for the empirical results that have been produced. In this article, we attempt to address this shortcoming in the literature. We propose a theory of sanctions effectiveness that is based on the spatial model of bargaining in international crises and use this theory to derive a number of hypotheses regarding when sanctions should produce favorable policy outcomes. We then subject some of the derived hypotheses to an empirical test based on a large number of international disputes. The model suggests that while sanctions will

not work in many cases, they can have a slight effect on the distribution of expected outcomes if the costs of the sanctions are sufficiently high relative to the values at stake. The available evidence appears to support these expectations.

Abbott, K. W. and D. Snidal (1998). "Why States Act through Formal International Organizations." Journal of Conflict Resolution **42**(1): 3-32.

States use formal international organizations (IOs) to manage both their everyday interactions and more dramatic episodes, including international conflicts. Yet, contemporary international theory does not explain the existence or form of IOs. This article addresses the question of why states use formal organizations by investigating the functions IOs perform and the properties that enable them to perform those functions. Starting with a rational-institutionalist perspective that sees IOs as enabling states to achieve their ends, the authors examine power and distributive questions and the role of IOs in creating norms and understanding. Centralization and independence are identified as the key properties of formal organizations, and their importance is illustrated with a wide array of examples. IOs as community representatives further allow states to create and implement community values and enforce international commitments.

Keohane, R. O. (1998). "International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?" Foreign Policy(110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge): 82-96+194.

International institutions have come a long way since the League of Nations. Yet we still do not understand why some succeed and others fail, nor why most remain so patently undemocratic.

Larson, D. W. (1998). "Exchange and Reciprocity in International Negotiations." International Negotiation **3**(2): 121-138.

Although international relations often involves a trade of favors or services, political scientists have not often used exchange theory. Social exchange is motivated by the prospect of mutual gain. The exercise of power entails exchange of needed resources for compliance with the influencer's wishes. The timing of repayment and explicitness of obligation are important dimensions of exchange that vary by issue area and relationship. In sequential exchange, the party that moves first risks being exploited and must therefore trust the other. The parties to an exchange may either leave open or specify what the other should do in return. Reciprocity refers to exchanges which are mutual and perceived by the parties as fair. It is difficult to determine whether exchanges are reciprocal without a common measure of value. Norms and customary expectations determine what is considered fair when there is no standardized measure of value. In negotiations, there are several competing principles of justice. Reciprocity requires that concessions be matched; it does not mean that their magnitude must be equal.

Martin, L. L. and B. A. Simmons (1998). "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions." International Organization **52**(4, International Organization at Fifty: Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics): 729-757.

Studies of international institutions, organizations, and regimes have consistently

appeared in the pages of *International Organization*. We review the theoretical and empirical work on international institutions and identify promising directions for the institutionalist research program. Early studies of international institutions were rich with empirical insights and often influenced by theoretical developments in other fields of political science, but lacking an overarching analytical framework they failed to produce a coherent body of scholarship. Current efforts to reinvigorate the study of international institutions draw on a new body of theory about domestic institutions. We argue that the assumptions of this new approach to institutions are more appropriate to international studies than those of earlier attempts to transfer theories across levels of analysis. We suggest that the most productive questions for future research will focus on specifying alternative mechanisms by which institutions can influence outcomes and identify particular sets of questions within this agenda that are especially promising.

Mastanduno, M. (1998). "Economics and Security in Statecraft and Scholarship." *International Organization* **52**(4, *International Organization at Fifty: Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics*): 825-854.

This article traces and explains how U.S. policy officials and IR scholars have conceived of the relationship between economics and security over the past half-century. During the interwar years, economics and security were integrated in both scholarship and statecraft. During the Cold War, scholars treated the two issues as separate areas of inquiry. U.S. policymakers integrated economics and security during the early Cold War, but by the 1970s the two components of U.S. foreign policy had drifted apart. After the Cold War, a renewed emphasis has emerged in both U.S. statecraft and IR scholarship on the integration of economics and security. Three factors explain these patterns: (1) the international distribution of material capabilities, (2) perceptions of the strategic environment, and (3) perceptions of the position of the United States in international economic competition.

Slaughter, A.-M., A. S. Tulumello, et al. (1998). "International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship." *American Journal of International Law* **92**(3): 367-397.

Scholars of international law and international relations have rediscovered one another. This article reviews the burgeoning "IR/IL" literature of recent years, examining how lawyers have employed IR theory in the analysis of international law and institutions and how they have challenged IR theory by reasserting the distinctive role of law in explanations of international affairs. The authors conclude by posing six substantive research questions around which an interdisciplinary research agenda might be built.

Hurd, I. (1999). "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics." *International Organization* **53**(2): 379-408.

The idea that the legitimacy of international institutions affects state behavior is increasingly common in discussions of international relations, and yet little has been said about what the term legitimacy means or how it works. This is peculiar, since legitimacy is widely cited in domestic social studies as a major reason,

along with coercion and self-interest, that actors obey rules. I examine the concept of legitimacy, defined as the internalization of an external rule, as it is used in domestic studies and in international relations, and find that the existence of institutions that states accept as legitimate has important implications for theories of international relations. Using the norms of sovereign nonintervention as an illustration, I compare coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy as three motivations for rule-following by states. Self-interest and coercion, alone or together, are insufficient to sustain the pattern of behavior we recognize as the system of sovereign states. The degree of settledness of borders, especially among states of unequal power, indicates that the institution of sovereignty owes part of its persistence to the widespread acceptance by states of the norms of sovereignty as legitimate. This is important for international relations because the existence of legitimate rules signals the presence of authority, which is inconsistent with the received image of the international system as anarchic. I conclude the article by charting a course of further research into the ideas of legitimacy, authority, and anarchy.

Ratner, S. R. and A.-M. Slaughter (1999). "Appraising the Methods of International Law: A Prospectus for Readers." American Journal of International Law **93**(2): 291-302.

Doyle, M. W. and N. Sambanis (2000). "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis." American Political Science Review **94**(4): 779-801.

International peacebuilding can improve the prospects that a civil war will be resolved. Although peacebuilding strategies must be designed to address particular conflicts, broad parameters that fit most conflicts can be identified. Strategies should address the local roots of hostility, the local capacities for change, and the (net) specific degree of international commitment available to assist sustainable peace. One can conceive of these as the three dimensions of a triangle whose area is the "political space"-or effective capacity-for building peace. We test these propositions with an extensive data set of 124 post-World War II civil wars and find that multilateral, United Nations peace operations make a positive difference. UN peacekeeping is positively correlated with democratization processes after civil war, and multilateral enforcement operations are usually successful in ending the violence. Our study provides broad guidelines for designing the appropriate peacebuilding strategy, given the mix of hostility, local capacities, and international capacities.

Langlois, C. C. and J.-P. P. Langlois (2001). "Engineering Cooperation: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Phased International Agreements." American Journal of Political Science **45**(3): 599-619.

This article examines the possible treaty designs that are available to the signatories of international agreements such as NAFTA and START. In the noisy environment that these treaties regulate we construct different types of phased designs that all require that signatories move towards the cooperative goal gradually over time at a pace that is determined by the particular features of the agreement. Self-enforcement of the terms of a phased agreement requires that the signatories adopt countervailing strategies. This means that punishment for observed noncompliance must be the minimum punishment that ensures



deterrence. This characteristic enhances the stability of cooperation so that the best phased designs lead signatories closer to full cooperation in the long run than would a traditional probabilistic trigger scheme. The discounted utility of the long-run position reached by the players provides a novel criterion for choice among the various phased and trigger designs that are available.

Richards, D. (2001). "Reciprocity and Shared Knowledge Structures in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game." Journal of Conflict Resolution **45**(5): 621-635.

A prominent solution to achieving cooperation in prisoner's dilemma situations is repeated interaction between players. Although indefinitely repeated play solves the mutual gains problem, it also creates an unsolved coordination problem because an infinite number of strategies are possible in equilibrium. This article explores whether a "shared grammar of strategies," formalized by a knowledge-induced equilibrium, resolves the coordination problem by prescribing a unique behavioral rule. Applied to the set of strategies submitted to Axelrod's prisoner's dilemma tournament, tit for tat emerges as that unique coordinating strategy.

Vagts, D. F. (2001). "The United States and Its Treaties: Observance and Breach." American Journal of International Law **95**(2): 313-334.

The commitment of the United States to its treaty obligations has recently been put in question by two persistent histories of treaty violation—the refusal to pay U.S. United Nations dues in full until the contentious and tenuous settlement of early 2001 and the repeated failure to advise alien prisoners of their rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.<sup>1</sup> Official advocacy of an antimissile defense system has also raised concern about the United States' continuing fidelity to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. What is especially unsettling is the change in the style of verbalization that has accompanied these breaches. In the past, the courts and the political branches consistently acknowledged that on a different plane treaties are binding upon the United States and that, if the United States breaches one, it has an obligation to set the matter straight. In recent years, however, the executive, Congress, the courts, and influential commentators have each conspicuously verbalized the idea that the later-in-time rule is the final answer and that the binding effect of international law carries little weight. This attitude, at a time when many foreigners distrust the United States as too powerful and too aware of that power, jeopardizes the conduct of our foreign affairs. This article reviews the practice of the United States as regards its treaty obligations, including both what it does and what it says about its behavior. Part I surveys the most obvious body of materials, those generated by three doctrines of American constitutional law—the later-in-time rule, which allows later statutes to override treaty provisions; the doctrine that some treaties are not self-executing and require further congressional action; and the doctrine that favors interpreting statutes so as not to override treaty obligations. Part II then examines the statements made by the courts in these cases, particularly when they have not upheld the treaty claim as a matter of domestic law. Typically, they have acknowledged a different, penumbral obligation that should not be disregarded—often referred to as the "interest and honor" of the United States. That part also surveys American scholarship about the binding quality of treaties. Part III attempts an overall view of United States behavior vis-a-vis treaty obligations,

trying to include as many cases as possible other than those arising from congressional action or inaction. Part IV concludes that the U.S. record has not been as negative as some have feared but that anxieties have been needlessly fueled in recent years by the reckless language of both officials and scholars.

Voeten, E. (2001). "Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action." American Political Science Review **95**(4): 845-858.

I examine if and how a superpower can use its asymmetric power to achieve favorable outcomes in multilateral bargaining between states that have conflicting interests and veto power. Using a game-theoretic framework, I show that the ability to act outside, either unilaterally or with an ally, helps the superpower to reach agreements that would be vetoed in the absence of the outside option. These agreements, however, are usually not at the superpower's ideal point. Under some conditions, uncertainty about the credibility of the outside option can lead to unilateral action that all actors prefer to avoid. In other circumstances, this uncertainty results in multilateral actions that the superpower (and the ally) would not initiate without multilateral authorization. The model provides useful insights that help explain patterns of decision-making in the United Nations Security Council in the 1990s, including the failed attempt to reach agreement over the Kosovo intervention.

Garoupa, N. R. and J. o. E. Gata (2002). "A Theory of International Conflict Management and Sanctioning." Public Choice **110**(1 - 2): 41-65.

In this paper we analyze sanctioning policies in international law. We develop a model of international military conflict where the conflicting countries can be a target of international sanctions. These sanctions constitute an equilibrium outcome of an international political market for sanctions, where different countries trade political influence. We show that the level of sanctions in equilibrium is strictly positive but limited, in the sense that higher sanctions would exacerbate the military conflict, not reduce it. We then propose an alternative interpretation to the perceived lack of effectiveness of international sanctions, by showing that the problem might not be one of undersanctioning but of oversanctioning.

Goodin, R. E. (2005). "Toward an International Rule of Law: Distinguishing International Law-Breakers from Would-Be Law-Makers." The Journal of Ethics **9**(1 - 2): 225-246.

An interesting fact about customary international law is that the only way you can propose an amendment to it is by breaking it. How can that be differentiated from plain law-breaking? What moral standards might apply to that sort of international conduct? I propose we use ones analogous to the ordinary standards for distinguishing civil disobedients from ordinary law-breakers: would-be law-makers, like civil disobedients, must break the law openly; they must accept the legal consequences of doing so; and they must be prepared to have the same rules applied to them as everyone else.