Schedule of Readings

International Law and Game Theory
(with a focus on security issues)
Fall 2005
Christopher K. Butler, Instructor

Meeting 1

Reviewed list of readings and organize them.
Reviewed normal form (game matrix) and extensive form (game tree) games.
Discussed single-shot versus repeated-interaction equilibria for the Prisoner's Dilemma.
Discussed layers of theoretical meaning in games (IR theory attached to value neutral core).

Meeting 2

Alger, C. F. (1963). "Comparison of Intranational and International Politics." American Political Science Review 57(2): 406-419.
Thompson, A. (2002). "Applying Rational Choice Theory to International Law: The Promise and Pitfalls." Journal of Legal Studies 31(January): 285-306.
Keohane, R. O. (2002). "Rational Choice Theory and International Law: Insights and Limitations." Journal of Legal Studies 31(January): 307-319.
Game Theory and the Law pp. 6-13, 19-23, and chapter 5.
Axelrod, R. and R. O. Keohane. (1985). "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions." World Politics 38(1): 226-254.
Jervis, R. (1988). "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation." World Politics 40(3): 317-349.
Butler, Christopher. (N.D.) "Game Theory Topics: Building Models From Start to Finish"

Recommended:

Slaughter, A.-M., A. S. Tulumello, et al. (1998). "International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship." American Journal of International Law 92(3): 367-397.
Ratner, S. R. and A.-M. Slaughter (1999). "Appraising the Methods of International Law: A Prospectus for Readers." American Journal of International Law 93(2): 291-302.

Meeting 3

Keohane, R. O. (1982). "The Demand for International Regimes." International Organization 36(2): 325-355.
Haggard, S. and B. A. Simmons (1987). "Theories of International Regimes." International Organization 41(3): 491-517.
Homework problems from PS 541: Fall 2003 (Aug 25, Sept 3, and Nov 5)

Meeting 4

Miller, Gary and Kathleen Cook. (1998). "Leveling and Leadership: Hierarchy and Social Order.", pp. 67-100, in Institutions and Social Order, Karol Soltan, Eric M. Uslaner, and Virginia Haufler, eds., Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Calvert, Randall L. 1998. "Explaining Social Order: Internalization, External Enforcement, or Equilibrium?", pp. 131-62, in Institutions and Social Order, Karol Soltan, Eric M. Uslaner, and Virginia Haufler, eds., Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Another backward induction problem.

Meeting 5

Sorokin, Gerald L. (1994). "Alliance Formation and General Deterrence: A Game-Theoretic Model and the Case of Israel." Journal of Conflict Resolution 38(2): 298-325.
Voeten, E. (2001). "Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action." American Political Science Review 95(4): 845-858.
Plus a one-page write-up on "How to structure the terms of an alliance to make compliance likely."

Meeting 6

Maoz, Z. and D. S. Felsenthal (1987). "Self-Binding Commitments, the Inducement of Trust, Social Choice, and the Theory of International Cooperation." International Studies Quarterly 31(2): 177-200.
Intriligator, Michael D. (1982). "Research on Conflict Theory." Journal of Conflict Resolution 26(2): 307-327.

Meeting 7

Simon, Michael W. (2002). "Rogue State Response to BMD: The Regional Context." Defense and Security Analysis 18(3): 271-92.
Plus a one-page write-up sketching the strategic nuclear concerns between the United States and China.

Meeting 8

Game Theory and the Law pp. 35-45 and chapters 3 and 4.
Plus be prepared to discuss how information and signaling problems affect nuclear proliferation.

Meeting 9

Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. (2001). "The Rational Design of International Institutions." International Organization 55(4): 761-99.
Koremenos, Barbara. (2001). "Loosening the Ties That Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement Flexibility." International Organization 55(2):289-325.
Plus a one- to two-page write up of the dilemmas facing Iran and North Korea when negotiating with the international community regarding nuclear weapons and nuclear energy.

Meeting 10

Kilgour, D. Marc and Steven J. Brams. (1992). "Putting the Other Side "On Notice" Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control." Journal of Conflict Resolution 36(3): 395-414.

Meeting 11

Attend Wednesday session of PS 540 (November 30, 1-3:30 PM). Review materials for that class period and do regular write-up of Kraig (1999).
Solingen, E. (1994). “The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint.” International Security 19(2): 126-169.
Fetter, S. and D. T. Hagerty (1996). “Nuclear Deterrence and the 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis.” International Security 21(1): 176-185.
Sagan, S. D. (1996). “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb.” International Security 21(3): 54-86.
Kraig, M. R. (1999). “Nuclear Deterrence in the Developing World: A Game-Theoretic Treatment.” Journal of Peace Research 36(2): 141-167.