Christopher K. Butler, Sabine Carey, and Neil J. Mitchell
Delegating Repression: The Effect of Pro-Government Militias on Human Rights Violations
WORKING PAPER
2009
Abstract
Does the presence of a pro-government militia worsen the human rights of a country? Previous research in human rights suggests that when faced with armed threats and civil war, governments are more likely to engage in violations. When governments face being held accountable for their actions by withdrawal of public support or international trade and investment, they are more likely to exercise restraint. Democracy and international trade tend to reduce the likelihood of violations. Little attention has been paid to the question of how repression is organized and how the choice of agent influences human rights. We develop the logic of accountability and examine how delegation to more informal armed groups influences human rights violations.
You may download this paper here.
Email me with a comment about this paper:  .
|
