Christopher K. Butler and Neil J. Mitchell
Non-State Actors, States, and Repression: The Effect of Militias and Informal Armed Groups on Human Rights Violations
WORKING PAPER
2007
Abstract
Does the presence of a pro-government militia worsen the human rights of a country even after controlling for other factors? In a statistical analysis of a cross-sectional data set, the authors find evidence that this is indeed the case. Previous research in human rights suggests the importance of accountability in understanding the decision to violate human rights. On the one hand, when faced with armed threats and civil war, governments are more likely to engage in violations. On the other hand, when governments face being held accountable for their actions by withdrawal of public support or international trade and investment, they are more likely to exercise restraint. Democracy and international trade tend to reduce the likelihood of violations. The authors further develop the accountability logic and examine the alternative choice of evading accountability. The empirical results suggest that where governments have an opportunity of evading accountability levels of human rights violations will increase, even after controlling for the factors found influential in earlier research.
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