The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction

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In most Cold War-style analyses of deterrence, leaders are assumed to be rational and willing to engage in cost-benefit calculations when making policy decisions. Yet, the assumption of rationality tends to obscure various factors that may be unique to the context and challenger, including idiosyncratic leadership beliefs that can be decisive in determining whether deterrence threats "work." This article outlines a methodology for tailoring deterrence policies to specific antagonists and contexts, to "get inside" the decision-making process of the challenger, and to ascertain as far as possible the basis for its decision-making with regard to a specific context and flashpoint. The primary areas of interest in this framework are characteristics of: the pertinent leaderships/countries, their motivations, goals, and determination, the nature of decision-making, the object of the friction (the "stakes" involved), the regional political/security context, and the sources of power available to the participants.

Introduction: Surprise, Surprise

In August 1941, Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson reassured President Roosevelt that war with Japan was unlikely because "no rational Japanese could believe an attack on us could result in anything but disaster for his country."[1] Four months later Japan launched a surprise attack against the United States at Pearl Harbor. Despite Acheson's confident prediction that Japanese leaders would never dare to strike the United States, they did exactly that, believing they were "doomed" if they did not.[2] Japanese leaders calculated that they had no acceptable alternative to war with the United States.

In November 1950, U.S. forces were fighting in North Korea. At the time the CIA and Gen. Douglas MacArthur advised President Truman that China would not intervene in the Korean War, in part because they believed that Mao Zedong and, more importantly, Mao's Soviet patrons would fear igniting a global conflict. Indeed, the CIA's Daily Summaries (intelligence summaries for the civilian leadership) continued until November 17, 1950, to claim that China would not intervene or, if it did, would not intervene on a large scale.[3]

Nevertheless, days later, on November 25, 1950, China hurled 170,000 troops against the U.S. Eighth Army in North Korea, signaling a massive surprise intervention that ultimately cost China a million casualties. Instead of being deterred by the prospect of war with the United States, Stalin expressed support for Chinese intervention. He stated to Mao, "If a war [with the U.S.] is inevitable, then let it be waged now."[4] Mao, in turn, saw no acceptable alternative to war because he believed U.S. intervention in Korea was part of a larger U.S. plan to encircle and ultimately attack China on three fronts, from the Korean Peninsula, across the Taiwan Strait, and from French Indochina. American

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leaders clearly misunderstood Chinese expectations and fears, and were taken by lethal surprise as a result.

On September 19, 1962, less than one month before photographic evidence proved that the Soviets had placed missiles in Cuba, Special National Intelligence Estimate 85-3-62, *The Military Buildup in Cuba*, essentially stated that the Soviet Union would not place missiles in Cuba because doing so “would be incompatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it. It would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in US-Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed thus far, and consequently would have important policy implications with respect to other areas and other problems in East-West relations.”[5] Sherman Kent, then-head of the National Board of Estimates, stated of this mistake regarding missiles in Cuba, “There is no blinking the fact that we came down on the wrong side.” Upon reflection, Kent concluded, that “We missed the Soviet decision to put the missiles into Cuba because we could not believe that Khrushchev could make a mistake.”[6]

In January 1979, Washington was shocked by the fall of the Shah of Iran. Indeed, only a year earlier President Jimmy Carter had praised Iran under the Shah as “an island of stability in one of the most troubled areas of the world.”[7] Then-Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Stansfeld Turner has acknowledged that: “We didn’t adequately predict the fall of the Shah. One reason was that while we saw the Shah declining in popularity and influence in his country, we were unwilling to believe that he would not call out the troops when the crisis came and spill blood in the streets if necessary. We had pretty good data on what was happening, but we didn’t make the right assumption.”[8]

Expecting and Defining Rationality

The above brief review of several surprises is meant only to illustrate the fact that expectations of foreign thinking and behavior frequently are grossly inaccurate, and that such mistakes can have terrible consequences.[9]

A common thread runs through the above brief survey of dramatic and in some cases lethal surprises. The U.S. expectation was that foreign leaders would make decisions rationally, and that this rationality would move them toward understandable, predictable behavior. U.S. leaders failed to take seriously the prospect for, and thus to prepare for, what seemed in Washington to be highly unreasonable foreign behavior. In several cases, despite considerable evidence, they failed to anticipate “out of the box” decision-making, and thus were surprised.

When attempting to anticipate a foreign leadership’s decision-making it is important to understand the difference between rational and reasonable behavior. All too frequently, the assumption that challengers will behave rationally, which typically they do, at least in a limited sense, leads to an expectation that they will also behave reasonably, which often they do not.

Rational and reasonable in this sense are not the same: rationality is a mode of decision-making that logically links desired goals with decisions about how to realize those goals. The judgment that another’s decision-making is “reasonable” typically implies much more than its “rationality.” Pronouncing another’s decision-making or behavior to be “reasonable” suggests that the observer understands that decision-making and judges it to be sensible based on some shared or understood set of values and standards. To assume rationality, however, and on that basis to expect behavior that is reasonable, that is behavior predictably driven by familiar, understandable norms and goals, is to risk lethal surprise.

Rationality does not imply that the decision-makers' prioritization of goals and values will be shared or considered "sensible" to any outside observer. The goals and values underlying decision-making do not need to be shared, understood or judged acceptable by any observer for the decision-making to be rational. Nor does "rational" imply that any particular moral standards guide the route chosen to realize preferred goals and values.

In short, rational decision-making can underlie behavior that is judged to be "unreasonable," shocking, and even criminal by an observer because that behavior is so far removed from any shared norms and standards. Historically, relatively few leaders have been functionally irrational.[10] Many, however, have been quite unreasonable. The goals and values underlying their decision-making, have been far outside familiar norms.

If rationality alone fostered reasonable behavior, then only in the rare cases of manifestly irrational leaderships would we likely be greatly surprised. Assuming challengers to be pragmatic and rational, and therefore reasonable, facilitates prediction of their behavior simply by reference to what we would consider the most reasonable course under their circumstances; the hard work of attempting to understand the opponent's particular beliefs and thought can be avoided. Such an opponent will behave predictably because, by definition, it will view the world in familiar terms and will respond to various pushes and pulls in ways that are understandable and predictable. Contrary and surprising behavior would be senseless, "irrational." Unfortunately, the convenient assumption that any rational leader ultimately will share our view of what is reasonable and therefore behave predictably, sets up the observer to discount the prospects for an opponent's conscious and purposeful moves that are outside expected norms.

In 1941 Dean Acheson believed that no "rational" Japanese would attack the United States because he judged such an attack to be too risky for the Japanese; attacking the United States must, he reasoned, also appear too risky to any Japanese leadership. But rational Japanese leaders ultimately concluded it to be the only acceptable option, and, in doing so, surprised Washington.

In 1962 the Kennedy Administration considered outlandish the possibility that Moscow would, in the words of then-National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, "do anything as crazy from our standpoint as placement of Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba."[11] Abram Chayes, a senior State Department official close to President Kennedy at the time, later acknowledged that he, and presumably much of Washington, did not believe initial reports about missiles in Cuba, "because I didn't *want* to believe them."[12] Until the evidence was overwhelming, the possibility that Khrushchev would take the risk of installing missiles in Cuba was dismissed as unreasonable.

Secretary of Defense McNamara planned coercive U.S. bombing campaigns against North Vietnam with an expectation that Ho Chi Minh would respond as McNamara believed logic dictated. He assumed that North Vietnam would rationally seek an accommodation when the cost of continuing the war outweighed potential benefits. Douglas Pike, one of America's foremost scholars on North Vietnam, observes that McNamara's logic was "flawless," except for the devastating fact that, "they don't think like we do."[13] Accurately anticipating North Vietnam's cost-benefit calculus may have been difficult: during the war senior American officials acknowledged that they knew "very little" about Hanoi's leaders and "virtually nothing" about North Vietnamese decision-making.[14]

In October 1973, Israeli and American leaders were surprised by the Egyptian and Syrian Yom Kippur offensive even though they were aware of the movement of Arab military units and their general plan of attack. Then-U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, has observed that American and Israeli leaders were surprised because "no one believed" the Arabs actually would strike: "Our definition of rationality did not take seriously the notion of [Egypt and Syria] starting an unwinnable war to restore self-respect. There was no defense against our own preconceptions."[15]

There are numerous additional past examples of how the convenient assumption that a rational opponent would also prove reasonable—as defined by the observer—contributed to surprises.[16] From Japan's decision to attack Imperial Russia in 1904,[17] to Washington's underestimation of Serbia's tenacity under NATO's 1999 bombing campaign,[18] the mistaken expectation that foreign leaders would be reasonable, according to familiar norms, appears to have played a significant role in lethal surprises and costly mistakes. In the latter case, Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic did not intend to be reasonable by Washington's standards, and considered this to be an advantage: "I am ready to walk on corpses, and the West is not. That is why I shall win."[19]

The expectation that foreign leaders will behave predictably fits well with the theory, particularly prevalent in the study of international relations, that national decision-making should be viewed as that of a rational and pragmatic, and thus presumably predictable, individual. The historical anecdotes noted above, however, illustrate well that decision-making and behavior considered scarcely plausible in Washington can appear entirely reasonable to a foreign leadership, not because foreign leaders are irrational, but because the definition of what constitutes "reasonable" can differ so dramatically. Consequently, surprises frequently are in store for those who believe that a foe's basic rationality permits confident prediction of its behavior.

Cold War Deterrence Theory and Practice

Belief that a foe will be rational cum reasonable, and thus ultimately predictable and controllable, has been most apparent, and potentially most dangerous, in the U.S. approach to nuclear deterrence. During the Cold War confident conclusions about the reliability of nuclear deterrence were the norm. Such conclusions typically were based on extrapolations from the implicit assumption of Soviet reasonableness, occasionally dressed up with quantitative modeling of a nuclear force exchange.[20]

If the modeling demonstrated that both sides possessed a manifest and secure capability for devastating nuclear retaliation, "mutual deterrence" generally was judged to be "stable." The underlying assumption was that neither side, being rational and reasonable, would intentionally initiate a war if the end result could be widespread mutual destruction. In the context of mutual vulnerability confidence in deterrence became a tautology: any rational leader would be deterred from severe provocation by the fear of mutual nuclear destruction; national leaders are rational (how else could they climb to positions of responsibility?); thus, nuclear weapons would deter. In short, rational leaders would be deterred via mutual nuclear threats because, by definition, they would be irrational if they were not so deterred.

This basic tautology was fully behind U.S. nuclear deterrence policy. It was assumed that any Soviet leadership, indeed "any sane political authority," would share in the basic features and logic underlying U.S. deterrence policy. This assumption overpowered suggestions that the unique characteristics of Soviet leadership and ideology could decisively shape the Soviet approach to nuclear weapons and deterrence, possibly moving Soviet leaders quite rationally in significantly heretical directions. The possible value of examining and understanding the particular beliefs of the Soviet leadership in establishing the U.S. deterrence policies intended to control the Soviet Union generally was dismissed in favor of simply assuming that "sane" Soviet leaders basically would think and behave as U.S. leaders ("mirror imaging"); they would, by definition, be deterrable because they would be rational. The deterrence tautology was firmly in play.

The lack of empiricism involved in such mirror-imaging helped to ensure that the Soviet leadership would be considered predictably deterrable. With this methodology, analysts and commentators offered highly confident and precise answers to questions such as, would deployment of accurate ICBM warheads, missile defense, or single-warhead mobile ICBMs "stabilize" or "destabilize" deterrence? The center of attention in this approach to deterrence was on U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, including ICBMs, long-range bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Indeed, because mutual vulnerability to retaliation came to be regarded as the guarantee of mutual deterrence, whether deterrence was judged to be "stable" or not was thought to depend almost exclusively on whether the number and character of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces promised mutual destruction.

Those strategic forces thought to help perpetuate the condition of mutual vulnerability were considered "stabilizing," while those that might challenge that condition were judged "destabilizing." These included, most prominently, active defenses such as ballistic missile defense (BMD) intended to defend against Soviet missiles after their launch, and ICBMs carrying multiple, highly accurate warheads.

Harold Brown, as Secretary of Defense in 1979, succinctly characterized both this U.S. theory and policy: "In the interests of stability, we avoid the capability of eliminating the other side's deterrent, insofar as we might be able to do so. In short, we must be quite willing—as we have been for some time—to accept the principle of mutual deterrence, and design our defense posture in light of that principle."[21]

The Cold War deterrence framework promised to deliver "stability" based near-exclusively on a condition of the nuclear balance: stable deterrence was deemed to be the near-certain result of mutual, secure, retaliatory threats of nuclear annihilation. And, because the condition of mutual vulnerability was the result of the types and numbers of offensive and defensive forces deployed by the U.S. and Soviet Union, purposefully manipulating deterrence stability came to be seen as a relatively straightforward matter of making "stabilizing" changes in U.S. and Soviet strategic forces.

The Cold War deterrence framework has proven resistant to change. There is understandable reluctance to cast into doubt the typical official and academic treatments of deterrence that exude confidence in its functioning predictably, and in the human capability to measure it and manipulate it predictably. Promises that we can control the future to preserve our security are too attractive to be given up lightly.

Cold War Deterrence Calculations and Assumptions

Unfortunately, in most Cold War-style analyses of deterrence "stability," those factors that tend to render policies of deterrence unreliable simply are not taken into serious consideration. Leaders are assumed to be ready, willing, and able, to engage in well-informed, dispassionate, rational, cost-benefit calculations, and to make their policy decisions accordingly. They recognize that value tradeoffs are involved in their decisions (i.e., they may have to choose one objective at the expense of another). They are assumed to be at least generally familiar with their opponent's threats, values, intentions, and military capabilities, able to absorb information, and able to implement value-maximizing and cost-minimizing decisions under great stress.

This image of the opponent as rational and pragmatic is an enormous convenience when constructing a policy of deterrence. It allows the defense planner to set aside those many factors that can limit the potential for deterrence to "work" as intended, and confidently rely instead simply on the opponent's rational pragmatism to preclude its decision for a "decisive showdown of power."

Yet, an entire set of often-ignored but necessary political and psychological conditions must dominate the decision-making process on both (or all) sides if deterrence is to function as envisaged. These include the following, *inter alia*:

- Leaders who value avoidance of the U.S. deterrence threat more highly than whatever might be the value at stake in a contest of wills with the United States;
- Leaders capable of relatively unbiased assessments of information and, based on that information, linking decisions to preferred outcomes, while recognizing value tradeoffs in relatively dispassionate decision-making;
- Leaders who are attentive to and comprehend the intentions, interests, commitments, and values of the opponent(s);
- Leaders who focus their cost-benefit calculations on external factors (i.e., deterrence threats) as the final determinant of their decision-making;
- Leaders who understand the military capabilities and consequences involved in their decisions, at least at a general level;
- Political systems that permit individually rational decision-makers to establish similarly rational state policies that do, in turn, control state behavior.

If one or several of these conditions is absent, there is no basis for assuming that the necessary rational, cost-benefit calculations could be conducted or would determine policy so that U.S. deterrence threats can have their intended deterrent effect.

When deterrence is defined only in terms of maintaining a particular level of military capability relative to an opponent, then it is not difficult to conclude that stability is relatively "easy" to calculate and predict. However, if the necessary decision-making variables identified above are taken into serious consideration, it is easy to understand that deterrence is a much more complicated process.

Regardless of the "strategic balance," when the challenger is not dispassionate, well-informed, or reasonable, as frequently has been the case in historical experience, deterrence cannot be assumed to function predictably. It cannot be "ensured" under any circumstances, and manipulating the force balance may be of trivial significance.

Why the Cold War Deterrence Framework Is Inadequate

How is it possible to reach conclusions that question much of what has for years passed for accepted wisdom regarding deterrence? Studies of deterrence based on evidence drawn from centuries of actual politico-military case studies validate the proposition that a wide variety of factors typically shape leadership decision-making, factors that cannot be derived from a methodology that simply assumes states and leaders to be similarly motivated, rational and reasonable.[22]

Several of the most common such factors are illustrated below.

Personal Beliefs, Goals, and Values

History abounds with examples of leaders' personal and political beliefs—ranging from the grossly criminal to the sublime—shaping decision-making in unreasonable and thus surprising ways.

Leaders' basic ideological beliefs and perceptions have been significant, including, for example, perceptions of threat (whether accurate or grossly distorted), theories about the nature of international relations, the prerogatives and obligations of the leadership, the state and the citizen, notions of national honor and sovereignty, and the view a leadership has of its own place in history. Leaders' views on such matters can be the direct determinant of their decision-making, autonomous of (and even contrary to) what seems to an outside observer to be pragmatic, rational and reasonable. They have guided policies in ways that were surprising and sometimes very dangerous for contemporary observers who anticipated reasonable behavior according to familiar norms.

For example, following the initial U.S. use of an atomic weapon, Japanese War Minister Gen. Korechiki Anami attempted to persuade the Japanese Supreme Council to continue the war. He "called for one last great battle on Japanese soil—as demanded by the national honor, as demanded by the honor of the living and the dead." General Anami argued, "Would it not be wondrous for this whole nation [Japan] to be destroyed like a beautiful flower."[23] The implications of this illustration for the deterrence tautology are profound: an opponent's rationality does not necessarily equate to its susceptibility to even very lethal U.S. deterrence threats.

Mao Zedong viewed himself as god-like, unaccountable, and infallible.[24] He held an instrumental view of China's citizens, with at least occasional gross disregard for their well-being beyond serving his own grandiose political goals. He sacrificed millions of Chinese in the state-sponsored famines unleashed by his ideological vision of a "great leap forward."[25] In numerous private and public statements he expressed shocking callousness regarding the potential for hundreds of millions of Chinese deaths from nuclear war, identifying such a horror as "no great loss."[26] That Mao could subordinate the lives of so many Chinese to his particular ideological goals left considerable room for Washington to have been surprised in a deterrence contest of wills.

Occult religious/spiritual beliefs represent another example of the type of what may be categorized as personal beliefs that can drive decision-making beyond U.S. expectations. This basis for decision-making may seem impossible in a technically advanced society, but it is not limited to Third World leaders. For example, Col. Gen. Vladimir Yakovlev, as Commander in Chief of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, identified astrology as "a quite serious science. It helps us launch spacecraft, missiles; we use it broadly to forestall suicides among the personnel. Experience shows it is unreasonable to reject it."[27] Clearly, that General Yakovlev, by his own account, could take astrology into serious consideration with regard to the forces under his command is unreasonable, even irrational by Washington's standards regarding such matters, and could have unpredictable consequences.

Overriding Imperatives and Conscious, High-Risk Brinkmanship

Historical case studies also demonstrate that two general imperatives can drive leaders to surprising and extraordinarily risky initiatives: grave foreign and/or domestic threats that leaders believe necessitate aggression.[28] In such circumstances, leaders have pursued highly risky brinkmanship despite their foe's seemingly credible and capable deterrence commitments. Leaders can consciously choose a high-risk course involving potentially great cost because the alternative of inaction appears to lead to wholly intolerable consequences. In the context of such need-driven decision-making, high-risk behavior can be accepted and rationalized because of the expected unacceptable cost of not acting.[29]

During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis Cuban leaders Fidel Castro and Che Guevara apparently urged the Soviets in Cuba and Moscow to launch a preemptive nuclear strike against the United States in the event of an attack against Cuba. During the crisis Castro urged Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to prepare for such a strike, "If they [Americans] actually carry out the brutal act of invading Cuba ... that would be the moment to eliminate such danger forever through an act of legitimate defense, however harsh and terrible the solution would be."[30] Khrushchev himself later said of Castro, "At that time he [Castro] was a very hot-tempered person.... He failed to think through the obvious consequences of a proposal that placed the planet on the brink of extinction."[31]

A Soviet participant in the crisis, Col. Viktor Semykin, describes how the Cubans, ready to accept any cost, urged a Soviet missile attack: "The Cubans really insisted we use our weapons. 'Why else did you come here? Use your weapons. Fire.' They were ready for war. Maybe they believed so strongly, they were ready to sacrifice themselves. They would say, 'Cuba will perish, but socialism will win.' They were ready to sacrifice themselves."[32]

Castro's political theoretician, Che Guevara, expressed his ideological fervor and willingness to sacrifice himself and Cuba for the cause of socialism. "If the rockets had remained, we would have used them all and directed them against the heart of the United States, including New York, in our fight against aggression."[33] These are the voices of an ideological commitment that is highly resistant to cost-benefit calculation and conciliation. As one biographer notes, Che looked forward to, and worked toward, such an "ultimate showdown" with the United States; in his view, it was "the final aim of Communism."[34]

In contrast, Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan's reply to Che reflects a different perspective, and a cost-benefit calculus more susceptible to deterrence threats. "We see your readiness to die beautifully, but we believe that it isn't worth dying beautifully."[35] Mikoyan complained in a letter to Khrushchev that with the Cuban leadership, "bitter feelings often overcome reason," and that the Cubans were, "expansive, emotional, nervous, high-strung, quick to explode in anger, and unhealthily apt to concentrate on trivialities."[36]

The Cold War deterrence framework's assumption that rationality yields reasonableness and predictability may well be useful in the context of a challenger of Mikoyan's dispassionate and pragmatic character. Such an assumption, however, is likely to lead to false conclusions about deterrence in the face of a dedicated ideological zealot such as Che Guevara. In effect, the potential for ideological fervor to so dramatically shape "rational" cost-benefit calculations is discounted or ignored by the Cold War deterrence framework. Fortunately, in 1962, relatively cautious Soviet bureaucrats were in control of the missiles, not Fidel Castro or Che Guevara. In future crises, leaders ready to "die beautifully" may be in control of missiles, and their cost-benefit calculus will not permit the predictable functioning of deterrence.

These are the types of factors affecting decision-making that can easily prevent the reasonable, predictable cost-benefit calculations upon which the Cold War deterrence framework is predicated. They include the willingness to risk all to maintain a threatened value or in passionate pursuit of a goal.

Cognitive Distortion: Drug Usage

In addition to surprising personal characteristics, a willingness to except great risk to preserve a threatened value or achieve a cherished goal, and cognitive distortions, other factors may limit the informed, rational and reasonable decision-making necessary for deterrence to operate predictably. One little-noted such factor is drug usage. This may, at first, seem not to be a serious concern with regard to national decision-makers. Yet it must be recognized that leaders under the influence of a variety of drugs have governed small and great powers, sometimes with dictatorial authority.

According to recently declassified U.S. State Department documents, senior U.S. officials considered former South Korean President Park Chung Hee to be dangerously unstable, largely because of his heavy use of alcohol. They were particularly concerned in 1965, following an unsuccessful North Korean terrorist attack against President Park himself, that he was "almost irrationally obsessed" with the desire to retaliate militarily against North Korea. Park's drinking was so heavy at the time that President Johnson's special envoy, Cyrus Vance, described him as "a danger and rather unsafe." Vance went on to observe that, "President Park will issue all sorts of orders when he begins drinking. . . . His generals will delay any action on them until the next morning. If he says nothing about those orders the following morning, then they just forget what he told them the night before."[37] In this case, sensible South Korean generals apparently provided a barrier to the implementation of presidential decision-making obviously skewed by alcohol consumption. In other past cases, as is discussed below, subordinates have had less leeway to ignore suspect orders.

China's Chairman Mao Zedong suffered from severe insomnia. As a result, according to his personal physician, Dr. Li Zhisui, Mao became addicted to barbiturates. At one point he was taking ten times the normal dosage of sleeping pills, enough to kill a person. According to Dr. Li, Mao initially used chloral hydrate to relieve his insomnia, but became addicted, often mixing it with sodium seconal. Ultimately, Mao used drugs "when receiving guests and attending meetings. He also took them for his dance parties."[38] How Mao's drug addiction may have shaped his decision-making is unclear, but that it could have done so is certain.

One possibly significant case occurred in 1971. Just before falling asleep, and in a drowsy, slurred directive to his private nurse, Wu Xujun, Mao countermanded an earlier decision agreed to with Zhou Enlai. In doing so, Mao may have changed the course of history. In that earlier decision Mao and Zhou had agreed to *deny* the request from the U.S. table tennis team, then in Japan, for a sporting engagement in China. Through the fog of barbiturates, Mao rescinded that decision and approved the American team's request. The Chinese invitation thus extended led to the famous "ping-pong diplomacy" of the 1970s and facilitated an historic opening to Washington.[39]

Whether or not barbiturates shaped Mao's decision to rescind the position he had earlier agreed to with Zhou obviously cannot be known with certainty. That Mao made a decision of some political magnitude under the influence of barbiturates is certain.

Washington, of course, is not immune to the possibility of drug usage affecting policy. President John Kennedy, for example, reportedly used steroids (cortisone and desoxy certicosterone acetate) to treat his Addison's disease, and apparently took them in excess.[40] More to the point, however, is that in 1961 it appears that Kennedy also began receiving by injection large doses of combined amphetamines and steroids from a now-discredited physician.[41] The potential side effects of steroids taken in excess are similar to those of amphetamines taken in excess: "delusions, agitation, anxiety, insomnia, and irritability, not to mention their addictive effects when taken in combination."[42] It is not possible here to identify the extent to which President Kennedy's decision-making may have been influenced by the excessive use of steroids and amphetamines. One such effort, however, suggests strongly that these drugs contributed to Kennedy's poor performance at the fateful 1961 Vienna Summit with Nikita Khrushchev, and to his reclusiveness following the summit.[43]

Adolf Hitler: A Study in Unexpected Decision-Making

Adolf Hitler's personal character and brutal ideological beliefs provide multiple illustrations of both rational and irrational factors shaping policy in unreasonable and unexpected ways, sometimes decisively.

For all Hitler's manipulative and oratory skills, he was at heart an ideological zealot.[44] Hitler considered the history of international relations to reflect nature's struggle for survival, governed only by the "laws of the jungle." In accord with then-fashionable ideas of Social Darwinism, he claimed that human progress was the product of this struggle.[45] Perhaps most importantly, Hitler placed race, as opposed to class, or individuals, at the center of nature's competition. He stated that his elevation of the concept that race is the dominant force in history was his greatest triumph.[46]

Hitler's ideology called for two primary tasks. The first was to promote Germany's "racial purity" with an "iron fist."[47] Hitler was explicit in his genocidal intentions in this regard. In a speech to the Reichstag on January 30, 1939, for example, Hitler, referring to "a certain foreign people" said "We will banish this people." Only slightly later in the speech he threatened European Jewry with "a crisis of yet inconceivable proportions;" and minutes later, taking the role of "prophet," said that another world war would lead to "the annihilation [*Vernichtung*] of the Jewish race in Europe."[48]

The second state task, as seen by der Führer, was to solve Germany's supposed overpopulation problem by securing territory in Russia in a war of conquest and annihilation.[49] In doing so, Hitler was a high-risk and even self-destructive gambler. As Edward Mead Earle notes, "Hitler so firmly believed in his destiny that in both the military and political spheres he took risks from which most generals would shrink."[50]

Hitler clearly scorned cautious risk-calculation in foreign policy: "As the political leader, however, who wants to make history, I must decide upon one way, even if sober consideration a thousand times tells me that it entails certain dangers and that it also will not lead to a completely satisfying end."[51] If success was in doubt, Hitler believed that will, energy, and "brutal ruthlessness" would overcome.[52] Convinced he was guided and protected by "Providence," Hitler appears to have had unique confidence, even against long odds, in the inner "voice" guiding him: "Neither threats nor warnings will prevent me from going my way. I follow the path assigned to me by Providence with the instinctive sureness of a sleepwalker."[53]

The failure of the Cold War deterrence framework, the deterrence tautology, to take into account the vicissitudes of actual leadership decision-making is dramatically illustrated by Hitler's so-called Nero orders of March 18 and 19, 1945, the goal of which can only have been national self-destruction.[54] The Führer Order of March 18 called for the removal of all civilians from western Germany, by foot and without supplies—a death march. The order of March 19 essentially sought to destroy all the material assets within the Reich necessary for civilian survival. Hitler's desire for national self-destruction is wholly outside the scope of possible behavior as recognized by the Cold War deterrence framework; it was nevertheless wholly consistent with Hitler's character, ideology, and rejection of "bourgeois" moral standards.

If he and Germany were to lose the war, Hitler's ego and belief in natural selection required that the final act be a Wagnerian *Götterdämmerung*, and that the German people themselves perish for failing him. Hitler's ultimate values had nothing to do with the protection and promotion of Germany. In the end, he sought the destruction of Germany in the service of his own brutality and ego: "I have to attain immortality even if the whole German nation perishes in the process."[55] Such decision-making lies far outside the boundaries of the U.S. Cold War deterrence framework, which is, "founded on the theory that an adversarial state or coalition group will act according to the logic of national or group self-interest."[56]

Not all policy, even in National Socialist Germany, has its origins in a leadership's particular, and possibly peculiar, psyche and belief system. Obviously, all leaderships, including Hitler's, operate within a broader context that facilitates or impedes their capability to translate ideas into policy. Nevertheless, as the above historical illustrations demonstrate, these factors clearly can shape decision-making in significant ways that are likely to be missed by the expectation of an opponent's rational, reasonable pragmatism.

The assumption of the Cold War deterrence framework, that deterrence will "work" in the context of secure and severe mutual threats because decision-making will be well-informed, dispassionate, and rational cum reasonable, ignores or discounts the variety of factors illustrated above. A comparison of the Cold War deterrence framework with the incredibly broad spectrum of human motivations, goals, thought and values highlights the point that this framework cannot capture the reality of human decision-making. As a result, it is inadequate at best, and potentially grossly misleading.

The introduction of nuclear weapons to the mix of factors operating does not "fix" this problem. The tremendous lethality of nuclear weapons may usefully focus leadership attention on occasion. Even very lethal threats, however, cannot bring to an end the enormous capacity of leaders to have poor judgment, impaired rationality, to pursue "unreasonable" goals and embrace unreasonable values, to be ignorant, passionate, foolish, arrogant, or selectively attentive to risks and costs, and to base their actions on severely distorted perceptions of reality. As much as we might wish it not to be so, these factors play to some degree in virtually all crisis decision-making, and in some crises, they—not the particular character of the nuclear balance—will dominate decision-making. This conclusion ultimately calls into question confidence in the Cold War deterrence framework.

Even the most hard-headed practitioners of *realpolitik*—assuming their opponent to be driven by rational, pragmatic, predictable calculation—will be vulnerable to gross surprise if they do not recognize that rational decision-making may be shaped by surprising goals and values, and by such imponderables as belief in astrology, dreams, or an inner "voice."

New Post-Cold War U.S. Deterrence Goals

There is, however, a problem for U.S. deterrence policy even beyond the unpredictability of opponents. It is a problem that appears not to be understood whatsoever by those who confidently assert that the deterrence of future regional aggressors involves simply the extension of the U.S. deterrence policies that "worked" against the Soviet leadership during the Cold War: U.S. deterrence goals vis-à-vis the Soviet Union were different than are U.S. post-Cold War deterrence goals vis-à-vis regional aggressors.

In the Cold War, the West held out the threat of nuclear escalation if the Soviet Union projected force into NATO Europe; in the post-Cold War period it will be regional aggressors threatening Washington with nuclear escalation in the event the United States needs to project force into their regional neighborhoods. In such a contest of wills, the U.S. may be at a great disadvantage in terms of the costs, benefits, and the stakes involved in most prospective regional crises. U.S. leaders are very unlikely to be more cost/risk tolerant in terms of prospective military and/or civilian losses; the reverse probably is true. The stakes involved in a regional conflict are unlikely to be greater for the U.S.; the reverse probably is true. In short, Washington will want effective deterrence in regional crises where the challenger is able to threaten WMD escalation and it is more willing to accept risk and cost.

Concern about this new U.S. deterrence mission is not fanciful or an instance of "worst-case analysis." Some regional powers desire WMD and long-range delivery means for the self-expressed purpose of deterring U.S. power projection by threatening Washington with WMD escalation, especially including nuclear threats. They seek to trump U.S. conventional superiority by threatening WMD escalation just as NATO sought to deter the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. Deterring Washington in this fashion clearly is the intention of China and some regional rogues.[57] In the midst of NATO's bombing campaign against Serbia then-Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic expressed his appreciation of, and desire for, such a coercive strategy and capability against the United States: "You are not willing to sacrifice lives to achieve our surrender. But we are willing to die to defend our rights as an independent Sovereign nation. . . . Missiles and other sophisticated weapons will not always be the monopoly of high-tech societies. . . . America can be reached from this part of the world."[58]

The question this rogue strategy introduces is, who will deter whom? During the post-Cold War period, regional powers may frequently have a coercive advantage against the United States—an advantage that Washington exploited against the Soviet Union with great confidence in the past. During the Cold War, NATO believed that its threat of nuclear escalation would keep Moscow's conventional superiority in check. Ironically, regional powers now aspire to, and express confidence in, the same deterrence strategy to prevent U.S. force projection into their regions. This is a very new deterrence ballgame for the United States and there is no basis for assertions that the old rules will apply.

The Dilemma of Popular Usage and a New Direction

A general finding from this review is that the outcome of deterrence and coercive threats can be affected significantly by the participant's modes of thought and the context. Various factors that may be unique to the context and challenger, including idiosyncratic leadership beliefs, can be decisive in determining whether deterrence threats "work."

Washington can establish deterrence policies, but it cannot control the results of those policies with the predictability assumed in the Cold War past. The post-Cold War environment leads us back to Carl von Clausewitz's classic insight about war and politics throughout the ages; uncertainties predominate and no "fix" can remove the "fog" that denies high confidence in the predictability of an opponent's behavior.

If discussions of deterrence are to have a chance of being more insightful than misleading, the Cold War assumption of a rational cum reasonable and predictable opponent must be discarded in favor of as much information as possible concerning the specific opponent and the specific context. In this manner, the opponent's cost-benefit calculus may be more accurately modeled and the likely effectiveness of U.S. deterrence threats in practice may be more accurately anticipated. As part of the policy-formulation process, a challenger's particular thought, beliefs, and values must be examined to reduce the prospect for wholly surprising responses to U.S. deterrence threats.

The need to investigate seriously such factors has grown as U.S. leaders increasingly are likely to confront relatively unfamiliar opponents such as Iran, North Korea, Libya, and Iraq. Unfortunately, U.S. confrontations with willful and unfamiliar regional challengers, including so-called rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction, appear to be on the rise. U.S. leaders will need the best possible basis for anticipating an opponent's behavior, and the convenient course of assuming an opponent to be rational and reasonable (and hence predictably deterrable), entails increasing risk.

Unfortunately, popular usage of the word "deterrence," at this point, is anchored firmly to its Cold War mooring. A dilemma suggested by this study is whether to banish the term deterrence for being hopelessly tied to its Cold War usage, or to work toward a healthier understanding of the term. The latter course probably is preferable, if only because the former is impractical.

There is no adequate alternative to the hard task of attempting to ascertain the particular opponent's modes of thought and core beliefs, assessing how they are likely to affect its behavior, and formulating U.S. deterrence policy in light of those findings. In the absence of this, expectations about the behavior of that particular leadership will reflect a dangerous ignorance. Such ignorance clearly cannot be eliminated by even very serious efforts to "know the enemy." But it may be reduced. Continued reliance on the convenient assumption of a rational and reasonable opponent now risks the type of foreign policy debacles that have followed such an assumption in the past—with the unprecedented additional threats posed by mass destruction weapons.

Accumulating pertinent information about a challenger will never be complete, and the relevant information is likely to change over time. Attempting to become familiar with the decision-making dynamics of foreign leaders, for the purpose of establishing an informed basis for deterring and coercing them, is not a trivial undertaking. And, it must be acknowledged that even extensive efforts at acquiring information concerning the factors underlying a challenger's decision-making will not preclude surprising, unpredictable behavior based on unfamiliar or wholly obscure motives, goals, and values. Even well-informed policies of deterrence will not be predictably effective.

Reducing the level of ignorance concerning the opponent in pertinent areas, however, may be possible in every case. And doing so should serve to increase the likelihood of effectiveness for U.S. deterrence policies by making those policies relatively more informed by the opponents' various motivations and cost-benefit calculations.

The methodology developed below is designed to provide a simple tool for tailoring deterrence policies to specific antagonists and contexts, to "get inside" the decision-making process of the challenger, and to ascertain as far as possible the basis for its decision-making with regard to a specific context and flashpoint. The primary areas of interest in this framework are characteristics of: the pertinent leaderships/countries, their motivations, goals, and determination, the nature of decision-making, the object of the friction (the "stakes" involved), the regional political/security context, and the sources of power available to the participants.

Correspondingly, this framework establishes a tool for identifying and characterizing the various factors (some likely unique, others subject to generalization) that may be critical to the functioning of deterrence and coercive threats in a specific case, and subsequently tailoring U.S. deterrence policies to that specific challenger and context.

Based on findings culled from historical research on deterrence, the following steps and areas of inquiry may be particularly pertinent in any attempt to "know the enemy," that is, to gain a useful understanding of an opponent's beliefs, will, values, and likely cost-benefit calculations under specific conditions:

A Deterrence Framework

Step 1. Identify antagonists, issue, objectives, and actions.
  1.1 Antagonists
  1.2 Issue
  1.3 Adversary's objectives
  1.4 Actions to be deterred
  1.5 U.S. objectives

Step 2. Identify and describe those factors likely to affect the adversary's decision-making in the context of this specific flashpoint and U.S. deterrent threats.
  2.1 Degree of rationality and predictability as indicated by past behavior
  2.2 Leadership characteristics
    2.2.1 Individuals with responsibilities for the issue at hand
    2.2.2 Leadership motivations
    2.2.3 Leadership determination
    2.2.4 Operational code (worldview and strategic style)
    2.2.5 Political-psychological profiles of key decision-makers
    2.2.6 Adversary's understanding of and attention to the U.S.
      2.2.6.1 Previous interactions with the U.S.
      2.2.6.2 Attention to U.S. declaratory policy
      2.2.6.3 Likelihood the adversary will (mis)comprehend U.S. demands and threats
  2.3 Value and cost/risk structure
    2.3.1 Location of the issue in the value hierarchy of the adversary's leadership
    2.3.2 Other relevant values of the adversary's leadership
    2.3.3 Cost/risk tolerance of the adversary's leadership with regard to this issue
  2.4 Options
    2.4.1 Military options available to the adversary
    2.4.2 Adversary's freedom to conciliate or provoke
  2.5 Adversary's belief about the costs the U.S. will incur if its deterrent threat is executed
    2.5.1 Costs from the adversary's retaliation
    2.5.2 Political costs at home and abroad
  2.6 Communications
    2.6.1 Optimal method for communicating with the adversary
    2.6.2 Possibilities for misperception
  2.7 Credibility of U.S. threats
    2.7.1 Past pledges or actions demonstrating U.S. commitments
    2.7.2 Other special circumstances

Step 3. Construct a strategic profile of the adversary with regard to the crisis in question.
  3.1 Predictability of the adversary's behavior
  3.2 Cost/risk tolerance
  3.3 Influence of considerations beyond immediate issue

  - 3.4 Will, determination, and freedom to conciliate or provoke
  - 3.5 Cognizance of U.S. demands and threats
  - 3.6 Credibility of U.S. deterrent threats
  - 3.7 Susceptibility to U.S. deterrent threats
- Step 4. Assess whether the challenger is likely to be susceptible to deterrence policies in this particular case; and, if so, the nature of those policies.
- Step 5. Identify available U.S. deterrence policy options.
  - 5.1 U.S. policy
  - 5.2 Punitive or denial threats
  - 5.3 Military actions
  - 5.4 Related diplomatic steps
  - 5.5 Means for communicating threats
  - 5.6 Likely adversary reactions and implications for options
  - 5.7 Indicators for determining option effectiveness
  - 5.8 Opportunities for learning
  - 5.9 Possible real-time modifications to improve option effectiveness
  - 5.10 Domestic and allied constraints on U.S. actions
  - 5.11 Expected results
- Step 6. Identify the gap between the likely requirements for deterrence and available U.S. deterrence policy options. Describe different, new, or additional military capabilities and policies that may be needed.
  - 6.1 Key military capabilities for supporting the deterrent options most suited to the challenger in this case
  - 6.2 Related declaratory policy and diplomatic measures

In no case could the collection of the desired information outlined above be fully accomplished. All attempts to become so well-informed in each of these potentially key areas will be frustrated to a greater or lesser degree by a lack of data, ambiguous data, conflicting data, and the possible intentional disinformation campaigns of some adversaries. The point here is to reduce the margin of ignorance, and to be more aware of what is not known, so that U.S. deterrence policies can be established on a more informed basis, and thus be more likely to work in practice.

Summary and Conclusions

Regardless of how well-informed U.S. deterrence policy may be, it is important to acknowledge that deterrence can fail unpredictably for the variety of potential reasons noted above: desperate leaders driven by an internal or external imperative may distort reality in a self-serving fashion; they may be inattentive, drugged, foolish, or simply so cost/risk tolerant in pursuit of an absolute goal that U.S. deterrence policy is impracticable. The notion that U.S. nuclear weapons, or any particular type of threat, can "ensure" deterrence and that nuclear deterrence is "existential" is a dangerous myth.

Deterrence is inherently unpredictable because challengers, including rational decision-makers, are not wholly controllable under any circumstances, and under conditions of great stress may often be beyond predictable reason and practicable control. This problem is certain to be exacerbated by Washington's lack of familiarity with, and the unpredictability of, regional rogue powers.

When considering deterrence for the post-Cold War era, it is essential that the limits of deterrence theory and policy be recognized. In the past, the U.S. has been surprised when coercion or deterrence failed to perform as hoped, and Washington subsequently chose to, or was compelled to, wage war, as with Japan in 1941 and Iraq fifty years later. In both of these cases, the U.S. succeeded at a cost modest by many historical comparisons.

In the future, however, a variety of regional foes assuredly will be armed with WMD and long-range delivery capabilities. In these circumstances, to misunderstand deterrence-that is, to believe that it is "ensured," and so not to prepare for its failure-could lead to unprecedented catastrophe.

Noted British historian A.J.P. Taylor was perhaps optimistic in his comment on the effectiveness of deterrence: "A deterrent may work ninety-nine times out of a hundred. On the hundredth occasion it produces catastrophe."[59] I suspect that deterrence does not "work ninety-nine times out of a hundred." But, even if Taylor's estimate is accurate, in a world increasingly armed with weapons of mass destruction, on that "hundredth occasion," U.S. preparation for deterrence failure may literally save millions of lives that otherwise would be lost, and preserve the continuing viability of our great American democracy.

Notes

1. Quoted in, Scott Sagan, "The Origins of the Pacific War," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, vol. 18, no. 4 (Spring 1988), p. 906.

2. See, for example, Louis Morton, "Japan's Decision for War," *Command Decisions* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1959). See also, Richard Betts, *Surprise Attack* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1982), pp. 133–137.

3. See, Woodrow J. Kuhns, ed., *Assessing Soviet Threat: The Early Cold War Years* (Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1997), pp. 16–19.

4. Alexandre Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War, September 16–October 15, 1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, Nos. 6–7 (Winter 1995–1996), p. 101.

5. Sherman Kent, "A Crucial Estimate Relived," in, *Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates, Collected Essays* (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1994), accessed at <www.cia.gov/csi/books/shermankent/toc.html> on August 9, 2000.

6. Ibid.

7. Quoted in, James Bill, "Iran and the Crisis of '78," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 57, no. 2 (Winter 1978/79), p. 339.

8. Gary Bertsch and Suzette Grillot, editors, *Russell Symposium Proceedings, U.S. Security Interests in the 1990s* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia, 1993), p. 19.

9. The classic study of such surprises is, Richard Betts, *Surprise Attack* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1982).

10. See, for example, Robert Noland, "Presidential Disability and the Proposed Constitutional Amendment," *American Psychologist*, no. 21 (March 1966), p. 232; and, Jonathan M. Roberts, *Decision-Making during International Crises* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), p. 186.

11. Quoted in, Donald Kagan, *On The Origins Of War* (New York: Doubleday, 1995), p. 503.

12. Ibid, p. 507.

13. Lewis Sorley, *Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), p. 266.

14. See Wallace Thies, *When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict 1964–1968* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 219–220; and Joseph McMillan, "Talking to the Enemy: Negotiations in Wartime," *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 11, no. 4, p. 455.

15. Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1982), p. 465. See also, Betts, pp. 68–80; and *CIA: The Pike Report* (Nottingham, England: Spokesman Books, 1977), pp. 141–148.

16. See, for example, the discussion in, Richard W. Shryock, "The Intelligence Community Post Mortem Program, 1973–1975," *Studies in Intelligence* (Fall 1977), pp. 15–28.

17. Tsar Nicholas was contemptuous of the Japanese and denied the possibility that Japan would dare attack a European great power. See, Count Sergei Witte, *The Memoirs of Count Witte*, ed. and translated by Abraham Yarmolinsky (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page, 1921), p. 125.

18. See, for example, Bill Sammon, "Clinton Misread Yugoslav Resolve," *The Washington Times*, June 21, 1999, p. A-11.

19. Milosevic's statement to German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer quoted in, Josef Joffee, "A Peacenik Goes to War," *The New York Times Magazine*, May 30, 1999, *The New York Times on the Web*, "Archives," p. 1.

20. The classic case is the analysis of strategic deterrence stability and its requirements that supported Secretary McNamara's definitions of "assured destruction." See, Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much Is Enough?* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 207–210.

21. *Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1980* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 25, 1979), p. 61.

22. As Jonathan Roberts observes, "The personality of an individual determines the reaction to information and events. A leader's nationality, passion, idealism, cynicism, pragmatism, dogmatism, stupidity, intelligence, imagination, flexibility, stubbornness, and so on, along with mental disorders such as depression, anxiety, and paranoia, shape reactions and decision during a crisis." *Decision-Making During International Crises* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), pp. 162–163.

23. Quoted from, David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), p. 459.

24. See, Li Zhisui, *The Private Life of Chairman Mao* (New York: Random House, 1994), pp. 120, 296.

25. See Jasper Becker, *Hungry Ghosts* (New York: The Free Press, 1997).

26. Li Zhisui, *The Private Life of Chairman Mao*, p. 125.

27. Quoted in, "Belarus: Russia's Rocket Troops Chief Views Cooperation, Astrology," *Vo Slavu Rodiny*, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Central Eurasia-Military Affairs*, February 26, 1998, p. 2.

28. See the excellent historical work in, Richard Lebow, *Between Peace and War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), chapter 9; and Lebow, "The Deterrence Deadlock: Is There A Way Out," in *Psychology & Deterrence*, Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, eds. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), pp. 180–188.

29. See the discussion in, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, *When Does Deterrence Succeed And How Do We Know*, Occasional Paper, No. 8 (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, February 1990).

30. Quoted in, Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble* (W.W. Norton: New York, 1997), pp. 272–273; see also, pp. 283, 286, 306.

31. Quoted in James Blight, et al., *Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993), p. 29.

32. Col. Viktor Semykin, interviewed for, "The Missiles of October: What the World Didn't Know," *ABC News*, Journal Graphics transcript no. ABC-40, October 17, 1992, p. 21. On the basis of conversations with Castro, former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara has confirmed that Castro was committed to the use of nuclear weapons against the United States, despite being convinced that Cuba "would have been totally destroyed," as a consequence. See, *News Hour with Jim Lehrer*, PBS TV, February 22, 2001.

33. Quoted in, Enrique Krauze, "The Return of Che Guevara," *The New Republic*, vol. 218, no. 6 (February 9, 1998), p. 34.

34. Daniel James, *Che Guevara* (New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1969), p. 147.

35. Quoted in, Krauze, "The Return of Che Guevara," p. 34.

36. Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, p. 306.

37. U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, Volume XXIX, *Korea*, at <www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xxix/index.html>, accessed January 29, 2001.

38. Dr. Li Zhisui, *The Private Life Of Chairman Mao* (New York: Random House, 1994), pp. 109, 112–113, 440.

39. Ibid., p. 558.

40. Park, *Ailing, Aging, Addicted*, pp. 168–171. See also, Roberts, *Decision-Making during International Crisis*, pp. 185, 203–204.

41. Park, pp. 170–183.

42. Ibid., p. 171.

43. Ibid., pp. 181–183.

44. For an elaboration of National Socialism's attempted fusion of political and religious belief see, Michael Burleigh, *The Third Reich: A New History* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000). See also, Jay Gonen, *The Roots of Nazi Psychology* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2000), pp. 1–15.

45. Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1943), pp. 131–132, 134–135, 151, 153; see also, Adolf Hitler, *Hitler's Secret Book*, Introduction by Telford Taylor (New York: Bramhall House, 1986), pp. 5–7.

46. *Hitler's Secret Conversations, 1941–1944*, Normai Cameron and R.H. Stevens, translators (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Young, 1953), October 21–22, 1941, p. 67.

47. *Mein Kampf*, p. 403, 686. See also, *Hitler's Secret Book*, p. 210.

48. See, Max Domarus, *Hitler: Speeches and Proclamations 1932–1945, The Chronicle Of A Dictatorship*, Vol. III, 1939–1940 (Wauconda, IL: Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 1997), pp. 1448–1449.

49. *Mein Kampf*, p. 140 and *Hitler's Secret Book*, pp. 46–48, 74, 124, 139. See also Jürgen Förster, "Hitler's Decision In Favor of War Against the Soviet Union," in, Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, *Germany and the Second World War*, Vol. IV (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 25–38.

50. Edward Mead Earle, "Hitler: The Nazi Concept of War," in, *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler*, Edited by Edward Mead Earle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 505.

51. *Hitler's Secret Book*, p. 40.

52. Ibid., p. 41.

53. Adolf Hitler, Speech, Munich Exhibition Halls, March 14, 1936. Quoted in, Max Domarus, *Hitler: Speeches and Proclamations 1932–1945, The Chronicle of a Dictatorship*, Vol. II, 1935–1938 (Wauconda, IL: Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 1992), p. 790.

54. See the discussions in, Sebastian Haffner, *The Meaning of Hitler* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 158–160. See also, Whitney Harris, *Tyranny on Trial* (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1999), pp. 472–473.

55. As quoted by Hitler's physician, Dr. Theo Morell. Military Intelligence Service Center, U.S. Army, O.I. Special Report 36 (April 1947), *Adolf Hitler: A Composite Picture*, National Archives, cited in Waite, p. 409.

56. As stated by Adm. Hank Chiles in testimony supporting his nomination to be Commander in Chief of U.S. Strategic Command. See, U.S. Senate, *Nominations Before the Senate Armed Services Committee*, Hearings, 103rd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), p. 227.

57. See, for example, the discussion of North Korean nuclear threats to the United States by Kim Myong Chol, a North Korean writer reportedly with close ties to the government in Pyongyang, in, *N. Korea Makes Public Threat to Blow Up US Mainland*, accessed at, www.kimsoft.com/1997 on March 3, 2000; and, "North Korea prepared to fight to the end as Kim Jong-Il has his own version of *The Art of War*," *Asia Times*, April 10, 1996, p. 9.

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