Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

Gregory Gleason

 

In a principal-agent relationship the principal cannot have full information regarding the work of the agent, thus the principal must rely on proxy indicators.

 

Two particularly important consequences of this reliance are “adverse selection” and “moral hazard.” 

 

In general, the principal must rely on indicators of success rather than success itself (adverse selection), while the agent directs attention toward the satisfaction of proxy measures rather than toward the success of the task itself. (moral hazard).  [1]

 

The “hazard” in moral hazard refers to the fact that the individual has an incentive to direct behavior toward proxy measures rather than toward the desired goal.  This redirection can result in a creating incentives for perverse behavior.

 

The “adverse” in adverse selection refers to the fact that the establishment of monitoring criteria leads to perverse measurement.

 

Consider the case of buy-outs.  Capitalism is a risky business.  But if taxpayers were to assume all the risk of bailouts there would be no market punishment for management inefficiency or corruption.   One argument against publicly financed remedies for such tragedies as the Enron debacle is that this would change the incentives such that managers may think that the costs of risk they take will be borne by someone else and, accordingly, they would be prepared to take big risks.

 

Consider the case of hostage-taking.  If the U.S. were to act humanely and try to come to the aid of hostages of terrorists, it would encourage terrorists to think that hostage-taking was a productive enterprise, thereby possibly encouraging more hostage-taking.   “Based upon past experience, the U.S. Government concluded that making concessions that benefit hostage takers in exchange for the release of hostages increased the danger that others will be taken hostage. U.S. Government policy is, therefore, to deny hostage takers the benefits of ransom, prisoner releases, policy changes, or other acts of concession.” [2]

 

1.   Daniel W. Bromley,  Economic Interests and Institutions: The Conceptual Foundations of Public Policy  (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989).

 

2.   U.S. Department of State, Richard Boucher, Washington, DC, February 20, 2002. International Terrorism: American Hostages.

 

 

 

Gregory Gleason