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The
Principle of Parallel Interests
There are two widely held views on cooperation. View number one is that parallel interests imply cooperation. If individual actors have a common goal or would benefit from working together, we can expect them to do so. According to this view, cooperation naturally arises out of mutual interest. View number two is that individual actors can be forced to work together. According to this view, if individuals have difficulty cooperating or if cooperation does not appear to be taking place, the solution is to make the disincentives to failing to cooperate so great that actors will turn to cooperation out of despair over the alternatives. Unfortunately, both of these widely held views on cooperation are mistaken. Sustained cooperation is based on neither of these. In the real world of complex interactions, parallel interests often dissolve in petty disputes on the road to cooperation. Parallel interests may mean that both sides benefit from cooperation, but it does not mean that both sides benefit equally. Thus cooperation often seems unfair. Coercion often seems to the subjects like extortion. It frequently results in avoidance behaviors such as dissimulation, prevarication, retaliation, foot-dragging, misrepresentation, and so on. How then is cooperation encouraged? How are institutions designed, managed, and changed in order to facilitate cooperation and reduce duplication, invidious competition, and outright conflict? Modern political theorists acknowledge that the road to cooperation is much more nuanced that either of these two traditional approaches suggests. Cooperation is influenced by leadership, management, organizational style, cooperation, monitoring and evaluation, and a proportionality between action and effect. But above all, successful formulas for cooperation are ones that recognize the importance of overcoming dilemmas of collective action.
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