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The Bush Administration in Central Asia

Central=20 Asia, June 8, 2001 [ 14:18 ]
By Gregory = Gleason, TCA

ALMATY. (TCA) -- = Washington's foreign policy is deeply rooted in the = values,=20 principles of American mentality and is therefore not = subject=20 to change by individual administrations. Yet some = American=20 presidential administrations do introduce shifts in = policy=20 emphasis, shifts that are particularly significant in = times of=20 crisis.

For the past decade the states of = Central Asia=20 have been involved in a massive enterprise to = transform their=20 political and economic institutions. While there was = much that=20 was positive in the communist era, there were also = many=20 problems that resulted from the social and economic=20 experimentation of seven decades of party rule.=20

Keeping the good while rejecting the bad has = been more=20 difficult than many people anticipated. Yet each of = the=20 Central Asian states was making reasonably good = headway under=20 difficult conditions. In different ways and at = different=20 rates, the states were struggling to come into sync = with=20 international standards while remaining faithful to = the best=20 cultural traditions of Central Asia.

However, = in the=20 past three years the efforts of the Central Asian = states to=20 join the broader international community have been = threatened=20 by another legacy of the Soviet past, the unresolved = conflicts=20 of the Afghanistan war.

Beginning with the = Hujand=20 uprising in November 1998 and continuing through the = assaults=20 by Juma Namangani's irregular military formation = during the=20 past two summers, the political atmosphere in Central = Asia has=20 changed dramatically. Only a few years ago the central = policy=20 question was how to open the borders fast enough to = attract=20 investment and technical expertise. Now the central = policy=20 question is how to close the borders fast enough to = keep out=20 the contagions of terrorism, religious extremism and = organized=20 crime.

Central Asia's revolutionaries claim = that their=20 goal is to sweep away the Central Asian governments = they=20 regard as illegitimate remnants of the Soviet-era and=20 establish an Islamic Caliphate uniting the Moslem = faithful=20 throughout Central Asia. What is at stake is a = competition for=20 hearts and minds throughout the Central Asian Islamic=20 crescent, from Chechnya in the west to Xinjiang in the = east.=20

As Tajikistan's Emomali Rahmonov recently = noted, when=20 the Soviet Union pulled out of Afghanistan in February = 1989=20 and then when the Soviet Union collapsed just two = years later,=20 Tajikistan was forced into the role as a buffer state, = absorbing from Afghanistan a contagion of violence and = brutality that threatened to sweep throughout Central = Asia and=20 beyond. The 1997 Peace Accord in Tajikistan brought = the=20 Tajikistan domestic conflict to a legal conclusion, = but it did=20 not eliminate the causes.

Today the fear of = insurgency=20 and political instability is imperiling the modest = gains of a=20 decade of national consolidation in Central Asia. = Confronted=20 by religious and political extremism, terrorism, and = national=20 separatism, the governments of the region have = redoubled=20 security measures and imposed new constraints upon = domestic=20 political opposition. The counterinsurgency measures=20 instituted by the governments have the goal of = neutralizing=20 terrorists and bandits. But the governments' programs = have=20 cast a wide net, rounding up terrorists and criminals = but also=20 ensnaring legitimate critics as well as many perfectly = innocent victims.

The Bush Administration's = Response=20

The Bush administration came to power in the = U.S.=20 offering to restore a sense of purpose, dignity, and=20 compassion to American government and encourage a new = realism=20 in foreign policy. America's foreign policy has = traditionally=20 been a blend of realism tempered with idealism. = Realism means=20 above all honesty about a state's goals and the means = it will=20 use to achieve those goals. Idealism means the = protection of=20 values and virtues even when that might not be the = most=20 expedient policy of the day.

Earlier American = policy=20 toward the former Soviet states had been criticized as = too=20 obscure in its objectives and too willing to = compromise in the=20 means that it used to achieve those objectives. = Responding to=20 this criticism, the Bush administration set out with a = fresh=20 commitment to the idea that American interests must = come=20 first, but mutually advantageous policies would always = be=20 attractive. Like all American administrations, the = Bush=20 administration underscored the deep American = commitment to the=20 inalienable rights of the individual to dignity, fair=20 treatment, and civil protections.

In practice, = the=20 most visible aspect of the Bush administration's = initial=20 policy toward Central Asia was a new emphasis on = political=20 stability and regional security. But the increased = attention=20 to security problems in Central Asia predated the Bush = administration. In the last years of the Clinton=20 administration, Washington's tendency to "search for = and take=20 credit for success" was already being replaced by = broader=20 strategic thinking, more in line with promoting = enduring=20 American principles than merely seeking today's = convenient=20 pragmatism.

Washington's Central Asia = specialists,=20 having focused for two years on the Caspian Basin = Initiative,=20 were awakened by the terrorist attacks on U.S. = Embassies in=20 Africa in August 1998. In the wake of the Embassy = bombings,=20 the U.S. launched an unsuccessful attempt at = retaliation=20 against the al Qaeda terrorist organization and its = chief=20 strategist, Osama bin Laden. These events focused = Washington's=20 attention on the military advances of the Taliban and = the=20 swelling availability of cheap Afghan heroin in Europe = and the=20 U.S. Central Asia moved upward in the hierarchy of=20 Washington's crowded and complex priority list. =

During=20 the early years of the Clinton administration, = requests for=20 security assistance from Central Asia had been = routinely=20 rejected on the grounds that they were likely to = encourage the=20 heavy-handed traditions of the security services in = the=20 region. But by 2000 the situation had changed. In = March 2000=20 CIA director George Tenet visited the Central Asian = capitals=20 of Astana and Tashkent. FBI chief Lois Freeh followed = the next=20 month. Shortly thereafter Secretary of State Madeleine = Albright made an official visit to Central Asia. The = commander=20 of the U.S. Army's Central Command, General Anthony = Zinni, was=20 the next high-ranking official to visit Central Asia = followed=20 by Stephen Sestanovich, the Special Advisor to the = Secretary=20 of State.

These high level meetings were = followed by a=20 series of bilateral commitments for technical = assistance and=20 joint military exercises. The State Department hosted = a=20 regional Central Asian Counter-terrorism Conference in = Washington in June 2000 focusing on counter-terrorism=20 cooperation but also emphasizing the idea that = national=20 strategies needed to be based on the rule of law and = respect=20 for human rights if they were to succeed as long-term = efforts=20 to curtail support for terrorism.

Just as the = Bush=20 administration was taking office, the situation in = Afghanistan=20 deteriorated. Worsening social and economic conditions = led to=20 yet another mass exodus of refugees as Afghanis fled = fighting,=20 drought, and economic isolation. A new, harsher set of = economic sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council = took=20 effect on January 20, 2001, the day that the Bush=20 administration came into office. The UN sanctions, = sponsored=20 jointly by the U.S. and Russia, called upon the = Taliban to=20 hand over Osama bin Laden to an American court where = he had=20 been indicted on charges of terrorism. The sanctions = called=20 upon Afghanistan to stop promoting terrorism and to = take steps=20 to curtail opium production and trade. UN Security = Council=20 Resolution 1333 forbade arms shipments and military = assistance=20 to the Taliban, froze financial assets of the Taliban, = and=20 essentially brought to a halt all non-humanitarian air = traffic=20 in Taliban controlled parts of the country.

At = the=20 same time, the Bush administration reaffirmed the U.S. = commitment to a political solution to the Afghanistan = problem.=20 U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in May 2001 = announced an=20 increase in emergency humanitarian relief to = Afghanistan,=20 bringing the total humanitarian aid during the first = six=20 months of the Bush administration to $124 million, = already far=20 exceeding the $114 million in aid provided during = 2000. The=20 U.S. continued to be the largest single provider of=20 humanitarian assistance to the country.

With = security=20 affairs specialist Condoleeza Rice appointed as the=20 President's new National Security Advisor and veteran = Afghan=20 specialist Zalmay Khalilzad appointed as the new = architect of=20 South Asian policy at the National Security Council, = the=20 resolution of the "Afghan problem" was moved to the = top of the=20 list of Washington's foreign policy priorities in=20 international security.

Playing a careful = balancing=20 act between what Washington calls "engagement", that = is=20 realist support for the recognized governments in = power, and=20 the protection of human rights, meaning support for = the=20 protection of civil rights of even those who may = oppose the=20 rule of those recognized governments, will not be an = easy task=20 in Central Asia.

The road ahead is not clear. = But some=20 things are easily predicted. Neither of the two = sponsors of=20 the UN Security Council sanctions--the U.S. and = Russia--is=20 likely to become directly involved in intervention as = a means=20 of resolving the Afghan problem. Support for proxies = or=20 intermediaries in "Great Game" intrigues is also apt = to be=20 viewed with a great deal of suspicion and = apprehension. In the=20 world of electronic globalization, state secrets are = often=20 yesterday's news.

There will be appeals to = provide=20 weapons to the Northern Alliance in its = counter-struggle=20 against the Taliban. But cooler heads are apt to = prevail in=20 seeking a less heroic but more durable solution. The = weapons=20 that are now fueling the flames of conflict are = primarily from=20 Pakistan and Iran. The key to exhausting the = war-fighting=20 capacity in the region will be the effectiveness of = the UN=20 sanctions against the arms trade and the drug trade = which=20 finances it.

The stakes are high. Central Asia = has=20 again become, in the phrase coined fifty years ago by = the=20 scholar Owen Lattimore, the "pivot of Asia." The area = lies at=20 a juncture of key trade routes of the 21st century. = The region=20 is rich in oil and mineral wealth. It is a region that = is=20 likely to be a fulcrum of geopolitical change over the = next=20 few decades driven by the rising and falling fortunes = of the=20 Great Powers as Russia recedes and China and India = advance.=20


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