

Collective Security and Non-State Actors in Eurasia

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International security cooperation usually takes one of two forms. A classical collective security organization is designed to promote international security through regulating the behavior of its member states. A defensive security organization is designed to protect a group of states from threats emanating from a challenging state or group of states. Both forms of security cooperation bind states to act in concert with respect to threats presented by other states. The emergence of non-state actors such as terrorist or extremist organizations challenges traditional forms of collective security. Threats from political extremism, terrorism, and outlaw organizations have grown in visibility during the past decade in the countries of Eurasia. The terrorist attacks of September 11 and the ensuing global war on terrorism have given added impetus to the Eurasian inter-state cooperation in confronting non-traditional threats and challenges from non-state actors. Bearing in mind the theory of collective security, this article analyzes threats posed by non-state actors with respect to Eurasian collective security organizations including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures, and the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization. The article concludes that the effectiveness of these organizations at achieving stated objectives depends upon their capacity to adopt new criteria of effectiveness.

Keywords: collective security, terrorism, Eurasia

Traditional conceptions of collective security are challenged by the emergence of non-state actors as fundamental elements in the dynamics of international relations. Conventional Westphalian concepts of the international system posit states as the primary actors in the dynamics of international high politics. Collective security arrangements, while they vary in form and scope, typically obligate states to act in certain ways with respect to other states. In the post-Cold War landscape of challenges emanating from hard-to-identify and hard-to-locate terrorist, separatist, criminal, and extremist organizations, states in Eurasia have sought to spur international cooperation through reinvigorating collective security organizations (Kubicek, 1997; Jonson, 1998; Allison and Jonson, 2001; Luong and Weinthal, 2002; Blank, 2003; Bukkvoll, 2003; Allison, 2004). Throughout the world, the major inter-state security organizations continue to be essentially

Westphalian in nature.¹ They assume the primacy of state actors. While collective security organizations have re-focused to their objectives to confront challenges emanating from below the level of the nation-state, they have not yet reorganized their operational programs to achieve these goals. This is particularly true in Eurasia.

While definitions of “Eurasia” vary, most analysts use the concept to refer to the states that are products of the disintegration of the communist bloc in the period 1989–1991.² The international agreement that brought the USSR to an end, the Alma-Ata Declaration of 1991, was primarily focused on establishing the sovereignty of the signatory states. Problems of regulating relations among the post-Soviet states were almost entirely ignored in the agreement.³ For over a decade, the security relations among the former Soviet states were largely *ad hoc* and structurally indeterminate. To be sure, a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements on regional security were adopted. In 1992 the CIS states adopted a CIS collective security treaty. A number of bilateral relationships, particularly between Russia and other Eurasian states emphasized security arrangements, military training programs and arms sales. But these early post-collapse arrangements only minimally functioned to regiment states and maintain regional security. A number of violent conflicts broke out in the early post-Soviet period, notably in Moldova, in Tajikistan, and in Chechnya. The decade-long guerilla war in Chechnya has proven to be one of the greatest tragedies of the post-Soviet collapse. But the political instability in Chechnya, like that of Moldova and Tajikistan, is essentially sub-national; it does not represent a state-to-state violent conflict. No major state-to-state conflict has occurred in the wake of the Soviet collapse. This was not pre-ordained by the logic of the situation. It could have been much worse. There have been periods of intense

¹The basic principles of international relations in the Westphalian system, named after the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and first articulated in modern form by Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), are considered to include: (1) sovereignty of the state; (2) sovereign equality of states; (3) the right of non-interference in domestic affairs of the sovereign state; (4) territorial integrity of the state; (5) the obligation to abide by international agreements; (6) the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes; and (7) the obligation to engage in international cooperation consistent with national interests.

²“Eurasia” is a malleable geographical concept. Depending on the analyst’s purposes and orientation, the concept may refer to countries located in what is commonly referred to as bridging in some sense countries of Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Many Russian analysts consider “Eurasianism” to be a concept first developed by Russian intellectuals. Russia is frequently considered to be within Eurasia. Many analysts would include the five former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to be Eurasian. Also typically included in the concept are the Caucasus states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Afghanistan and Mongolia have historical linkages with the other Eurasian countries because of Soviet era commercial and cultural relations. Xingjian Province of the People’s Republic of China has historically been separated politically and economically from the post-Soviet Central Asian states but has close cultural ties to them, particularly to Kazakhstan. Iran is a Caspian littoral country and a potentially important trans-shipment route for other countries of Eurasia. There is no natural boundary of Eurasia. Consequently, the definition of Eurasia, like any definition, depends on the purposes of the task at hand. Many institutions continue to divide the Eurasian continent on the basis of institutional criteria that often reflect more about the dynamics of the institution than about the dynamics of geopolitics. Most U.S. government agencies, for instance, continue to characterize the region in terms of the categories of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Eurasia continues to be associated with Europe. But some institutions recently have taken a new approach to the region. In July 2003 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reorganized its Middle Eastern Department (MED), renaming it the Middle East and Central Asia Department (MCD) and adding eight countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia. (IMF Press Release No. 03/130, July 30, 2003). While such delineations would appear to be neutral, they often in fact have significant substantive influence in operational and policy terms.

³The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics consisted of fifteen Soviet republics. Although these republics claimed to exercise a degree of autonomy within the USSR, in fact most were almost entirely subordinate to central Soviet authorities and, as a consequence, had little role in international decisions. After the Soviet Union collapsed, many of the Eurasian states were ill prepared to provide for their own security. The international agreement that brought the USSR to an end and created the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Alma-Ata Declaration, was a document whose primary motivation was to give expression to the powerful centrifugal forces that had built up in the last days of the USSR. Shielding the post-Soviet republics from the consequences of international anarchy was simply not a concern of the signatories.

state-to-state tension. Russia and Ukraine's confrontation over control of the Crimea in the early period of independence or Uzbekistan and Tajikistan's confrontation over the leadership of northern Tajikistan provide examples of periods of escalating conflict that ran the risk of provoking the state-to-state use of force. During this period national defense expenditures in the Eurasian countries remained relatively low. In the Central Asian countries, for instance, annual defense expenditures accounted for less than 2 percent of GDP in all of the countries except Turkmenistan, where the figure appeared to be closer to 4 percent of GDP (Stålenheim et al., 2003).

But even as the danger of state-to-state conflict receded during the first decade of post-communism, the threats emerging from non-state actors continued to grow. Political extremists, terrorists, separatists, and organized crime syndicates grew increasingly visible and influential during the first decade of post-communism, eventually emerging as the greatest threat to political stability in the Eurasian region. By the late 1990s these new dangers had grown so apparent that they motivated a new willingness among the political leaders of the Eurasian states to reconsider multilateral approaches to security questions. All of the Eurasian states began to take these threats seriously as they struggled to set aside past disagreements in an effort to find new formulas for collective action. The movement toward inter-state cooperation in Eurasia was already in place and rapidly gathering momentum when terrorists targeted the U.S. in September 2001. It was the events of September 11th, the onset of the global war on terrorism and, most important of all, the positioning of American military personnel in the Caucasus and Central Asia, that precipitated a quantum leap forward in efforts to find new broad and effective formulas for Eurasian collective security.

A threat is also an opportunity. Preserving enemies is an ancient *modus operandi* of Machiavellian leaders. It well understood feature of international politics that a state's perception of threat is often self-serving in the sense that it is politically expedient for a particular set of government officials (Ullman, 1983:131–133). While there is great variation among the Eurasian countries, these countries generally rank low on scales of economic advancement, market-oriented governance, human rights, and electoral practice (Motyl and Schnitzer, 2004). Criticism of the failure to produce domestic conditions of prosperity and equity can often be overcome by leaders who emphasize an external threat. The threat of terrorism can justify otherwise unpopular actions. In this climate of a shared sense of common threat from non-state actors—and on the background of perceived encroachment from the sole remaining Superpower, the United States, the Eurasian countries returned to the bargaining table. In these circumstances a number of security organization already in nascent form, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures, and the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), were rapidly expanded and further institutionalized to address the new security challenges.

The political leaders of the Eurasian countries are united in viewing terrorism, separatism, and organized crime as great evils confronting one and all alike. This gives the campaigns against terrorism a moral clarity. But moral clarity is not strategic clarity. Joint action to confront common threats presupposes that action jointly taken can be effective to achieve common goals. To what extent are these Eurasian organizations suited to the goals at hand? How can the contribution of these organizations to promoting international security under these new circumstances best be evaluated? What implications do these findings hold for the evolution of security cooperation in the circumstances of globalization? Finally, does this post-Westphalian moment portend a significant departure from traditional realist theories of alliance behavior?

The Security Dilemma in Post-Communist Eurasia

The first major multilateral effort to regulate the security relations among the former Soviet states was the CIS Collective Security Treaty signed in May 1992. The treaty provided that aggression or threat of aggression against one country would be regarded as aggression against all participants in the treaty. The agreement could not rely on the regimenting effect of an overarching ideological compass. Communist doctrine was discredited by the Soviet experience. The agreement could not rely on the dominant influence of a single power in the region. No one state was in a position to enforce security guarantees. Russia was widely regarded as a receding colonial power and was not welcomed in the role of a "protector" for the newly independent states (Banuazizi and Weiner, 1994). And the agreement could not rely on the unifying effect of a foreign threat. The end of the Cold War had removed the specter of threat from Europe or America. Consequently, the post-Soviet states quickly found themselves in an anarchic situation of competition in which they were forced to turn to their own devices to ensure their security (Sakwa and Webber, 1999).

This situation is very similar to the classic realist descriptions of the state of nature in international affairs. The defining aspect of this situation is one of the oldest general propositions of international relations theory, the security dilemma. Thucydides (460–400 B.C.), historian of the Peloponnesian Wars between Athens and Sparta, noted long ago that insecurity propelled people toward the very thing they feared, conflict. To be unprepared for conflict is to invite aggression. To prepare for conflict is to inspire fear in an opponent that in turn invites aggression. To confront a threat the Athenians gathered their resources to increase their power, but "what made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which that caused in Sparta." (Smith, 1986:4). John Herz gave a formal title to the phenomenon of the security dilemma by observing that, as a general principle, actors in the international community can be expected to strive to increase their security from being attacked, subjugated, or annihilated by other groups and individuals. But, as these groups or individuals strive to maintain security from foreign threat, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the power of others. As Herz wrote in the journal *World Politics* in 1950, "This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on" (Herz, 1950:158).

States have historically allied with one another as a means to address the security dilemma (Waltz, 1979). Alliances may take many forms (Fedder, 1968). An alliance is a collective of states that expresses the will to either deter or respond to a common threat. It is traditional to distinguish between a collective security alliance and a defensive security alliance. The former is inward looking, and the latter is outward looking. A collective security alliance is designed by the members of a group to protect themselves from each other, while a defensive alliance is a way for a group to protect itself from some other group.

A collective security alliance is usually based on a formal agreement among states to provide mutual assistance in the event of specified aggression or threat of aggression toward one or more of the alliance members. A collective security alliance is designed as a self-stabilizing agreement among members who agree to subordinate the pursuit of their narrow self-interest to the broader goal of system stability. A collective security organization is essentially an idealist conception that stability can be obtained through the consent of member nations that, as Woodrow Wilson expressed it, consent to the idea that "there must... be, not a balance of power, not one powerful group of nations set off against another, but a single overwhelming group of nations who shall be the trustee of the peace..." (Jacobson, 1984:143). Such collective security organizations typically require "that all nations

come to the aid of a victim of aggression by resisting the aggression with all means necessary. . .” (Morgenthau, 1954:126)

By way of contrast, defensive security alliances are oriented toward external threats. Although most contemporary military treaty organizations refer to themselves as collective security alliances, strictly speaking they are collective defense alliances because they are primarily geared to confronting challenges from outside the group rather than regimenting the members of the group themselves. NATO, for instance, is often referred to as a collective security alliance despite the fact that it is oriented toward external threats and not toward internal regimentation. But, in deference to common usage, we may say in loose sense we may say that both collective security alliances and defensive security alliances represent collective security organizations.

The successes and failures of collective security organizations in the past have frequently been attributed to the extent of common values at stake and the willingness of states to shoulder the common burden (Bennett, Lepgold and Unger, 1994). Collective security failures, such as that of the League of Nations in failing to deter WWII, are typically attributed to two factors: (1) the inability of the group effectively to apply sanctions to their renegade members over their strong objections and (2) the ambiguity of what would constitute “resisting aggression with all means necessary.” If a state agrees to undertake a common task in protecting the system from aggression does this entail actions that might seriously compromise its own national interest for the benefit of the group? States rarely see the commitment to common security as implying actions which might endanger the state’s own ability to survive.

Collective security cooperation is most successful when a coalition forms against a common foe. “Grand Coalitions” form to achieve common aims (Brown and Rice, 1979; Betts, 1992). When the common aim is the joint confrontation of a foe seen by all as a serious danger, coalitions exhibit great cohesiveness. But when the common aim is merely stability and maintenance of the status quo, coalitions have a tendency to become debating societies rather than security structures. Not all members benefit equally from the status quo. When grand coalitions achieve their ends they soon turn into coalitions of everybody against nobody. Because there is no way for such a coalition to win anything, the coalition disintegrates as each member begins to seek to win something from some other member (Riker, 1962:32–33).

The traditional accounting of the successes and failures of collective security organizations almost exclusively refers to instances of state-to-state aggression (Morrow, 1994). Directing the activities of collective security organizations toward countering the influence of non-state actors is both more difficult to measure and more difficult to monitor. If the most serious challenge emanates from murky and ill-defined groups of terrorists, hard to identify groups of separatists and irredentists, subterranean and covertly acting ideological extremists, how does the state measure its compliance with the goals of the collective security organization? What level of state commitment is enough when extremist groups will naturally seek to make a separate peace with any state that seems sluggish in making and carrying through on commitments of resisting aggression? (Tsebelis, 1998). States that are at the forefront of efforts to combat terrorism and extremism are apt to be punished by becoming the targets of choice for terrorists and extremists. States that renege on a commitment to the goals of an anti-terrorist collective security organization are apt to be rewarded with fewer suicide bombings, fewer terrorist attacks, and fewer reasons to put themselves in harm’s way.

National Consolidation, Political Conflict, and Political Stability in Eurasia

When the Soviet Union disintegrated in the early 1990s, the national independence of the former Soviet republics was heralded as the new basis for the government, economics, and foreign relations of the countries of Eurasia. In a short period of time Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,

and Turkmenistan became separate and independent countries, each committing itself to the establishment of secular, democratic government, market-oriented economic systems, and the observance of internationally accepted standards of policy and practice. Each of the Eurasian states committed itself to the values, the goals and the development of the infrastructure of independent, sovereign states (Dawisha and Parrott, 1997; Jonson, 1998; Fairbanks, Nelson, Starr, and Weisbrode, 2001; Shaikhutdinov, 2002; Syzdykov, 2003) Leaders of these new states expressed relief that the “Bolshevik experiment” in their societies had come to an end and that they would now return to the international community and reestablish normal societies within the community of nations (Pomfret, 1995). Each of the newly independent Eurasian countries soon joined major international organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the IMF.

A prevailing but naïve expectation of many people in these countries during the early stage of post-communist reform was that the newly independent states would merge seamlessly into a new era of justice, economic prosperity, rule of law, and stability resembling the prevailing status quo in Europe or the Americas. Democratization and national consolidation were heralded as the linchpin of stability and predictability. States with political ballast composed of an economically enfranchised middle class seeking stability and normalcy, could be expected to act responsibly and prudently. But the first decade of the collapse of communism produced a much more complicated picture, one marked by great peaks and valleys. As the politics of national consolidation took place in the Eurasia countries, a new politics emerged that began to reshape the post-communist transition in the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia. If the politics of western societies was characterized by a competition between the “haves” and the “have-nots”, the Eurasian political dimension was more aptly characterized as between the “cans” and the “cannots”. Those who had control of the levers of state power could exploit it to their benefit and exclude those on the outside. Those who did not have access to the control over government processes were pushed to the sidelines.

Organized opposition to the governments of the Eurasian states during the late Soviet period and early periods of independence was primarily subterranean (Haghayeghi, 1995; Hunter and Broxup, 1996). Only after the breakup of the USSR did political opposition succeed in mobilizing. One of the clearest examples of the mobilization of political opposition was the Tajikistan war of 1992–1993. In 1992 the Tajik communist party broke into regional factions that eventually turned into a civil war. With the exception of sporadic outbursts, fighting came to an end in 1994. It was followed by a tense stand-off that lasted for 3 more years. When the June 1997 Tajikistan peace accord brought Tajikistan’s opposing factions into a single, united Tajik government, the last major civil conflict in the Central Asian region appeared to come to a resolution.

The Tajik conflict burst into the open again in fall 1998 when a former commander in the Tajikistan civil war, Makhmud Khudaiberdiev, descended on the city of Hujand in the northern province of Tajikistan leading an army of 700 rebel troops. Khudaiberdiev’s goal was to establish a revolutionary government in Tajikistan. Troops loyal to the Tajikistan government and outnumbering the rebels by a factor of four to one soon recaptured the city of Hujand. The show of force and counterforce in Tajikistan exploded just a few months later in neighboring Uzbekistan. A series of terrorist bomb explosions in February 1999 in downtown Tashkent, the Uzbek capital, took sixteen lives and narrowly missed claiming the life of Islam Karimov, the country’s president. The revolutionary group that took credit for the bombing, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, or IMU, announced the goal of overthrowing the Karimov government. In summer 1999 started a major insurrection in the Fergana Valley with the purpose of overthrowing the Central Asian governments in order to establish an Islamic Caliphate throughout the Central Asian Islamic crescent, from Chechnya in the west to Xinjiang in the east.

The Central Asian insurgency brought into sharp relief the resourcefulness of the coalition of terrorists, separatists, organized crime figures, and foreign supporters that had fixed its sights on the overthrow of the Eurasian governments. The coalition was led by Uzbek, Tajik, and Kyrgyz opponents of secular government in Central Asia. The coalition drew on the resources of Islamic extremists from the Chechnya and Caucasus regions seeking to overthrow Russian rule in the Caucasus and Tatarstan. The coalition included Uighur separatists from Xinjiang who had long been seeking to wrest political control from Beijing. The insurgents were financed by drug traffickers profiting from the opium trade in Central Asia. The insurgents also found technical and financial support from Afghanistan and other Middle Eastern countries seeking to expand militant Islam's reach to the Muslim countries of Central Asia.

The insurgency movement held the potential to reshape the process of post-communist reform in the states of Central Asia. Beset by fears of terrorism, organized crime, uncontrollable migration, and growing threats of trans-border spread of diseases, weapons of mass destruction, and religious extremist doctrines, the Central Asian governments began to take steps to impose control over their borders, and root out extremist political opponents. Government crackdowns on domestic opposition swept the Central Asian region. Security agencies were expanded, political opposition was monitored, the press, already subservient in all these countries, was brought under rigid control, and the political opposition was harassed into compliance with the state's definition of public order. The counterinsurgency programs cast a wide net, ensnaring legitimate and extremist opponents alike, chilling human rights, and creating impediments to legitimate social and political evolution. The counterinsurgency efforts were often counterproductive, rarely resulting in compliance and often polarizing opposition movements, politicizing religion and transforming the region's poverty, inequality, and underemployment into the *casus belli* for anti-government agitation (Gleason, 2001). The terrorist attack on the U.S. in September 2001 transformed the situation in Central Asia. The terrorist acts quickly led back to Osama bin Laden's Al Qaida organization and its protector the Taliban government, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The actions of the American-led coalition against terrorism and its Taliban protectors began the shaping a new security terrain not only for Afghanistan, but also for Eurasia and the entire west Asian region.

At the beginning of the actions of Operation Enduring Freedom to oust the Taliban from Afghanistan, the Central Asian states, particularly Uzbekistan, quickly emerged as key strategic partners for the U.S. The Central Asian states had long and unsuccessfully lobbied for greater international attention to the Afghan problem (Akimbekov, 2003). These states broadly welcomed U.S. offers to assist in the normalization of the Afghanistan. The Central Asian states offered ground access and territorial overflight access. The U.S. promptly established logistical base facilities in Central Asia (at Khanabad base in southern Uzbekistan and Ganci base near Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan). Despite suspicions expressed in the Russian language press in Central Asia and in Russia, the Russian government took no steps to interfere with the extension of American military power through Central Asia. The Russian government concluded an agreement with Kyrgyzstan to station troops at Kant airbase not far from Bishkek. Russian troops had been responsible for border security of the Tajikistan border with Afghanistan continuously since the end of the USSR. Discussions began over the establishment of a Russian airbase not far from Dushanbe in Tajikistan.

Initiatives in Eurasian Security Cooperation

It was in the context of the confluence of transnational political extremism, terrorism, separatism, and organized crime that an entirely new level of cooperative-

ness among the governments of the Eurasian states emerged after 2001. The governments agreed to revitalize existing security organizations and establish new ones. Some of the initiatives were supra-regional, such as the CIS itself. Others were sub-regional, involving only a limited number of states. Some of the initiatives have accompanied or led to the establishment of ongoing regional international organizations. The organizations differ in their background, objectives, mechanisms, and influence.

Under the auspices of the CIS, a Collective Security Treaty was signed in May 1992. The CST, while not successful in creating a security umbrella for the region, formed the basis for subsequent agreements. The most recent phase in this cooperation is the CIS CSTO. Members originally included Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The CSTO manages the CIS Collective Rapid Deployment Force (CRDF) that consists of roughly 1,300 servicemen from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan, under Russian command. The CSTO is designed to respond to emergency situations such as the capture of hostages or terrorist attacks. The CSTO continues to be basically an instrument for coordination of national militaries. It is designed to promote interoperability and serve as a mechanism for military transfers. But is a state-centric institution.

Under the auspices of the CIS is the Anti-Terrorism Center (ATC). The ATC was originally established in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan but arrangements were later made to move the ATC to Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Members of the agreement include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The ATC serves as an informational and analytic center on international terrorist and extremist organizations, their leaders, and supporters. The ATC is supervised by the Russia Federal Security Service (FSB) Director. The ATC is essentially a forum for the exchange of information on the activities of terrorists, separatists, and criminals.

The SCO was established in October 2001, and outgrowth of border negotiations that originally culminated in the Shanghai Agreement of 1996. The SCO includes China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan maintains observer status in the organization. The SCO is a multipurpose international organization, which seeks to promote confidence building through cooperation in science and technology, education, energy, transportation, environmental protection through regional peace, security, and political stabilization measures. Financing for the organization is on the basis of member contributions to the organization. The SCO has not yet developed full-time professional staff with expectations of program continuity. Consequently the organization tends to function in the context of ministerial meetings and meetings of heads of state.

In June 2002 Kazakhstan acted as host to the first meeting of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). The meeting resulted in the Almaty Act of 2002 creating CICA as an ongoing institution. The idea of CICA originated in 1992 with proposals by Kazakh president Nazarbaev. The group includes Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Mongolia, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Palestine, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan. The CICA is a multipurpose international organization, which seeks to develop a role throughout Eurasia equivalent to that of the Organization for Security and Cooperation. It functions as a diplomatic forum and promotes confidence building through international diplomatic and military cooperation throughout the greater Eurasian region.

Conclusions: Assessing Threat and Response

Eurasian security organizations recently created or adapted to confront threats from non-state actors are key players in the international relations of post-com-

unist region. These are not institutions that will be hierarchically managed by any one central authority. These institutions are decentralized in design and function. Given that coordination without hierarchy is the critical challenge in any collective undertaking, it is important to ask to what extent these institutions are suitably organized to achieve the objectives of their new mandates?

The threats posed by non-state actors are different in essential features from the threats posed by inter-state rivalries. State-to-state collective security agreements are marked by five important structural features: (1) the assumption of rational calculations by unitary actors; (2) the clarity of the negotiating forum; (3) the use of bargaining for signaling and communication; (4) relatively transparent burden sharing; and (5) easily identifiable measures of success.

First of all, the effectiveness of well-defined alliance structures at confronting state-to-state threats is often measured by the effectiveness of deterrence, that is, the ability to deter certain kinds of unwanted behavior on the part of an adversary. In some cases, the goal may be to induce a particular behavior in an adversary through compellence (Schelling, 1960). But in either case the goal is to elicit a rational response; it is not to completely eliminate the adversary. Cold-war era alliance structures were designed primarily to achieve the objective of deterring future threats. They were not designed to eliminate the sources of those threats. NATO's guiding purpose during the period of the Cold War was to make Warsaw Pact aggression self-defeating and pointless. The Warsaw Pact had just the opposite objective. But neither organization had as an element of its public mandate the complete elimination of the rival. Looked at in this light, the challenges posed by non-state actors such as terrorists are distinctively different in nature. Collective security cooperation opposing terrorist entities envisages their complete neutralization or elimination. This is a different kind of struggle. It is a struggle that must be waged differently. It is a struggle whose success must be gauged differently.

Second, clarity of the negotiating forum is critical in traditional security negotiations. In the case of a traditional collective security organization, the negotiating forum is public, transparent, and accepted. There is no ambiguity regarding legitimate representation. In the case of defensive security organization, the opponent is uniquely represented by a delegation or organization which has the task of representing the organization's goals and has the authority to conclude agreements. Third, bargaining can take place to conclude agreements but even in cases where agreements are not concluded, may carry out a more important function of signaling critical information about dangers and non-negotiable issues. The most important part of bargaining may be that it is a way to signal to the other side regarding the existence of firebreaks. In this way injudicious decisions that might have been taken on the basis of misunderstanding, miscalculation, or misperception can often be deterred. Fourth, the collective security organization can articulate with some clarity how the burden of security within an alliance can be shared. Parties know their obligations are public knowledge and that a failure to equitably carry out their responsibilities may also become public. Fifth and finally, the parties can agree on what would be the success of an agreement, or in the case of a conflict, what would constitute a point at which the conflict can be considered resolved.

These structural features are absent when collective security organizations confront disparate, loosely connected, or hard to identify cells, groups of cells, or inchoate ideological/religious movements. Terrorist organizations frequently act in ways that run counter to the expectations of rational behavior. Their most effective weapon, suicide actions, fundamentally confounds rational choice models. Second, there is little clarity with respect to the negotiating forum. Who speaks for the organization? Who is the authoritative representative of the organization's will? Is it reasonable to even assume that the organization has anything identifiable as an objective or set of goals other than chameleonic tactics? Even when bargaining does take place between formal organizations and informal representatives of the non-

state actors, there is little communication that can take place in the form of signaling. A delegation from a formal organization, which pronounces threats toward an informal terrorist organization is not necessarily signaling a critical issue—as would be the case in negotiations between formal security blocs—but rather might be revealing an indication of weakness to the terrorists. Third, burdens shared within organizations confronting non-state actors are not often shared transparently and openly. If the terrorists witness some disparity in the sharing of burdens, they may be able to use that to leverage internal disagreements. Consequently, burden sharing within collective security organizations tends to be non-transparent. Fourth and most importantly, the new context of collective action by state actors against the threats posed by non-state actors is marked by a critical feature of ill closure. When is a terrorist opponent defeated? What would constitute an adequate level of confidence that new terrorist threats would not reemerge after a period of normalcy?

These structural features distinguish traditional security contexts from the new, post-Westphalian context of contemporary Eurasian security. There are critical differences for analysts to bear in mind in assessing the adaptability of these organizations to the threats they confront. Traditional coalitions stress rationality, deterrence, signaling, territory, and compellence with the focus on the adversary. These new coalitions must find ways to anticipate the irrational, coordinate burden sharing, and strive toward the elimination of threat.

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