

The Danger and the Promise of Heidegger: An American Perspective

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Thanks to Heidegger, we have learned to hear the ambiguity of subjective and objective genitives in many phrases with the form, “The X of Y.” We needed to be *taught* to hear this ambiguity, because it is concealed by the impossible simultaneity of its dual meanings. *Critique of Pure Reason*, for example, signifies both criticism *directed at* pure reason and criticism *belonging to* pure reason. Ordinarily, however, we hear the title of Kant’s great work only as an objective genitive, as a critique directed at the pretensions of pure reason, and so not also as a subjective genitive, as a critique used by pure reason in order to establish and secure its own legitimate domain. What is more, even after we learn to recognize that *Critique of Pure Reason* also means the critique which belongs to pure reason, we still cannot hear both meanings *at the same time*. This is because we hear one meaning *instead* of the other; what we hear occupies the place of what we do not.

The point is nicely illustrated by the gestalt figure Wittgenstein made famous:



Unless this figure has already been introduced as a “duck-rabbit,” we do not ordinarily notice that it has another aspect (that it can be seen as a rabbit), because the aspect we do see (the duck) stands in the place of the aspect we do not see (the rabbit), and we cannot see both the duck and the rabbit at once.¹ After we have recognized that the figure can be seen as either a duck or a rabbit, most of us can freely gestalt-switch back-and-forth between them. Yet, untutored viewers of gestalt figures like the duck-rabbit, Necker cube, and Janus vase do not usually see that there

is anything they do not see, because what they do see stands in the place of what they do not see.

The crucial point, for our purposes, is that we see what we see *instead of* what we do not see.

I begin by rehearsing such seemingly obvious and rudimentary phenomenological lessons because I want to suggest that Heidegger, in a strictly analogous way, teaches us to see the danger as standing *in the place of* the promise. Heidegger's hope for the future, I shall show, turns crucially on helping us learn to make a gestalt switch whereby we come to see the promise *instead of* the danger—there, in the same place. When we examine the precise meaning Heidegger gives these philosophical terms of art, it will become clear that seeing the promise *instead of* the danger does not mean adopting some Pollyannish optimism.² Rather, learning to see the promise *instead of* the danger means developing a phenomenological comportment attuned to what we can anticipate but never expect, that is, the future, the very “project” which has brought our international colloquium together “under the title ‘Heidegger—the danger and the promise.’”³

This title of our colloquium, for the same reasons, can also be heard in at least two different senses. First, “Heidegger—the danger and the promise” signifies what remains dangerous and promising *about* Heidegger. We tend to hear the title first in this sense, I think, despite the fact that what remains dangerous and promising about Heidegger's thinking cannot easily be reduced to a single “danger” or “promise.” Heidegger's *dangerousness* may be most obvious in his unapologetic attempt to think “the inner truth and greatness” of National Socialism, but it is also clearly visible in his claim to have “dissolved the idea of ‘logic’ in the turbulence of a more originary questioning,” in his reading of the entire history of Western metaphysics as “nihilism,” and in his never-relinquished endeavor to restore to thinking “a proper though limited leadership in the whole of human existence” (IM 213; P 92; 83). Rather

than multiplying examples of the dangers attendant upon Heidegger’s thinking, or exploring their important interconnections (as I have done elsewhere), I would prefer to risk a hypothesis that does not presume to stand entirely outside these dangers, as though diagnosing them from a safe distance.⁴ For, in my view, these dangers, undeniable though they are, cannot be entirely disassociated from “the promise of Heidegger,” from what remains promising about Heidegger’s thinking. Admittedly, it sounds provocative to maintain that what is promising about Heidegger remains linked to what is most dangerous in his thinking. Yet, is it not precisely this difficult and troubling juxtaposition of danger *and* promise that we have gathered together, and been gathered together by, in order to think?

This, then, is how I would begin to read the “*and*” in the title of our colloquium: Heidegger’s thinking remains dangerous *and* promising, in one and the same place. Of course, the *and* in our title can be understood differently. “Heidegger—the danger and the promise” could easily be taken as entitling one to specify the dangers of Heidegger’s thinking, on the one hand, and then, on the other hand, to comment upon what remains promising about his work. This, however, presumes that we can take the measure of Heidegger’s thinking by weighing its “pros and cons” in separate scales. If I think it more fitting to hear our title as asking us about what remains *both* dangerous *and* promising about Heidegger’s thinking, this is not only because understanding our task in this way accords with Heidegger’s cherished Hölderlinian maxim (from the late hymn, *Patmos*): “Yet, where the danger is, the saving power also grows.” It is, moreover, because I try to show in my forthcoming book that we understand what remains most promising about Heidegger’s thinking precisely by exploring what is most dangerous in his work.⁵

I show, to sketch only the most striking example, how Heidegger's philosophical view of the relation between philosophy and the other sciences motivated his attempt to transform the German university in 1933-34. This means that the infamous connection between Heidegger's philosophy and his opprobrious commitment to National Socialism cannot be understood apart from his radical philosophical efforts to rethink and reform higher education. Instead of using this dangerous connection as an excuse to dismiss Heidegger's promising views on education, however, I contend that his prescient critique of the university has only become more relevant since he elaborated it, and that, with the important philosophical corrections suggested for this philosophical research program by his so-called "turn," the later Heidegger's mature vision for a re-ontologization of education merits the careful attention of those of us seeking to understand the roots and implications of our own growing crisis in higher education. This is to suggest, in other words, that we cannot critically reconstruct and develop Heidegger's views on the future of education—one of the most promising dimensions of his thinking—without first understanding the philosophical depths of his commitment to Nazism, however dangerous that subject remains. While my work is anything but an apology for Heidegger's disastrous Nazism, then, it does suggest that we recognize what remains most promising in his thinking only by coming to terms with what remains most dangerous about it, and, moreover, that this intimate connection between danger and promise holds not only for Heidegger's long-developed vision for higher education and his resulting commitment to Nazism, but also for his controversial critique of our current "technological" ontotheology and his complementary vision of an "other beginning" for Western history, a beginning whereby our history might regain its future, the connection I shall seek to elucidate here.

As I began by suggesting, however, we can also understand the title of our colloquium in a second sense, seemingly quite different from the way we have been reading it. “Heidegger—the danger and the promise” can be heard not as entitling an examination of what remains dangerous and promising *about* Heidegger’s thinking, but rather as calling for an elucidation of Heidegger’s *own* understanding of “the danger and the promise.” Indeed, we begin to appreciate the semantic riches concealed by the very economy of our colloquium title when we realize that Heidegger not only explicitly uses the concepts of “the danger” and “the promise” himself, but that the precise meanings he gives to these two concepts link them inextricably together. What is so suggestive, in other words, is that Heidegger does not just think “the danger” as well as “the promise”; he thinks “the danger *and* the promise” and, moreover, he thinks the danger and the promise specifically in order to address the question of the future, the very issue we have come together to try to think. Such a coincidence is too promising merely to be adventitious, so I shall focus here upon Heidegger’s reasons for thinking precisely these three matters together, examining, in particular, the way they intersect with and give rise to Heidegger’s provocative critique of “America.”

I. “The Danger” and “the Promise” in Heidegger

Heidegger’s conception of “the danger” can only be fully understood against the background of his critique of “enframing” (*Gestell*), our “technological” understanding of the being of entities. In turn, this critique of “enframing” *follows from*, and so can only be fully understood in terms of, the understanding of metaphysics as “*ontotheology*” central to his later thought. Our endeavor to fully understand Heidegger’s own use of “the danger” must thus begin with a quick sketch of his profound but idiosyncratic conception of metaphysics as *ontotheology*.

Heidegger, as I understand him, is a great critical heir of the German idealist tradition.⁶ He builds upon the Kantian idea that we implicitly participate in the making-intelligible of our worlds, but maintains that our sense of reality is mediated by lenses we inherit from metaphysics. In effect, Heidegger *historicizes* Kant’s “discursivity thesis,” which holds that intelligibility is the product of a subconscious process by which we “spontaneously” organize and so filter a sensibly overwhelming world to which we are fundamentally “receptive.”⁷ For Heidegger, this implicit organization is accomplished not by historically-fixed cognitive “categories” but, rather, by the succession of changing historical ontotheologies that make up the “core” of the metaphysical tradition. These ontotheologies establish “the truth concerning entities as such and as a whole,” in other words, they tell us both what and how entities *are*—establishing both their essence and their existence, to take only the most famous example. When metaphysics succeeds at this ontotheological task, it temporarily secures the intelligible order by grasping it both “ontologically,” from the inside-out, and “theologically,” from the outside-in. These ontotheologies provide the dual anchors that suspend humanity’s changing sense of “reality,” holding back the flood-waters of historicity long enough to allow the formation of an “epoch,” an historical constellation of intelligibility which is unified around its ontotheological understanding of the being of entities.

I thus interpret Heidegger’s understanding of the ontotheological structure of Western metaphysics (“the history that we *are*”) as advancing a doctrine of *ontological holism*. By giving shape to our historical understanding of “what *is*,” metaphysics determines the most basic presuppositions of what *anything* is, ourselves included. This is what Heidegger means when he writes that: “Western humanity, in all its comportment toward entities, and even toward itself, is in every respect sustained and guided by metaphysics” (N4 205/NII 343). This ontological

holism explains how the successful ontotheologies can function historically like self-fulfilling prophecies, pervasively reshaping intelligibility. Put simply, since all entities *are*, when a new ontotheological understanding of what and how entities *are* takes hold and spreads, it progressively transforms our basic understanding of *all* entities. By explicitly focusing and disseminating an ontotheological understanding of the being of entities, our great metaphysicians help establish the fundamental conceptual parameters and ultimate standards of legitimacy for each of our successive historical “epochs.”

Nietzsche is the pivotal figure in Heidegger’s critique of our technological epoch of enframing because, according to Heidegger’s reductive yet revealing reading, Nietzsche’s “unthought” metaphysics provides the ontotheological lenses that implicitly structure our current sense of reality. Let us recall that Nietzsche criticized what he (mistakenly) took to be Darwin’s doctrine of “the survival of the fittest” by pointing out that life forms cannot survive by aiming at mere survival.⁸ In a changing environment characterized by material scarcity and hence competition, life can survive only by continually overcoming itself, surpassing whatever stage it has previously reached. From the perspective of this inner “will” of life (what Nietzsche calls “will-to-power”), any state of being previously attained serves merely as a rung on the endless ladder of “sovereign becoming.” As Heidegger thus puts it, Nietzsche understands “the totality of entities as such” *ontotheologically* as “eternally recurring will-to-power,” that is, as an unending disaggregation and reaggregation of forces with no purpose or goal beyond the self-perpetuating augmentation of these forces through their continual self-overcoming. Now, our Western culture’s unthinking reliance on this Nietzschean ontotheology is leading us to transform all entities into *Bestand*, mere resources standing by to be optimized, ordered, and enhanced with maximal efficiency. As this historical transformation of beings into intrinsically-

meaningless resources becomes more pervasive, it increasingly eludes our critical gaze. Indeed, we late-modern Nietzscheans come to treat even ourselves in the nihilistic terms that underlie our technological refashioning of the world: No longer as modern subjects seeking to master an objective world, but merely as one more intrinsically-meaningless resource to be optimized, ordered, and enhanced with maximal efficiency, whether cosmetically, psychopharmacologically, genetically, or even cybernetically.⁹

As this “technological” understanding of being takes hold and spreads, it dramatically transforms our relations to ourselves and our worlds, yet we tend not to notice these transformations, because their very pervasiveness helps render them invisible, a seemingly paradoxical fact Heidegger explains by appeal to the “first law of phenomenology.” This “law of proximity” (or “distance of the near”) states that the closer we are to something, the harder it is to bring it clearly into view (the lenses on our glasses, for example, or Poe’s purloined letter), and thus that the more decisively a matter shapes us, the more difficult it is for us to understand it explicitly. Eventually, however, Heidegger thinks that either new ways of understanding entities will emerge and take hold (perhaps, as Thomas Kuhn suggests, out of the investigation of those anomalous entities which resist being understood in terms of the dominant ontotheology), or else our conception of *all* entities will be brought permanently into line with our spreading Nietzschean ontotheology. The latter alternative has never yet occurred (since no previous ontotheology succeeded in permanently entrenching itself), but this is precisely what Heidegger calls “the danger” (*die Gefahr*), in the singular—the singular danger he also designates using such superlatives as “the greatest danger” and “the most extreme danger.” The danger, in other words, is that our Nietzschean ontotheology could become permanently *totalizing*, “driving out every other possibility of revealing” (QCT 27/GA7 28) by overwriting and so effectively

obscuring Dasein’s “special nature,” our defining capacity for world-disclosure, with the “total thoughtlessness” of lives lived entirely in the grip of the Nietzschean conception of all entities, ourselves included, as intrinsically-meaningless resources on stand-by to be optimized for maximally flexible use (DT56/G 25).

If Nietzsche’s metaphysical “enframing” manages to secure its monopoly on the real, preemptively delegitimizing all alternative understandings of being (by deriding them as “non-naturalistic,” for example, and thus as irrelevant, ridiculous, non-serious, irrational, and so on), this enframing could effect and enforce a double forgetting in which we lose sight of our distinctive capacity for world-disclosure *and* forget that anything has thus been forgotten. The greatest danger, put simply, is that we could become so *satiated* by the endless possibilities for flexible self-optimization opened up by treating our worlds and ourselves as resources to be optimized that we could lose the very sense that anything is lost with such a self-understanding.¹⁰ This explains the later Heidegger’s strange and seemingly paradoxical claim that the “greatest danger” is expressed in the “authentic need” of “needlessness” (GA79 56), his idea that we live in the age of greatest need precisely insofar as we experience ourselves as not needing anything at all.¹¹ It is exactly this concealed manifestation of the greatest danger—in which dystopia masquerades as utopia—that the later Heidegger comes to associate with “America.”

II. America as the Danger

When Heidegger first develops his conception of the danger in the late 1930s, he associates it primarily with the *total mobilization* of the Nazi war machine, which was then expanding to an unprecedented scale the metaphysical logic of “technicity” (*Technik*) or “machination” (*Machenschaft*)—Heidegger’s first names for the historical mode of revealing he later calls

enframing. In “The Turning in Enowning,” the penultimate section of “The Final God,” the concluding “fugue” of his *Contributions to Philosophy: From Enowning* (1937-38), Heidegger envisions this metaphysical logic reaching its conclusion in the dead-end of an historical age unable to recognize that it has rationally managed and controlled its own “future” right out of existence. In the ominous scenario he foresees:

Man with his machinations might for centuries yet pillage and lay waste to the planet, [and] the gigantic character of this driving might “develop” into something unimaginable and take on the form of a seeming rigor as the massive regulating of the desolate as such... [Here] The only thing that still counts is the reckoning of [the] succeeding and failing of machinations. This reckoning extends itself to a presumed “eternity,” which is no eternity but rather only the endless etcetera of what is most desolately transitory. (CP 287/GA65 408-9)¹²

Recognizing that this “desolate” mode of revealing is rooted in Nietzsche’s metaphysics of “constant overcoming,” Heidegger maintains that “[t]he bewitchment by technicity and its *constantly self-surpassing progress* is only *one* sign of this enchantment, by which everything presses forth into calculation, usage, breeding, manageability, and regulation” (CP 87/GA65 124, first emphasis mine).¹³

As such critical references to “breeding” suggest, Heidegger associates the danger with National Socialism in 1938. By 1940, however, when America directly enters the Second World War in response to the bombing of Pearl Harbor, Heidegger is no longer sure Germany will win the massive arms race for global control he thinks all nations are being driven into by the Nietzschean ontotheology underlying the age. Heidegger thus concludes his 1940 Nietzsche lectures dramatically, interpreting for those students who have not already gone off to war Nietzsche’s famous prophecy that: “The time is coming when the struggle for dominion over the earth will be carried on...in the name of *fundamental philosophical doctrines*.” According to the reading Heidegger will never subsequently relinquish, Nietzsche’s ontotheological understanding of the being of entities predetermines the destiny of our contemporary world. Indeed,

Nietzsche's ontotheological understanding of "the totality of entities as such" as "eternally recurring will-to-power" not only intensifies "the struggle for the unrestrained exploitation of the earth as a source of raw materials" (a struggle already implicit in the modern subject/object divide). It also generates our distinctively late-modern, reflexive application of that limitless objectification back upon the subject itself. This objectification of the subject dissolves the subject/object distinction itself and so lays the ground for what Heidegger already recognizes in 1940 as "the cynical exploitation of 'human resources' in the service of the absolute empowering of will to power" (N3 250/NII 333).¹⁴

Heidegger thinks that the way Nietzsche's ontotheology reduces the subject to just another resource to be optimized renders it inevitable that "humanity...be forged and bred into a type, a type that possesses the essential aptitude for establishing absolute dominion over the earth" (N3 245/NII 327), but he is no longer sure that Germany is the nation which will prove itself equal to the metaphysical essence of the age and so inherit the destiny of global domination. Indeed, he expresses such dangerously "unpatriotic" doubts (for "all those who had ears to hear") in the final hour of this 1940 lecture:

The question remains as to which peoples and what kinds of humanity ultimately...will rally to the law of this fundamental trait and thus pertain to the early history of dominion over the earth. (N3 250/NII 332-3)

By 1969, however, at the height of the Vietnam war, there no longer seems to be any question in Heidegger's mind: "America" has become virtually synonymous with "the danger."

"As for America," Heidegger says during his 1969 seminar in France—not hesitating to pronounce his views on a land he would never deign to visit, despite numerous invitations from Americans interested in his thought—"the reality of that country is veiled from the view of those interested" in the question of being. The "reality" of "America," Heidegger proclaims, must be understood as "the collusion between industry and the military," that is, in terms of "economic

development and the armament that it requires” (FS 56/GA15 359). To see that Heidegger is not simply advancing another critique of America’s “military-industrial complex,” we need to understand the context in which he introduces these remarks.

Discussing “the end of physics” with Jean Beufret and others, Heidegger employs a logic I examine in detail in my book in order to argue that physicists, as physicists, cannot understand the being of physical entities, but instead tend unknowingly to adopt from metaphysics the ontological understanding of the physicality of the physical which implicitly guides their scientific endeavors. Thus, when Heidegger asserts that “technology is not grounded in physics, but rather the reverse; physics is grounded upon the essence of technology” (FS 54/GA15 355), his point is that physics’ guiding understanding of the being of physical entities is taken over from Nietzsche’s “technological” ontotheology, which has already pre-understood the being of entities as intrinsically-meaningless forces seeking only their self-perpetuating increase. While Heidegger acknowledges that “nothing is more natural than to ask whether science will be able to stop in time,” he thus maintains that: “Such a stop is nevertheless fundamentally impossible” (FS 55/GA15 358). Long before the explosive developments we have witnessed in biotechnology, the human genome project, stem-cell research, cloning, genetic engineering, and their like, Heidegger recognized that we would not be able to control the scientific objectification by which we seek to extend our control over our own human being. As Hubert Dreyfus succinctly explains, “the drive to control everything is precisely what we do not control,” because this drive toward increasing control over the human being simply expresses the ontotheology definitive of our historical age.¹⁵

For Heidegger, the distinctive dictum of enframing is expressed in our fundamental conviction that: “The human can be produced according to a definite plan just like any other

technological object.” (FS 55/GA15 358) What *distinguishes* our late modern, technological enframing of *all* entities as resources to be optimized from the modern subject’s domination of the objective world, we have seen, is the reflexive application of this objectification back upon the subject itself; for this self-objectification “dissolves” the subject into the resource pool. That which makes enframing unique, however, is also precisely what makes possible the emergence of an historically unprecedented danger. As Heidegger says here in 1969:

The most extreme danger [*die äußerste Gefahr*] is that man, insofar as he produces [*herstellt*] himself, no longer feels any other necessities than the demands of his self-production. ...What is uncanny, however, is not so much that everything will be extinguished [*ausgelöscht*], but instead that this [extinction of language and tradition] does not actually come to light. The surge of information veils the disappearance of what has been, and prospective planning is just another name for the obstruction of the future. (FS 56/GA15 359)

It is obviously no coincidence that Heidegger explicitly mentions “America” in the sentence immediately following this description of a dystopia blithely mistaking itself for utopia. Clearly, “America” is the name on the tip of Heidegger’s tongue for a life lived in the eternal sunshine of the permanent present, for a humanity alienated from its own alienation, blind to the fact that the relation to the past preserved in its language is being buried beneath an unprecedented “surge of information,” and unaware that its own prodigious capacity for generating far-reaching plans for the control of every foreseeable eventuality is in danger of blocking its path to the *future*—that is, the “opening” of a genuinely new understanding of human beings and “an entirely new relation to nature” (FS 55/GA15 358). In sum, then, when Heidegger names “America” as his sole example for “the emergence of a new form of nationalism...grounded upon technological power” (*ibid.*), his point is not simply that America has become the world’s most advanced military-industrial complex, but rather that we have become this by succeeding where the Nazis failed, by making ourselves into the most extreme expression of the technological ontotheology of the age. For Heidegger, America is the avant-garde of the greatest danger, the country

working hardest to obscure the “most important...insight that man is not an entity who makes himself” (FS 56/GA15 359).

Although it will be obvious to anyone who knows more about “America” than what they read in the newspapers that Heidegger’s critique is terribly one-sided, he does diagnose this one terrible side with an unequalled depth of insight. Indeed, it is hard to deny that Heidegger was right to see “America” as blazing the trail toward the greatest danger, since, guided by enframing’s endless optimization imperative, we continue to develop a broad spectrum of cosmetic psychopharmacologies—from Prozac to Viagra—with which to eradicate whatever remaining existential anxieties we cannot escape by throwing ourselves into an accelerating work world or distract ourselves from by means of our burgeoning entertainment technologies. So, is our self-proclaimed “super-power” really working out the will of the will-to-power and thereby increasing the danger that any other future becomes merely “a thing of the past”?¹⁶ To begin to discuss this important question, which is all I can do here, allow me to quote just one telling anecdote. In an article on the increasingly prominent role religious convictions have come to play in American politics (both abroad and at home), Ron Suskind, the former senior national-affairs reporter for *The Wall Street Journal* (the unofficial newspaper of the American ruling class), reports on a conversation he had in 2002 with a “senior advisor to [President George W.] Bush.” This senior advisor, who was unhappy with a magazine article Suskind had written, said:

that guys like [Suskind] were in “what we call the reality-based community,” which he defined as people who “believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality.” [Suskind] nodded and murmured something about enlightenment principles and empiricism. He cut [Suskind] off. “That’s not the way the world really works anymore,” he continued. “We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality—judiciously, as you will—we’ll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that’s how things will sort out. We’re history’s actors...and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do.”¹⁷

It is, of course, both alarming and revealing to hear such imperialistic hubris expressed so openly by one of President Bush's senior advisors. One thing it shows, from our perspective, is that recognizing historicity is not sufficient for actually transforming history. From this important insight that humanity's basic sense of reality changes with time, it does not follow that the American administration even recognizes the nature of our current historical reality, let alone is succeeding in changing it. Indeed, this administration's delusions of "empire" seem to be reifying and reinforcing rather than transforming the same ontotheologically-grounded historical self-understanding that Heidegger already recognized in America in 1969, and before that, in Nazi Germany in 1940.

Of course, there is always something grotesque and misleading about such comparisons, by which we ignore hugely important differences in order to emphasize a deeper continuity that usually passes unnoticed. Granted, happily. A more interesting objection to what I have just said, however, would be the suggestion that the current American administration, under the control of religious fundamentalists such as President Bush, is doing its best to reverse the technological control of human beings, as can be seen in its outlawing the use of federal funds for further genetic lines for stem cell research, its increasing restrictions on abortion, reproductive freedom, cloning, and so on. To this my response would be as follows. First, that if America abdicates its leading global role in these rather obvious manifestations of the technological transformation of human beings into resources, other countries—as well as extra- and intra-national entities (multinational biotech corporations and my home state of California, for example)—already have shown themselves more than eager to compete to assume this role themselves. Thus, even if America turns against this small spectrum of the technological enframing of humanity, this underlying enframing itself is not likely to stop anytime soon.

Indeed, it will never stop, and this is the second point, without a prior diagnosis which recognizes and addresses the roots of the problem, rather than simply seeking to ameliorate a few of its most obvious symptoms. For such an effort, insofar as it succeeds, simply gives us a *symptom-free disease*—and what is that but another way of describing the greatest danger? Third, and perhaps most importantly, what this objection misses is that transcending enframing does not require us to abandon biogenetic research and cloning, let alone reproductive freedom. Instead, Heidegger insisted, a real solution demands not that we abandon our technological manipulation and control of human beings (which he recognized will not happen in the foreseeable future), but rather that we find ways to integrate these technological projects for increasing self-optimization into our basic sense of self without allowing this sense of self to be completely dominated by enframing’s optimization imperative. Attaining such a “free” relation to technology means, in other words, making the danger less dangerous (or getting past the “greatest danger”), and this, in turn, requires an insight Heidegger first sought to communicate under the heading of “the promise.” By way of conclusion, I will simply say a few words about what Heidegger means by the promise, showing how its intimate connection with the danger expresses his most basic insight concerning what we need first in order to regain our futures.

III. From the Danger to the Promise

In “Nihilism as Determined by the History of Being” (1944-46), the important but difficult essay which forms the capstone of his *Nietzsche* work, Heidegger addresses the relationship between the danger and “the promise” (*das Versprechen*). We have seen that the danger is Heidegger’s dystopian scenario for the end-of-history, his depiction of what could happen if our current understanding of entities as intrinsically-meaningless resources on stand-by for optimization

becomes *totalizing* by driving out, co-opting, or preventing the formation of any other ways of understanding ourselves and our place in the world. “*Yet, where the danger is, the saving power also grows.*” The point of Hölderlin’s salvific insight, as Heidegger understands it, is not that it is always darkest before the dawn, but rather that the new day is discovered in another way of experiencing the greatest darkness: Midnight, seen otherwise, *is* dawn. That sounds paradoxical, but Heidegger believes that we discover what saves us precisely by deeply experiencing what most endangers us, and he first tries publicly to communicate his way of making sense of this idea in terms of “the promise.”

The basic idea is that being has promised itself to us, and that this promise cannot be broken even if we forget about it. For *Dasein* *is* the place where being takes place, and we remain the place being takes place, even if the way being takes place for us is by not taking place. In other words, the promise is Heidegger’s name for the insight that, although being shows up for us as nothing, this nothing (or “nihilating”) safeguards the future possibilities of being. Heidegger expresses this difficult idea as follows:

[I]nsofar as being is the unconcealment of entities as such, being has...already addressed itself to [*zugesprochen*] the essence of man. Being has already spoken out for and insinuated itself in the essence of man insofar as it has withheld and saved itself in the unconcealment of its essence. Addressing [us] in this way, while withholding itself in staying-away, being is the promise of itself [*Sein ist das Versprechen seiner selbst*]. To think to encounter being itself in its staying-away means to become aware of the promise, as which promise being itself “*is*.” (N4 226/NII 368-9)

That is, being discloses itself in our way of understanding the being of entities. But our understanding of the being of entities—as eternally recurring will-to-power—reduces being itself to nothing, dissolves it into “sovereign becoming.” (From within enframing, being shows up as nothing; it “comes across” as “staying away,” as Heidegger puts it here.) Nevertheless, our understanding of being, which reduces being to nothing, is still an understanding of being. Recognizing our ineliminable ontological receptivity, Heidegger thinks, makes possible this

crucial insight: Rather than experience being as nothing, we can instead experience the nothing as the way being shows itself to us. To experience being as nothing is to reach the fulfilled peak of Western nihilism. Yet, precisely this same experience—the most extreme point of the greatest danger—can be experienced differently: We “become aware of the promise” when, instead of experiencing being as nothing, we experience the nothing as being. In this simple gestalt switch, in which we pass from experiencing being as nothing to experiencing the nothing as the way being happens for us, we have passed, without moving, from the most extreme point of the greatest danger to the promise. With this gestalt switch we have taken both “the step back” beyond metaphysics and, at the same time, the first step into the future Heidegger calls the other beginning.

The relation of the danger to the promise is very much like the relation of the duck to the rabbit in the figure of the duck-rabbit with which we began: Both can be “gestalted” otherwise; each has a second, non-simultaneous aspect, which we can learn to see in the place of the first, as replacing it, standing in its stead. Because the danger is a *totalizing* understanding, which reduces everything to *Bestand*, the danger is replaced by seeing the promise—that is, by experiencing the nothing of being as concealing and thereby preserving other ways of understanding ourselves and the meaning of our worlds. We see the promise instead of the danger when, rather than see being as nothing, we learn to recognize this nothing as the “nihilating” of being—that is, as the “presencing” of being as such which makes itself felt only in its *difference from* enframing. In this experience entities show up not as intrinsically meaningless resources, but otherwise, namely, as being richer in meaning than we are capable of doing justice to conceptually, and thus as already exceeding, in the direction of the future, the ontologically reductive confines of enframing. There is, of course, much more to say about this

verbal “noth-ing” or “nihilating,” which was Heidegger’s first name, in 1929, for the phenomenological presencing which exceeds the ontological difference (he previously thought unsurpassable). For, in my view, Heidegger’s recognition that the “nihilating” of the nothing is the action of being as such, an activity which exceeds and so cannot be explained in terms of the ontological difference between being and entities, is the defining experience at the heart of his so-called “turn” and the *sine qua non* of his “later” thought.

Despite withering attacks from Rudolph Carnap and others, Heidegger never gave up this difficult notion. Rather, he struggled his whole life to develop this phenomenological insight more clearly, continually seeking new names with which to evoke the way being gives itself which would not hypostatize this giving as if it were a given entity, names such as “noth-ing,” “earth,” “being as such,” ~~Bing~~ (written under a “cross-wise striking-through”), “the fourfold,” “the difference,” and so on. We see evidence of this if we simply notice that, following the discussion of America as the greatest danger we examined, Heidegger immediately turns to help his students think “the identity of being and nothing...in departure from the ontological difference” (FS 56/). That segue will look like a bizarre non-sequitur, an abrupt change of topics, to anyone who does not recognize that, as late as 1969, Heidegger is still trying to help his students learn to make that gestalt switch from danger to promise which turns on recognizing that (as he puts it here): “The nihilation of the nothing ‘is’ being.” (FS 57/GA15 361) The passage from danger and promise we have examined is thus only one of Heidegger’s first attempts to communicate his recurring later notion of a “freeing” gestalt switch, a “lighting flash” in which we catch sight of an active phenomenological “presencing” which our ontotheology denies yet presupposes, coming thereby to exceed metaphysics from within. In this gestalt switch we come to recognize that (as Heidegger puts it on what I cannot help but note was

September 11, 1969): “Enframing is, as it were, the photographic negative of enowning.” (FS 60/GA15 366). Still, despite many such attempts, Gianni Vattimo recounts that Heidegger himself remained deeply distressed by his sense that he had failed to develop this necessary gestalt switch with the requisite clarity. Tellingly, Heidegger believed that his “insufficient elaboration of this intuited relation” between the danger and the promise remained a “failure of his thought” greater even than “the wretched business of his involvement with (alas!) Nazism.”¹⁸

Obviously, such matters have a temporality of their own, and cannot be forced. I thus think it fitting, given the context of our colloquium, and the presence whose absence marks it most poignantly, to end by acknowledging that the seed for the way I have tried here to develop the connection between the danger and the promise—as dual and dueling aspects of the same figure—was planted years ago, by one of Jacques Derrida’s observations which has long haunted me. Only after reaching (what I take to be) the same point myself, do I now understand that Derrida already recognized, in 1981, Heidegger’s crucial insight that the highest point of fulfilled nihilism belongs to two different planes—joining, in a single point, the danger of metaphysics and the promise of what exceeds it—and that this is the *crucial point*, so to speak, of Derrida’s lucid but unexplained observation that Heidegger’s *Nietzsche* lectures are:

directed at gathering together the unity and the uniqueness of Nietzsche’s thinking, which, as a fulfilled unity, is itself in a fair way toward being the culmination of occidental metaphysics. Nietzsche would be precisely at the crest, or ridge, atop the peak of this fulfillment. And thus, he would be looking at both sides, down both slopes.¹⁹

If this is right, then the connection between danger and promise I have developed here can, I hope, be understood as a belated homage to Derrida’s insight.²⁰

Abbreviations Used for Works by Heidegger

(Translations frequently modified)

CP *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*. P. Emad and K. Maly, trans. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999.

DT *Discourse on Thinking*. J. Anderson and E. Freund, trans. New York: Harper & Row, 1966.

FS Martin Heidegger, *Four Seminars*, trans. A. Mitchell and François Raffoul (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003),

G *Gelassenheit*. Pfulligen: Neske, 1959.

GA3 *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 3: *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed. Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1991.

GA5 *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 5: *Holzwege*. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed. Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1977.

GA7 *Gesamtausgabe* Vol. 7: *Vorträge und Aufsätze*. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed. Frankfurt a. M.: V. Klostermann, 2000

GA15 *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 15: *Seminare*. Curd Ochwadt, ed. Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1986.

GA50 *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 50: *Nietzsches Metaphysik*. Petra Jaeger, ed. Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1990.

GA65 *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 65: *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed. Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1989.

GA79 *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 79: *Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge*. Petra Jaeger, ed. Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1994.

IM *Introduction to Metaphysics*. G. Fried and R. Polt, trans. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000.

KPM *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. R. Taft, trans. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997.

N3 *Nietzsche: The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics*. David Farrell Krell, ed. J. Stambaugh, D. F. Krell, and F. Capuzzi, trans. New York: Harper & Row, 1987.

N4 *Nietzsche: Nihilism*. David Farrell Krell, ed. F. Capuzzi, trans. New York: Harper & Row, 1982.

NII *Nietzsche*. Pfullingen: G. Neske, 1961, vol. II.

P *Pathmarks*. William McNeill, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

PLT *Poetry, Language, Thought*. A. Hofstadter, trans. New York: Harper & Row, 1971.

QCT *The Question Concerning Technology*. W. Lovitt, trans. New York: Harper and Row, 1977.

TTL “Traditional Language and Technological Language.” W. T. Gregory, trans. *Journal of Philosophical Research* XXIII (1998), pp. 129-45.

USTS *Überlieferte Sprache und Technische Sprache*. Hermann Heidegger, ed. St. Gallen: Erker-Verag, 1989.

Notes

¹See Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), p. 194. The fact that Wittgenstein himself apparently sees the rabbit first, rather than the duck, illustrates what the gestalt psychologists called “the law of *Prägnanz*,” which states that we tend to make the best possible sense of the figure with which we are presented; for, whether a naive viewer sees Wittgenstein’s figure as a duck or as a rabbit seems to depend upon the angle at which it is viewed. As the picture is rotated such that the “duck’s beak” points north, this “beak” becomes increasingly likely to appear as the “ears” of a rabbit. Wittgenstein seems to have left the figure at the rotation at which it would be maximally ambiguous, which I have reproduced here. Indeed, neither the gestalt figures nor the subjective-objective genitives have an intrinsically dominant aspect (although in each precise case there is a dominant aspect which we tend to see instead of the other), and this constitutes a noteworthy difference from the danger-promise ambiguity, in which the danger hides the promise.

²“The greater danger consists in optimism, which recognizes only pessimism as its opponent.” (N4 247/NII 393) I would suggest, nonetheless, that the old cliché of “seeing the glass as half full rather than half empty” turns out not to be an entirely inappropriate image for what Heidegger has in mind.

³Here I recall that the announcement for our international colloquium began: “To situate this project under the title ‘Heidegger—the danger and the promise’ [*sous le titre ‘Heidegger—le danger et la promesse’*] is not only to engage reflection on the thinking of one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century, but it is also to propose an encounter with our historical destiny and its future. And, [to speak] more precisely about this question: Would not the future be a thing of the past?” Yes, I shall suggest, but only if Heidegger’s thinking is considered a thing of the past; for there is a future—and more than one—disclosed by his thinking.

⁴I refer here, and below, to my *Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2005).

⁵On the question of whether Heidegger himself consistently lived up to his own joining of danger and promise, see Giorgio Agamben, *Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive*, trans. D. Heller-

Roazen (New York: Zone Books, 1999), p. 75, where Agamben relies upon “Hölderlin’s principle” to suggest, *pace* Heidegger, that “precisely in the extreme situation of the camp appropriation and freedom ought to be possible.” This, however, is a topic for another time.

⁶Of course, for Heidegger “critical heir” is a pleonasm, since the calcified tradition is only turned into the living heritage through the critical “reciprocal rejoinder” which updates it, altering it so that it can speak to the changed needs of the contemporary world.

⁷On Kant’s “discursivity thesis,” see Henry Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 65-8. For Heidegger, the “discursivity” (*Diskursivität*) “which belongs to the essence of understanding is the sharpest index of its finitude” (KPM 21/GA3 29--30), and “the understanding of being which thoroughly dominates human existence...manifests itself as the innermost ground of human finitude” (KPM 160/GA3 228).

⁸See John Richardson, “Nietzsche Contra Darwin,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 65:3 (2002), pp. 537-75.

⁹Heidegger is deeply worried that within our current technological constellation of intelligibility, the post-Nietzschean epoch of enframing, it is increasingly becoming the case that: “Only what is calculable in advance counts as being” (TTL 136/USTS 17). For, our technological understanding of being produces a “calculative thinking” (DT 46/G 13) which quantifies all qualitative relations, reducing entities to bivalent, programmable “information” (TTL 139/USTS 22), digitized data ready to enter into (what Jean Baudrillard aptly describes as) “a state of pure circulation” on the Internet. See Baudrillard’s *The Transparency of Evil: Essays on Extreme Phenomena*, J. Benedict, trans. (London: Verso, 1993), p. 4; and Dreyfus’s important monograph, *On the Internet* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003).

¹⁰For Heidegger, the danger thus has two isomorphic aspects: “humanity is threatened with the annihilation of its essence, and being itself is endangered in its usage of its abode” (N4 245/NII 391).

¹¹Thus we get Heidegger’s provocative evocation of the great danger we could call, with a nod to Marx, *the problem of the happy enframer*: “What has long since been threatening man with death, and indeed the death of his own nature, is the unconditional character of mere willing in the sense of purposeful self-assertion in everything [i.e., “will-to-will,” Heidegger’s shorthand for the ontotheological unity of will-to-power and eternal recurrence]. What threatens man in his very nature is the willed view that man, by the peaceful release, transformation, storage, and channeling of the energies of physical nature could render the human condition, man’s being, tolerable for everybody and happy in all respects” (PLT 116/GA5 294). Heidegger’s postulation of a great “need of needlessness” may sound strange (he was writing at a

time when nuclear energy promised to conquer material scarcity), but he develops here a line of thought long familiar to German philosophy (and not only critical theory), going all the way back to the Hippocratic tradition of diagnosing diseases of which the patient remains blissfully unaware. (See Raymond Geuss, *The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Recall, e.g., Kant's historical prediction that "human nature must endure the harshest of evils, which pass in disguise as external well-being," because: "All good that is not grafted onto a morally good character is nothing but illusion and glistering misery." ("Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent," *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*, T. Humphries, trans. (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1983), pp. 36, 32.)

¹²Although I cut it for the sake of clarity, it is worth noting that (what we will come to understand as) the promise is already present in its absence here, in Heidegger's first description of the danger: "yet the greatness of be-ing continues to be closed off, because decisions are no longer made about truth and untruth and what is most their own."

¹³"Machination itself...is the essencing of being as such [*die Wesung des Seyns*]" (CP 89/GA65 128).

¹⁴The fuller context runs: "Nietzsche's metaphysics, that is to say, the truth of the totality of entities as such...is the fundamental trait of the history of our age, which is inaugurating itself only now in its incipient consummation as the contemporary age. ...That is not to say, however, that the struggle for the unrestrained exploitation of the earth as a source of raw materials or the cynical exploitation of 'human resources' in the service of the absolute empowering of will to power will explicitly appeal to philosophy for help in grounding its essence, or even will adopt philosophy as its facade. On the contrary, we must assume that philosophy will disappear as a doctrine and a construct of culture, and that it can disappear only because as long as it was genuine it identified the reality of the real, that is, being, on the basis of which every individual entity is designated to be what it is and how it is. ...'*Fundamental metaphysical doctrines*' means the essence of self-consummating metaphysics, which in its fundamental traits sustains Western history, shapes it in its modern European form, and destines it for 'world domination.' ...Nietzsche's metaphysics is at its core never a specifically German philosophy. It is European, global." In the *Gesamtausgabe* edition of this text, moreover, Heidegger explicitly identifies this global phase of fulfilled metaphysics with "the English empire" (GA50 82).

¹⁵See Dreyfus, "Heidegger on the Connection Between Nihilism, Art, Technology, and Politics," in Charles Guignon, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 307-10.

¹⁶Here I am quoting from the colloquium announcement; see note 3 above.

¹⁷Ron Suskind, “Without a Doubt,” *New York Times Magazine*, October 17, 2004 (ellipses in original).

¹⁸Vattimo credits Hans-Georg Gadamer as the source of this telling remark. See Vattimo, *Nihilism and Emancipation: Ethics, Politics, and Law*, Santiago Zabala, ed., William McCuaig, trans. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), p. 14. I have sought to develop my own sense of this connection in more concrete detail in *Heidegger on Ontotheology*, as well as in “The Philosophical Fugue: Understanding the Structure and Goal of Heidegger’s *Beiträge*,” *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 34:1 (2003), pp. 57-73, and “Ontology and Ethics at the Intersection of Phenomenology and Environmental Philosophy,” *Inquiry* 47:4 (2004), pp. 380-412.

¹⁹See Derrida, “Interpreting Signatures (Nietzsche/Heidegger): Two Questions,” in D. P. Michelfelder and R. E. Palmer, eds and trans., *Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), p. 58.

²⁰This paper was delivered on 4 December 2004 to the *parlement des philosophes*, which gathered in Strasbourg, France to address the topic, “Heidegger—the Danger and the Promise” (see also note 3 above). Derrida had agreed to participate in the parliament (which he helped found) before his untimely death. For helpful criticisms and suggestions, I would especially like to thank Anne Margaret Baxley, Kelly Becker, Joseph Cohen, Peter Gordon, Hubert Dreyfus, Gianni Vattimo, Samuel Weber, and Mark Wrathall.

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