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THE PHILOSOPHICAL FUGUE: UNDERSTANDING THE STRUCTURE AND GOAL OF HEIDEGGER'S BEITRÄGE

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Heidegger's *Beiträge* is a dense, strange, difficult, and – *pace* Otto Pöggeler and Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann – also a deeply *problematic* text.² As Pöggeler's famous remark that "a wind from Sils-Maria has blown through ... the *Beiträge*" suggests, the *Beiträge* is a text in which Heidegger is at his most *Nietzschean* (that is, hyperbolic, elliptical, allusive, fragmentary), even as he tries to get back *behind* Nietzsche, to Nietzsche's Hölderlinian sources, in order to accomplish what (looking back in 1951) Heidegger would characterize as the "most difficult task" of having had to extricate himself from Nietzsche's "ruinous" influence.³ Such factors help explain why Schürmann, surely one of the most perceptive readers of the later Heidegger, would complain of the *Beiträge* that "at times one may think one is reading a piece of Heideggerian plagiarism, so encumbered is it with ellipses and assertoric monoliths."⁴ In order to help us navigate a safe approach toward what is certainly an elliptical but also, for anyone hoping to understand the immanent relation between Heidegger's philosophy and his politics, a particularly important "monolithic assertion" – namely, Heidegger's unexpected invocation of "The Ultimate God" at the climax of the *Beiträge* – a few words may well be called for about the *Beiträge*'s remarkable history, which Schürmann himself refers to a bit elliptically as the text's "overdetermined legacy."

Von Herrmann was the editor of Heidegger's *Collected Works* [*Gesamtausgabe*] when the already famous *Contributions to Philosophy: (On Enowning)* [*Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*] was finally published in 1989 (as volume 65). In this capacity, von Herrmann tells us that the *Beiträge*'s publication was sped-up ahead of schedule in order to coincide with and thus commemorate the centennial of Heidegger's birth. Still, no less than fifty years elapsed between the writing of these "contributions" in 1936-8 and their publication in 1989.⁵ These circumstances might not be so remarkable, however, were it not for the fact that the *Beiträge* had already become famous long before their 1989 publication, when they were greeted quickly – indeed a bit precipitously – by more than a few enthusiastic Heideggerians as "Heidegger's second *magnum opus*."⁶ The enthusiasm distorting this judgment can be explained by the text's remarkable pre-publication fame, which can itself be traced back to the fact that Pöggeler had read the manuscript in the early 1960s and, in his

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influential 1963 study, *Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking* [*Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*], he acted as an effective philosophical "PR man" for the *Beiträge*, granting them the status of an obvious secret by frequently quoting tantalizing snippets from them, dropping intriguing hints and promissory notes, and issuing incredible claims about the text's importance for any philosophical understanding of Heidegger's "thoughtpath as a whole."

Some of the more extraordinary of these claims were subsequently widely disseminated and, ironically, have now ossified into a scholarly dogma which threatens to obstruct our access to a text that has finally become available first hand. To wit, Pöggeler went so far as to call the *Beiträge* Heidegger's sole "major work proper [*das eigentliche Hauptwerk*]," a characterization he based on the claim that in the *Beiträge* Heidegger outlined the complete *system* of thought which he spent the rest of his life developing in a piecemeal fashion.⁷ It is incredible that this fantasy of having had exclusive access to the Heideggerian Rosetta stone, a hermeneutic fantasy of the first order to be sure, has been so widely adopted.⁸ With the actual publication of the *Beiträge* it has become clear that Pöggeler seriously mischaracterized the *Beiträge*'s organizational structure, which, as we will see shortly, "is essentially other than a 'system'" [CP 56/GA65 81]. It is thus not surprising that significantly varying judgments have begun to emerge concerning both the text's merits and its status within Heidegger's increasingly immense *oeuvre* (the *Collected Works* are now scheduled to include no less than 102 volumes). For instance, the *Beiträge* was recently described (much more modestly, but with a certain psychoanalytic perceptivity) by Safranski as a kind of "philosophical diary,"⁹ while Schürmann himself characterized this "disconcerting document" as "a monstrous site." (Schürmann implies that this dramatic sounding appellation is not meant to connote "terrifying" [*ungeheuer*] so much as *demonstrative*, although – if Schürmann's own series of dense but provocative analyses of the *Beiträge* are any indication – just *what* this text demonstrates will surely be a matter of contention for a long time to come.)¹⁰

I. The Fugal Structure of the *Beiträge*

The *Beiträge* as a whole are organized into seven divisions. Yet, as Heidegger explains in the first of the seven "divisions" (the "Preview" or "Glimpse Ahead" [*Vorblick*]), merely to call the major organizational units of the *Beiträge* "divisions" is already to imply the very opposite of what Heidegger intends when he names them "*Fügungen*," a word which means "unifications" rather than "divisions," but, carrying multiple resonances, also connotes the working of fate in our existence. Through these *Fügungen*, in other words, Heidegger intends to designate the way in which decisive events (the ordinary German meaning of *Ereignis*) not only join together to

shape our lives but, properly understood, can lead us to transform human history itself.¹¹

These are, moreover, not the only meanings of *Fügungen*. Crucial to understanding the text, I submit, is Heidegger's subtle suggestion that the *Beiträge*'s complex organizational structure, which he elliptically maintains to be "essentially other than a 'system,'" can best be understood according to the musical model of the *fugue*, the "polyphonic composition constructed on one or more short subjects or themes, which are harmonized according to the laws of counterpoint, and introduced from time to time with various contrapuntal devices."¹² In another context, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe has suggestively examined what I take to be the most important of these "laws of counterpoint" or "contrapuntal devices" at work in Heidegger's *Beiträge*: what Hölderlin calls the "*cæsura*" and describes as "the pure word, the counter-rhythmic interruption." If the *cæsura* is the "pure word," then for Heidegger clearly this is *das Ereignis*, a word which draws attention to its own "wording," that is, to the world-disclosing action of language itself.¹³ It is crucial to develop a feel for the way in which the fugal "composition" of the *Beiträge* "polyphonically" conveys its own underlying theme: "enowning" [*Ereignis*], because for Heidegger, it is this underlying, contrapuntally developed theme which harmonizes the text as a whole. Understanding the fugal composition of the *Beiträge* can also help us to understand *how* Heidegger hopes to accomplish the goal he sets out here: "to prepare for the transition [*Übergang*]" to "the other beginning" [CP 5/GA65 6]

After the anticipatory "Preview," Heidegger suggestively titles the *Beiträge*'s second through seventh "fuguings" [*Fügungen*]: "The Echo of Reminiscence [*Der Anklang*]," "The Interplay or Playing Forth [*Das Zuspiel*]," "The Leap [*Der Sprung*]," "The Grounding [*Die Gründung*]," "The Ones to Come [*Die Zu-Künftigen*]," and "The Ultimate God [*Der Letzte Gott*]."¹⁴ According to von Herrmann's interpretation, the *Beiträge*'s second through seventh *Fügungen* illuminate six different but interconnected "essential aspects of *Ereignis*."¹⁵ This interpretation – and the editorial redaction of the text it underwrites – risk concealing the fugal structure at the core of the *Beiträge*. *Only the second through seventh Fügungen were written in 1936-37 and intended by Heidegger as a unified fugue*. By appending a final "division" on "Being as such" [*Das Seyn*] to the *Beiträge* as if it were the text's conclusion (when in fact it is a summarizing restatement of the text's major themes which Heidegger penned in 1938), von Herrmann's editorial redaction obscures the fugal structure at the core of Heidegger's original text. We can begin to experience this fugal structure if, keeping in mind the text's six "fuguings" (or *contrapuntally developed subjects*), we attend carefully to the idiosyncratic way in which Heidegger uses these short counterpointed subjects to develop the underlying theme

which joins them together: "This is the essential swaying of Being itself [*die Wesung des Seyns selbst*], which we name *enowning*" [CP 6/GA65 7].

As we will see, *enowning* is Heidegger's name for the way "Being as such" happens historically (by being interpretively appropriated, *enowned*, by human beings). So, if *enowning* – the way Being as such happens – is the *Beiträge's* underlying theme, how is this theme developed by the six "fuguings" (*Fügungen*) which unify the *Beiträge*? As Heidegger explains: "Each of the six fuguings of the fugue stands for itself, but only in order to make the essential onefold more pressing" [CP 57/GA65 81]. In what may at first glance look to be a wild run-on sentence, Heidegger presents the "essential onefold" his six fuguings are meant to convey:

[T]he "Interplay" between the first and the other beginning [—] out of Be-ing's "Echo" in the distress of Being's abandonment [—] for the "Leap" into Be-ing [—] for "Grounding" its truth [—] as preparation for "The Ones to Come" [—] of "The Ultimate God." [CP 6/GA65 7]

This entire fugue – which unifies the text – is developed according to what Heidegger calls the "hidden inter-resonating" of the *Beiträge's* six counterpointed fuguings [CP 57/GA65 81]. In other words, the text's six different fuguings join together to develop a complex but unified philosophical vision – which we will characterize further when we turn to the *Beiträge's* "goal" below.

Already, however, just by recognizing the *Beiträge's* fugal structure, we can avoid Pöggeler's influential misconstrual of Heidegger's project as a self-defeatingly *systematic* break with the urge to philosophical system building, and thus as at best an ironic or parodic gesture. Such interpretations, which in the abstract might seem to fit the Nietzschean style of the text,¹⁶ nevertheless seriously mischaracterize its tone, which is not only almost humorless (with the exception of occasional bitter sarcasm and the usual punning) but also – in the somber yet hopeful pitch of its ambivalent elegy – even *reverential*.¹⁷ The *Beiträge's* elegiac tone is that of a *mournful celebration*, a Hölderlinian-Nietzschean ambivalence borne witness to in Heidegger's claim that: "The most terrible jubilation must be the dying of a god" [CP 163/GA65 230].¹⁸

Despite this important Nietzschean-Hölderlinian obsession with the death of God and the possibility of "His" return, the structure organizing the *Beiträge* is more Bachian than Bacchanalian. So, instead of mistaking the *Beiträge* for a series of Nietzschean aphorisms, we need to take seriously Heidegger's implication that his text is joined together according to the musical model of the fugue. Indeed, Joan Stambaugh's recognition of the *Beiträge's* "preference for terms taken from the realm of sound" is better understood not as a self-conscious refusal of "ocularcentric" metaphors (as Stambaugh herself rather anachronistically has it), but rather as evidence for

the fact that in the *Beiträge* Heidegger adopts the fugal form (thus bringing the style of his writing into a politically-charged proximity to Paul Celan's fugal poetry).¹⁹ Of course, as Michael Hamburger points out, a "fugal composition with words" is literally "an impossibility, ...because words cannot be counterpointed if they are to remain intelligible."²⁰ Words written atop one another like the successive contrapuntal themes of a fugue will eventually obliterate themselves, leaving only an indecipherable palimpsest. Fugal writing thus tends to experiment with the limits of legibility, as Heidegger's *Beiträge* itself attests. In so far as it is legible, sustained fugal writing will adopt the form of the fugue conceptually rather than literally; ironically, this makes a successful experiment in fugal writing rather difficult to recognize.

It is strange, nevertheless, that commentators continue to mistake the *Beiträge* for a series of aphorisms. Aphorisms, in the very economy of their expression, quietly point back to the presence of the author who thought, penned, and polished them. The *Beiträge's* fragments not only lack the wit and polish of aphorisms, but Heidegger clearly goes to great lengths to *erase* his own authorial presence from the text – if only to augment the forcefulness of the perspective he advocates by effacing its individuality and thus rendering its broader adoption less dependent on the idiosyncratic circumstances of a personal life-trajectory which is in some unmistakable sense Heidegger's own. (Still, when Heidegger goes so far as to put "I" in scare-quotes when writing in the first person, one cannot help recalling that *fugue* also has a revealing psychological connotation: a "fugue state" designates "a flight from one's own identity, often involving travel to some unconsciously desired locality.")²¹ If Hegel in the *Phenomenology* plays the role of a phenomenological tour-guide, a guide whose presence becomes invisible precisely in so far as he disappears into his own tour, then we should recognize that Heidegger too disappears into the *Beiträge*, much as the composer disappears into his own composition.²² As an authorial composer-director absorbed into the *fugue* which he himself directs, Heidegger polyphonically elaborates a single theme through a series of successive treatments, the cumulative effect of which is to get us to attend to and come fully to appreciate the significance of the multi-aspectival phenomenon of "enowning" [*Ereignis*].

Enowning is Heidegger's name for the *rapprochement* between human beings and Being by which intelligibility takes place. That is, *Ereignis* designates the process whereby human beings actively participate in the becoming-intelligible of their worldly environments, the disclosure of their worlds.²³ A philosophical application of the art of fugue affords Heidegger the ideal means to meditate on, explore, and develop the riches of his subject (*Ereignis*), for it allows the *Beiträge* to remain structurally organized even as

it breaks with the hierarchical demands of systematicity in favor of the alternative formal model of “fuguing,” a form which nicely accommodates multiple, overlapping explorations of a rich underlying theme. Indeed, because Heidegger is repeatedly elaborating the same subject from different perspectives, developing its inner possibilities through a series of successive, varied, and cumulative treatments, such “fuguing” seems perfectly chosen to explore and reveal the fullest possible implications of the polysemic, deeply resonant phenomenon of *Ereignis*. Otherwise insightful scholars have, nevertheless, thus far entirely failed to recognize that the *Beiträge* is composed according to the musical model of the fugue (an easy mistake to make if, under the influence of Pöggeler’s reading, one too quickly “explains” the strangeness of Heidegger’s text by reference to its “Nietzscheanism”), even as they inadvertently document its fugue-like structure. To wit, Alexander Schwan writes:

The outward construction of the work leads to many, often formulaic repetitions, producing a line of thought that does not really go anywhere. ... The more pages Heidegger heaps up, the more the voluminous text becomes the document of an inner, albeit magnificent, yet nonetheless manifest foundering on the possibility of “making requisitely clear” the *Ereignis* or “event” of the truth of “Being”.... In the final analysis, the *Beiträge* are unable to offer that minutely worked out, structured philosophy of Being that Heidegger intended.²⁴

Had Schwan recognized such “formulaic repetitions” as Heidegger’s polysemic “fuguing” on the “theme” of *Ereignis*, he might have been able to see the big picture otherwise than as a failed structure, a heap. Schwan’s is indeed the kind of impression one will likely get if one misses the text’s fugal structure and, misled by the Pöggelerian dogma of “Heidegger’s second *magnum opus*,” one reads the *Beiträge* expecting the systematic organization familiar from *Being and Time*, an organizational structure which (*pace* Pöggeler and Schwan) it was never Heidegger’s intention to provide.

II. The Goal of the *Beiträge*

So, if the *Beiträge*’s structure is fugal, what is its goal? And how does its fugal structure serve this goal? Heidegger’s self-effacing style works to conceal this, but in the *Beiträge*’s six “fuguings” [*Fügungen*], Heidegger first retraces the successive stages whereby he himself initially recognized the integrally related phenomena of enowning and “Being as such,” and then lays out the subsequent steps according to which he plans to elaborate the philosophical significance of thinking them in concert (as *the enowning of Being as such*).²⁵ Thus these *Fügungen* are not merely (as von Herrmann has it) interconnected “essential aspects” of *Ereignis*, but rather articulate the series of successive steps which take us from the *recognition* to the *elaboration* of the significance of the later Heidegger’s primary, interconnected philosophical insights into enowning and Being as such. The *Beiträge*’s fugal structure thus develops a complex but unified set of claims,

what we could think of as a *fugal argument*. Recall the “essential onefold” of the *Beiträge*’s six fugal subjects:

[T]he “Interplay” between the first and the other beginning out of Be-ing’s “Echo” in the distress of Being’s abandonment for the “Leap” into Be-ing for “Grounding” its truth as preparation for “The Ones to Come” of “The Ultimate God.” [CP 6/GA65 7]

This fugal argument can be unpacked as follows. If we recognize “Being’s abandonment” (experiencing the “distress” of the fact that Being has been dissolved into *nothing* but pure becoming by the underlying Nietzschean metaphysics of our atomic age), we can glimpse, in this seeming “nothing,” an “echo” of the first beginning of Western philosophy, in which “Being as such” – that phenomenological “presencing” (*Anwesen*) which simultaneously elicits and defies conceptual circumscription – was “inceptively” enowned, interpretively appropriated and so rendered intelligible in terms of *phusis* and *alêtheia* (by Heraclitus and Parmenides). There are three crucial claims here: First, that what initially appears to us (from within the fundamental conceptual parameters set by Nietzsche’s metaphysics) as “nothing” is really “Being as such” [CP 188/GA65 266], an “inexhaustible” phenomenological “fullness” [CP 266/GA65 382] which “beckons for” [CP 260/GA65 372] and “overflows” [CP 176/GA65 249] all of our conceptualizations. Second, that the activity by which human beings appropriate aspects of this inexhaustible phenomenological presencing is *Ereignis*, “enowning,” the “clearing” or world disclosing whereby Dasein – the taking place of Being – implicitly appropriates the phenomenological “presencing” which informs and exceeds it, thus making an ontological home within the historical “storm of Being” as such [CP 211/GA65 300]. Third, that the “first beginning” doubly informs (or “plays forth” into) the “other beginning” beyond Western metaphysics (which Heidegger seeks to inaugurate), because the deconstructive retrieval of the Greek understanding of *phusis* and *alêtheia* helps us to recognize the temporal dynamism of phenomenological presencing and the inconspicuous occurrence of *Ereignis*, respectively. So, Heidegger’s fugal argument concludes, to embrace these two crucial, interrelated aspects of phenomenological intelligibility – that is, *to understand and experience intelligibility as the enowning of Being as such* – is to “leap” into and thereby “ground” the “truth” (that is, the occurrence) of this other understanding of Being, making us members of a future human community (“those to-come”) who, sharing this other understanding of Being, prepare for a new historical sense of what matters (which Heidegger here calls “the ultimate god”).²⁶

It is thus in the *Beiträge* that Heidegger elaborates for the first time what will become the central phenomenological insights of his later work (*Ereignis* and Being as such), and where he first attempts to spell out what he takes to be their implications. Although these implications especially remain

sketchy and elliptical, it is nevertheless quite clear that for Heidegger the potential significance of this dual phenomenological insight is not narrowly "philosophical." Rather, the intended consequences of understanding intelligibility as the enowning of Being as such are best described as "ontopolitological" (as Jacques Derrida suggests) because for Heidegger they include nothing short of the "possible transformation of Western history [*mögliche Wandlung der abendländischen Geschichte*]" [CP 57/GA65 82].²⁷ Indeed, with his philosophical characterization of the meaning and possibility of such a radical historical transformation as an "other beginning" for Western history, Heidegger seems to transgress into the domain of religion (if not theology); for he goes so far as to equate this other beginning's occurrence with the return of a "God," most famously (if only esoterically) in the *Der Spiegel* interview. As Heidegger explains in the *Beiträge*: "The ultimate God is not the end, but rather the other beginning in the immeasurable possibility of its history" [CP 289/GA65 412].²⁸

In what was originally the climactic *Fügung* of the *Beiträge* – the abrupt but deeply resonant fuguing Heidegger calls "The Ultimate God" [*Der Letzte Gott*] – Heidegger first and perhaps most fully articulates and defends philosophically the historical possibility of what may initially be described as a secularized conception of historical "salvation."²⁹ Hence, thanks to the *Beiträge*'s section on "The Ultimate God," we are now in a much better position to understand Heidegger's controversial *Der Spiegel* pronouncement that: "Only another God can save us [*Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten*]."³⁰ For with the publication of the *Beiträge*, we can now recognize that this haunting posthumous pronouncement to *Der Spiegel* (literally haunting, because *deliberately* posthumous) was not a spontaneous parapraxis by which Heidegger unconsciously betrayed his Christian despair, and thus a "sad profession of impotence" (as Richard Wolin has it), but rather an apparently deliberate allusion to "the wholly other" [*der ganz Andere*] "ultimate God" Heidegger knew himself to have privately set forth in the *Beiträge*, and thus a reference Heidegger also had to have known would only make sense *after* the *Beiträge*'s publication – that is, as it turned out, more than three decades later.³¹ If this is right, then before we will be able to unravel these long-standing mysteries of Heideggerian thought and scholarship, we will first need to understand the philosophical work Heidegger is attempting to do in "the ultimate God," this especially esoteric *Fügung* which, prior to the trustees' editorial redactions, had in fact been the *Beiträge*'s final and climactic "unification."³²

If we had time to carefully unpack the fascinating combination of Hölderlinian, Nietzschean, and Bultmannian influences which come together in Heidegger's mysterious call for "the ultimate God," we would see that the vision of philosophical salvation Heidegger alludes to in the 1966 *Der*

Spiegel interview is the same positive philosophical project he had been elaborating since 1936-38, when he broke with the "movement" of the National Socialist pseudo-revolution as the most extreme symptom of enframing's totalizing metaphysics, the technocratic Nietzschean ontotheology of eternally recurring will-to-power. This Nietzschean mode of revealing "preconceives" all entities as mere *Bestand*, forces endlessly coming together and breaking apart with no purpose other than their own unlimited, self-aggrandizing increase, and so it "extends itself to a presumed 'eternity' which is no eternity but only the endless etcetera of what is most desolately transitory" [CP 287/GA65 409].³³

If Nietzsche's metaphysics empties history of its meaning, Heidegger's "other beginning" seeks to reinstaurate history through a post-metaphysical turn. To understand adequately the later Heidegger's central philosophical project, it would be crucial to take the fullest possible measure of the complex and sometimes competing influences which come to a head in Heidegger's philosophical soteriology of "the ultimate God." Since we cannot do this here, let us at least single out what is perhaps the most important of these influences, namely, that provided by Hölderlin's poetic vision of "the future," *die Zukunft*, that which remains "to-come."³⁴ Playing on this connotation with the utmost seriousness, Heidegger writes:

Of the ones-to-come, Hölderlin has come the furthest, and hence is the most futural poet [*zukünftigste Dichter*, in other words, the poet who remains the most to-come]. Hölderlin is the most futural [*der Zukünftigste*, that is, the one who remains most to-come], because he came the furthest, and in this distance he *traversed* and transformed what is greatest. [CP 281/GA65 401]

Hölderlin was for Heidegger "the one who *poeticized the furthest ahead*" into the future of our age [CP 143/GA65 204], and Hölderlin's vision was of a future "turning."

Beginning in his student years (1788-90) with Hegel and Schelling at the Lutheran Theological Seminary in Tübingen (the recent eruption of the French revolution made their shared faith in the possible "spiritual" progress of politics seem much less utopian, if no less *dangerous*, than it does now³⁵), Hölderlin dedicated himself through his poetry to a "vernal renewal" of the German nation, "these people whom God has forsaken" (as he put it in *Hyperion*), a people who "live in the world like strangers in their own house."³⁶ Hölderlin's moving lamentations exercised a profound and important influence on the ambitions Nietzsche and Heidegger harbored for the political role of philosophy in helping "*Germania*" discover and appropriate its own national "identity."³⁷ Indeed for Hölderlin, the spiritual-political homelessness of the "God-forsaken" German people will only be ended when a new historical "*Göttertag*" is inaugurated and the "flight of the Gods" thereby *reversed*. This "reversal" is the Hölderlinian *Kehre*, and the

eschatological vision underwriting it may be the most revealing of the major influences which come together in Heidegger's politically momentous invocation of "the ultimate God" at the climax of the *Beiträge*.

In his 1936-38 *Beiträge*, his 1937-38 lecture course on the *Basic Questions of Philosophy*, and his 1943 lecture on Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister," Heidegger philosophically appropriates and consistently characterizes this return in Hölderlinian terms as "a decision over the final flight or new advent of the gods." For Heidegger too, "the future of humanity will decide itself...in this turning" [CP 287/GA65 408].³⁸ But Heidegger philosophically appropriates Hölderlin's salvific vision in order to convey his own contention that the current historical "night" of cybernetic technology can actually help awaken a phenomenological sensitivity, a receptive comportmental modality ("dwelling") which is itself capable of facilitating a history "healing" return of "the Holy [*das Heilige*]" (as he puts it in 1935), or a spiritual *Heimkehr*, a "turn-home" or "homecoming through alterity" (as he will say in 1943, evoking Odysseus). The *Beiträge's* fugal structure serves this goal, I would now suggest, because at bottom the text is an attempt to *re-attune* humanity, to foster a new, more thankful "fundamental attunement" (*Grundstimmung*) out of which will emerge our journey home, back to ourselves and thus toward a post-metaphysical historical age.³⁹ Heidegger's names for this attunement will be "dwelling" (*wohnen*) and "releasement to things" (*Gelassenheit zu den Dingen*); what such dwelling should be attuned to – or dwell within – is the *Sache selbst* the *Beiträge* calls "Being as such."

Yet, however philosophically appropriated, this vision of a "turning" of the wheel of history is, in a word, the dream of a *revolution*. Understanding the fugal structure of the *Beiträge* helps us to recognize that the ultimate goal of this text is to foment philosophically just such a revolution in our ways of understanding ourselves and the meaning and intelligibility of our world, indeed, to restart history by transcending the technological eternal return of the same, "the endless etcetera of what is most desolately transitory." I would add, finally, that despite the undeniable radicality of this project and the striking language Heidegger uses to describe and motivate this philosophico-ontopolitical revolution in the *Beiträge*, this is nevertheless precisely the same revolution for which he already laid the philosophical groundwork in *Being and Time* by reconceptualizing the self as *Dasein*, that is, as a temporally-structured making-intelligible of the place in which we happen to find ourselves. By developing his fuguing on the theme of *Ereignis*, the master-word of his later thought, Heidegger's *Beiträge* seeks to help us understand just how rich, meaningful – indeed, philosophically *revolutionary* – this seemingly simple world-disclosure may yet turn out to be.

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References

1. An earlier version of this paper was presented to the 21st annual "Heidegger Symposium" (on 20 April 2001 in Denton, Texas). I would especially like to thank Bert Dreyfus, Michael Eldred, Manfred Frings, Ted Kisiel, and Ken Maly for insightful comments and criticisms. Iain Thomson, Department of Philosophy, University of New Mexico, 527 Humanities Building, Albuquerque, NM 87131-1151. Email: ithomson@unm.edu.
2. See Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*, trans. P. Emad and K. Maly (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999); hereafter "CP"/*Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1989), *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 65; hereafter GA65. Henceforth all volumes of the *Gesamtausgabe* will be referenced as "GA" plus the volume and, where applicable, page numbers. Page references to the *Contributions/Beiträge* will be inserted in brackets in the main text (translations are frequently modified). It is hoped that the forthcoming publication of many of the lecture courses contemporaneous with the *Beiträge* will help further illuminate some of its darker passages (as do the lectures on Nietzsche, 1936-7's *Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected "Problems" of "Logic,"* trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994]/GA45, and – although from more of a distance – 1941's *Basic Concepts*, trans. G.E. Aylesworth [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993]/GA51). These lectures include, most promisingly (*pace* Pöggeler, *Heidegger's Path of Thinking*, trans. D. Magurshak and S. Barber [Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1989], p.178), Heidegger's treatment of Hölderlin's "Empedocles" (*Zu Hölderlins Empedokles-Bruchstücken*, which unfortunately is not scheduled to be published until GA75, *Zu Hölderlin – Greichenlandreisen*), Heidegger's 1935-6 "Altercation with *Being and Time*" (forthcoming as GA82), and his 1936 seminar on *Kant's Third Critique* (GA84). Heidegger claims, dubiously, that all these aforementioned lectures "remain only foreground" for the *Beiträge*, which (he tells us) incorporates them all in its third 'division,' *das Zuspiel* (see GA66 p. 421 and below). Heidegger did, moreover, group the *Beiträge* together with a series of texts meant to help us understand it. These are currently being published – as "Collected Works, Division III: Unpublished Treatises." The first of these, *Reflections [Besinnung]* came out in 1997 as GA66, the third, GA69 (*The Historicity of Beyng [Die Geschichte des Seyns]*) was published in 1998 as GA69, and at least three more are in the works [see GA65 p.519 and GA66 pp.419-28]). It will thus likely be at least another decade before all the texts needed to fully understand and evaluate the *Beiträge* are published; consequently, many overarching pronouncements concerning it remain *prima facie* premature.
3. "People have no idea how difficult it is truly to lose that thought again" (Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?*, trans. J. Gray [New York: Harper & Row, 1968], p.56). Pöggeler reports Heidegger's frequent lament that Nietzsche had "ruined" him: see Pöggeler's "Besinnung oder Ausflucht? Heideggers ursprüngliches Denken (in Forum für Philosophie Bad Homburg, eds., *Zerstörung des moralischen Selbstbewusstseins: Chance oder Gefährdung* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1988), pp.240-1; cf. Wolin, *The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p.198 note 25. See Pöggeler's *Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking*, p. 281, for the famous remark that a philosophical *sirocco* from the birthplace of Nietzsche's own most "elevated" (Heidegger says "theological") thought of eternal recurrence left its mark on the *Beiträge*, which helps to explain what Guignon characterizes as "the soteriological and apocalyptic 'meta-narrative'" underlying Heidegger's Nietzschean-Hölderlinian understanding of the history of Being. See Charles Guignon, "Introduction", in C. Guignon, ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
4. Schürmann, "Riveted to a Monstrous Site: On Heidegger's *Beiträge zur Philosophie*" (in Rockmore and Margolis, eds., *The Heidegger Case: On Philosophy and Politics* [Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992], p.313. (Schürmann's footnotes make clear his polemical implication that Derrida is the "Heideggerian plagiarist" in question.)

5. The *Beiträge*'s publication was sped up to be in time for the centennial of Heidegger's birth – against the letter if not the spirit of Heidegger's last *Gesamtausgabe* directives – which (von Herrmann informs us) specified that the *Beiträge* should not be published until after all of the Marburg and Freiburg lectures (see his "Editor's Afterword" [CP 363/GA65 511]). See Alexander Schwan, "Heidegger's *Beiträge zur Philosophie* and Politics," trans. E. Briant, in Harries and Jamme, eds., *Martin Heidegger: Politics, Art, and Technology* [New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1994], p.71.
6. See e.g. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, "Way and Method in Philosophy: Hermeneutic Phenomenology in Thinking the History of Being," trans. P. Emad (in C. Macann, ed., *Critical Heidegger* [London: Routledge, 1996], p.185. (See also the jacket-cover of *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993].) Pöggeler had already called the *Beiträge* Heidegger's sole major work [Otto Pöggeler, "Heideggers Politisches Selbstverständnis" (in Annemarie Gethmann-Siebert and Otto Pöggeler, eds., *Heidegger und die praktische Philosophie* [Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1988]). Von Herrmann still insists that: "As Otto Pöggeler has rightly and repeatedly pointed out, the *Beiträge zur Philosophie* are the major work of Heidegger's thinking of the history of Being" (p.56); I try to show here (and in my "Ontotheology? Understanding Heidegger's *Destruction of Metaphysics*," see note 26 below) that this is simply not the case.
7. Pöggeler, "Heidegger und die hermeneutische Theologie," p.481 (quoted by Schürmann, in "A Brutal Awakening to The Tragic Condition of Being: On Heidegger's *Beiträge zur Philosophie*," in Harries and Jamme, eds., *Martin Heidegger: Politics, Art, and Technology*, p.104, note 2). As Schürmann notes, "Pöggeler ... kept his readers in suspense for a quarter of a century; as Heidegger's one major work, the *Beiträge* alone, he claimed, contain Heidegger's genuine thinking which the public lectures and courses were merely to make accessible to a more general audience" (*ibid.*, punctuation corrected; cf. Pöggeler, *Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking*, p.116).
8. Although, to be fair, Heidegger does say things which encourage such a fanciful view (see e.g. GA66 p.421), helping to explain why thinkers like Schwan (who envisions the *Beiträge* as "a complete blueprint" developed in only "a truncated form" in the later philosophy, see his "Heidegger's *Beiträge zur Philosophie* and Politics," p.72) and von Herrmann (see previous note) adopt Pöggeler's view much too uncritically. Although one can all too easily understand why a scholar with sole access to a text might make such claims (had not Gadamer long done something similar, if of a much lesser magnitude, with the early lectures?), the text does not bear them out.
9. Rüdiger Safranski, *Heidegger: Between Good and Evil*, trans. E. Oslers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), p.307; cf. GA66 p.433.
10. Schürmann's title also connotes Heidegger's reading of Hölderlin's later "Hymns to the Fatherland" as monstrous [*ungeheuer*], that is, as overwhelming and terrifying – carrying clear resonances of what Kant called the "sublime" (see Heidegger, *Existence and Being*, trans. W. Brock [Washington: Gateway, 1949], p.282/GA4, p.42). For Schürmann's four interrelated articles on Heidegger's *Beiträge* (which together constitute its most sustained critical reading to date), see Schürmann's "Riveted to a Monstrous Site"; "Ultimate Double Binds" (*Graduate Philosophy Faculty Journal* 14:2-15:1 [1991]); "Technicity, Topology, Tragedy: Heidegger on 'That Which Saves' in the Global Reich" (in A.M. Meltzer, J. Weinberger, and M.R. Zinman, eds., *Technology in the Western Political Tradition* [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993]; and "A Brutal Awakening to the Tragic Condition of Being: On Heidegger's *Beiträge zur Philosophie*."
11. See CP 57/GA65, pp.81-2 and below.
12. See CP 56-7/GA65, p.81 for Heidegger's defense of the "rigor," "unity," and "clarity" of this fugal construction. E.g., Heidegger justifies "the rigor of the fugal-articulation of this construction [*die Strenge des Gefüges im Aufbau*]" as an attempt to envision an alternative way of accomplishing what has always been for philosophy "the impossible," namely, "to grasp the truth of Beyng in the fully unfolded richness of its grounded essence [*die*

Wahrheit des Seyns in der voll entfalteteten Fülle seines begründeten Wesens begreifen]." This fugue appears to be Heidegger's last-ditch attempt to accomplish precisely the kind of project he soon turns against; as Pöggeler aptly observes, "Only slowly did Heidegger's thinking relinquish its wanting to ground" (*Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking*, p.130). See James Murray, et al., eds., *The Compact Oxford English Dictionary*, second edition [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991], henceforth "OED," p.642.

13. See Lacoue-Labarthe, *Heidegger, Art, and Politics: The Fiction of the Political*, trans. C. Turner (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), pp.45-6; and Hölderlin, *Essays and Letters on Theory*, ed. and trans. Thomas Pfau (New York: State University of New York Press, 1988), p.102. Without recognizing the *Beiträge*'s fugal structure, Schürmann insightfully points out that as such a *césure*, *Ereignis* is meant as Heidegger's own answer to what (like Hölderlin and Nietzsche) Heidegger takes to be a historical call for "decision," and thus the enactment of the latest in the series of "epochal breaks 'severing' (*caedere*) eras of truth" (Schürmann, "Riveted to a Monstrous Site," p.316).
14. Although we cannot discuss it much here, one of the most interesting of these is *der Anklang*, by which Heidegger means a kind of *echo of reminiscence*. Among *Anklang*'s multiple connotations is the first glimpse of twilight, a glimpse that has a trace of dawn in it (as in "I hear 'traces' of Bach in that"), and Heidegger's *Anklang* thus anticipates Benjamin's theory of "reminiscences" (based on his analysis of Proust's remembrances – the famous *Madeleine* – and Baudelaire's analogous understanding of the relation between current Spleen and past Ideal). This "ringing echo" is literally a "reminiscence" triggered by a sound received through the ear, and we should remember that as the son of a Catholic Sexton, childhood memories involving the ringing of church bells were certainly close to Heidegger's heart (in 1935's *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Manheim [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959], Heidegger describes the "call" in terms reminiscent of that "ringing of silence" in which Yahweh is said to have spoken to Abraham). *Das Zuspield* is also polysemic: "Playing Forth, Interplay, or Pass"; it connotes the playing forth of certain themes from the "first beginning" within the "other beginning (and thus the "interplay" of these two beginnings), as I will show below, as well as the play of space-time (i.e., Being), in its approach to Dasein. Interestingly, Heidegger seems to have drawn the metaphor from soccer, where "the pass" is the *release* that makes playing together possible. (Heidegger himself played wing, the position for which passing – both giving and receiving – is most important, but also a position which much of the world, following the 1990 world-champion German national team, no longer employ, although *that* is another story.) This "Playing Forth" further connotes the giving of a gift in which the recipient does not know who gave it, although for Heidegger the unrecognized giver is Being as such. In his Heideggerian-Maussian treatment of the theme of the gift, Derrida argues that only an impossible gift, a gift which is neither given nor received as a gift – "the gift that is not present" – would be a "gift" worthy of the name (see Jacques Derrida, *The Gift of Death*, trans. D. Wills [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995], p.29). *Der Sprung* ("The Leap") and *die Gründung* ("The Grounding") are directly related; the latter is "The Landing" from the neo-Kierkegaardian leap, an arrival at the site for building a new dwelling for historical humanity (hence Heidegger's claim that this "ground" is something we work toward rather than from). I return (all too) briefly to these fugues and to *die Zukünftigen* ("The Futural One/Those [who remain] To-Come") and *der Letzte Gott* ("the Ultimate God") below.
15. See von Herrmann, "Technology, Politics, Art," p.59. Von Herrmann's problematic claim that these "essential aspects" come together in an "essential unity" illustrates, I take it, that he has adopted a bit too uncritically Pöggeler's emphasis on the "systematic" character of the *Beiträge* (an impression borne out by a closer reading of von Herrmann's various treatments of this text), a mistake we need to be careful not to make. Von Herrmann is not counting the introductory "Preview" [*Vorblick*] or the concluding "Beyng" [*Das Seyn*]. These translations come mostly from Kenneth Maly (who co-translated the *Beiträge* with

- Parvin Emad and also co-translated – with Karsten Harries – von Herrmann's "Technology, Politics, Art").
16. At least on the "modernist" interpretation of Nietzsche's style; for an insightful elaboration of the differences between the traditional, modern, and post-modern "readings of Nietzsche," see Slavoj Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology* (London: Verso Press, 1999), p.171.
 17. Related considerations inform my decision to refer to this text by its now standard title, "Beiträge," which Pöggeler, following Heidegger himself, disparagingly calls its "public title," and opposes to its "essential heading," its parenthetical sub-title "(Vom Ereignis)" [CP 3/GA65 3], as well as my adoption of Emad and Maly's rendering of Heidegger's "essential subtitle" as "(From Enowning)." "From" is an apt translation of Heidegger's *Vom* because it assumes that Heidegger's *Beiträge* did in fact seek to make contributions to philosophy, contributions which come *from* his insights into enowning. Indeed, Heidegger has not yet given up on all "philosophy" as "metaphysics" in the *Beiträge*, but rather is still seeking to rehabilitate "philosophy," at least "whatever in the future and in truth dares to be called philosophy" [CP 15/GA65 20]. For although readers like Kisiel rightly detect irony in Heidegger's characterization of the title as "public" and the subtitle as "essential," this irony is not (*pace* Kisiel) directed at the very idea of making "contributions to philosophy." Instead, this irony conveys Heidegger's recognition that he is appropriating a once common but now slightly dated German tradition of titling one's text *Beiträge zur Philosophie*. Since Heidegger intentionally gives his text this slightly stilted "public" title, the subtitle could perhaps be rendered as *Of Enowning*, following the (in this respect analogous) example of Derrida's *Of Spirit*. Yet because the text is centrally concerned with drawing out the implications of Heidegger's insights into *Ereignis*, Emad and Maly's *From Enowning* seems to be the best choice.
 18. For a revealing treatment of Heidegger's pervasive use of religious metaphor in the *Beiträge*, see Alexander Schwan, "Heidegger's *Beiträge zur Philosophie* and Politics," pp.71-88.
 19. See Stambaugh, *The Finitude of Being* (New York: The State University of New York Press, 1992), pp.112-3. The proximity to Celan is politically-charged; a fact connoted by the original title of Safranski's biography of Heidegger (*Ein Meister aus Deutschland*), which links Heidegger to the German "death" of the concentration camps, described by Celan with a "terrible beauty" in his famous poem, "Death Fugue." There remains much to be said about Celan's relation with Heidegger (see Safranski, *Martin Heidegger*, pp.421-5). In the end, Heidegger reached the sad conclusion that "Celan is sick – hopelessly." But the "sickness" afflicting Celan was "the survivor's wound" (Hamburger); his parents were both murdered in the death camps. In this connection, Blanchot seems, if not to blame Heidegger for the Shoah, then to accuse him of a profound complicity with it through his "silence" (which Blanchot calls "a wounding of thinking"). This is, at any rate, how I would begin to read that passage of Blanchot's letter in January 22-28, 1988 *Le Nouvel Observateur* where he writes: "Heidegger's irreparable fault lies in his silence concerning the Final Solution. The silence, or his refusal, when confronted by Paul Celan, to ask forgiveness for the unforgivable, was a denial that plunged Celan into despair and made him ill, for Celan knew that the Shoah was the revelation of the essence of the West" (Blanchot, "Penser l'apocalypse," in *Le Nouvel Observateur*, January 22-28, 1988; quoted in Ungar, *Scandal and Aftereffect: Blanchot and France since 1930* [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995], p. 63). Wolin too implies that Heidegger was at least partially responsible for Celan's suicide (see Wolin, "Review of *Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil*, by Rüdiger Safranski," *Los Angeles Times Book Review*, April 12, 1998, p.6).
 20. See Michael Hamburger, "Introduction," in Celan, *Poems of Paul Celan*, p.23.
 21. Such a fugue state "is a dissociative reaction to shock or emotional stress on the part of a neurotic, during which all awareness of personal identity is lost though the person's outward behavior may appear rational." OED 642. Taken together, these musical and psychological senses of *fugue* (which both go back to the Latin word for *flight*) would provide a provocative dual avenue of approach to the *Beiträge*, both in terms of their organization and something of their psychological motivations (perhaps revealing another side of the motivations for writing this strange and incredibly ambitious text). In this latter regard, remember Heidegger's report that he had to give himself over entirely to "*das Denken*" daily at the same time in order to avoid doing himself psychological harm, and of his psychologist's claim that the epiphany of *Ereignis* hit Heidegger with the force of a psychoanalytic cure. Schürmann's observation that "these *Contributions* date from the years when Heidegger was painfully working through what he would later call his greatest blunder", and Boss's claim that Heidegger's "own proper and fundamental self-realization was evidently reached with his waking discernment of that state of affairs which revealed itself to him as '*das Ereignis*,'" encourage us to recognize the *Beiträge* as the central text for any psychoanalytic reading of the turn (see Schürmann, "Riveted to a Monstrous Site," p.313; Boss, "Martin Heidegger's Zollikon Seminars" in K. Holler, ed., *Heidegger and Psychology*. Special issue of *Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry*, [1988], pp.13, 20.
 22. Of course, such authorial self-effacement is never perfectly complete. In *Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), Judith Butler shows that no author can entirely efface those marks in their discourse which testify to the process whereby they enacted their own self-disappearance through writing. On the signs or symptoms of this authorial self-erasure in the *Beiträge*, see Schürmann, "Riveted to a Monstrous Site," pp.315-6. The irony here of course is that Heidegger's effacement of his own authorial presence implicitly reinforces the other impression which calling these *Fügungen* also conveys; viz., that Heidegger seems to be writing here as a perfectly receptive vehicle of Providence, as if indulging in the daydream of purely passive agency, the *metaphysical* fantasy of being a self-grounding authority, an authority whose words derive their legitimacy from nowhere other than themselves (a dream shared by the "Enlightenment" [*Aufklärung*] as well as by some of the most dogmatically authoritarian systems, as Horkheimer and Adorno artfully show in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. J. Cumming [New York: The Continuum Publishing Company, 1972]).
 23. That the ongoing process whereby intelligibility is created and maintained required the application of conceptual categories which filter and give structure to the intelligible was first recognized by Kant. But the theoretical framework of Kant's inaugural phenomenological enterprise was bound too tightly by the artificial presuppositions of an 18th century faculty psychology which demanded that such cognitive categories be ahistorically applicable. Heidegger will claim that metaphysics itself provides historically situated intelligibility-filtering categories, a fact that grants these categories a fundamentally historical character. Thus Heidegger historicizes Kant's discursivity thesis.
 24. Alexander Schwan, "Beiträge zur Philosophie and Politics," p.72. Thus I cannot agree with Schwan's judgment that the *Beiträge* "fail to match even remotely the density of thought, content, and structure evidenced in" *Being and Time* (see Schwan, Heidegger's *Beiträge zur Philosophie* and Politics, p.72); put simply, Schwan is misled here by the radical stylistic differences between these texts.
 25. I take it that this is what Olafson is getting at when he remarks (insightfully, if perhaps according to an overly Hegelian script) that the *Beiträge*'s "*pensées*" trace the "stages...in the progress of a form of thought that undertakes to move toward a 'new beginning'" (Olafson, *Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics: A Study of Mitsein* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998], p.103 note 5), and what von Herrmann means when he says that "[t]he six divisions must thus be enacted in thought" ("Technology, Politics, and Art," p.59).
 26. For a much more detailed development and defense of these claims, see my "Ontotheology? Understanding Heidegger's *Destruction of Metaphysics*," *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 8:3 (2000), pp.297-327.

27. See Derrida, "Philopolemology: Heidegger's Ear (*Geschlecht IV*)," in J. Sallis, ed., *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations* (Bloomington and Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1993). "Ontopolitological" is Derrida's term for the way in which the understanding of Being in the background of our social practices filters our decisions in such a way that metaphysics helps to shape the very intelligibility of (what during the thirties Heidegger refers to as) the "domain of space-time" [*Zeit-spiel-raum*]. Heidegger's idea – that metaphysics, by "doubly" (that is, onto-theologically) "grounding" intelligibility, acts "ontopolitologically" – has been hugely influential in recent political theory (this emphasis on ontological politics underwrites Ernesto Laclou and Chantal Mouffe's seminal *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards A Radical Democratic Politics*, trans. W. Moore and P. Cammack [London: Verso, 1985] and makes itself felt in the work of Bourdieu, Wolin, Dallmayr, Connolly, and others).
28. Stambaugh nicely suggests "ultimate" as a translation for *Letzte* (Emad and Maly use "last"). Of course, the question of this God's finality – that is, of the supposed permanence of this last God's presence – is an issue near the heart of Heidegger's reading of Hölderlin (see esp. *Existence and Being*, pp.263-7).
29. Von Herrmann's editorial placement of "Die Kehre im Ereignis" as the third of four sections in the seventh of eight "divisions" is appropriate in one sense (despite being part of the problematic editorial redaction which obscures the fugal structure of the core of the text), for it marks with a strange penultimacy a section which reflects the thinker's struggle with the ultimate metaphysical urge, the desire to speak one's final words – the "secret" [*Geheimnis*] words kept closest to one's heart and home but which, Nietzsche thought, precisely in their very "idiosyncratic individuality" may yet allow the individual to speak for humanity – "and then break," as Zarathustra said. Nietzsche's idea that what is most individual best represents humanity may have come from his early reading of Hölderlin's *Empedocles*, a reading which leaves an obvious impression on Zarathustra. On the "universality" of the "distinctive," see Nietzsche's *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, trans. M. Cowan [Washington: Regnery Gateway, 1962], pp.23-4/*Kritische Gesamtausgabe* (Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, eds. [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter], p.295)); Hölderlin, "The 'Ground' for Empedocles" (in *Essays and Letters on Theory*, p.56); and Hölderlin's "Bread and Wine," in which he speaks of the suffering preceding "naming that which is dearest [*nennst er sein Liebstes*]" [see *Hyperion and Selected Poems*, ed. and trans. Eric L. Santner [New York: Continuum, 1994], pp.182-3, translation modified]). Clearly, the *Beiträge* is a text ripe with Heidegger's Hölderlinian-Nietzschean dreams for a political realization of his own dearest philosophical ambitions.
30. See Neeske & Kettering, eds., *Martin Heidegger and National Socialism: Questions and Answers* (New York, Paragon House: 1990), p.57. Hubert L. Dreyfus proposes this "equally possible translation" in his "Heidegger on Gaining a Free Relation to Technology" (in Andrew Feenberg and Alastair Hannay, eds., *Technology and the Politics of Knowledge* [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995]), pp.105, 107 note 34). Cf.: "Only a God can save us" (the original English translation by Alter and Caputo) and "Only a God can still save us" (L. Harries' translation).
31. See CP 283-93/GA65, pp.403-17; Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, p.13. The *Der Spiegel* interview was given Sept. 23, 1966 and published May 31st, 1976 (5 days after Heidegger's death). The *Beiträge* was written between 1936-8 (its fugal core composed between 1936-37), but not published until 1989.
32. See CP 365/GA65, pp.514-16.
33. I develop and defend Heidegger's critique of "enframing" (our ontologically-reductive, technological mode of revealing) in "What's Wrong with Being a Technological Essentialist? A Response to Feenberg," *Inquiry* 43:4 (2000), pp.429-44.
34. Heidegger makes this etymological connection explicit when he hyphenates "Zu-kunft" and "zu-kommt" [see e.g. GA65 401].

35. This is shown clearly by Derrida, in *Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question*, trans. G. Bennington and R. Bowly (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).
36. Hölderlin, *Hyperion and Selected Poems*, p.130. As Benn shows, "the conception of salvation involved here is very different from the orthodox Christian conception" (see Benn's "Introduction" to Hölderlin, *Der Tod des Empedokles*, ed. E.M. Benn [London: Oxford University Press, 1968], pp.27, 34).
37. As Ananda Spike-Turner has recognized, Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* begins with Nietzsche symbolically overcoming the event named in the title of Hölderlin's *The Death of Empedocles* (Empedocles throws himself into the volcano; Zarathustra carries his own ashes to the mountain to be reborn). Indeed, Hölderlin's *Empedocles* and Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* come together in a way that likely helped encourage Heidegger to revitalize the dangerous Platonic dream of the philosopher-statesman. See my "Heidegger and the Politics of the University," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* (forthcoming).
38. See Heidegger, *Basic Questions of Philosophy*, p. 110/GA45 p.127.
39. On this revolutionary return home to ourselves, see my "Heidegger on Ontological Education, or: How We Become What We Are," *Inquiry* 44:3 (2001), pp.243-68.

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