The legislative consequences of Mexico’s mixed-member electoral system, 2000–2009

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ABSTRACT

The emergence of mixed-member electoral systems across the globe has been an attempt to balance local types of representation through single-member districts (SMD) with programmatic representation through proportional representation lists (PR). However, there are several competing theoretical interpretations for the consequences of mixed systems on legislative bodies. Through a study of the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, I test several empirical implications of these competing theories by examining the impact of the electoral system on party discipline, participation, and legislative organization. I find little convincing evidence of differences between legislators elected through PR and those elected through SMD in their levels of party discipline, but I do find that PR legislators participate in a manner theoretically consistent with their mode of election. I also find that PR legislators have disproportionate control over key leadership positions. I argue that these findings are due to differing methods of candidate selection and restricted use of dual candidacy.

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1. Introduction

The emergence of mixed-member electoral systems across the globe has been an attempt to balance local types of representation through single-member districts with programmatic, partisan representation through proportional representation lists within a single legislative body (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001). In a number of countries throughout the 1990s, institutional designers attempted to redefine the representational relationship by combining the perceived benefits of both single-member district (SMD), plurality elections, and closed-list proportional representation (PR) elections. Nearly 30 countries in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Europe have now experimented with mixed-member systems (Ferrara et al., 2005).

However, there are several competing theoretical interpretations of the consequences of mixed systems on legislative bodies, the ‘best of both worlds’ (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001), the ‘worst of both worlds’ (Bawn and Thies, 2003), and contamination (Ferrara et al., 2005). What do these competing theories suggest about how mixed systems influence legislatures? Through a study of Mexico’s Chamber of Deputies from 2000 to 2009, I develop and test a number of hypotheses that result from each of the three theories of mixed systems, looking specifically at party discipline, participation, and legislative organization. I argue that evidence from the Mexican case provides strong support for the worst of both worlds theory. Through the disproportionate placement of PR legislators in leadership positions, Mexico’s major political parties have been able to strategically use the mixed electoral system to maintain agenda control over the legislative process, which is consistent with the worst of both worlds theory. I also find that PR legislators spend more time initiating substantive legislation, while SMD legislators spend more time seeking particularistic benefits and engaging in symbolic politics, consistent with the best and worst of both worlds theories. Finally, I find little difference across electoral tiers in terms of...
party discipline, supporting both the contamination and worst of both worlds viewpoint. I suggest the primary reason for the differences between SMD and PR legislators is due to differing methods of candidate selection for each electoral tier and the very limited use of dual candidacy, unlike many other mixed electoral systems. The Mexican case adds important empirical knowledge to the debate over the consequences of mixed electoral systems, since little attention has been given to electoral rules that restrict dual candidacy, a controversial aspect common to many other mixed systems (Massicotte, 2004; Pekkonen et al., 2006; Shugart, 2005, 2007).

Studying legislative behavior and organization under mixed-member electoral systems can also speak to larger issues such as the quality and type of representation citizens receive from their legislators, and whether or not electoral institutions can alter the behavior of representatives. The type of representation provided to constituents is often perceived to be related to the type of electoral institutions in place. In the context of the United States, it is often implicit in most studies of representation and Congress that the presence of single-member districts leads to legislative behavior that privileges local concerns over national or partisan concerns, and voters respond in kind (Eulau and Karps, 1977; Fenno, 1978; Mayhew, 1974). In the context of closed-list proportional representation systems, it is often assumed that legislators are more concerned with national issues and maintaining the image of their party, rather than attending to localized concerns, while voters are thought to vote based on party rather than on the individual characteristics of legislators present on the PR list (Jones et al., 2002). The extent to which mixed systems can combine these forms of representation, or tend to display the characteristics of only one system speaks to the potential desirability of implementing mixed electoral systems.

Much of the still small body of literature on legislative behavior in mixed systems has focused on European countries (e.g. Ferrara, 2004; Ferrara et al., 2005; Montgomery, 1999; Thames, 2001). A few studies have begun to look at the consequences of mixed electoral systems in Latin America (Calvo and Abal Medina, 2002; Crisp, 2007; Mayorga, 2001), but there is clearly a need for more research on understanding the potential effects of these electoral rules across a wide range of political behavior and cases. Work on Mexico’s mixed-member system is minimal, although a few studies have looked at the influence of mixed electoral rules on the party system (Calvo and Abal Medina, 2002; Quinones and Vengroff, 2002) and legislative behavior (Díaz Rebolledo, 2005; Weldon, 2001, 2008). I not only add empirical evidence that has not been presented before in previous studies of the Mexican electoral system, but also advance previous findings (Díaz Rebolledo, 2005; Weldon, 2008) by arguing that the electoral system does influence individual behavior and the organization of Mexico’s Chamber of Deputies.

2. Contending interpretations of mixed electoral systems

Theoretically, there exist three interpretations of what mixed electoral systems are supposed to accomplish. One strand of research suggests that mixed systems are the ‘best of both worlds’ and are preferable to the outcomes under pure SMD systems and pure PR systems (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001). According to this view, there are tradeoffs in selecting a pure SMD or a pure PR system along two dimensions. First, there is a tradeoff between majoritarian representation and proportional representation. Under SMD systems, it is possible to form a majority government with less than a majority of votes, while under a PR system, a coalition is generally needed to form a government when no party wins the majority of votes. Under the best of both worlds logic, a mixed system allows for balancing each type of representation, providing the possibility for majority party government, while still providing an avenue for the representation of smaller parties. Second, there is a tradeoff between strong candidates under a pure SMD system, and strong parties under a pure PR system. The best of both worlds logic suggests that mixed systems allow for both strong candidates and strong parties (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001: 25–26). In short, mixed systems are supposed to provide incentives for a strong national party system where parties can be held accountable, while at the same time providing incentives for the representation of local interests (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001: 582–591).

Under the best of both worlds logic, one might expect to see differences in legislative behavior across the two electoral tiers. Those legislators elected in single-member districts should demonstrate a greater propensity for representing local interests, and may be more likely to challenge the party leadership when local interests conflict with national party priorities. One might also expect SMD legislators to be more active in pushing parochial issues in the legislature, as they have greater incentives to demonstrate they are working for their district, whereas PR legislators may be more concerned with demonstrating loyalty to the party leadership and engaging in activities that benefit the party on a national level. Finally, it is likely that leadership positions within the legislature will be roughly balanced between the two tiers, providing a balance between local and partisan representation in determining the legislative agenda.

The second interpretation of mixed systems suggests that mixed-member electoral systems have the potential to create particularly perverse incentives for individual legislators that would make them even less responsive to their constituents (Bawn and Thies, 2003; Sartori, 1997). This strand of research suggests that mixed systems are the ‘worst of both worlds.’ Bawn and Thies (2003) argue that it is equally likely that instead of mixed systems balancing local and national forms of representation, they instead inherit the problems of both PR and SMD.

The critical issue for Bawn and Thies (2003) is whether or not legislators can simultaneously run in district races as well as be placed on a PR list. Theoretically dual candidacy provides incentives to balance both district and party mandates. The basic argument is that candidates allocate their legislative effort between representing organized and unorganized interests. Organized interests, or interest groups, provide resources that aid in a candidate’s reelection, while unorganized interests, or ordinary citizens,
provide the needed votes to win an election. Dual-listed candidates must balance their effort between representing interest groups and unorganized citizens, while, as argued by Bawn and Thies, specialization in a single tier provides increased incentives for PR candidates to become even more responsive to organized interests without compensation by the district candidates. The reasoning is that the needed votes to win an election are primarily the result of the activities of district candidates, while PR candidates have little individual incentive to allocate their effort towards increasing the vote share. The lack of compensation in representing unorganized interests results from the presence of a party list, as it leads to greater party voting in the electorate and less influence in the legislative process for local, unorganized interests. The key point of the worst of both worlds logic is that PR legislators will be more responsive to organized interests, with little change in the expected behavior of SMD legislators.

At present, there has not been any empirical tests of Bawn and Thies’ argument, but Mexico is a good test case as the use of dual candidacy is extremely limited unlike many other mixed systems. Most countries with mixed systems allow candidates to run in both tiers simultaneously, and in studies that have examined the frequency of dual candidacy, specialization in a single tier is relatively rare (Massicotte, 2004: 71–77). While dual candidacy is common among mixed systems, there has been some controversy over this provision, especially in countries that have recently implemented a mixed electoral system or have considered it, such as in New Zealand, Scotland, Wales, and at the sub-national level in Canada (Baston, 2005; Massicotte, 2004: 77; Shugart, 2005, 2007). However, scholars of mixed systems generally suggest that dual candidacy is necessary to make a mixed-member system work properly (Massicotte, 2004; Shugart, 2007) as it is critical for providing incentives to balance local and partisan representation, and reduces individual incentives to specialize in a particular mandate. Moreover, the lack of dual candidacy centralizes control over the PR list in the hands of the party leadership, and allows PR candidates to completely ignore local interests.

Assuming specialization in a single electoral tier, there are a number of potential empirical implications of the worst of both worlds logic. One might expect to see similar levels of party discipline across both electoral tiers, as the increased presence of a party list should lead to stronger party control within the legislature and over candidate nominations. However, one might expect specialization in a single tier to lead individuals to engage in different types of legislative activities under the worst of both worlds, similar to the best of both worlds. PR legislators should have few incentives to engage in activity that would benefit particular districts or states, and might be expected to engage in activities that benefit the party and any party-allied organized interests. In contrast, SMD legislators, primarily in charge of winning elections at the district level, should be expected to engage in parochial behavior to bring particularistic benefits to a district or state. While the effects of parochial behavior may be muted due to increased party voting in the electorate, parties may encourage their SMD legislators to engage in this type of activity for its potential influence on future support for the party. Finally, it is likely under the worst of both worlds logic, as a result of increased party voting and party strength due to the PR list, one would expect legislatures to adopt party-centered internal rules. Thus, one might expect that leadership positions will be dominated by PR legislators as a way to maintain party influence over the legislative agenda.

In between these two extreme interpretations of the consequences of mixed systems is a growing literature that argues there is ‘contamination’ across electoral tiers (Crisp, 2007; Ferrara et al., 2005). The contamination literature suggests that mixed-member systems are a distinct type of electoral system, and should be conceptualized as something more than a combination of SMD and PR. The logic behind this argument is that the two electoral tiers are not independent, that political parties develop strategies that incorporate the interaction between the two tiers, that voters do not make independent decisions on the composition of each tier, and legislators elected from both tiers must operate within a single legislature under a single set of institutional rules (e.g. Cox and Schoppa, 2002; Ferrara et al., 2005; Herron, 2002a).

In this interpretation, one is likely to see similar types of behavior in terms of party discipline across electoral tiers because individual legislators face electoral incentives to provide both local and partisan representation, regardless of the tier under which they were elected. A party’s future electoral success depends on balancing both types of representation, which likely affects SMD and PR legislators in similar ways. In terms of legislative participation, members of both tiers are likely to engage in similar legislative activity at similar rates for the same reason. However, with regards to legislative organization, one might expect the logic of contamination to be more similar to the best of both worlds rather than the worst of both worlds. The logic of contamination suggests one may see few differences across electoral tiers in the distribution of agenda-setting leadership positions.

3. Legislative behavior in mixed electoral systems

It is not possible to specifically test the three competing theoretical interpretations of political behavior under mixed systems. However, there are a number of empirical implications that result from these interpretations that can be observed through an analysis of party discipline, bill sponsorship, and the selection and organization of congressional leadership.

3.1. Party discipline

Explaining the level of party discipline within a given legislature has major implications for how one understands political dynamics within any particular country. It is often argued that the type of electoral rules in place provide incentives for legislators to engage in either parochial or personal forms of representation versus national or programmatic forms of representation (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Crisp et al., 2004). The presence of single-member districts creates incentives for individual legislators to
develop a personal reputation in order to enhance their reelection prospects, which may weaken incentives for strong party discipline (Mayhew, 1974). In contrast, closed-list proportional representation is thought to provide incentives for legislators to engage in behavior that benefits their political party as a whole, increasing incentives for strong party discipline. It is assumed that high levels of party discipline reflect strong party organizations, while weak levels of discipline reflect more personalized politics and the lack of programmatic parties. The degree to which a country has programmatic political parties can help explain the type of policies that are likely to be favored within a legislature, the nature of political campaigns, and the type of relationships that exist between voters and their representatives (Downs, 1957; Fiorina, 1974; Kitschelt, 2000).

These generalizations about the effects of electoral rules on party discipline are based on countries that employ either single-member districts, or some form of proportional representation. The puzzle for scholars of mixed-member electoral systems is to determine the consequences of combining both types of electoral rules within a single system. As a result of the presence of these competing incentives within mixed systems, scholars have sought to determine if legislators elected under a particular mandate behave in ways consistent with the theoretical expectations of behavior under pure forms of SMD or PR. The initial results from studies of roll call votes have been mixed. In studies of the Russian Duma, one study found little difference in the level of party discipline across electoral tiers after controlling for party affiliation (Haspel et al., 1998). In contrast, Thames (2001) found that SMD legislators in Russia are significantly less disciplined than PR deputies in an analysis of budgetary votes where it is argued that SMD legislators may be more concerned with distributive politics. Thames also found that his results held when expanded to all contested roll call votes and after controlling for party affiliation. When Thames (2005) extended his analysis to include Hungary and the Ukraine, in addition to Russia, he found that there was only a mandate divide in Russia.  

Herron (2002b) found similar results as Haspel et al. (1998) when he looked at party discipline in Ukraine’s parliament. After controlling for party affiliation, the effect of electoral tier became insignificant. In Italy, Ferrara (2004) has also concluded that electoral tier does not explain much about the level of party discipline. Finally, in Mexico, two scholars have found no difference between PR and SMD legislators (Díaz Rebolledo, 2005; Weldon, 2008), although one analysis was restricted to only presidential initiatives on which there was no major party dissent (Díaz Rebolledo, 2005). Notwithstanding these null findings, it is worthwhile to confirm these results in the present context due to the problematic research design of Díaz Rebolledo (2005) and by using a larger dataset and additional variables than used by Weldon (2008).

The bulk of the limited research on party discipline in mixed electoral systems suggests that there is little difference between SMD and PR legislators, although it is not clear if these results are country specific or more generalizable to mixed systems in general. These findings support the notion of contamination across tiers or the worst of both worlds, rather than the best of both worlds interpretation of mixed systems. This discussion suggests one hypothesis that can be tested with data from Mexico.

H1: If the best of both worlds theory is correct I should find lower levels of party discipline among SMD legislators. Alternatively, the contamination and worst of both worlds theories predict support for the null hypothesis that there should be little difference in the party discipline of SMD and PR legislators.

3.2. Participation

The extent to which legislators participate in the legislature is critical for understanding the practice and quality of democratic representation (Hall, 1996). In the U.S., Hall argues that legislators are purposive actors and decide to participate in the legislative process when that participation is likely to enhance chances for reelection or when it is part of their policy agenda. In the context of mixed electoral systems there are very few studies that look at participation among legislators. Crisp (2007) suggests that PR legislators in Venezuela were less likely to seek additional committee assignments than SMD legislators, but are no different from SMD legislators in terms of bill initiation. However, these findings are particularly dependent on the extent to which SMD legislators are selected through decentralized candidate selection procedures, and whether or not the PR legislators run in both tiers. In Italy, Ferrara et al. (2005) have suggested that PR legislators are less likely to participate in the legislative process since they are more likely to be engaged in party-related activities, but the evidence is weak.

If one assumes that legislators are primarily reelection-seeking political actors (Mayhew, 1974), then these findings from Venezuela and Italy make intuitive sense. SMD legislators are more likely to be concerned with reelection and face greater incentives to participate and claim credit for legislative activity, while PR legislators have little incentive to develop a personal reputation based on their legislative work. One important study does suggest that variation in electoral rules influences individual-level decisions to participate in the legislature. Crisp et al. (2004) find that as candidate selection is increasingly decentralized, individual legislators are more likely to initiate bills that address parochial rather than national issues. These findings are in line with the theoretical expectations regarding electoral system effects on legislative participation. Legislators elected under SMD are particularly concerned about representing the interests of their district as it influences their future political career. Thus, SMD legislators will be more interested in initiating bills and engaging in other types of legislative activity that will allow them to claim credit to their constituents. In contrast, PR legislators are relatively more anonymous, face reduced incentives to

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1 The different findings between Haspel et al. (1998) and Thames (2005) are likely due to different measures of the dependent variable, party unity. Haspel et al. use only party votes, while Thames uses all votes and weights them according to how closely contested each vote was.
engage in credit-claiming activity in the legislature, and should be expected to engage in activity that is more likely to benefit the party at the national level (Bawn and Thies, 2003; Crisp et al., 2004; Crisp, 2007).

However, the reelection assumption is not particularly necessary to extend this logic to the Mexican case, or to other cases where it makes more sense to assume progressive rather than static ambition (Samuels, 2002). In the Mexican context, SMD legislators, constitutionally prohibited from seeking immediate reelection, may be attempting to build a reputation at the state level to further their political careers, as suggested by Díaz Rebolledo (2005) and Langston and Aparicio (2008). Others have suggested there are increasingly significant local effects on the outcomes of legislative elections in Mexico (Morgenstern, 2005) which might suggest legislators elected in a district may have incentives to participate in activities that not only further their own individual careers, but also the party’s reputation in that district as well as the state. PR candidates are typically selected by the national party leadership, unlike SMD candidates who are more often selected at the state or local level (Wuhs, 2006). This difference in candidate selection may suggest some differences in the career paths of each type of legislator, and which might influence incentives to participate in the legislative process. For example, SMD legislators may be seeking a future post in municipal or state government, while PR legislators may be more likely to seek positions in the party bureaucracy, the national government, or as part of an important interest group that is allied with a particular party. Preliminary research examining the careers of Mexican deputies suggests this is the case (Langston and Aparicio, 2008). This discussion of participation does suggest one hypothesis that can be tested with data from Mexico:

H2: If the worst of both worlds or best of both worlds theories are correct I expect to find that SMD legislators will be more likely to dedicate their legislative activity towards parochial concerns than PR legislators, while PR legislators will be more likely to dedicate their time towards national issues than SMD legislators. On the other hand, if the contamination theory is correct, I expect to see support for the null hypothesis that SMD and PR legislators dedicate their legislative activity towards parochial and national concerns at similar rates.

3.3. Legislative organization

A few scholars of mixed electoral systems have suggested that future research of mixed systems should look at the development of cameral rules and the organization of the legislative process to understand how the competing incentives legislators face under these electoral rules might alter legislative organization (Crisp, 2007; Ferrara et al., 2005). Legislative organization is substantively important as it has impact on the quality of representation citizens are likely to receive from a representative assembly, the quality of public policies produced, and who has control over the legislative agenda.

Theories of legislative organization have suggested that political parties can form a legislative cartel that determines the policy agenda (Cox and McCubbins, 1993), that legislatures are organized in ways that provide information to legislators through committee systems (Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1990; Krehbiel, 1991), or in ways that give individual legislators policy gatekeeping power over those policy areas that are most salient to those legislators (Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1994; Weingast and Marshall, 1988). These U.S.-based studies suggest that under SMD, legislators are organized in a way to serve the reelection interests of its members. However, in a party-centered system, few incentives exist for legislators to adopt policy expertise through the development of strong committees, or to develop institutional rules that help improve the visibility of individual members (Jones et al., 2002).

These theories of legislative organization are based on the implicit assumption that individual legislators have a similar set of goals. The emergence of mixed-member electoral systems provides an interesting set of cases where legislators face competing incentives but must conform to a similar set of legislative rules. Have political actors in mixed systems been able to design legislative institutions to adapt to the incentives facing both PR and SMD legislators? Depending on context, does one tier come to dominate the other in terms of designing legislative institutions that conform to a particular set of incentives? Scholars of mixed electoral systems have not yet answered these questions, and there are few studies that suggest how legislative organization might be affected under these electoral rules. The presence of party lists in all these systems might suggest the strengthening of political party leaders at the expense of individual legislators, but there is still little evidence to support this notion.

In the Bolivian case, Mayorga (2001) has qualitatively suggested that SMD legislators have been marginalized in the legislative process. In Japan, Pekkanen, Nyblade, and Krauss (2006) have found that party leaders are strategic in how they choose which individuals receive leadership posts. The LDP allocates leadership posts to particular representatives to enhance their reelection prospects in the next election. In particular, dual candidates who lost in their single-member district race, but reached office through the PR list were more likely to hold important high policy leadership positions, while those who ran in only one tier were less likely to hold these positions. In Hungary, Montgomery (1999) found that electoral incentives led legislators to adopt more party-centered rules and restrict the ability of individual legislators to engage in credit claiming. The evidence from these cases conforms more to the interpretation of the worst of both worlds. The increased importance of party that comes with the use of a PR list, may potentially lead to increasingly party-centered legislative rules, and may reward particular legislators with leadership posts in order to maintain agenda control over the legislative process in the hands of the party leadership.

However, there is evidence to the contrary more consistent with the ‘best of both worlds’ and contamination scenario. Stratmann and Baur (2002) have argued that SMD legislators in Germany are more likely to serve on
committees that can serve geographic constituencies, while PR legislators serve on committees that allow them to serve partisan-based constituencies. This evidence suggests that it is possible mixed electoral systems might allow for the development of legislative institutions to balance the competing incentives facing PR and SMD legislators. These competing interpretations of legislative organization in mixed systems suggest one hypothesis that can be tested with data from Mexico:

H3: One should find that PR legislators will be more likely to hold leadership positions within the legislature than SMD legislators if the worst of both worlds theory is correct, but should find a balance between SMD and PR legislators in the possession of leadership positions if the best of both worlds or contamination theories are correct.

4. Mexico’s mixed electoral system

Mexico’s mixed system has a long history, reaching back to 1963. The reason for the implementation of the mixed electoral system under the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) was to increase the political system’s legitimacy while continuing to maintain the single-party dominance of the PRI (Bejar Algazi, 2004; Mabry, 1973). The addition of proportional representation seats in the Chamber of Deputies was first introduced in 1963 to provide additional legislative seats to the minor parties in a highly uncompetitive political system, while still preserving the PRI’s super-majority (Mabry, 1974; Molinar Horcasitas and Weldon, 2001: 210–211). Opposition parties could win a maximum of 20 PR seats under the 1963 reform, although victories in single-member district races led to a proportionate decrease in the number of PR seats that could be obtained. If an opposition party won more than 20 SMD seats, they were ineligible for PR seats.

In 1977, the electoral system was substantially reformed again, leading to the creation of a mixed-member system with 300 SMD seats and 100 PR seats. Mexico in the 1970s witnessed substantial increases in political violence, while the democratic facade of the PRI regime was seriously challenged. In the 1976 presidential election, the PRI candidate ran uncontested as the PAN failed to agree on a candidate. In an attempt to bring new political parties into the fold, as well as regain some legitimacy for electoral politics, the 1977 electoral reform promoted the creation and participation of a number of new opposition parties while giving them an increased chance to win seats in the Chamber of Deputies (Greene, 2007; Rodríguez Araujo, 1989).

From 1988 on, the Chamber of Deputies has been made up of 300 plurality seats, and 200 closed-list PR seats. While the specifics of the mixed system in Mexico have changed numerous times over the years, the current formula has been in place since 1997. Table 1 provides the breakdown of seats by party after the 2000, 2003, and 2006 elections. Since 1994, the electoral rules stipulate that no party can win more than 300 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, which prevents a single party from being able to reform the constitution without participation from at least one other political party (Molinar Horcasitas and Weldon, 2001: 225–229). PR seats are allocated based on five 40-member districts, which have typically been regional groupings of states. The large district magnitude for the PR seats has encouraged the presence of numerous minor parties in most Mexican elections, as seen in Table 1.

Unlike most other mixed electoral systems, Mexican voters do not cast a separate ballot for deputies elected in the PR tier, and therefore seat allocation is based purely on the number of votes cast in single-member districts. List deputies therefore do not have to campaign, and their primary loyalty is to the national party leadership, which is in charge of selecting candidates for the lists (Langston, 2006, 2008; Weldon, 2001: 472–473).

Mexico does allow a limited form of dual candidacy. However, while each party can place sixty candidates in both a district race and on the PR list, in practice the major political parties in Mexico rarely place candidates in both tiers. Moreover, a large number of dual candidacies are given to suplentes (alternates) rather than propietarios (principals). Table 2 demonstrates the minimal use of dual candidacy in the 2000, 2003, and 2006 elections for candidates to the Chamber of Deputies. The PAN is the most frequent user of dual candidacy, with about six to ten percent of their candidates running in both tiers, but almost half of these candidacies are for suplente positions. The PRI rarely, if at all, uses dual candidacy, while the PRD has placed around two to four percent of their candidates in both tiers. Moreover, the use of dual candidacy does not...
seem to be strategic on the part of the major parties unlike other countries with mixed electoral rules (Ferrara et al., 2005: 103). None of the candidates who eventually became party leaders were candidates in both tiers, nor are the number of dual-listed candidates who won a legislative seat very large. Being a dual candidate in the propietario position does increase the chances of winning, as many of the winning dual candidates were propietarios in both the district and PR races. The position of dual-listed candidates on the PR lists is also not suggestive of the parties attempting to insure a seat for that particular individual, as many dual candidates are not placed at the top of the PR lists. The decision to run a candidate in both tiers may be idiosyncratic on the part of the major parties, or may reflect the difficulty of having to fill 1000 positions for just the Chamber of Deputies every three years in a context where reelection is prohibited. Moreover, the prevalence of dual-listed suplentes suggests the parties do not think highly of dual candidacy as a mechanism for increasing the chance of victory for their best candidates.

Within the legislature, differences between PR and SMD legislators in obtaining powerful leadership positions is most apparent. The most powerful organ of the Chamber of Deputies is the Junta de Coordinación Política (JCP), which is made up of the party leaders from each political party with legislative representation. In addition to this party leadership committee, there is the Mesa Directiva (MD), which is in charge of running general legislative business. The party leaders typically serve the entire 3-year term, while members of the Mesa Directiva are renovated annually by the JCP (Reveles Vázquez, 2002: 184–86; Alemán, 2006). The JCP and the MD have joint control over the legislative agenda. Individual legislators can petition either organ to change the agenda, but there is no recourse for a majority of the legislature to alter the agenda against the wishes of these two leadership bodies (Alemán, 2006).

The JCP is made up of the caucus leader (coordinador parlamentario) from each political party with at least five seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The powers of the JCP are fairly extensive. They have the power to name the leaders and secretaries of each committee, and they also have the power to remove members of committees temporarily or permanently. The JCP also proposes the legislative budget for the year, and has the authority to dispense human, material, and financial resources to each party as well as to individual legislators (Reveles Vázquez, 2002: 184–86). The naming of the party leaders is largely out of the hands of individual legislators and is in the control of the national party organizations.

The committee system in the Chamber of Deputies is fairly weak, primarily because of the strong control over committee membership by the JCP. Committees are required to reflect the proportional distribution of seats in the entire Chamber as long as no party holds a majority, but the most important positions are the leadership positions. Formally, all bills must pass through a committee before coming to the floor. However, the Chamber can force a bill out of committee if it so desires (Rivera Sánchez, 2004). Nevertheless, committee leadership positions are important for individuals as the parties use them as rewards, and only leadership positions come with additional benefits for individuals, such as additional staff, financial resources, and agenda power (Rivera Sánchez, 2004). The party leaders are also strategic in their distribution of leadership positions, with the larger parties reserving the most important committees for themselves (Rivera Sánchez, 2004).

Examining the assignment of these key leadership positions in the Chamber of Deputies, it is readily apparent that legislators elected under PR lists hold a disproportionate

![Table 2](image)

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<th>No. of dual candidates (suplentes)</th>
<th>No. of dual candidates (mixed propietario and suplente)</th>
<th>% of all candidate openings</th>
<th>No. of winning dual candidates</th>
<th>No. of winning dual candidates (propietarios only)</th>
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<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>32.7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 PRI</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* (No. of dual candidates × 2)/(total no. of candidacies).

+ (No. of winning dual candidates)/no. of all dual candidates).

Candidate totals include minor party candidates in coalition with the PRI, PAN, or PRD.

The Senate is organized slightly differently, although the basic structures and the patterns described in the text generally apply to the Senate as well. Dual candidacy is reduced to 6 candidates that run simultaneously in both tiers (Article 8.3 of the Electoral Code). The MD is made up of one president, three vice-presidents, and a secretary. Candidates for the MD are proposed by each political party, and elected annually by a 2/3 floor vote (Ley Orgánica del Congreso General, hereafter LOCG, Art. 17–19).
number of the key leadership positions in Congress. The caucus leaders for each party are overwhelmingly drawn from the PR lists. The caucus leader position is the most important for the political party, as in addition to controlling a large amount of resources and having a large influence over the legislative agenda, caucus leaders are the most visible members of the Chamber and are constantly in the media. Caucus leaders are typically chosen to serve their entire term, and only on rare occasions have caucus leaders been changed mid-term (Béjar Algazi, 2005). In addition, nearly all of the Presidents of the MD have come from the PR lists.

The party leaders in the JCP have also given committee leadership positions to a disproportionate number of deputies elected under PR lists. Of the 17 committee leadership positions held by the PRI after 2000, about 59% of those positions were held by those from the PR lists, compared to only 37% of the PRI’s legislative delegation in the Chamber. Similarly, of the 19 seats awarded to the PRI in 2003, about 42% went to PR deputies, compared to 28% of PR seats held by the PRI’s legislative delegation, and of the 10 seats awarded to the PRI in 2006, 60% went to those on the PR lists. The PAN has adopted a similar strategy as the PRI in its assignment of committee chairs. In 2000 and 2003, the PAN gave slightly more leadership positions to those on the PR lists compared to the distribution of seats by electoral tier for the party as a whole. In 2006, about 56% of committee chair positions went to deputies from the PR lists compared to only about 34% of PAN deputies elected under PR. In contrast to the PAN and the PRI, the PRD has been fairly equitable in its distribution of committee leadership positions across electoral tiers. For the PRD, the assignment of committee chairs to deputies elected under PR and SMD has been roughly in proportion to the number of seats each set of deputies held within the party.

The strategic use of the PR lists by the major political parties to maintain agenda control over their legislative blocs has not gone unnoticed by SMD legislators, the media, or reformers. While the PAN and the PRD have always relied on gaining seats through the PR lists, when the PRI lost a number of single-member districts in 2000, district legislators became angry over the preference shown towards PR legislators in the assignment of various leadership positions (Teherán, 2000). More recently, in the 2009 mid-term elections, one of the major concerns of the null vote movement that received heavy media coverage was the elimination of the PR lists. The general concern of the null vote movement was the perceived lack of representation citizens received by their legislators and the strong control the national party organizations exerted over the entire candidate selection process (Alemán, 2009; Cuevas, 2009; Jiménez, 2009).

One study that has looked at the committee assignment process has found no evidence that the PR legislators are more or less likely to receive a committee leadership position (Aparicio and Langston, 2009). However, they define their dependent variable in such a way as to give equal status to committee chairs and secretaries. They also ignore the important role of caucus leaders and MD presidents in the legislative process. However, it remains to be seen if this qualitative assessment of leadership assignment holds up in a multivariate model.

5. Data and methods

To test my hypotheses regarding the empirical implications of the three competing theories of mixed systems, I gathered roll call data for all recorded votes taken in Mexico’s lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, from the fall of 2000 to the spring of 2009.7 I also gathered data on all bills initiated by deputies during this time period, on committee assignments, and on leadership assignments to the MD and the JCP within the Chamber. This time period encompasses the entirety of the LVIII, LIX, and LX Legislatures. The first two legislatures occurred under Vicente Fox’s (PAN) presidential term, while the LX Legislature encompasses the first three years of President Felipe Calderón’s (PAN) term. From this data, I coded the individual behavior of all legislators of the three major parties, the PAN, the PRI, and the PRD. Mexico’s Senate is also an important body, however I restrict my analysis to the lower house as electronically recorded roll call votes are not currently available for the upper house.

5.1. Dependent variables

I define four different dependent variables. For the 1st hypothesis regarding party discipline, the dependent variable is the party unity score for an individual legislator. It is a percentage that was calculated by taking the number of times the legislator voted the same position as the majority of their party, divided by the total number of actual votes taken.8 The average party unity score across all legislators in the dataset was 92.4 percent, suggesting a very high rate of party discipline in the Mexican Congress. To test the first hypothesis, I restrict the analysis to party votes. In the American context of a two-party system, party votes are considered votes where a majority of one party opposes the majority of the other party (Cox and McCubbins, 1993). In a multiparty context, this definition is not as useful. Therefore, following Weldon (2008), I define a party vote in Mexico as when the majority of voting members of at least one of the three major parties opposes the majority of voting members of another major party.9 I use Ordinary Least Squares regression to test hypothesis 1, as party unity score is a continuous measure, ranging from 0 to 1.

To test the 2nd hypothesis related to participation, I use two different dependent variables. Both are count variables that count the number of bills initiated by an individual

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8 Absences were excluded from the calculation except for three votes where the PAN decided to boycott the vote. Abstentions were considered as voting against the party’s position, except in cases where a party’s position was abstention.
9 The restriction to voting members only is critical. There is a high absentee rate within the Chamber of Deputies, and since these absences are for a variety of reasons, it makes little sense to include them. Furthermore, bills pass in the Chamber of Deputies by a majority of those present. Unlike other countries, where legislators can ‘vote with their feet’ (Haspel et al., 1998), missing a vote in Mexico is not commonly considered strategic behavior (Weldon, 2008).
legislator. In Mexico, bills are divided between iniciativas (initiatives) and propuestas con punto de acuerdo (propositions). Initiatives are formal bills and involve substantive legislation, such as Constitutional reform, proposing a new law, or reforming an existing law. Propositions are not actual legislation, but are pronouncements made by individual legislators on political, cultural, economic and social matters. Many times, propositions are requests to direct funding towards a particular project in a municipality or state, but can also serve as a form of credit claiming or position taking by individual legislators on controversial issues. Both initiatives and propositions are turned over to the relevant committee and voted upon on the floor if they receive enough support. The first dependent variable is a count of the number of initiatives sponsored or cosponsored by an individual legislator, which serves as a measure of legislative activity directed towards national issues. The median number of initiatives sponsored or cosponsored by an individual is two bills. The second dependent variable is a count of the number of propositions sponsored or cosponsored by an individual, and serves as a measure of legislative activity directed towards parochial concerns. The median number of propositions sponsored by individual legislators is three. The analysis of proposition sponsorship is limited to the LX and LXII Legislatures, as electronic records of propositions in the LVIII Legislature are not available. For both dependent variables, I use negative binomial regression to test hypothesis 2.

For the third hypothesis, I use a dichotomous measure to capture the possession of a major leadership position within the Chamber of Deputies. I define a leadership position as any legislator who served as a caucus leader, served as president of the MD, or held a committee chair. Leadership is coded 1 for any legislator who held one of these positions, 0 otherwise. I use logistic regression to test hypothesis 3.

5.2. Independent variables

The main independent variable, electoral tier, is dichotomous and coded 1 for PR, 0 SMD. I control for ideology using W-NOMINATE scores (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997). I only use the first coordinate as previous work on the Mexican Congress suggests a left-right ideological continuum is the primary dimension along which individual legislators divide (Greene, 2002; Jiménez Badillo, 2006). I use the W-NOMINATE scores in two different ways. First, W-NOMINATE scores are recoded to measure each individual legislator’s distance from the caucus leader for their respective party. I expect that individual legislators that are ideologically further away from their caucus leaders will be less disciplined, participate more in the formal bill initiation process (Hall, 1996) and be less likely to hold a leadership position. Second, I include a W-NOMINATE measure that captures the individual legislator’s ideological distance from the chamber median. I expect legislators that are further away from the chamber median to be more likely to engage in formal bill sponsorship activity and less likely to hold a leadership position.

I also control for the influence of dual candidacy on party discipline, participation, and leadership selection. Dual candidacy is also dichotomous, and coded 1 for those legislators who ran in both tiers. Since there is no evidence regarding the strategic placement of candidates on both lists, I do not expect the dual candidacy variable to be significant. Also included are controls for party identification (dummy variables for PAN and PRD), legislative term (dummy variables for the 2003–2006 term, and the 2006–2009 term), and if the legislator was a principal office holder or an alternate (coded 1 if an alternate). Although alternates have been largely ignored in studies of the Mexican Congress, I expect them to be somewhat more disciplined as they have a much lower standing within the party than principal office holders and likely face greater incentives to demonstrate their loyalty to party leaders. I exclude alternates when testing hypotheses 2 and 3, as they engage in very little legislative activity and hold hardly any leadership positions. Finally, I include a dummy variable for individual legislators that held leadership positions within Congress in the party discipline model, and separate dummies for party leaders and committee leaders in the participation models. Descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables used in the analysis are available in the Appendix.

6. Results

Table 3 displays the results from the tests of the three hypotheses. I discuss each hypothesis in order, beginning with party discipline. The results in Model 1 provide a test of hypothesis 1, and suggest the electoral system has little impact on party discipline, supporting the expectations of both the worst of both worlds and contamination theories. I find that after controlling for party, legislative tier, dual candidacy, and being an alternate, PR deputies are no more disciplined than SMD deputies. I also find that the PAN and the PRD are both significantly more disciplined than the PRI on party votes. PAN deputies have about a 5.6% higher party unity score than members of the PRI, and PRD deputies have a party unity score that is 3.3% higher than PRI deputies, holding all else constant. PAN deputies are also significantly more disciplined than members of the PRD.

10 While it is not exactly correct to assume that initiatives only deal with national concerns and propositions with parochial concerns, there is some overlap, it is fair to suggest that parochial concerns are more likely to be expressed through propositions than initiatives. Since there is overlap, using these two types of bills actually provides a tougher test of my hypothesis. If I do find differences across PR and SMD legislators, it is likely these differences would be greater if each individual bill was coded as dealing with national or parochial concerns.
11 More extreme members should be more likely to engage in formal activities as a way to signal their preferences, since they are less likely to be able to achieve their goals through informal means (Hall, 1996).
12 Since the dependent variable, party unity score, and the W-NOMINATE score are both derived from roll call votes, I ran another model, not included here, predicting party discipline that excluded the W-NOMINATE scores in order to determine if including W-NOMINATE scores significantly affected the interpretation of my results. I found that the inclusion of a W-NOMINATE score does not significantly affect the results, and produces a model substantively similar to that presented in Model 1. The only substantial difference between the two models is the coefficient for Alternate fails to reach standard levels of significance.
13 This difference was determined through a post-estimation test for the equality of coefficients between the PAN and the PRD. Chi-square test significant at the $p < .001$ level.
Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DV: Party unity score</td>
<td>0.0052</td>
<td>0.1541**</td>
<td>−0.1852**</td>
<td>0.7870***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0037)</td>
<td>(0.0681)</td>
<td>(0.0814)</td>
<td>(0.0652)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DV: Initiatives</td>
<td>−0.0051</td>
<td>−0.0201</td>
<td>0.3666</td>
<td>−0.1023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0099)</td>
<td>(0.1877)</td>
<td>(0.2287)</td>
<td>(0.2507)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DV: Propositions</td>
<td>0.0330***</td>
<td>0.1843</td>
<td>0.2803**</td>
<td>0.1880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0050)</td>
<td>(0.1258)</td>
<td>(0.1375)</td>
<td>(0.2549)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DV: Leadership</td>
<td>0.0562***</td>
<td>−0.3622***</td>
<td>−0.2362***</td>
<td>−0.0077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0041)</td>
<td>(0.0887)</td>
<td>(0.1253)</td>
<td>(0.2786)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003–2006 Congress</td>
<td>0.0538***</td>
<td>0.9177***</td>
<td>0.0231</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0044)</td>
<td>(0.0842)</td>
<td>(0.2471)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006–2009 Congress</td>
<td>0.0789***</td>
<td>1.5066***</td>
<td>0.4396***</td>
<td>−0.1564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0045)</td>
<td>(0.0810)</td>
<td>(0.0850)</td>
<td>(0.2617)</td>
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<td>Alternate</td>
<td>0.0165**</td>
<td>0.0142**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0065)</td>
<td>(0.0062)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party leader</td>
<td>0.7787***</td>
<td>−0.0572</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.2341)</td>
<td>(0.2737)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee leader</td>
<td>0.1638</td>
<td>−0.1045</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1159)</td>
<td>(0.1369)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W-Nominate distance</td>
<td>−0.0232**</td>
<td>0.0410</td>
<td>0.5555**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from party leader</td>
<td>(0.0090)</td>
<td>(0.2164)</td>
<td>(0.2489)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W-Nominate distance</td>
<td>0.5176***</td>
<td>0.4473**</td>
<td>−0.6831</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from chamber median</td>
<td>(0.1864)</td>
<td>(0.2218)</td>
<td>(0.5054)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party unity score</td>
<td>4.001**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.8494***</td>
<td>0.3352***</td>
<td>1.1111***</td>
<td>−5.8936***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0041)</td>
<td>(0.0975)</td>
<td>(0.1258)</td>
<td>(1.5066)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted/</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>66.42***</td>
<td>376.90***</td>
<td>80.51***</td>
<td>28.70***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR chi-square</td>
<td>1536</td>
<td>1371</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>1371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>Negative Binomial</td>
<td>Negative Binomial</td>
<td>Logit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ****p < .001 level; ***p < .01 level; **p < .05 level; *p < .10 level.

Dual candidacy seems to have little to no impact on party discipline, which is consistent with findings from the Ukraine (Ferrara et al., 2005: 110), but unlike Italy, where dual candidacy seems to weaken party discipline (Ferrara et al., 2005: 116). Since dual candidacy is so low, this finding is expected. Alternates have a party unity score that is about 1.6% higher than principal office holders, according to Model 1. This finding may suggest that alternates feel they have a weaker standing within the party, or feel they have less discretion in their votes, than principal legislators. Congressional leaders are, as expected, significantly more disciplined than rank and file legislators. Also as expected, I find that legislators that are further away ideologically from the caucus leaders are less disciplined. Finally, I find that the legislators in the LIX and LX Legislatures were much more disciplined than those who served in the LVIII Legislature. The significant finding of legislative term might suggest some significant uncertainty among legislators and the major parties following the important 2000 presidential election where the PAN defeated the PRI after 70 years of single-party dominance.

The results in Models 2 and 3, which test hypothesis 2, are consistent with expectations from the best and worst of both worlds theories. In Model 2, I find that PR legislators are significantly more likely to sponsor or cosponsor initiatives in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies in contrast to SMD legislators. Model 3 also shows a significant relationship between electoral tier and the number of propositions sponsored or cosponsored by legislators. I find SMD legislators are more likely to sponsor propositions compared to PR legislators. In addition to the effect for the main independent variable of interest, I also find some interesting party and temporal effects. Regarding initiatives and propositions, I find the PAN is less likely to sponsor initiatives than the PRI and the PRD, which might suggest the PAN is deferring to the President during this time period (since the President is from the PAN during these three terms). The PRD is also more likely to sponsor propositions than the PRI and the PAN.14 The consistent finding for the center-left PRD across Models 2 and 3 likely reflects the PRD’s use of the legislative process to take strong positions to differentiate themselves from the center-right PAN and the centrist PRI. When ideological distance from the chamber median is not included in Model 2, I also find the PRD is significantly more likely to introduce initiatives than the PRI. These effects for the PRI and the positive coefficients for both ideological measures in Models 2 and 3, suggest that more ideologically extreme legislators are significantly more likely to introduce formal bills as a form of position taking. I also find increased amounts of bill sponsorship in the more recent legislative terms, likely reflecting the growing importance of the Mexican Congress in the policymaking process after many years under a single-party regime.

Table 4 presents the substantive effects of the independent variables in Models 2 and 3. I find that PR legislators introduce about 17% more initiatives and 17% less propositions than SMD legislators. While the effects are somewhat modest, especially compared to the effects of party, time, and ideology, since the base level of bill initiation is so low in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, they are still substantively important.

These results of the two models predicting bill sponsorship are consistent with both the best of both worlds and the worst of both worlds. PR legislators are significantly more likely to allocate their legislative resources towards initiatives that have national implications and are likely to benefit the political party sponsoring the initiative. In contrast, SMD legislators are more likely to spend their time sponsoring propositions, which in many cases are used to request particularistic benefits for specific constituencies. These significant effects of mandate on sponsorship activity are especially surprising considering the prohibition against consecutive reelecton, yet it appears

14 The significant differences between the PAN and the PRD were determined by testing for the equality of coefficients after estimating the regression. The differences between the PAN and the PRD in Models 2 and 3 were significantly different according to an F test at the p < .001 level.
that even in the Mexican case, legislators are acting in ways one might expect to further their careers.

Turning to hypothesis 3, the results are presented in Model 4 of Table 3. I find that PR legislators are significantly more likely to be selected as either a caucus leader, president of the MD or receive a committee chairmanship. The only other significant variable is the measure of party discipline.15 I find that the more disciplined legislators are more likely to hold leadership positions. I do find that legislators that are ideologically closer to the chamber median are somewhat more likely to be chosen for a leadership position, but the variable is not statistically significant.16 These results are consistent with the worst of both worlds theory.

I use Clarify (King et al., 2000) to determine the predicted probability of obtaining a leadership position. For each major party, about ten percent of legislators that are not alternates hold one major leadership position in the Chamber of Deputies, and this ratio does not change across the three legislative terms in question. After holding all other variables at their mean or mode, I find that SMD legislators have about a seven percent predicted probability of obtaining a leadership position, while PR legislators have about a fourteen percent predicted probability of gaining a party or committee leadership position. This seven percent increase in predicted probability of getting a leadership position holds across the three major parties and across the three legislative sessions.

In results not shown here, I re-run the model that removes the electoral tier dummy and includes a dummy variable for only those legislators that occupied the first five positions on the PR list. I find that controlling for list position drastically increases the explanatory power of the model, and the predicted probability of holding a leadership position after occupying one of the first five list positions increases to 25%. These results suggest that not only do the three major political parties strategically use the presence of the PR lists to place their preferred candidates in the most important leadership positions within the Chamber of Deputies, they also are strategic in their placement of these candidates on the list. The general picture of the Chamber of Deputies is one where the legislative agenda and resources are controlled by those legislators elected under the PR lists, and who in turn are directly chosen by the national party organizations. These initial findings conform to the logic of the worst of both worlds rather than to the best of both worlds or contamination interpretation of mixed systems.

7. Conclusion

I have presented three competing theories regarding the legislative consequences of mixed electoral systems. While I find some support for each of the three theories, I only find consistent support for the worst of both worlds theory presented by Bawn and Thies (2003). The strongest evidence in support of the notion that the electoral system does have legislative consequences comes from the results of who is most likely to obtain powerful leadership positions within the Chamber of Deputies. These results conform most closely to the worst of both worlds theory of mixed systems. I also find support for the worst of both worlds interpretation when I examined participation in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies. My findings suggest SMD legislators allocate more time towards credit-claiming activities that can help bring benefits to particular constituencies, while PR legislators spend more time drafting legislation that serves national party interests. Finally, I find evidence to support the worst of both worlds viewpoint in finding minimal differences across electoral tiers in terms of party discipline. While more recent studies of mixed systems have privileged the contamination and evidence to support the worst of both worlds interpretation (Ferrara et al., 2005; Crisp, 2007) over the theoretical alternatives, this case study of Mexico’s lower house should give pause to the notion that legislators in mixed systems do not differ according to mandate.

As mentioned before, the presence of the PR lists in Mexico is coming under increasing scrutiny. The results presented here do provide some justification for this growing discontent with the electoral system. If the worst of both worlds theory is an accurate portrayal of Mexico’s electoral system, this paints a picture of the Mexican legislature that is highly partisan, with strong control over congressional leadership and major legislative activity by the national party organizations. National party leaders pick the candidates who occupy the PR lists, and these candidates then exert substantial control over the legislative agenda.

The limited use of dual candidacy and the nature of candidate selection, the two most likely reasons why differences across tier are observed in Mexico, suggest the problem does not necessarily lie with the electoral rules per

Table 4
Substantive effects of independent variables from Models 2 and 3 on bill initiation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Percent change in no. of initiatives introduced for a 1 unit change in X</th>
<th>Percent change in no. of propositions introduced for a 1 unit change in X</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral tier</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>–16.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual candidacy</td>
<td>–2.0%</td>
<td>44.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>–30.4%</td>
<td>–21.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003–2006 Congress</td>
<td>150.4%</td>
<td>55.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006–2009 Congress</td>
<td>351.1%</td>
<td>74.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party leader</td>
<td>117.9%</td>
<td>–5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee leader</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>–9.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W-Nominate</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>74.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>distance from party leader</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W-Nominate distance from chamber median</td>
<td>67.8%</td>
<td>56.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Variables are in bold if they were significant at least at the $p < .05$ level in Table 3.

15 I use the party unity score here instead of the W-NOMINATE distance from the party leader since being a party leader is part of what I am trying to explain in the dependent variable.

16 In models not shown here, I ran variations of Model 4 without the party unity score, and without the W-NOMINATE score measuring distance from the chamber median, since both of these variables are derived from the same source of data, roll call votes. Including only one of these variables produces results substantively similar to those presented in Model 4, and do not affect my interpretation of the influence of electoral tier on obtaining leadership positions. Party unity score and distance from the chamber median are weakly correlated at 0.19.
se, but rather with their implementation by the major political parties. While some are arguing for the elimination or reduction of the PR legislators (Robles de la Rosa, 2009), this solution ignores the potentially negative consequences of a return to single-party dominance in the legislature. What criticisms of the PR lists have ignored is the specialization by tier that is prevalent in Mexico. As the worst of both worlds theory recognizes, the limited use of dual candidacy is the major difference between Mexico and other mixed systems that might help explain the findings presented here. Other solutions in Mexico might consider increasing the use of dual candidacy, or forcing the PR candidates to campaign similar to the ‘best-loser’ provision used in Japan (Bawn and Thies, 2003).

The other potential reason why the evidence from Mexico conforms most closely to the worst of both worlds theory is the differing nature of candidate selection across the two electoral tiers (Langston, 2008; Wuhs, 2006). With PR candidates selected by the national party leadership, and SMD candidates selected by state and local leaders, or through primaries, it is possible each type of legislator responds to a different constituency or follows a distinct career path, leading to a difference in behavior across tiers.

This study has also found opportunities for future research regarding mixed electoral systems in general, and Mexico’s electoral system in particular. First, there is a need to look at a greater number of indicators of legislative participation across all the major parties in Mexico. More work needs to be done on committee behavior and bill sponsorship to better determine if electoral institutions have any impact on the representation of more localized interests in the legislature. Second, what seems to be the most unexplored avenue of research is the impact of mixed electoral rules on legislative organization. A comparative perspective on legislative organization across a wider range of cases would allow for greater theorizing and greater empirical knowledge regarding the potential consequences of mixed systems.

Acknowledgments

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Appendix A. Descriptive statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party unity score</td>
<td>0.924</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiatives introduced</td>
<td>4.314</td>
<td>6.718</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1622</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propositions introduced</td>
<td>4.342</td>
<td>6.041</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1085</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership (leaders = 1)</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee chairs (Chair = 1)</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral tier (PR = 1)</td>
<td>0.352</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRI (PRI member = 1)</td>
<td>0.386</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN (PAN member = 1)</td>
<td>0.415</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRD (PRD member = 1)</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual candidacy (dual candidate = 1)</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternate (Alternates = 1)</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1621</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

References

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Rodríguez Araujo, O., 1989. La reforma política y los partidos en Mexico. Siglo Veintiuno Editores, México, D.F.


