

The Influence of Spanish-Language Media on Latino Public Opinion and Group Consciousness*

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Objective. This article determines if the use of Spanish-language media among Latinos influences public opinion on various policy issues and group consciousness. *Methods.* Using a 2004 national public opinion survey of U.S. Latinos, a multivariate analysis is run to determine the effect of language media preference on immigration policy, abortion, same-sex marriage, and three measures of group consciousness. *Results.* I find more frequent use of Spanish-language media leads to more liberal attitudes toward immigration, but has no effect on opinions toward abortion and same-sex marriage. I also find increased use of Spanish-language media leads to increased levels of group consciousness. *Conclusions.* The differences in attitudes are due to the diverging goals of Spanish-language and English-language media. The effect of using Spanish-language media serves to promote a sense of group consciousness among Latinos by reinforcing roots in Latin America and the commonalities among Latinos of varying national origin.

Do Latinos who prefer Spanish-language media over English-language media have significantly different views about politics? If so, what are the consequences? Several studies have suggested that Spanish-language media, and ethnic media in general, is significantly different than English-language general-market media in its portrayal of various policy issues (Dávila, 2001; Molina Guzmán, 2006; Moran, 2006; Subervi-Vélez, 1999; Veciana-Suarez, 1990). In addition, some scholars have suggested that media in general can influence political attitudes in significant ways (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987), while others have suggested that the fragmenting of television audiences can have important implications for political behavior (Morris, 2007). However, it is not clear if Latinos are influenced by the different types of political communication they receive through English- and Spanish-language media.

The existing research that attempts to make a link between language and public opinion has not made a strong theoretical case for why language and use of ethnic media should influence attitudes. A number of scholars have

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argued that use of ethnic media leads to stronger ethnic identity (Subervi-Vélez, 1986, 1999; Moran, 2006; Ríos and Gaines, 1998; Jeffres, 2000; Dávila, 2001; Rodríguez, 1999), although the empirical evidence at the individual level is not strong. One study that tests this relationship finds that the use of ethnic media among Asians and Latinos is not a significant predictor of group consciousness (Masuoka, 2006). At a more general level, some scholars have found that stronger Spanish-speaking ability is related to greater panethnic identification (Jensen et al., 2006), while Sanchez (2006:441–42) found that more English-proficient Latinos favor more restrictive policies on immigration and are less supportive of bilingual education. Yet, the theoretical reasons for why language proficiency is related to political attitudes is not clear, nor has previous research found convincing empirical evidence linking the use of Spanish-language media to systematic differences in opinion within the Latino community.

In sum, there is not much literature that links the Spanish language and use of ethnic media to public opinion. While literature coming from the disciplines of communications and marketing suggests that language and the use of ethnic media might matter for public opinion, political science research suggests much more mixed effects. In these studies, language is seen more as a proxy for the level of cultural assimilation into the United States, and the one study that considered the use of ethnic media found no convincing evidence that it matters for understanding minority politics (e.g., Masuoka, 2006). Moreover, language and the use of media were not the main theoretical interest of this research. The current study is an attempt to add to this literature in a more theoretically compelling way. I argue that Latinos who primarily use Spanish-language media have significantly different views about politics in the United States than those who mainly rely on English-language sources for information. This difference in attitudes is due to the diverging goals of Spanish-language and English-language media, leading Spanish-language media to focus more on ethnically salient issues and frame political debates in ways that resonate with Latinos. The effect of using Spanish-language media serves to promote a sense of group consciousness among Latinos living in the United States by reinforcing Latino roots in Latin America and the commonalities among U.S. Latinos from different national backgrounds. This argument is tested using a 2004 national public opinion survey of Latinos.

The rest of this study is organized as follows. I first review prior research on media, language, and politics from a diverse set of fields. I examine literature from sociolinguistics that emphasizes the social content of language, and the link between language and identity. Then I look at research from the fields of journalism, communications, and marketing that has more thoroughly studied the role of ethnic media in the United States. Finally, I tie together the link between ethnic media and panethnic identity suggested by communications scholars with the group consciousness literature in political science. Second, I examine a number of relationships between Spanish-language media and political attitudes using data from the Pew

Hispanic Center. I look at the impact of media use on ethnic policy issues (i.e., immigration policy), nonethnic policy issues (i.e., abortion and same-sex marriage), and on Latino group consciousness. I find that Latinos who use Spanish-language media have more liberal views about immigration policy and an increased level of Latino group consciousness. I find no effect for the type of media used on attitudes toward more general issues.

Language, Identity Politics, and Ethnic Media

Language use is not only related to ability, but to a number of other factors, such as historical, geographical, and social contexts, social class, and identity politics. The field of sociolinguistics has argued that language has social content and is related to the social situation in which the act of speech takes place. Especially among bilinguals, language choice is related to the level of appropriateness assigned to each language based on social context (Fishman, 1972; Ma and Herasimchuk, 1979). Language, according to sociolinguistic scholars, has a social function and the use of a particular language must be understood in relation to the historical context and the speech practices of particular communities (Canagarajah, 2000; Mills, 1984). In short, as argued by Murray Edelman: “Language is always an intrinsic part of some particular social situation; it is never an independent instrument or simply a tool for description. By naively perceiving it as a tool, we mask its profound part in creating social relationships and in evoking the roles and the ‘selves’ of those involved in the relationship” (1984:45).

At least one scholar has suggested that Latinos make a conscious choice to use Spanish, regardless of language ability, to affirm their ethnic identity, resist “Americanization,” and defend themselves against racism (Nevaer, 2004). However, the empirical basis for this argument is somewhat weak. Others have suggested that social class must be considered when explaining language use among Latinos, with higher socioeconomic status related to the use of English, while poverty is linked to the maintenance of Spanish (Elías-Olivares, 1979). Language choice among Latinos is a complex phenomenon that is only partly related to ability. Within the Latino community, choosing Spanish or English is a signal to others about identity.

The relationship of the Spanish language to Latino identity is contested by many scholars and activists (Jensen et al., 2006; Johnson, 2000; Sinclair, 1999), but there is some consensus about the importance of language use by ethnic media. Subervi-Vélez (1986) has argued that the use of Spanish-language media by Latinos serves the twin goals of cultural assimilation and integration into the dominant society, and the maintenance of a distinct ethnic identity (see also Moran, 2006; Subervi-Vélez, 1999). Ríos and Gaines (1998) suggest that Latino media serves group-based and cultural needs not otherwise met in English-language media, while Jeffres (2000) has

found in a longitudinal study of white ethnic groups that use of ethnic media led to increased ethnic identification over time.

Arlene Dávila (2001) and América Rodríguez (1999) have both argued that Hispanic media in the United States is designed to “de-nationalize” Latinos for the purpose of creating a panethnic identity that erases differences based on national origin. Spanish-language media also uses Latin-America-based content as a symbolic and cultural referent to maintain a connection to the “homeland” (Dávila, 2001:101, 159–60), and strengthen Latino cultural identity. Hispanic media owners and operators view themselves as spokespersons and advocates for the entire U.S. Latino population, and place a special emphasis on the Spanish language as a tool for promoting and maintaining a group-based Latino identity (Dávila, 2001:156–65; Veciana-Suarez, 1990:17). In short, two assumptions are made by those who create Latino-specific media and those who design marketing strategies aimed at Latinos. First, language is assumed to be the critical component of Latino identity and, second, the use of Spanish is key for reaching U.S. Latinos (Dávila, 2001:4).

If, as many scholars have suggested, ethnic media is designed to promote panethnic identity, then one might expect that the use of Spanish-language media should be related to a sense of group consciousness among Latinos. Scholars of racial and ethnic politics in the United States are interested in group consciousness primarily because of its influence on political attitudes and behavior (Miller et al., 1981; Dawson, 1994; Stokes, 2003; Masuoka, 2006; Sanchez, 2006). Sanchez (2006:437, citing Garcia, 2003) defines group consciousness as “instances when a group maintains a sense of affinity and group identification with other members of the group, which leads to a collective orientation to become more politically active.” Group consciousness is more than identification with a particular group; it includes a sense of political awareness that the individual political and economic fortunes of group members are linked. In a study of group consciousness among African Americans, Michael Dawson (1994:64) considers access to black information sources as one important component predicting a sense of group consciousness. Although Dawson does not have adequate measures to test this theoretical relationship, it is possible that in the case of Latinos, access to Spanish-language media designed to give special emphasis to Latino issues will influence perceptions of common group interests among Latinos.

There is significant evidence to suggest that news coverage in Spanish-language media is very different from its English-language counterpart. For example, Kristin Moran (2006) compared local news broadcasts in Spanish and English in the San Diego area, and found significant differences in the type of content covered. Compared to English-language broadcasts, Moran (2006:397) found that the Spanish broadcasts had significantly more coverage of local, national, and international politics, and a much greater number of stories related to border issues and immigration. Despite the proximity of San Diego to the Mexican border, Moran found it surprising that coverage of immigration and the border was virtually nonexistent in the

English-language local news. When the English broadcasts did deal with Latino-related issues, the stories tended to exaggerate the differences between Latinos and Anglos, and served the purpose of creating an “us versus them” mentality (Moran, 2006:400).

Spanish-language media also seems to dedicate more coverage to service-oriented activities that benefit Latinos. Moran found that Spanish-language stations, during an election season, provided much more coverage on the issues and candidates, and information on where and how to vote. This type of information was largely absent from English-language broadcasts (Moran, 2006:398). In terms of health coverage, Subervi-Vélez (1999) found that Spanish-language television made a specific effort to link health-related coverage to Latinos, which allowed the audience to connect the information to their own values and norms.

Finally, a few studies have found differences in coverage of immigration policy between English- and Spanish-language media (Branton and Dunaway, 2008; Abrajano and Singh, 2009). Branton and Dunaway (2008), in a content analysis of Spanish- and English-language newspapers from California, found that for the period of March 2004 through March 2005, Spanish-language papers produced significantly more coverage of immigration issues, and were less likely to focus on the negative aspects of immigration compared to English-language papers. Similarly, Abrajano and Singh (2009), in a content analysis of television news transcripts of major English- and Spanish-language networks from early 2004, found that the large majority of stories about immigration adopted a neutral tone, yet a larger percentage of Spanish-language stories adopted a pro-immigration stance compared to English-language stories. Both these studies suggest that ethnic media adopts different perspectives toward immigration compared to mainstream English-language media and, most important for this study, these effects are apparent around the time the data used for this study was collected.¹

Unfortunately, there does not seem to be any existing research that examines how Spanish-language media differs from English-language media in terms of nonethnically salient issues, such as abortion or same-sex marriage, and it is beyond the scope of this study to engage in content analysis of Spanish-language media. Research that does examine Latino public opinion toward these social issues suggests that noncitizens and Spanish-dominant Latinos tend to hold more conservative attitudes toward social issues (Leal, 2004; Sanchez, 2006). While speculative, the existing research might suggest that those Latinos who may be more likely to use Spanish-language media may hold more conservative attitudes toward abortion and same-sex marriage. What remains unclear is if Spanish-language media caters to these socially conservative attitudes,

¹The data used for this study come from a survey conducted from April 9 through June 21, 2004. The data from the Branton and Dunaway (2008) article focus on the period March 1, 2004 through March 1, 2005, while the data from the Abrajano and Singh (2009) article are limited to the period January 7 through February 15, 2004.

or steers clear of these issues altogether, and how, if at all, it differs in coverage compared to English-language media. Nevertheless, since existing studies suggest that one of the major goals of Spanish-language media is to promote a common ethnic identity among Latinos in the United States (Rodríguez, 1999; Dávila, 2001), it seems unlikely that Spanish-language media as a whole would adopt a systematically different stance toward issues unrelated to panethnic identity and may even avoid these particular issues in order to reduce potential conflicts among Latinos.

To what extent do these differences in coverage matter? While the impact of television on public opinion is certainly debated in the literature (Goldstein and Ridout, 2004), some ground-breaking studies have suggested that the mass media and television news influence the political attitudes of the public in important ways. Iyengar and Kinder (1987) argue that television news influences which social and political problems viewers regard as the most serious. Television media has the power to set the political agenda and shape public opinion (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987:16, 60; Zaller, 1992), although the impact of the media on public opinion is mediated by the level of political knowledge and awareness of viewers (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987:60; Zaller, 1992:266). Moreover, Domke, McCoy, and Torres (1999) find that when experimental subjects are presented with articles on immigration framed in ethical and material perspectives, the type of news frame to which subjects are exposed has a significant impact on their thinking about immigration. When their subjects were presented with ethical considerations regarding immigration policy, they were more likely to subsequently consider ethical perspectives when responding to questions about immigration, despite the dominance of material perspectives in English-language media. Although these authors did not address Spanish-language media, it is plausible that ethical considerations are much more likely to be present in Spanish media compared to English media, which might lead to a division in public opinion regarding immigration depending on the media source Latinos use for information.

There is not much consensus among researchers on how frequently Latinos use Spanish-language media. Among political strategists and campaign workers, the assumption has been that in order to reach Latino voters, campaigns need to create Spanish-language ads (Segal, 2003:12, 35–36). This assumption is based on marketing research that suggests Spanish-language advertising is more effective at getting its message across than English-language ads. In a 2006 study by the Roslow Research Group, it was found that Spanish ads were much more effective at creating ad recall, in communicating a message, and at persuading Hispanics compared to English ads. This study also suggests that these effects are not related to language comprehension. Even among bilingual households, Spanish ads were more effective (Roslow Research Group, 2006). This study is the third since 1994 that has reached nearly identical results (Nevaer, 2004:21–22). In the San Diego market, it has been argued that Latinos are not reachable through English-language media. Even among third- and fourth-generation Latinos,

these individuals use both English and Spanish media, although 85 percent prefer to communicate in Spanish (Calbreath, 2002; Moran, 2006). However, other studies have argued that Mexican Americans in Texas relied more on English media than Spanish media for news (de la Garza, Brischetto, and Vaughn, 1983; Subervi-Vélez, Herrera, and Begay, 1987). Ríos and Gaines (1998) suggest that, in general, Latinos who are most assimilated into the dominant culture mainly use English-language media, those who are bicultural tend to use both English and Spanish media, and those who identify as having a predominantly Latino heritage primarily use Spanish media.

This discussion suggests several important implications for differences between Spanish- and English-language media. First, the decision to use English or Spanish media may lead to differences in opinion regarding various issues of specific relevance to the Latino community as a whole. Those Latinos who use Spanish-language media should be more likely to be supportive of policies that favor Latinos as a group and strengthen or maintain their distinct cultural identity. Second, the use of Spanish-language media should lead to an increased sense of panethnic identity or group consciousness among Latinos compared to those who rely on English-language media. Finally, the influence of Spanish-language media should be mediated by socioeconomic status, region, national origin, and political interest.

Thus, I hypothesize that Latinos who primarily use Spanish media as a primary news source will have significantly different political attitudes regarding ethnically salient issues from those who privilege English-language sources for information. I hypothesize that greater reliance on Spanish-language media will lead to more liberal attitudes toward immigration and immigration policy. I test this hypothesis by looking at two different aspects of immigration: support for increased levels of immigration from Latin America, and whether undocumented immigrants working in the United States have a positive or negative effect on the economy.² It is expected that as use of English-language media increases, Latinos will be less likely to favor increased levels of immigration, and less likely to think undocumented immigrants have a positive effect on the economy.

To test the notion that differences between English- and Spanish-language media are only related to Latino-specific concerns, I test the influence of using Spanish-language media on attitudes toward two issues that are not considered ethnic-specific issues: abortion and same-sex marriage. This decision to look at nonethnically salient policy areas builds off the research design used in Sanchez (2006). I hypothesize that the language media used will have no influence on whether or not one thinks abortion should be legal, and whether or not there should be a constitutional amendment to

²I also tested the hypothesis on support for amnesty for undocumented immigrants. However, since there is little variation in this measure—over 90 percent of respondents favored amnesty—I dropped this dependent variable from the analysis. Nevertheless, the model performs as expected, with those who use Spanish-language media significantly more likely to support amnesty.

ban same-sex marriage, primarily because Spanish-language media is designed to promote a panethnic identity among Latinos. Attitudes toward issues unrelated to the primary goals of Spanish-language media organizations should not vary by language media choice.

Finally, I hypothesize that an increased use of Spanish-language media will lead to a greater sense of group consciousness. Measuring the concept of group consciousness is somewhat difficult. Therefore, following Sanchez (2006), I conceive of group consciousness as a multidimensional concept and model three separate dimensions of group consciousness: group commonality, an awareness of the group's relative position in society, and a desire to engage in collective action on behalf of that group (Sanchez, 2006).³ Group commonality is measured by the importance of Latinos maintaining a distinct culture, a group's relative position in society is measured by perceived level of discrimination, and a desire to engage in collective action is measured by an increased belief that Latinos are able to work together to achieve common political goals. Thus, it is expected that as use of English-language media increases, Latinos will be less likely to feel it is important to maintain a distinct Latino culture, less likely to perceive discrimination against Latinos as a problem, and less likely to believe Latinos can work together to achieve common political goals.

I hypothesize that use of Spanish-language media will have an influence on Latino public opinion; however, it is very possible that use of Spanish-language media is nothing more than a proxy for immigrant assimilation into the United States and, thus, use of Spanish media is highly correlated with the immigrant experience. If I find support for the above-stated hypotheses, it is still possible that differences in the immigrant experience, rather than variation in media usage, better explain the findings. To deal with this competing hypothesis, I employ a number of controls to capture variation in the immigrant experience that are thought to be important in the immigrant incorporation literature (e.g., Ramakrishnan, 2005). I control for generational status, as it has been found that first-generation Latinos differ in their attitudes and behavior compared to second, third, and later generations. Later generations are thought to be more assimilated into U.S. political culture and therefore should be more likely to hold attitudes closer to those expressed in English-language media. I also control for nativity, as Latinos born in the United States are likely to hold different attitudes than those born abroad. National origin is also important for understanding the immigrant experience. The major national-origin groups within the United States and in the survey used in this study are Mexicans, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans. Mexicans are the

³My measure of group commonality differs substantially from that used in Sanchez (2006). Sanchez (2006:438) uses responses to the question: "Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Latinos in the United States share FEW political interests and goals." Unfortunately, the survey data used here do not ask this or a similar question. I instead use a measure that taps into the importance of maintaining a distinct Latino culture in the United States.

largest national-origin group, and also the group most likely to have problems with immigration status compared to other groups. Cubans, in contrast, have received much more support from the U.S. political system and find it much easier to immigrate to the United States. Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens and thus have no trouble entering the United States. Finally, I also control for citizenship, as U.S. citizens are more likely to be assimilated into U.S. politics, more likely to speak English, and thus more likely to hold attitudes that are similar to those espoused in English-language media.

These are strong controls for the immigrant experience. If the above-stated competing hypothesis is accurate, then I should find no significant difference in attitudes based on media language choice after including these major dimensions of immigrant incorporation. However, if I do find a significant effect for media language, then I can be more certain that the choice of language media has an independent impact on attitudes above and beyond the immigrant experience.

Data

To test my hypotheses, I use a 2004 National Survey of Latinos conducted by the Pew Hispanic Center and the Kaiser Family Foundation. The survey is a nationally representative survey of 2,288 Latino adults living in the 48 contiguous states conducted by telephone between April 21 and June 9, 2004.⁴ Respondents were able to complete the survey in either English or Spanish: 53.5 percent of respondents elected to complete the survey in Spanish, 42.1 percent completed the survey in English, and the remaining 4.4 percent completed the survey in both languages. The large majority of respondents came from California (26.9 percent), Florida (25.1 percent), Texas (16.5 percent), and New York (8.4 percent), but there are respondents from 43 different states in the sample. This particular survey is ideal for arriving at differences in attitudes among Latinos as it excludes non-Latinos and, unlike many other nationally representative surveys, has an exceptionally large sample size. Moreover, this particular survey includes a number of relevant questions about media use and political attitudes.

Dependent Variables

Numerous dependent variables are used in the analysis to test the robustness of the influence of Spanish-language media use across a wide variety of attitudes. To measure opinion on the level of legal immigration into the United States from Latin America, I use a three-point categorical variable

⁴The “2004 National Survey of Latinos: Politics and Civic Participation” is publicly available at (<http://pewhispanic.org/datasets>).

where 1 represents those who think immigration should be reduced, 2 represents those who think immigration should remain the same, and 3 represents those who think legal immigration should increase.⁵ To measure the influence of undocumented immigrants on the economy, I use a question that asks if the respondent thinks undocumented immigrants help the economy by providing low-cost labor (coded 1) or hurt the economy by driving wages down (coded 0).⁶ Group commonality, or the importance for Latinos of maintaining a distinct culture, is measured on a four-point scale ranging from not important at all to very important.⁷ The level of discrimination is coded on a three-point scale, with 1 representing those who think discrimination is not a problem, 2 representing those who think discrimination is a minor problem, and 3 representing those who think discrimination is a major problem.⁸ The potential for Latino collective action is measured with a dichotomous variable where 1 represents those who felt Latinos are working together to achieve common political goals.⁹ To measure opinion on abortion, I code as 1 all respondents who said abortion should be legal in all or most cases, 0 otherwise.¹⁰ Finally, support for same-sex marriage is coded 1 for all respondents who oppose a constitutional amendment that would prohibit same-sex marriages and 0 if they favor an amendment.¹¹ Dichotomous measures are estimated using logistic regression and categorical measures are estimated using ordered probit.

Independent Variables

To measure my main independent variable of interest, I use the survey question: *In what language are the news programs you usually watch on TV or*

⁵“Do you think the United States should increase the number of Latin Americans allowed to come and work in this country legally, reduce the number, or allow the same number as it does now?”

⁶“Some people say undocumented or illegal immigrants help the economy by providing low-cost labor. Others say they hurt the economy by driving wages down. Which is closer to your views?”

⁷“How important is it for Latinos to maintain their distinct cultures—very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important?” Not everyone in the survey answered this question ($N = 1,127$). Therefore, in the multivariate analysis, there is a large difference in the total number of respondents between the model predicting answers for this question and the other models.

⁸“In general, do you think discrimination against Latinos is a major problem, minor problem, or not a problem in preventing Latinos in general from succeeding in America?”

⁹“Which comes closer to your views, Hispanics/Latinos from different countries today are working together to achieve common political goals or are not working together politically?”

¹⁰“On another subject, do you think abortion should be legal in all cases, legal in most cases, illegal in most cases, or illegal in all cases?”

¹¹“Do you favor or oppose a constitutional amendment that would define marriage as a union between one man and one woman thereby prohibiting legally sanctioned marriages for same sex couples?”

listen to on the radio? Only Spanish, more Spanish than English, both equally, more English than Spanish, or only English? This is a five-point scale where only English is coded 5. I control for language preference, which is coded 1 for Spanish and is based on the language in which the respondent answered the survey. In addition, I control for language ability, which is measured with dummy variables for bilingual Latinos and English-dominant Latinos, with Spanish-dominant Latinos being the omitted category.¹²

Finally, in order to address the possibility raised by Nevaer (2004) that ethnic identity may lead Latinos to choose Spanish-language media for ideological reasons, I control for the importance of the Spanish language to the individual respondent.¹³ Language importance is based on a question asking the individual how important it is for future generations of Latinos in the United States to speak Spanish. Language importance is coded on a four-point scale from not at all important to very important.

Controlling for language preference, ability, and importance provide a strong test of my hypotheses. If the use of Spanish-language media is purely a function of language ability, one would expect little effect for the use of ethnic media after controlling for language ability. Furthermore, after controlling for ability, if the use of Spanish-language media was primarily a reflection of one's preference for Spanish because of the importance of the Spanish language to one's identity, I would be unlikely to find a significant effect for media language preference after including this control. Finally, if individuals feel it is important to maintain the use of the Spanish language among U.S. Latinos, they should be much more likely to use Spanish-language media and thus I would likely find no effect for the language media use variable after controlling for language importance.

I also use a number of controls to capture the immigrant experience in order to determine if language media preference is nothing more than a proxy for one's experience and level of incorporation into the United States. First, I control for a respondent's nativity, as well as that of his or her parents. One might expect foreign-born Latinos of parents also born abroad to be more likely to use Spanish-language media than those who have substantial experience in the United States. Thus, I include a dummy variable for those born in the United States. The nativity of a respondent's

¹²Language ability is coded based on a composite index using self-reported ability to carry on a conversation in Spanish and English, and to read a newspaper or book in Spanish and English.

¹³Admittedly, there is likely an endogenous relationship between language media use and the dependent variables used in the analysis. Especially among bilingual Latinos, it is possible that particular attitudes lead these individuals to choose English- or Spanish-language media rather than the other way around as I have modeled it in this article. Future research should address this potential relationship. One way to address this problem would be to use a two-stage model to test for endogeneity (see Foster, 1997; Terza, Basu, and Rathouz, 2008). However, the current data set does not provide an adequate instrumental variable with which to perform the test.

parents is measured by dummy variables for those with one parent born outside the United States, and for those with both parents born outside the United States. Respondents with parents born in the United States are the excluded category. In addition to nativity, I control for those respondents who are U.S. citizens (coded 1 if a U.S. citizen). U.S. citizens are more likely to be assimilated into U.S. political culture and thus one might expect them to be more likely to use English-language media.

The final set of controls that captures the immigrant experience is a series of dummy variables measuring national origin. I include dummy variables for Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and other Central and South Americans. Mexicans are the excluded category. I expect all groups to be significantly more conservative in their policy attitudes toward immigration compared to Mexicans, as Mexicans are the largest national-origin group within the United States and their immigration experience is significantly different than that of many Cubans, and all Puerto Ricans.

A number of political controls are also included. Political interest is based on how much an individual respondent pays attention to politics and government. Interest is a four-point scale ranging from none (1) to a lot (4). Dummy variables for identifying as a Republican or Independent are included as well.¹⁴ The excluded category is Latinos who identified as Democrats. The attitudes toward immigration, abortion, and same-sex marriage can readily be identified with the stances of the Democratic and Republican Parties. I expect Republicans to favor more restrictive immigration policies, oppose legal abortions, and support a ban on same-sex marriage compared to Democrats. Regional controls are also included for living in the South, West, and Northeast, with the North Central region of the United States as the excluded category. I include regional controls to capture any potential variance in local political cultures due to variation in the makeup of Latino populations in different parts of the United States.

The other independent variables included as controls are fairly standard. Socioeconomic status is measured by education and income. Education is coded on a seven-point scale that ranges from less than high school to postgraduate education. Income is measured as a series of dummy variables measuring reported annual household income. I group together those making less than \$30,000, those making between \$30,000 and \$50,000, and those making between \$50,000 and \$75,000 per year. The excluded category is those Latinos making more than \$75,000 per year. Age is measured in years. Gender is a dummy variable coded 1 for female. I have no a priori expectations for education, income, age, or gender.

¹⁴Independents include those who identified as Independent, those who stated a party other than Republican or Democrat, and those who answered "don't know." Approximately 24 percent of the sample identified themselves as Independents, 11 percent as something else, and 10 percent responded with don't know. Twenty-one percent identified themselves as Republicans and 34 percent as Democrats.

When testing the hypotheses regarding abortion and same-sex marriage, I include an additional variable to capture religious belief.¹⁵ Strength of religious belief is measured by the frequency of attending religious services on a six-point scale from never to more than once a week. I expect those who attend services more often will be less supportive of legal abortion and oppose same-sex marriage.

Descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis are provided in the Appendix.

Results

I first present bivariate results in Table 1, looking at the relationship between media language preference and each of the seven dependent variables used in the analysis. In general, the bivariate relationships support the notion that among those who prefer Spanish-language media, Latinos are more likely to support an increase in the level of migration from Latin America and more likely to think undocumented immigrants help the U.S. economy. I also find initial support for my hypotheses regarding group consciousness. Latinos who more frequently use Spanish-language media are more likely to feel Latinos are working together toward common political goals, more likely to think that discrimination against Latinos is a major problem, and more likely to think maintaining Latino culture is very important. Moreover, the percentages across each category of media language preference are significantly different at the $p < 0.001$ level according to a Pearson's chi-square test.

Looking at the two nonethnically-specific issue areas, abortion and same-sex marriage, I find some somewhat surprising evidence that support for legal abortion is related to language media preference. Those who prefer Spanish-language media are less likely to support abortion. This relationship provides some initial disconfirmation of my hypothesis that ethnic media will not lead to differences in opinion toward nonethnically salient issue areas. However, as expected, I find no relationship between support for same-sex marriage and language media preference. It remains to be seen if the results in Table 1 hold up against a number of strong controls in the multivariate analysis.

Table 2 presents the results from a number of multivariate regressions examining the influence of language media preference on various aspects of immigration, abortion, and same-sex marriage. Overall, the models perform as expected, although the influence of media preference is somewhat weak. In the two immigration models, *Migration Level* and *Influence Economy*, I find that as Latinos are more likely to prefer English-language media, they

¹⁵The inclusion of this extra variable does not affect my results. If religious attendance is excluded from these models, media language is still insignificant.

TABLE 1
The Relationship Between Media Language and Various Indicators of Latino Public Opinion

| | Media Language | | | | | Total |
|---|----------------|---------------------------|----------------|---------------------------|----------------|-----------------|
| | Only Spanish | More Spanish than English | Both Equally | More Spanish than English | Only English | |
| Migration level (% increase)* | 41.5% (176) | 43.4% (111) | 37.7% (209) | 34.8% (109) | 25.5% (129) | 35.7% (734) |
| Influence economy (% help economy)* | 80.9% (351) | 79.8% (213) | 77.5% (419) | 66.7% (200) | 57.3% (291) | 71.9% (1474) |
| Abortion (% legalize)* | 39.9% (176) | 32.8% (89) | 49.6% (278) | 52.2% (164) | 59.7% (319) | 48.4% (1026) |
| Same-sex marriage (% oppose amendment) | 54.0% (222) | 52.3% (146) | 50.5% (267) | 48.5% (150) | 50.2% (258) | 51.1% (1043) |
| Group politics (% working together)* | 52.4% (223) | 50.2% (135) | 51.1% (283) | 43.4% (134) | 40.6% (210) | 47.5% (985) |
| Discrimination (% major problem)* | 60.9% (279) | 54.7% (157) | 57.3% (335) | 40.6% (132) | 32.7% (179) | 49.1% (1082) |
| Maintain Latino culture (% very important)* | 80.4% (181) | 77.9% (116) | 73.6% (228) | 62.6% (109) | 54.0% (141) | 69.3% (775) |

*Differences are significant according to Pearson's chi-square test at $p < 0.001$ level.
NOTE: Percentages are column percentages from individual cross-tabulations between media language and each individual dependent variable.

TABLE 2
The Influence of Spanish-Language Media on Latino Public Opinion

| | Dependent Variable | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------------|--------------------|------|-------------------|------|------------|------|-------------------|------|
| | Migration Level | | Influence Economy | | Abortion | | Same-Sex Marriage | |
| | Ordered Probit | SE | Logit | SE | Logit | SE | Logit | |
| Media language | -0.07 ** | 0.03 | -0.10 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.06 | -0.07 | 0.05 |
| Language preference | 0.35 **** | 0.11 | 0.65 **** | 0.23 | -0.19 | 0.19 | 0.02 | 0.19 |
| Importance of Spanish | 0.18 **** | 0.04 | 0.21 **** | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0.08 | -0.01 | 0.07 |
| Bilingual | 0.25 ** | 0.11 | 0.07 | 0.24 | 0.13 | 0.19 | -0.05 | 0.19 |
| English dominant | 0.29 ** | 0.14 | -0.11 | 0.30 | 0.29 | 0.26 | 0.03 | 0.25 |
| One parent born outside U.S. | 0.30 **** | 0.11 | 0.26 | 0.23 | 0.03 | 0.22 | -0.20 | 0.21 |
| Both parents born outside U.S. | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.19 | 0.21 | -0.08 | 0.19 | -0.44 ** | 0.18 |
| U.S. citizen | -0.04 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.20 | -0.13 | 0.17 | -0.33 ** | 0.16 |
| U.S. born | -0.33 **** | 0.11 | -0.79 **** | 0.22 | 0.06 | 0.20 | 0.21 | 0.19 |
| Other Central/South American | -0.20 ** | 0.09 | -1.08 **** | 0.20 | -0.05 | 0.17 | 0.11 | 0.16 |
| Puerto Rican | -0.49 **** | 0.12 | -1.63 **** | 0.25 | 0.18 | 0.23 | 0.74 **** | 0.22 |
| Cuban | 0.01 | 0.10 | -1.04 **** | 0.21 | 0.89 **** | 0.19 | 0.48 **** | 0.18 |
| Political interest | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.18 ** | 0.07 | 0.13 ** | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.06 |
| Republican | -0.25 **** | 0.08 | -0.33 | 0.17 | -0.55 **** | 0.16 | -0.57 **** | 0.15 |
| Independent/other party/don't know | 0.03 | 0.07 | 0.00 | 0.15 | -0.39 **** | 0.13 | -0.20 | 0.12 |
| Religious attendance | | | | | -0.36 **** | 0.04 | -0.09 ** | 0.04 |
| Female | -0.07 | 0.06 | -0.37 *** | 0.13 | 0.31 *** | 0.11 | -0.01 | 0.10 |
| Age | -0.01 *** | 0.00 | -0.01 *** | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Education | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.11 *** | 0.04 | 0.15 **** | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.03 |
| Income less than \$30,000 | -0.21 ** | 0.10 | -0.25 | 0.22 | -0.25 | 0.19 | 0.09 | 0.18 |

TABLE 2—continued

| | Dependent Variable | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|--------------------|------|-------------------|------|------------|------|-------------------|------|--|--|--|--|
| | Migration Level | | Influence Economy | | Abortion | | Same-Sex Marriage | | | | | |
| | Ordered Probit | SE | Logit | SE | Logit | SE | Logit | SE | | | | |
| Income \$30,000 to \$50,000 | -0.14 | 0.10 | -0.25 | 0.21 | -0.10 | 0.19 | 0.05 | 0.18 | | | | |
| Income \$50,000 to \$75,000 | -0.19 | 0.11 | -0.35 | 0.23 | -0.04 | 0.21 | 0.16 | 0.20 | | | | |
| South | -0.03 | 0.13 | -0.48 | 0.31 | -0.26 | 0.25 | -0.13 | 0.24 | | | | |
| West | -0.06 | 0.13 | 0.14 | 0.32 | -0.06 | 0.24 | -0.01 | 0.24 | | | | |
| Northeast | 0.19 | 0.15 | -0.27 | 0.34 | -0.11 | 0.28 | -0.21 | 0.27 | | | | |
| Constant | | | 1.59** | 0.62 | 0.86 | 0.54 | 0.47 | 0.52 | | | | |
| Cut 1 | -0.94 | 0.29 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Cut 2 | 0.67 | 0.28 | | | | | | | | | | |
| LR chi-square | 144.39**** | | 263.73**** | | 252.40**** | | 50.41**** | | | | | |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.05 | | 0.14 | | 0.11 | | 0.02 | | | | | |
| N | 1,623 | | 1,611 | | 1,655 | | 1,590 | | | | | |

****p < 0.001; ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05, two-tailed tests.

are significantly less likely to support an increase in levels of migration and less likely to think undocumented immigrants help the economy, even after controlling for a large number of factors. However, in the *Influence Economy* model, media language just misses the cutoff for conventional levels of significance, with a p value of 0.10. I also find, as expected, that language media preference is not a significant predictor of attitudes toward abortion and same-sex marriage. The relationship between language media preference and abortion policy found in Table 1 does not hold up in a multivariate analysis.

The significant effects for language media preference, at least in the *Migration Level* model, are all the more surprising given the controls for language preference, language ability, language importance, nativity, generational status, citizenship, and national origin. One would expect those who prefer to speak in Spanish and were not born in the United States to be more likely to use Spanish-language media and therefore face greater exposure to information from these media outlets that are sympathetic to immigrants and Latinos. Indeed, I do find significant effects for nativity, preferring Spanish, and the importance of maintaining the Spanish language on attitudes toward immigration. Latinos who are foreign born, prefer Spanish, and think maintaining Spanish among future generations of Latinos is important are significantly more likely to support increased levels of immigration, and feel that immigrants help the economy. However, my measures for generational status generally fail to reach conventional levels of significance, although the coefficients are positive and in the expected direction. In addition, I find that Latinos who are U.S. citizens do not have significantly different attitudes toward immigration than those who are not, although the effect of this variable is likely overwhelmed by the nativity variable. Finally, I have fairly robust findings regarding national origin, and all the coefficients are in the expected direction. Overall, it seems that Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and other Central and South Americans hold significantly more conservative attitudes toward immigration compared to Mexicans.

I also find my political variables to generally perform as expected. With regard to partisanship, Latino Republicans are significantly less likely to support increases in immigration. However, Latino Republicans are not significantly less likely to think that immigrants help the economy compared to Democrats, although the coefficient is in the expected direction. Among those who have higher levels of political interest, I find that politically interested Latinos are more likely to think that immigrants help the economy, but I find no effect for interest on support for increased levels of immigration.

Turning to the results of the abortion and same-sex marriage models, I find some interesting effects among the national-origin variables. I find Cubans are significantly more supportive of liberal positions on abortion and same-sex marriage compared to other national-origin groups. These results are somewhat surprising given the tendency among Cubans to vote

more Republican. It seems the socially conservative policy stances of the Republican Party have not had much influence on Cuban attitudes toward these issues. In terms of partisanship, I also find that Latino Republicans are less likely to support abortion and same-sex marriage, and my measure of religiosity also performs as expected. The more often Latinos attend church, the more likely they are to oppose abortion and same-sex marriage.

Table 3 presents the results for the three models examining different dimensions of group consciousness. The results in Table 3 provide stronger evidence of the influence of Spanish-language media on group consciousness. Specifically, I find that as Latinos are more likely to receive news in English, they are significantly less likely to think Latinos are working together toward common political goals. I also find that as the use of English-language news sources increases, Latinos are less likely to think discrimination against Latinos as a group is a problem and less likely to think maintaining a distinct Latino culture is important. Spanish-language media is much more likely to cover news stories of discrimination against Latinos and, as the previously cited literature has suggested, is much more likely to promote a notion that Latinos of different national origins have much in common and can work together.

In terms of the other variables, I do not find consistent effects across the three group consciousness models. Latinos who feel it is important to maintain the Spanish language among Latinos are significantly more likely to think maintaining a distinct Latino culture is important and more likely to think discrimination is a problem, but this variable has no significant effect on perceptions of Latinos working together for common political goals. I do find that Latino Republicans are less likely to think discrimination is a problem, and the coefficient is in the expected direction in the other two models. I also find that less educated and lower-income Latinos are more likely to feel Latinos are working together toward common political goals, although I find no significant effects for socioeconomic status on attitudes toward discrimination and maintaining a distinct Latino culture. In the maintaining Latino culture model, I find that Latinos who prefer Spanish, who were born in the United States, and who are U.S. citizens are more likely to think maintaining a Latino culture is important. These variables have no effect in the other two models. Finally, variables measuring generational status and national origin have little to no consistent effect on the various components of group consciousness.

Since the magnitude of the effects of language media preference are not readily apparent in Tables 2 and 3, I generated predicted probabilities using Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg, 2000) to examine the substantive influence of using Spanish-language media. I present the results of probabilities for Latinos who are bilingual and U.S. born since, as I understand it, this is the most likely group to have a choice between English- and Spanish-language media. To generate the predicted probabilities, I held all other variables at their median or mode, and generated separate probabilities

TABLE 3
The Influence of Spanish-Language Media on Latino Group Consciousness

| | Dependent Variable | | | | | |
|------------------------------------|--------------------|------|----------------|------|----------------------------|------|
| | Group Politics | | Discrimination | | Maintaining Latino Culture | |
| | Coefficient | SE | Coefficient | SE | Coefficient | SE |
| Media language | -0.14*** | 0.05 | -0.15**** | 0.03 | -0.12** | 0.05 |
| Language preference | -0.28 | 0.18 | -0.04 | 0.10 | 0.33** | 0.17 |
| Importance of Spanish | 0.13 | 0.07 | 0.15**** | 0.04 | 0.64**** | 0.06 |
| Bilingual | 0.15 | 0.18 | -0.03 | 0.10 | 0.04 | 0.18 |
| English dominant | 0.19 | 0.25 | -0.12 | 0.14 | 0.03 | 0.23 |
| One parent born outside U.S. | 0.09 | 0.21 | 0.21 | 0.11 | 0.04 | 0.17 |
| Both parents born outside U.S. | 0.11 | 0.18 | 0.14 | 0.10 | -0.16 | 0.16 |
| U.S. citizen | -0.05 | 0.16 | -0.05 | 0.09 | 0.31** | 0.15 |
| U.S. born | 0.06 | 0.19 | -0.07 | 0.10 | 0.34** | 0.17 |
| Other Central/South American | 0.12 | 0.16 | 0.02 | 0.09 | 0.30** | 0.15 |
| Puerto Rican | -0.16 | 0.22 | 0.08 | 0.12 | 0.37 | 0.19 |
| Cuban | 0.09 | 0.18 | -0.19** | 0.10 | 0.26 | 0.16 |
| Political interest | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.05 |
| Republican | -0.04 | 0.15 | -0.43**** | 0.08 | -0.03 | 0.13 |
| Independent/other party/don't know | 0.05 | 0.12 | -0.10 | 0.07 | -0.09 | 0.11 |
| Female | 0.12 | 0.10 | -0.05 | 0.06 | -0.04 | 0.09 |
| Age | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.01** | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Education | -0.13**** | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.03 |
| Income less than \$30,000 | 0.67**** | 0.19 | 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.24 | 0.16 |

TABLE 3—continued

| | Dependent Variable | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|--------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------------------|----------------|
| | Group Politics | | Discrimination | | Maintaining Latino Culture | |
| | Logit | Ordered Probit | Logit | Ordered Probit | Logit | Ordered Probit |
| | Coefficient | SE | Coefficient | SE | Coefficient | SE |
| Income \$30,000 to \$50,000 | 0.57*** | 0.18 | 0.21** | 0.10 | 0.14 | 0.15 |
| Income \$50,000 to \$75,000 | 0.37 | 0.20 | -0.03 | 0.11 | 0.01 | 0.17 |
| South | -0.11 | 0.23 | -0.19 | 0.13 | -0.25 | 0.22 |
| West | -0.19 | 0.23 | -0.16 | 0.13 | -0.21 | 0.21 |
| Northeast | -0.02 | 0.27 | -0.03 | 0.15 | -0.34 | 0.25 |
| Constant | -0.26 | 0.51 | | | | |
| Cut 1 | | | -1.33 | 0.28 | -0.30 | 0.45 |
| Cut 2 | | | -0.36 | 0.28 | 0.28 | 0.45 |
| Cut 3 | | | | | 1.62 | 0.45 |
| LR chi-square | 71.61**** | | 188.97**** | | 180.95**** | |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.03 | | 0.05 | | 0.13 | |
| N | 1,645 | | 1,727 | | 881 | |

****p < 0.001; ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05, two-tailed tests.

for those who prefer English or Spanish. Within each language preference group, I then generated probabilities by varying attitudes relating to the importance of maintaining the Spanish language from its minimum (not at all important) to its maximum (very important). The results are presented in Table 4.

Of the five attitudes examined in Table 4, I find fairly substantial effects for language media preference on levels of group consciousness and somewhat weaker effects for attitudes toward immigration. For example, support for increased levels of migration drops by about 6–10 percent from those who obtain their news only from Spanish-language sources to those who obtain their news only from English-language sources. In terms of immigrant influence on the economy, I find substantively similar effects, with a decrease of about 7–10 percent in the likelihood a Latino feels undocumented immigrants help the economy as one moves from using only Spanish media to using only English media. For both attitudes toward immigration, I find generally similar effects for language media use regardless of an individual's language preference or attitude toward maintaining the Spanish language. However, regardless of language media use, I also find that bilingual Latinos who prefer Spanish and feel that maintaining Spanish is very important have generally higher predicted probabilities of holding more liberal attitudes toward immigration.

Looking at the three components of group consciousness, I find fairly substantial effects for language media preference on perceptions toward discrimination and on perceptions of Latinos working together politically, and somewhat smaller effects on the importance of maintaining Latino culture. The largest effects for language media preference are seen in attitudes toward discrimination against Latinos. Latinos, regardless of their language preference and attitudes toward maintaining Spanish, have a 20–23 percent decrease in the likelihood they will view discrimination as a major problem as one switches from using only Spanish-language media to only English-language media. Latinos also have about a 13–14 percent decrease in the predicted probability that they feel Latinos are working together politically as they switch from using only Spanish-language to only English-language media. Finally, the probability of thinking it is very important to maintain Latino culture also drops by about 10–14 percent, depending on language preference and attitudes toward the Spanish language, as one switches from only using Spanish-language media to only using English-language media.

Conclusions

I have argued that Latinos who rely on Spanish-language media have significantly different views about politics in the United States compared to those Latinos who primarily use English-language media, and this difference

TABLE 4

Predicted Probabilities of the Influence of Media Language on Measures of Latino Public Opinion Among U.S.-Born Bilingual Latinos

| | Language Preference | Language Importance | Media Language | | | | | | % Change |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|----------------|---------------------------|--------------|---------------------------|--------------|-------|----------|
| | | | Only Spanish | More Spanish than English | Both Equally | More English than Spanish | Only English | | |
| Migration level (% increase) | Spanish | Not at all | 27.2% | 25.0% | 22.9% | 21.0% | 19.1% | 8.1% | |
| | English | Very | 47.5% | 44.9% | 42.3% | 39.7% | 37.2% | 10.3% | |
| Influence economy (% help economy) | Spanish | Very | 34.1% | 31.6% | 29.3% | 27.0% | 24.9% | 9.2% | |
| | English | Not at all | 70.6% | 68.5% | 66.3% | 64.0% | 61.6% | 9.0% | |
| Group politics (% working together) | Spanish | Very | 82.2% | 80.7% | 79.0% | 77.2% | 75.3% | 6.9% | |
| | English | Not at all | 56.3% | 53.8% | 51.3% | 48.7% | 46.2% | 10.1% | |
| Discrimination (% major problem) | Spanish | Very | 71.0% | 68.9% | 66.7% | 64.4% | 62.0% | 9.0% | |
| | English | Not at all | 54.0% | 50.6% | 47.2% | 43.8% | 40.4% | 13.6% | |
| Maintain Latino culture (% very important) | Spanish | Very | 62.9% | 59.7% | 56.3% | 52.9% | 49.5% | 13.4% | |
| | English | Not at all | 60.6% | 57.3% | 53.9% | 50.5% | 47.1% | 13.5% | |
| | Spanish | Very | 69.1% | 66.1% | 63.0% | 59.7% | 56.3% | 12.8% | |
| | English | Not at all | 43.1% | 37.5% | 32.2% | 27.3% | 22.8% | 20.3% | |
| | Spanish | Very | 60.0% | 54.4% | 48.6% | 43.0% | 37.4% | 22.6% | |
| | English | Not at all | 44.5% | 38.9% | 33.6% | 28.5% | 23.8% | 20.7% | |
| | Spanish | Very | 61.4% | 55.9% | 50.1% | 44.4% | 38.8% | 22.6% | |
| | English | Not at all | 30.1% | 26.1% | 22.3% | 18.9% | 16.0% | 14.1% | |
| | Spanish | Very | 90.9% | 88.9% | 86.5% | 83.7% | 80.6% | 10.3% | |
| | English | Not at all | 19.8% | 16.6% | 13.7% | 11.3% | 9.2% | 10.6% | |
| | | Very | 84.5% | 81.6% | 78.3% | 74.6% | 70.6% | 13.9% | |

NOTE: Percentages are the predicted probabilities of the influence of media language on each dependent variable based on the models presented in Tables 2 and 3. All other variables are held at their median or mode.

is due to variation in coverage between the two types of media. I found some evidence that the use of Spanish-language media impacts public opinion on immigration policy and stronger evidence that it influences perceptions of Latino group consciousness, but that it has little effect on political issues not specifically relevant to Latinos.

These results are important for understanding variation in Latino public opinion among ethnically salient issues that goes beyond traditional predictors such as national origin and socioeconomic status. This study also suggests a mechanism through which Latinos develop different attitudes toward immigration and group consciousness, which has not been subject to much previous empirical study. The increasing growth of the Latino population in the United States has seen a parallel growth in Latino media outlets that cater to this ever-growing community. Students and scholars of Latino politics should not ignore the potentially large effects Spanish-language media has and will have among Latinos living in the United States.

Scholars of group consciousness should also recognize the importance of the Spanish language in fostering a sense of Latino group consciousness within the United States. Although some studies have suggested that it is the wide variety of national-origin subgroups that may hinder the development of group consciousness among Latinos (i.e., Stokes, 2003), these results suggest the Spanish language and the use of alternative media outlets that specifically cater to Latinos are critical for understanding variations in attitudes.

APPENDIX

Descriptive Statistics

| | Mean | SD | Min | Max | N |
|--|------|------|-----|-----|-------|
| <i>Dependent Variables</i> | | | | | |
| Migration level (increase = 3) | 2.21 | 0.67 | 1 | 3 | 2,067 |
| Influence economy (help economy = 1) | 0.72 | — | 0 | 1 | 2,065 |
| Abortion (legal = 1) | 0.48 | — | 0 | 1 | 2,136 |
| Same-sex marriage (oppose amendment = 1) | 0.51 | — | 0 | 1 | 2,054 |
| Group politics (working together = 1) | 0.47 | — | 0 | 1 | 2,086 |
| Discrimination (major problem = 3) | 2.3 | 0.77 | 1 | 3 | 2,210 |
| Maintain Latino culture (very important = 4) | 3.61 | 0.67 | 1 | 4 | 1,127 |
| <i>Independent Variables</i> | | | | | |
| Media language (only English = 5) | 3.09 | 1.45 | 1 | 5 | 2,272 |
| Importance of Spanish (very important = 4) | 3.51 | 0.79 | 1 | 4 | 2,273 |
| Language preference (Spanish = 1) | 0.53 | — | 0 | 1 | 2,288 |
| Bilingual = 1 | 0.34 | — | 0 | 1 | 2,288 |
| English dominant = 1 | 0.23 | — | 0 | 1 | 2,288 |
| One parent born outside U.S. = 1 | 0.09 | — | 0 | 1 | 2,288 |
| Both parents born outside U.S. = 1 | 0.17 | — | 0 | 1 | 2,288 |

APPENDIX—continued

| | Mean | SD | Min | Max | N |
|--|------|-------|-----|-----|-------|
| U.S. citizen = 1 | 0.21 | — | 0 | 1 | 2,288 |
| Political interest (a lot = 4) | 2.72 | 0.96 | 1 | 4 | 2,266 |
| Religious attendance (more than once a week = 6) | 3.87 | 1.48 | 1 | 6 | 2,253 |
| Republican = 1 | 0.21 | — | 0 | 1 | 2,288 |
| Independent/other party/don't know = 1 | 0.46 | — | 0 | 1 | 2,288 |
| U.S. born = 1 | 0.37 | — | 0 | 1 | 2,288 |
| Puerto Rican = 1 | 0.12 | — | 0 | 1 | 2,288 |
| Cuban = 1 | 0.18 | — | 0 | 1 | 2,288 |
| Other national-origin groups = 1 | 0.16 | — | 0 | 1 | 2,288 |
| Female = 1 | 0.55 | — | 0 | 1 | 2,288 |
| Age (in years) | 40.6 | 16.15 | 18 | 98 | 2,234 |
| Education (postgraduate = 7) | 3.62 | 1.81 | 1 | 7 | 2,248 |
| Income less than \$30,000 | 0.49 | — | 0 | 1 | 2,288 |
| Income \$30,000 to \$50,000 | 0.24 | — | 0 | 1 | 2,288 |
| Income \$50,000 to \$75,000 | 0.13 | — | 0 | 1 | 2,288 |
| Income \$75,000 and over | 0.15 | — | 0 | 1 | 2,288 |
| South | 0.44 | — | 0 | 1 | 2,288 |
| West | 0.36 | — | 0 | 1 | 2,288 |
| Northeast | 0.15 | — | 0 | 1 | 2,288 |

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