VENEZUELA: OPPOSITION FAILS TO OVERTHROW PRESIDENT HUGO CHAVEZ

Reprinted with permission from Notisur, Latin American Data Base (LADB),

University of New Mexico. http: www.ladb.unm.edu

T

he Venezuelan opposition, with the support of dissident military officers, attempted to overthrow President Hugo Chavez on April 11, but coup leaders seriously misjudged the degree of support Chavez had both within the military and in civilian society. Outrage at the undemocratic actions of the "interim government" forced a reversal of the coup, with Chavez returning to power April 13. Chavez now faces the difficult task of uniting an extremely polarized society.

On the third day of a national strike, the opposition, which refers to itself as "civil society," held a huge anti-Chavez demonstration. The action was purportedly in support of fired oil company (Petroleos de Venezuela, PDVSA) executives who opposed the Chavez-appointed company president and members of the board of directors (see NotiSur, 2002-04-12).

The protest was led by Pedro Carmona Estanga of the business organization Fedecamaras and Carlos Ortega, president of the Accion Democratica (AD)-controlled Confederacion de Trabajadores de Venezuela (CTV).

The widely publicized march was supposed to go to PDVSA headquarters. Midway, however, march leaders changed course, heading to the Miraflores presidential palace, where several thousand Chavez supporters were assembled. That decision appears key to subsequent events and challenges claims that what happened was a spontaneous uprising.

Violence erupted as the two groups faced off in front of Miraflores and at least 14 people were killed. Some eyewitnesses saw at least three groups firing--the city police, Chavez supporters, and unidentified snipers. The opposition immediately claimed Chavez supporters had fired on unarmed opposition demonstrators, and local TV stations repeatedly broadcast edited footage showing men shooting from a rooftop (see other article in this issue).

Who started the shooting is still unclear, but the dead including both opponents and Chavistas, including the vice president's driver. Among the groups suspected of responsibility are members of Chavez's Bolivarian Circles, the Bandera Roja--an extremist group wanting to set the stage for the coup, the National Guard acting on Chavez's orders, and police under the command of the opposition mayor of Caracas Alfredo Pena.

Whoever gave the orders to shoot, the deaths provided the dissident military with the justification to enter the presidential palace and demand that Chavez step down. The military claimed that Chavez had resigned, although they produced no evidence, and they named Pedro Carmona to head an interim government.

Carmona's democratic image is quickly tarnished

Carmona promised that the new government would adhere to the principles of "freedom, pluralism, and democracy, ensuring respect for the state of law." He said, "We can achieve the governability required to improve Venezuela's image. The strongman era has ended."

But the strongman era had not ended. Seriously misjudging both his internal support and world reaction to the coup, within 24 hours Carmona abolished the 1999 Constitution, fired the justices of the Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (TSJ), the Fiscal General, the Contralor General, the Defensor del Pueblo, and members of the Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE). He abolished the Asamblea Nacional, cut off oil shipments to Cuba, and said he would call elections "within a year."

Carmona named a Cabinet that excluded all sectors of society except the far right, even cutting out the CTV, his partner in opposing Chavez.

Meanwhile, security forces were going after Chavez's Cabinet and other members of his government. Chavez's Interior Minister Ramon Rodriguez Chacin was attacked by a mob as security forces hustled him away in handcuffs.

The swearing-in ceremony of the new government was scheduled for the afternoon of April 13, but growing numbers of protesters in the streets demanding Chavez's return prompted Carmona's backers to postpone the ceremony.

The same generals who had gone on the air early Friday to announce that Chavez had resigned came on again to criticize the government they had installed to replace him.

"We demand respect for the Constitution," said Gen. Efrain Vasquez, head of the army, as other generals stood at his side. "Our action [Friday] was not a coup....We believe there should be corrections in the transition to a new government."

To the demands of the military who were beginning to question his leadership, Carmona said Chavez would be allowed to leave the country and the Asamblea Nacional would be reinstated. But by then, it was too late.

In the absence of any evidence that Chavez had resigned, several key military units refused to support the coup. With his support dwindling, Carmona decided to resign. He first tried to turn over power to the Asamblea Nacional that he had dissolved, but Chavez's Vice President Diosdado Cabello said he was assuming power under provisions of the Constitution, and he would return power to Chavez when he returned.

Chavez returns to Miraflores

In the early morning hours of April 14, military loyal to Chavez brought him back from the Caribbean island of La Orchila, where he had been taken. In a nationally broadcast message later that morning, Chavez called for national reconciliation and said he was convening a Federal Council of Government in which all branches of power as well as opposition governors and mayors would take part.

This seemed a response to one of the strongest criticisms against Chavez--that he refuses to consult with those who disagree with his vision for the country.

"I also have to reflect on many things," Chavez said. "I bring back lessons that I'll never forget after so much thinking and anxiety. I come willing to make corrections where I have to make corrections."

In his strongest conciliatory gesture, Chavez said that the members of the PDVSA board of directors opposed by company executives had resigned.

"It was a [internal company] conflict, but it was used," Chavez said, adding that he would restructure the company so that "this industry cannot be used this way again." The president also said no reprisals would be taken against the PDVSA managers who participated in the protests.

Vice President Cabello said at least 120 people orchestrated the conspiracy against Chavez, including 80 members of the military. Many were briefly jailed and released; it is unclear how many are still being detained. On Monday, April 15, Carmona was released from jail and placed under house arrest. Carmona and other coup leaders will be charged with conspiracy to wage a military rebellion, Cabello said.

"This was not a spontaneous rebellion or a popular rebellion," Cabello said. "This was a civilian-military rebellion, and those involved must take responsibility. They will be put on trial with all their rights, but they will be put on trial."

Cabello also said the incidents of April 11 would be investigated. "Who pushed an enormous mass of Venezuelans to come to Miraflores where they knew 20,000 people were there waiting for whoever was coming?" Cabello asked. "They are, morally at least, responsible for a great number of deaths."

Almost universal international condemnation of coup

Whatever private opinion Latin American leaders may have of Chavez, they closed ranks to support constitutional rule. Meeting in Costa Rica, the 19-member Grupo de Rio quickly condemned the coup and said it could not recognize the provisional government. They invoked the Organization of American States (OAS) Inter-American Democratic Charter, signed in Lima in September at the urging of the US, which was crafted to strengthen democracy in the hemisphere.

The OAS called an emergency meeting in response to the coup. Only after Chavez was back in control did the US support the OAS statement, and then only after pushing to soften the language to "altering the constitutional order" from "interrupting the constitutional process."

The difference is significant. If the term "interrupting" had been used, it would have meant immediately invoking Article 21 of the Democratic Charter, which suspends the country in question. In contrast, the term "altering" calls for applying Article 20, which triggered a trip by the OAS secretary general to analyze the situation.

Several presidents said they would not recognize the new government. Nicaragua, Argentina, Paraguay, and Panama branded the Carmona government illegitimate. Chilean President Ricardo Lagos called for swift presidential elections and a return to democracy. Mexican President Vicente Fox said his country would not recognize Carmona's government until presidential elections were held, but he did not break off diplomatic relations. Of Latin American leaders, only Francisco Flores of El Salvador recognized the Carmona government.

Chavez has been a maverick among Latin American leaders, most of whom have, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, embraced the US neoliberal, free-trade hemispheric vision.

Chavez is one of the few leaders who has spoken out against the abuses of globalization and against the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). He also criticized Plan Colombia and refused to allow US military flights over Venezuelan territory. He strongly backed Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quotas to keep the price of oil from dropping. He has a strong friendship with Cuban President Fidel Castro and has visited Iraq and Libya. These actions raised the ire of the US (see other article in this issue).

Gustavo de Greiff, a constitutional law expert at the Colegio de Mexico, said Chavez' ouster was "a coup that followed a model we have seen very often in this region." "If this uprising in Caracas had been tolerated, it wouldn't be long before this could have blown up in the face of other democracies," Oscar Raul Cardoso wrote in the Argentine daily Clarin. "The majority of Latin American governments pulled out the stops and condemned the coup, refusing to recognize those who carried it out."

Trying times ahead for Venezuela

By April 14, people of various political stripes said Carmona's actions sealed his fate almost as soon as he took office. His efforts to destroy with the stroke of a pen all vestiges of the Chavez "peaceful revolution" reinforced the suspicion that what had occurred was not a popular revolt but a coup by the business elite.

"We overestimated the extent of popular resentment toward Chavez, and we also misjudged the true situation within the military," said Anibal Romero, an anti-Chavez political science professor at the Universidad Simon Bolivar.

"The government is facing the challenge of governing a country that is split in half," said Education Minister Aristobulo Izturiz. "That has to be the main focus of our first Cabinet meeting with President Chavez."

"The lesson from all these developments should be, for all of us, respect for political pluralism in this country, and for tolerance," said the minister, who added that in the crisis "there were Talibans [extremists] on both sides."

National Guard commander Gen. Belisario Landis said the rupture within the military must be addressed. "We must repair it in the best way possible," he said.

In addition, "a thorough investigation, with citizen participation, must be carried out to determine those responsible, on either side, for the events that occurred Thursday through Saturday," Carlos Correa of the human rights group Programa Venezolano de Educacion-Accion en Derechos Humanos (PROVEA) told Inter Press Service.

Besides those killed on Thursday night, at least 25 were killed and scores injured on Saturday in the crackdown on the demonstrations in support of Chavez. Whatever happens, the significance of the response by Venezuelans who refused to accept a business-backed military coup cannot be overstated. Nor can the danger that those who planned it, both inside Venezuela and abroad, will try again.

Journalist Bill Vann wrote that a failed uprising preceded the September 1973 military coup that overthrew the elected government of Salvador Allende in Chile. That attempt, like the move against Chavez, he said, showed the government's vulnerability. It also provided a dress rehearsal and allowed those plotting the coup to see which military units could be relied upon and which could not. [Sources: Prensa Libre (Guatemala), La Jornada (Mexico), 04/11/02; Reuters, 04/12-14/02; El Universal (Venezuela), 04/14/02; Radio Union (Venezuela), Tal Cual (Venezuela), The Wall Street Journal, 04/15/02; Spanish news service EFE, 04/11-13/02, 04/15/02, 04/16/02; Inter Press Service, 04/12-16/02; Notimex, 04/12/02, 04/14/02, 04/16/02; San Francisco Chronicle, 04/13/02, 04/15/02, 04/16/02; Clarin (Argentina), 04/15/02, 04/16/02; El Nuevo Herald (Miami), 04/16/02; Associated Press, 04/13-17/02; The Miami Herald, The Washington Post, 04/15-17/02]