In his last, posthumously published book, *Truth and Predication*, Donald Davidson suggests that the application of Tarskian truth-definitions for particular languages within the scope of radical interpretation depends upon a pre-existing grasp of a general concept of truth. This concept is to be distinguished from particular Tarskian definitions of the truth predicates for particular languages that Davidson conceives as offering specific “theories of meaning” for those particular languages, for these do not by themselves indicate what the various truth-predicates have in common. Davidson puts the matter this way:

My own view is that Tarski has told us much of what we want to know about the concept of truth, and that there must be more. There must be more because there is no indication in Tarski’s formal work of what it is that his various truth predicates have in common, and this must be part of the content of the concept. It is not enough to point to Convention-T as that indication, for it does not speak to the question of how we know that a theory of truth for a language is correct. The concept of truth has essential connections with the concepts of belief and meaning, but these connections are untouched by Tarski’s work. (*Truth and Predication*, pp. 27-28)

In particular, while particular Tarskian theories for specific languages point to a general structure which must be fulfilled by any systematic account of meaning for a particular language, showing the “kind of pattern truth must make, whether in language or thought,” (p. 28), neither the particular Tarskian truth-definitions nor this general pattern suffices to exhaust the general concept of truth as it must be presupposed in actual interpretation; what is needed to supplement these, Davidson suggests, is an account of how the systematic pattern of truth shown by the Tarskian structure is actually identified “in the behavior of people.” Although Davidson argues strenuously, here and in other late publications, that it is quixotic to attempt to provide a definition of this general concept of truth -- and in particular that any definition of it in terms of any notion of correspondence, coherence, assertibility, or any other notion (whether of a “realist” or an “anti-realist” character) must fail – it is thus nevertheless to be seen as requisite to the very possibility of interpretation, and thus deeply linked to the constitutive structure of linguistic meaning or sense.

In this chapter, I consider whether and to what extent Heidegger’s understanding of truth as unconcealment or *aletheia* can underwrite a general understanding of the basis of truth and predication in such a way as to be capable of synthesis with Davidson’s Tarski-inspired picture. I argue that there is significant initial negative ground for such a synthesis, insofar as Davidson and Heidegger agree in
rejecting: i) correspondence theories of truth; ii) the idea of timeless propositions as truth-bearers; and iii) “epistemic,” verificationist, subjectivist, coherence, communitarian, or pragmatist theories of the basis of truth. Furthermore, there is positive ground for a synthesis of Davidson and Heidegger’s views in that both claim that the phenomenon of truth plays a constitutive and normative role in the interpretation of language and the linguistic intelligibility of entities. Nevertheless, if Davidson’s and Heidegger’s views are to be synthesized, there is prima facie a major obstacle which must first be overcome. This obstacle is posed by Heidegger’s thoroughgoing rejection of an assumption that is in many ways foundational for Davidson’s theory as well as most conceptions of truth in the analytic tradition, the assumption that the basic locus of truth is the sentence or proposition. This assumption is basic for “truth-conditional” accounts of language and meaning such as Davidson’s, which hold that the meaning of a sentence is given by giving its truth-conditions, but it is rejected by Heidegger in holding that the truth of assertions has its “ontological” foundation in the more basic phenomenon of truth as aletheia, or unconcealment. In his habilitation, Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger, Ernst Tugendhat articulates a series of objections to this conception of truth as aletheia or unconcealment from a perspective informed by the truth-conditional and propositional approach. These objections include: i) that Heidegger’s picture makes truth an ontic event rather than an ontological structure; that ii) it fails to grasp the aspects of logical structure that yield inferential relations among concepts and judgments; and iii) that it provides no ultimate basis for distinguishing between true and false statements about the same entities.

I argue that Heidegger’s conception can be defended against all three objections by recalling and developing the specific features of what he conceives as the basic “existential-hermeneutic” “as-structure” of unconcealment. According to this conception, the basic structure underlying the possibility of truth is the disclosure of “something as something” in practical comportment, and this basic structure is hermeneutic in that it supports the interpretive intelligibility of any entity whatsoever. Developing this conception further in connection with Davidson’s late views, I argue for a two-dimensional hermeneutic conception of the structure of truth, which has propositionally articulated logical/linguistic intelligibility as one dimension and non-propositional, disclosively articulated intelligibility as another. On the picture, neither dimension is more “basic” than the other, but both point toward the unitary phenomenon of world as the formally indicated horizon of their possible application. This has some further interesting consequences, as I argue in the final section, for the structure of sense and the relationship of paradox to truth.

In pointing to the existence of a general concept of truth, not specific to a particular language, and necessarily (as Davidson argues) presupposed in the course of actual interpretation and understanding, Davidson gestures toward a concept of what I shall call transcendental truth.

1 For Heidegger: truth is the locus of us rather than the other way around; and it is Being involving so can’t be specified in terms of any simply ontic structure.
2 NB this structure is explicitly ‘intensional’ – remember this for later.
• Is there something to say about truth in general (not just truth-in-L for a particular language L)?
• Is there something to say about the non-sentential preconditions for the truth of sentences?
  (including the preconditions for the possibility of (sentential) predication)

An understanding or grasp of such a concept, it is reasonable to hold, preconditions both the explicit provision of a Tarskian truth-theory (or, as Davidson calls it, a theory of meaning) for a particular language and (because this explicit provision models the usually implicit structure of a competent speaker’s understanding of a language) the everyday possibility of understanding it. In a direct sense, it will thus underlie as well the possibility of understanding the sentences that describe situations and make assertions about situations and facts, as well as the singular terms that refer to particular entities. And along with this, it will also underlie the intelligibility or significance of entities and our engagements with them, at least insofar as this intelligibility can be linguistically articulated. This intelligibility of entities will in turn be connected to the structure of (true or false) predication, insofar as to speak truly about an entity is to predicate something truly of it, and insofar as what is truly predicable of an entity characterizes what it is (in the “predicative” sense of “is”).

This threefold connection among truth, entities, and predication is classically formulated by Aristotle in his famous ‘definition’ of truth and falsity in *Metaphysics, book 4*:

“To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true...”

*Metaphysics IV, 7, 1011 b 26*

On Aristotle’s conception, in particular, the characterization of falsity and truth is linked both to predication (in the formulation “to say of...”) and to the being and non-being of entities (“what is” and “what is not”). Without prejudice to the question of whether the underlying phenomenon of truth that underlies the intelligibility of (non-linguistic) entities and the structure of (linguistic) predication is itself to be understood as basically language-dependent, I shall characterize any theory on which a general (non-language-specific) concept of truth preconditions the intelligibility of entities and the structure of predication in this way a transcendent account of truth.

Tarski (as D’son reminds us) offers his Convention T as an interpretation of Aristotle’s remark, and Heidegger himself gives a (partially critical) phenomenological interpretation of it in sketching his own account of the possibility of truth and falsehood.

It is clear that Heidegger’s account of truth as unconcealment, as developed in *Being and Time*, is a transcendental account in this sense. Throughout much of his career, in fact, Heidegger seeks to account for both propositional and non-propositional truth as ontologically grounded in the phenomenon of aletheia or unconcealment [Unverborgenheit]. In *Being and Time*, this account largely takes the form of a description of the “original” phenomenon of truth as uncoveredness.
Thus, in section 44 of *Being and Time* (the section that concludes Division I’s “Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein”), Heidegger defines the truth of assertions as their uncovering or disclosure of entities:

To say that an assertion “is true” signifies that it uncovers the entity as it is in itself. Such an assertion asserts, points out, ‘lets’ the entity ‘be seen’ (apophansis) in its uncoveredness. The *Being-true* (truth) of the assertion must be understood as *Being-uncovering* [Entdeckend-sein] ... “Being-true” (“truth”) means Being-uncovering. [Wahrsein (Wahrheit) besagt entdeckend-sein].

This uncovering is itself grounded, according to Heidegger, in the structure of Dasein as well as that of the world itself. In particular:

Uncovering is a way of Being for Being-in-the-world ... What is primarily ‘true’ – that is, uncovering – is Dasein ...

Our earlier analysis of the worldhood of the world and of entities within-the-world has shown ... that the uncoveredness [Entdecktheit] of entities within-the-world is *grounded* in the world’s disclosedness [Erschlossenheit]. But disclosedness is that basic character [Grundart] of Dasein according to which it *is* its “there”. (SZ, 220).

Heidegger is here concerned with a “most primordial” phenomenon of truth as uncoveredness that has two holistic aspects. First, the most primordial phenomenon of truth is grounded in (or even identifiable with) disclosedness as the “basic character of Dasein.” Second, this basic character – the disclosedness of Dasein – is also identifiable with the disclosedness of the world, what underlies the possibility of any unconcealment or showing of entities within the world.

Although it does not itself directly involve an account of linguistic predication, Heidegger’s defense of this account of the most basic and general phenomenon of truth is nevertheless closely linked with the sophisticated phenomenological theory of predication that he had developed in the lecture courses *Plato’s Sophist, History of the Concept of Time, Logic: The Question of Truth*, and other courses from the early to mid-1920s, and which Heidegger briefly outlines in sections 32 and 33 of Division I of Being and Time. According to this theory, the possibility of assertive predication in language itself has its condition of possibility in a more basic and essentially non-linguistic phenomenon of interpretive disclosure. The most basic underlying structure of linguistic assertion is characterized as that of an “apophantical as” which is itself ontologically founded on a more basic “as” structure of hermeneutical understanding or interpretation [Auslegung]. This basic and fundamental “‘as’-structure,” whereby any entity is disclosed as something or other, always characterizes, in a fundamental way, any possible

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5 In this sense, in particular, “Assertion and its structure...are founded upon interpretation and its structure” (S&Z, p. 223).
understanding or interpretation of entities. This is the case, in particular, already when entities are disclosed in “concernful circumspection” [besorgenden Umsicht] as ready to hand, prior to any explicit thought or linguistic assertion about them. In such circumspection, for example in handling a hammer, there need not be any explicit judgment or linguistic assertion, but it is nevertheless possible for an entity to be interpretively disclosed as having a particular character (for instance, the hammer as “too heavy”). (p. 157) Nevertheless, the original, primordial “as”-structure of hermeneutic understanding can under certain conditions become transformed into the explicit formation of an assertion. In particular, by way of a transformation in our way of being “given” the object. the “fore-having” which already characterized the hermeneutical disclosure of the hammer as hammer is changed over into the “having” of something present at hand, which can now be the “about which” of an explicit assertion. The primordial ‘existential-hermeneutical ‘as’” of circumspective interpretation is thus modified into the ‘apophantical’ ‘as’, which makes it possible to formulate any explicit assertion about the object.

The more basic existential-hermeneutic “as” structure, as it operates in “everyday circumspective interpretation” (with or without an explicit, thematic focus) itself breaks up into three “fore”-structures that jointly connect the individual entity to the total context of involvements that articulate, for Heidegger, its basic character. First, there is a “fore-having” whereby this totality of involvements is always already (in some sense) “understood.” Second, there is a “fore-sight” which begins to separate from this total context of involvements the specific entity in question and makes it capable of being conceptualized. Finally, there is a “fore-conception” which “decide(s) for a specific way of conceiving” the entity, and thus “can be drawn from the entity itself, or …can force the entity into concepts to which it is opposed in its manner of Being.” (p. 150). The threefold fore-structure of understanding is itself “existentially-ontologically” connected to the basic phenomenon of projection, whereby entities are “disclosed in their possibility” by Dasein. This involves that entities are “projected upon the world”; “that is, upon a whole of significance, to whose reference relations concern, as Being-in-the-World, has been tied up in advance.” (p. 151) In particular, it is the projective relation of Dasein to this totality of significance that allows entities to be understood with respect to their distinctive kinds of Being. Meaning or sense (Sinn) is itself “that wherein the intelligibility [Verstandlichkeit] of something maintains itself” and the “upon-which” [Woraufhin] of “a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something.” (p. 151) Given that it has this structure, according to Heidegger, ““meaning” must be conceived as the formal-existential framework of the disclosedness which belongs to understanding”; that is, in formal terms, meaning or sense is the general form of the kind of disclosure that allows understanding and interpretation to take place. The characteristic fore-structure of understanding and the basic hermeneutic as-structure of interpretation thus are themselves unitarily grounded in the structure of projection whereby Dasein projectively maintains the intelligibility of entities.

Heidegger’s understanding of the most basic precondition of assertoric and non-assertoric truth thus involves a general phenomenon, that of the “existential-hermeneutic as,” which is not specific to any particular language (or indeed, to language at all) and which is further characterized both as the foundation of the possibility of interpretation of the being of entities and as the ultimate underlying

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6 SZ, p. 158
basis of the structure of linguistic predication. Turning, now, to Davidson’s remarks on the general concept of truth, it is clear that they can also be characterized, in the setting of Davidson’s interpretive project, as gesturing toward a “transcendental” conception of truth in this sense. Familiarly, on Davidson’s conception, a “theory of meaning” for a natural language recursively embodies a compositional structure of assignments of meaning to the language’s primitive predicates and singular terms. This structure of meaning can be embodied, Davidson suggests, by a theory which yields as consequences all of the true “T-sentences” for a particular language, the structure described by Tarski in “The Concept of Truth in Formal Languages” as the one that must be exhibited by any extensionally adequate definition of the term “true” as it is used in a (formal or natural) language.  

According to Tarski, any such definition will be adequate only if it implies all sentences of a certain form, what he calls form (T):

\[
X \text{ is true, if and only if, } p.
\]

Here, ‘p’ stands for any sentence of the language and ‘X’ is to be replaced with a name for that very sentence, formed by enclosing the sentence itself within quotation marks, or by some other naming device.

Thus, for instance, a Tarskian theory of truth will imply that “Snow is white” is true (in English) if and only if snow is white.

Tarski suggests, in “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages” and “The Semantical Concept of Truth”, that a definition of the truth predicate that implies all the instances of the T-schema will be both “materially adequate” and “formally correct”; that is, it will capture the actual behavior of the truth-predicate for the language and will do so in a way that reveals its underlying formal structure. And as he goes on to show, such a definition can in fact be constructed from that of a more primitive “semantic” relationship, that of “satisfaction”. The relation of satisfaction coordinates primitive singular terms of a formal language to particular objects, and primitive predicates to sets and sequences of objects; intuitively, the relation is that of “reference” in the case of the singular terms and the sets and sequences that a predicate is “true of” in the case of predicates. Given the specification of the satisfaction relations, the definition of the truth-predicate can be built up recursively from them; in this way it is possible actually to define the truth-predicate (which must characterize an infinite number of possible sentences) from a finite set of axioms (the specification of the satisfaction relations for the (finitely many) basic terms of the language). The result will be a definition of truth for the particular

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7 Following standard practice in the “analytic” literature, I here use “natural language” to indicate a contrast with “formal” or “artificial” languages, and thus actually to refer to what Heidegger, by contrast, generally calls “historical” languages. This usage should not be taken to indicate, however, any judgment at this point as to whether the character of these languages is in fact deeply “natural” or deeply “historical” (or neither).


9 Or, in fact, non-recursively, exploiting a method due to Hilbert (?) for converting recursive definitions into explicit ones.
language that, since it yields all instances of the T-schema, in an intuitive sense formalizes the underlying structure of the particular “concept” of truth characteristic of that language. And as Tarski himself suggests, indeed, it is plausible that it exhibits the central constraint that any more specific theory of the “nature” of truth will have to respect, the constraint that it “get right” the truth-conditions of the sentences of which we can predicate “truth.”

In Davidson’s project of analyzing the semantical structure of natural languages, the order of explanation that characterizes Tarski’s truth-definitions is, in a certain way, reversed. Rather than beginning with primitively specified satisfaction relations for particular formal languages in order to build up the recursive structure of truth for the language, Davidson, following Quine envisages the radical interpreter beginning with the project of interpreting an already existing natural language at first completely obscure to her, and working to reconstruct its underlying structure from the attitudes of holding-true and rejection of particular sentences exhibited by its speakers. Nevertheless, the recursive structure underlying the true T-sentences remains the primary object of investigation, and Davidson argues that (as for Tarski) this compositional structure, in turn, must be adequate in the sense that it yields as deductive consequences the whole corpus of T-sentences for the language in question. A speaker’s understanding of the language may then be considered equivalent to her knowledge of this recursive structure, and an interpretation of it in another language may be considered to be a precondition for successful understanding of speakers of the first language by speakers of the second.10

In particular, where what is at issue is the interpretation of an unknown language (as it is in the situation of “radical interpretation”), the theory of meaning will, in yielding the T-sentences for the language under consideration, specify truth-conditions for each sentence of the considered language by means of the interpreter’s own distinct language, thus yielding a systematic translation or interpretation of the alien language as a whole.

In Truth and Predication, Davidson emphasizes the utility of the Tarskian framework for resolving some of the problems involved in the ancient problem of predication, as well as the virtues of Tarski’s conception of truth in its own right. Chief among these virtues, according to Davidson, is the complete extensional match between Tarski’s conception, when applied to a particular language, and what is involved in our intuitive notion of truth; it is this match that makes it plausible, according to Davidson, that Tarski’s structure has captured central aspects of the concept of truth as we employ it in everyday discourse and communication, and has not simply stipulated a new or wholly distinct notion for formal purposes. Moreover, in the setting of radical interpretation, it is the capacity of a recursive truth-definition comprehensively to match truth-conditions with sentences that qualifies it to be considered to embody a systematic theory of meaning for the language at all. This is because, as Davidson says in Truth and Predication, a theory of truth in accordance with Tarski’s convention T provides the only way finitely to specify the “infinity of things the [successful] interpreter knows about the speaker” under interpretation. In particular – though it is certainly not necessary, as Davidson emphasizes, to demand that an interpreter know the Tarskian theory explicitly – it is the only way to capture the systematic structure of the truth-conditional meaning of the infinite number of sentences that the speaker can

produce and the interpreter can understand, and which thus manifest in their actual speaking and understanding of the language.

Even if Tarski’s definitions provide an extensionally adequate characterization of truth in a particular language, in this sense, though, this is not to say, as Davidson admits, that they capture “all there is” to the concept of truth itself. First, there is the obvious point that Tarski’s definitions (whether applied to formal languages given a satisfaction relation, as Tarski does, or applied to the structure of a natural language only under an interpretation) define truth only for specific languages L; the general concept of truth (in an arbitrary language) is not explained or defined by them, and it is not clear from the Tarskian structure alone where or even whether we should look for such a definition. (In particular, in radical interpretation we must use a general concept of truth in characterizing utterances in an alien language as those held true, so we must presuppose it in interpretation). Second, as a number of commentators have objected, neither the specific Tarskian definitions of truth-predicates nor their general pattern suffice by themselves to define the general sense of truth in a way that goes beyond their extensional adequacy in each case. For example, as Dummett has objected, Tarski’s definitions provide no guidance in extending the concept of truth to the case of a new language, and as Field has objected, they provide no guidance, even in the case of a single language, in extending the concept of truth to apply to sentences involving concepts or terms introduced de novo and thus not provided for in the original truth-definition. Both objections are related, moreover, to Dummett’s suggestion that in an important sense, Tarski’s definitions fail to capture the “point” of the introduction of a truth-predicate into a language to begin with.

Admitting the trenchancy of these objections, Davidson agrees that in an important sense, Tarski has not provided a definition of the concept of truth, even as applied to particular languages. In particular, there is a clear sense in which the Tarskian definitions, though they provide the extension of the concept of truth in each case, do not provide its meaning. Their failure in this respect can, according to Davidson, is a result of the fact that they can provide the extension and reference of basic predicates and terms only by listing (finitely many) cases; in particular, the specification of the satisfaction-conditions for basic terms and predicates, on which each Tarskian truth-definition structurally depends, does not and cannot provide any guidance for how to go on in applying either satisfaction or truth to new cases, or any useful characterization of the point or purpose of doing so. This is what leads Davidson to suggest that, while Tarski’s theory does provide an essential formal guide to the contours of any truth predicate, it is nevertheless reasonable to suppose that the truth predicates have further essential properties, not captured or reflected in the Tarskian language-specific definitions or in Convention T itself. In particular, for Davidson, these further properties can come into view when we consider (as we necessarily do in the course of radical interpretation) whether a particular T-theory actually applies to a given natural language, and in this way consider how the type of pattern embodied in a particular T-theory is identifiable in the actual use of a language by its speakers.

For Davidson, though, the insight of Tarski’s structural approach to truth is not limited to its essential use in the practice of radical interpretation or to the way it supports the project of giving a theory of meaning for a natural language; in it is to be found, as well, the essential ingredients for an actual solution to the ancient problem of predication. As Davidson presents it, this is the problem of how the
separately meaningful elements of a predicative sentence come together to produce something unified and evaluable as true or false. In the second part of *Truth and Predication*, Davidson considers a series of historical attempts, beginning with Plato, to explain the truth-evaluable unity of a predicative sentence by accounting for the way in which its separately meaningful parts compose a unified structure. Davidson considers attempts by Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Leibniz, and Russell; each of these fails, he argues, either by failing to explain the actual basis of the unity of the sentence or by doing so in a way that does not account for how this unity is evaluable as true or false. On Davidson’s telling, though, Tarski’s structural conception of truth provides the essential structure that is needed to account for the unity of the proposition without inviting the problems of infinite regress and explanatory idleness that seem recurrently fatal for the earlier theories; in particular, Tarski is able to succeed where others have failed by providing a systematic way, through his recursive truth definitions, of linking the meanings of the smallest meaningful parts of sentences (the individually referring terms and predicative expressions) systematically with the truth-conditions of those sentences as wholes. In so doing, Tarski accounts for how the provision of semantic roles for finitely many basic sentential elements can provide compositionally for the infinite range of possible sentences with distinct truth-conditions; and he does so without requiring that the (infinitely many) sentences of a language themselves correspond to distinct entities or objects. (p. 155).

The crucial idea underlying the possibility of the solution is simply that “predicates are true of the entities which are named by the constants that occupy their spaces or are quantified over by the variables which appear in the same spaces and are bound by quantifiers.” (p. 159). The solution, thus stated, has an appearance of truism, in that it turns on the obvious-seeming observation that predicates have a role in the truth-evaluable unity of sentences only in that, and because, they are possibly true or false of individuals. But the appearance of obviousness is misleading; as Davidson explains, a solution of this form is uniquely able to account for the unity of the assertoric sentence and for the infinite production of sentences without inviting an infinite regress. The key concept underlying this possibility of solution is Tarski’s concept of satisfaction. It is this concept that allows the theorist to characterize the circumstances in which entities or sequences of entities are assigned to the variables in an open sentence which would make the sentence true if the variables were replaced by names for those entities and sequences. In this way, the systematic truth-conditional structure of the language becomes accessible to theoretical reconstruction in the form of a Tarskian truth-theory; as Davidson suggests, indeed, there is no other structure that could systematically elucidate the essential structural relationship of predication with truth, in such a way as to account for the infinite possibility of forming truth-evaluable predicative sentences that every natural language affords.

But this does not mean, as Davidson emphasizes, that a privileged relation of satisfaction, or any other reference-like relationship, holding between singular terms and particular objects is presupposed. Rather, the application of the Tarskian pattern to natural languages aims to discern how the systematic pattern of truth-evaluable sentences itself involves that singular and other terms have semantic roles that require them to be satisfied by particular objects. In making this application, the theorist does not presuppose a specific concept of satisfaction, or any other reference-like relationship, but rather the general concept of truth. This general concept is, Davidson suggests, the “most basic semantic concept
that we have;"\(^{11}\) while it is idle to hope for a definition of it in terms of satisfaction or any other relation, we can use the general concept to illuminate the structure of predication. The result is a general method that allows us to characterize, for any predicate, the conditions under which it is true of any number of entities; nothing more (but also nothing less) can be expected, as Davidson suggests, of a theory of meaning for a language. The result is thus an illumination of the predicative structure of a language which also, by systematically characterizing the satisfaction-conditions of predicates, also makes it clear what objects and type of objects the language discusses. In particular:

...[T]he key role of Convention-T in determining that truth, as characterized by the theory, has the same extension as the intuitive concept of truth makes it seems that it is truth rather than reference that is the basic primitive. [This] is, I think, the right view. In his appeal to Convention-T, Tarski assumes ... a prior grasp of the concept of truth; he then shows how this intuition can be implemented in detail for particular languages...The story about truth generates a pattern in language, the pattern of logical forms, or grammar properly conceived, and the network of semantic dependencies. There is no way to tell this story, which, being about truth, is about sentences or their occasions of use, without assigning semantic roles to the parts of sentences. But there is no appeal to a prior understanding of the concept of reference.\(^{12}\)

Like Heidegger, then, Davidson points to a general concept of truth, not specific to a language, and necessarily presupposed in any interpretation of the meaning and structure of utterances. Given that both Davidson and Heidegger discuss transcendental truth in this sense, the question arises whether their accounts can be squared with one another, and also whether they can be seen as pointing in the same direction. I shall argue that they can, even though Davidson argues that truth is indefinable and (for reasons to be explained) Heidegger’s description of generic truth as aletheia or unconcealment is itself not best seen as offering anything like general “definition” of it. In particular, as we shall see, Heidegger and Davidson can be jointly read as pointing toward a structurally unified hermeneutic conception of transcendental truth as jointly conditioning the truth of sentences and the intelligibility of objects. This is not to deny, of course, that there are major differences between the two accounts; most obviously, Heidegger’s is a theory of a phenomenon – unconcealment or aletheia – that is not necessarily linguistic, while Davidson’s, in line with Tarski, takes sentences to be the characteristic truthbearers. We shall discuss this difference in the next section; for now, it is sufficient to note a few suggestive points of agreement. To begin with, there are at least three significant and general negative points of agreement in the conceptions of transcendental truth to which Heidegger and Davidson gesture. First, both philosophers reject correspondence theories of the basis of truth. Second, both philosophers reject coherence, anti-realist, and other epistemically based theories of truth. Third, both philosophers reject the existence of propositions, Fregean thoughts, ideal contents, or other timeless entities as the primary truth-bearers.

1. Against correspondence:

\(^{11}\) P. 160.
In *Being and Time* and elsewhere, Heidegger presents his account of truth as an alternative to what he sees as a still-dominant “traditional conception of truth.” The traditional conception, as Heidegger describes it, has two main substantive components: first, the claim that the *primary* ‘locus’ of truth is the assertion or judgment; and second, the claim that “the essence of truth lies in the ‘agreement’ [or correspondence] of the judgment with its object.” Both components are captured, according to Heidegger, in the scholastic motto according to which truth is *adequatio intellectus et rei*, which has its ultimate roots in Aristotle’s description of the soul’s experiences (*pathemata*) as *omoiomata* or “likenesses” of things (*pragmaton*), and continues to characterize conceptions of truth such as Kant’s and those of nineteenth-century neo-Kantians. Heidegger asks after the “ontological character” of this supposed “truth-relation” of agreement: “With regard to what do *intellectus* and *res* agree?” On one view, the requisite agreement is one between an ideal content of judgment and a real thing about which a judgment is or can be made. This relationship, like the relationship between ideal contents and real *acts* of judgment, may be said to “subsist.” But Heidegger asks whether such “subsisting” has ever been clarified ontologically and what it can, basically, mean; this is, as he points out, nothing other than the question concerning the actual character of the relationship of *methexis* (or participation) between the real and the ideal, with which “no headway has been made ... in over two thousand years.” (p. 216).

More broadly, Heidegger considers how the relationship of agreement which is supposed by correspondence theories to hold between entities and judgments about them actually becomes manifest phenomenologically. In judging or asserting that “the picture on the wall is hanging askew,” Heidegger argues, one is not related primarily to “representations” or psychological processes, but rather to the picture itself. And in the act of perception that confirms the truth of the judgment, there is again no matching of representations to objects, but rather the phenomenon of the picture revealing itself “just as” it (truly) is. (p. 218). This is not, as Heidegger points out, a relation of representation between the picture and a representation of it; nor is it a comparison of various representations with each other. Rather, in the demonstration, the picture *itself* is uncovered as being a certain way; in the perceptual confirmation of the judgment, the entity that was judged about *shows itself* as being a certain way (indeed, just the way it was judged to be). If what takes place here is indeed the most basic and primary phenomenon of truth, it is clear that truth cannot be theorized as having a basis in the correspondence of subject and object, or of the psychical with the physical, or in any other relation of representation or agreement. As Heidegger explains in *Logic: The Question of Truth*, it is rather to be described as a phenomenon of entities and Dasein that is not essentially relational at all, unless the “relationship” in question is something like a relationship of Dasein to the world.

Truth is not a present (*vorhanden*) relationship between two beings that are themselves present – for instance between something psychical and something physical, and also it is no “coordination” (as one often says these days). If it is in any sense a relationship, it is one with

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13 *S&Z*, p. 214.
15 Heidegger appears to have in mind Husserl’s view, though he does not say so explicitly here, and it is also not clear that the view that is sketched captures accurately all the aspects of Husserl’s actual discussions of the “synthesis of fulfillment” between the content of an significative intention and the content that may fulfill it (see chapter 2, above).
has no analogy with any kind of relation between beings. It is – if one may say so – the relationship of Dasein as Dasein to its world itself, the world-openness of Dasein, whose being toward the world itself is disclosed and uncovered in and with this being toward the world.

(Logic: The Question of Truth, p. 137)

That the basis of truth is not any relation between beings suggests that it is ontologically grounded in the difference between Being and beings.

Davidson’s arguments against correspondence theories are differently motivated and situated, but their upshot is, in important ways, structurally similar, despite the linguistic setting of Davidson’s theory. In particular, Davidson has essentially two reasons for holding that there is no tenable relation of “correspondence” between language and the world to be found at all, for “there is nothing interesting or instructive to which true sentences correspond.” (p. 39). The first is that, as Davidson argues drawing on an argument made in different forms by Frege, Church, Gödel, and Neale, if a sentence is said to correspond to one entity in the world, it must ultimately be said to correspond to all of them.  The argument, the so-called “slingshot,” demonstrates on relatively straightforward (but not entirely unproblematic) assumptions\(^1\) that any two true sentences, if they each correspond to anything, both correspond to the same thing; similarly, any two false sentences also correspond to the same thing.  It is thus possible to hold that true sentences correspond to something only if all true sentences correspond to some maximal object, perhaps the totality of reality or the world itself. The resulting

\(^{16}\) The argument for this, though already at least implicit in Frege’s arguments for the claim that the “reference” of a sentence is always one of the two truth-values (True or False), is sometimes called the “slingshot” and is given in (slightly different) classic forms by: Church, A. (1956) Introduction to Mathematical Logic, vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton U. Press) and Gödel (1944) “Russell’s Mathematical Logic,” in P.A. Schlipp (ed.), The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern U). For the discussion and further references, see Davidson, Truth and Predication, pp. 126-30.

\(^{17}\) The first assumption is that if a sentence corresponds to something, substituting a co-referring noun phrase will not change what it corresponds to; the second is that two logically equivalent sentences correspond to the same thing if they correspond to anything at all.

\(^{18}\) Assumptions:

i) if a sentence corresponds to something, substituting a co-referring term won’t change what it corresp. to.

ii) Logically equivalent sentences corresp. to the same thing.

\(G = \text{Grass is green.}\)

\(S = \text{The sun is 93 million miles away.}\)

1) \(G\)

2) The \(x\) such that \([x=\text{Socrates} \text{ and } G]\) = The \(x\) such that \([x=\text{Socrates}]\)

3) The \(x\) such that \([x=\text{Socrates} \text{ and } S]\) = The \(x\) such that \([x=\text{Socrates}]\)

4) \(S\)

These ALL correspond to the same thing. 1 and 2, and 3 and 4, are logical equivalents

3 just substitutes a co-referring term into 2.
picture evokes, in some ways, the Eleatic thesis according to which all that exists is the One of a total and ultimately undifferentiated reality; however, as Davidson notes, it is no longer in any important sense a picture of truth as correspondence at all.  

Davidson’s second reason for rejecting correspondence accounts of the truth of sentences turns on the problem of predication, and in particular on the problem of accounting for the unity of sentences. As Davidson convincingly argues by rehearsing a series of failed solutions to the problem of what gives an assertoritic sentence unity, we cannot understand predication or the unity of the sentence by taking predicates or the copula to have their own, separable, representational reference or by taking there to be special kinds of composite entities for sentences to correspond to. The underlying argument for this is related to the classical problem discussed by Aristotle as the “Third Man.” In particular, the assumption that the separate terms of a predicative sentence, including predicate terms such as verbs and adjectives, name separate and distinct objects leads directly to the question of what binds or ties the separate elements thus named together into a unity. One theory of such a bond is provided by Aristotle in his discussion of the predicative “is” as the “copula” and his suggestion that all sentences structurally include such a binding element, even if only implicitly. But this leads directly to the question of what binds the copula to the other parts, both in the sentence itself and in the object (perhaps a “fact” or “state of affairs”) to which it is supposed to correspond, and we are off on an infinite regress. As Davidson notes, the problem of this kind of infinite regress is very closely related to the problem of predication itself, so much so that “the difficulty of avoiding one infinite regress or another might almost be said to be the problem of predication...”

It was Frege who, according to Davidson, provided the first important clue to the way of overcoming this general problem. His distinction between concept and object, and the correlative distinction between terms for functions and terms for objects on the level of sentences, provided the first real breakthrough with the problem of predication since Plato and Aristotle by making it possible, for the first time, to consider that the linguistic predicate need not be endowed with its own distinct representational object in order to account for the structure of predication. In this, Frege was also the first, according to Davidson, to account adequately for how both singular and predicative terms contribute to the status of sentences as truth-evaluable; in this respect, Frege’s theory forges a closer and more revealing connection between the meaning of terms and the truth of sentences than any before him.

As we have seen (chapter 1), Frege’s distinction between concept and object is in fact strongly motivated by his own argument against correspondence truth. This argument suggests that any account of truth as correspondence will result in an infinite vicious regress, and so can be seen as an ancestor of Davidson’s Tarskian argument in Truth and Predication. Nevertheless, according to Davidson, Frege’s

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19 Davidson had earlier suggested in “True to the Facts” that the Tarskian truth-theory is understandable as a (special kind of) correspondence theory owing to its employment of a concept of reference or satisfaction; later on, he also called this “correspondence without confrontation.” In Truth and Predication (pp. 38-41), however, Davidson explains clearly and directly that to call the Tarskian theory a “correspondence” theory in any respect was a mistake.

20 P. 79.

21 Pp. 133-34.
picture still threatens to open the door to infinite regresses, and raises significant additional problems of its own. First, there is the notorious problem of reference to concepts: the attempt to say anything about a concept immediately demands that it have the logical type of an object, and thus involves a crossing of levels which Frege must rule out by fiat. Second, Frege’s assumptions about the compositional structure of sentences lead him to hold that both the sense and reference of sentences must be determined by the sense and reference of their individual parts; and this leads him to the claim that predicative terms have functions or function-like objects as referents. Frege’s metaphor for such objects is that they are “unsaturated”; but as Davidson points out, it is obscure what can be meant by the existence of objects that are inherently “gappy” in this sense. One can identify the “semantic value” of functional expressions with their semantic role rather than their reference, as Dummett essentially suggests; but this represents an important departure from Frege’s original picture, and makes the reference itself redundant.

It is here, according to Davidson, that recursive picture improves over Frege’s. In particular, in characterizing truth-conditions of a language’s sentences as systematically dependent upon satisfaction conditions for predicates and singular terms, Tarski can account for the compositional structure underlying these conditions without invoking unsaturated entities or shadowy referents for predicates and functional expressions. More generally, the Tarskian structure avoids all of the various kinds of regresses that have recurrently problematized correspondence and other theories by conceiving of truth as a unitary predicate of sentences, to be illuminated ultimately in terms of the overall truth-conditional structure of a language, rather than in terms of the relation of any particular sentence to anything else. As Davidson emphasizes, it is, here, the fact that the predicate “true,” as applied to sentences, is essentially a one-place predicate that here provides an important clue to the emptiness of correspondence theories:

We explain the application of a one-place predicate by reference to a relation only when there is an indefinitely large number of distinct entities to which the relation bears. There are no such entities available in the case of sentences, beliefs, judgments, or sentential utterances. It is important that truth, as applied to things in the world (utterances of sentences, inscriptions, beliefs, assertions), is a unitary property, for it is this that ties it so closely to the problem of predication. A large part of the problem of predication is, after all, just the problem of specifying what it is about predicates that explains why the sentential expressions in which they occur may be used to say something true or false. (p. 130)

As Davidson here suggests, any theory of the truth of sentences that treats it as a relational property will ultimately fail to account for the kind of truth-evaluable unity that sentences exhibit. This is because any such theory will advert to a relationship between a true sentence and some entity (be it a fact, state of affairs, situation, or whatever) that makes it true; and it will then be necessary to explain the unity of the sentence in terms of the unity of this entity. But this does not solve the problem of unity, but only reiterates it; and given the Slingshot argument, the only entity in terms of which it will be possible to explain the truth of any sentence will be the “maximal” entity, the True. Though this might be treated as a kind of correspondence explanation, if there is indeed at most one thing for true sentences to correspond to, ‘we say no more when we say ‘corresponds to the truth’ than we say by the simpler ‘is
true”. (p. 130). The appeal to correspondence, or indeed to any relation between sentences and entities as the basis for truth, is shown to be idle and useless for its intended explanatory purposes.

Thus Davidson, like Heidegger, is led by a systematic reflection on the contours of transcendental truth to reject the usefulness of any correspondence theory, or any theory that treats truth as essentially a relation between beings. For both philosophers, this rejection is the result of consideration of the systematic way in which the truth of sentences is conditioned by a broader and more general structure, one that also determines the presentation or availability of objects and the structure of possible predication with respect to them. For both philosophers, the rejection of correspondence theories gives shape to a more general anti-representationalist attitude which (following one strand of anti-psychologistic arguments made by Husserl and Frege) rejects the explanatory utility of internal, mental, or subjective representations or phenomena in accounting for the phenomenon of truth, and looks instead to the systematic structure of possible predication. But in both cases, it is worthy of note that this attitude is not motivated simply by a general distrust of representation or of the psychological or subjective, but rather emerges from a structural reflection on the basic phenomenon of transcendental truth, in relation to the structure of possible predication, itself. Such a reflection looks to the structure of possible (true) predication as a privileged, and primitive, guide to the nature of truth, and looks for this to be systematically illuminated through reflection on the kind of “pattern” that truth makes in ordinary utterances and judgments.

2. Against timeless truthbearers:

As we have seen, both Heidegger and Davidson apply arguments against correspondence and representationalist pictures of truth that resemble and descend from arguments made by their respective forebears, Husserl and Frege. Davidson’s application of the Slingshot, in particular, develops a line of thought that some have seen as at least implicit in Frege, and his more general argument linking correspondence truth to a problematic infinite regress echoes Frege’s own argument in “Thought” against correspondence theories. Somewhat similarly, at least one strand of Heidegger’s anti-correspondence position in Being and Time echoes Husserl’s own criticisms of “picture theories” of meaning and emphasizes the implications of the type of anti-representationalist direct realism that Husserl had long advanced. However, there is an important difference between the positions of both

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22 In fact, as Tugendhat points out in his own critique (Tugendhat, E. (1967) Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter &Co.) (Henceforth: DW), p. 331), Husserl himself had actually given a similar argument against “picture” theories already in the Logical Investigations, some 25 years before Heidegger’s writing of Being and Time, which makes the basis for some of Heidegger’s occasional criticisms of Husserl as a “correspondence” theorist rather mysterious. One version of Husserl’s own argument is given in Logical Investigations, vol. 2. See Husserl, E. (2001) The Shorter Logical Investigations (transl. by J. N. Findlay, ed. and abridged by Dermot Moran. London: Routledge), Investigation V, pp. 238-41. Husserl’s formulation of the argument also bears close comparison to Frege’s: “Since the interpretation of anything as an image presupposes an object intentionally given to consciousness, we should plainly have a regressus in infinitum were we again to let this latter object be itself constituted through an image, or to speak seriously of a ‘perceptual image’ immanent in a simple percept, by way of which it refers to the ‘thing itself’.” (p. 239)
Davidson and Heidegger, and one hand, and Frege and Husserl on the other, for while both of the latter were led by what they saw as the consequences of their shared opposition to psychologistic and individualist-subjectivist accounts of meaning to embrace “ideal” contents as the ultimate bearers of truth, Davidson and Heidegger clearly reject any appeal to timeless or a priori entities or phenomena such as propositions, Fregean thoughts, extra-temporal “senses”, ideal contents, or the like. Instead of maintaining the privileged link between sense and such timeless phenomena that traces back to Plato, both theorize the nature of truth and the meaning of sentences as inherently temporal phenomena of actual human life. In Heidegger’s case, this rejection is motivated by the larger critique he undertook over a period of several years prior to *Being and Time* of Husserl’s failure to pose the question of the ontological basis of the distinction, presupposed by Husserl and contemporary neo-Kantians alike, between the ideal and the real, a question whose most important aspect is the question of the temporality of both “realms” and their supposed interrelation. In Davidson’s case, suspicion of ideal and extra-linguistic contents such as Fregean propositions is motivated largely by his inheritance of Quine’s devastating arguments against the intelligibility of any such notion of content; this inheritance has the consequence that Davidson, like Quine, insists upon the availability in principle of the evidentiary basis for a systematic theory of the meaning of a language in the empirical evidence available to a radical interpreter. These motivations are differently situated, both theoretically and programatically; but in the context of the project of illuminating the transcendental phenomenon of truth, their upshot is in each case similar. For both philosophers, it is not ultimately helpful to posit extra-temporal entities as the bearers of truth; instead, truth must be explained in terms of the actual temporal phenomena of assertion, utterance, disclosure and unconcealment as these underlie the phenomenon of sense.

But although both philosophers thus reject timeless entities as truth-bearers, and substitute for these an account of the actual phenomena of linguistic and non-linguistic meaning as they are manifest in the actual life of speakers, this does not mean that either philosopher abandons the concept of sense itself or its essential link to the phenomenon of truth. As we have seen, for Heidegger sense becomes the interpretive projection of Dasein upon possibilities; according to this conception, sense retains a privileged structural connection to the world-disclosive essential structure of Dasein but nevertheless characterizes the very being of entities, both individually and collectively. Davidson’s project of radical interpretation, similarly, retains the goal of theorizing what is known, at least implicitly, by a competent speaker in knowing a language by structurally characterizing the pattern of truth-conditions exhibited by the language’s sentences as a whole. It is because of the privileged link between this pattern of truth-conditions and the compositional structure of sentences that such a theory can justly be characterized as a “theory of meaning” for the language, and to insist upon the holistic interdependence of truth-conditions and compositional structure in this way is essentially to insist upon a dimension of sense that is essentially linked to the structure of truth and is independent (as we have seen) of the dimension of reference. Once again, the key concept in illuminating or characterizing the structure of sense is that of truth, and in particular of the total “pattern” that truth must exhibit in the utterances, judgments, and practices of speakers. But that this pattern is exhibited in the actual utterances, judgments, and

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23 See chapter 2, above.
practices of speakers does not prevent it from embodying, as well, the real structure of the properties and relations of objects, insofar as they can figure as the subject matter of sentences, judgments and beliefs that are true.

If, for both philosophers, sense thus remains linked to the temporal phenomenon of truth, there here arise deep questions about the temporal constitution of sense, so conceived. In particular, if both philosophers point to a temporal phenomenon of truth that is not in any sense subjectivist or psychologistic, it is necessary in the context of both philosophers’ theories to ask how this phenomenon is temporally structured and how this structure is linked to the structure of sense. If, in particular, the pattern of meaningfulness exhibited by a successful Tarskian meaning theory, for Davidson, is essentially linked in each case to the structure of a particular language, then the question arises of how the interpretation of natural languages, as phenomena arising in historical time and capable of historical change and transformation, nevertheless presupposes (as Davidson has argued) a transcendent and non-language-specific concept of truth that is not conceived as arising anew with the institution or adoption of each new language. And if, for Heidegger, the phenomenon of truth is always linked with the sense of entities in terms of the specific possibilities of disclosure that are at any time afforded to Dasein as a historical being, then the question arises of how the various historical transformations of these possibilities of sense are in each case, again, linked back to the more general and transcendent phenomenon of truth as unconcealment. But crucially, this structure is itself not simply independent of time; rather, it is, in a way that still must be clarified (see chapter 1 and 3 (?) of part II), conceived as a structure in which is tied up the ontological givenness of time itself. We are not yet in a position to address these questions, though we will return to them in Part II. As we shall see there, their adequate formulation requires first a temporal and being-historical posing of the question that Heidegger sometimes describes as that of the “being of language” – that is, the question of the specific kind of temporality that “natural” or “historical” languages exhibit in their institution, transformation, and everyday practice. For now, it suffices to note simply that the privileged structural link that both philosophers maintain between the structure of sense and the phenomenon of transcendental truth raises questions of temporality and precedence that cannot simply be answered, as both philosophers recognize, by reference to an a priori, timeless, or transcendent realm of contents simply independent of historical time.

3. **Against epistemic, anti-realist, warranted assertability, or coherence theories**

If truth cannot be defined in any explanatorily useful way in terms of any relation of correspondence or any other relation between beings, there is also good reason, in the context of the structurally unified approach to truth and sense that both Davidson and Heidegger exemplify, to believe that it is not definable in terms of knowledge, verifiability, assertibility, or any other aspect of human epistemic or pragmatic abilities. The basic reason for this is that the concept of truth, as it operates in structuring sense, is linked more deeply conceptually and ontologically, to being than it is to knowing, or indeed to any concept of practice or knowledge grounded in, and limited to, the contingent reach of human abilities. Davidson makes the point clear in the course of a trenchant critical discussion of recent anti-realist theories such as Dummett’s, which holds that the truth of sentences in a language is to be
understood in terms of the possibilities of their verification, and Putnam’s “internal realism,” which characterized truth as warranted assertibility in an idealized sense:

We should not say that truth is correspondence, coherence, warranted assertibility, ideally justified assertibility, what is accepted in the conversation of the right people, what science will end up maintaining, what explains the convergence on final theories in science, or the success of our ordinary beliefs ...

Davidson’s basic reason for opposing all of the family of “anti-realist” accounts on which truth is dependent on standards of ascertainability, assertibility, or actual practice is that “antirealism, with its limitation of truth to what can be ascertained, deprives truth of its role as an intersubjective standard.” (p. 48). According to Davidson, it is constitutive of this role as a standard that truth cannot be “lost”; that is, it cannot be correct to hold that a sentence that is true at one time can ever become untrue later. But on an account like Dummett’s, which links truth to justified assertibility in the sense of the actual capabilities of an individual or community to verify or assert sentences, truth can be lost in this sense, for actual abilities develop in historical time and may also diminish or vanish. In this way a sentence that was formerly false or neither true nor false could become true simply by virtue of the contingent conditions of justification or assertibility changing; and a sentence formerly true could become not true with the waning of the requisite abilities or practices. The only alternative, while maintaining a constitutive link between truth and “human” practices or the epistemic abilities they are seen as embodying, is to idealize the requisite abilities; this is the alternative taken by Putnam with his “internal realist” account, which identifies truth with idealized justified assertibility, or what reasonable belief would converge upon ultimately, given “good enough” epistemic conditions. The problem with this alternative is that the idealization deprives the appeal to abilities of any distinctive force; in particular, if we idealize away from any possibility of error, we are simply no longer making any important use of a concept of human abilities at all. In this way, according to Davidson, all anti-realist theories, in making truth dependent upon a constitutive conception of human abilities, capacities, or practices, fall prey to a fatal dilemma: either they must hold that truth can be lost, or they make the epistemic concept of truth essentially empty.

Heidegger’s grounds for opposition to any theory of truth as grounded in epistemic (or any other) human abilities, capacities or practices may seem, initially, more obscure; for Heidegger, as we have seen, recurrently identifies truth as, in a basic way, a structure of Dasein; and (despite Heidegger’s own usual practice in Being and Time and significant internal evidence to the contrary) it has become usual to interpret or identify Dasein as it is discussed in Being and Time with a “human” way of being. Along similar lines, Heidegger’s discussion of Being-in-the-World and of the way that entities are primarily disclosed as ready-to-hand or zuhanden in contexts of everyday practice has suggested to some that he intends a conception of truth as grounded in a fundamental way in the contingent structure of social practices, or individually or socially maintained abilities or skills. Nevertheless, Heidegger’s attitude toward the view that truth “presupposes” human abilities or practices is well expressed in a passage from The Basic Problems of Phenomenology:
It is not we who need to presuppose that somewhere there is “in itself” a truth in the form of a transcendent value or valid meaning floating somewhere. Instead, truth itself, the basic constitution of the Dasein ... is the presupposition for our own existence. Being-true, unveiledness, is the fundamental condition for our being able to be in the way in which we exist as Dasein. Truth is the presupposition for our being able to presuppose anything at all. For presupposing is in every case an unveiling establishment of something as being. Presupposition everywhere presupposes truth." (Basic Problems, p. 221)²⁴

Here, it is clear that truth does not presuppose any abilities, capacities, or contingent practices; rather, the phenomenon of truth as unveiledness is the basic phenomenon that conditions our “being able to be in the way in which we exist as Dasein” at all. In *Being and Time*, this preconditioning takes the form of the basic structural relation of Dasein to unconcealedness or disclosure, in terms of which Dasein is “primordially” structured by truth, and is “equiprimordially” both “in truth” and “untruth”. In later texts, for instance in the *Beiträge*, this conception of truth as a precondition for our being Dasein is further radicalized, in the context of the deepened problem of the truth of being/beyng (Seyn), into the problem of attaining Dasein by means of attaining a standing in the ontologically privileged region of what is now thought of as the “clearing”. Though to do full justice to this point will require a deeper investigation (part II) into what is involved in the very concept of a human ability, or of a “practice” structured by such an ability, in a real or idealized sense, it is clear that in neither case is it trenchant to suppose that Heidegger simply ascribes the phenomenon of truth to individual or social abilities or practices (or to suppose that the definition of Dasein only accidentally leaves out the concept of the “human”). (provided the underlying ontological situation is seen clearly).

As Davidson emphasizes, the primary motivation for many anti-realist theories of truth is the felt desire to avoid a “metaphysically realist” account in terms of metaphysical correspondence, mind-independence, or a “God’s-eye view” that threatens to make the availability of truth to human knowers mysterious. If, however, correspondence accounts can be resisted by recourse to the Tarskian structure in the way Davidson has argued, then this motivation lapses and it is possible to begin to see the contours of an account of truth that is neither anti-realist nor “metaphysically” realist (in the “correspondence” sense). On such an account, truth is constitutively related to sense, not because sense is itself rooted in human abilities or practices, but because sense is in turn linked to the *being* of beings, to their being in the sense of existence and to their being the ways that they are. These linkages are manifest in the general logical structure underlying the possibility of predication, which is not specific to any particular language, and which exhibits the structure in virtue of which linguistic predicates are *true of* objects and entities, without necessarily ascribing this structure to any (ontic) domain of beings. In this way it is possible to see truth, resisting the anti-realist arguments, as

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²⁴ Cf. S&Z, pp. 227-228: “It is not we who presuppose ‘truth’; but it is ‘truth’ that makes it at all possible ontologically for us to be able to be such that we ‘presuppose’ anything at all. Truth is what first *makes possible* anything like presupposing... The truth which has been presupposed, or the ‘there is’ by which its Being is to be defined, has that kind of Being – or meaning of Being – which belongs to Dasein itself. We must ‘make’ the presupposition of truth because it *is* one that has been ‘made’ already with the Being of the ‘we’.”
essentially a realist structure touching on the very Being of beings itself (without construing this realism as “mind-independence,” correspondence, or any other ontically specified relation).

What, then, of Heidegger’s insistence that “there is truth only as long as, and because of, Dasein,” and Davidson’s declaration that “Nothing in the world, no object or event, would be true or false if there were not thinking creatures?” (p. 7) Both declarations can be upheld, if the specific phenomenon of truth is seen in its genuinely ontological structural relationship to Dasein and to the structure of thought. It is not that the structure of Dasein, or the existence of thinking creatures itself, is for either philosopher intelligible quite independently of the link between these phenomena and truth; rather, as Heidegger says, both Dasein and the characterization of any creature as “thinking” depends upon the structure of truth in its specific linkage with truth. The result of construing the dependence this way is that while, as Heidegger and Davidson both emphasize, it is incoherent to suppose truth to be completely and constitutively independent of the actuality of life and practices, it is also not the case that truth can simply be seen as an outcome of these.

These negative points of agreement between Heidegger and Davidson do not by themselves establish the positive possibility of a comprehensive theory of truth that is consistent with both philosophers’ accounts. But there is a further negative point of agreement, this time on a methodological level, that begins to point the way toward such a comprehensive picture. To see this point, it is important to note that both philosopher’s rejection of various types of traditional theories of truth that attempt to define it, whether of a correspondence, coherence, or a priori nature, has its methodological ground, in both cases, in a motivated suspicion of the very possibility of providing any definition of truth in terms of simpler or more basic phenomena. Davidson, for instance, argues that truth, as our “simplest semantic notion” cannot and should not be defined in terms of correspondence, knowledge, reference, or any other notion or phenomenon; indeed, it appears likely that any such definition will fail to respect the pattern already exhibited by Tarski’s extensionally adequate structure, and will hence fail to capture truth, even extensionally. Moreover, truth is a notion that we already understand, and indeed must understand if we are to interpret any language (even our own) at all.

The connection exhibited in the course of radical interpretation between truth and sense is so deep and basic that it is idle to expect one to be defined in terms of the other, or either one to be defined in terms of more simple or basic notions. Nevertheless, what we can do, according to Davidson, is to reflect on the relations among maximally basic concepts such as truth, meaning, and intention in order systematically to illuminate the pattern of their interconnections. This illumination is provided in part by reflecting on the Tarskian structure, and on what it suggests about the structure of predication in a language as a whole; as we have seen, this reflection illuminates, in particular, how the two structures are interrelated in producing the truth-conditional structure of a language that can be understood and learned by finite creatures, and thus how this possibility is itself linked back to what is true and false.

As we have seen, for Heidegger as well truth is an ontologically basic concept, one that is not explained on the presupposition of some other phenomenon but is, in a sense, itself presupposed to the intelligibility of any phenomenon as such. For this reason, the interpretive situation with respect to it is just as Davidson says: it is not explained or defined in the course of interpretation, but is rather
presupposed to the possibility of any interpretation, and hence to the very intelligibility of phenomena and beings as well. Moreover, since the kind of depth that is relevant here is ontological rather than ontic, the hermeneutic situation with respect to truth is directly analogous (or even homologous) with that of the concept of Being itself. As Heidegger makes clear in *Being and Time*, though it would be idle to search for an explicit definition of Being, we already stand in a hermeneutic situation determined by a certain “understanding” of it, albeit a vague and inexplicit one; what we can do to gain ontological clarity is to practice a kind of hermeneutic reflection that aims to make it intelligible and fixate in explicit concepts what we already implicitly understand. The analogies here between the ways that Davidson and Heidegger describe our hermeneutic position are telling, for they suggest that when the attempt to define truth is left behind, what remains is the possibility of clarifying it by reflection on its relation to equally deep concepts or phenomena, among them the phenomenon of sense itself. In the reflection, the underlying phenomenological structure can become gradually more and more visible, though always only on the essential basis of the inexplicit understanding of the phenomenon that the investigator already has. Heidegger’s term in the 1920s for this sort of reflection, which makes explicit the underlying structure of a phenomenon already in some way known by means of our own reflection on it, is *formal indication* (cf. chapter 2). The evident hermeneutic parallels between Davidson’s way and Heidegger’s way of describing the reasons for the indefinability of truth suggest that the Tarskian structure of convention T, as well as Heidegger’s own identification of truth as unconcealment, suggest that both might be seen as formal indications in this sense.

II

Thus far, I have argued that there are several initially suggestive similarities between Heidegger’s and Davidson’s respective discussions of transcendental truth. Both situate their accounts of truth within the broad context of interpretation, both understand transcendental truth as pointing to a broader holistic structure that preconditions the intelligibility of specific concepts of truth in particular languages, both connect this structure closely to that of meaning or sense, and for both the connection involves, in large part, an account of how the structure of transcendental truth illuminates the structure of possible linguistic predication (and the availability of objects). Moreover, as we have seen, both reject in common many common accounts of truth, including correspondence accounts, coherence and epistemic accounts, and accounts on which propositions or timeless senses are ultimate truthbearers. Finally, the resistance of both philosophers to all of these types of theories may be seen as connected negatively to their shared resistance to the project of defining truth, and positively to the methodology of formal indication that both effectively adopt. However, there is at least one large-scale and obvious difference that must be overcome before any serious unification of Davidson’s and Heidegger’s accounts can be considered. Drawing as it does in detail upon Tarski’s structure of truth-definitions for well-defined languages, and arising in the context of the kind of broadly “truth-conditional” accounts that are characteristic of much theorizing in the analytic tradition, Davidson’s consideration takes assertoric sentences to be the primary locus of truth and the structure of a language to be the primary one to which a systematic consideration of truth is applicable. Views of this sort, on which sentences are the primary locus of truth and sentences or sentential structures articulate logical form in a way that is
essential to any consideration of truth, gained predominance at an early stage in the analytic tradition; without prejudice to whether sentences, sentence-types, or propositions are taken as the relevant units of analysis, we shall call them sentential views. By sharp contrast with them, as we have seen, Heidegger recurrently criticizes a “traditional” conception of truth according to which the “assertion” [Aussage] is its primary locus and characterizes the basic phenomenon of truth (as aletheia or unconcealment) as a phenomenon that does not necessarily involve explicit judgment, linguistic predication, or assertion. This criticism involves Heidegger repeatedly in challenging the actual possibility of giving an adequate account of truth if one begins with sentences or their linguistic interrelations; while from the other side, given the basic and essential connection, within the practice of a language, between the structure of sentences and the possibility of saying something true or false, it can be questioned whether any account of truth can succeed without a structural basis in the logical structure of sentences (of the kind that Tarski’s account captures).

This difference points in obvious ways to broader methodological and thematic differences in the traditions and lineages in which the two philosophers have most often been located. In particular, Davidson’s sentential approach fits centrally within the tradition of which both of his most important antecedents, Tarski and Quine, are unquestionably located, that of analytic philosophy in the wake of the “linguistic turn”; whereas Heidegger’s approach, developing from Husserl’s phenomenology, does not accord the linguistic turn, at least in the form inspired by Frege and first taken by Russell and the early Wittgenstein, any central methodological priority. Some recent scholarship has emphasized the ways in which Heidegger’s own commitments, particularly with respect to truth, can be seen as embodying a critical position with respect to those of much of the mainstream analytic tradition; for example, Dahlstrom has recently suggested that a major basis for Heidegger’s positive views is his critique of a “logical prejudice” which is both historically dominant and also characteristic, according to Dahlstrom, of the analytic tradition of Frege, Quine and Davidson. On the position that Dahlstrom presents Heidegger as criticizing, the sentence, proposition, or assertoric utterance is the basic locus of truth, and the structure of truth can only be understood through a systematic reflection on the structure

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25 A good example of a propositional conception is the view that comes powerfully to the fore in the first remarks of Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*:

The world is all that is the case.

And

The world is the totality of facts, not of things.  

Here, the contrast is drawn explicitly between a conception of the world as inherently *structured* in such a way that it can only be adequately revealed or described by means of sentences or propositions and a conception (to be rejected) on which it does not have this kind of structure, but is instead simply a collection or totality of *individual* things or objects.
of language. Conversely, from a position methodologically influenced by the “language-analytic”
tradition, Ernst Tugendhat in the 1960s articulated a by-now-classic critique of Heidegger’s conception
of truth in his Habilitation, Der Wahrheitbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger, and in a related shorter
article, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth.” In both pieces, Tugendhat argues that Heidegger’s aletheiac or
disclosive conception cannot account for important specific features of the phenomenon of truth,
among them the basic difference between truth and falsity itself, and suggests that only a conception
that takes the truth of sentences or sentence-like structures as basic can account for truth in its close
connection to predication. In this section, I will consider Tugendhat’s objections and argue that
Heidegger can be defended against them; the basis for the defense is a consideration of the implications
of Heidegger’s conception of the phenomenologically basic structure of the “existential/hermeneutic
as”. On the other hand, considering the genuine methodological grounds for Tugendhat’s critique
allows us to see the appropriate place of a consideration of sentential structure in the context of a more
comprehensive general picture of transcendental truth, one that does not accord either the disclosure
of objects or the truth of sentences a simple priority, but rather presents both kinds of priority as
equally real and significant, although articulable along different dimensions.

In considering the relationship of Heidegger’s views to the analytic tradition, it is important first to note
that the “traditional conception” that Heidegger criticizes fits many analytic sentential conceptions of
truth only poorly. First, Heidegger generally characterizes the traditional conception as one on which
the “assertion” [Aussage] or “act of judgment” is accorded primacy; but because of the anti-
psychologistic basis of the sentential accounts of truth that originate with Frege and gain prominence in
the analytic tradition, these accounts generally distinguish (as Husserl himself in fact did) distinguish
sharply between individual, datable acts of assertion, judgment or utterance and their contents, and so
do not accord primacy to any individual linguistic act of assertion or psychological event of judging.
Even in the context of a picture like Davidson’s, where the interpretation of meaning is the
interpretation of the utterances of the speakers of a language or the speaker of an idiolect, these
utterances are seen as having a significant logical structure of contents, shown in the recursive structure
of the axiomatized T-theory, which is conceived as independent of (and productive of) these actual
utterances. Second, and perhaps more significantly in the context of considering the actual nature of
truth, Davidson’s account and some other analytic accounts combine a sentential conception of the
locus of truth with a non-correspondence conception of its nature.

It is not that Heidegger ever explicitly argues against just this kind of view. Rather, his own discussions
recurrently identify sentential theories with correspondence theories under the unified heading of the
“traditional” conception of truth. As we have seen, in Being and Time, Heidegger discusses the
“traditional” conception as committed to both the claim that the primary locus of truth is assertion or
judgment, and the claim that truth consists in ‘agreement’, adequation, or correspondence.26 Heidegger
does distinguish between these two components of what he sees as the “traditional” account of truth,
but throughout Being and Time and in other texts dating from both before and after its composition,
Heidegger repeatedly assumes that these two components *must* go together.²⁷ In fact, Davidson and other philosophers in the analytic tradition have indeed often adopted a view of truth that holds that it is primarily sentential while clearly *rejecting* a correspondence account of (sentential) truth.²⁸

This suggests that accounts of the sort that Davidson gives, which (as we saw above) clearly and decisively rejects any type of correspondence or any other ontic relation as the basis of truth while maintaining the primarily sentential form of truth, may capture important features of the phenomenon of truth that neither the “traditional conception” nor Heidegger’s own picture can capture as adequately. This suggestion is the basis of Tugendhat’s critique. At the heart of Tugendhat’s argument in the shorter article “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth” is the suggestion that Heidegger’s account of truth as unconcealment in section 44 of *Being and Time* fails to account for the central difference that all theories of truth must account for, if they are to be considered adequate at all: that between truth and falsity itself. For in reducing truth to the unitary phenomenon of unconcealment, Heidegger can consider it only as an event that either occurs or does not, and cannot therefore provide any basis for a distinction between true and false unconcealments. In particular, Tugendhat suggests, it is reasonable to suppose that we understand the claim that something is true only if we are also able to understand, as well, the claim that it is false: that is, if we have the actual concept of truth in view, it must include, as part of its basic structure *both* the possibilities of truth and falsehood. However, on the view that Heidegger argues for, the truth of an assertion consists in its disclosure or uncovering of an entity; it is this uncovering or disclosure that deserves the name “truth” in the primary sense.²⁹ This “being-uncovered” (*Entdeckend-sein*) of the entity or entities thus appears to be simply something that either *happens* or *does not* happen ³⁰ As Tugendhat argues, if Heidegger indeed considers truth to consist in uncovering, then he must apparently consider *all* uncovering to be in itself “true,” and thus must consider even a false proposition to depend on the uncovering of the entities involved in it.³¹ Indeed, Heidegger himself says that in a *false* assertion “the entity” is “already in a certain way uncovered.”³² But if this is right, and the concept of uncoveredness does not include or support a bivalent distinction between truth and falsehood, then it is also clearly insufficient to account for the bivalence of propositions, one of the key defining features of propositions on any reasonable view.

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²⁸ Thus, whereas the scholastic motto which Heidegger most often mentions in discussion of the “traditional” conception of truth, according to which truth is the *ad equatio intellectus et rei*, calls on its face for correspondence or “adequation” between the intellect and a *thing or object* (*rei*), and so does not immediately suggest a propositional conception of truth at all, on the other hand the conceptions of those twentieth-century philosophers who have held a propositional conception of truth can almost universally be separated from the idea of truth as correspondence or adequation, and indeed in many cases involve conceptually devastating critiques of this idea.


³¹ “HIT,” pp. 253-54; *Der Warheitsbegriff*, p. 333.

³² S&Z, p. 222.
Heidegger’s formulation at the beginning of section 44b, that “Being true (truth) means being-uncovered” [“Wahrsein (Wahrheit) besagt entdeckend-sein”] therefore appears to be inadequate. Tugendhat suggests that Heidegger can reach this formulation, in fact, only through a crucial equivocation. In section 44a, he has moved from the claims that an assertion is true when it “uncovers the entity as it is in itself” to the simple claim that the assertion’s truth is simply its “uncovering” of the entity (full stop).\(^3\) With the first claim, we still have a bivalent distinction between truth and falsity; for an assertion can presumably disclose an entity (or perhaps, as Tugendhat suggests, a state of affairs) as it is in itself or otherwise; in the first case, it will be true, and in the second, false. But with the slide to the third claim, we have lost the possibility of any such distinction; uncovering either occurs or it does not, and we no longer have any ground to distinguish between a “true” and a “false” kind of uncovering.

In failing to draw this distinction, according to Tugendhat, Heidegger has in fact equivocated between two concepts of “uncovering” or pointing out; according to the broader of the two, “uncovering” means pointing out or indicating entities in general, and includes true as well as false instances, while according to the second, narrower concept, it is limited to cases of truth and a false assertion is, instead, a case of covering-up or concealing. Thus, although Heidegger has (quite rightly, on Tugendhat’s account) further developed the central strand of Husserl’s thought, already in fact hinted at by Plato and Aristotle, according to which truth is at bottom to be understood in terms of the phenomenon of givenness, he has nevertheless continued it in such a way that the particular differentiation that makes for a specific concept of truth as such becomes unavailable.

Although Tugendhat argues that Heidegger, in defining truth as unconcealment, has thus crucially failed to capture essential features of the actual concept of truth, he does not simply reject Heidegger’s project in all of its aspects. Both in “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth” and in Der Wahrheitsbegriff, Tugendhat emphasizes the significance of Heidegger’s continuance of the classical “ontological-transcendental” project that begins with Kant and also characterizes Husserl’s phenomenology, and moreover suggests that Heidegger’s inquiry deepens radicalizes this project in an important respect by turning its attention away from the subjective conditions for possible knowledge of objects and toward the broader “ontological” question of the structural conditions of givenness in general. In the first part of Der Wahrheitsbegriff, Tugendhat shows how Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, especially in connection with the problem of “constitution”, drives toward a systematic consideration of the modes of givenness of different types and regions of objectivities (pp. 184), culminating in the idea of a kind of “phenomenological aletheiology” that systematically elucidates the transcendental conditions for truth in the sense of the various kinds and modes of subjective givenness (p. 259). But as Heidegger suggests, Husserl could not fully carry out the project of such a systematic inquiry because of his presupposition of subjectivity as an absolute region of self-givenness and his consequent failure to inquire radically into the underlying sense of givenness itself, in a way that does not simply presuppose the subject-object relationship. There thus arises, beyond Husserl’s inquiry into the specific conditions of intentional givenness of objects, the more general “ontological” question of the “dimension of ways of givenness” of beings as beings; Heidegger develops the question, in Being and Time, as the analysis of facticity and in determinative connection with the phenomenon of world (at which Husserl had hinted, again without

\(^3\) S&Z, p. 218.
being able fully to treat it, with his late concept of “lifeworld”). Here, in particular, the givenness of phenomena in general is characterized in terms of their liability to be encountered as beings and with this the question of their truth in the sense of their “disclosure” is intimately linked to the question of the meaning of Being itself.\(^\text{34}\) This widening of the question represents a real deepening of the transcendental problematic, according to Tugendhat, in that it amounts to posing the question of the very constitution of the horizon within which beings are given as meaningful at all, a question which is, Tugendhat suggests, unprecedented in the history of the tradition. In this respect, in broadening the concept of disclosedness beyond the intentional relation or the relationship between subjects and objects, Heidegger has thus made real progress (“Idea of Truth p. 258); but by simply identifying truth and disclosedness \emph{tout court}, he has also lost track, as we have seen, of the specific possibility of differentiating between truth and falsehood, and hence of the possibility of a “critical consciousness” grounded in responsiveness to this difference. It remains possible, as Tugendhat suggests briefly at the end of “Heidegger’s idea of truth,” that the “transcendental” problematic of the ultimate horizons of givenness might itself be developed differently, and even in such a way that the bivalent distinction between truth and falsity itself is itself preserved, and even illuminated, at this level.

It is against this possibility that Tugendhat’s more specific objections to apparent consequences of Heidegger’s picture of truth as disclosedness should be measured, and to its further development, both in ways actually suggested by Heidegger and also in ways supplementary to his official account, that they may perhaps be seen as pointing. In particular, in \emph{Der Wahrheitsbegriff}, Tugendhat instructively offers three more specific articulations of the underlying objection that Heidegger’s identification of truth with disclosedness \emph{tout court} must fail to account for the specific difference between the truth and falsehood of assertions. First, since Heidegger wishes to identify truth with what transpires in \emph{acts} of disclosure or unconcealment rather than the \emph{contents} of these acts, he essentially makes truth into the result of an (factual and “ontic”) event. But this results in seemingly implausible consequences about truth itself, including its \emph{ontic} relativity to human acts of inquiry and discovery. For example, Heidegger says near the beginning of section 44c that “‘There is truth only in so far as Dasein is and so long as Dasein is”, that Newton’s laws, like other truths, “are true only as long as Dasein is”, and that “Through Newton [his] laws became true…” (pp. 226-227). This suggests, according to Tugendhat, that according to Heidegger a being can \emph{become} ‘true’ when and if it is factically indicated or pointed out. But:

\begin{quote}
If a state of affairs, so long as it is unrecognized, is not true, then it would indeed seem appropriate to say as a consequence of this that it ceases being true when it is no longer recognized by anyone, and that its truth grows greater the more people recognize it.\(^\text{35}\)
\end{quote}

Similarly, according to Tugendhat, Heidegger’s identification of truth with acts or events of disclosure leaves mysterious the status of a sentence or proposition that is understood but not yet verified; such a sentence would seem indeed to disclose the entities treated by it, but would not by that token seem to be automatically characterizable as true. More generally, Tugendhat suggests:

\(^{34}\) P. 270; cf. also being and time p. 31, p.44.
\(^{35}\) \emph{Der Wahrheitsbegriff}, p. 344.
Insofar as one can assume that Heidegger indeed has in mind in this section the specific sense of truth, the ontical and ontological levels are simply confused: on the ground of the indubitable ontological relativity of truth as such to the Dasein, the ontic independence of the occurrent truth from its factually being known is denied.\textsuperscript{36}

-The objection is essentially the same as the one that Davidson makes against epistemic conceptions of truth. Since Heidegger also wants to avoid such theories, we should not attribute to him the implications of these kinds of views. In particular, since (as he says) the phenomenon of truth is a more general one that preconditions our possibility of being Dasein...

Second, as Tugendhat suggests, when Heidegger does characterize the truth of assertions, “the assertions of which Heidegger is thinking are primarily simple predications of individual objects ... Only here is the talk of indication, uncovering and concealing clear without further ado.”\textsuperscript{37} That is, if the truth of assertions is itself to be characterized in terms of the uncovering of entities, it is not immediately clear which entities should be thought of as uncovered (etc.) in any case but that of the attribution of a single property to a distinct individual. For instance, if we begin with sentences such as “Socrates is tall” simply predicating a property of an individual object, we may indeed readily be led to an account of the truth of this sentence as consisting in the uncoveredness of Socrates as he is in himself (namely as tall). However, it is not at all clear from this account what we are to do with even a simple relational sentence such as “Socrates is older than Plato.” Should we think of the truth of this as grounded in the disclosure only of Socrates (since he is the grammatical subject)? But then we must think of his being disclosed in terms of a relational property (being older than Plato) as his being disclosed as he is in himself. This would threaten to make all relations into internal properties of an individual, and since each object is related somehow or other to all others, it would imply that the full disclosure of an individual object also discloses the whole universe. Or should we think of the relevant disclosure here as that of Socrates and Plato jointly, as they are in themselves? But this too is inadequate, since in addition to the disclosure of Socrates, and that of Plato, we evidently need the disclosure of the relationship between them as well. And this relationship can hardly itself be attributed to either of the “things” as they are “in themselves.”

Finally, as Tugendhat suggests in passing, an even harder case is that of (true) negative judgments of existence, for instance the judgment “Santa Claus does not exist” or “there are no unicorns.” It is not at all clear how the truth of these judgments can be grounded in the “disclosure” (uncovering, etc.) of the entities mentioned, since these entities do not even exist. Here, as Tugendhat suggests, it is accordingly unclear what it could mean to speak of the “thing itself” or of the true proposition as disclosing it as it itself is; rather, the problem of accounting for the basis of (true or false) negative existential assertions evidently demands a much more complex accounting for the relationship between their possible truth and the meanings of their constituent terms, including terms such as “not,” and “being” itself. This is not to say that such an account could not be given, but only to suggest that it would necessarily pass through an ontological development of the transcendental problematic that would at the same time be

\textsuperscript{36} Der Wahrheitsbegriff, p. 345.

\textsuperscript{37} Der Wahrheitsbegriff, p. 342.
requisite to clarifying the relevant sense of the availability of beings in general and as a whole on the basis of which the truth of such a negative assertion is possible.

Taken together, Tugendhat’s objections suggest that neither Heidegger’s account, nor any account that sees the linguistic truth of assertions or sentences as secondary to a more basic kind of truth “of beings”, can succeed in capturing the actual contours of the concept of truth, including the important distinction between truth and falsity itself. As Tugendhat emphasizes at the end of “Heidegger’s idea of truth,” however, this does not prevent Heidegger’s extension of the question of truth from representing a genuine advance over earlier transcendental pictures such as Kant’s and Husserl’s. In particular, in extending the question of the basis of givenness beyond intentional relations of subject and object, Heidegger’s account can encompass the dynamic and temporal character of the unconcealment of entities in the horizon of world and formulate the essential question of the way in which the opening of the world as such already conditions the possibility of assertoric truth. Nor does it exclude the possibility that Heidegger’s advanced transcendental picture might in some way be reconciled with assertoric or sentential theories that emphasize the specific features of assertoric truth which seem to go missing on Heidegger’s explicit account in section 44 of Being and Time (pp. 257-259). Can Heidegger’s picture be defended or supplemented without modifying its basic structure, but in such a way as to respond adequately to Tugendhat’s objections? I shall now argue that it can, and that the defense indeed points the way to a reconciled, more comprehensive picture that can accommodate the best features of Heidegger’s “transcendental” position with respect to the givenness of entities as well as those of sentential theories such as Davidson’s.

To a large extent, such a defense can be formulated by considering the far-reaching implications of Heidegger’s development of the hermeneutically basic “existential-hermeneutic” “as-structure,” which Heidegger treats as the most basic structure underlying any possible understanding and unconcealment, including (but emphatically not limited to) that which occurs in explicit assertion. The structure and implications of this basic “existential-hermeneutic as” are sketched only quickly in Being and Time; but Heidegger gives a much more detailed account, in extensive deconstructive dialogue with Aristotle, in the 1925-26 course “Logic: The Question of Truth”. Here, Heidegger pursues a detailed and penetrating analysis of the basis of the structure of the assertoric logos in Aristotle, including importantly the possibility of a logos being false (section 13).

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38 “In Heidegger’s metatranscendental position – in which the most primordially given is neither substance nor subject, but instead, an open region – critical consciousness could have been able to find its proper balance. Here, at the point at which transcendental not only takes in history, but also opens itself to it and renounces the support of an ultimate ground, arose the possibility of radicalizing and developing anew the idea of critical consciousness; yet also thereby the danger of surrendering this idea and giving preference to a new immediacy. But in fact the open region did not yield that proper balance; for without the depth dimension of truth, it was thought only as a region of immediacy ...for the moment of reflection, which is constitutive for the question of truth, remained from the outset on the margins.” (pp. 262-63).
Heidegger finds that, for Aristotle, the possibility of truth as well as falsehood in a logos depends on its instantiating a structure of *synthesis* and *diaeresis*; in virtue of this structure, a simple predicative sentence both synthesizes the subject with the property or determination expressed by the predicate, and also separates out from the many possible determinations of that subject the one that is explicitly expressed in the particular sentence. Aristotle sees this structure of synthesis and diaeresis in the predicative sentence as characteristic of the actual meaning of the “copula” or of the “is” of predication, although it is also present, for Aristotle, in sentences which do not include the copula explicitly. At the same time, though, this possibility of combination and separation in the sentence has an ontological basis, for Aristotle, in intrinsic possibilities of synthesis among objects; thus, for the synthetic/diaeretic structure to characterize the possibilities of truth and falsehood in the sentence, “the being itself must have an ontological structure such that, on the basis of its being [Sein] and as the being [Seiende] that it is, the thing offers the possibility of synthesis, indeed demands synthesis with another being.” In this respect, for Aristotle, “the thing must be what it is only within the unity of such a synthesis.” (p. 156).

The synthetic/diaeretic structure which Aristotle thus discovers in the assertoric sentence has its historical basis in Plato’s conception of the logos as a synthetic structure in the *Sophist*, which was possible for him only in that “he posed anew the problem of being,” thereby achieving a concept of synthesis that is, in a “chameleon-like” way, both logical and ontological. Aristotle, however, “pressed further ahead” in discovering how this structure could show that the possibility of falsehood lies “within beings themselves and in the possible ways they can be.” As Heidegger shows through a detailed reading of *Metaphysics* IX 10, in particular, Aristotle’s synthetic/diaeretic conception, in accordance with the way that “the question of truth in the Greeks is primarily oriented to knowledge as intuition,” (p. 143) is itself dependent on Aristotle’s claim for the necessary existence of certain non-composite beings about which falsehood and deception are impossible; these beings, the *eide*, are “always already in every being that is there” (p. 152) and thus are “constitutive for all beings in their being”.39 Thus Aristotle determines the possibility of truth and falsehood only on the basis of a privileged determination of the *aei on* – the beings that always are – and the possibility of a mode of uncovering that has no opposite. In this special kind of uncovering, “the being is present simply in and of itself and ‘as’ itself”. (p. 152)

In this sense, *for Aristotle* (as Heidegger reads him), an ultimate basis for assertoric truth and falsehood is indeed to be found in the phenomenon of a privileged disclosure which itself does not admit of any possibility of falsehood, and thus does not provide an ultimate basis for the bivalence of assertoric truth.

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39 “If this concluding clarification of being is also to be the most proper one, then it must also take for its theme the being [Seiende] that is constitutive for all beings in their being. This being [Seiende] that, in every being, *is* the being [Seiende], or its being [Sein] (this oscillation of terms is characteristic) – this being [Seiendes] that makes every being be what it is, is the essence, the what, from which everything that is has its origin. That which from the outset always already is in every being that is there (and which therefore is there in an entirely special way) must be investigated as and in terms of being [Sein], if being is to be understood in its most proper sense. The question about being must be finally directed to essence and its being. In effect, it is the question about the being of beings.” (pp. 151-152)
This determination, as well as the need to characterize the structure of the logos as synthesis and diresis founded ultimately on the presence of necessarily existing eternal entities, result from Aristotle’s understanding of the synthetic unity of the logos as expressing an ontological state of co-presence, or presence-together. But this understanding itself has its root, according to Heidegger, in Aristotle’s interpretation of being (in its most basic and general sense) as presence. (Cf. chapter 1 above). By contrast with this, Heidegger aims to show that the apparently synthetic structure of the logos has real ontological and hermeneutic basis in the primary structure of the “existential-hermeneutic as,” which cannot be basically characterized as any synthesis of already existing entities.40

This more general hermeneutic “as” structure is, as Heidegger argues, the actual foundation of the more specific possibility of the kind of synthesis that occurs, according to Aristotle, in the explicit logos. It conditions the specific possibility of falsehood, as Heidegger goes on to say, through three structural conditions that it has as inherent aspects. First, there is a basic “tendency toward the uncovering of something” which amounts to a prior “meaning and having” of the subject matter [das Woruber], or an “always already prior disclosure of world”. Second, “within” this comportment of uncovering, there is a letting-be-seen [Sehenlassen] of the subject matter “from another;” it is on the basis of this moment, that there arises the “possibility of something’s giving itself out as something”. Third and finally, the encountering of something through the basic “as” structure always involves a possibility of the “togetherness” [Beisammen] of something with something; this possibility is itself always determined by the context of a particular “range of indications” that constrain what possibly can appear in a particular environment. It is through this threefold structure that the possibility of error and illusion first arises, even in cases that do not involve anything like explicit assertion, as Heidegger illustrates by considering a simple case of mistaking a bush for a deer while walking in a dark forest. In this case, the first condition is fulfilled in that I indeed have something coming before me that I regard in some way; the second is fulfilled in that I encounter something as something (indeed, in this case, as a deer); and the third is fulfilled in that I understand in advance that something like “a deer” can indeed be present in this environment.

In Being and Time, (section 32, p. 150) Heidegger replicates these three constitutive structures precisely, albeit more briefly and without explicit connection to the possibility of falsehood, as the three structural moments of fore-having [Vorhabe], fore-sight [Vorsicht] and fore-conception [Vorgriff]. These moments, together, found everyday circumspective interpretation [alltäglichen, umsichtigen Auslegung] and thus structure, in an inexplicit way, the “whole of involvements” [Bewandtnisganzheit] from which

40 "This synthetic showing is a showing on the basis of, and is preformed within, a focus on something else. The act of showing something by focusing on something else that has the feature of “can be together-with,” is what we have already characterized as the determining act of speaking about something as something – logos as a statement that determines something. This brings to light an inner connection between the ontological structure of synthesis and of the as-structure, which we earlier characterized as the basic hermeneutical structure.” (pp. 157-58)
the ready-to-hand is itself understood. Meaning or sense [Sinn], as the “upon-which” [Woraufhin] of a projection through which something becomes understandable as something, is essentially structured by these three moments. (p. 151). [as discussed above] In this way, the threefold “fore-” structures articulate the underlying “hermeneutic-existential as” and also provide a concrete basis for the general possibility of falsehood – not limited to the kind of falsehood exhibited by assertions – in Dasein’s concrete comportment and relation to world. This provides, as Heidegger suggests in Logic, a real basis for understanding the possibility of falsehood as arising, not simply from the structure of sentences or representations, but from “the very beings about which statements are possible” and from the underlying structure of truth as unconcealment or uncovering (p. 141). More broadly, the basic figuring of the “hermeneutic-existential” as structure in every instance of interpretation or unconcealment clarifies that all such instances can be characterized in terms of the basic distinction between truth and falsehood. In particular, the underlying structure of the hermeneutic as ensures that it is a basic and irreducible feature of the disclosure of entities that they can be disclosed as they are or otherwise. In the second case, Heidegger indeed sometimes says that the entity or entities are “partly concealed” or “covered-over”; but this is itself to be understood as a mode of disclosure. In being disclosed as it is or as it is not, an entity is shown in its being or otherwise; accordingly, the difference between “true” and “false” disclosure already implicates the specific way in which the being is available (or not) to Dasein in relation to its own particular way of being. It should not be taken as an implication of this, though, that whether a being is disclosed as it is or otherwise is always or even generally known to the individual discloser. Rather, because the distinction between truth and falsehood is here ontologically (rather than epistemically) basic, there is no reason to suppose that it must be transparent to the individual knower.

Because of the closeness and exhaustiveness of Heidegger’s readings of Aristotle in Logic and other courses of the early and mid-1920s and because of Heidegger’s suggestion that Aristotle himself sees, at least implicitly, something of the disclosive structure that underlies the possibility of propositional truth, Heidegger’s own thinking about the ontological foundations of the distinction between truth and falsity are not always clearly separated from Aristotle’s. However, at the outset of part 2 of Logic, Heidegger makes it clear that, if the synthetic structure of the logos is, for Aristotle, rooted in the primary and assumed a priori existence of objects about which falsehood is ultimately impossible, an assumption itself based on the assumed primacy of the continuous and enduring present, a phenomenological investigation which replaces this assumption with a grounding in the existential-hermeneutic “as” structure must necessarily replace this with a deeper investigation into the underlying temporality that this structure demonstrates. In particular, Heidegger here calls for a radicalization of the question of

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41 “If we understand the phenomenon of truth (as uncovering) more radically – from Dasein itself and what we characterized as its basic hermeneutical structure – then we can understand from the beginning that falsehood necessarily depends on the very beings about which statements are possible.” (p. 141)

42 What does being mean such that truth can be understood as a characteristic of being? As we have pointed out, Aristotle...introduced the idea that the being of a synthetic being means presence-onto: the presence-together of something with something in the unity of a present being. This unity, this primary presence that precedes an grounds presence-together, must be understood as presence, presenting [Anwesenheit, praesenz]. Why? If being
truth and the intimately related phenomena of “falsehood, synthesis, ...statement,” and being itself are essentially related to the constitution of time. Thus it is necessary to investigate the basic temporal determinations of these interrelated phenomena. Temporality (Temporality) in this sense is to be distinguished from intratemporality (zeitlichkeit), or the mere fact of something’s running its course in time; what is sought is rather an investigation of how these phenomena themselves are essentially related to time; Heidegger calls this a “phenomenological chronology.”

With respect to the ongoing analysis begun with the reading of Aristotle, this means that “the analysis of the proposition is now oriented toward time.” Its provisional thesis is that “truth, being, and consequently falsehood, synthesis, and statement are, in some kind of (for the time being) obscure sense, connected with the phenomenon of time...” (pp. 168-69) This investigation is, in particular, explicitly directed toward an analysis of the underlying temporality of the basic “as-structure;” this analysis will itself, Heidegger says, provide an analysis of the deepest underlying temporal conditions of the possibility of propositions and of the mode of synthesis that they represent.

We need to work out an analysis of the conditions of the possibility of propositions and of synthesis in terms of their ur-temporality. We led synthesis back to the as-structure, and that means we now have to explain the ur-temporality of the as-structure. We have characterized this as-structure as a basic hermeneutical structure of existence. We likewise showed how the ‘as’ of this basic hermeneutical structure gets leveled down to the ‘as’ which is used to determine things that are merely there. .... (pp. 174-75).

In particular, since the possibility of explicit assertion is not primarily determined as the possibility of synthesis, but rather from a “leveling-down” of the more basic as-structure, the investigation of temporality must consider how the “leveled-down” temporality of propositional assertion is itself constituted by the more basic temporality of the underlying “as”-structure. This involves a consideration, in particular, of the underlying temporality of care, in terms of which any network of comportments available to Dasein is constituted.

As so described, the underlying hermeneutic “as”-structure has several logically significant features, which I now briefly adumbrate. First, as we have seen, although the structure underlies the possibility of sentential predication, it is more general than the structure of predication itself. In particular, it is

means and (mostly implicitly) is understood as presenting or presence, then the genuine and corresponding act of relating to beings as beings is one that, qua relating, also has a pres-ential character. But an act of relating is pres-ential not insofar as it is merely present the way a mental event is, of which (it is commonly held) I am immediately aware. ....” (p. 162)

“Plato already characterizes being as presence-now. And the word ousia (which gets peddled around absurdly in the history of philosophy as “substance”) means nothing other than “presence” in a sense that we still have to specify. But in all this it is necessary to emphasize that, yes, the Greeks (Plato and Aristotle) do determine being as ousia, but they were very far from understanding what is really entailed in defining being as presence and as presence-now. Presence-now is a characteristic of time. To understand being as presence on the basis of presence-now means to understand being in terms of time.” (p. 163)
operative already in *various* kinds of circumstances of uncovering that possess a dimension of “veridicality” or truth-evaluable, including perception and engaged practice, whether or not there is any explicit conceptual articulation of a judgment or linguistic articulation of a sentence. Second, the structure is nevertheless fully (and irreducibly) ‘intensional’. That is, if, in accordance with the structure, an item is uncovered as having a certain trait or characteristic, this does not generally imply that the substitution of co-referential terms would preserve the truth of the statement that the item is thus uncovered (for instance, if a particular apparent celestial object is uncovered as the morning star, there is no implication that it is thereby also uncovered as the planet Venus). In this sense, what is unconcealed through the basic “as” structure is always “under” a “mode of presentation,” though we should not think of this as equivalent to being “under a conception” (since there need not be any *explicit* conception at all). Third, the structure is irreducibly holistic: the uncovering of a particular entity as being a particular way in general depends on the whole surrounding structure of its relations of significance to other entities. This irreducible holism is captured, in particular, in the “fore-having” that amounts, according to Heidegger, in an “always already prior disclosure of world.”

With this, we are now in a position to see how Heidegger’s development of the underlying “as-” structure provides at least the elements for satisfactory responses to each of Tugendhat’s objections to the general picture of truth as unconcealment. First, Heidegger’s account of the way that the possibility of falsehood is involved in this basic structure through the three fore-structures confirms that the distinction between truth and falsehood is itself a basic and irreducible feature of any unconcealment, on this account; in particular, the essential difference between something’s being uncovered as it is and its being uncovered otherwise is always coherently grounded, through the fore-structures, whenever it is possible to speak of a thing’s being uncovered at all. To say, as Heidegger does, that the apparently synthetic structure of the proposition depends ontologically upon the more basic and non-synthetic phenomenon of unconcealment is not to deny that a distinction between truth and falsehood is coherent and characteristic even at this more basic and non-synthetic level. In particular, since the basic structure of disclosure always is the structure of “something as something” the possibility of something’s being uncovered as it (actually) is or otherwise always characterizes it in a basic way. In this respect, *all* levels of the specific phenomenon of truth, whether propositional or non-, retain the basic feature of bivalence for Heidegger.43

It seems at least possible, given the actual bivalence that characterizes disclosive truth on Heidegger’s account ‘all the way down’, that this kind of truth can also be a site for the kind of “critical consciousness” that Tugendhat worries about the loss of (though this doesn’t say HOW the critical consciousness gets a grip in the case of horizons, etc.)

It is also possible, on this basis, to respond to the more specific objections formulated in Tugendhat’s *Der Wahrheitsbegriff*. While it is true that, as Tugendhat suggests, the formulation that a truthful disclosure discloses something “as it is in itself” applies most directly only to cases wherein only one entity is obviously in question and one feature or property attributed to it, the broader hermeneutic...

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43 It is true that the formulation at the beginning of 44b, according to which – besagt –, is from this perspective somewhat elliptical, and omits the necessary qualification. But this does not mean it represents an equivocation.
“as” structure is nevertheless sufficiently general and structurally articulated to handle more complex cases of predication, as well as relational and multi-part predicates. In a case such as that of the relational “Socrates is older than Plato,” for example, the disclosure involved, if true, will be, in an obvious sense, characteristic of the beings involved, not necessarily “as they are in themselves” but nevertheless “as they are” (full stop). And since there is always a significant contextual and holistic dimension involved in every instance of the “as”-structure and thus in every disclosure, there is no problem with considering such a disclosure to be significantly co-determined by the relevant broader context, up to and including the “fore-having” of a world in which relations take place and are articulated. In other cases, for instance that of Newton’s laws and other universally quantified statements, it will not necessarily even be clear that there are specific entities involved; but because of the holistic dimensions of the fore-having of world and the fore-conception which involves the availability of a totality of indications, these cases too can be treated at the level of the specific kind of generality they possess. The case of negative existentials, while difficult on anyone’s account, might be handled the same way or similarly (in fact, the cases are logically identical, since negative existentials (‘there does not exist…’) are equivalent to universally quantified negative statements (‘for all x, x is not a…’)): while it is plausibly impossible meaningfully to formulate a statement such as “there are no unicorns” without some antecedent grasp of the totality of the world, the holistic complexity of the fore-structure which underlies the hermeneutic “as” gives us ample structural resources to characterize the disclosure underlying the statement as involving just such a grasp.

Finally, it is now possible to turn to the objection that Heidegger makes truth an “ontic” event, and hence must deny the actual independence of a truth from the factual occurrence of its becoming known? On the basis of the objection, Tugendhat suggested that it would be necessary for Heidegger to hold, absurdly, that a truth grows more true when more people recognize it, or that something that is true can become false when everyone forgets it (despite Heidegger's more or less explicit denial of the latter), were he not “protected” from these consequences by his vague use of the singulare tantum “Dasein”. Significantly, the objection in this form is just the one brought by Davidson against epistemic theories of truth: if truth is directly dependent upon acts of discovery or verification, it must be possible for it to wax and wane, and in particular for truths, once established, to be lost. Alternatively, we can idealize the relevant sense of epistemic dependence, speaking (for instance) not simply of verification but of idealized “verifiability conditions;” but if we idealize sufficiently, the satisfaction of these simply coincides with truth on a non-epistemic conception. If Heidegger should be seen as an opponent of epistemic theories, as I have argued on the basis of his claims about the structural dependence of Dasein’s kind of being on truth rather than vice-versa, then his position should also not be interpreted as falling prey to this objection. In particular, it is essential to remember here the grounding of all unconcealment in the structure of the hermeneutic-existential “as”, and the further indication that this structure points to an ontologically deeper and more complex underlying temporality than that of individual, “ontic” events.

We are not yet in a position fully to understand this indicated temporality; we will return to the question of the deep linkage between truth and underlying temporality in part II of this work. For now, though, it is sufficient to note that the dependence of concrete disclosure upon the broader structure of the
hermeneutic “as” verifies that any actual event of disclosure has several temporally distinct elements (including the “always already” availability of the world as such) and so cannot simply, in any case, be identified with a specific, datable factual event. Moreover, since the structure is explicitly one that essentially involves beings in their being, it is never simply an “ontic” or ontologically specifiable one, but one that is always in a certain way ontic-ontological. Indeed, more broadly, as Heidegger emphasizes, in this it shares or even exemplifies the characteristic twofold ontic-ontological “priority” of Dasein, and is to be traced ultimately to Dasein as a formally indicated structure. In this respect, the Dasein involved need not simply be an individual actor, nor is disclosure to be understood as always simply a result of individual acts or actions; it is rather an explicitly ontic-ontological structure, one with its own distinctive temporality which is not the same as that of factual events. In this respect, Heidegger is right to use Dasein as a singulare tantum; the logical status of the term reflects the formal indication of a structure that is indeed formal but singular, a structure that must still be gone into and understood in its own distinctive kind of temporality. Though this is not an idealization (but rather formalization in Heidegger’s specific sense of formal indication), it has something of the structure of the idealization of verification (or other epistemic) conditions to the point where there is no longer anything distinctively epistemic about them at all; this is the point at which they become genuinely ontological (or ontic-ontological), expressing the real structure that must be responsible for presencing in order for us to speak of “being in the sense of truth”.

What, then, of the broader motivational dispute that gives Tugendhat’s criticisms their conceptual and motivational point? Even with the actual structure of Heidegger’s account of the ontological basis of propositional assertion now in view, an opponent more sympathetic to the project and method of linguistic analysis as practiced in the analytic tradition might still hold that the linguistic structure of assertoric sentences in a language cannot reasonably be seen as “founded” on disclosure in Heidegger’s sense. Here, though, it is important to consider that, as Heidegger himself suggests, truth may be a phenomenon with “more than one kind of foundation”; in particular, it is not obvious that an ontological foundation in disclosure and in the more ultimate structure of the “as”, which is indeed, as we have seen, a structure characteristic of the “being of beings,” is not compatible with a different kind of structural semantic foundation for the truth of sentences in a language, one that comes into view much more clearly through structural accounts such as Davidson’s. Along these lines we shall consider, in the next section, how Davidson’s and Heidegger’s specific accounts might indeed be seen as supplementing one another within the context of a broader hermeneutic account of truth as the formally indicated horizon of interpretive understanding and intelligibility; for now, it is sufficient to note the obvious sense in which, one on hand, the truth or falsity of sentences can be seen as dependent upon the ways of being of the entities involved in them, whereas, on the other, particular entities are only intelligibly available, even in unthematic praxis and everyday dealing, to those who possess “concepts” of them or of their features, and so would not be available to an animal simply lacking any linguistic or rational capacities whatsoever.

We can also begin to see how the availability of this structure complicates the underlying methodological dispute that forms the basis for Tugendhat’s critique of Heidegger, that of propositional vs. “object”-based theories of truth and meaning. In Traditional and Analytic Philosophy (1976),
Tugendhat contrasts contemporary “language-analytic philosophy” with an “object-orientated” conception typical of the modern philosophy of consciousness in both its (Cartesian) epistemological and (Kantian) transcendental modes. On this object-oriented position in either of these modes, the primary question for a philosophical discussion of objectivity to address is that of the way in which objects are given or made accessible to conscious subjects. In particular, while in the first (Cartesian) mode of the philosophy of consciousness, this question of accessibility is primarily conceived as the question of the certainty with which I can know external objects on the basis of internal presentations, on the second (Kantian) mode the accessibility of objects is regarded as transcendentally constitutive of their objecthood, so that (as in the famous Kantian statement) “the conditions of the possibility of experience ... are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience.” (pp. 58-59).

Although Tugendhat’s main focus in these lectures is not on Heidegger or on ontology in Heidegger’s specific sense, he nevertheless treats Heidegger as continuing the object-oriented conception of the philosophy of consciousness in its transcendental mode, albeit while “substituting” for the older, narrower, concept of consciousness the “broad concept of consciousness” that he characterizes as “disclosedness.”

He then contrasts this transcendental mode of philosophy in general to the language-analytical one, which seeks to answer all of the relevant questions about the categories and givenness of objects on the basis of an investigation of the structure of language, and in particular finds in the analysis of linguistic structure an alternative to the Kantian conception of the synthetic a priori. From the analytic perspective, Tugendhat argues that the idea of a “pre-linguistic” basic relationship of consciousness to objects must be rejected as illusory. In the tradition, the idea of such a relationship depends upon a representational model based ultimately on sensuous awareness, and even Husserl’s sophisticated conception of intuition (including the possibility of non-sensuous “categorial” intuition) is ultimately founded on the idea of such a direct consciousness-object relation.

However, Tugendhat argues, all of the supposedly non-propositional or pre-propositional types of relationship of this sort can in fact be shown to be logically dependent on “propositional modes of consciousness” involving attitudes toward propositional contents. In this way, all forms of the object-directed philosophy of consciousness, including the transcendental one that Heidegger continues, on Tugendhat’s account, can

44 Tugendhat recognizes (p. 60) that Heidegger at least attempts to broaden this concept beyond one simply characterizing the consciousness of objects. He does so, according to Tugendhat, by allowing the “broadened” concept of disclosedness to include the specifically non-objectual phenomena of the disclosedness of world and Dasein as co-constitutive of the disclosure of objects. Nevertheless, according to Tugendhat, Heidegger falls back into an object-oriented position because of his neglect of the specific structure of sentences: “In contrast to the disclosedness which is expressed in sentences [Heidegger] sought to exhibit a pre-logical, pre-linguistic disclosedness as more basic (but for the analysis of which he nonetheless took the statement-structure – the ‘as’, ss. 32 – as his clue). This exclusion of sentences from the core-area of the analysis which results from the rejection of the logical contradicts the central importance which Heidegger attributed to language (‘Language is the house of being’). In his statements about language Heidegger therefore reverted to the level of the most primitive theories of language, in that he emphasized the significance of the word for the disclosedness of beings. Because Heidegger restricted the notions of objecthood and objectification to the level of statements, objects could once more gain access through the backdoor of another terminology (that of ‘beings’ and ‘things’) and take up a dominant and analytically uncontrollable position.” (p. 415)

be shown to be dependent upon attitudes and judgments that are linguistically articulated. This demonstrates the greater comprehensiveness of the language-analytical approach and shows that the “transcendental” inquiry into the givenness of objects must henceforth be taken up within it rather than remaining within the primarily “object-oriented” attitude.

Although Tugendhat is right to see Heidegger as continuing the Kantian transcendental inquiry into the conditions for the possible givenness of objects (although in a sense that, significantly, does not any longer construe these conditions as those of givenness to a subject, or construe the conditions for givenness as simply equivalent to the conditions for spatiotemporal objecthood), we are now in a position to see that this analysis of the differences between linguistic-analytic and transcendental approaches is misleading with respect to Heidegger in at least two respects. First, Tugendhat effectively assumes that the only way that the “transcendental” problematic of the accessibility of objects can be pursued, if it is not transferred to the purportedly superior methods of linguistic analysis, is through the conception of a direct and not further articulated relationship between an individual subject and an individual object. By marked contrast with this, as we have seen, Heidegger’s conception of the primacy of the hermeneutic “as” structure allows for a basic kind of articulation, relevant to truth and falsity, in every phenomenon of unconcealment as such, and it is to this basic ontic-ontological structure, rather than any simply bipolar relation between consciousness and object, that the phenomenon of truth is to be transcendentally traced. This structure, as articulated by the three fore-structures, is moreover inherently holistic and always, as Heidegger emphasizes, involves the disclosure of Dasein and world; and this implies as well, as we have seen, that not only every kind of representational relationship, but even the “intentional relation” between subject and object itself must be seen as a specification of the more basic phenomenon of unconcealment rather than as a basis for it. Second, Tugendhat underestimates the extent to which such an explicitly ontic/ontological analysis of the transcendental conditions for the accessibility of objects, both individually and in their overall categorical structure, is not only not at odds with a “language-analytic” approach to linguistic predication, but in fact actually implied by it as an essential component of any successful analysis. In particular, while Tugendhat is surely right to suggest that the idea of a “basic” and otherwise inarticulate “pre-linguistic” intentional relationship between subject and object does not survive on the linguistic-analytic approach, there is, conversely, an obvious sense in which it is a precondition for the meaningful utterance of any predicative sentence, or for its understanding, that the various objects and phenomena mentioned or described in it be accessible in some way, and a thorough analysis of the structural basis of the possibility of meaningful predication (and hence of the truth or falsity of sentences) cannot be successful if it simply ignores this precondition. Heidegger’s analysis, in particular, gives, as we have seen, an account of how the possibilities for the uncovering of objects may themselves be conditioned, in part, by the accessibility or possession of various relevant “concepts” by an individual thinker as well as – and herein lies its strength – such other conditions (involving, for example, the existence of collective and social practices, that of a language shared by others, or one’s whole inexplicit relationship to an entire surrounding context of significance or the world itself) as may also be reasonably considered to precondition any phenomenon of unconcealment with an veridical (i.e. true or false) dimension. For Heidegger, these conditions are in fact no longer linked to consciousness in any essential way; nor are they (as we have seen) exclusively linked to any individual subject in its relations to objects (but rather
to the structure of Dasein in relation to world). Although most of these conditioning phenomena are not “pre-linguistic,” in the sense that they could probably not be accessed by an individual consciousness (such as that of an animal or infant) incapable or innocent of articulate language, neither the linguistic analysis of meaning nor an account of the general conditions of linguistic predication (and hence of the specific nature of truth) cannot afford wholly to ignore the dimension of accessibility that is illuminated by Heidegger’s account.

What comes into view here, specifically, is the possibility of a broader and expanded picture of transcendental truth, the elucidation of which is not possible from the perspective of either the “object-oriented” or the “linguistic-analytic” approach alone (as Tugendhat describes them) but to which they can both be seen as, necessarily, joint and complementary contributors. On this picture, in particular, the truth and falsity of sentences is not founded simply (as the linguistic-analytic approach has it) in the structure of language or simply (as Heidegger’s approach has it) in the givenness of objects, for there is not just one dimension of foundedness; rather, both presuppose each other and thereby found the phenomenon of predication in different ways and from different directions. The debate between the linguistic conception of the foundations of sentential truth and Heidegger’s disclosive conception is therefore to be resolved as a draw, or rather replaced by a broader and more comprehensive picture in which they are not in competition to begin with.

III

I have argued that Heidegger’s disclosive approach to transcendental truth can be brought together with a “linguistic-analytic” conception that bases itself on the analysis of the structure of language, and that there need not be any competition between the two approaches provided that they are seen as “founding” the phenomenon of truth in different, though complementary ways. This contention can be tested by consideration of what is in many ways the most fully worked-out example of the linguistic-analytic approach to truth, Davidson’s Tarskian account. As I will argue in this section, Davidson’s picture of transcendental truth can indeed usefully be supplemented with Heidegger’s disclosive account, yielding a more comprehensive picture that illuminates the phenomenon of truth in ways that neither picture can do alone. In particular, Heidegger’s disclosive picture supplements Davidson and Tarski’s description of the systematic structure of languages by illuminating the ontological and ultimately temporal foundations for the specific phenomenon of linguistic structure, on which the Tarskian-Davidsonian picture of truth and predication turns.

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This appropriation of a being in a true assertion about it is not an ontical absorption of the extant entity into a subject, as though things were transported into the ego. But it is just as little a merely subjectivistic apprehending and investing of things with determinations which we cull from the subject and assign to things. ... Assertion is exhibitive letting-be-seen of beings. In the exhibitive appropriation of a being just as it is qua uncovered, and according to the sense of that appropriation, the uncovered entity’s real determinativeness which is then under consideration is explicitly appropriated to it. We have here once again the peculiar circumstance that the unveiling appropriation of the extant in its being-such is precisely not a subjectivizing but just the reverse, an appropriating of the uncovered determinations to the extant entity as it is in itself.”
As we have seen, there is good reason to think that the Tarskian truth-theory for any specific language does not, by itself, suffice to capture “all there is” to the concept of truth. To begin with, as Davidson points out, the truth-definitions that Tarski shows us how to provide are truth-definitions for particular, well-defined languages, and do not by themselves provide a definition or even an account of the general (and non-language-specific) concept of truth, which must nevertheless itself be presupposed in successful Davidsonian interpretation. Relatedly, as commentators have pointed out and Davidson agrees, the Tarskian truth-definition for any particular case, since it treats the language as fixed, does not provide any kind of guidance for new cases, either new terms or concepts that are added to an existing language or wholly distinct languages. Nevertheless, Davidson’s radical interpretation project attempts to provide a model for any linguistic understanding, including the understanding of arbitrary natural languages and languages changing over time. In particular, Davidson’s application of the general Tarskian structure to the problem of the provision of a “theories of meaning” for a natural language means that the understanding and applicability of this general concept of truth is itself, in each case, intimately linked to the possibility of interpretive understanding of sense that is modeled in the radical interpretation of a natural language, and seen as capturing what a competent speaker comes to know in mastering such a language to begin with. Furthermore, as Davidson argues, it is plausible that the general pattern of relationships that the Tarski shows us how to discern in particular languages is itself closely connected with the structure of predication, and that a general (and non-language-specific) understanding of this pattern is therefore needed to understand the structure of predication (again in a non-language-specific sense). Such an understanding is again yielded, according to Davidson, only by reflection on the general (or transcendental) concept of truth in relation to the various related notions of reference, satisfaction, truth-functionality, etc., which articulate the very idea of a logical or grammatical structure of (a) language.

As we have seen, Davidson’s radical solution to the ancient problem of predication in Truth and Predication turns on the implications of Tarski’s “ingenious use” of the idea of satisfaction, and in particular of the “idea that predicates are true of the entities which are named by the constants that occupy the spaces or are quantified over by the variables which appear in the same spaces and are bound by quantifiers.” (p. 159). This idea allows Tarski to gesture toward the general “relationship” of satisfaction, which applies equally to open as well as closed sentences and thus amounts to a more “basic” (in one sense of “basic”) relation in terms of which the (non-relational) truth of sentences can be defined for a particular language. As Davidson in fact points out, however, this leaves the “nature” of the satisfaction “relation” itself unclear; it is not clear, for example, from what independent perspective it could be specified or how it might be possible, independently of the pattern of truth-values exhibited by the sentences of a language as a whole, to “fix” the satisfaction relations themselves. In fact, as Davidson argues, in the context of the interpretation of a natural language, it is actually impossible to “fix” these relations in advance of developing an interpretation of the language as a whole (for the interpreter does not have independent access to “primitive relations” between words and objects, or general terms and their extensions) and such an interpretation itself depends on discerning the systematic pattern of the truth-values of sentences in the language as a whole. This is why Davidson suggests that in working out an actual interpretation, the “satisfaction relations” must be seen as an outcome of the systematic pattern of truths, rather than as a substantive basis for them. In adopting
this practice, rather than “building up” the concept of truth, as Tarski does, for a particular language from particular, specified satisfaction-relations, we are rather using our general concept of truth (according to Davidson, the “most basic semantic concept we possess”) to provide an explicit reconstruction of the structural basis of meaning for the particular language at hand, including the particular “satisfaction” or other reference-like relationships we interpret it as involving.

Without disputing the actual hermeneutic utility (and even necessity) of this general picture of what is involved in interpretation (on which truth is primary and reference-like (or subsumption-like) relations such as satisfaction are secondary), one must note that it is actually in substantial initial tension with Davidson’s solution to the problem of predication, which turns (as we have seen) on Tarski’s use of the general idea of satisfaction as the basic explanatory notion in characterizing the structure of a language overall. The solution Davidson draws from Tarski is (recall) to characterize the truth of a predicative sentence as consisting in the predicates being true of the entities named by its constants or “quantified over” by its variables. Here, “true of” is simply a formulation of the general relation of satisfaction as it applies to predicates in relation to entities or sequences of entities, and Davidson’s idea is that it is the specification in terms of this relationship that is alone capable of avoiding the problems to which historical theories of predication are recurrently prone. But for all Davidson says, it remains in a certain sense obscure what is meant by a predicate’s being “true of” an entity; in particular, because of the way that this is, for Davidson, conceptually dependent on the primitive and unanalyzed notion of truth (rather than conversely), we have no specific characterization (nor, Davidson suggests, could we have one) of the actual relationship to which the formulation points, and which is clearly at the basis (in one sense) of the possibility of predication itself. (even as central a matter as what it is a relationship of – whether of words to words, or words to things, or things to properties, is not clarified!)

A way of putting the issue, using terminology that is not Davidson’s, is that despite its obvious structural merits, the suggested solution leaves the basic relationship, and hence the actual structure of predication itself, phenomenologically (or ontologically) unclear. We have from Tarski the basic idea that we illuminate the structure of predication by saying that a sentence is true if its predicates hold of, or are true of, its objects; but what can we say, guided by the general concept of truth, about what it is for this to be the case? My suggestion is not, here, that a specific relation or kind of relation between words and objects would have to be specified or determined, quite independently of a specific or general idea of truth, in order for Davidson’s solution to the problem of predication to be successful. indeed, Davidson has given us good reason to think that there is no such relation to be found. Nor is the point that, in order for any specific Tarskian truth-theory for a particular language to be verified as holding of that language (as it is actually spoken), we would somehow need access to the word-object relations of that particular language (access which, as Davidson has successfully argued, we cannot generally have) independently of our interpretation of its distinctive pattern of truths.

It is rather that, even agreeing with Davidson that we have no access to the “satisfaction relation”, in particular cases or in general, independently of our grasp of the pattern of truths, the general idea of this relation nevertheless plays an essential role in producing the general form of solution to the problem of predication that Davidson draws from Tarski. And this idea of something’s being true of something, to which Davidson’s solution essentially appeals, needs further illumination in terms of the
general concept of truth if the solution is going to provide a significant illumination of the nature of predication (rather than just a structural placeholder for such an illumination). Here, it is in fact unavoidable that what must be appealed to in illuminating the nature of predication is the general concept of truth, rather than just the specific truth-predicate for a particular language. For it is, on Davidson’s account, this idea which must ultimately be appealed to if we are to illuminate the nature of predication itself in general; and it is clearly this notion that is the one to which we must relate predication if we are to illuminate the general structure of predication itself, across new cases and changes in language.

What, then, has Tarski actually shown us in showing that the idea of something being true of something, the general form of the “relation” of satisfaction, is the central idea which allows us to understand the structure of predication, in such a way as to avoid replicating the question-begging assumptions and vicious infinite regress that vex the history of attempts to explain it? In fact, the outlines of a partial answer can be found in Heidegger’s disclosive account of truth as founded on the most basic underlying “as” structure of interpretive understanding. In particular, if Heidegger is right, the phenomenon that is ultimately at the basis of the possibility of any linguistic predicates being “true of” their objects (as well as any other phenomenon of disclosure) is the phenomenon of unconcealment, itself founded on the existential-hermeneutic “as.”

In a passage from *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger specifies how the hermeneutic “as” can be understood as the underlying basis for the “is” of predication, and indeed for the structure of linguistic predication generally, in light of the general conception of truth as disclosure or (here) unveiling:

So far as the “is” in assertion is understood and spoken, it already signifies intrinsically the being of a being which is asserted about as unveiled. In the uttering of the assertion, that is to say, in the uttering of exhibition, this exhibition, as intentionally unveiling comportment, expresses itself about that to which it refers. By its essential nature, that which is referred to is unveiled. So far as this unveiling comportment expresses itself about the entity it refers to and determines this being in its being, the unveiledness of that which is spoken of is eo ipso co-intended. The moment of unveiledness is implied in the concept of the being of the entity which is meant in the assertion. When I say “A is B,” I mean not only the being-B of A but also the being-B of A as unveiled. ...The extant entity itself is in a certain way true, not as intrinsically extant, but as uncovered in the assertion. ...(Basic Problems of Phenomenology, pp. 218-19)

On Heidegger’s account, it is therefore the basic way in which an entity, in being disclosed, is shown as something that provides the ultimate phenomenological basis for the explicit “is” of predication, or indeed the inexplicit structure of predication when no form of the predicative “to be” is present in the sentence. It is thereby possible, as we have seen, to see the predicative structure as phenomenologically grounded in the more basic “as” structure, which is in a fundamental way not relational or synthetic. One the one hand this can be seen as providing a concrete basis for the claim, basic to Davidson’s account of the most important reason why Tarski’s account of predication succeeds where all others have failed, namely that it (almost uniquely) refuses to treat the structure of a simple
predicative sentence logically as the synthesis of two or more separate and individually referential elements. On the other, it extends the non-synthetic form of the solution to the more general structure of all truth-evaluable phenomena of disclosure, whether or not they yield explicit, linguistic assertions.

Returning to the explicit form of the solution that Davidson finds in Tarski, what kind of illumination of the notion of being “true of” does this provide? As we have seen, it provides an account of the conditions for the possible availability of entities to be understood, conditions that must be seen as aspects of their sense. And it is plausibly requisite to any full picture of predication that we give some such account; otherwise it would be just mysterious how we should conceive of entities as becoming possible subjects for true or false predication, or what general, transcendental conditions must be met in order for them to be able to be the subject of true or false assertions by the speakers of a particular language. These are issues on which Davidson’s account of the basis of predication, as far as it goes, is simply silent; Heidegger’s picture, by contrast, gives a phenomenologically motivated basic clarification of both. In so doing, it a fortiori also speaks to other questions about predication that are not and cannot be answered by Tarski’s structure of language-specific truth-definitions alone, such as questions about diachronic changes and the extensibility of the notion of truth across all languages with a minimal kind of predicative structure.

From a Davidson perspective, it can seem at first that such a supplementation of the general picture of truth and predication that we can draw from Tarski’s structure must be either unhelpful or incorrect. Given, in particular, the plausibility of the claim, which Davidson emphasizes, that a Tarskian truth theory for a language must, by virtue of the way it is constructed, be extensionally correct in picking out just the true sentences of the language, provided it is in fact applicable to the language in question, it can seem that there is no further room for any substantive explanation of truth beyond that which is already given in whatever structure determines the totality of the T-sentences for a language. But the kind of supplementation that the Heideggerian account provides is not to be conceived as affecting the pattern of linkages of sentences to truth conditions given by a Tarskian truth-theory, or as modifying the range or truth-values of the T-sentences thereby generated. Rather, leaving the pattern of T-sentences entirely in place, it simply clarifies or further explicates the general feature or phenomenon of truth which the determination of truth predicates for particular languages must have in view. It is true that, as Davidson emphasizes, the provision of any further general and substantive criterion for truth – for instance a criterion couched in terms of correspondence, or some epistemic notion – would necessarily imply a divergence from the pattern of T-sentences and so be incorrect from the Tarskian perspective. But the conception of truth as disclosure is not intended to operate, here, as a further substantive criterion in this sense. It is, rather, intended just as a further explication of the concept of truth at which all of the systematic developments of specific truth-predicates in accordance with the Tarskian pattern are directed.

Nevertheless, even if it thus need not actually be seen as incorrect from a Tarskian perspective, it might seem that the suggested supplementation should still be rejected as unnecessary. Recall that, on Davidson’s own view as expressed in *Truth and Predication*, although the pattern that Tarski points out avowedly does not show us “all there is” to the concept of truth in that it does not exhibit the essential connections between this concept and the concepts of belief and meaning, what is needed in order to
exhibit these is simply to supplement the general Tarskian pattern with an account of “how to identify the presence of such a pattern or structure in the behavior of people.” (p. 28). In particular, a Tarskian theories must be supplemented, in the context of the radical interpretation of a particular language, by a determination that the theory in question does characterize the language as it is actually spoken. This determination is itself to be worked out in radical interpretation, and as Davidson emphasizes, the evidence for it must lie in publically available “facts about how speakers use the language” (p. 37), where the “public” availability of these facts means that they must be “available in practice to anyone who is capable of understanding the speaker or speakers of the language.” (p. 37) As Davdison points out, to say this does not amount actually to giving a criterion for the correctness of a Tarskian truth-theory as applied to any actual language. It is only to constrain the form of the evidence on which any such application must rest. Nevertheless, it may seem that, given that such evidence is generally available whenever a language is interpretable at all, the actual possibility of interpretation is by itself sufficient to provide the requisite supplementation of the Tarskian structure to provide the “full” or general concept of truth.

How, though, are these facts about the “behavior of speakers” and their “use [of] the language” themselves to be understood? The particular theory is determined as holding of, or descriptively correct of, the “behavior” of the speakers of the object language, in the sense of the facts about their meaningful “use of language.” But these facts about usage are not, as Davidson emphasizes, capable of characterization as such independently of, or prior to, a systematic interpretation of the language in question, and as we have seen, the very possibility of such an interpretation depends on an essential appeal to the general concept of truth as it can be seen as invoked in the attitudes and assertions of the language’s speakers. This leaves open, and in fact seems to positively suggest, the possibility that the content of the interpretive determination that the utterances of the speakers of a language are in fact correctly characterized by a Tarskian truth theory can be further characterized, and indeed that it can be further characterized by a further positive elucidation of the concept of truth of the sort that Heidegger’s account provides.

Such a characterization can take place within the context of a broadened conception of the linkage between the concepts of truth and interpretation, now not restricted to the narrow (Davidsonian) idea of the interpretation of a language by an interpreter already possessing all of the concepts that figure in the language under interpretation, but extended to encompass as well the further issue of the availability of these concepts (and hence the intelligibility of the beings falling under them). From the perspective of this suggested Heideggerian supplementation, although what Davidson says here about the need to apply Tarskian theories of truth by determining the fit of these theories to the facts about use is not incorrect, it is incomplete. In particular, Davidson says that the individual Tarskian theories must be supplemented by more general considerations that emerge in the context of interpretation – yielding ultimately a determination that a particular theory applies to a particular language as spoken – and he says something about the necessary form of the evidence upon which such a determination must rest. But he does not specify in any basic way what it is that an interpreter determines in making this determination of applicability. It is here that the Heideggerian conception of truth as disclosure can provide a basic phenomenological elucidation and clarification bearing both on the general
phenomenon of truth and its link to predication. In particular, as I have argued, it illuminates the structure of predication that shows up in the distinctive pattern of truths of a particular language, under interpretation, insofar as this pattern has general conditions involving the availability of objects and of the concepts under which they fall.

Elsewhere, Davidson has sought partially to account for the linguistic availability of objective concepts and reference through the idea of “triangulation.” On this account, the objectivity of concepts, including the basic distinction between (possibly false) belief and truth, depends on the availability of a communicative link between at least two speakers in relation to a common object of concern. In sharing a public language, Davidson suggests, interlocutors possess the “concept of a shared world,” and it is this concept that allows their concepts and reference to be understood as objective. Only through intersubjective language, and the sort of communicative distance it makes possible, does the structure of objective concepts, with an inherent distinction between true and false application, gain a bearing on objects of the public world at all. Thus, it is necessary in order for concepts to have bearing on the world that a language exist and be shared between at least two speakers.

From the perspective of the suggested Heideggerian supplementation, what Davidson says about “triangulation,” is, again, not false, but incomplete. In particular, it is an important aspect of the account in terms of disclosure that many specific phenomena of disclosure are possible only given a horizon of intelligibility that is available in advance (even if only inexplicitly) as a “totality” or “whole” of references. Although Heidegger himself, especially before the mid-1930s, does not always emphasize the point sufficiently, it is clear that the availability of such a horizon, even inexplicitly, to an individual speaker or thinker depends in general on the availability of a language which is itself available, as well, to others. This is a consequence of the way in which the whole structure of disclosure is dependent upon the structural openness of Dasein to the world, and is at the same time world-disclosure. While on the one hand, Dasein in the sense of the structure of disclosure is clearly and repeatedly distinguished by Heidegger from any individual subject or subjectivity, on the other, it is also clearly impossible to consider most aspects of the world as a “totality of significance” without implicit or explicit reference to the structure of a shared language. This makes it clear that the Heideggerian picture of disclosure, though extending more broadly than the specifically linguistic phenomena of utterance and assertion, is not in competition with a picture, such as Davidson’s, on which objectivity depends on a shared language, and thus can usefully supplement such a picture. Specifically, what the supplementation does, in this connection, is make sense of how particular concepts and the objects that they fall under can emerge together in the temporal course of the development of a language or its historical alteration and how the whole process unfolds the larger and global phenomenon of truth, both topics which are not addressed by Davidson’s account.

Indeed, far from being superfluous or unneeded in the context of a Davidsonian approach to interpretation, we can in fact see the positive need for such a supplementation (which illuminates the availability of concepts and objects “in” something with the structure of an (intersubjective, shared) language) in at least two ways. First, as has already been noted, interpretation on Davidson’s account requires constitutive appeal to a general idea of truth which is not completely determined by any specific interpretation of a particular language, but is presupposed to the possibility of any successful
interpretation. This general idea of truth operates as a kind of transcendental condition on the possibility of interpretation, and is closely connected to what Davidson, in various places, characterizes as a “constitutive idea” of rationality. But this general idea of truth needs further illumination if it is to be used to clarify the preconditions of interpretation, in such a way as to illuminate the structure of linguistic predication, and in particular to clarify the way in which this structure is rooted in the availability (whether through explicit assertion or not) of objects and the concepts under which they fall.

A second reason concerns the structural form of Davidsonian theories of meaning themselves. Such a theory of meaning, as we have seen, is intended to capture what a competent speaker of a language knows (in some sense of “knows”) in being able to speak the language. Knowledge of the theory of meaning for a foreign language on the part of an interpreter, moreover, is conceived as giving the interpreter a comprehensive grasp of the language, akin to that possessed by native speakers. However, how should we understand the conceptual preconditions on the part of the interpreter for a translational theory of meaning to be understood and used to grasp the meaning of all of the native speakers’ utterances? Following Dummett, we can distinguish between two ways of understanding these preconditions. If knowledge of a theory of meaning can yield a grasp of the meaning of native utterances only when, in general, the interpreter already possesses the concepts that the theory portrays the natives (under translation) as possessing (i.e. the concepts figuring on the right-hand side of the theory’s T-sentences), then the theory of meaning can be termed “modest”. If, on the other hand, learning the theory of meaning can be conceived as equipping an interpreter initially innocent of some of these concepts with them, Dummett terms it “full-blooded”.

In “What is A Theory of Meaning?” Dummett argues that theories of meaning must indeed be “full-blooded,” in this sense, if they are to serve the purpose of specifying, not only of what someone has to know in order to possess a mastery of language, but also of “what it is” to have this knowledge. This further specification is itself requisite, Davidson suggests, if an theory of meaning is actually to give the meaning of each of the sentences of a language, and not simply translate them; Dummett also suggests that the further specification is to be given in terms of “what we are taking as constituting a manifestation of a knowledge of those propositions” which are expressed by the sentences of the interpretation theory. Against this, McDowell has argued that Davidsonian theories of meaning can and must be construed as “modest” in Dummett’s sense, and thus as presupposing (in their characterization of what is known in mastering an interpreted language) a mastery of the relevant concepts on the part of the interpreter. For there could not be, McDowell argues, a unique description of a speaker’s linguistic behavior as manifesting implicit knowledge of (e.g.) the concept “square” unless the description is given from “inside content,” that is, from a position in which we count ourselves as entitled to the assumption that the speaker possesses a concept which is analogous in its conditions for application to our relevant concept (e.g., in this case, our concept of squares).\footnote{Can implicit knowledge that that is how square things are to be treated be manifested in behavior, characterized ‘as from outside’ content? It may seem that nothing could be simpler: the manifestation would be someone’s treating a square thing in whatever way is in question. But any such performance would be an equally good manifestation of any of an indefinite number of different pieces of such implicit knowledge. (Consider implicit knowledge to the effect that that is the way to treat things that are either square or . . . .) If we assume a stable} It is thus necessary
both in working out an interpretation and in understanding it as embodying knowledge of a language
that we presuppose the various concepts used on the right-hand side of the T-sentences in any
description of the speakers under interpretation as using language in such a way as to be interpretable
at all.

McDowell’s argument appears to be confirmed by Davidson in Truth and Predication; as we have seen,
Davidson emphasizes that the facts “about speakers’ use of a language” which provide the evidentiary
basis for a theory of meaning for that language are simply those which can be understood and
ascertained by anyone capable of understanding the language. There is no necessity, or reasonable
expectation, of describing them from a position “outside content,” that is, a position that does not
presuppose the applicability of the interpreter’s own concepts (of the things they are interpreted as
talking about) to their description. But if McDowell’s position is correct, it is clear that a Davidsonian
truth-theory for a particular language does not (as Dummett actually points out) by itself provide an
explanation of either the speakers’ or the interpreters’ grasp of these concepts. In particular, it does not
account for how these concepts come to be possessed or how they may change over time, or how their
possession is related to the structure of the language as a whole, on one hand, and actual pieces of
propositional knowledge, on the other. It is here that the Heideggerian supplementation in terms of
disclosure again proves relevant, and provides a kind of illumination of the basis of truth and predication
that the Davidsonian theories by themselves cannot give. In particular, it illuminates the
“transcendental” or general conditions for the possibility of linguistic predication, and hence of linguistic
truth, insofar as these conditions characterize not only the possibility of interpretation of languages
narrowly speaking, but also the sense of beings themselves. (i.e something like how the beings “enter”
language).

Given commitments that Heidegger and Davidson share (see section II above), there are strong
constraints on the kind of illumination that this can provide. For example, for reasons that have been
discussed, it cannot portray truth as any kind of correspondence relation, so that objects would count as
discovered or discoverable only insofar as they are correlated one to one with names or other
referential terms of a language. Such a picture of correspondence perhaps captures one of the
intuitions on which Tarski relied in his original construction of truth-definitions for formal languages, but
as we have seen it cannot figure, and also has no point, in theories of meaning for natural languages
constructed in the Davidsonian way. Just as importantly, it cannot portray truth as dependent upon
assertibility, verification, epistemic practice, or any other “epistemic” notion. As Davidson argues, any
such portrayal, if not empty, will make truth dependent on actual epistemic abilities or practices, and so
variable as these abilities and practices wax, wane and vary; and this variation is to be rejected as at
odds with what is involved in the general idea of truth itself. It has perhaps not been obvious, either to
interpreters of Davidson or, especially, of Heidegger, that Heidegger’s conception of truth as disclosure

propensity, guided by an unchanging piece of implicit knowledge, we can use further behavior to rule out some of
these competing candidates. But no finite set of performances would eliminate them all; and finite sets of
performances are all we get.
can be understood in such a way that it, too, does not violate this constraint. In particular, as we have seen, though Heidegger’s picture of truth as disclosure does offer to significantly illuminate the structural (and ultimately temporal) “accessibility” of objects and the concepts under which they may fall in explicit predication, it is not to be construed as a contribution to the epistemology of objects. Nor is the illumination it here gives dependent on exploiting any prior idea of epistemic (or other) practices, abilities, or activities of actual individuals or societies. The idea of truth is here, rather, understood essentially and constitutively as an issue of the uncovering of beings in their being, including essentially (as I have argued) the constitutive possibility of false as well as true uncovering. The hybrid Davidsonian-Heideggerian picture that emerges is thus one in which any relevant description of the “use” of language by a speaker or a community thereof includes this specific structure of disclosure at the most basic level. In the Davidsonian jargon, this is just the requirement that epistemic considerations not be imported into the basis of a theory of truth for a language; in the Heideggerian one, it expresses the requirement that assertoric truth be traced back to the basic ontological structure of Dasein whereby it is “originally” and equiprimordially in truth and untruth. Either way, it is sharply to be contrasted with verificationist, coherentialist, anti-realist, and pragmatist accounts, which attempt to base a substantive conception of truth on one or another notion of “use”, practice, or behavior that is not itself already characterized in terms of this basic structure.

I have tried to indicate how the phenomenon of transcendental truth, and hence the basis of linguistic predication, can be clarified by the supplementary addition of a Heideggerian account of disclosure, bearing not simply on linguistic structure but also on the uncoveredness of beings in their being, to the Tarskian-Davidsonian structure of truth theories for languages. But it should be obvious that the supplementation suggests, as well, a complementary broadening of the concept of interpretation as it is constitutively linked to the nature of sense. In particular, with the Heideggerian emphasis on the ultimate grounding of truth in the sense of disclosure on the interpretive and hermeneutic structure of Dasein in relation to the world, the concept of interpretation is broadened beyond that of the interpretation of a natural language in Davidson’s sense. In the broadened picture, the two kinds of interpretation – what we can call the “existential-hermeneutic” one (Heidegger) and the “linguistic-semantic” one (Davidson) – should again not be seen as in competition with one another, but rather as complementary, if orthogonal, aspects or directions of an essentially unified hermeneutic structure. On this picture, the (Davidsonian) interpretation of a natural language, taking concepts of familiar phenomena as fixed, is, in other words, just one dimension of a unified activity of which the (Heideggerian) circumspective or explicit interpretation of phenomena, within a broader horizon of intelligibility constituted by a particular language, is another. As we have seen, both depend essentially on constitutive appeal to the holistic and horizonal presupposed structure of world, and the developments of the implications of this appeal in both Davidson and Heidegger involve an essential appeal to an inherent dimension of universality (as we shall see more fully in part II) in both cases equally implicit in the hermeneutic structure, and so presupposed to the possibility of interpretation in

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48 The standard error, which Davidson aptly diagnoses, is to think that the facts about usage to which a truth-theory must be matched can be independently described in such a way as to yield substantive criteria for the fit. This is the mistake Dummett makes, in particular, when he supposes that
both senses. When our focus is restricted to the kind of intelligibility that is structured by language or languages, as we have seen, while Davidson provides a logical/semantic structure that links the intelligibility of linguistic expression to the constitutive idea of transcendental truth, Heidegger provides something like a general picture of the conditions for the temporal entry and continued figuring of beings “in” language, a picture that supplements Davidson’s formal-logical picture with the kind of substantive account of beings and their categories that was once called a “transcendental” logic. The Heideggerian supplementation, in particular, points to the essential and constitutive way in which truth, in this sense, cannot simply be treated as a phenomenon of language considered as a human artifact or construction, but is more basically to be treated as an aspect of beings in relation to being itself. For this reason, as well as the reasons mooted in the last paragraph (and as we shall see more fully in part II) it is not illuminating of this conception to see the possible figuring of objects in language as just an aspect of historical languages’ embodying “cultural” constructions or amounting to “repositories of tradition” where “cultures” and “traditions” are taken in an anthropological or factual-historical sense; rather, it is essential to recognize the ontologically basic way in which beings themselves enter, through their uncovering, into the structural possibility of linguistic falsehood or truth.\textsuperscript{49} As we have seen, it is also not sufficient, in clarifying this way in which being enter into the possibilities of linguistic falsehood and truth, to treat languages themselves simply as static factual structures of reference to a fixed totality of pre-existing objects; rather, the disclosive dimension of truth, as it allows beings to figure in language, points toward the more complex temporality of the origin and dynamic temporal structure of language in relation to the totality of a world with which it is correlative. There is thus indicated here a real question about how the structure of language (or a language) is to be temporally characterized – how we should think of it as arising, how enduring, and how we can consider it to change or be transformed over time. This is a question that Heidegger himself does not raise explicitly until after the “turn” of the 1930s, when he comes, on the one hand, to see the historical truth of the being of beings as captured in the series of epochal configurations identified with historical languages, and, on the other, to see the origin and temporal character of language as intimately linked with the problematic of the unconcealment of being itself. The twofold hermeneutic picture of truth and interpretation which I have attempted to sketch here points, in a natural way, to a logical/temporal intensification of this problematic that draws as well on the farthest-reaching results of linguistic analysis, such as Davidson’s radical interpretation picture; I shall attempt to develop this intensification in further detail in part II.

IV

I have attempted to sketch, at least in its rudiments, a hybrid picture of truth on which it is understood both in terms of a linguistic-structural dimension that is articulated through the development of Tarskian truth-theories and in terms of an ontological-hermeneutic dimension that is articulated as disclosure, and yields the more specific phenomenon of uncovering. The picture is not intended as anything like a \textit{definition} of truth; it is reasonable to think, especially in light of arguments given both by Heidegger and by Davidson, that no such definition is possible. Nevertheless, it is intended as a logical and phenomenological clarification of the underlying phenomenon as it is indicated in reflection on the formal structures of language and of Dasein as such. The picture, as we have seen, also has further

\textsuperscript{49} Gadamer; cf. Figal.
implications for our understanding of the nature of presence, the basis of predication, and the structure of sense. In this last section, I shall briefly further develop two of these possible implications: the first concerns the (Fregean) conception of senses as modes of presentation, and the second concerns the semantical behavior of languages (such as English) which contain both their own truth-predicate and the general possibility of forming names for their own sentences by means of quotation or some similar device.

Frege often describes the sense of an expression, whether it be a name, a concept-term, or a sentence, as a “mode of presentation” (Art des Gegebenseins) of a referent. His most basic reason for doing so is the same as his reason for introducing the distinction between sense and referent to begin with: the need to account for the informativeness of judgments of identity. On the conception, it is necessary in order to account for this informativeness that the same referent (e.g. a triangle or the planet Venus) can be presented or given in any of various different ways, and that it is the same object may not be evident from these presentations alone. The sense of a name is thus to be understood as a way in which its referent is presented or given, and analogously the sense of a sentence is understood as a way of presenting its truth-value.

As commentators have noted, this conception of senses as modes of presentation is in some tension with another picture Frege sometimes employs, particularly with respect to sentential senses: namely that of senses as non-physical objects of a special kind, capable of being grasped in thought, and possibly existing in a “third realm” beyond those of the spatiotemporal and the individual-subjective. One particular place in which the tension shows up is in connection with Frege’s own account of indirect discourse or oratio obliqua. On Frege’s account, a sentence in oblique discourse (such as “the planetary orbits are circles” as it figures in “Copernicus asserts that the planetary orbits are circles”) has an “oblique” referent which is not its ordinary one, i.e. a truth-value, but rather its (ordinary) sense. In terms of Frege’s overarching picture of the distinction between concepts and objects, this means that senses, in oblique contexts, are treated as particular kinds of objects. But it is not clear how to individuate or distinguish senses if we treat them as objects in this way. In particular, senses cannot be distinguished simply by the words used to express them; for it might be correct to describe Copernicus (for instance) as having the same belief even though he never spoke English. On the other hand, we also cannot identify the senses of two terms, even if their referents are necessarily identical (e.g. we cannot identify the sense of “equilateral triangle” with that of “equiangular triangle”), since the judgment of identity may still, in this case, be informative.

In Meaning and Necessity, Carnap argues that Frege’s treatment of sense, reference, and indirect discourse points toward a more general antinomy which arises for any theory that treats the various types of expressions composing a sentence as each having a distinct sense and reference. In particular, if we allow the general substitution of extensionally equivalent or even just necessarily co-referential terms into sentential contexts, including sentences containing oblique contexts, the result will be contradictions in the truth-values assigned to some of these sentences. Frege’s device of ascribing as the reference of a sentence in oratio obliqua its (ordinary) sense can be seen as a way of avoiding the

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50 Russell’s example
antinomy, but it leads, as Carnap notes, to a kind of infinite proliferation of entities. In particular, if a particular sentence is used obliquely, its sense is thereby named; but the name must be conceived as different from the sentence in its usual use (which, instead, names a truth-value). This name then has a further sense, which itself must have a further name, and so forth. The treatment of senses as possible objects of reference, which Frege introduces to attempt to deal with the special problems of indirect discourse, thus necessarily introduces an infinite series of names and special objects for each sentence that can appear embedded in such discourse.

As an alternative, Carnap develops a “method of extension and intension” on which intensions are defined by the semantic rules laid down in advance for “the use of corresponding expressions in language systems to be constructed” (p. 8) and substitution of co-referring terms is not generally permitted into intensional contexts (pp. 142-144). Carnap observes that any picture committed to treating linguistic expressions generally as names (or as always having referents, in Frege’s terminology) will lead to the antinomy of the name relation and invite, by invoking senses (or intensions) themselves which must be nameable, something like the infinite proliferation of names and entities that Frege’s picture involves. What Carnap does not point out is that his own method of extension and intension, while prohibiting the substitution of coreferring terms in intensional contexts internal to a language, nevertheless leads to a formally similar problem on the level of the determination of a language itself. For Carnap, the rules which determine the analytic truths (or L-truths) of a language and its logical equivalences (or L-equivalences) are to be stipulated in advance in such a way as to explicate the pre-existing notion of necessity or analyticity (p. 8).

To begin with, it is not clear that actually solves the problem which Frege’s invocation of the sense/reference distinction was originally meant to answer, since Carnap does permit the substitution of L-equivalent expressions in all (intensional as well as extensional) contexts. If, for instance, the axioms of geometry are considered to be among the semantic rules definitive of the linguistic system, then Carnap’s system will allow “X believes the triangular figure is equilateral” to be substituted with “X believes the triangular figure is equiangular,” and the informativeness of the identity judgment “an equilateral triangle is equiangular” is not explained. More generally, if the semantic rules determining L-truth and L-equivalence are themselves conceived as explicating pre-existing determinations of analyticity and logical equivalence in a natural language, the question arises: on what basis can these pre-existing determinations themselves be justified? The stipulation of semantic rules explicative of analyticity in a natural language as spoken would thus seem to presuppose a further explicit stipulation of the rules already constitutive of the natural language in question. But it is impossible to suppose that this stipulation of rules could take place, unless the rules in question were already in place. The argument is made explicitly by Quine in “Truth by convention,” and formulated somewhat differently in the classic “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”. It appears to affect any picture on which the intensional structure of a language is considered capable of being wholly and uniquely described from outside that language itself, whether the object of description is understood as a corpus of explicitly stated rules, conventions of usage, or even just regularities implicit in practice. The aporia that results is, in the context of the present discussion, a direct consequence of treating the intensional structure of a

51 Ref. the article that says this
language as capable of objective description from without, and so may be understood as a consequence of “treating senses as objects” (in a suitably extended sense of “sense” and “object”). With respect to the origin and constitution of natural (historical) languages, it appears to demonstrate the untenability of any conception of their intensional structure as conventionally or stipulatively instituted, and point to a deeper problematic of their historicity.

At any rate, there are good reasons to think that Frege’s own motivations in introducing the sense/reference distinction to begin with should have led him to try to avoid these interrelated problems, even if he was not completely successful in doing so. According to Dummett, the common complaint that Frege does not tell us much about what constitutes senses or how to individuate them is only partly justified; for Frege has, after all, specified the sense of an expression as “the manner in which we determine its reference,” and has furthermore said much about the different kinds of referents of different types of expressions. Nevertheless, Dummett admits that Frege’s usual way of indicating the senses of words and symbols is not to describe these senses directly, but rather just to state the reference. The reason for this procedure, according to Dummett, is that, since the sense of an expression is just the mode of presentation of a referent, we cannot expect to be able, in general, directly to specify senses, for instance by a pronouncement of the form “The sense is...”. Thus, at least on the “healthier” of the two strands of Frege’s notion of sense (Dummett means, here, the strand according to which senses are modes of presentation rather than ideal objects) “the sense of a proper name is the way we arrive at the object, but not conceived as a means to a separable end;” sense is thus “better understood as the manner in which we pick out the object than as the route we take to it.”

Instead of describing senses directly, which we thus cannot do in general, according to Dummett, when we wish to convey or stipulate a sense we may adopt the procedure that Frege does adopt, which is to “choose that means of stating what the referent is which displays the sense.” Dummett here appeals, in particular, to the early Wittgenstein’s distinction between saying and showing, suggesting that in thus saying what the referent of a word is (in a particular way) we may succeed in showing its sense.

As Dummett acknowledges, however, this leaves open the question of what is actually known in knowing the sense of an expression of a certain type. The distinction between sense and reference was introduced, after all, to track salient distinctions in knowledge, and in particular to account for the possibility of gaining knowledge of the truth of a statement of identity, so it seems reasonable to ask this further question. One possibility that Dummett considers is that “to know the sense of a proper name is to have a criterion for deciding, for any given object, whether or not it is the bearer (referent) of that name” and similarly that to know the sense of a predicate or relational expression is to have a criterion for deciding “for any given object[s]” whether the predicate or relational expression applies to them. On this sort of view, to grasp a word’s sense is thus to possess a kind of ability to determine the truth-conditions of sentences involving it, and this ability is further to be understood, in the case of

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52 FPL, p. 227.
53 IFP, 132.
54 FPL, p. 229.
55 ?
56 FPL, p. 229.
names, as the ability to recognize the requisite objects (or recognize whatever counts as establishing that the name applies to a particular object).

The trouble with this, as Dummett in fact notes, is that it is not in fact legitimate, in the context of a full picture of sense, simply to characterize the knowledge of sense as a matter of the ability to recognize “a given object.” For:

In understanding a proper name or predicate, I am supposed to be able to recognize something as establishing that a given object is the referent of the name or that the predicate applies to it: but what is it that I recognize to be established? That such-and-such a name stands for the object, or that such-and-such a predicate applies to the object – indeed: but which object? The given object, of course: but here we have a right to ask, ‘How was it given?’ (pp. 231-232)

In fact, as Dummett points out, the conception of knowledge of sense as simply consisting an ability to recognize objects cannot succeed, since an object cannot be recognized at all unless it is first presented in some specific way or other, and this already involves (in terms of the conceptions of senses as modes of presentation) that they are presented by means of some sense or other. “We are,” Dummett concludes in a parallel discussion, “never given an object, complete in itself; we can think about it, speak of it or apprehend it only as presented to us in some particular way...” (IFP, p. 132) Thus the conception of knowledge of senses as consisting in the ability to recognize objects as the bearers of names, or as falling under predicates, cannot succeed, except perhaps in the context of a much broader conception of sense, one inclusive of the observation that the grasping a sense (for instance) of a proper name must include the ability to grasp objects as of a type or category, including grasping general “criteria of identity” for objects of that type. For instance, even the use of a proper name in connection with a demonstrative gesture in expressing a judgment of recognition (“This is Fido”) already involves the availability of sortal criteria for objects of the type (e.g. “dog”) that are not wholly given in the recognitional judgment itself.

It is here that we may appeal to Heidegger’s specific disclosive conception of truth as providing an appropriate conception of sense as mode of presentation that has undergone the requisite broadening with respect to Frege’s own conception. As we have seen, Heidegger’s conception of truth as disclosure is ontologically grounded in the primary structure of the hermeneutic-existential “as”, or the disclosure of something as something. This structure, according to Heidegger, characterizes what it is for anything to be presented (whether in explicit assertion, perceptual consciousness, engaged practice or just everyday inexplicit, circumscriptive concern) in any way at all, and the articulation indicated by the “as” is here, as Heidegger says, structurally basic and unavoidable. Sense is itself, for Heidegger, grounded in the “projective” phenomenon of interpretation characterized by the “as” structure, and so it is, on this conception, nothing other than “mode of presentation” in a generalized sense. As we have seen (above), the underlying existential/hermeneutic “as” structure is inherently intensional and plausibly preconditions (without being reducible to) narrower intensional and “intentional” phenomena such as propositional and intentional attitudes by pointing toward the general hermeneutic conditions for any

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57 FPL, p. 233.
intentional “accessibility.” On Heidegger’s picture, it is thus possible to agree with Dummett’s point, that we can recognize, speak about, or apprehend objects “only as presented in some particular way” (i.e. including that they are presented as being of some particular type) and, as well, to give an expanded and phenomenologically motivated account of how this presentation occurs. This account, understood as a suitable generalization of Frege’s narrower conception of sense as mode of presentation in language, connects the conception back to the phenomenological and ontological ground of possible givenness of objects that must plausibly underlie any account (such as Frege and Dummett attempt to give) of how linguistic signs can function to express senses that are themselves conceived as modes of presentation of objects.

There are other precedents for generalizing Frege’s notion of modes of presentation in this way. In 196-, Dagfinn Follesdaal argued that Husserl’s notion of noema or noematic sense can be seen as a generalization of Frege’s notion of sense as mode of presentation. On the suggested generalization, the noematic sense is that ideal component or aspect of an intentional act by means of which it achieves an intentional connection to a particular object or objectivity; the generalization results from relaxing Frege’s restriction of the notion to the case of language and allowing it to characterize the structure of intentional acts of consciousness generally (thus Husserl can speak of the particular noemata of acts of perception, memory, imagination, etc.) Noematic senses, on Follesdaal’s reading, thus generalize the notion of modes of presentation or of givenness beyond the linguistic cases that Frege considers to encompass all of the non-linguistic modes of givenness to individual consciousness that Husserl himself describes phenomenologically. Of course, the conception of givenness that Heidegger develops in his discussions of sense and truth itself develops from Husserl’s picture and is in some ways a generalization of it; in particular, it results (as we have seen above) from considering that givenness “to consciousness” is in fact rooted in the deeper and more original phenomenon of Dasein’s being-in-the-world, and by further generalizing the modes of possible givenness of objects beyond the sphere of subjective consciousness. If Follesdaal’s suggested generalization of Frege’s original notion is itself justified, then all that is needed in order to further broaden the notion to coincide with Heidegger’s conception is to include those forms of givenness (for instance to circumspective concern or practical comportment) that do not depend on givenness within consciousness at all. This allows the expanded conception to capture, in particular, those forms of givenness implicated in the structure of Dasein’s factual life that, while avowedly in many cases emergent only along with the articulation implied by the existence of a shared language, nevertheless are equally dependent on the particular ways in which the relevant entities are thereby presented in their being.

Most significantly, however, the supplementation of the broad picture of truth with the Heideggerian conception of truth as disclosure allows for an ontological clarification of the status of sense (conceived as mode of presentation in a broad sense) that indicates the actual ontological reasons for the “antinomy of the name-relation” and the related aporias that arise for pictures that treat senses as objects to which reference can be made. As we have seen, on the Heideggerian picture, sense, in accordance with the underlying hermeneutic-existential “as”, is always related to presentation in a suitably broadened sense, and presentation is as such constitutively linked to being in that the underlying “as” structure always reveals beings in their being or otherwise. It is thus that sense, while it
typically and primarily characterizes beings, is also always structurally linked to their being, and also to their unconcealment within the ontic-ontological structure of Dasein. A general reason for concluding that modes of presentation cannot be treated as objects, then, can be found in the observation that sense is always characterized by a twofold reference, not only to beings but to their being; and owing to the ontological difference, being itself is not a being. Modes of presentation, in Heidegger’s sense, cannot therefore be characterized simply as entities, and cannot be accounted for (as we have already seen in connection with Davidson) in terms of the merely ontic relationship between two or more beings. More specifically, to treat any mode of presentation as a separable and distinct object of reference would be, in Heidegger’s framework, to suppose that the phenomenon of sense and presentation in general could be described as a structure or event purely on the ontic level; and this, as we have seen, runs counter to the whole thrust of Heidegger’s inquiry.

With this in mind, it is possible to consider the implications of Heidegger’s broadened picture for the narrower issue specifically treated by Frege, that of the senses of linguistic expressions as modes of presentation (of referents). From the broadened Heideggerian perspective, as we have seen, linguistic senses can still be treated, as Frege does treat them, as given by whatever allows truth-conditions for the sentences of a language as a whole to be determined. But this determination must, in addition to the linguistic-structural determination of the truth-values of sentences from “primitive” relations of satisfaction in accordance with a Tarskian truth theory, also include whatever determines the presentation of beings (such as they could plausibly figure in relations of satisfaction or other reference-like relations to begin with). Dummett actually grasps this point, at least in a negative way, as is evident in his recognition of the need to address the ways in which objects are given as part of a general theory of sense. But although he also recognizes that modes of presentation cannot be treated as separable objects of reference, on pain of aporia and infinite regress, he is led by the apparent demand to explain what knowledge of a linguistic sense consists in to attempt to countenance such knowledge as possession of an ability to recognize objects, or more broadly to use linguistic terms meaningfully in specific, epistemically characterizable ways.

The attempt to describe knowledge of senses in terms of recognitional abilities does not succeed, since as Dummett also recognizes, the description of knowledge of sense in terms of abilities to recognize objects itself presupposes the availability of the senses it is supposed to explain. But while recognizing this failure in the case of the narrow recognitional theory, Dummett nevertheless persists in supposing that it must be possible to characterize the knowledge involved in knowing a linguistic sense non-circularly in terms of some notion of epistemic ability, ultimately at the basis of our ability to identify something as being the case when it is. This is what yields Dummett’s attempts to describe knowledge of sense in terms of such formulas as the “grasping of a rule,” the possession of a specifiable ability, adoption of a method, the possession of specifiable criteria, or the knowledge of a means of “picking out” something from among others. But as we have seen, if it must (on pain of aporia) be impossible to treat senses in general as separable objects of reference, then it appears likely that these attempts to characterize sense non-circularly in terms of some prior methodological means must fail as well. Moreover, to introduce them as figuring centrally in explanations of what it is to grasp a sense, as Dummett does, is effectively to locate epistemic notions at the heart of the systematic theory of sense.
and truth, a strategy which is (as Dummett himself recognizes) in substantial tension with Frege’s own realist approach, and which we have good reason to think (see above) cannot succeed in capturing the specific sense of truth, in any case.58

On the recommended Heideggerian alternative, there is no requirement, in general, for the knowledge involved in grasping the sense of an expression to be portrayed as consisting in the possession of any ability, adherence to any practice, or any relation of the individual subject to any other (ontic) event, object or process. This negative point is just the obverse of the positive recognition that sense as a phenomenon can only be described in terms that are ontological as well as ontic, and that this ontic-ontological double structure (itself inherent to the structure of Dasein) is essential to the specific phenomenon of truth itself. Significantly, this allows for a generalized discussion of linguistic sense that situates it as a specific phenomenon within the broader context of the ontological concept of presence and presentation as such, and thereby allows a broadened discussion, as well, of the temporal determinants of the possibility of presence in the broad as well as the narrower (i.e. linguistic) sense, a discussion in which the temporality of language is, necessarily, equally at issue. From this perspective, the picture of an already-constituted language, determined and fixed as a total structure, coming to bear on the world simply by confronting a world already constituted as a totality of determinate objects bearing determinate properties, is a complete fiction. Rather, it must be acknowledged that objects and their determinate properties and relations emerge, in a temporally complicated sense, only with the development of a language and the specific possibilities of expression and presentation that its structure, at any given point of its development, make possible. That fictional picture is, however, the one that ultimately motivates conceptions, such as Carnap’s, on which a language can be conventionally instituted or stipulated as a whole simply by fixing its semantic rules; it is also the picture which may be thought to motivate Tarski’s original idea of truth-predicates for artificial languages as definable in terms of “primitive” relations of satisfaction, though not (or at any rate, not in the same way) Davidson’s modified picture of the interpretation of natural languages, which is inherently holistic and reconstructs satisfaction from truth rather than vice-versa. Recognizing that such fictional pictures of the “language-world” relation must cede to one that takes seriously the thought that linguistic sense itself is co-

58 Dummett recognizes the general issue: “If I am wrong...and there is some non-circular account of the notion of knowing what it is for something to be the case, not construed as verabalizable knowledge (on pain of circularity in the course of explaining what it is to understand words), nor appealing to the recognition of its being the case, then the general form of the model of sense we have been considering can be preserved while the whole model is recast in terms of this notion. What we are interested in in the present context is, after all, this general form, the structure of a model of sense, and not the question how far epistemological notions can legitimately be employed within such a model. But, despite the fact that Frege was undoubtedly highly realist in his whole philosophical outlook, that for him sense was related to truth rather than to the recognition of truth, and despite his constant inveighing against the intrusion of psychological notions into logic (more properly, into the theory of meaning), it is far from apparent that he would have rejected an account of the form we have been considering, on the grounds of the present objection [viz., that it the model in terms of recognition “invokes epistemological considerations where they are relevant.”]” (FPL, pp. 239-240). Dummett goes on to argue that the notion of sense for Frege is, after all, connected to “cognitive notions” involved in the advance from a thought to a truth-value, and that this suggests that it is wrong to hold that “Frege wanted to extrude everything epistemological from logic or from theory of meaning...”. While it is true that the idea of “cognitive value” to which Frege appeals in introducing the concept of sense is, at least partly, an epistemic notion, though, this does not suffice to establish that Frege would be willing to accept any general epistemic constraint, of the sort Dummett imagines, on the nature of sense.
constituted along with the articulation and constitution of the world on which it bears, including the
determinate presentation of its objects and phenomena, we can, at any rate, begin to see a
phenomenological basis for challenging the Fregean assumption that senses must themselves be
timeless or eternal existences whose own temporality is quite independent of the temporality of the
specific phenomenon they are actually invoked to explain, that of the presentation of objects. This is to
open, in other words, the question of the underlying temporality of sense as (in the Heideggerian
jargon) the question of the being of language, including the question of its temporal constitution,
continued existence, and possibilities of gradual or radical transformation or change in co-articulation
with those of the world it discloses.

I turn, now, to another issue about linguistic truth upon which the suggested Heideggerian extension of
the concept of truth has specific bearing. This is the question of the structure of a language which
contains, as natural languages generally do, its own truth-predicate (e.g. the English predicate “true”, as
characterizing sentences in English). In “The Semantic Concept of Truth,” Tarski famously argued that
any language which includes its own truth-predicate along with devices for forming arbitrary names for
its own sentences (such as the device of naming sentences by quoting them, or some other suitable
device), would, in connection with the structure of T-sentences, necessarily involve a contradiction. For
it is possible in any such language to construct a “liar” sentence of the form

L: L is not true

and, assuming the relevant truth-predicate is in the language under discussion, the T-schema for L
produces the contradiction

“L is not true” is true iff L is not true

i.e.

L is true iff L is not true.

Tarski accordingly suggested that no language that contains its own truth-predicate could be formally
characterized in accordance with the T-schema; it was thus necessary to discuss and define the truth-
predicate for each language under consideration in a different language which contains all the sentences
of the original language (or translations of them) as a proper part. Given this, it is impossible to
formulate the liar sentence, and the contradiction is avoided. The procedure has some plausibility in the
case of formal languages, for which there is a stronger metalanguage (such as English) readily available.
But even in this case, one can reasonably wonder how the notion of truth in the metalanguage itself is
defined or definable; here, the general application of Tarski’s solution would involve the postulation of
an indefinite open hierarchy of metalanguages, each stronger than the last, in which truth for each
language is definable only by the next higher one. And if we are interested primarily in natural
languages rather than formal ones, the device of defining truth in a metalanguage is of no use to begin
with. For these languages plausibly contain their own truth-predicates, and there is not, in general, a
More recently, though, some philosophers have considered how the structure of truth can be formally treated in accordance with the T-schema even for those languages which, like English, contain their own truth-predicates (as well as the resources to make descriptive reference to their own sentences). In his influential “Outline of a Theory of Truth,” Kripke notes that Tarski’s hierarchical approach cannot handle situations that occur routinely in natural languages where the truth of sentences is discussed, such as the situation in which Dean says, “Most of Nixon’s statements are false” and Nixon says, “Most of Dean’s statements are false.” As Kripke notes, there need not be any actual contradiction here, since both Dean’s statement and Nixon’s statement can be true without producing a contradiction; but Tarski’s hierarchical device implies both that the truth-predicate which Dean uses in describing Nixon’s remarks must be at a higher linguistic level than the one Nixon uses and that (conversely) Nixon’s must be at a higher level than Dean’s. Kripke suggests, accordingly, that Tarski’s account in terms of a hierarchy of languages and different truth-predicates should be replaced by one on which sentences, rather than being assigned to fixed levels of a linguistic hierarchy, are allowed to “find their own levels” within a language conceived as unitary. In particular, given an initial partial interpretation which assigns truth-values to some of the language’s sentences, sentences involving ascribing the truth-predicate to other sentences can be assigned truth-values at a higher level than the sentences discussed. The hierarchical construction can be iterated arbitrarily and even through transfinite ordinal levels. Kripke shows that, within the iteration, there will be certain fixed points at which some sentences attain a stable value (such that, if true at that level, they will be true at all subsequent levels of the hierarchy, or if false there, they will always subsequently be false), and these can then be treated as determinately true or false. Nevertheless, there will still be some sentences (such as the liar sentence itself) that never attain a stable truth-value on any level; these are treated as “ungrounded” and as exhibiting truth-value gaps, i.e. being neither true nor false.

Drawing on Kripke’s “fixed-point” construction but modifying its intuitive basis, Gupta and Buelnap have proposed a “revision theory” of truth which attempts to explicate the concept of truth as a circularly defined one. In particular, whereas Kripke understands the levels of the hierarchical construction as iterated interpretations of a language at ever-higher inductive levels, Gupta and Buelnap understand the Tarski biconditionals as pointing toward an underlying concept of truth that is circular in the sense that the definendum (truth) is in some cases contained in the definiens. Such a definition, as Gupta and Buelnap note, does not permit the determination of the extension of the definiendum non-circularly, but it does give a rule according to which we can determine the final extension of the definiendum given an initial hypothesis about its extension. The re-interpretations of the truth-predicate that occur on

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59 Revision theory, pp. 113-118.
60 Pp. 118-119.
different levels of the hierarchical construction, including fixed points, are thus interpreted as revisions of a truth-predicate that is defined, in itself, circularly. This kind of circularity is, Gupta and Buelnap hold, at the root of both the irremediably paradoxical behavior of some sentences (such as the Liar sentence) and the fact that others eventually attain stability at some fixed points.

Against both pictures (and others), Graham Priest (2006) has argued that taking seriously the Tarskian T-schema in application to the truth-predicates of natural languages such as English requires recognizing that the concept of truth that they formulate is inherently contradictory in the sense that such a language will contain true contradictions. Attempts to avoid a contradictory semantics while preserving the Tarskian schema, such as Tarski’s own as well as those of Kripke, Gupta, and Buelnap, are therefore to be rejected. Priest’s main argument against theories such as Kripke’s, which invoke truth-value gaps and deny the general applicability of the law of the excluded middle, is that no such solution can, in fact, avoid contradiction. For instance, for a sentence, a, that turns out to be ungrounded in Kripke’s sense and is thus treated as lacking a truth-value, “a is not true” is nevertheless itself true (since sentences that lack a truth value are not true). Thus we can consider the “extended” liar paradox

S: S is not (stably) true.

If S is true, it is not (by the T-schema) and if it is false or valueless (for instance if it is “ungrounded” in Kripke’s sense), then it is true. Accordingly, even the hierarchical construction in terms of stable truths at fixed points fails to achieve an unparadoxical classification of sentences across the language as a whole.

Priest gives a further argument against Gupta and Buelnap’s revision theory, this time bearing on the structure of the underlying basis of the “conventions” that provide for the definition of truth, on their account. As Priest notes, since the revision theory identifies the truth-value of sentences with their truth-values on stabilized interpretations, it can regard the T-schema as holding only for stably true or false sentences, rejecting its applicability to paradoxical sentences (such as the liar). But Priest questions what this is supposed to show: in particular, how does the elaborate formal construction involved in the distinction between stable and unstable sentences actually relate to the semantics of English as spoken? The construction involves, after all, a hierarchy of interpretations that must be continued not only through finite but also through transfinite ordinal levels. If this hierarchy of interpretations is supposed to explicate the meaning of the truth predicate of an actually spoken language such as English, it is thus apparently necessary to attribute to the speakers of the language at least an implicit grasp of the (highly complex) notions of a transfinite ordinal, of transfinite induction, etc.; but that ordinary speakers of English generally grasp these notions in using the ordinary notion of truth seems highly implausible. Similarly, Priest questions how the successive stages of revision are actually to be interpreted: it seems inappropriate to interpret them as actually temporally or chronologically ordered (so that the extension of the truth-predicate would be revised periodically, perhaps every week or every month), but it is unclear how else to interpret the claim that truth is successively “revised,” as Gupta and Buelnap claim. Finally, even if we follow Gupta and Buelnap in

61 In contradiction, p. 12.
taking sentences to have the semantical properties they do when the revisions finally stabilize, there will still be the possibility of generating paradoxes of the “extended liar” type anyway.

All of these constructions and interpretations of the significance of the paradoxes are relevant in the current context because they attempt formally to explicate what I have here called the “transcendental” concept of truth, which is plausibly the concept underlying truth-predicates of languages such as English that contain their own truth-predicate and that possess “universal” expressive power in Tarski’s sense. As we have seen, any attempt seriously to consider the structure of this transcendental concept of truth requires rejecting Tarski’s hierarchical structure of languages with distinct truth-predicates, since none of these captures the target notion under consideration. The transcendental concept of truth, as I have discussed it here, is itself intended to capture explicitly the *phenomenon* of truth, which is not restricted to any particular language or even to contexts in which sentences are formed and uttered at all. But since it is also highly plausible, as I have argued, that Tarski’s T-schema essentially captures the formal-linguistic aspect of this phenomenon as it figures in the structure of natural languages, the necessary existence and implications of the semantic paradoxes within these languages must also be considered relevant here, and might reasonably be considered to characterize in a significant sense the semantic structure of any language capable of discussing the truth-values of its own sentences. Thus each of the formal interpretations that make sense of the implications of the paradoxes for the overall semantic structure of a language is, at least, potentially suggestive of the formally indicated features of the broad phenomenon of (transcendental) truth.

Certain aspects of these constructions can also be linked in more specific ways to features of the transcendental phenomenon of truth in the sense that I have described. For example, the circularity in the definition of linguistic truth to which Gupta and Buelnap advert can be motivated, in the broadened context of a disclosive understanding of transcendental truth, by recalling the well-known circularity in the hermeneutic basis of the unconcealment of beings to which Heidegger points in *Being and Time*. According to Heidegger, because of the necessary involvement of the fore-structures (see above) in any interpretive understanding of the world, all possible interpretative unconcealment is itself situated within a circle, grounded in the structure of Dasein itself, in which Being-in-the-world must first be understood as a whole, albeit in a vague and inexplicit way, in order that it can subsequently be made explicit. In this sense, “Any interpretation which is to contribute understanding, must already have understood what is to be interpreted.” (p. 152). The circular structure is, according to Heidegger, characteristic of the kind of understanding that is requisite to grasping the present-at-hand as well as other modalities of beings (p. 153) and is “formal-indicatively disclosed” by Dasein’s understanding projection itself. (p. 315). The circularity of the interpretive foundations of truth is thus a necessary

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62 “As the disclosedness of the ‘there’, understanding always pertains to the whole of Being-in-the-world. In every understanding of the world, existence is understood with it, and *vice versa*... [The] circle of understanding is not an orbit in which any random kind of knowledge may move; it is the expression of the existential *fore-structure* of Dasein itself... In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing. To be sure, we genuinely take hold of this possibility only when, in our interpretation, we have understood that our first, last, and constant task is never to allow our fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out these fore-structures in terms of the things themselves.” (pp. 152-53).
feature of the phenomenon, according to Heidegger, and it is thus reasonable to think that any explicit conceptual grasp of it would include this circularity. In particular, since assertion is, for Heidegger, a type of uncovering, itself grounded in the broader disclosive structure of Dasein, it is reasonable to suppose that when we restrict our attention to assertoric truth (as all the philosophers who follow in the tradition of Tarski do), we will find the same circular structure. Here, the fact that the circular structure of the truth-predicate for a natural language can be shown to be a consequence of the uniform applicability of the T-schema is itself an important independent confirmation of a result that could also have been predicted on phenomenological-existential grounds.

In particular, from the perspective of the Heideggerian picture, the circular structure that Gupta and Buelnap discover in the concept of truth may be thought to reflect the fact that, due to the kind of objectification that language makes possible and its own inherent reflexivity, itself grounded in the reflexivity that is structurally characteristic of Dasein, sentences of a language are themselves continually uncovered as true or false and thereby become entities that can be discussed in terms of their own semantic status. In the course of inquiry, the extension of the truth-predicate will then pass through various stages of revision in which the status of various sentences or sentence-types as true or false is itself taken into consideration and used as a guide to the revision. This might even reasonably be thought to include moments of “infinitary” reflection involving the consideration of infinite sets of sentences of a particular type or characterizing a certain subject matter; these are the moments modeled, in Gupta and Buelnap’s construction, by the “limit” stages of the procession to, and through, transfinite ordinals. In chapter – of this work, we will see how a certain idea of passage to the infinite, which can be modeled by appeal to Cantor’s transfinite hierarchy, can itself be motivated by a phenomenological consideration of the reflexivity of Dasein in a way that is nevertheless not inconsistent with Dasein’s essential structural finitude. For now, it is sufficient to note the possibility of this phenomenological motivation and to point out how it could be reflected in the narrower dynamics of the behavior of the truth-predicate of a language over time.

What, then, of Priest’s second argument against the revision theory, the argument concerning the relation of the theory to the actual knowledge and practice of speakers? As we have seen in connection with Dummett, the phenomenon of transcendental truth itself does not need to be seen (and should not be seen) as necessarily grounded in the capacities, abilities, or practices of individual knowers in order to be explicated phenomenologically. It is, rather, to be seen as grounded in a structure which, though it is formally indicated in the structure of Dasein’s facticity, also does not have to be (and generally is not) explicitly present in the conscious awareness of any individual subject. Moreover, the formal indication is itself understood as involving important aspects of formalization and interpretive articulation, so that it may turn out on interpretation to have essential structural moments that are not at first apparent from the facts about linguistic usage or conscious mastery alone. Though the existence of elaborate formal structures such as the transfinite construction of Gupta and Buelnap’s picture would admittedly have to be positively demonstrated in relation to the underlying phenomenon of truth, it is thus not inconsistent with this conception that it exist and characterize, more narrowly, the meaning and
behavior of the truth-predicate as it is actually employed in linguistic practice. Priest’s second objection to the revision theory is thus to be rejected in this context.  

Nevertheless, Priest’s first objection – that the revision theory and Kripke’s theory do not in fact eliminate paradox, but only relocate it – remains legitimate, and in fact also can be seen as pointing to significant features of the underlying phenomenon of transcendental truth. As Priest argues in detail, it is plausible that any theory that eliminates the semantic paradoxes and the closely related set-theoretical ones from a particular language will do so only by limiting the expressive resources of the language in question. It is this limitation, for example, that saves the consistency of each language within the Tarskian hierarchy by stipulating that none of the languages in question can capture their own notion of truth. The choice between consistency and expressive completeness is, then, a fundamental one, and it appears to be unavoidable that any theory that attempts to characterize a language as a whole must choose for one or the other. Thus if we consider the language in question to have full expressive resources, as characterized by the unlimited applicability of the T-schema, we must also accept that there will always be paradoxes and contradictions that characterize the very structure of truth.

Should we see truth, as illuminated by the Heideggerian picture, as structurally circular or as contradictory, then? The answer is, “both”. The inherent reflexivity of any language that discusses truth, itself a structural outcome of the hermeneutic circularity of Dasein, means that the semantic structure of any existing language can either be viewed as containing a circular truth predicate that is, at any moment, incomplete, and as undergoing ongoing revision as the semantic consequences of existing theories are themselves considered and reflected upon. The process is, under this aspect, never complete (even at fixed points), and will always leave some sentences in the category of paradox or instability. But it is equally possible, with a shift of perspective, to characterize the truth-predicate of a language as already embodying the general phenomenon of truth as a whole, and thereby to see the actual phenomenological basis for the necessary structural existence of contradiction and paradox. The two perspectives – that of consistency with incompleteness and that of inconsistency with completeness – cannot be occupied simultaneously; but if the structural features of truth are indeed phenomenologically characterized as I have suggested here, it must essentially be seen as describable only in terms of this irreducible duality. The inherent circularity and contradictoriness that thereby emerge as essential structural features of the concept of truth would be a problem, in an obvious sense, for any theory that wishes to define truth consistently and non-circularly. But where the goal is not the fixing of definitions but rather phenomenological and formal indication of an underlying structure that is and must be presupposed, it is not unreasonable to see the structure as bearing these features essentially.

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63 Also, the temporality objection.
64 Connection to limit-contradictions; relation (that both Priest and Gupta/Buelnap point out) to set theory.
65 In part II, I will further develop this dual picture of truth as consistent incompleteness or inconsistent completeness on basic phenomenological/ontological grounds, with close reference to the guiding idea of consistency that appears in the force of the “law of noncontradiction,” and also with reference to the constitution of fundamental temporality.
In closing, it is worth noting that although the two issues I have discussed in this final section -- namely, the issue of the status of linguistic senses as “modes of presentation” and the issue of the structure of truth-predicates in natural languages -- are not the same, there is nevertheless a suggestive formal homology between them. In both cases, what is phenomenologically at issue is the way in which sentences reflect, in the narrowed context of linguistic assertion, the broader phenomenon of truth characterized in terms of presentation and presence. In both cases, as well, this reflection produces irreducible structures of circularity and contradiction within language itself. The inevitable presence of these structures plausibly demonstrates, in both cases, the impossibility of characterizing the functioning of meaningful language wholly in syntactic terms, or of any clean divide between the syntax of language from the semantics of truth. Rather, in light of the broadened consideration of the phenomenological conditions of assertoric truth, the paradoxical and aporeatic results (such as Tarski’s) that have appeared to demand this separation within the ambit of the assumption that truth is simply characteristic of assertion actually show it to be untenable once the broader phenomenological phenomenon of presentation is taken in view as a necessary component of the specific concept of truth. The aporias and paradoxes can then emerge as formal indications, within the structure of language more narrowly conceived, of the phenomenalization of phenomena, the presentation of presence itself.