

PVSV 11–38 worksheet

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Explanation of annotations

Headers on each page show pagination for Gnoli's 1960 edition and Pandeya's 1989 edition; headers also show the verse number being commented upon. Marginal notes show the pagination for Mālvaṇīya's 1959 edition. Footers show pagination of Derge and Peking editions of Tibetan translation. Section numbers correspond to kārikā numbers in Gnoli's edition. Section titles show pagination and lineation in Gnoli's and Pandeya's edition and in Derge edition. Subsection titles show pagination and lineation of Gnoli's and Pandeya's editions.

In the workbook itself, the sign “†” signifies a literal first-draft translation, “‡” a revised version of the initial literal translation, “§” Gillon's notes and “§§” Hayes's notes.

Annotative labels

AC scope
AC without subject
agreement: x with y
apposition: x to y
appositive gloss: x wrt y
asyndeton
bv cpd
bv cpd: N (within cpd)
bv cpd: NP (has or is antecedent)
cataphora
cpd intrusion: x wrt y
conjunction
constituency violation
copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP or VP NP1s or indeterminate covert: existential (possession)
copula: overt: predicational: VP NP1s overt: existential (possession):
counter-anaphora
disjunction
ellipsis: E is
emendation: read x instead of y
x extraposition: from y

implicit argument: for x, coref with y
implicit arguments: for x and y shared
incomplete sentence:
interleaving
inter-s anaphora
intra-s anaphora
landing site violation
modal subordination
modifier giving reason: x wrt y
negation scope: "na" narrower/wider than
negation scope: "a" narrower/wider than
negation scope: constituent negation
null subject
number
parenthetical
pattern
predicate marker
pronoun with complement
protasis
redundancy
result clause
secondary predication
sentential subject
split antecedent
subjacency violation
topic genitive
tp cpd
unrecoverable citation
unrecoverable meaning
unrecoverable denotation: for "x"
use mention
valence
vat phrase
yathā clause: introduces an instance ('as when') appositive specification correlative with tathā result clause

Abbreviations

AC absolute clause
ADC adverbial clause
GC gerundial clause
IC infinitival clause
MC main clause
PC participial clause
RC relative clause
bv bahuvrihi
tp tatpuruṣa

11 G8.16; P177.13 D265a.8; Pk409a.7

hetunā tv asamagreṇa yat kāryam anumīyate śeṣavat tad asāmarthyād dehād rāga-anumāna-vat

[S [RC [NP3 hetunā [CNJ tu] [AP3 (a-samagreṇa)] 1] [NP1s [AP1 yat] kāryam]
[VP _ anumīyate]] [VP 0 [AP1 śeṣa-vat]] [NP1s tat] [NP5 [NP6 e 1] (a-sāmarthyāt)
] [[NP5 dehāt] ((rāga<anumāna)-vat)]]

rgyu ma tshogs pas 'bras bu ni. rjes su dpag¹ pa gang yin de.
lhag ma dang ldan (*D265b.1*) nus med phyir. lus (*Pk409a.8*) las 'dod chags rjes dpog
bzhin.

† But, an effect inferred from a non-totality of causes is deficient, because it lacks the capacity <to produce it>, as is exemplified by the inference of <the existence of> passion from <the existence of> a body.

‡ But that effect which is inferred from an incomplete cause, such as the inference of passion from a body, is deficient because of [the cause's] lack of capacity.

§ cpd intrusion: “dehāt” wrt “anumāna”.

§ left extraposition from VP of NP3 within RC

§ implicit argument: for “a-sāmarthyāt”, coref with NP3

§ intra-s anaphora: link between “yat” and “tat”

§ vat phrase

§ copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s

§§ Make a note of Kaṇakagomin's gloss of “anaikāntika” for “śeṣavad” (S50.16).

11.1 G8.18; P177.15

samagrāṇy eva hi kāraṇāni yogyatām apy anumāpayanty asamagrasya
ekāntaasāmarthyāt. yathā dehendriyabuddhibhyo rāgādyanumānam.

[S [NP1s [AP1 samagrāṇi [PRT eva]] [CNJ hi] kāraṇāni 1] [VP [NP2 [NP6 e 1]
yogyatām [PRT api]] anumāpayanti] [NP5 [NP6 (a-samagrasya)]
(ekānta<(a-sāmarthyāt))] [S [CNJ yathā] [NP1s [NP5 (deha+indriya+buddhibhyaḥ)
] ((rāga-ādi)<anumānam)] [VP 0]]]

rung ba nyid kyang rgyu tshogs pa dag kho nas rjes su dpog par byed de, ma tshogs pa
la shin tu nus pa med pa'i phyir. dper na lus dbang po dang blo dag (*Pk409b.1*) las 'dod
chags la sogs pa rjes su dpog pa bzhin (*D265b.2*) no.

† For only the totality of causes makes one infer even so much as their aptitude, because their non-totality is completely incapable, as when there is an inference of <the existence of> such things as passion from <the existence of> the body, the senses, and thoughts.

‡ For it is no less than all the causes that enable one to infer as much as their aptitude, since the incomplete [cause] is quite lacking the capacity. Consider the inference of passion and so forth on the basis of the body, the sense-faculties and intellect.

¹ D: dpag; Pk: dpog

- § possible intra-s anaphora: between NP6 and NP1s
 § valence: causee argument missing for causative of “anumā”
 § “api” resists translation as “even” here; note, however, that should “only” be rendered negatively, “even” can stand as a translation: the non-totality does not imply even their aptitude.
 § yathā clause: introduces an instance (“as when”)
 § copula: covert: existential: indeterminate order
 §§ Why not take “api” as “also, too, as well” or even “very”: “It is no less than all the causes that enable one to infer the very aptitude.”

11.2 G8.20; P177.16

ātmātmīyābhīniveśapūrvakā hi rāgādayo ayoniśomanaskārapūrvakatvāt
 sarvadoṣotpatteḥ.

[S [VP 0 [AP1 (((ātma+ātmīya)<abhīniveśa)<pūrvakāḥ)]] [CNJ hi] [NP1s
 (rāga+ādayaḥ)] [NP5 ((a-(yoniśaḥ<manaskāra))<pūrvakatvāt) [NP6
 ((sarva<doṣa)<utpatteḥ)]]]

’dod chags la sogs pa ni bdag dang bdag gir zhen pa sngon du ’gro ba can yin te, nye
 ba thams cad skye ba’i sngon du ’gro ba ni tshul ^(Pk409b.2) bzhin ma yin pa yid la
 byed pa yin pa’i phyir ro.

† For things such as passion are based on a belief that there is a self and that things belong to the self, because the arising of every flaw is based on disorderly thinking.

‡ Passion and so forth are preceded by a fondness for oneself and one’s possessions, because the arising of every vice is preceded by disorderly thinking.

- § copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s
 § “a-yoniśamanaskāra”: incorrect judgement, said to be the cause of avidya in
 Sahetusapratyayasānidāna-sūtra and of the five hindrances (nīvaraṇa) in Mahākausthīla-sūtra (Mejor 1997b p. 155)
 §§ The Tibetan expression “tshul bzhin ma yin” (for “ayoniśas”) literally means “not being methodical, not orderly”. The PTS dictionary has “unsystematic”. Hayes has translated it “unprincipled” elsewhere.

11.3 G8.21; P177.17

dehādīnāṃ hetutve ’pi na kevalānāṃ sāmāthyam astīti. vipakṣavṛtter adṛṣṭāv api
 śeṣavadanumānāt saṃśayaḥ.

[S [AC [NP6 (deha-ādīnām) 1] [NP7 hetutve] [PC7 0 [PRT api]]] [ADV na] [NP1s
 [NP6 [AP6 kevalānām] e 1] sāmāthyam] [VP asti]]

[S [CNJ iti] [AC [NP7 [NP5 (vipakṣa<vṛtteḥ)] (a-drṣṭau) [PRT api]]] [VP 0 [NP5
 (śeṣa-vat<anumānāt)]] [NP1s saṃśayaḥ]]

lus la sogs pa rgyu nyid ni yin mod kyi ’ba’ zhig pa rnams la ni nus pa med ^(D265b.3)
 pas mi mthun pa’i phyogs la ’jug pa ma mthong du zin kyang rjes su ^(Pk409b.3) dpag
 pa lhag ma dang ldan pa’i phyir, the tshom za ba yin no.

† Even though such things as bodies are causes, alone they do not have a capability <to produce such things as passion>. So, doubt accrues to an inference from

deficient <grounds>, even when there is no observation of <the ground's> occurrence in the vipakṣa.

‡ Even though bodies and so forth are causes, alone they lack the capacity, so even though there is no observation of the occurrence [of the evidence] in a subject dissimilar [from the subject of inference], there is uncertainty because the inference is deficient.

§ intra-s anaphora

§ copula: overt: existential: NP1s VP (possession)

§ translation of “kevalānām” differs from K 51.6 but follows M 263.2

§§ The above difference between Karṇakagomin and Manorathanandin should be noted in the Haygil commentary.

§ copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s

§ negative scope: “a” has scope over entire AC

§§ “Unsubjectlike class” is the translation for *vipakṣa* used in Hayes 1988. The Tibetan “mi mthun pa’i phyogs” literally means “a dissimilar subject.” Given that “pakṣa” can mean “class” according to Apte, perhaps “dissimilar class” would be better. In any event, a note on this term should appear in the Haygil commentary.

§§ The Tibetan reads “. . . there is uncertainty, because the inference is deficient.” Karṇakagomin says “viparyaya bāddhakapramāṇābhāvāc cheṣavad anumānam asmāc ca saṃśayo bhavati” [51.8–9]

12 G8.23; P178.01 D265b.3

tathā

**vipakṣe adrṣṭimātreṇa kārya-sāmānyadarśanāt.
hetujñānam pramāṇābham vacanād rāgitādivat.**

[S [ADV tathā] [NP1s [NP5 [NP3 [NP7 vipakṣe] [NP6 e 1] ((a-drṣṭi)<mātreṇa)] ((kārya<sāmānya)<darśanāt] (hetu1<jñānam)] [VP 0 [AP1 (pramāṇa<ābham)-B]] [[NP5 vacanāt] (((rāgitā-ādi)-vat)]]]]

de bzhin du,

mi mthun phyogs la ma mthong ba. tsam gyi ’bras spyi mthong ba las.

gtan tshigs shes pa tshad ltar snang. tshig las ^{(D265b.4)(Pk409b.4)} chags can la sogs bzhin.

† In this way, cognition of a cause from an observation of a common effect through the mere non-observation of the effect in <its> vipakṣa is pseudo-epistemic, as is exemplified by <the cognition, i.e., the inference, of> passion-possession from speech.

‡ So cognition of a cause, like [the inference] from the act of speaking to the fact of being impassioned, is spurious knowledge when it comes from observing a general property of the effect through nothing more than its not being observed in a dissimilar subject.

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

§ intra-s anaphora

§ vat phrase

§§ Note in Haygil commentary that the Tibetan has “gtan tshigs shes pa” for “hetujñāna”, suggesting that “hetu” means “evidence” instead of “cause.” But Karṇakagomin glosses “hetujñānām” as “viśiṣṭākāraṇānumānam” [S51.10]. Manorathanandin offers no gloss.

12.1 G9.03; 178.04

na hi rāga-ādīnām eva kāryaṃ spandanavacanādayaḥ, vaktukāmatāsāmānyahetutvāt.

[S [ADV na] [CNJ hi] [VP 0 [NP1 [NP6 (rāga-ādīnām) [PRT eva]] kāryam]]
[NP1s ((spandana+vacana)-ādayaḥ) 1] [NP5 [NP6 e 1]
(((vaktu-kāmatā)<(sāmānya<hetu))-B-tvāt)]]

g.yo ba'am tshig la sogs pa ni 'dod chags la sogs pa kho na'i 'bras bu ma yin te, brjod
par 'dod pa spyi'i gyu can nyid yin pa'i phyir ro.

† For such things as movement <of the lips> and speaking are not the effect of such things as passion alone, because their common cause is the desire to speak.

‡ For such things as movement [of the lips] and speaking are not the effect of such things as passion alone, because their general cause is the desire to speak.

§ copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s

§ cpd intrusion: null NP6 wrt B

§ intra-s anaphora

§ “eva”: “only” (semantic restriction on NP denotation)

12.2 G9.04; P178.04

sa eva rāga iti cet

[S [NP1s sā [PRT eva]] [NP1 rāgaḥ] [CNJ iti cet]]

gal te de nyid 'dod chags ^(Pk409b.5) yin no zhe na.

† It might be argued that the very <desire to speak> is passion.

‡ It might be argued that that very [desire to speak] is a passion.

§ copula: covert: identity: indeterminate order

§ “eva”: “very” (NP emphasis)

12.3 G9.04; P178.05

[S [NP5 iṣṭatvāt [NP6 e]] [ADV na] [NP1s (kim-cit)] [VP [AP1 bādhitam] syāt]]

'dod pa yin pa'i phyir cung zad kyang gnod par mi 'gyur ro.

† Because of what is accepted <as the definition of passion> nothing < you have said > could contravene <what I had said>.

‡ Because it is accepted, nothing at all [that I have said] would be contradicted.

§ inter-s anaphora: e has no clear antecedent; K51.18 supplies vaktukāmatā-kāryasya vacanasya (with the former a secondary predicate of the latter); I suggest that the antecedent is in the following clause.

§§ S51.18 says “vaktukāmatā kāryasya (→ vaktukāmatākāryasya) iṣṭatvān na kiṃcid aṅiṣṭam. (Since it is agreed that the the act of speaking is an effect of the desire to speak, nothing is disagreed with.)”.

12.4 G9.05; P178.05

nityasukhātmātmīyadarśanākṣiptaṃ sāsraavadharmaviṣayaṃ cetaso 'bhiṣvaṅgaṃ
rāgaṃ āhuḥ.

[S [VP [NP2 [AP2 (((nitya+sukha+ātma+ātmīya)<darśana)<ākṣiptam)] [AP2
((sāsraava<dharma)<viṣayam)-B] [NP6 cetasaḥ] abhiṣva'ngam] [NP2 rāgam] āhuḥ
] [NP1s e]]

(D265b.5) 'dod chags ni sems kyi mngon par zhen pa rtag pa dang bde ba dang bdag
dang bdag gir lta bas 'phangs pa zag pa dang bcas pa'i chos (Pk409b.6) kyi yul can yin
par smra'o.

† They say passion is the mind's intense attachment, which is activated by belief that permanent things exist, that contentment exists, that the self exists and that things belong to the self and the subject matter of which is a corrupted property.

‡ They define passion as the mind's intense attachment, which is activated by belief in the permanent, in happiness, in oneself and in possessions, and the subject matter of which is a corrupted property.

§ secondary predication

§ null subject: unrecoverable denotation

§§ The English word "corrupt" covers very nearly the same semantic range as "āsraava" and its Tibetan equivalent "zad pa": moral depravity, impurity and decay. S 52.1 glosses "sāsraavadharma" with "pañcopādānaskandha".

12.5 G9.06; P178.06

naivaṃ karuṇādayo 'nyathāpi sambhavād iti nivedayiṣyāmaḥ.

[S [ADV na] [VP 0 [AP evam]] [NP1s karuṇā-ādayaḥ 1] [NP5 [AP anyathā [PRT
api]] [NP6 e 1] sambhavāt]] [S [CNJ iti] [VP nivedayiṣyāmaḥ]]

snying rje la sogs pa ni de lta bu ma yin te, gzhan du yang srid pa'i phyir ro zhes bstan
pa bya'o.

† Such things as compassion are not like this, because they arise otherwise instead. As we will relate.

‡ We shall show that compassion and so on are not like that, because they arise otherwise also.

§ copula: overt: predicational: VP NP1s

§ counter-anaphora: anyathā

§ inter-s anaphora: "evam" 's antecedent is secondary predicate of last clause

§ "api": unclear

12.6 G9.07; P187.06

atra yathā rakto bravīti tathā virakto 'pīti vacanamātrād apratipattiḥ.

[S [ADV atra] [S [ADV yathā] [NP1s raktaḥ] [VP bravīti]] [ADV tathā] [NP1s viraktaḥ [PRT api]] [VP E]] [S [CNJ iti] [NP1s [NP5 (vacana<mātrāt) (a-pratipattiḥ)] [VP 0]]]

ji ltar chags (*D265b.6*) pa sgra ba ltar 'dod chags dang bral ba yang de dang 'dra (*Pk409b.7*) bas tshig tsam las mi rtogs so.

† Now an unimpassioned person speaks in the same way as an impassioned one does. So, there is no knowing <whether or not someone is impassioned> from his merely speaking.

‡ There is no knowing about this from the act of speaking alone, because a dispassionate person also speaks, as does an impassioned one.

§ ellipsis: E is VP of last clause

§ K (52.7-8) construes “atra” with “a-pratipatti” of next sentence

§ yathā clause: correlative with tathā

§§ Tibetan has no equivalent of “atra”.

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ “mātra”: “mere”; nb: contrast with “viśeṣa” in next sentence

12.7 G9.08; P178.07

nāpi viśeṣāt. abhiprāyasya durbodhatvāt. vyavahārasaṃkareṇa sarveṣāṃ vyabhicārāt.

[S [ADV na] [PRT api] [NP1s E [NP5 viśeṣāt 1]] [VP 0] [NP5 [NP5 [NP6 abhiprāyasya] durbodhatvāt [NP3 (vyavahāra<saṃkareṇa)]] [NP6 [AP6 sarveṣāṃ] e 1] vyabhicārāt]]

khyad par las kyang ma yin te, bsam pa ni rtogs par dka' ba'i phyir. tha snyad 'chol bas thams cad 'khrul pa'i phyir ro.

† Nor is <there any knowing whether or not someone is impassioned> from a special kind <of speaking>, because, <a speaker's> intentions' being difficult to know, <his various forms of> behavior are diverse and so all <forms of his speaking> are deviant <with respect to whether or not he has passion>.

‡ Nor is there knowing from a specific act of speaking, because [the speaker's] intention is difficult to discern, since all [acts of speaking] are erratic owing to confusion about conventions.

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ ellipsis: E comprises head of cpd in NP1s and non-head of cpd in NP5 (Cf. G3.17)

12.8 G9.10; P178.08

prayojanābhāvād avyāhāra iti cet, na, parārthatvāt.

[S [NP5 (proyojana<abhāvāt) [NP6 e 1] [VP 0] [NP1s [NP6 e 1] (a-vyāhāraḥ)] [CNJ iti cet]] [S [ADV na] E [NP5 (para<arthatvāt)]]]

gal te dgos pa med pa'i phyir mi smra'o (*Pk409b.8*) zhe na, ma (*D265b.7*) yin te, gzhan gyi yod [→ don] yin pa'i phyir ro.

† It might be argued that <a dispassionate person> does not speak because he has no <selfish> motive. <This is> not <so>, because <he speaks for> altruistic motives.

‡ It might be argued that [a dispassionate person] would not speak, because he has no purpose. That is not the case, for [he speaks] for the benefit of others.

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ implicit argument: for "a-vyāhāra", coref with implicit argument for NP5; the restriction on the implicit argument is not determined by the co-text.

§§ Pk409b.8 confirms "don" for "yod"

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ ellipsis: E is NP5 of last sentence (K 52.16)

§ implicit argument: for "para-arthatvāt", coref with "vyāhāra" implicit in E.

12.9 G9.11; P178.09

na yukto vīta-rāgatvād iti cet,

[S [NP1s e 1] [ADV na] [VP 0 [AP1 yuktaḥ]] [NP5 [NP6 e 1] (vīta;rāga)-B-tvāt] [CNJ iti cet]]

gal te 'dod chags dang bral ba'i phyir rigs pa ma yin no zhe na.

† It might be argued that <he> is not able to because he is passionless.

‡ It might be argued that he is unable [to speak], because he is free from passion.

§ copula: covert: predicational: indeterminate

§ unrecoverable denotation: NP1s

§ inter-s anaphora: implicit NP1s's antecedent is implicit NP for "a-vyāhāra", two clauses back.

§ intra-s anaphora: implicit argument for "vītarāgatvāt" has as its antecedent NP1s, itself implicit.

12.10 G9.11; P178.09

na karuṇāpi vṛtṭeḥ.

[S [ADV na] E [NP5 [NP3 karuṇayā [PRT api]] pravṛtṭeḥ]]

ma yin te, snying rjes kyang 'jug pa'i phyir ro.

† <This is> not <so>, because <an activity> is undertaken out of compassion too.

‡ This is not so, because he can be activated by compassion as well.

§ ellipsis: E is "na E yuktaḥ" of last clause

§ emendation: read "vṛtṭeḥ" as "pravṛtṭeḥ" (following K 52.18)

12.11 G9.11; P178.09

saiva rāga iti cet.

[S [NP1s sā [PRT eva]] [VP 0 [NP1 rāgaḥ]] [CNJ iti cet]]

ci ste de nyid 'dod (*Pk410a.1*) chags yin no zhe na.

† It might be argued that compassion itself is passion.

‡ One might argue that compassion itself is passion.

12.12 G9.12; P178.10

iṣṭam. aviparyāśasamudbhavān na doṣaḥ.

[S [NP1s iṣṭam 1] [NP5 [NP6 e 1] (a-(viparyāśa<samudbhavāt))] [ADV na] [VP 0 [NP1 doṣaḥ]]]

'dod pa yin te, phyin ci ma log pa las byung ba'i phyir nyes pa med do.

† Because what is accepted <sc., compassion> does not arise from misjudgement, it is not a flaw.

‡ Agreed. It is not a vice, because it does not arise from misjudgment.

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP VP

§ K (52.19–20) has a construal which is unclear

§ inter-s anaphora: implicit argument's antecedent is "sā"

12.13 G9.12; P178.10 D266a.1

asaty apy ātmagrahe duḥkhaviśeṣadarśanamātreṇābhyāsabalotpādinī bhavaty eva karuṇā.

[S [AC [PC7 (a-sati) [PRT api]] [NP7 (ātma<grahe)]] [VP [AP1 [NP3 (((duḥkha<viśeṣa)<darśana)<mātreṇa)] ((abhyāsa<bala)<utpādinī)] bhavati [PRT eva]] [NP1s karuṇā]]

(*D266a.1*) snying rje ni bdag tu 'dzin pa med kyang sdug bsngal gyi khyad par mthong

(*Pk410a.2*) tsam gyis goms pa'i stob las skye ba yin te,

† Compassion is in fact produced on the strength of habitual practice by the mere observation of some specific instance of suffering, even without a belief that the self exists.

‡ Even when one is not preoccupied with oneself, compassion is produced owing to the strength of habitual practice through nothing more than the observation of a specific instance of discontent.

§ copula: overt: predicational: VP NP1s

§ NP3 may not be in VP

§ "eva": "in fact" (V emphasis)

12.14 G9.14; P178.11

tathā hi. sattvadharmādyāḷambanā maitryādaya iṣyante.

[S [ADV tathā] [CNJ hi] [AP1 (((sattva+dharmā)-ādi)<āḷambanāḥ)-B] [NP1s (maitreya-ādayaḥ)] [VP _ iṣyante]]

'di ltar byams pa la sogṣ pa ni sems can dang chos la sogṣ pa la dmigs pa yin par 'dod do.

† Likewise, for instance, such things as friendliness are accepted as based on such things as sentient beings and virtue.

‡ For instance, such things as friendliness are accepted as having sentient beings and virtue as their foundation.

§ left extraposition from VP of AP1 (secondary predicate) within MC, except ADV and CNJ

§ secondary predication

§ "tathā hi": see Apte dictionary entry (3) and Apte para 307 (3)

§ K 53.2 explains that, depending on one's insight, one can have different things as objects of friendliness.

12.15 G9.15; P178.11

etāṣ ca saajātīyābhyāsavṛttayo na rāgāpekṣiṇyaḥ.

[S [NP1s [AP1 etāḥ] [CNJ ca] ((sajātīya<abhyāsa)<vṛttayaḥ)] [ADV na] [VP 0 [AP1 (rāga<apekṣiṇyaḥ)]]]

de dag kyang rigs mthun ^(D266a.2) pa la goms pas ^(Pk410a.3) 'byung ba can yin gyi, 'dod chags la ltos pa can ni ma yin no.

† And these things are dispositions <created by> the same habitual practice do not depend on passion.

‡ And these are activated by the same kind of habitual practice; they do not depend on passion.

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

12.16 G9.16; P178.12

naivaṃ rāgādayo viparyāsābhāve 'bhāvāt.

[S [ADV na] [VP 0 [AP evam]] [NP1s (rāga-ādayaḥ) 1] [NP5 [AC [NP7 (viparyāsa<abhāve)] [PC7 0]] [NP6 e 1] abhāvāt]]

'dod chags la sogṣ pa ni de lta ma yin te, phyin ci log med na med pa'i phyir.

† Such things as passion are not like this, because they do not exist in the absence of delusion.

‡ Such things as passion are not like this, because they are absent when misjudgement is absent.

- § copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s
 § inter-s anaphora: “evam”’s antecedent is predicate of next to last clause (K53.14)
 § intra-s anaphora
 § negative scope: “na” narrower than NP5

12.17 G9.16; P178.12

kāruṇikasyāpi niṣphala ārambho ’viparyāsād iti cet.

[S [NP6 kāruṇikasya [PRT api] 1] [VP 0 [AP1 (niṣ-phalaḥ)]] [NP1s - ārambhaḥ]
 [NP5 [NP6 e 1] (a-viparyāsāt)] [CNJ iti cet]]

gal te snying rje can gyi rtsom pa ’bras bu ^(Pk410a.4) med pa yang phyin ci log la yin
 no zhe na.

† It might be argued that the undertaking of even a compassionate person is pointless because he does not misjudge.

‡ It might be argued that the undertaking of even a compassionate person is ineffective owing to the lack of misjudgment.

§ copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s § left extraposition from NP1s of NP6 within MC § “api”: a compassionate person, being free from misjudgement, is the least likely to undertake something pointless.

§§ Tibetan places equivalent of *api* after equivalent of *ārambha*, rather than after *kāruṇikasya*

§§ The Tibetan translation suggests *viparyāsāt* rather than *aviparyāsāt*. Karṇakagomin supports *aviparyāsāt*.

12.18 G9.17; P178.14

na. parārthasyaiva phalatveneṣṭatvāt. icchālakṣaṇatvāt phalasya.

[S [ADV na] E [NP5 [NP6 (para<arthasya) [PRT eva]] [NP3 phalatvena] iṣṭatvāt
 [NP5 (icchā<lakṣaṇatvāt) [NP6 phalasya]]]]

ma yin te, ^(D266a.3) gzhan gyi don khon ’bras bu nyid du ’dod pa’i phyir ro. ’bras bu’i
 mtshan nyid ni ’dod pa yin pa’i phyir ro.

† <This> is not <so>, because an altruistic motive is itself accepted as an aim, since an aim is a characteristic of desire.

‡ This not so, because the benefit of others is itself agreed to be the effect, because the effect is characterized by desire.

§ “eva”: “itself” (NP emphasis)

§ secondary predication

12.19 ¶ G9.18; P178.14

sarvathā ’bhūtāsāmāropān nirdoṣaḥ.

[S [ADV sarvathā] [NP5 ((a-bhūta)<(a-samāropāt))] [NP1s (nir-doṣaḥ)] [VP 0]]
 rnam pa thams cad du yang dag pa ^(Pk410a.5) ma yin pa sgro 'dogs pa ma yin pa'i
 phyir nyes pa med do.

† There is no fault at all because there is no ascription of what does not exist.

‡ This is unproblematic, because there is no attribution in any way of what is unreal.

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ possible implicit arguments: for “samāropa” and possessor of doṣa shared

§ negative polarity: “sarvathā”

§§ Tibetan suggests that “sarvathā” modifies “asamaropāt” rather than “nirdoṣaḥ”

12.20 G9.19; P178.14

tadanyena doṣavattvasādhane na kiṃcid aniṣṭam.

[S [NP7 [NP3 (tat<anyena)] (doṣavattva<sādhane)] [ADV na] [NP1s _ (kim-cit)]
 [VP 0 [AP1 (an-iṣṭam)]]]]

de las gzhan pas nyes pa dang ldan pa nyid du bsgrubs pas na ni mi 'dod ^(D266a.4) pa
 cung zad kyang med do.

† Nothing <you have said> about the establishment of fault possession through
 something other than this is unaccepted <by us>.

‡ There is nothing at all with which we disagree in the argument for viciousness due
 to something other than that [passion].

§ copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s

§ left extraposition from NP1s of NP7

§ inter-s anaphora: “tat” is “rāga” (K 53.24); “rāga” last mentioned four sentences back

§ negation: head scope

12.21 ¶ G9.20; P178.15

vaktary ātmani rāgādidarśanenānyatra tadanumāne 'tiprasaṅgaḥ.

[S [AC [NP7 [NP3 [NP7 vaktari [NP7 ātmani] 1] ((rāga-ādi)2<darśanena)] [NP7
 anyatra 3] (tat2<anumāne)]] [NP1s (ati-prasa'ngah)] [VP 0]]]

smra ba po bdag la 'dod chags la sogs pa mthong ^(Pk410a.6) bas gzhan la de rjes su
 dpog na ni ha cang thal bar 'gyur ro.

† If such things as passion are inferred in others through the observation of them in the
 speaker himself <sc. the speaker of the inference under discussion>, an unwarranted
 conclusion obtains.

‡ It is far-fetched conclusion if one infers passion in someone else on the basis of
 observing it in oneself as a speaker.

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ intra-s anaphora: English requires inversion of the relation of referential dependence

§ counter-anaphora: 1 and 3 distinct

§ AC: Hayes takes the NP7 to be a complement to NP1s

12.22 G9.21; P178.15

vyabhicārāt. ananyānumāne ihāvyabhicāra iti ko niścayaḥ.

[S [AC [NP7 [NP5 vyabhicārāt] (an-(anya<anumāne))] [PC7 0]] [S [VP 0 [NP7 iha]] [NP1s (a-vyabhicārah)] [PRT iti]] [VP 0 [AP1 kaḥ]] [NP1s _ niścayaḥ]]

'khrul pa'i phyir gzhan rjes su mi dpog na ni 'di la mi 'khrul lo zhes bya ba'i nges pa ci zhig yod.

† If there is no inference of things other <than passion> because of deviation, how is it ascertained that there is no deviation in this case?

‡ Given that there is no inference in other cases owing to [the evidence] being erratic, what ascertainment is there that it is not erratic in this case?

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s

§ left extraposition from NP1s of S, except AC

§ see K 54.7 on "iha"

§§ Placement of negation in Tibetan would literally be translated "anya-anumāna" rather than "an(anya-anumāna)".

12.23 G10.01; P178.16

karaṇaguṇavaktukāmate hi vacanam anumāpayet.

[S [NP2 ((karaṇa<guṇa)+(vaktu<kāmate))] [PRT hi] [NP1s vacanam] [VP _ anumāpayet]]

tshig gis ni byed pa'i yon tan ^(D266a.5) dang brjod ^(Pk410a.7) pas [→ par] 'dod pa nyid dag rjes su dpog par byed do.

† Speech can imply qualities in the organ <of speech> and a desire to speak alone.

‡ The act of speaking can enable one to infer only qualities in the organ [of speech] and a desire to speak.

§ left extraposition from VP of NP2 within MC

§ valence: causee argument missing for causative of "anumā"

§ "hi": see Apte dictionary entry (4) or Apte para 307 (4)

§§ Tibetan translates as an emphatic particle "ni", which is not the usual translation of "eva"

§ potential: See Apte 1885 art. 199.

§§ Word order in Tibetan, which is equivalent to "vacanam hi karaṇaguṇavaktukāmate 'numāpayet", confirms NP extraposition in Sanskrit.

12.24 G10.02; P178.16

rāgotpādanayogyatārahite vacanādarśanāt tad-anumāne 'tiprasaṅgaḥ uktaḥ.

[S [AC [NP7 [NP5 [NP7 (((rāga<utpādana)<yogyatā)1<rahite)] (vacana<(a-darśanāt)) [tat1<anumāne)] [PC7 0]] [NP1s (ati-prasaṅgaḥ)] [VP uktaḥ]]

'dod chags bskyed par rung ba nyid dang bral ba la smra ba ma mthong ba'i phyir, de rjes su dpog na yang ha cang thal bar 'gyur ro zhes bshad zin to.

† If there is an inference of an aptitude to produce passion because of the non-observation of speech in that which is devoid of the aptitude, an unwarranted conclusion has been stated.

‡ It is said to be a far-fetched conclusion if one infers the aptitude to produce passion from the failure to observe speaking in one who lacks the aptitude to produce passion.

§ intra-s anaphora

§ "uktaḥ" seems wrong; see four sentences back

§ AC: Hayes takes the NP7 to be a complement to NP1s

12.25 G10.03; P178.17

rāgasyānupayoge katham tacchaktir upayujyate.

[S [AC [NP7 [NP6 rāgasya 1] (an-upayoge)] [PC7 0]] [ADV katham] [NP1s (tat1 <śaktiḥ)] [VP upayujyate]]

'dod (*Pk410a.8*) chags kyis phan mi 'dogs na ni, ji ltar de'i nus pas (*D266a.6*) phan 'dogs par 'gyur.

† If there is no need for passion <in the production of speech>, in what way is its potentiality needed?

‡ If passion has no utility, how can its potential be of use?

§ intra-s anaphora

12.26 G10.04; P178.18

śaktyupayoge hi sa evopayuktaḥ syāt tac ca nāstīty uktam.

[S [AC [NP7 (śakti <upayoge)] [PC7 0]] [CNJ hi] [NP1s saḥ [PRT eva]] [VP [API upayuktaḥ] syāt]] [S [NP1s tat] [CNJ ca] [VP [ADV na] asti]] [S [PRT iti] [VP uktam]]

nus pas phan 'dogs na ni, de nyid kyis phan btags par 'gyur ba zhig na, de ni med do zhes bhad zin to.

† For if there were a need for <the> potentiality <for passion>, then it itself <namely, passion> would be needed. Yet that is not the case, as was stated.

‡ For if potentiality did have utility, then that [passion] itself would be useful, but it is said that that is not the case.

§ copula: overt: predicational: NP1s VP

§ "eva": "itself" (NP emphasis)

§ unrecoverable denotation: for "tat"; K (55.3) supplies "upayogitvam"

§ copula: overt: existential: NP1s VP

12.27 ¶ G10.05; P178.19

tasmān nāntarīyakam eva kāryaṃ kāraṇam anumāpayati, tatpratibandhāt.

[S [CNJ tasmāt] [NP1s [AP1 nāntarīyakam [PRT eva]] kāryam 1] [VP [NP2 kāraṇam 2] anumāpayati] [NP5 [NP6 e 1] (tat2<pratibandhāt)]]

de Ita (*Pk410b.1*) bas na med na mi 'byung ba'i bras bu kho nas rgyu rjes su dpog par byed do. de la rag las pa yin pa'i phyir ro.

† Therefore, only an immediate effect implies a cause because of <its> relation to it <sc. the cause>.

‡ Therefore, only an inseparable effect enables the inference of a cause, because it is dependent on it.

§ intra-s anaphora

§ valence: causee argument missing for causative of “anumā”

§ “tat-pratibandha”: 7tp cpd (K 55.5)

§ “eva”: “only” (semantic restriction on AP denotation)

§§ Tibetan “med na mi 'byung ba'i”, here equivalent to “nāntarīyaka” usually translates “avinābhāvin”.

Apte has “inseparable” for “nāntarīyaka”. K55.4 glosses with “kāraṇa avinābhāvi eva”.

§§ Tibetan “rag las pa”, here used to translate “pratibandha”, has been used in previous passages to render “adhīna” and “ayatta”, both of which mean dependent. K55.5 glosses “tatpratibandhāt” as “tatra kāraṇa āyattatvāt”.

§§ Tibetan places equivalent of “eva” equivalent of “kāryam” rather than after “nāntarīyakam”. But K55.4 confirms placement of “eva” after “nāntarīyakam” and contrasts it with “apratibaddham” (55.5).

12.28 G10.06; P178.19

na anyad vipakṣe adarśane api.

[S [ADV na] [NP1s [AP1 anyat] E1 1] [VP E2] [AC [NP7 [NP7 vipakṣe] [NP6 e 1] (a-darśane) [PRT api] [PC7 0]]]]

gzhan (*D266a.7*) ni mi mthun pa'i phyogs la ma mthong ba yang ma yin no.

† No other <kind of effect> does, even if there is no observation <of it> in the vipakṣa.

‡ The contrary kind [of effect] does not, even though there is no observation of it in the dissimilar subject.

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ ellipsis: E1 is head of NP1s in last clause; E2 is its VP

§ intra-s anaphora

12.29 G10.06; P178.20

sarvadarśino hi darśanavyāvṛtṭiḥ sarvatrābhāvaṃ gamayet.

[S [NP6 (sarva<darśinaḥ)] [CNJ hi] [NP1s (darśana<vyāvṛtṭiḥ)] [VP [NP2 [NP7 sarvatra] abhāvam] gamayet]]

thams cad gzigs pa'i (*Pk410b.2*) gzigs pa logs ni, thams cad na med pa gro bar byed do.

† Only for him who has seen everything, might the exclusion of <something's> observation make known <its> absence everywhere,

‡ It is only the failure of one who sees everything to observe something that would make its absence in all places known.

§Secondary predication: in yathā phrase

§topic genitive: NP6 in MC can be construed with “gam”

§valence: causee argument missing for causative of “gam”

§“hi”: see Apte dictionary entry (4) or Apte para 304 (4)

§§Translation of “hi” into Tibetan does not suggest the usage described in Apte para 304 (4). Tibetan usage suggests rather usage in Apte dictionary entry 3.

§§“sarvadarśin” is translated as “thams cad gzigs”, an honourific form usually reserved for referring to the Buddha.

12.30 10.06; P178.20

kvacit tathā dṛṣṭānām api deśakālasaṃskārabhedenānyathādarśanād. yathāmalakyaḥ kṣīrāvasekena madhuraphalā bhavanti. na caivaṃ bahulaṃ dṛśyante.

[NP5 [NP6 [NP7 (kva-cit)] [ADV tathā] dṛṣṭānām [PRT api]] [NP3 ((deśa+kāla+saṃskāra)<bhedena)] [ADV anyathā] darśanāt [S [CNJ yathā] [NP1s āmalakyaḥ] [VP [NP3 (kṣīra<avasekena)] [AP1 (madhura;phalāḥ)-B] bhavanti]]] [S [ADV na] [CNJ ca] [NP1s E] [VP [AP evam] [ADV bahulam] dṛśyante]]]

la la na de ltar mthong ba rnam kyang dus dang 'du bya ba'i khyad par las gzhan du snang ba'i phyir te, dper na skyu ru ra'i shing dag (*D266b.1*) 'o mas bcus (*Pk410b.3*) na 'bras bu mngar po chags la, phal cher ni de ltar mi snang ba lta bu'o.

† because even things observed to be one way in one place are observed to be otherwise <elsewhere> due to differences in time, place, and cultivation, as when myrobalan trees become sweet-fruited by being watered with milk.

‡ Because even those things that are observed in a particular manner in one place are observed to be otherwise owing to a difference in location, time and preparation. For example, myrobalan trees become sweet-fruited by being sprinkled with milk, but they are not usually seen to be like this.

§yathā clause: introduces an instance (“as when”)

§“tathā”: why is it not “anyathā”; see K 55.20-21

§ secondary predication: in yathā clause

§ “tathā”: why is it not “anyathā”; see K 55.20-21

§ ellipsis: E is NP1s of yathā clause

§ inter-s anaphora: “evam”'s antecedent is predicate of yathā clause

§ secondary predication

12.31 G10.10; P178.22

tanaivaṃ syād yuktam vaktum, mādrśo vaktā rāgīti
rāgotpattipratyayaviśeṣeṇātmadarśanāyonīśomanaskāreṇa yogāt.

[S [CNJ tena] [ADV evam] [VP syāt [AP1 yuktam [IC [VP vaktum [S [NP1s [AP1 mādrśaḥ] vaktā 1] [VP 0 [AP1 rāgī]] [PRT iti]]]] [NP5 [NP6 e 1] [NP3 [NP3 ((rāga<utpatti)<pratyaya)<viśeṣeṇa)] ((ātma<darśana)<(a-(yoniśaḥ<manaskāreṇa)))] yogāt]]]]

des na 'di skad du bdag lta bu'i smra ba po ni 'dod chags can yin no zhes brjod par rigs par 'gyur te, 'dod chags skye ba'i rkyen gyi (^{Pk410b.4}) khyad par bdag tu lta ba dang, tshul bzhin (^{D266b.2}) ma yin pa yid la byed pa dang ldan pa'i phyir ro.

† So, for this reason, it would be apt to say that a speaker like me is impassioned, because he is endowed with misguided thought in the form of a belief that the self exists, which is a special cause for the arising of passion.

‡ So for that reason it would be correct to say “a speaker like me is impassioned,” provided that he is endowed with disorderly thinking in the form of belief in a self, which is the specific causal factor through which passion arises.

§ copula: overt: pleonastic: subjectless

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

§ apposition: first NP3 to second NP3

§ intra-s anaphora

§§ The Tibetan also has “iti” following “rāgī” and construes ablative clause as the reason why it would be correct to make the statement.

§§ Karṇakagomin [p.55, last line] says that “ātmadarśanāyoniśomanaskāra” may be construed either as a dvandva or as a karmadhāraya samāsa. The Tibetan translators construe it as a dvandva samāsa and have “rāgotpattipratyayaviśeṣeṇa” in simple apposition to it.

12.32 G10.12; P178.23

tadāpy apārthako vacanodāhāraḥ. tasmād vipakṣe 'drṣṭir ahetuḥ.

[S [ADV tadā [PRT api]] [VP 0 [AP1 apārthakaḥ]] [NP1s (vacana<udāhāraḥ)]]

[S [CNJ tasmāt] [NP1s [NP7 vipakṣe] (a-drṣṭiḥ)] [VP 0 [NP1 (a-hetuḥ)]]]

de'i tshe yang smra ba dpe brjod pa ni don med de, de'i phyir mi mthun pa'i phyogs la ma mthong ba ni gtan (^{Pk410b.5}) tshigs su mi rung ngo.

† Even then the example of speech is pointless. Therefore, non-observation <of the ground> in the vipakṣa does not provide grounds <for inference>.

‡ Even in that case, citing the example of the act of speaking is of no use; therefore, non-observation [of the evidence] in a dissimilar subject does not count as evidence.

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

13 G10.13; P179.1 D266b.2

na cādarśanamātreṇa vipakṣe 'vyabhicāritā
sambhāvvyabhicāratvāt sthālitaṇḍulapākavat.

[S [ADV na] [CNJ ca] [NP3 ((a-darśana)<mātreṇa) [NP7 vipakṣe]] [NP1s (a-vyabhicāritā)] [NP5 ((sambhāvya<vyabhicāra)B-tvāt)] [(((sthālī<taṇḍula)<pāka)-vat)]]]

mi mthun phyogs la ma mthong ba. tsam gyis 'khrul pa med pa min.
'khrul pa srid pa ^(D266b.3) can nyid phyir. phru ba'i 'bras ni tshos pa bzhin.

† No non-deviation <of something> obtains through <its> mere non-observation in the vipakṣa, because <its> deviation is possible, as is exemplified by the cooking of rice in a pot.

‡ And it is not that the [evidence's] not being erratic is [established] through nothing more than its not being observed in a dissimilar subject, because its being erratic is possible like the cooking of rice in a cauldron.

§ possible donkey anaphora: see previous comment.

§ bv cpd:

§ null anaphora: K56.8-9 treats NP5 cpd as a bv cpd, which is otherwise unmotivated

§§ Tibetan treats sambhāvya-vyabhicāra as a bv cpd.

13.1 G10.15: P179.03

na hi bahulaṃ pakvadarśane 'pi sthālyantargamanamātreṇa pākaḥ sidhyati.
vyabhicāradarśanāt.

[S [ADV na] [CNJ hi] [AC [NP7 [ADV bahulam] (pakva<darśane)] [PC7 0 [PRT api]]] [NP3 ((sthālī<antargamana)<mātreṇa)] [NP1s pākaḥ] [VP _ sidhyati] [NP5 (vyabhicāra<darśanāt)]]]

mang po zhiḡ tshos pa mthong du ^(Pk410b.6) zin kyang phru ba'i nang du 'dug pa tsam
gyis tshos par mi 'grub ste, 'khrul pa mthong ba'i phyir ro.

† For, even if <the grains of rice> are observed, for the most part, to be cooked, <their> mere inclusion in the pot does not establish their being cooked, because of the observation of deviation.

‡ For even if one observes that [grains] are mostly cooked, it is not that the fact of being cooked is established by nothing more than being inside the cauldron, because one does observe aberrations.

§ cpd intrusion: "bahulam" wrt "pakva" (Sanskrit reconstructed from Tibetan takes "bahulam" as a secondary predicate)

§§ "bahulam" and its counterpart in the Tibetan may be adverbs.

§ left extraposition from VP of NP3 within MC, except ADV, CNJ, and AC

§ possible null anaphora: argument to NP1s and argument of NP3

§ possible donkey anaphora: see previous comment.

13.2 G10.16; P179.03

evaṃ tu syād evaṃ svabhāvā etatsamānapākahetavaḥ pakvā iti.

[S [VP [AP evam] [CNJ tu] syāt] [S [NP1s (evam<svabhāvāḥ)-B [AP1
(((etat<samāna)<pāka)<hetavaḥ)-B]] [VP 0 [AP1 pakvāḥ]] [PRT iti]]]

'di ltar 'di lta bu'i rang bzhin la, 'di dang tshogs [⇒ tshos] pa'i rgyu 'dra ba can dag ni
tshos (*D266b.4*) so zhes bya bar ni (*Pk410b.7*) rung ngo.

† But it might be the case that <grains> with the same nature and the same cooking
causes <as those which are uncooked> are cooked.

‡ But it may be that those [grains] having the same natural properties and having the
same causes of cooking as these [observed grains] are cooked.

§ copula: overt: pleonastic: subjectless

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

§ bv cpd: NP

§ possible cataphor: first “evam” ’s antecedent is second S

§§ Tibetan syntax confirms that antecedent for “evam” is second S. Tibetan embeds the second S: evam S2
iti syāt.

§ unrecoverable denotation: for “evam” and “etat”

13.3 G10.17; P179.04

anyathā tu śeṣavad etad anumānaṃ vyabhicāri.

[S [ADV anyathā] [CNJ tu] [NP1s [AP1 śeṣa-vat] [AP1 etat] anumānam] [VP 0
[AP1 vyabhicāri]]]

de lta ma yin na ni rjes su dpag pa de lhag ma dang ldan pa'i 'khrul pa can yin no.

† Otherwise, however, this inference, being deficient, is deviant.

‡ But otherwise this inference, being deficient, is erratic.

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

§ counter-anaphora: anyathā

§ appositive reason: “śeṣavat” wrt “vyabhicāri”

§§ Tibetan apparently construes “anumāna” as subject, “śeṣavat vyabhicārin” as predicate.

13.4 ¶ G10.18; P179.06

kiṃ punar etac śeṣavat.

M7

[S [ADV kim] [CNJ punar] [NP1s etat] [VP 0 [AP1 śeṣa-vat]]]

yang lhag ma dang ldan pa zhes bya ba 'di ci zhig ce na.

† Still, why is this <inference> deficient?

‡ But why is this [inference] deficient?

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

14 G10.19; P179.07 D266b.4

**yasyādarśanamātreṇa vyatirekaḥ pradarśyate
tasya saṁśayahetutvāc cheṣavat tad udāhṛtam.**

[S [RC [NP6 yasya 1] [NP3 ((a-darśana)<mātreṇa) 2] [NP1s _ vyatirekaḥ] [VP _ pradarśyate]] [NP5 [NP6 tasya 1] (saṁśaya<hetutvāt)] [AP1 śeṣa-vat] [NP1s tad] [VP _ udāhṛtam]]

gang zhig ma mthong ba tsam gyis. ldog pa rab tu ston ^(Pk410b.8) byed pa.
de ni the tshom rgyu yin phyir. de la ^(D266b.5) lhag ma ldan zhes brjod.

† It is called deficient, because that whose contra-concomitance is shown through mere non-observation is grounds for doubt,

‡ That whose dissociation is shown through nothing more than non-observation is called deficient, because it is a cause of uncertainty.

§ left extraposition from NP1s of NP6 (rel pron) within RC: i.e., WH movementP

§ left extraposition from VP of NP3 within RC, except extraposed NP6 (rel pron)

§ left extraposition from VP of AP1 (secondary predicate) within MC, except RC and NP5

§ intra-s anaphora: “yat” construed with both “tat”. K (58.6-7) has a parallel where “yat” is construed with second “tat”. K (57.2) links “yat” with only the first “tat”.

§ possible landing site violation: AP extraposition from predicate AP

§ secondary predication

14.1 G10.21; P179.09

sa tasya vyatireko na niścita iti vipakṣe vṛttir āśaṅkyeta.
vyatirekasādhanaśyādarśanamātrasya saṁśayahetutvāt.

[S [NP1s [AP1 saḥ] [NP6 tasya] vyatirekaḥ] [ADV na] [VP niścitaḥ]]

[S [PRT iti] [NP1s [NP7 vipakṣe] vṛttiḥ] [VP āśaṅkyeta] [NP5 [NP6 (vyatireka<sādhanaśya)] [NP6 ((a-darśana)<mātrasya)] (saṁśaya<hetutvāt)]]]

de'i ldog pa de ni ma nges pas mi mthun pa'i phyogs la 'jug par the tshom za bar
'gyur te, ldog pa sgrub pa ma mthong ba tsam ^(Pk411a.1) ni the tshom gyi rgyu yin
pa'i phyir ro.

† The contra-concomitance belonging to it is not ascertained. So, one must be uncertain < whether or not > the hetu occurs in the vipakṣa, because the establishment of contra-concomitance which consists in mere non-observation is grounds for doubt.

‡ Since its dissociation is ascertained, its residence in a dissimilar subject must be called into doubt, because the method of establishing dissociation that consists of nothing more than non-observation is a cause of uncertainty.

§ inter-s anaphora: “tat” ’s antecedent is previous correlative

§ appositive: NP6 wrt NP6

14.2 G10.22; P179.10

na sarvānupalabdhir gamikā.

[S [ADV na] [NP1s [AP1 sarvā] anupalabdhīḥ] [VP 0 [AP1 gamikā]]]

mi dmigs pa thams cad ni rtogs par byed pa ma yin no.

† Not every <kind of> non-apprehension leads to knowledge.

‡ For not every non-apprehension is indicative.

§§ P reads *na hi sarvānupalabhir gāmikā*. Tibetan confirms *hi*.

14.3 ¶ G10.23; P179.11

tasmād ekanivṛtṭyā 'nyanivṛttim icchatā tayoh kaścit svabhāvapratibandho apy eṣṭavyaḥ.

[S [CNJ tasmāt] [NP3 e [PC3 [NP2 [NP3 (eka1 <nivṛtṭyā) (anya2 <nivṛttim)] icchatā]]] [NP1s [NP6 tayoh 1,2] [AP1 (kaḥ-cit)] (svabhāva <pratibandhaḥ) [PRT api]] [VP - eṣṭavyaḥ]]

de'i phyir gcig log ^(D266b.6) pas gzhan ldog par 'dod pas ni de gnyis rang bzhin ^(Pk411a.2) 'brel pa 'ga' zhig kyang 'dod par bya dgos so.

† Therefore, one who accepts the exclusion of one thing through the exclusion of another must accept some natural relation also between them.

‡ Therefore, one admitting the ruling out of one thing through the ruling out of another must also admit some natural connection between them.

§ left extraposition from VP of NP3 within MC, except CNJ

§ intra-s anaphora: split antecedent

§§ Tibetan auxiliary verb *dgos* indicates necessity or compulsion.

14.4 G10.24; P179.12

anyathā 'gamako hetuḥ syāt.

[S [ADV anyathā] [AP1 (a-gamaḥ)] [NP1s hetuḥ] [VP - syāt]]

de lta ma yin na gtan tshigs go bar byed pa ma yin par 'gyur ro.

† Otherwise, a ground would not lead to knowledge.

‡ Otherwise, evidence would be nonindicative.

§ copula: overt: predicational: NP1s VP

§ counter-anaphora: anyathā

§ left extraposition from VP of AP1 within MC, except ADV

15 G10.26; P179.13 D266b.6

hetos triṣv api rūpeṣu niścayaḥ tena varṇitaḥ asiddhaviṣparītarthavyabhicārivipakṣataḥ.

[S [NP1s [NP6 hetoḥ] [NP7 [AP7 triṣu api] rūpeṣu] niścayaḥ] [VP [NP3 tena] varṇitaḥ] [NP5 (((a-siddha)+(viparīta < artha)+vyabhicāri) < vipakṣataḥ)]]

gtan tshigs kyi ni tshul gsum la'ang. de yis ma grub bzlog don dang.
(D266b.7, [Pk411a.3) 'khrul pa can gyi gnyen por ni. nges pa brjod par mdzad pa yin.

† Ascertainment of the ground in all three forms <i.e., that it satisfies all three criteria> therefore is stated as hostile to any property which is unestablished, contrary, or deviant.

‡ Therefore, ascertainment of all three characteristics is portrayed as an antidote to what is unattested, has an opposite conclusion or is erratic.

§ discussed in Steinkellner (1988, p. 1429)

§§ Karṇakagomin supplies “kāraṇena” after “tena”

§§ “api” after number in sense of “all” (Apte usage 4). Tibetan fails to reflect this usage.

§§ Karṇakagomin says that the suffix *tasi* is used in sense of third case: *vipakṣatas* ⇒ *vipakṣeṇa*. This use of third case with “varṇita” to indicate secondary predication is confirmed by the syntax of the Tibetan.

15.1 G10.28; P179.15

na hy asati pratibandhe 'nvayavyatirekaniścayo 'sti. tena tam eva darśayan niścayam āha.

[S [ADV na] [CNJ hi] [AC [PC7 (a-sati)] [NP7 pratibandhe]] [NP1s ((anvaya+vyatireka)<niścayaḥ)] [VP asti]]

[S [CNJ tena] [NP1s e [PC1 [NP2 tam [PRT eva]] darśayan]] [VP [NP2 niścayam] āha]]

'brel pa med par ni rjes su 'gro ba dang ldog pa nges pa med de, des na de nyid ston par mdzad pa ni nges pa bshad pa yin no.

† For there is no ascertainment of concomitance and contra-concomitance without a relation. For this reason, to indicate the <relation> itself, one mentions ascertainment.

‡ For there is no ascertainment of association and dissociation when there is no connection. Therefore, pointing just that out, he mentioned ascertainment.

§ copula: overt: existential: NP1s VP

§ inter-s anaphora

§ “eva”: “itself” (NP emphasis)

§§ The Tibetans use one of two particles to render Sanskrit “eva”; *nyid* gives simple emphasis, while *kho na* indicates restriction. Here the Tibetan has “de nyid” for “tam eva”.

15.2 G11.01; P179.15

tatrānvayasya niścayena viruddhatatpakṣyāṇām nirāsaḥ.

[S [ADV tatra] [NP1s [NP3 [NP6 anvayasya] niścayena] [NP6 ((viruddha1)+(tat1<pakṣāṇām))] nirāsaḥ] [VP 0]]

(*Pk411a.4*) de la rjes su 'gro ba nges pas ni 'gal ba dang de'i phyogs dang mthun pa rnam bsal (*D267a.1*) lo.

† Now, there is the rejection of contrary properties and ones like them <as grounds> through ascertainment of concomitance.

‡ Concerning that, ascertainment of association eliminates [evidence] that is incompatible and [evidence that is] similar thereto.

§ intra-s anaphora

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ emend “pakṣya” to “pakṣa” (Tibetan uses same translation here and below)

15.3 G11.02; P179.16

vyatirekasyānaikāntikasya tat-pakṣasya ca śeṣavadādeḥ.

[S [NP1s [NP3 [NP6 vyatirekasya] E1] [NP6 [NP6 anaikāntikasya 1] [NP6 (tat1<pakṣasya)] [CNJ ca]] [NP6 (śeṣa-vat-ādeḥ)] E2]]

ldog pas ni ma nges pa dang de'i phyogs dang mthun pa lhag ma dang ldan pa la sogs pa'o.

† <And there is> the elimination of indecisive properties and ones like them, such as deficient properties, <as grounds> through certainty about contra-concomitance.

‡ [Ascertainment] of dissociation [eliminates] ambiguous [evidence] and such things as deficient [evidence that is] similar thereto.

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ ellipsis: E1 is head of NP3 in last clause; E2 is head of NP1s in last clause

§§ The Tibetan translation handles the ellipsis of “vyatirekasya [niścayena]” by putting an instrumental case marker after the word for “vyatireka”.

§§ The Tibetan for “tatpakṣasya” is the same as the Tibetan for “tatpakṣyāṇām” in the preceding sentence.

Despite Gnoli's appeal to the principle of *lectio difficilior*, there seems to reason to prefer his reading

(*tatpakṣya*) over Pañḍeya's (*tatpakṣa*) in the preceding sentence.

§§ Note that Karṇakagomin offers definition here of śeṣavad.

15.4 G11.03; P180.01

dvayor ity ekasiddhapraṭiṣedhaḥ.

[S [NP1s [NP3 dvayor] [PRT iti]] ((eka<siddha)<praṭiṣedhaḥ)] [VP 0]]

gnyi ga la zhes bya ba (*Pk411a.5*) ni gcig la grub pa dga pa yin no.

† The expression “for both” prohibits establishment for <only> one.

‡ The expression “of both” is a denial of what is established by [only] one.

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ unrecoverable citation

§§ Include note from Gnoli, citation from Prajñākaragupta, and comments of Karṇakagomin (58.08) in Haygil commentary.

15.5 G11.03; P180.01

prasiddhavadanena sandigdghayoḥ śeṣavadasādhāraṇayoḥ sapakṣavipakṣayor api.

[S [NP1s [NP3 (prasiddha<vacanena)] [NP6 sandigdghayoḥ [AP6 (śeṣa-vat+(a-sādhāraṇayoḥ)) [NP7 (sapakṣa+vipakṣayoḥ) [PRT api]]]] E]]

rab tu grub pa zhes smos pas mthun pa'i phyogs dang, mi mthun pa'i phyogs dag
(*D267a.2*) la lhaḡ ma dang ldan pa dang, thun mong ma yin pa'i the tshom za ba dag
kyang (*Pk411a.6*) ngo.

† The expression “established” prohibits doubtful properties which are deficient and undistributed with respect to the sapakṣa and vipakṣa.

‡ The expression “attested” [denies] deficient or unique [evidence that is] dubious concerning similar and dissimilar subjects.

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ ellipsis: E is head of cpd of the head of NP1s in last clause

§ unrecoverable citation

§§ Amazing trivium: this is the first of only three times that the word “sapakṣa” occurs in the PVSV.

§§ The Tibetan translation suggests a somewhat different analysis than that given at K58.09ff.

16 G11.05; P180.03 D267a.2

**anyathā hy asati pratibandhe adarśana-mātreṇa vyatireke
vyabhicāri-vipakṣeṇa vaidharmya-vacanam ca yat.**

[S [ADV anyathā] [CNJ hi] [AC [AC [PC7 (a-sati)] [NP7 pratibandhe]] [NP7 [NP3 ((a-darśana)<mātreṇa)] vyatireke] [PC7 0]] [NP1s [NP3 (vyabhicāri<vipakṣeṇa)] (vaidharmya<vacanam) [CNJ ca] [AP1 yat]]]]

de lta ma yin te 'brel ba med par ma mthong ba tsam gyis ldog na ni, 'khrul pa can gyi
gnyen por ni, mi mthun chos brjod gang yin pa.

† For otherwise, if contra-concomitance <is established> through mere non-observation, without a relation, then the statement of contra-concomitance <would be of no use> in excluding deviant properties.

‡ For otherwise, if dissociation [is established] through nothing more than non-observation, without a connection [between the evidence and what is established through it], then the expression of dissimilarity [would be of no use] as an antidote to erratic [evidence].

§ apposition: AC wrt “anyathā”
 § incomplete sentence: K (58.15) supplies “tat apārthakam”
 § “ca” does not fit

16.1 G11.07; P180.5

yad āha. eṣa tāvan nyāyo yad ubhayam vaktavyam viruddhānaikāntikapratipakṣeṇa iti. sādharmyavacanam viruddhapratipakṣeṇa. vaidharmyavacanam anaikāntikapratipakṣeṇa.

[S [VP [NP2 yat] āha] [S [NP1s [AP1 eṣaḥ [PRT tāvat]] nyāyaḥ] [S [CMP yat] [NP1s ubhayam] [VP vaktavyam [NP3 ((viruddha+anaikāntika)<pratipakṣeṇa)]]] [PRT iti]]]

[S [NP1s (sādharmya<vacanam)] [VP E [NP3 (viruddha<pratipakṣeṇa)]]]

[S [NP1s (vaidharmya <vacanam)] [VP E [NP3 (anaikāntika<pratipakṣeṇa)]]]

re zhig ’gal ba dang ma nges pa’i gnyen por gnyi (*D267a.3*), [*Pk411a.7*] ga brjod par bya ba gang yin pa ’di ni rigs so zhes bshad pa gang yin pa ste, chos mi mthun pa smos pa ni ma nges pa’i gnyen por ro.

† which he stated as follows: first, the rule is that both should be stated to exclude contradicted and indeterminate properties: the statement of concomitance to exclude contradicted properties; the statement of contra-concomitance to exclude indeterminate properties.

‡ Which [Dignāga] stated as follows: “First, the rule is that both should be expressed as an antidote to incompatible and ambiguous [evidence],” the expression of similarity as an antidote to [evidence] incompatible [with the conclusion], the expression of dissimilarity as an antidote to ambiguous [evidence].

§§ Note in Haygil commentary that Gnoli traces this quotation to Nyāyamukha.

§ incomplete sentence: gloss

§The second sentence does not occur in the Gnoli edition,§§ but is mentioned in a footnote as occurring in one of his manuscripts. It is also missing in the Tibetan translation.

§ ellipsis (gapping): E is head of last VP in last clause ellipsis.

§ E is head of last VP in last clause

Verse 16cd

16.2 G11.10; P180.7

yady adrṣṭīphalam tac ca
 yadi tena vipakṣe ’darśanaṃ khyāpyate.
tad anukte api gamyate.

[S [S [CNJ yadi] [VP 0 [AP1 ((a-drṣṭi)<phalam)-B]] — [S [CNJ yadi] [NP3 tena] [NP1s [NP7 vipakṣe] (a-darśanam) 1] [VP _ khyāpyate]] — [NP1s tat 2] [CNJ ca]] [NP1s tat 1] [AC [NP7 e 2] [PC7 (an-ukte) [PRT api]]] [VP gamyate]]

gal te ma mthong 'bras can te, gal te des mi mthun pa'i chos la ma ^(Pk411a.8) mthong ba ston par byed na, de ma smos kyang rtogs par 'gyur.

† And if it <i.e., the statement of contra-concomitance> is the result of non-observation — if non-observation in the vipakṣa is communicated by it, then it <i.e., the non-observation> is known, even without <its> being stated.

‡ And if that [statement of dissimilarity] has the outcome of non-observation—that is, if non-observation in a dissimilar subject is communicated by it—then that [non-observation] is understood even if not stated.

§ copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s

§ AC without overt subject

§ intra-s anaphora

§ inter-s anaphora

§ left extraposition from VP of NP3 within MC, except CNJ

§ inter-s anaphora

§ incomplete sentence: gloss

§§ Tibetan renders 'adrṣṭiphalam' as bahuvrīhi, which seems to make sense here.

16.3 G11.13; P180.10

na hi tasya prāg darśanabhrāntir yā vacanena nivartyeta.

[S [ADV na] [CNJ hi] [NP6 tasya] [ADV prāk] [NP1s (darśana <bhrāntiḥ) 1] [RC [NP1s yā 1] [VP [NP3 vacanena] nivartyeta]]]

de la ^(D267a.4) sngon brjod pas log par 'gyur ba mthong ba'i 'khrol pa gang yin pa ni med do.

† For there is no error in someone's previous observation which might be excluded by the statement <of contra-concomitance>.

‡ For there is no error from previous observation of it that would be averted by the expression [of dissimilarity].

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ intra-s anaphora: link between "yā" and NP1s

§ unrecoverable denotation: "tasya" refers to any interlocutor (K 59.5); alternatively, antecedent is the implicit agent of preceding "gamyate"

§§ K59.05 glosses "tasya" with "pratipādyasya", that which is made communicated (rather than interlocutor). So "tasya" expresses karman rather than kartṛ of "darśana".

§ cpd intrusion: NP6 and ADV wrt "darśana"

§§ The Tibetan translation is bizarre; it is difficult to see how it was arrived at.

16.4 G11.13; P180.10

smṛtir vācādarśane kriyata iti cet.

[S [NP1s smṛtiḥ [NP7 e 1]] [VP [NP3 vācā [NP7 (a-darśane) 1]] kriyate] [CNJ iti cet]]

gal te tshig gis ma mthong ba la dran par byed zhe na.

† It might be argued that a statement of non-observation brings about a recollection <sc., to that effect>.

‡ It might be argued that recollection of the non-observation is triggered by speech.

§implicit argument: Bhartrhari's rule

§§ Evidence of movement: Tibetan has “adarśane” as object of “smṛti” rather than of “vācā”.

16.5 G12.01; P180.10

darśanaṃ khalv apratīyamānam anaṅgam iti yuktaṃ tatra smaraṇādhānam. adarśanaṃ tu darśanābhāvaḥ. sa darśanena bādhyate.

[S [NP1s darśanam [ADV khalu] [PC1 [VP (a-pratīyamānam)]]] [VP 0 [AP1 (an-aṅgam)-B]]] [S [CNJ iti] [VP 0 [AP1 yuktaṃ [NP7 tatra]]] [NP1s (smaraṇa <adhānam)]]

[S [NP1s (a-darśanam)] [CNJ tu] [VP 0 [NP1 (darśana<abhāvaḥ)]]] [S [NP1s saḥ] [VP [NP3 darśanena] bādhyate]]

(*Pk411b.1*) mthong ba ma rtogs pa ni yan lag ma yin pas de la ni dran pa gzhag par rigs na, ma mthong ba ni mthong ba med pa yin te, de la ni (*D267a.5*) mthong bas gnod par 'gyur ro.

† Certainly, an observation of which one is unaware is not a factor. So, the effecting of a recollection is apt in this case <sc., the case of an observation>. But non-observation is an absence of observation. It <sc., the absence of observation> is contravened by observation.

‡ Surely an observation that is not being noticed is not a factor, so evoking a memory is appropriate in that case. But non-observation is the absence of observation. It is countered by observation.

§copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

§copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s

§inter-s anaphoras

§copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

16.6 G12.03; P180.12

tadabhāve tu siddha eva ity apārthakaṃ tatsiddhaye vacanaṃ.

[S [AC [NP7 (tat<abhāve)] [PC7 0]] [CNJ tu] [NP1s E] [VP [AP1 siddhaḥ] 0 [PRT eva]]]

[S [CNJ iti] [VP 0 [AP1 apārthakam]] [NP1s [NP4 (tat<siddhaye)] vacanam]]
de med na grub pa kho na yin pas de ^(Pk411b.2) grub par bya ba'i phyir brjod pa don
med do.

† But if there is an absence of it <sc., observation>, then it <sc., the
non-observation> is indeed established. So, a statement to establish it <sc., the
non-observation> is pointless.

‡ But since [the absence of observation] is already established in the absence of that
[observation of the evidence in a dissimilar subject], an expression for the purpose of
establishing that [absence of observation] is of no use.

§ inter-s anaphora

§ copula: covert: predicational: indeterminate

§ “eva”: “indeed” (V emphasis): thus, covert copula

§ ellipsis: E is NP1s of previous clause

§§ All material in square brackets is supplied from Kaṇakagomin 59.10–15

§ inter-s anaphora

16.7 G12.04; P180.13

na vai anupalambhamānasya tāvatā na astīti bhavati tadarthaṃ vacanam iti cet.

[S [ADV na [PRT vai]] [NP6 e [PC6 anupalambhamānasya [NP2 e 1]] 2] [NP3
tāvatā] [NP1s [S [NP1s e 1] [ADV na] [VP asti] [PRT iti]]] [VP bhavati]] [S [VP
0 [AP1 (tat2<artham)-B]] [NP1s vacanam] [CNJ iti cet]]]

gal te mi dmigs pa'i tshé de tsam gyis med do zhes bya ba ma yin pas de'i phyir brjod
do zhe na.

† It might be argued that someone not apprehending something, to that extent, has not
<ascertained> that it does not exist. The statement <of vyatireka> is for his sake.

‡ It might be argued that [a person], to the extent that he is not apprehending
something, has no [knowledge] that it is not present, so a statement is for his sake.

§ copula: overt: existential: unclear

§ left extraposition from VP of NP6 within its clause

§ possible clausal possession: treated as “for NP6”

§ intra-s anaphora: antecedent of “tāvat” unclear. §§ Tibetan renders it as temporal adverb: “mi dmigs pa'i
tshé de tsam gyis”

§ valence: “anupalambhamāna” seems to need an object

§ donkey anaphora: between null arguments

§ “iti”: marks sentential subject

§ “iti”: K 59.17 supplies “niścaya”

17 G12.06; P180.14 D267a.5

na ca nāstīti vacanāt tan nāsty eva yathā yadi
nāstī sa khyāpyate nyāyas tadā nāstīti gamyate

[S [ADV na] [CNJ ca] [NP5 [S [NP1s e 1] [ADV na] [VP asti] [PRT iti]] vacanāt] [NP1s tat 1] [ADV na] [VP asti [PRT eva]] [S [CNJ yathā] [S [CNJ yadi] [S [NP1s e 2] [ADV na] [VP asti]] [AP1 saḥ] [VP khyāpyate] [NP1s _ _ nyāyaḥ]] [CNJ tadā] [NP1s [S [NP1s e 2] [ADV na] [VP asti] [PRT iti]]] [VP gamyate]]]

med ces bya ba 'i tshig gis kyang, de med kho na min gal te.

(D267a.6), [Pk411b.3] ji ltar med rigs de brjod na, de tshe med ces bya bar rtogs.

† It is not the case that because of a statement that something does not exist it indeed does not exist, so that, if the rule for something's not existing is communicated, then it is known that it does not exist.

‡ And it is not that something is not present owing to the act of stating that it is not present. So, if the rule that it is not present is communicated, then it is understood that it is not present.

§ left extraposition from NP1s of S within its clause, except CNJ

§ left extraposition from NP1s of AP1 within its clause, except CNJ and extraposed clause

§ donkey anaphora: "tat"'s antecedent is covert subject of first "asti"

§ donkey anaphora: between null arguments "asti"

17.1 G12.08; P180.16

yady anupalabhamāno nāstīti na pratyeti vacanād api naiva pratyesyati. tad api hy anupalambham eva khyāpayati.

[S [S [CNJ yadi] [NP1s e [PC1 anupalambhamānaḥ [NP2 e 1]]]] [VP [S [NP1s e 1] [ADV na] [VP asti] [PRT iti]]] [ADV na] pratyeti]] [S [NP5 vacanāt [PRT api]] [ADV na [PRT eva]]] [VP E pratyesyati]]]

[S [NP1s tat [PRT api]] [CNJ hi] [VP [NP2 anupalambham [PRT eva]] khyāpayati]]

gal te ma dmigs pas med do ces bya bar mi rtogs na brjod pas kyang mi rtogs pa kho nar 'gyur te, de yang mi dmigs pa kho na brjod par ^(Pk411b.4) byed pa yin no.

† If one who is not apprehending <something> does not believe that it does not exist, then he will surely not believe it from a statement <to that effect> either. For it too communicates mere non-apprehension.

‡ If one who is not apprehending something does not believe that it is not present, then surely he will also not believe it from an expression; even that communicates nothing but non-apprehension.

§ copula: overt: existential: unclear

§ left extraposition from NP1s of S within its clause, except CNJ

§ left extraposition from NP1s of AP1 within its clause, except CNJ and extraposed clause

§ donkey anaphora: "tat"'s antecedent is covert subject of first "asti"

§ donkey anaphora: between null arguments "asti"

§ "eva": "indeed" (V emphasis)

§ yathā clause: result clause

§ ellipsis: E is iti-clause of previous clause

- §§ What is the sense of “pratyesyati”? Tibetan “rtogs” usually means to understand, to realize, to be sure
 § copula: overt: existential: unclear
 § ellipsis: E is iti-clause of previous clause
 § donkey anaphora: between null arguments
 § valence: “anupalambhamāna” seems to need an object
 § “eva”: emphatic after “na”
 § “api”: “either”

17.2 G12.09; P180.17

na caikānupalambho ’nyābhāvam sādhayaty atiprasaṅgāt.

[S [ADV na] [CNJ ca] [NP1s (eka<anupalambhaḥ)] [VP [NP2 (anya<abhāvam)] sādhayati] [NP5 (ati-prasaṅgāt)]]

gcig ma dmigs pas ni gzhan med pa sgrub ^(D267a.7) par byed pa yang ma yin te, ha ^(Pk411b.5) cang thal bar ’gyur ba’i phyir ro.

† And the non-apprehension of one thing does not establish the absence of something else, because of <the latter> being unwarranted.

‡ And the non-apprehension of one thing does not establish the absence of something else, because that is farfetched.

17.3 G12.10; P180.16

na ca tena nāstīti vacanāt tathā bhavaty atiprasaṅgāt.

M8

[S [ADV na] [CNJ ca] [NP5 [NP3 tena] [S [NP1s e 1] [ADV na] [VP āsti] [PRT iti]] vacanāt] [VP [ADV tathā] bhavati] [NP1s e 1] [NP5 (ati-prasaṅgāt)]]

des med do zhes brjod pas kyang de ltar ’gyur pa ma yin te, ha cang thal bar ’gyur ba’i phyir ro.

† Nor by his statement that something does not exist, does it become so, because of <the latter> being unwarranted.

‡ Nor from the expression by him that it is not present does it become so, because that is farfetched.

- § copula: overt: existential: indeterminate
 § copula: overt: predicational: indeterminate
 § inter-s anaphora: “tathā” ’s antecedent is previous sentence
 § unrecoverable denotation: for “tena”; K 60.12 supplies Dignāga.
 § donkey anaphora: between null arguments

17.4 G12.11; P181.01

tat kathaṃ vaidharṃyavacanenānaikāntikaparihāraḥ.

[S [CNJ tat] [ADV katham] [NP1s [NP3 (vaidharmya<vacanena)]
(anaikāntika<parihāraḥ)] [VP 0]]

de bas na ji ltar chos mi mthun pa smos pas ma nges pa spangs pa yin.

† How, then, does a statement of contra-concomitance exclude an indeterminate
<ground>?

‡ In that case, how does one eliminate ambiguous evidence by stating dissimilarity?

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

17.5 G12.12; P181.01

tasmād vyāvṛttim icchatā tatra nyāyo vaktavyaḥ yato 'sya vyāvṛttam iti bhavati.

[S [CNJ tasmāt] [NP3 [PC3 [NP2 [NP6 e 1] vyāvṛttim 2] icchatā] 4] [NP1s [NP7
tatra 2] nyāyaḥ 3] [VP -- vaktavyaḥ] [RC [NP5 yataḥ 3] [NP1s [NP6 asya 4] [S
[NP1s e 1] [VP vyāvṛttam] [PRT iti]] [VP bhavati]]]]

de lta bas na ldog par 'dod (^{D267b.1}) pas de la gang gis na 'di la ldog pa zhes bya bar
'gyur ba'i rigs (^{Pk411b.6}) pa brjod dgos so.

† Therefore, one who maintains that something is excluded <from the vipakṣa> must
state the rule for the exclusion, on account of which he has <ascertained> that it is
excluded.

‡ Therefore, one who acknowledges exclusion [of the evidence from dissimilar
subjects] must express the rule because of which [the knowledge] “it is excluded”
arises.

§ left extraposition from VP of NP3 within MC, except CNJ

§ intra-s anaphora

§ NP3 is antecedent for “asya”; K (60.16) supplies “pratipādyasya”

§§as above, this could mean “that which is to be explained or discussed” rather than “he who must be
convinced”.

§ null subject: its denotation is “sādhnam” according to K (60.17)

§ possible donkey anaphora

§ left extraposition from VP of NP6 within RC

§ copula: overt: existential: NP1s VP (possession)

§ “iti”: marks sentential subject

§ “iti”: K 60.17 supplies “niścaya”

17.6 ¶G12.14; P181.03

nanu tadabhāve 'nupalambhāt siddhā vyāvṛttiḥ.

[S [CNJ nanu] [NP5 [AC [NP7 (tat1<abhāve)] [PC7 0]] [NP6 e 1] anupalambhāt]
[VP 0 [AP1 siddhā]] [NP1s [NP6 e 1] vyāvṛttiḥ]]

de med pa la mi dmigs pas ldog pa grub pa ma yin nam zhe na.

† Is not something’s exclusion established from its non-apprehension when it <sc., the sādhyā> is absent?

‡ Is it not the case that, when something is absent, its exclusion is established from non-apprehension?

§ unrecoverable denotation: for “tat”; K (60.18) supplies “sādhyā”

§§ Donkey anaphora?

18 G12.15; P181.04 D267b.1

yady adrṣṭyā nivṛtṭiḥ syāc cheṣavad vyabhicāri kim.

yathā pakvāny etāni phalāni evamrasāni vā rūpāviśeṣād ekaśākhāprabhavatvād vā upayuktavad iti.

[S [S [CNJ yadi] [NP1s [NP3 (a-drṣṭyā)] nivṛtṭiḥ] [VP syāt]] [S [NP1s śeṣa-vat] [VP 0 [AP1 vyabhicāri]] [ADV kim] [S [CNJ yathā] [VP 0 [AP1 pakvāni]] [NP1s [AP1 etāni] phalāni] [AP1 (evam<rasāni)-B [CNJ vā]] [NP5 (rūpa<(a-viśeṣāt))] [NP5 ((eka<śākhā)<prabhavatvāt) [CNJ vā]] [(upayukta-vat)]] [PRT iti]]]

gal te ma mthong bas ldog ’gyur, ci ste lhag ldan ’khrul can yin. dper na ’bras bu ’di dag ni smin (*D267b.2*), [*Pk411b.7*] pa’am ro ’di bro ba yin te, gzugs khyad par med pa’i phyir ram, gcig las skyes pa’i phyir, zos ba dang ’dra’o zhes bya ba lta bu’o.

† If there were exclusion through non-observation, then why is a deficient <inference> deviant, as when these fruits are ripe or have such and such a flavor because they have the same color or grew from the same branch as those which were eaten?

‡ If dissociation [of the evidence from dissimilar subjects] were due to non-observation, then why is a deficient [inference] erratic? For example, [one says] “this fruit is ripe or has the same flavor, because there is no difference in visible properties or because they originated on the same branch as those which were eaten.”

§ copula: overt: existential: NP1s VP

§ copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s

§ copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s

§ disjunction

§ possible ellipsis

§ vat phrase

§ yathā clause: introduces an instance (“as when”)

§ Note that the protasis in the verse is not accurately formulated. It should say: “if exclusion were established through non-observation”.

§§ Variant readings: P has “upabhukta” for G’s “upayukta”; see G’s footnote. P omits “iti”. Tibetan supports the “iti” in G. Tibetan omits word for “śākhā”.

18.1 G12.17; P181.06

atrāpi vivakṣitāśeṣapakṣikaraṇe hetoḥ sādhyābhāve ’nupalambho ’stīti katham vyabhicāraḥ.

[S [NP7 atra [PRT api]] [AC [NP7 ((vivaṅkṣita<(a-śeṣa)<(pākṣī-karaṇe))] [PC7 0]] [NP1s [NP6 hetoḥ] [AC [NP7 (sādhyā<abhāve)] [PC7 0]] anupalambhaḥ] [VP asti]]

[S [CNJ iti] [ADV katham] [NP1s vyabhicāraḥ] [VP 0]]

'di la yang brjod par 'dod pa ma lus pa phyogs su byas na ^(Pk411b.8) bsgrub par bya ba med pa la gtan tshigs mi dmigs pa yod pas ^(D267b.3) ji ltar 'khrul pa yin.

† Even here, when all <else> of what is intended is made the pakṣa, there is non-apprehension of the grounds in the absence of the sādhyā. So, how is there deviation?

‡ In this case, too, when the entirety of what is intended is made the subject of an inference, there is non-apprehension on account of an absence of the evidence with the establishable [property], so how is there errancy?

§ copula: overt: existential: NP1s VP

§ inter-s anaphora: “atra”’s antecedent is example in last “yathā” phrase

§ “api”: “even” because the example argument is a patently bad inference

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

18.2 ¶G12.19; P181.07

pratyakṣabādhāśaṅkāvyabhicāra ity eke.

[S [S [VP 0 [NP1 ((pratyakṣa<bādhā)<āśaṅkā)]] [NP1s vyabhicāraḥ] [PRT iti]] [NP1s eke] [VP 0]]

kha cig na re mngon sum gyis gnod par dogs pa'i 'khrul pa ma yin no zhes zer ro.

† Some say that deviation consists in uncertainty as to whether or not there might be a contravening perception.

‡ Some people say that errancy consists in doubt about being countered by sensation.

§ copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§§ Variant readings: † follows P's reading: *pratyakṣabādhāśaṅkā vyabhicāra*. ‡ follows G's reading: *pratyakṣabādhāśaṅkāvyabhicāraḥ*. Tibetan supports G in reading this as a compound but suggests the analysis *pratyakṣabādhāśaṅkā-avyabhicāraḥ*, which is not supported by K61.11. K supports G and analyses it as a karmadhāraya compound.

§§ According to K, this passage refers to the view of Īśvarasena.

18.3 G12.19; P181.07

na. pakṣīkṛtaviṣaye 'bhāvāt.

[S [ADV na] E [NP5 [NP7 ((pākṣī-kṛta)<viṣaye)] [NP5 e] abhāvāt]]

ma yin te phyogs su ^(Pk412a.1) byas pa'i yul la med pa'i phyir ro.

† <This is> not <so> because there is none <i.e., no contravening perception> for an object taken as a pakṣa.

‡ This is not so, because [being contravened by sensation] is absent in the case of the subject matter that has been made the subject of inference.

§ ellipsis: E is embedded S in last clause

§ intra-s anaphora: antecedent of e is “pratyakṣa;bādhā” in G12.19

§ K61.14 explains that the subject of an inference is always something that is beyond the range of the senses, and therefore there cannot be a sensation of it: *pakṣīkṛto yo viśayaḥ parokṣas tatra pratyakṣabādhāyā abhāvāt.*

18.4 G12.20; P181.07

kadācid bhaved iti cet.

[S [ADV (kadā-cit)] E [VP bhavet] [CNJ iti cet]]

ci ste gal te na 'gyur ro zhe na.

† It might be argued that at some <other> time there could be <a contravening perception>.

‡ It might be argued that it may arise at some time.

§ copula: overt: existential: indeterminate

§ ellipsis: E is E of last clause

§§unclear: what such times might be like: K (61.15) also unclear: *na pravṛttena pratyakṣeṇa bādhāśaṅkā kintu kadācid gandhapratyakṣabādhāpakṣa iti cedāha.*

18.5 G12.20; P181.08

tathā śaṅkāyām atiprasaṅgaḥ. anyatrāpy abhāvaniyamābhāvāt.

[S [AC [PC7 0 [ADV tathā]] [NP7 āśaṅkāyām]] [NP1s (ati-prasaṅgaḥ)] [VP 0] [NP5 [NP7 anyatra [PRT api]] [NP6 e] ((abhāva<niyama)<abhāvāt)]]

de lta bus dgos (⇒ dogs) na ha cang thal bar 'gyur te, gzhan la yang med par ^(D267b.4) nges pa med pa'i phyir ro.

† If the uncertainty is of this kind, unwarranted conclusions obtain, because there is no restriction that there be no contravening perception also in cases other <than the pakṣa>.

‡ In such a case when there is expectation there is a farfetched conclusion, because there is no restriction of the absence [of sensations that counter the evidence] elsewhere.

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ inter-s anaphora: “tathā” ’s antecedent is “kadaa-cit” (K61.16)

§ intra-s anaphora: antecedent of e is “pratyakṣa;bādhā” in G12.19

§§ Variant reading in P: *tathāśaṅkāyāmatiprasaṅgo 'nyatrāpyabhāvaniyamābhāvāt.* Tibetan supports G.

K61.15–17: tathā kadācit pratyakṣabādhā bhaved ity āśānkāyām atiprasaṅgaḥ.
yasmad anyatrā bhimate hetau pratyakṣabādhāyā abhāvānīyamābhāvāt. na hi
sambandhā[na]bhyupagame parasya bādhāśānkā nivartata iti bhāvaḥ.

18.6 G12.21; P181.08

vṛtṭam pramāṇam bhādhakam. avṛttabādhane sarvatrānāśvāsaḥ.

[S [NP1s [AP1 vṛtṭam] pramāṇam] [VP 0 [AP1 bādhakam]]]

[S [AC [NP7 a-(vṛtta<bādhane)] [PC7 0]] [VP 0 [NP7 sarvatra]] [NP1s
(an-āśvāsaḥ)]]

tshad ma ^(Pk412a.2) zhugs pa gnod par byed pa yin gyi, ma zhugs par gnod na ni
thams cad la yid brtan du med do.

† An actual epistemic cognition is a contravener. If there is no contravention by an
actual <epistemic cognition>, then there is no confidence with respect to any
<ground yielding knowledge>.

‡ Actual knowledge is the means of countering. If the means of countering is through
what is not actual, then there is no guarantee anywhere [that is, there is no certainty
that any evidence yields knowledge].

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ negative polarity: “sarvatra”

§§ Tibetan syntax suggests that “avṛtta” patient rather than agent or instrument of “bādhane”, but K61.19
does not support this construal.

K61.18–21: tasmāt pratibandhān abhyupagamavādinā vṛtṭam pramāṇam bādhaka
meṣṭavyam. avṛttabādhane `pravṛttenaiva pramāṇena bādhane sarvatrānāśvāsaḥ
sarvatra hetau na syādāśvāso gamakatvaniścayaḥ. bādhakasya śaṃkya mānatvāt.
naivaṃ pratibandhavādināḥ sarvatra heāvanāśvāsaḥ sādhyapratibaddhe hetau
bādhakāśaṃkāyā apyabhāvāt.

18.7 ¶ G12.22; P181.10

vyatirekas tu siddha eva sādhanam iti tathābhāvānīścayam apekṣate.

[S [NP1s vyatirekaḥ [CNJ tu] [AP1 siddhaḥ] [PRT eva]] [VP 0 [NP1 sādhanam]]]

[S [CNJ iti] [VP [NP2 ((tathā<bhāva)<niścayam)] apekṣate]]

ldog pa ni grub pa kho na bsgrub pa yin te, de'i phyir de lta bu'i ngo bo ni nges pa la
lto so.

† But only established contra-concomitance establishes <anything>. So, one requires
ascertainment that such is the case.

‡ But only a dissociation that is established is a method of establishing [something
further]; therefore, one requires ascertainment of such a nature.

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP
 § "eva": "only" (semantic restriction on NP denotation)
 § inter-s anaphora: subject's antecedent is NP1s of last clause
 § "tathā"'s antecedent is NP1 of last clause

K62.02–05: nanu pratibandhabalāt sādhyābhāve hetor vyatireke sati sattāmātreṇa
 vyatireko gamakaḥ syād ity ata āha. vyatirekas tv ity ādi. hetor yo vipakṣād
 vyatirekaḥ sa siddha eva nīścita eva sādhanam. iti hetos tathābhāvāniścayaṃ
 sādhyābhāve yo hetvabhāvas tanniścayaṃ

18.8 G12.23; P181.10

anupalambhāt tu kvacid abhāvasiddhāv apy apratibaddhasya tadabhāve
 sarvatrābhāvāsiddheḥ. saṃśayād avyatireko vyabhicāraḥ śeṣavataḥ.

[S [AC [NP7 [NP5 anupalambhāt] [CNJ tu] [NP7 (kva-cit)] (abhāva<siddhau) [PRT
 api]] [PC7 0]] [NP5 [NP5 [NP6 (a-pratibaddhasya) [NP7 e 1]] [AC [NP7
 (tat1<abhāve) [AP7 sarvatra]] [PC7 0]] (abhāva<(a-siddheḥ))] saṃśayāt] [VP 0]
 [NP1s [NP1 (a-vyatirekaḥ)] vyabhicāraḥ [NP6 śeṣa-vataḥ]]]

mi (*Pk412a.3*) dmigs pa'i sgo nas ni 'ga' zhig (*D267b.5*) la med pa grub pa zin kyang
 'brel pa med pa ni de med kyang thams cad la med pa mi grub pas, the tshom za ba'i
 phyir ldog pa med pa ni lhag ma dang ldan pa'i 'khrul pa yin no.

† But a deficient property's deviation is <known to consist in>
 non-contradictoriness, since, even if an absence is established in some instance
 from non-apprehension, <nonetheless> doubt remains because there is no
 establishment of the absence of what is unrelated <to the sādhyā> in every instance
 of its absence.

‡ But the errancy of defective [evidence] that lacks dissociation is due to uncertainty,
 since, even if absence is in some case established by means of non-apprehension,
 when that which has no [natural] connection [with the establishable property] is
 absent someplace, there is no establishing that it is absent in every case.

§ copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s
 § cpd intrusion: NP7 wrt "abhāva"; NP6 wrt "abhāva"; second AC wrt "abhāva";
 § past participle used as noun
 § unrecoverable denotation: for "tat"; K (62.9) supplies "sādhyā"
 § donkey anaphora

Verse 18c

18.9 G13.01; P181.12 D267b.5

kiṃ ca
 vyatireky api hetuḥ syān.

nedam nirātmakaṃ jīvaccharātram aprāṇādimattvaprasaṅgād iti.

[S [CNJ kim ca] [NP1s vyatikarāḥ] [PRT api]] [VP [NP1 hetuḥ] syāt] [[S [ADV na] [AP1 idam] [VP 0 [AP1 (niḥ-ātmakam)]] [NP1s _ (jīvat<śarātram) 1] [NP5 [NP6 e 1] (((a-((prāṇa;ādi);mat));tva);prasaṅgāt)]] [PRT iti]]]

(Pk412a.4) gzhan yang, **ldog pa can yang gtan tshigs 'gyur**. gson po'i lus 'di ni bdag med pa (D267b.6) ma yin te, srog la sogs pa dang ldan pa dang ldan pa ma yin pa nyid du thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro.²

† Moreover, an uninstantiated <property> also would be a hetu, as <exemplified in the inference to the effect that> this living body is not soulless because of the absurd consequence of its not having such things as breath.

‡ Moreover, even a negative property would be evidence, [as in] “This living body is not lacking a self, since that would entail its being without breath.”

§ left extraposition from NP1s of AP1 within clause, except ADV

§ intra-s anaphora

§ yathā phrase: “yathā” phonetically null

§ protasis: G12.15 (i.e., beginning of v 20)

§ This argument is given by Uddyotakara at NS 1.1.5, 1.1.35

§ This argument is further discussed by Dharmakīrti

§ G 154.21 ff; PV 4.194, PV 4.205-10 (Ono 1999 sec 2.2.2)

§ copula: overt: predicational: NP1s VP

§ copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s

18.10 G13.03; P181.14

nirātmakeṣu ghaṭādiṣu dr̥ṣṭeṣu prāṇādyadarśanāt tannivṛtṭyātma-gatiḥ syāt.

[S [NP5 [NP7 [AP7 (niḥ-ātmakeṣu)] (ghaṭa-ādiṣu) [AP7 (dr̥ṣṭa+(a-dr̥ṣṭeṣu))] ((prāṇa-ādi);(a-darśanāt))] [NP1s [NP3 (tat;nivṛtṭyā)] (ātma;gatiḥ)] [VP syāt]]]

bdag med (Pk412a.5) pa bum pa la sogs pa mthong ba dang ma mthong ba dag la srog la sogs pa ma mthong ba'i phyir ro. de las ldog pas bdag yod par rtogs pa'i phyir ro.

† Because of the non-observation of such things as breath in such things as pots, both observed and unobserved, there would be knowledge of <the existence of> the soul through such exclusion.

‡ Because breath and so forth is not observed in water-jugs and other things that lack a self, whether or not they are observed, there would be knowledge of a self [in a living body] through its contrast with that [absence of breath].

§ copula: overt: existential: NP1s VP

§ intra-s anaphora: “tat” has no constituent as antecedent

§§ Tibetan translation does not conform to Sanskrit. It suggests a reading such as “nirātmakeṣu ghaṭādiṣu dr̥ṣṭādr̥ṣṭeṣu prāṇādyadarśanāt. tannivṛtṭyā ātmagateḥ” as in Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s reconstruction (S62.07).

This reading is not supported by any of the MSS or by Karṇakagomin’s commentary.

² Delete second *dang ldan pa*.

K62.16–20: tathā hi **nirātmakeṣvāt**marahiteṣu **ghāṭādiṣu dr̥ṣṭādr̥ṣṭeṣu**
prāṇādyadarśanāt prāṇāpānonmeṣanimeṣādarśanāt. dr̥ṣṭeṣu
svabhāvānupalambhenaivādarśanaṃ prāṇādīnāṃ upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptatvāt.
adr̥ṣṭeṣv api tajjāṭiyatayā. tena nairātmyaṃ prāṇādyabhāvena vyāptam.
jīvaccharīre tu **tannivṛṭtyā** prāṇādīmattvābhāvanivṛṭtyā nairātmasya
nivṛṭterātmagatiḥ syāt.

18.11 G13.04; P181.15

adr̥ṣyānupalambhād abhāvāsiddhau ghaṭādīnāṃ nairātmyāsiddheḥ prāṇāder anivṛṭtiḥ.

[S [NP5 [AC [VP 0 [NP5 ((a-dr̥ṣya)<anupalambhāt)]] [NP7 (abhāva<(a-siddhau))]
] [NP6 (ghaṭa-ādīnām) 2] (nairātmya<(a-siddheḥ)] [NP1s [NP6 (prāṇa-ādeḥ)] [NP5
e 2] (a-nivṛṭtiḥ) 2] [VP 0]]]

bltar ^(D267b.7) mi bya ba mi dmigs pas med pa ma ^(Pk412a.6) grub na, bum pa la sog
pa bdag med par ma grub pa'i phyir srog la sog pa ldog pa med do.

† If the absence of something unobservable is not established from its not being
observed, then, because the soullessness of such things as pots is not established, such
things as breath is not excluded <from them either>.

‡ Given that there is no establishing an absence on the basis of non-apprehension of
what is unobservable, there is no establishing that such things as water-jugs have no
selfs; therefore, there is no ruling out such things as breath.

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ cpd intrusion: NP6 wrt "nairātmya"

§ negation scope: "a" entire AC

§ donkey anaphora

K62.20ff: adr̥ṣyetyādi. adr̥ṣyasyātmano 'nupalambhād ghaṭādiṣv
abhāvāprasiddhau ghaṭādīnāṃ nairātmyāsiddheḥ kāraṇān nairātmakāt prāṇāder
anivṛṭtiḥ. prāṇādyabhāvena sandīghasya nairātmyasyāpy asiddhir iti yāvat.

18.12 G13.05; P181.16

abhyupagamāt siddham iti cet.

[S [NP5 abhyupagamāt] [NP1s e] [VP 0 [AP1 siddham]] [CNJ iti cet]]

gal te khas blangs pa'i phyir 'grub po zhe na.

† It might be argued that it is established on account of <their, i.e., Buddhists'> basic
beliefs.

‡ It might be argued that it is established as a result of being an accepted belief.

§ copula: covert: predicational: indeterminate

§ null subject: its denotation nairātmyam according to K (63.1)

K63.01: bauddhena nairātmyam abhyupagatamato 'bhyupagamānnirātmakatvam
ghaṭādeḥ siddham iti cet.

18.13 G13.06; P181.16

katham idānīm ātma-siddhiḥ.

[S [ADV katham] [ADV idānīm] [NP1s (ātma<siddhiḥ)] [VP 0]]

da ni ji ltar na bdag 'grub.

† Now how is there the establishment of <the existence of> the soul?

‡ In this case, how is a self established?

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

K63.03–05: yadi bauddhābhyupagamaḥ pramāṇaṃ katham idānīm ātmasiddhir
jīvaccharīre. tad api bauddhena nirātmakam iṣṭam. jīvaccharīre
nairātmyābhyupagamo 'pramāṇakas tato 'syātmā sādhayata iti.

18.14 G13.06; P181.17

parasya apy apramāṇikā kathaṃ nairātmyasiddhiḥ.

[S [NP6 parasya [PRT api]] [VP 0 [AP1 (a-pramāṇikā)]] [ADV katham] [NP1s _
(nairātmya<siddhiḥ)]]

gzhan bdag med ^(Pk412a.7) pa tshad ma ma yin pa yang ji ltar 'grub par ^(D268a.1)
'gyur.

† How is the establishment of soullessness in the other cases too non-epistemic?

‡ Why is the establishment of not having a self not authoritative in another case as well?

§ copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s

§ left extraposition from NP1s of NP6 within MC

§ cpd intrusion of NP6 wrt “nairātmya”

§§ Tibetan: How does that which is not a source of knowledge of selflessness of another thing become an establishment?

§§ the Tibetan translation construes “parasya” with “pramāṇikā”

K63.05–06: yady evaṃ parasyāpi jīvaccharīrād anyasyāpi ghaṭāder apramāṇikā
kathaṃ nairātmyasiddhiḥ. na hi bauddhasyābhyupagamaḥ kvacit pramāṇaṃ
kvacin neti.

18.15 G13.07; P181.17

abhyupagamena ca sātmakānātmakau vibhajya tatrābhāvena gamakatvaṃ kathayatā
āgamikatvaṃ ātmani pratipannaṃ syāt. nānumeyatvam.

khas blangs pas ni bdag dang bcas pa dang, bdag med pa dag rnam par phye nas de la
med pas rtogs par byed pa nyid yin par brjod par ^(Pk412a.8) byed pas kyang, bdag lung

las byung ba nyid du khas blangs par 'gyur gyi, rjes su ^(D268a.2) dpag par bya ba ni ma yin no.

[S [NP3 e [PC3 [GC [NP3 abhyupagamena] [CNJ ca] [NP2 ((sa-ātmaka)+(an-ātmakau)1)] vibhajya] [NP3 [NP7 tatra 1] [NP6 e 2] abhāvena] [NP2 [NP6 e 2] [NP7 e 3] gamakatvam] kathayatā]] [NP1s āgamikatvam] [VP [AP1 _ [NP7 ātmani 3] pratipannam] syāt]] [S [ADV na] [NP1s anumeyatvam] E]

† And one who distinguishes between what has a soul and what does not have a soul by means of his tradition and asserts a property to lead to knowledge of it on account of its absence among things with no soul, must acknowledge that <his claim that the soul exists> is based on tradition, not inference.

‡ Moreover, one who uses his accepted beliefs to distinguish between what has a self and what lacks a self and declares something to be indicative of it in virtue of absence would be admitting about the self that it is based on tradition, not that it is something that can be inferred.

§ copula: overt: predicational: NP1s VP
 § left extraposition from VC (AP1) of NP3 within MC
 § donkey anaphora: shared by “abhāva” and “gamakatva”
 § constituent negation: clause terminal (ellipsis)

K63.06–10: kiṃ cābhyupagamena kevalena sātmakānātmakau vibhajya ghaṭādayaḥ pareṇāsmābhiścānātmakā abhyupagatāḥ. jīvaccharīram sātmakam asmābhir abhyupagataṃ tvayā tu nirātmakam evaṃ vibhajya tatra nirātmakeṣu prāṇādīnām abhāvenātmaviṣaye gamakatvam kathayatā pareṇāgamikatvamātmani pratipannaṃ nānumeyatvam.

18.16 G13.09; P181.18

tasmād adarśane 'py ātmano nivṛtṭyasiddheḥ nāsti kutaścit nivṛtṭiḥ.

[S [CNJ tasmāt] [NP5 [AC [NP7 (a-darśane) [PRT api] [NP6 ātmanaḥ 1]] [VP 0]] [NP6 e 1] (nivṛtṭi<(a-siddheḥ))] [VP [ADV na] asti] [NP1s [NP5 (kutaḥ-cit)] nivṛtṭiḥ]]]

de lta bas na ma mthong du zin kyang bdag ldog pa ma grub pa'i phyir ro.

† Therefore, because, even though there is no observation of the soul, there is no establishment of the soul's exclusion <either>, <so> there is no exclusion <of it> from anything.

‡ Therefore, since there is no establishing that the self is ruled out even when there is no observation of it, there is no ruling it out from anything.

§ copula: overt: existential: VP NP1s
 § Variant readings: P follows Malvania. G reads “tasmād adarśane 'py ātmanonivṛtṭyasiddheḥ”, omitting “nāsti kutaścīn nivṛtṭiḥ.” K supports P.
 §§ “ātmanonivṛtṭyasiddheḥ” in G seems clearly to be a mere typographical error. K supports P. And Tibetan suggests “. . . ātmano nivṛtṭyasiddheḥ” or “. . . ātmanivṛtṭyasiddheḥ”, thus supporting P.
 §§ Tibetan omits “nāsti kutaścīn nivṛtṭiḥ,” thus supporting G.

K63.10–13: tasmād ātmano ghaṭādāvadarśane 'py adṛśyasvabhāvasyātmano
nivr̥tṭyasiddher nāsti kutaścīn nirātmakāt prāṇāder nivr̥tṭir ity agamakatvam. evaṃ
tāvan naivātmanaḥ kutaścīn nivr̥tṭiḥ siddhā. abhyupagamyā tūcyate.

18.17 G13.10; P181.19

tannivr̥tṭau kvacin nivr̥tṭāv api prāṇādīnām apratibandhāt. sarvatra nivr̥tṭyasiddher
agamakatvam

[S [AC [AC [NP7 (tat1<nivr̥tṭau)] [VP 0]] [NP7 (kva-cit)] [NP7 nivr̥tṭau [PRT api]
[NP6 (prāṇa-ādīnām) 2]] [VP 0]] [NP5 [NP6 e 2] [NP7 e 1] (a-pratibandhāt)] [NP7
sarvatra] [NP6 e 2] (nivr̥tṭi<(a-siddheḥ)] [NP1s [NP6 e 2] [NP7 e 1] a-gamakatvam]
[VP 0]]

(Pk412b.1) 'ga' zhiḡ la de log ste, srog la sogs la log kyang 'brel pa med pa'i phyir,
thams cad las ldog pa mi 'grub pas rtogs par byed pa ma yin pa nyid do.

† The soul does not lead to knowledge of breath, since, even if, in some <particular>
case, when the soul is excluded breath is excluded, there is no establishment of
exclusion <of the soul> in every case, because the soul has no relation to breath.

‡ Even though breath is denied in some cases when that [*scil.* the self] is denied, there
is no establishing that it is ruled out everywhere, because it has no connection [with
the self]; therefore, it is not indicative.

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate
§ inter-s anaphora: "tat" 's antecedent is "ātmā"
§ intra-s anaphora

K63.13–15: tannivr̥tṭāv apy ātmanivr̥tṭāv api kvacid iti dṛṣṭe ghaṭādaḥ nivr̥tṭāv api
prāṇādīnām apratibandhād ātmanā saha sambandhābhāvāt. sarvatrādṛṣṭeṣv api
ghaṭādiṣv ātmanivr̥tṭyā prāṇādīnām nivr̥tṭyasiddheḥ sandigdḥavyatirekitvād
agamakatvam.

Verse 18d

18.18 ¶G13.12; P182.01 D268a.3

yāpy asiddhiyojanā tathā sapakṣe sann asann ity evamādiṣv api yathāyogam
udāharyam ity evamādikā. sāpi

na vācyā 'siddhiyojanā.

anupalambha eva saṃśayāt. upalambhe tadabhāvāt.

[S [RC [NP1s [AP1 yā [PRT api]] ((a-siddhi)<yojanā)] [VP 0 [AP1 [S [ADV tathā]
[S [VP 0 [AP1 [S [PC1 [VP [NP7 sapakṣe] san]] [PC1 [VP E (a-san)]] [PRT iti]]
[NP7 (evam<ādiṣu) [PRT api]] [ADV (yathā<yogam)] udāharyam]] [PRT iti]]
(evam<ādikā)]] [AP1 sā [PRT api]] [ADV na] [VP 0 [AP1 vācyā] [NP1s -

((a-siddhi)<yojanā)] [NP5 [AC [NP7 upalambhe [PRT eva]] [VP 0]] samśayāt
1] [NP5 [AC [NP7 upalambhe] [VP 0]] (tat1 <abhāvāt)]]]]]

(*D268a.3*) gang yang ma grub pa'i sbyor ba be bzhin (*Pk412b.2*) du mthun pa'i phyogs
la yod pa dang, med pa zhes bya ba la sogs pa la yang ci rigs par brjod par bya'o zhes
bya ba de lta bu la sogs pa. **ma grub sbyor ba** de yang **brjod bya min**. mi dmigs pa
kho nar zad na (*Pk412b.3*) the tshoms za ba'i phyr te, (*D268a.4*) dmigs na de med pa'i
phyir ro.

† <Dignāga> would not have set out his treatment of certain properties as
unestablished in the way he did, as where he says that “it is to be stated appropriately
with regard to such things as existing and not existing in the sapakṣa”, because when
there is mere non-apprehension, there is doubt, and when there is apprehension, there
is none.

‡ The application of a disestablishment, which [is explained] in [a passage of
Dignāga's *Nyāyamukha*] beginning thus: “it should be stated according to the
occasion as in the passage that begins ‘present and absent in a similar subject,’ ”
cannot be said, since there is uncertainty when there is mere non-apprehension,
because that [uncertainty] is absent when there is apprehension.

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

§ copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s

§ “eva”: “mere” (semantic restriction on NP connotation)

§ left extraposition from NP1s of AP1 within MC, except RC

§ intra-s anaphora

§ asyndeton: between two final NP5s; K (64.1) treats second as reason for first.

§ protasis: G12.15 (beginning of v20)

§ A clearer explanation for the claim in MC is provided by M (265.15ff)

§§ Variant reading: G “evamādikā”; P evam ādi.

K63.16–64.03: adarśanamātrād vyatirekābhyupagame saty ayam aparo doṣa ity
āha. **yāpīty** ādi. kā punaḥ setyāha. **tathā sapakṣe sann ity** ādi. ācāryasya cāyam
granthaḥ. tatra hy uktaṁ pakṣadharmo vādipratīvādinīscito gṛhyate. tenobhayor
anyatarasya cāsiddhasya sandigdhasyāśryāsiddhasya ca vyudāsaḥ. yathā ca
pakṣadharmaniścayena caturvidhasyāsiddhasya vyudāsaḥ tathā sapakṣe sann
asann ity evamādiṣv apy anyavyatirekaniścayena nirastam asiddhajātam
anyatarāsiddhādīnāṁ sapakṣādiṣv asaṁbhavāt. **yathāyogam udāhāryam ity** āha.
sāpi na vācyā 'siddhiyojanā.

tadvyācaṣṭe 'nupalambha evety ādi. apramāṇake 'nupalambh eva sati hetor
vipakṣe samśayāt. katham upalambhe tadasaṁbhavāt. vipakṣe hetor upalambhe
sati tasya samśayasyābhāvāt.

18.19 G13.15; P182.04

anupalambhāc ca vyatireka iti samśayito anivāryaḥ syāt.

[S [S [VP 0 [NP5 anupalambhāt]] [CNJ ca] [NP1s vyatirekaḥ] [PRT iti] [S [NP1s
samśayitaḥ] [VP [AP1 (a-nivāryaḥ)] syāt]]]]]

mi dmigs pa'i phyir ldog go zhes bya bas na the tshom du gyur pa yang ma bzlog par 'gyur ro.

† And a property whose contra-concomitance is in doubt would be unexcludable for anyone thinking that it comes about from <mere> non-apprehension.

‡ If one thinks that dissociation is due to non-apprehension, a dubious [dissociation] would be inevitable.

§ copula: overt: predicational: NP1s VP

§ “iti”: unclear

K64.03: tasmād anupalambhād dhetoḥ vipakṣād vyatireka ity arthāt sandīghavyatireko hetur iṣṭa eva. tasmāt saṃśayito 'nivāryaḥ. saṃśayena viśayīkṛtaḥ saṃśayito vyatireko na vāryaḥ syāt.

18.20 G13.16; P182.05

yathāyogavacanād anivārita eveti cet.

[S [NP5 ((yathā<yoga)<vacanāt)] [NP1s E] [VP 0 [AP1 (a-nivāritaḥ) [PRT eva]]] [CNJ iti cet]]

gal te ci rigs par zhes smos pa phyir ma ldog pa kho na yin no. zhe na.

† It might be argued that it is indeed unexcluded because of the mention of “respectively”.

‡ It might be argued that it is certainly not avoided by the expression “according to circumstances.”

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

§ ellipsis: E is NP1s of last clause

§ “eva”: “in fact” (V emphasis); cf. last clause

K64.06: yathāyogam udāhāryam ity ato yathāyogavacanāt saṃśayito 'nivārita eveti cet.

18.21 G13.17; P182.05

na. ya eva tūbhayaniścitavācītyādivacanāt.

[S [ADV na] E [NP5 [S [NP1s yaḥ [PRT eva]] [CNJ tu] [VP 0 [AP1 ((ubhaya<niścita)<vācī)]] [PRT iti]] (ādi<vacanāt)]]

(Pk412b.4) ci yin te, brjod pa gang zhig gnyi ga la nges pa kho na zhes (D268a.5) bya ba la sogs pa 'byung ba'i phyir ro.

† <This is> not <so>, because of the statement beginning “but only that which mentions what is ascertained by both . . .”.

‡ This is not so, because there is the statement beginning “but only that which expresses [a triple-natured sign] ascertained by both [association and dissociation is a method of establishing or a method of refutation].”

§ copula: covert: predicational: indeterminate

§ “eva”: “only” (semantic restriction on NP denotation)

§ ellipsis: E is the embedded clause in the last sentence; see K 64.07

K64.07–11: naitad evam. tadanantaram eva ya eva tūbhayaniścayavācītyādi vacanāt. ya eva śabda ubhayaniścitasya trairūpasyāsiddhatvāder vācakaḥ sa eva sādhanam dūṣaṇam na cānyataraprasiddhasandigdhamvācī punaḥ sādhanāpekṣaṇādityayaṁ grantha ihodāharaṇam. anyatarasya vādinaḥ prativādino vā. yo ’siddham sandigdham vā vakti na sa sādhanam dūṣaṇam vā. sandigdhamvayati rekaniścayaheturubhayorapi vipakṣe sandigdhasmāttadabhidhānamasādhanam.

18.22 G13.18; P182.06

tenānupalambhe ’pi saṁśayād anivṛttiṁ manyamānaḥ tatpratiṣedham āha.

[S [CNJ tena] [NP1s e [PC1 [VP [AC [NP7 anupalambhe [PRT api]] [VP 0]] [NP5 saṁśayāt] [NP2 (a-nivṛttiṁ)] manyamānaḥ]]] [VP [NP2 (tat<pratiṣedham)] āha]]

de’i phyr mi dmigs kyang the tshom za bas ldog pa med par dgos te, de dgag par bshad ^(Pk412b.5) pa yin no.

‡ For this reason, he <i.e., Dignāga>, bearing in mind that, because of doubt, there is no exclusion, even if there is non-apprehension, prohibits a property whose contra-concomitance is in doubt from being a ground.

‡ Therefore, bearing in mind that even when there is non-apprehension [of something], there is, owing to uncertainty, no ruling it out, [Dignāga] denied [dubious dissociation as evidence].

§ inter-s anaphora: “tat” ’s antecedent is “saṁśayitaḥ” (3 sentences back)

§ null subject: unrecoverable denotation

§ “pratiṣidh”: the usage here seems to be the same as at: G1.13: “prohibit from being a ground”

K64.12–14: yasmād ubhayaniścita eva hetur uktas tenānupalambhe ’pi sati nivṛttisaṁśayād vipakṣād dhetor anivṛttiṁ manyamānas tasya sandigdhamvayati rekasya pratiṣedham āha asiddhiyojanayā.

19 G13.19; P182.07 D268a.5

kiṁ ca.

viśeṣasya vyavacchedahetutā syād adarśanāt.

[S [CNJ kim ca] [NP6 viśeṣasya 1] [NP1s ((vyavaccheda<hetutā)] [VP _ syāt] [NP5 [NP6 e 1] (a-darśanāt)]]]

gzhan yang, **khyad par rnam par gcod pa yi, gtan tshigs su 'gyur ma mthong phyir.**

† Moreover, because a property specific <to the pakṣa> is not observed <either in what is eternal or what is non-eternal>, it must be a ground for the <audibility's> detachment <from what is eternal and what is non-eternal>.

‡ Moreover, a property specific [to the subject] would be evidence of the separation [of all other properties from the subject], since [it] is not observed [with any of them].

§ copula: overt: existential: NP1s VP
 § intra-s anaphora
 § clausal possession
 § protasis: G12.15

K64.16: kiñca. yady adṛṣṭyā nivṛttir iṣyate tadā viśeṣasyāsādhāraṇasya śrāvaṇatvāder vyavacchedahetutā syāt. kiṃ kāraṇaṃ. nityānityayor adarśanāt.

19.1 G14.02; P182.09

śrāvaṇatvasyāpi nityānityayor adarśanād vyāvṛttir iti tadvyavacchedahetutā syāt.

M9

[S [NP6 śrāvaṇatvasya [PRT api] 1] [NP7 (nitya+(a-nityayoḥ)) 2] (a-darśanāt)]
 [NP1s [NP6 e 1] [NP5 e 2] vyāvṛtṭiḥ] [VP 0]]

[S [CNJ iti] [NP6 E] [NP1s ((tat<vyavaccheda)<hetutā)] [VP syāt]]

mnyam par bya ba nyid kyang rtag pa ^(D268a.6) dang mi rtag pa dag la ma mthong ba'i phyir ldog pas, ^(Pk412b.6) de dag rnam par gcod pa'i gtan tshigs nyid du 'gyur ro.

† Because audibility too is observed in neither what is eternal nor what is not eternal, it is excluded <from them both>. So, it must be a ground for the <audibility's> detachment from both <what is eternal and what is not eternal>.

‡ Because audibility too is unobserved in both what is permanent and what is not impermanent, it is excluded [from them both]. Therefore it would be evidence for their separation [from the subject].

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate (possession)
 § intra-s anaphora
 § See M. Ono 1999 sec. 2.1.1 for discussion
 § Dharmakīrti takes up this argument at PV 4.218-221 (Ono 1999 sec. 2.2.3)
 § copula: overt: existential: NP1s VP
 § implicit argument: pakṣa to 'vyavaccheda'
 § inter-s anaphora: "tat"'s antecedent is "nitya+(a-nitya)"

K64.16–19: tad vyācāṣṭe. śrāvaṇatvasyāpīty ādi. tathā hy adarśanamātrād vyāvṛttir iṣṭā. asti ca nityānityayor adarśanaṃ śrāvaṇasya tadvyavacchedahetutā syāt. nityānityapratīṣedhahetutvaṃ bhavet.

19.2 G14.03; P182.09

na hi tadvyāvṛtter anyad vyavacchedanam.

[S [ADV na] [CNJ hi] [VP 0 [AP1 [NP5 (tat<vyāvṛtteḥ)] anyat]] [NP1s vyavacchedanam]]

rnam par gcod pa ni de dag las ldog pa las gzhan pa yin no.

† For <its> detachment <from both what is eternal and what is non-eternal> is nothing other than <its> exclusion from them <both>.

‡ For audibility's exclusion from what is permanent and what is impermanent is nothing other than its separation from them.

§ copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s

§ inter-s anaphora: "tat" 's antecedent is "nitya+(a-nitya)"; "e" 's antecedent is "śrāvaṇatva"

§ implicit argument: śrāvaṇatva to 'vyavaccheda'

K64.19–21: yadi nāmādarśanāt tato vyāvartteta śrāvaṇatvaṃ
tadvyavacchedahetur tu kuta ity āha. na hīti. na tadvyāvṛtter anyad
vyavacchedanaṃ nityānityavyavacchedanam.

19.3 G14.04; P182.10

avyavacchedas tu kutaścid vyāvṛtter eva aniścayāt.

[S [NP1s (a-vyavacchedaḥ)] [CNJ tu] [VP 0] [NP5 [NP6 [NP5 (kutaḥ-cit)]
vyāvṛtteḥ [PRT eva]] (a-niścayāt)]]

rnam par gcod pa ma yin pa ni gang las kyang log pa nyid du ma nges ^(Pk412b.7) pa'i
phyir ro.

† But, because there is no ascertainment on account of mere exclusion from <sc., non-observation of> something, there is no <ascertainment of> detachment <of audibility from what is eternal and what is non-eternal>.

‡ But there is no separation, because there is no ascertainment owing to mere exclusion from something.

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ "eva": "mere" (semantic restriction on NP connotation) (see K65.1)

K64.21–65.02: tavāpi kathaṃ śrāvaṇatvaṃ na vyavacchedahetur iti ced āha.
avyavacchedas tv ity ādi. kutaścin nityād anityāc cādarśanamātreṇa vyāvṛtter
evāniścayāt. aniścayaś cānyataratra pratibandhāniścayāt.

19.4 G14.05; P182.10

yo hi yatra nāstīti niścitaḥ sa bhavaṃs tadabhāvaṃ kathaṃ na gamayet.

[S [RC [NP1s yaḥ 1] [CNJ hi] [VP [AP1 [S [VP [NP7 yatra 2]] [ADV na] asti] [NP1s e 1] [PRT iti]] niścitaḥ] 0] [NP1s saḥ [PC1 [VP bhavan]] 1] [VP [NP2 (tat2<abhāvam)] [ADV katham] [ADV na] gamayet]]

gang ^(D268a.7) zhiḡ gang la med do zhes bya bar nges pa de yod na ji ltar de med par rtogs par mi byed de.

† For how might an existent property ascertained not to be somewhere fail to make its absence known < everywhere>?

‡ How can an existent property that is ascertained not to be somewhere fail to make its absence there known?

§ copula: overt: predicational: indeterminate

§ intra-s anaphora: donkey anaphora (K65.02)

§ secondary predication:

K65.02-04: avaśyaṃ caitad evaṃ anyathā yo hi dharmo yatra nāstīti niścitaḥ sa bhavan kvacid dharminī kathaṃ tadabhāvaṃ yatra nāstīti niścitas tasyābhāvaṃ katham na gamayet.

Verse 19c

19.5 G14.06; P182.12

pramāṇāntara-bādhā cen.

[S [NP1s [NP3 e 1] ((pramāṇa<antara)2<bādhā)] [VP 0] [CNJ cet]]

gal te tshad ma gzhan gyis gnod.

† It might be argued that <in such cases> there is contravention of one epistemic cognition <by another>.

‡ It might be argued that it is countered by another bit of knowledge.

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ counter-anaphora: 1 and 2 are distinct

K65.05-06: nityānityād vyāvṛttasyāpi śrāvaṇatvasyobhayavyavacchede sādhye pramāṇāntarabādhā cec chaṅkyeta.

19.6 G14.07; P182.13

athāpi syād ubhayavyavacchede pramāṇāntaraṃ bādhakam asti.

[S [S [CNJ atha [PRT api]] [VP syāt]] [AC [NP7 (ubhaya<vyavacchede)] [PC7 0]] [NP1s (pramāṇa<antaram) 1] [VP [AP1 [NP6 e 2] bādhakam] asti]]

ci ste gnyi ga rnam par gcod pa yin na gnod ^(Pk412b.8) par byed pa'i tshad ma gzhan yod do.

† Even should <what was just said> be <so>, when there is detachment from both, the one epistemic cognition is a contravener <of the other>.

‡ Suppose that when there was separation from both, there were another piece of knowledge [serving as] a means of countering [the other cognition].

§ copula: overt: predicational: NP1s VP

§ “antara”: “one”

§ counter-anaphora: 1 and 2 distinct

§§ This sentence is spelling out the preceding one.

K65.06–07: athāpītyādy asyeva vyākhyānam. śrāvaṇatvenobhayavyavacchede nityānityavyavacchede sādhye prāmāṇāntaraṃ bādhakam asti.

19.7 G14.08; P182.13

anyonyavyavacchedarūpāṇām ekavyavacchedena anyavidhānād apratiśedhaḥ. vidhipratiśedhayor virodhāt.

[S [NP5 [NP6 ((anyonya<vyavaccheda)<rūpāṇām)-B] [NP3 (eka l <vyavacchedena)] [anya2<vidhānāt)] [NP1s [NP6 e 2] (a-pratiśedhaḥ)] [VP 0] [NP5 [NP6 (vidhi+pratiśedhayoḥ)] virodhāt]]

phan tshun rnam par gcod pa'i ngo bo can rnam kyī gcig rnam ^(D268b.1) par gcod pas gzhan sgrub pa'i phyir dgag pa ma yin te, sgrub pa dang dgag pa dag ni 'gal ba'i phyir ^(Pk413a.1) ro zhe na.

† Because, with respect to mutually detached things, the detachment of the one affirms <the presence of> the other, there is no denial <of the presence of the latter>, since affirmation and denial are contradictory.

‡ We do not deny this, because one affirms one of two things that have mutually separate natures by separating the other, because affirming and denying are incompatible.

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ counter-anaphora: 1 and 2 distinct

§§ Tibetan suggests *anyonyavyavacchedarūpa* is a bahuvrīhi, as does Kaṇakagomin's gloss.

K65.07–10: tad āha. anyonyetyādi. anyonyavyavacchedo rūpaṃ yeṣāṃ te tathā. tathā hi nityavyavaccheda evānityatvaṃ tadvyavaccheda eva ca nityatvaṃ tathā bhavavyavaccheda evābhāvo 'bhāvavyavaccheda eva ca bhāvaḥ. teṣāṃ ekasya vyavacchedenānyavidhānāt. dvitīyasya viruddhasya vidhānādapratiśedhaḥ.

Verse 19d

19.8 G14.10; P182.15

nedānīm nāstitā 'dṛśaḥ

[S [ADV na] [ADV idānīm] [NP1s nāstitā] [VP 0] [NP5 (a-dṛśaḥ)]]

de ni ma mthong las med min.

† It is not true in this case that, because of non-observation, <one knows that> there is non-existence <of the hetu in the vipakṣa>.

‡ In this case, it is not the case that absence [of the evidence in a dissimilar subject is known] because of non-observation.

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ negative scope: wide wrt NP5

§ protasis: last part of this verse

§ Monier-Williams (sv) gives 'idānīm' the sense of 'just'; however, K suggests that it means something like 'in this case'.

K65.17: nedānīm iti siddhāntavādī. idānīm iti bādhāsambhāve sati. adṛṣo
'darśanād vipakṣe hetor nāstitā.

19.9 G14.11; P182.16

naivam adarśanaṃ pramāṇaṃ bādhāsambhavāt.

[S [ADV na] [ADV evam] [NP1s (a-darśanam) 1] [VP 0 [NP1 pramāṇam]] [NP5 [NP6 e 1] (bādhā<sambhavāt)]]

de ltaṅ na ma mthong ba ni tshad ma yin te, gnod pa srid pa'i phyir ro.

† So, because non-observation can be contravened, it is not epistemic.

‡ Thus non-observation is not a means of acquiring knowledge, because there is a possibility of its being countered.

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

§ negative scope: narrow wrt NP5

K65.18: tasmād evaṃ satyadarśanaṃ na pramāṇaṃ bādhāsambhavāt.

DISCUSSION: G14.06–09

The overarching problem is the one raised at G12.15. It runs as follows: If one accepts that mere non-observation establishes pervasion, one lands in a number of problems. Up to this point, several have been stated (introduced by “kim ca” with

a verb in the potential). The problem raised here is broached at G14.01, namely, that one must accept the bad argument to the effect that sound is eternal.

G14.06: Here, the Buddhist who wishes to hang on to the sufficiency of mere non-observation to establish pervasion argues that he has a way of circumventing the unwanted consequence, just alleged by D. to accrue to his position. This person wants to argue that there is another way to rid oneself of having to accept the bad argument. It is blocked by another pramana.

G14.07-09: Here Dharmakirti elaborates on what was just said.

K: atha api iti ādi asya eva vyākhyānam.

The sentence beginning with atha api is an explanation of just that (i.e., the preceding point)

Here is my rough translation of K:

That is, suppose it is argued: even should what was said [by you] be so, when something is to be proved cut off from either nitya or anitya through its being audible, one of the two contravenes the other.

In this regard, K's summary is helpful. I translate it here:

K 65.11-16: Here is what has been said. At the very moment that audibility must cut off what is eternal since audibility is excluded from what is eternal, it must affirm non-eternality, and at the very same time, since audibility is excluded from what is non-eternal, it must exclude non-eternality and affirm what is eternal. So, there must be both affirmation and denial of the same thing at the very same time. And that is impossible. So, because of the simultaneous incompatibility between affirmation and denial, there is the denial of nothing at all. For affirmation is the exclusion of a denial and denial is the exclusion of an affirmation. And how can something have these two mutually incompatible things simultaneously? Hence, it is not the case that one ascertains the exclusion of anything from something because it is audible.

DISCUSSION: G14.10

K. and M. suggest that “adṛṣā” is a fifth case noun, apparently glossing it as “adarśanāt” and “adṛṣṭeh”; yet, by my reading of Apte's dictionary, it must be nominative singular (see p. 830 column 2).

BSG

20 G14.12; P182.17 D268b.1

tathānyatrāpi sambhāvyaṃ pramāṇāntarabādhanam.

[S [ADV tathā] [NP7 anyatra [PRT api]] [VP sambhāvyaṃ] [NP1s ((pramāṇa<antara)<bādhanam)]]

de bzhin du ni gzhan la yang. tshad ma gzhan ^(D268b.2) **gyis gnod pa srid.**

† Likewise, in other cases too, contravention by another epistemic cognition is possible.

‡ In the same manner in other cases as well, being countered by another piece of knowledge is possible.

K65.19-20: śrāvaṇatva evāpramāṇaṃ bhavatu nānyatra bādhā 'bhāvād iti ced āha. tathetyādi. anyatrāpi hetor vyatirekasādhanasyādarśanasya saṃbhāvyaṃ pramāṇāntarabādhanam.

20.1 G14.13; P182.18

lakṣaṇayukte bādhāsambhave tallakṣaṇam eva dūṣitaṃ syād iti sarvatrānāśvāsaḥ.

[S [AC [NP7 [NP7 (lakṣaṇa<yukte) 1] (bādhā<sambhave)] [PC7 0]] [NP1s (tat1<lakṣaṇam) [PRT eva]] [VP [AP1 dūṣitaṃ] syāt]]

[S [CNJ iti] [NP7 sarvatra] [NP1s (an-āśvāsaḥ)] [VP 0]]

(Pk413a.2) mtshan nyid dang ldan pa la gnod pa srid na, de'i mthsan nyid sun phrung ba kho nar 'gyur bas thams cad la yid brtan du mi rung ngo.

† If there were the possibility of a contravener with respect to that which has the defining characteristic <of a hetu>, the very defining characteristic would be refuted. So, there would no confidence with respect to any <ground yielding knowledge>.

‡ If it is possible for [a sign] endowed with the characteristics to be countered, its characteristic itself would be refuted; therefore, there is no guarantee in any case [of establishing dissociation through non-observation].

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate
 § intra-s anaphora
 § “eva”: “itself” (NP emphasis)
 § copula: covert: existential: indeterminate
 § negative scope: “an-” narrow wrt NP7

K65.21–66.03: hetor vipakṣādarśanavyāvṛttinibandhanam iti yallakṣaṇam tena yuktaṃ śrāvaṇatvasya yad adarśanaṃ tasmin bādhāsambhave sati tallakṣaṇam eva tasya vyatirekasādhanasyādarśanasya sarvaviṣayam eva lakṣaṇam svarūpaṃ dūṣitaṃ syād iti sarvatrādarśane vyatirekasādhane 'nāśvāsaḥ. na gamakatvaniścayaḥ.

20.2 G14.14; P182.18

anumānaviṣaye 'pi pratyakṣānumānavirodhadarśanād anāśvāsaprasaṅga iti cet.

[S [NP5 [NP7 (anumāna<viṣaye) [PRT api] 1] (((pratyakṣa+anumāna)<virodha)<darśanāt)] [NP1s [NP7 e 1] ((an-āśvāsa)<prasaṅgaḥ)] [VP 0] [CNJ iti cet]]

gal te rjes su dpag pa'i yul la yang mngon sum dang rjes su dpag pa dang (Pk413a.3) 'gal ba mthong bas yid brten du mi (D268b.3) rung bar thal bar 'gyur ro zhe na.

† It might be argued that there is the absurd consequence of there being no confidence even with respect to the object of inference, because of the observation of contradiction by both perception and inference.

‡ It might be argued that this entails that there is also no guarantee about the subject matter of inference, since it is observed that the incompatibility [of certain properties in sound is established] through sensation or inference.

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ intra-s anaphora: lazy anaphora

§ “vi.saya”: conclusion, instead of object

K66.04–07 yady evam anumānaviṣaye ’pi kvacit
pratyakṣānumānavirodhadarśanāt. tatha hi nityaḥ śabdaḥ
śrāvaṇatvācchabdatvavad iti kṛte nityatvam anumānena bādhyate. evam aśrāvaṇaḥ
śabdaḥ sattvād ghaṭavad iti pratyakṣeṇa. tataś ca sarvatra tad
avaśiṣṭalakṣaṇenānumāne ’py anāśvāsaprasaṅga iti cet.

20.3 G14.15; P182.19

na. yathokte asambhavāt. sambhavinaś ca atallakṣaṇatvāt.

[S [ADV na] E [NP5 [NP7 (yathā<ukte)] (a-sambhavāt)] [NP5 [NP6 sambhavinaḥ] [CNJ ca] (a-(tat<lakṣaṇatvāt))]]

ma yin te, ji skad bshad pa lta bu la mi srid pa’i phyir ro. srid na ni de’i mtshan nyid kyang ma yin pa’i phyir.

† <This is> not <so> because it is not possible in the case of that which accords with what was stated and because that which might be <contradicted by perception or inference> does not having the defining characteristics.

‡ This is not so, because [incompatibility] is impossible in [inference] as explained [by us], and because that which has the possibility [of incompatibility] does not have the characteristics of that [*scil.*, inference]

§ “tat” without antecedent

§ ellipsis: E is the NPs of last clause

§ “ca” unclear: second NP5 seems to be a reason for the first NP5

K66.08–10 naitad evam. yathokta iti kāryasvabhāvānupalambhaje ’ṅgaje
’numāne pratyakṣānumānavirodhasyābhāvāt.
pratyakṣādivirodhasambhavinaścātallakṣaṇatvāt tadanumānālakṣaṇatvāt.

Note the placement of the negative particles when *a-tad-lakṣaṇa* is glossed as *tad-anumāna-alakṣaṇa*.

DISCUSSION: K66.08

The expression “kārya-svabhāva-anupalabdhi” does not occur in the NB, however, the following two expressions do: “kārya-anupalabdhi” and “svabhāva-anupalabdhi.” Each names a kind of inference. Here are the examples in NB:

svabhāva-anupalabdhi: na atra dhūmaḥ upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāptasya
anupalabdheḥ.

kārya-anupalabdhi: na iha apratibaddha-sāmārthyāni dhūma-kāraṇāni santi
dhūma-abhāvāt.

BSG

20.4 G14.16; P182.20

viruddhāvyabhicāry-avacanam iti cet.

[S [NP1s ((viruddha<(a-vyabhicāri))<(a-vacanam))] [VP 0] [CNJ iti cet]]

gal te 'gal ba 'khrul ^(Pk413a.4) pa med pa can gyi brjod par 'gyur ro zhe na.

† It might be argued that there <should have been> no statement of <the fallacy of>
concomitance with what are contradictory <by Dignāga>.

‡ It might be argued that [there should be] no expression about that which is not
erratic from what is incompatible.

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ mood: unclear

§§ Tibetan makes mood subjunctive, but omits the privative on *vacana*.

K66.10: yadi yathoktalakṣaṇe 'numāne nāsti bādhā tadā hetulakṣaṇayuktam
parasparaviruddhārthasādhakam hetudvayam ekasmin dharmiṇyavatīrṇam
viruddhāvyabhicāryuktam ācāryeṇa tasyāvacanam iti cet. anenābhyupetahānim
āha.

20.5 G14.17; P182.20

anumānaviṣaye 'vacanād iṣṭam.

[S [NP5 [NP7 (anumāna<viṣaye)] [NP6 e 1] (a-vacanāt)] [NP1s x 1] [VP iṣṭam]]

rjes su dpag pa'i yul la ma brjod pa'i phyir ^(D268b.4) 'dod pa yin te,

† Because there is no statement <of this fallacy> within the scope of inference, it is
accepted.

‡ Because there is no expression [of this] about the subject matter of inference, we
agree.

§ intra-s anaphora

§ inter-s anaphora

K66.12–13: anumānaviṣaye viruddhāvyabhicāryavacanād iṣṭam eveti kuto
'bhyupetahānam.

20.6 G14.17; P182.20

viṣayaṃ cāsyā nivedayiṣyāmaḥ.

[S [VP [NP2 viṣayam [CNJ ca] [NP6 asya]] nivedayiṣyāmaḥ]]

'di' i yul ni bstan par bya'o.

† And we shall relate its subject matter.

‡ And we shall show its subject matter.

K66.13–14: kva tarhy ācāryeṇokta ity āha. viṣayaṃ cety ādi. asya viruddhāvyaḥcārīṇaḥ.

Verse 20cd

20.7 ¶ G14.19; P183.01

kiṃ ca.

drṣṭā 'yuktir adṛṣṭeś ca syāt sparśasyāvirodhinī.

[S [CNJ kim ca] [NP1s (drṣṭa<a-yuktiḥ)) -- [NP5 [NP6 e 1] (a-drṣṭeḥ)]] [CNJ ca] [VP syāt [NP6 sparśasya 1] [AP1 (a-virodhinī)]] [S [CNJ yadi [PRT hi]] [NP3 anupalambhena] [NP1s abhāvaḥ] [VP -- sidhyet]]]

gzhan yang **ma mthong phyir reg mthong ba dang. mi ldan 'khrul pa med**
(Pk413a.5) **pa can.**

† Moreover, <the conclusion of> the non-connection of <lukewarm> touch with what is observed due to its non-observation would be uncontradicted, if indeed an absence should be established by non-apprehension.

‡ The disjunction owing to non-observation of tangible properties from what is seen would not be incompatible.

§ copula: overt: predicational: NP1s VP

§ right extraposition from NP1s of NP6 within MC

§ left extraposition from VP of NP3 within its clause, except CNJ and CNJ

§ intra-s anaphora

§ constituency violation: NP6 within VP is construed with NP1s

§ see K 67.01 for confirmation of constituency

§ protasis: G12.15

§ "kim ca" in commentary; "ca" in verse.

§ See Vaiśeṣika sūtra 2.1.9–10

§ see Apte dictionary entry (2) or Apte para 307 (2)

K66.14–67.03: kiṃcety ādi. iha vaiśeṣikeṇa vāyoḥ sattvasādhanaṅgamaṃ "sparśaś ca na ca drṣṭānām" iti sūtram uktam. asyāyam arthaḥ. yo guṇaḥ sa dravyāśrayī tadyathā rūpādiḥ. apākajānuṣṅhāsītaspārśaś ca guṇas tasmāt tasyāśrayabhūtena dravyeṇa bhavitavyam. na cāyaṃ drṣṭānām pṛthivyādīnām guṇas teṣāṃ

pākajānuṣṅāśītasparśādiguṇatvāt. tato yasyāyaṃ guṇaḥ sa vāyur bhaviṣyatīty ukte vaiśeṣikeṇa. tatrācāryadiñnāgenoktam. yady adarśanamātreṇa dr̥ṣṭebhyaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ kriyate na ca so 'pi yukta iti. yad etad uktaṃ tadvirudhyata iti vārttikakāro darśayann āha. dr̥ṣṭety ādi. yady adr̥ṣṭyā nivṛtṭiḥ syāt tathā 'dr̥ṣṭer adarśanāt kāraṇād apākajasyānuṣṅāśītasparśasya dr̥ṣṭāyuktitaḥ. dr̥ṣṭeṣu pṛthivyādiṣvasaṅgitaryā varṇitā vaiśeṣikair yasyācaryeṇāyuktatvam uktam sā syād avirodhinī yuktaiva syād ity arthaḥ.

20.8 G14.20; P183.03

yadi hy anupalambhenābhāvaḥ sidhyet. yad āha. yady adarśanamātreṇa dr̥ṣṭebhyaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ kriyate. na ca so 'pi yukta iti. katham ayuktaḥ. anupalambhād abhāvasiddheḥ.

[S [CNJ yadi] [CNJ hi] [NP3 anupalambhena] [NP1s abhāvaḥ] [VP _ sidhyet]

[RC [NP1s e] [VP [NP2 yat] āha] [[S [CNJ yadi] [NP3 ((a-darśana)<mātreṇa)] [NP1s [NP5 dr̥ṣṭebhyaḥ] pratiṣedhaḥ] [VP _ kriyate]] [S [ADV na] [CNJ ca] [NP1s saḥ [PRT api]]] [VP 0 [AP1 yuktaḥ]]]] [PRT iti]]]

[S [NP1s e 1] [ADV katham] [VP 0 [AP1 (a-yuktaḥ)]]] [NP5 [NP5 anupalambhāt] (abhāva<siddeḥ)]]

gal te mi dmigs pas ldog pa 'grub par 'gyur na, gal te ma mthong ba tsam gyis mthong ba la las 'gog par byed na, ^(D268b.5) de yang rigs pa ma yin no zhes gang bshad pa ji ltar rigs pa ma yin te, ^(Pk413a.6) mi dmigs pas med pa grub pa'i phyir ro.

† For if an absence should be established by non-apprehension—which he <i.e., Dignāga> stated <as follows>: “if exclusion from what is observed is made through mere non-apprehension, yet this too is not correct”—<then> how is it not correct, because <according to you> an absence is established from non-apprehension.

‡ For suppose an absence were established by means of non-apprehension. [Dignāga] said: “Perhaps denial [of tangible properties] from things that are seen is by nothing more than non-observation. But this is also incorrect.” Why is that incorrect, since an absence is established through non-apprehension?

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

§ left extraposition from VP of NP3 within its clause, except CNJ and CNJ

§ left extraposition from VP of NP3 within its clause, except CNJ and CNJ

§ inter-s anaphora: “yat” ’s antecedent is protasis

§ null subject: unrecoverable denotation; denotation is anaphorically determined

§ copula: covert: predicational: indeterminate

K67.04–08: tad vyācāṣṭe. yadīty ādi. yad āhācāryaḥ vāyuprakaṛaṇe yady adarśanamātreṇa dr̥ṣṭebhyaḥ pṛthivyādiḥ spārśasya pratiṣedhaḥ kriyate vaiśeṣikeṇa na ca so 'pi yukta iti. yady ācārsyasyāpy adarśanamātreṇa vyatireko 'bhīmatas tadā katham ayuktaḥ spārśasya pratiṣedho. yukta eva syāt. kiṃ kāraṇam. atrāpi hetor anupalambhād abhāvasiddher abhyupagamāt.

20.9 G15.01; P183.04

nanūpalabdḥilakṣaṇaprāpteḥ sparśasya yukta eva pratiṣedhaḥ.

[S [CNJ nanu] [NP5 ((upalabhi<lakṣaṇa)<prāpteḥ) [NP6 sparśasya 1]] [VP [AP1 yuktaḥ] 0 [PRT eva]] [NP1s [NP6 e 1] pratiṣedhaḥ]]

reg pa dmigs pa'i mtshan nyid kyir gyur pa dgag pa rigs pa kho na ma yin nam zhe na.

† Since <lukewarm> touch have the defining characteristics of apprehensibility, is not the denial of its existence indeed possible?

‡ Is it not the case that the denial of the tangible property [in earth etc.] is indeed correct because of its meeting the conditions of an apprehension?

§ copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s

§ possible left extraposition from NP1s of "sparśa" to non-terminal position

§ intra-s anaphora

§ "eva": "indeed" (V emphasis)

K67.09–10: nanvityādi paraḥ. upalabdḥilakṣaṇaprāpteḥ kāraṇād
apākajasyānuṣṅāśītasparśasyānupalabhyamānasya pṛthivyādiṣu yukta eva
pratiṣedhaḥ.

20.10 G15.02; P183.05

na yuktaḥ. dr̥śyatatsvabhāvaviṣayamātrāpratiṣedhāt.

[S [NP1s E] [ADV na] [AP1 yuktaḥ] [NP5
(((dr̥śya+(tat<svabhāva))<viṣaya)<mātra)<(a-pratiṣedhāt))]]

rigs pa ma yin te, snang ba dang de'i rang bzhin gyi yul ^(D268b.6) tsam la 'gog pa ma
(Pk413a.7) yin pa'i phyir ro.

† It is not correct, because one has not denied its existence only in objects which are either observable or have the nature of an observable.

‡ It is not correct, because it is not a denial [of the tangible property] in nothing but that subject matter that is visible and has the natural property thereof.

§ copula: covert: predicational: indeterminate

K67.11–14: na yukta iti siddhāntavādī. kiṃ kāraṇam. yaḥ pṛthivyādir anuṣṅāśītād
anyena sparśena yuktaḥ pratyakṣaḥ sa dr̥śyaḥ. anyatra ca deśād āvapatyakṣo 'pi
tathābhūtasparśayukta eva pṛthivyādis tatsvabhāvaḥ. dr̥śyaś ca tatsvabhāvaś ceti
dvandvaḥ. tad eva viṣayaḥ sa eva tanmātraṃ supsupeti samāsaḥ. tasminn
apraṭiṣedhāt sparśasya.

20.11 G15.03; P183.05

pr̥thivyādi sāmānyena gr̥hītvā 'yaṃ pratiṣedham āha.

[S [GC [VP [NP2 (pr̥thivī-ādi)] [NP3 sāmānyena] gr̥hītvā]] [NP1s ayam] [VP [NP2 pratiṣedham] āha]]

des ni sa la sogs pa spyir bzung nas dgag pa smras so.

† This <proponent of Vaiśeṣika doctrine> grasps such things as earth in general and states a denial <of its existence therein>.

‡ This [Vaiśeṣika] person grasped earth and so forth in general and states a denial.

K67.14–17: tatra hi pratiṣedhe syād eva niścayaḥ yāvataḥ pr̥thivyādidharmibhūtaṃ sāmānyenāvaiśeṣeṇaiva gr̥hītvā 'yaṃ vaiśeṣikaḥ sparśasya pratiṣedham āha. yat kiṃcit pr̥thivyādi tat sarvam anuṣṅāśītasparśarahitam iti. na ca pr̥thivyādimātre sparśasyopalabdihlakṣaṇaprāptir asti.

20.12 G15.04; P183.06

tatra ca tūlopalapallavādiṣu tadbhāve 'pi sparśabhedadarśanād asyāpi kvacid viśeṣe sambhavāśāṅkayā bhavitavyam iti sarvatrādarśanamātreṇayuktaḥ pratiṣedha iti.

[S [NP7 tatra] [CNJ ca] [NP5 [AC [VP 0 [NP7 ((tūla+upala+pallava)-ādiṣu) 1] [NP7 (tat<bhāve) [PRT api]]] [NP7 e 1] ((sparśa<bheda);darśanāt)] [VP 0 [NP3 [NP6 asya [PRT api]] [NP7 [AP7 (kva-cit)] viśeṣe] (sambhava<āśāṅkayā)] [AP1 bhavitavyam]]]]

[S [CNJ iti] [NP7 sarvatra] [NP3 ((a-darśana)<mātreṇa)] [VP 0 [AP1 (a-yuktaḥ)]] [NP1s -- pratiṣedhaḥ]]

de la shing bal dang rdo ba dang lo ma la sogs pa la de yod kyang reg pa tha dad pa mthong ba'i phyir ro. 'di yang khyad par 'ga' (Pk413a.8) zhig la srid par dgos par 'gyur pas (D268b.7) thams cad la ni mthong pas dgag par rigs pa ma yin no.

† Yet, in this case, there should be uncertainty as to whether or not this <i.e., lukewarm touch> too exists in some special kind <of earth>, because, even though it <i.e., earth> exists among such things as grass, stones, and sprouts, different <kinds of> touch are observed <among them>.

So, denial of the existence <of touch> in all <of earth> is incorrect through <its> mere non-observation.

‡ And in that case, because one observes a difference in the tangible properties in such things as cotton bolls, stones and buds, even though it [*scil.* earth] is present, there must be doubt concerning the presence of that [tangible property] in a given specific thing. So in every case denial through mere non-observation is incorrect.

§ copula: covert: existential: passive

§ cpd intrusion: NP6 and NP7 "sambhava"

§ intra-s anaphora

- § inter-s anaphora: “tat” ’s antecedent is NP2 in GC of last sentence
 § unrecoverable denotation: “asya” refers to “an-uṣṇa-a-sparśa-śīta” (K 67.20)
 § copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s
 § left extraposition from NP1s of NP7 within its clause, except CNJ
 § left extraposition from NP1s of NP3, except PRT and NP7
 § negative scope: “a-” wide wrt NP3

K67.18–68.01: na caikasparśaniyamah pṛthivādīnām yatas tatra
 pṛthivyādisāmānye tūlopalapallavādiṣu bhedeṣu tadbhāve ’pi pṛthivyādibhāve ’pi
 sparśabhedadarśanāt. tathā hi tūlasyānyaḥ sparśaḥ ślakṣṇatvalakṣaṇo ’nyaś
 copalādeḥ karkaśatvādilakṣaṇaḥ. asyāpīty anuṣṇāśītasparśasya kvacit
 pāṛthivadravyaviśeṣe sambhavāśaṃkayā bhavitavyam iti kṛtvā sarvatra
 pṛthivyādāv adarśanamātreṇānuṣṇāśītasparśasyayuktaḥ pratiśedhaḥ.

20.13 G15.07; P183.07

evam ācāryīyaḥ kaścīd anupalambhād abhāvaṃ bruvāṇopālabdhaḥ.

[S [PRT iti] [ADV evam] [NP1s ācāryīyaḥ [AP1 (kaḥ-cit)]] [PC1 [VP [NP5
 anupalambhāt] [NP2 abhāvam] bruvāṇaḥ]] [VP 0 [AP1 upālabdhaḥ]]]

de ltar na slob dpon mi dmigs pas med pa smra ba ’ga’ zhig gis klan ka btsal ba yin no.

† So, in this way, any follower of the teacher <i.e., Dignāga> who asserts an absence because of non-apprehension is rebuked.

‡ Therefore, a certain disciple of the teacher stating an absence owing to non-apprehension is censured in this way.

§§ Karṇakagomin offers twenty lines of commentary on this.

21 G15.08; P183.09 D268b.7

api ca

deśādibhedād dṛśyante bhinnā dravyeṣu śaktayaḥ.

[S [CNJ api ca] [NP5 ((deśa-ādi)<bhedāt)] [VP dṛśyante [AP1 bhinnāḥ]] [NP1s
 [NP7 dravyeṣu] śaktayaḥ]]

gzhan ^(Pk413b.1) yang, yul la sogs pa’i khyad par las, rdzas la nus pa tha dad
 snang.

† Moreover, **potentialities among things are observed to be different because of differences in such things as location.**

‡ Moreover, **the potentials in substances are observed to be different according to differences in location and so forth.**

§ constituency: NP1s follows K 68.23-24 § secondary predication:

K68.22–24: api cety adarśanamātreṇābhāvābhyupagame pratyakṣabādhā
 darśayitum āha. deśādibhedāt. ādiśabdāt kālasaṃskārabhedāt. bhinnā nānārūpā
 dṛśyante dravyeṣv ekajātīyeṣv api śaktayo rasavīryādilakṣaṇaḥ.

21.1 G15.10; P183.11

tatraikadrṣṭyā nānyatra yuktas tadbhāvaniścayaḥ.

[S [NP3 [NP7 tatra] (eka1<drṣṭyā)] [ADV na] [NP7 anyatra] [VP 0 [AP1 yuktaḥ]] [NP1s - ((tat1<bhāva)<niścayaḥ)]]

de la gcig mthong gzhan la de. yod par nges pa rigs ma yin. [So reads the Tibetan verse text. Translation of PVS text reads: de la gcig mthong ^(D269a.1) bas gzhan na de yod par nges par ni rigs pa ma yin no.]

† **Ascertainment of the existence of one thing in one place is not possible through the observation of something similar to it elsewhere.**

‡ **It is not possible to be certain on the basis of observing one [substance with a given potential] in one location that it will be present elsewhere.**

§ copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s

§ intra-s anaphora: the identity is type, not token

§ counter-anaphora: “tat” and “anya”

§ left extraposition from NP1s of NP7 within MC, except NP3 and ADV

§ possible landing site violation: NP7 extraposition

K68.24–69.01: tatrety anekaśaktiṣu dravyeṣv ekadrṣṭyā ekasvabhāvasya dravyasya kvacid darśanānyatrāpi deśādau yuktas tadbhāvaniścayaḥ. yathāparidrṣṭadravyasvabhāvaniścayaḥ.

21.2 G15.11; P183.12

yadi kathamcid vipakṣe ’darśanamātreṇāpratibaddhasyāpi tadavyabhicāraḥ.

[S [ADV yadi (katham-cit)] [NP3 [NP7 vipakṣe] ((a-darśana)<mātreṇa) [NP6 e 1]] [NP1s [NP6 [NP7 e 2] (a-pratibaddhasya) [PRT api] 1] (tat2<avyabhicāraḥ)]]

gal te ji zhiḡ ltar mi mthun pa’i phyogs la ^(Pk413b.2) ma mthong³ ba tsam gyis ’brel ba med pa yang de ’khrul pa med do zhe na.

† It is hardly the case that, through its mere non-observation in the vipakṣa, a <grounding property> unrelated <to a sādhya> is <ascertained as> not deviating from it.

‡ Suppose that even an unconnected property’s not being erratic from something [is established] merely through its not being observed in some way in the dissimilar subject.

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ “yadi kathamcit”: see M-W 845 col. 1

§ intra-s anaphora

§ donkey anaphora: antecedent for “tat2” is implicit argument for “a-pratibaddhasya”, otherwise “tat” has an unrecoverable antecedent

³ Pk: phyogs la ma mthong; D phyogs la mthong

K69.02–05: yadīty ādinaitad eva vyācaṣṭe. yadi vipakṣe hetor
adarśanamātreṇāpratibaddhasya svasādhye tadavyabhicārah sādhyāvyabhicāra
iṣyate. tadaikatra dṛṣṭasya dravyasya yad rūpam upalabdham tat tasyānyatrāpi
dravyasāmānyād anumeyaṃ syāt. asti hi tatrāpi tatkālaṃ hetor vipakṣe
'darśanamātram.

21.3 G15.12; P183.12

kvacid deṣe kānicid dravyāṇi kathamcid dṛṣṭāni punar anyathānyatra dṛṣyante.

[S [NP1s [NP7 [AP7 (kva-cit)] deṣe] [AP1 (kāni-cit)] dravyāṇi [AP1 [ADV
(katham-cit)] dṛṣṭāni]] [CNJ punar] [VP [ADV anyathā] [NP7 anyatra] dṛṣyante]]
yul 'ga' zhig na rdzas kha cig ci zhig ltar mthong ba gzhan na gzhan (^{D269a.2}) du yang
snang ngo.

† Some things observed to be one way in one place are observed still to be otherwise
elsewhere,

‡ [That is not so.] Some things observed to be some way in one place are nevertheless
observed to be otherwise elsewhere.

K69.06–07: na cedam yuktam. yasmāt kvacid deṣe kānicid dravyāṇi kathamcid
dṛṣṭāni pratiniyatarasāditvena. punar anyatheti yathādṛṣṭākāravaiparītyenānyatra
deṣe dṛṣyante.

21.4 G15.13; P183.13

yathā kāścid oṣadhayaḥ kṣetraviśeṣe viśiṣṭarasavīryavipākā bhavanti. na anyatra. tathā
kālasaṃskārabhedāt.

[S [CNJ yathā] [S [S [AP1 (kāḥ-cit) oṣadhayaḥ]]] [VP [AP1 [NP7 (kṣetra<viśeṣe)]
(viśiṣṭa<(rasa+vīrya+vipākāḥ)-B) bhavanti] [S [ADV na] [NP1s E1] [VP [NP7
anyatra] E2]] [S [ADV tathā] E3 [NP5 ((kāla+saṃskāra)<bhedāt)]]]]]

dper na sman kha cig zhing khyad par can las (^{Pk413b.3}) ro dang nus pa dang khyad
par du smin par byed pa khyad par can du 'gyur la, gzhan la ni ma yin pa lta bu ste,
dus dang legs par bya ba'i khyad par las kyang de dang dra'o.

† as when some herbs have a special taste, potency and effect in a specific field but not
in another; likewise, because of difference in season and cultivation.

‡ For example, certain medicinal herbs have specific taste, potency and effects in a
specific field but not in another, as well as because of a difference of season and
method of preparation.

§ copula: overt: predicational: NP1s VP

§ counter-anaphora: "anyathā"

§ counter-anaphora: "anya"

§ ellipsis: E1 and E2 are NPs1 and VP (modified at NP7) of previous clause

§ ellipsis: E3 is previous clause except for NP7

§ yathā clause: introduces an instance ("as when")

K69.08–11: yathety ādinā viṣayam āha. vīryam doṣāpanayanaśaktiḥ. pariṇāmo vipākāḥ. viśiṣṭā rasavīryavipākā yāsām iti vighrahaḥ. nānyatreti kṣetraviśeṣād anyatra. yathā deśaviśeṣāt yathā kālasaṃskārabhedād viśiṣṭarasavīryavipākā bhavanti. saṃskāraḥ kṣīrādivasekaḥ.

21.5 G15.15; P183.14

na ca taddeśais tathā dṛṣṭā iti sarvās tattvena tathābhūtāḥ sidhyanti. guṇāntarāṇām kāraṇāntarāpekṣatvāt.

[S [ADV na] [CNJ ca] [[S [NP1s E 1] [VP 0 [NP3 (tat<deśaiḥ)-B] [AP1 [ADV tathā 2] dṛṣṭāḥ]]] [PRT iti]] [NP1s sarvāḥ 1] [VP [NP3 tattvena] [AP1 (tathā2<bhūtāḥ) sidhyanti] [NP5 [NP6 (guṇa<antarāṇām)] ((kāraṇa<antara)<apekṣatvāt)]]]

yul de pa rnams kyis de ltar (*D269a.3, Pk413b.1*) mthong shes te, thams cad de nyid du de lta bu yin par ni 'grub par mi 'gyur te, yon tan gyi khyad par rnams ni rgyu'i khyad par la ltos pa'i phyir ro.

† And it is not the case that, because <herbs> observed to be one way by those in the region, all are established really to be that way, because different qualities depend on different causes.

‡ And it is not the case that, since [herbs] are observed to be some way by those in the region, all are established to be essentially the same way, because different qualities depend on different causes.

§ copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s

§ bv cpd: NP

§ bv cpd: “tat<deśa” non-predicative (K 69.11)

§ donkey anaphora: “tathā” with “tathā”

§ ellipsis: E is NP1s of last clause

§ inter-s anaphora: “tathā”'s antecedent is “-vipākāḥ” (K 69.11) configuration for donkey anaphora

§ intra-s anaphora

§ “iti”: unclear grammar; “iti kṛtvā” (K 69.12)

K69.11–14: na ca tad deśair iti pradeśo yeṣāṃ purṣāṇām tais tathāviśiṣṭarasādiyuktā dṛṣṭā iti kṛtvā sarvā ataddessā api tattvena tulyarūpādītvena tathābhūtā yathāgrhītasvabhāvatulyāḥ sidhyanti. kiṃ kāraṇam. guṇāntarāṇām rasādiviśeṣāṇām kāraṇāntarāpekṣatvāt.

21.6 G15.17; P183.15

viśeṣahetvabhāve tu syād anumānam. yathādṛṣṭakartṛkam api vākyam puruṣasaṃskārapūrvakam iti. vākyeṣu viśeṣābhāvāt. sarvaprakāraṇām puruṣaiḥ karaṇasya darśanāt.

[S [AC [NP7 ((viśeṣa<hetu)<abhāve)] [VP 0]] [CNJ tu] [VP syāt] [NP1s anumānam] [[ADV yathā] [S [NP1s [AP1 ((a-dṛṣṭa)<kartṛkam) [PRT api]] vākyam

] [VP 0 [AP1 ((puruṣa<saṃskāra)<pūrvakam)]]] [PRT iti]] [NP5 [NP7 vākyeṣu 1] (viśeṣa<abhāvāt) [NP5 [NP6 [NP6 (sarva<prakārāṇām)-B 1] [NP3 puruṣaiḥ] karaṇasya] darśanāt]]]]

rgyu'i khyad par med na ni rjes su dpag tu rung ste, ^(Pk413b.5) byed pa po ma mthong ba can gyi tshig kyang skyes bu'i 'du byed pa sngon du ^(D269a.4) 'gro ba can yin te, tshig la khyad par med pa'i phyir ro zhes bya ba lta bu'o. rnam pa thams cad skyes bu dag gis byed par mthong ba'i phyir ro.

† But, if there are no special reasons, one must infer that sentences, even those whose author is unobserved, result from human enunciation, because there are no special sentences, since humans are observed to utter all kinds of sentences.

‡ But in the absence of a special cause, one might make an inference such as this: 'A sentence, even if its author be unobserved, is preceded by a human being's preparation, because there is no difference among sentences', because all kinds are observed to be made by human beings.

§ copula: overt: existential: VP NPs

§ copula: covert: predicational: indeterminate

§ bv cpd: NP (has antecedent)

§ intra-s anaphora

§ yathā clause

§ cpd intrusion: vākyeṣu wrt viśeṣa

§§ P reads *vākye tu*, G *vākyeṣu*; K supports G. P reads *karaṇadarsanāt*, G *karaṇasya darśanāt*; K supports P.

K69.14–21: viśeṣahetvabhāve tu syād ekasvabhāvātānumānam. adṛṣṭaḥ karttā yasya vaidikasya tat tathā. tad api puruṣasaṃskārapūrvakam puruṣaprayatnāhetukam. etac ca sādhyaphalam. vākyeṣu pauruṣeyāpauruṣeyatvenābhimateṣu viśeṣābhāvād anena hetuḥ kathitaḥ. prayogā punar yad vastu yad abhinnasvabhavaṃ tat samānāhetukam. yathaiko dhūmo dhūmāntarasamānajātīyaḥ. pauruṣeyavākyābhinnasvabhāvāni cāpauruṣeyābhimatāni vākyaṇīti svabhāvahetuḥ. na cāsiddho hetuḥ. tathā hi yaiḥ prakārair viśādyapanayanād iti vaidikānām viśeṣa iṣyate. teṣāṃ sarvaprakārāṇām puruṣaiḥ kāraṇadarśanāt. tathā hi śabarādīmantrāṇām api viśādyapanayanādayo dṛśyante.

21.8 ¶ G15.20; P183.18

M10

naivam asambhavadviśeṣahetavaḥ puruṣā yena vacanādeḥ kiṃcin-mātrasādharmyāt sarvākārasāmyam anumīyeta. sarvaguṇeṣu viśeṣa-darśanāt. saṃskārabhedena viśeṣapratipatteḥ.

(Pk413b.6) legs par bya ba'i phyir bye brag las khyad par rtogs pa'i phyir. yon tan thams cad la khyad par mthong bas na gang gis na tshig (D269a.5) la sogs pa cung zad tsam chos mthun pas rnam pa thams cad du mthun par (Pk413b.7) rjes su pag par 'gyur ba de lta bur skyes bu dag ni rgyu'i khyad par med pa can ma yin pa nyid do.

‡ It is not the case that human beings have no such existing special cause by which it could be inferred from a similarity in only some aspects, such as speaking, that there is a similarity in all aspects. Because differences are observed in all [mental] qualities, since it is admitted that differences [in mentality] are due to differences in habit.

K70.04–12: naivam ity ādi. yathā vākyānyasambhavadviśeṣahetūni naivam sambhavadviśeṣahetavaḥ puruṣāḥ yena viśeṣahetvasambhavana. vacanāder ādigrahaṇenendriyāsritatvacittatvādigrahaṇam. vacanāder eva kiṃcinmātreṇaikadeśena sādharmaḥ tasmāl līngāt puṃsām rāgādimattvena niyataviṣayatvenānyena vā sarvākāreṇa sāmyamanumīyeta.

viśeṣahetusambhava eva kuta ity āha. sarveṣv eva cetoguṇeṣu viśeṣasya darśanāt. rāgaprajñādayo hi svaviśayaagrahaṇam prati mandamandavṛttayo 'pi kālāntareṇa paṭutarā bhavanti. svaviśayaś caiśām spaṣṭataro bhavatīti viśeṣo dr̥śyate. sa punaḥ kuto bhavatīty āha. saṃskāro 'bhyāsas tasya viśeṣeṇam prajñādīnām viśeṣapratīteḥ.

21.9 G15.22; P183.19

tadvad anyasyāpi sambhavād.

de bzhin du gzhan la yang srid pa'i phyir ro.

‡ Also because there is the possibility of other [mental qualities] similiar to that [habit].

K70.12–14: bhavatu prajñādīnām manoguṇānām abhyāsāt prakarśo dr̥ṣṭatvāt. sarvajñādayas tu na dr̥ṣṭā iti katham teṣām bhāva ity ata āha. tadvad ity ādi. anyasyāpi sarvajñatvāder viśeṣasya sambhavāt.⁴

21.10 G15.23; P183.20

asambhavānumāne ca bādihakahetvabhāvāt. vairāgyādr̥ṣṭeḥ. adr̥ṣṭena ca bādhyabādihakabhāvāsiddheḥ.

⁴ Commentary continues K70.14–23.

mi srid par rjes su dpag pa yang gnod par byed (*D269a.6*) pa'i (*Pk413b.8*) gtan tshigs med pa'i phyir te, 'dod chags dang bral ba ma mthong ba'i phyir la, ma mthong bar yang gnod par bya ba dang, gnod par byed pa'i dngos po mi 'gyur pa'i phyir ro.

‡ And because in the inference of impossibility there is no evidence ruling it out, because there is no observation of dispassion, and because there is no establishing a relation between a means of countering and what is to be countered through what is unobserved.

K70.24–71.01: asambhave tv anumātavye bhavatām na tasya dharmasya bādhaḥ kaścīd hetur vidyate. tadabhāvān nāsambhavadviśeṣahetavaḥ pumāṃsa iti sambandhaḥ. katham punar bādhakasyābhāva ity āha. vairāgyasyādṛṣṭatvāt. upalakṣaṇam caitat sarvajñasyāpy adṛṣṭatvāt. adṛṣṭena ca vairāgyeṇa saha hetor bādhyabādhakabhāvāsiddheḥ.

21.11 G15.24; P183.20

rāgādyavyabhicārikārya-abhāvāt. sambhave 'pi viśeṣānām draṣṭum aśakyatvāt. tādrśām cāpratikṣepārthatvāt.

'dod chags (*Pk414a.1*) la sogs pa'i 'bras bu 'khrul pa med pa can med pa'i phyir ro. srid (*D269a.7*) kyang khyad par rnamts blta bar mi nus pa'i phyir ro. de lta bu dag ni spang bar 'os pa yang ma yin no.

‡ And because there is no invariable effect of such things as passion. Because even when specific properties are present, it is impossible to observe them. And because it is not appropriate to dismiss such things.

K71.02–12: syān matam. na vacanāder vairāgyādīnām sākṣād asambhavo 'numīyate yena bādhaḥ hetur mṛgyate. kintu vītarāgābhimateṣu rāgādayo 'numīyante. teṣv anumiteṣv arthato vītarāgādīpratiśiddhamadrṣṭenāpi vairāgyeṇa rāgitvasya virodhād ity ata āha. rāgetyādi. na hi rāgādīnām avyabhicāri kāryam asti. ādigrahaṇād asarvajñaparigrahaḥ. tathā hi vyavahāryutpattim ārabhya yathā yathārthaparijñānam tathā tathā tadviśayam vaktṛtvam bhavātīti tena yadi sarvaviśayam kasyacid vijñānam syāt tad viśayam api vaktṛtvam kena vāryate.

syād etat. yadi vairāgyādīlakṣaṇam tasya viśeṣo 'sti katham asmabhir nopalabhyata ity āha. sambhave 'pi teṣām vairāgyādīlakṣaṇānām viśeṣānām parasantāne draṣṭum aśakyatvāt. na ca tathābhūtānām anupalambhāt praktikṣepa ity āha. tādrśo ca viprakarṣiṇām apratikṣepārthatvāt.

21.13 G16.01; P184.01

naivaṃ vākyāni dṛśyaviśeṣatvāt.

tshig ^(Pk414a.2) rnam ni de lta bu ma yin te, khyad par bltar rung ba'i phyir ro.

‡ Sentences are not that way, since they have observable differences.

K71.13–15: syād etat. yathā puruṣā apratikṣepārhās tadvad vakyānīty āha. naivamityādi. kiṃ kāraṇam. dṛśyaviśeṣatvāt. tathā hi vaidikānāṃ vākyānāṃ viśeṣo dṛśya eveṣyate.

21.14 G16.02; P184.01

adṛśyatve 'py adṛṣṭaviśeṣāṇāṃ vijātīyatvopagamavirodhāt.

bltar mi rung ba zhig yin na yang khyad par ma mthong ba rnam rigs mi mthun pa nyid du khas len pa ^(D269b.1) 'gal ba'i phyir ro.

‡ And because, even if [the difference] is not observable, it is incompatible with the assumption that those [Vedic sentences and ordinary sentences] that have unobserved differences are of a different class.

K71.15–17: atha neṣyate. evam adṛśyatve 'pi viśeṣasyābhyupagamyamāne. tenānupalabdheṇa viśeṣeṇādṛṣṭaviśeṣāṇāṃ vaidikavākyānāṃ laukikavākyebhyo vijātīyatvopagamavirodhāt.

21.15 G16.02; P184.02

tadviśeṣāṇāṃ anyatrāpi śakyakriyatvāt.

de'i khyad ^(Pk414a.3) par rnam ni gzhan la yang bya bar nus pa'i phyir ro.

‡ Because their differences can be produced in the other [*scil.*, in the human sentences] as well.

K71.18–20: syān matam. dṛśyā eva viśeṣo vaidikānāṃ duḥśravaṇatvadurbhāṇatvādayas taiḥ pauruṣeyebhyo bhinnāni bhaviṣyatīty ata āha. tadviśeṣāṇāṃ ity ādi. anyatreṭi pauruṣeyeṣu.

21.16 G16.03; P184.02

pratyakṣāṇāṃ śabdānāṃ apratyakṣasvabhāvābhāvāt.

sgra mngon sum pa rnam la mngon sum ma yin pa'i ngo bo nyid med pa'i yang phyir ro.

‡ Because sensible sounds do not have the nature of what is insensible.

K71.20–22: na kevalam adṛṣṭaviśeṣāṇām vijāṭiyatvopagamavirodhād adṛṣyatvaṃ viśeṣāṇām ayuktam itaś ca pratyakṣāṇām apratyakṣasvabhāvāvirodhāt. na hy ekasya svabhāvād vyaṃ ghaṭate. viśeṣāḥ pratyakṣā eva kevalaṃ bhrāntinimittasadbhāvāt.

21.17 G16.04; P184.02

bhrāntinimittābhāvāt. bādhakābhāvād bhrāntyasiddheḥ.

'khrul pa'i rgyu mtshan med pa'i phyir te, gnod par byed (^{Pk414a.4}) pa med pas 'khrul pa mi 'grub pa'i phyir ro.

‡ Because there is no occasion for error, because there is no establishing that there is error given the absence of a means of countering.

K71.22–72.02: viśādiśaktivan nāvadhāryanta iti ced āha. bhrāntinimittābhāvād iti. rūpasādharmadarśanaṃ hi bhrāntinimittaṃ viśādiṣu. naivaṃ vaidikeṣu. kathaṃ gamyata iti ced āha. bhādakābhāvād bhrāntyasiddher iti. yadi vaidikāṇām viśeṣe bhrāntyānapalakṣyamāṇe punar viśeṣāvalambipramāṇam utpadyeta bhrānter bādhakaṃ tadā bhrāntes tannimittasya ca bhavati nīścayas tac ca nāsti. tasmāl laukikāiḥ śabdaiḥ vaidikāṇām aviśeṣe sādhye nāsti sādhaḥkaṃ pramāṇam.

21.18 G16.05; P184.03

puruṣeṣu viśeṣadarśanasya bādhakatvād asamānam. parabhāvabhūtasya ca vākyaviśeṣasyātadviśeṣatvāt.

[S [NP5 [NP7 puruṣeṣu] [NP6 (viśeṣa<darśanasya)] bādhavat] [NP1s (a-samānam)] [VP 0] [NP5 [NP6 [AP6 [NP5 e 1] ((para<bhāva)<bhūtasya)] [CNJ ca] (vākya<viśeṣasya)] (a-(tat1<viśeṣatvāt))]]

(^{D269b.2}) skyes bu dag ni khyad par mthong ba gnod par byed pa yin pa'i phyir mtshungs pa ma yin no. tshig gi khyad par gzhan gyi ngo bor gyur pa ni de'i khyad (^{Pk414a.5}) par ma yin pa'i phyir ro.

‡ Because the observation of differences among men contravenes <the belief that there are no differences>, and because the particular sentences alleged to have a nature different <from ordinary sentences> are not different from them, there is no similarity <between the case of men and the case of sentences>.

‡ It is not parallel, because the observation of differences among human beings is the means of countering, and because the difference in sentences that constitutes a difference in nature is not that differentiating property.⁵

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate § donkey anaphora: antecedent for “tat1” is implicit argument for “para”, otherwise “tat” has an unrecoverable antecedent; K 72.9 supplies “vākya”.

§ “viśeṣa”: ambiguous between “difference” and “particular”

§ “samāna”: treated as an abstract noun; but dictionaries have no such entry

§ “bhūta”: alleged (consult Hayes on “bhūta” in “pramāṇa-bhūta”)

⁵ This translation is murky.

K72.03–09: puruṣeṣu tarhi kiṃ bādhakaṃ yena sarvākāraguṇasāmyasādhane doṣa ity āha. puruṣeṣv ity ādi. prajñādiviṣayasyātiśayasyābhyāsapūrvakasya yad darśanaṃ tad eva bādhakam. yady asaṃbhavad vairāgyaṃ puruṣasya cittaṃ bhavet. nābhyāśasādheyaviṣeṣaṃ bhavet. bhavati ca. tato viṣeṣadarśanasya bādhakatvād asamānam. vedavākyaṇumāne yad uktaṃ pratyakṣāṇaṃ śabdānām apratyakṣasvabhāvābhāvād iti. syād ayaṃ doṣo yadi viṣeṣaḥ svabhāvabhūtaḥ syāt. kiṃ tu parabhāvabhūta ity āha. parabhāvabhūtasyeti. parabhāvaṃ gataḥ parabhāvabhūtaḥ. anyasvabhāva ity arthaḥ. atadviṣeṣatvād ity avākyaṇaviṣeṣatvāt.

21.19 G16.07; P184.04

tad abhinnasvabhāvānāṃ sarveṣāṃ puruṣakriyā na vā kasyacit.

[S tat [NP1s [NP6 [AP6 ((a-bhinna)<svabhāvānām) sarveṣāṃ] (puruṣa<kriyā) [NP6[ADV na] vā (kasya-cit)]]]

de'i phyir khyad par med pa'i rang bzhin thams cad skyes bus byed do. yang na ni 'ga' yang ma yin no.

† Therefore, all <sentences>, having the same nature, are a product of human human activity or none are.

‡ Therefore, [the property of] being the work of human beings belongs to all, without any difference in nature, or to none.

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate (possession)
§ possible ellipsis: confirmed by K 72.11.

K72.09–11: yato nāsti viṣeṣo vākyaṇāṃ tattasmādabhinnasvabhāvānāṃ sarveṣāṃ pauṣeyāpauṣeyābhimatānāṃ puruṣakriyā. puruṣaiḥ karaṇam. na vā kasyacit. laukikasyāpi na puruṣakriyetyarthaḥ.

22 G16.08; P184.06 D269b.3

kiṃ ca

**ātmaṃrcetanādīnāṃ yo 'bhāvasyāprasādhakaḥ
sa eva anupalambhaḥ kiṃ hetvabhāvasya sādhaḥ.**

[S [CNJ kim ca] [RC [NP6 ((ātma+(mṛd<cetana))-ādīnām) [NP1s yaḥ 1] [VP 0 [NP1 [NP6 _ abhāvasya] (a-prasādhakāḥ)]]] [NP1s [AP1 saḥ [PRT eva]] anupalambhaḥ 1] [ADV kim] [VP 0 [NP1 [NP6 (hetu<abhāvasya)] sādhaḥ]]]

(D269b.3) gzhan yang, bdag dang sa la shes yod sogs. med par (Pk414a.6) bsgrub byed min pa'i. mi dmigs gang yin de kho na. gtan tshigs med sgrub yin nam ci.

† Moreover, **how can the very same non-apprehension which does not establish the absence of such things as the self and consciousness in earth establish the absence of the hetu <from the vipakṣa>.**

‡ Moreover, **how can the same non-apprehension that is incapable of establishing the absence of a self and the absence of consciousness in clay establish the absence of the evidence [among non-possessors of the property requiring establishment]?**

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

§ left extraposition from NP6 of NP6 within RC except CNJ

§ subjacency violation: NP6 within NP6 within predicate NP1 moved unless first NP6 is extroposed from NP1s and the gap contains a null pronoun

§ intra-s anaphora

§ “eva”: “the very same” (identity emphasis)

K72.12–18: evam ācāryīyasyādarśanamātreṇa vipakṣād dhetoḥ vyātirekam
icchataḥ granthavirodhaṃ pramāṇavirodhaṃ coktvā tīrthikānāṃ
parasparavyāghātāmāha. kiṃ cety ādi. mṛdaś cetanā. etac ca lokayatadarśanaṃ.
ātmā ca mṛccetanā ceti dvandvaḥ. ādiśabdāt kṣīrādiṣu dravyādi. teṣāṃ abhāvasya
sādhanañyānupalambhaḥ pareṇokto 'pi yas tasyābhāvasyāprasādhaka iṣṭa
ātmādivādibhir anupalambhamātrasyāpramāṇatvād iti. sa evānupalambha
ātmādinīṣedhe pramāṇatvenāniṣṭaḥ kiṃ hetvabhāvasya hetoḥ vipakṣād
vyātirekasya sādhakaḥ.

22.1 G16.11; P184.09

anupalambhaṃ cāsya pramāṇayata ātmavādo nirālambaḥ syāt. apratyakṣatvād
ātmanas tatkāryāsiddheḥ.

[S [NP2 anupalambham] [CNJ ca] [NP6 asya [PC6 [VP _ pramāṇayataḥ]]] [NP1s
(ātmā<vādaḥ)] [VP [AP1 nirālambaḥ] syāt] [NP5 [NP5 (a-pratyakṣatvāt) [NP6
ātmanaḥ 1]] ((tat1 <kārya) <(a-siddheḥ))]]]

mi dmigs pa tshad mar byed pa 'di'i bdag dngos su smra ba yang dmigs pa med par
'gyur te, ^(Pk414a.7) bdag mngon ^(D269b.4) sum ma yin pa'i phyir dang, 'bras bu ma
grub pa'i phyir ro.

‡ And the view of the self <as existent> must be baseless for one who regards
non-apprehension as epistemic, because, due to the self's imperceptibility, effects are
unestablished as its <effects>.

‡ And the theory of a self on the part of him who makes non-apprehension a means of
acquiring knowledge would be baseless, because, owing to the self's insensibility, its
effects cannot be established.

§ copula: overt: predicational: NP1s VP

§ intra-s anaphora

§ left extraposition from PC of NP2 to MC

§ subjacency violation: NP extraposition from PC (unless “asya” is omitted)

§ cpd: *tat-kārya-a-siddhi*. The cpd *tat-kārya* does not make sense as a typical 6th case tatpuruṣa. Rather, it
seems to have the force of the non-bahuvrihi part of the *vyadhikarāṇa-bahuvrihi uṣṭra-mukha*
(*camel-faced*, i.e., having a face like a camel's).

K72.18–22: hetvabhāve cānupalambhaṃ cāsyā vaiśeṣikādeḥ pramāṇayataḥ ātmavādo nirālambo nirāśrayaḥ syāt. tatrānupalambhasyābhāvasādhanasya sambhavāt. tathā hi na pratyakṣeṇātmana upalambho nityaparokṣatvābhyupagamāt. atha syād ātmano 'numānam evopalambho 'sty evety ata āha. tatkāryety ādi. apratyakṣatvād evātmanas tatkāryasvabhāvarūpasya liṅgasyāniścayān nānumānam upalambhaḥ.

22.2 G16.12; P184.10

indriyādīnāṃ tu vijñānakāryasya kādācitkatvāt sāpekṣyasiddhyā prasiddhir ucyate. kim apy asya kāraṇam astīti. ca tv evambhūtam iti.

[S [NP1s [NP6 (indriya<ādīnām) 2] [CNJ tu] [NP3 [NP5 [NP6 (vijñāna<kāryasya) 1] kādācitkatvāt] [NP6 e 1] [NP6 e 2] (sāpekṣya<siddhyā)] prasiddhiḥ] [VP ucyate [S [S [NP1s e 2] [VP [NP1 [AP1 kim [PRT api]] [NP6 asya 1] kāraṇam] asti] [PRT iti]]] [S [ADV na] [CNJ tu] [NP1s e 2] [VP 0 [AP1 (evam<bhūtam)]] [PRT iti]]]]]]

dbang po la sogs pa ni 'bras bu rnam par shes pa res 'gag pa yin pa'i phyir ltos pa dang bcas pa nyid du grub pas rab ^(Pk414a.8) tu 'grub par brjod de, 'di la rgyu ci zhig yod do zhes bya ba yin gyi 'di lta bur gyur ba ^(D269b.5) zhig go zhes bya ba ni ma yin no

† The establishment of <the existence of> such things as the sense faculties through the establishment that awareness, their effect, being transient, is dependent on them, is spoken of as a case of their being a cause of awareness not as their being thus and so.

‡ But concerning the establishment of such things as the sense-faculties by establishing that their effect, sensory awareness, is occasional, it is said that it [*scil.* sensory awareness] has dependence [upon some cause], but not that [the cause] has such and such a nature.

§ copula: overt: predicational: NP1s VP
 § cpd intrusion: both null NP6 wrt "sāpekṣya"
 § ellipsis: E is NP1 of previous clause
 § intra-s anaphora

K73.01–09: yathā nityaparokṣāṇām apīndriyādīnām anumānam tathātmano bhaviṣyatīti ced āha. indriyāṇām ity ādi. ādiśabdāt smṛtibijādīnām. vijñānam eva kāryaṃ tasya kādācitkatvād. tathā hi satsv api rūpālokamanaskāreṣu nimīlitalocanādyavasthāsu vijñānasyābhāvāt. punaś conmīlitalocanāvasthāsu bhāvāt. vijñānakāryaṃ kāraṇāntarasāpekṣaṃ sidhyati tato 'sya sāpekṣyasiddhyā indriyādīnāṃ prasiddhir ucyate.

etad uktaṃ bhavati. yat sapekṣam idaṃ kādācitkam. vijñānaṃ tat kim apy asya vijñānasya kāraṇam astīty anumīyate tad eva cendriyam iti vyavahriyate. na tv evambhūtam iti na rūpaviśeṣeṇa mūrttatvādīnā yuktam indriyam anumīyata iti arthaḥ.

22.3 ¶ G16.15; P184.12

naivaṃ sukhādikāryaṃ prasādhitaṃ kaṃcid arthaṃ puṣṇāti. yena kenacit
kāraṇavattvābhyupagamāt.

[S [ADV na] [ADV evam] [NP1s ((sukha-ādi)<kāryam) 1] [VP [NP2 [AP1
prasādhitam] [AP2 (kam-cit)] artham] puṣṇāti] [NP5 [NP3 yena (kena-cit)] [NP6 e
1] ((kāraṇavattva<abhyupagamāt)]]

'bras bu bde ba la sogs pa rab tu bsgrubs pa ni de ltar don cung zad kyang rgyas
(Pk414b.1) par mi byed de, gang yang rung bas rgyu dang ldan par khas blangs pa'i
phyir ro.

† In contrast, it is not the case that, because one accepts something to have a cause, an
effect such as happiness shows some established thing <such as a permanent self to
be its cause>.

‡ An effect such as happiness does not support any established conclusion [such as a
permanent self] in this way [that is, by arguing that since happiness is occasional it
must have a cause], because what is known through some [cause of undetermined
nature] is [just that happiness] has a cause [but not that its cause is a permanent self].

§ analysis does not follow K (73.09–13) wrt NP1s or NP3

§ cpd intrusion: “yena kena-cit” wrt “kāraṇavattva”

§ apposition: AP1 to NP1s

§ negation scope: “na” wider than NP5

§§ G *sukhādikāryaṃ*; PM *sukhādi kāryam*. K and T support G.

§§ Tibetan construes “prasādhitam” as modifying “sukhādikāryam,” but K construes it as modifying
“kaṃcid artham,” which seems right.

§ “evam”: like “tathā”, in negative contexts, it cannot be translated as “likewise”.

K73.09–14: **evam** iti yathā

kādācitkavijñānakāryānyathānupapattyendriyānumānam. tathā sukhādikāryaṃ
yasya **sukhādikāryaṃ** tat kim apy asīty anumānena tac cātmasvarūpam iti
prasādhitaṃ kaṃcid artham ātmavādīno **na puṣṇāti. yena kenacid**
anirdiṣṭaviśeṣeṇa kāraṇena **kāraṇavattvābhyupagamāt** sukhādinām. na
caivambhūta ātmā nityakarṭṛbhoktrtvādilakṣaṇatvenābhyupagamāt. yataś ca
yathābhyupagatasyātmano nāsti kāryaliṅgam.

22.4 G16.16; P184.12

tathā cānupalambha evātmanaḥ syāt.

[S [AC [NP7 e] [PC7 [ADV tathā] 0]] [CNJ ca] [NP1s anupalambhaḥ [PRT eva]
[NP6 ātmanaḥ]] [VP syāt]]

de lta yin dang, bdag mi dmigs pa kho nar 'gyur na,

† And, this being so, there could be no apprehension of the self at all.

‡ And this being so, there would surely be no apprehension of the self.

§ copula: overt: existential: NP1s VP
 § “tathā”: construed as “tathā sati” following K 73.14–15.
 § “eva”: emphatic after privative prefix

K73.14–15: **tathā ca satyanupalambha eva ātmanaḥ syāt.**

22.5 G16.17; P184.13

tam tena pratyācakṣāṇaḥ kim iti prativyūḍho ’nupalambhasyāsādhana tvād iti. katham asādhanaṃ vyatirekaṃ sādhayet.

[S [NP1s e [PC1 [VP [NP2 tam] [NP3 tena 1] pratyācakṣāṇaḥ]]] [ADV kim iti] [VP 0 [AP1 prativyūḍhaḥ]] [NP5 [NP6 anupalambhasya 1] (a-sādhana tvāt)]]

[S [PRT iti] [ADV katham] [NP1s (a-sādhanaṃ)] [VP [NP2 vyatirekaṃ] sādhayet]]

des de sel ba na ci ste ^(D269b.6) mi dmigs pa bsgrub pa ma yin no zhes bsal, ldog ^(Pk414b.2) pa ji ltar sgrub par byed.

† How does one <who holds that the soul exists> refute someone who, through its not being apprehended, rejects its existence? <He does so> by saying that non-apprehension <of the soul> does not establish <that it does not exist>. So, how could that which does not establish <an absence> establish a counter-comitance?

‡ How is one who rejects that [*scil.*, the self] by that [non-apprehension] counter [the proponent of the self]? By saying that [the self exists] because non-apprehension is not a means of establishing [an absence]. How would that which is not a means of establishing [an absence] establish a dissociation?

§ inter-s anaphora: antecedent of “tam” “ātmanaḥ”; antecedent of “tena” “anupalambhaḥ”.

§ ellipsis: E is previous clause

§ “iti”: “by saying that” (cp. K 73.17)

§§ The Tibetan translation is not very clear.

K73.15–18: **tasmāt tam ātmānaṃ tenānupalambhena**
 pratyakṣānumānanivṛtilakṣaṇena **pratyācakṣāṇaḥ. kim iti prativyūḍhaḥ**
 pratikṣipta ātmavādinā. anupalambhamātrān nāsty asattvam ātmana iti. **katham**
 asādhanaṃ sad vipakṣād dhetoḥ prāṇādimatvāder **vyatirekaṃ sādhayet.**

22.6 G16.19; P184.14

mṛdaḥ khalv api kaścic caitanyam anupalabhyamānam apīcchann adarśanād vacanaāder vyāvṛttim āha.

[S [NP6 mṛdaḥ] [ADV khalu [PRT api]] [NP1s (kaḥ-cit) [PC1 [NP2 _ caitanyam [PC2 anupalabhyamānam [PRT api]]] icchan]] [NP5 (a-darśanāt) [NP6 e 1]] [VP [NP2 [NP6 (vacana-ādeḥ) 1] vyāvṛttim] āha]]

yang la la ni sa la shes pa yod par mi dmigs par 'dod bzhin du yang ma mthong bas tshig la sogs pa ldog par smra'o.

† It is well-known too that some, who accept the sentience of earth, even though being unapprehended, assert the exclusion of such things as speech <from such things as omniscient beings> due to their non-observation <therein>.

‡ But some people, while admitting that clay has sentience even while not being apprehended, assert the exclusion of things such as speaking on the grounds of its not being observed.

§ left extraposition from NP2 of NP6 to MC

§ subjacency violation: extraposed NP6 originates as object of a participle and moved to the beginning of MC (unless “mr̥daḥ” after NP1s: see Sanskrit reconstruction)

§ intra-s anaphora

§ “khalu api”: see Emeneau 1969. §§ Tibetan translation “yang” is the usual translation for “api ca” or “tu”.

K73.18–22: bhūtānām eva śaktiś caitanyam iṣyate cārvākaiḥ. bhūtasvabhāvā ca mṛd ity evaṃ mṛdaḥ khalv api caitanyam anupalabhyamānam apīcchan lokāyatikaḥ. yad āha tebhyo bhūtebhyaś caitanyaṃ madaśaktivad vijñānam iti. punas tata evāpramāṇakād anupalambhāt. adarśanād vacanāder asarvajñatvādisādhānāya līngatvenopanītasya vipakṣād vyāvṛttim āha.

22.7 G16.20; P184.15

dadhyādikam cāparaḥ kṣīrādiṣv aparārtheṣu saṃghātavādarśanād vyatirekam.

[S [NP2 (dadhy-ādikam)] [CNJ ca] [NP1s aparāḥ [PC1 [VP - [NP7 (kṣīra-ādiṣu)] [AP2 E1] E2]]] [NP5 [NP7 (a-(para<artheṣu))] (saṃghātatva1 <(a-darśanāt))] [VP [NP2 [NP6 e 1] vyatirekam] E3]]

gzhan ni 'o ma la sogs pa 'o la sogs pa ste, gzhan gyi (*Pk414b.3*) don ma (*D269b.7*) yin pa dag la 'dus pa nyid ma mthong bas ldog pa'o.

† And others, who accept <the existence of> such things as curds in such things as milk, even though being unapprehended, assert exclusion of compositeness from things not for others, because of their non-observation in them.

‡ And others, [while admitting that] there are such things as curds in such things as milk [even though it is not apprehended, assert] its dissociation in things that are not for the sake of something else on the grounds that being aggregated is not observed in them.

§ constituency violation: complement of moved constituent not moved

§ ellipsis: E1 is AP2 of last clause; E2 is AP1 of last clause; E3 is V of last clause.

§ left extraposition from PC of NP2 to MC

§ cpd intrusion: NP7 wrt “saṃghātatva”

§ intra-s anaphora

§ subjacency violation: NP extraposition from PC to MC initial

K73.22–74.03: dadhyādikam kṣīrādiṣv anupalabhyamānam apīcchan.

apara iti sāmḅhyaḅ punaḅ sa eva. parārthās cakḅurādayaḅ saḅghātatvād ity
abhidhāyāparārtheḅu śāśaviḅāñādiḅu saḅghātatvasyādarśanād vyatirekam āha
evaḅ tāvad asya parasparavyāghātaḅ. na cādarśanamātreḅāsyā hetor vyāptiḅ
sidhyati.

22.8 G16.22; P184.16

ko hy atra niyamaḅ saḅhatair avaśyaḅ parārthair bhavitavyam iti.

[S [VP 0 [AP1 kaḅ] [CNJ hi] [NP7 atra]] [NP1s niyamaḅ [[S [VP [NP3 saḅhataiḅ]
[ADV avaśyaḅ] [AP3 (para<arthaiḅ)] bhavitavyam]] [PRT iti]]]]

'di la 'dus pa dag ni gdon mi za bar gzhan gyi don yin par 'gyur ro. zhes bya ba'i nges
pa ci zhig yod.

† For what restriction is there in this case <to the effect> that composites must
necessarily be for others?

‡ For what is the restriction in this case whereby aggregated things must necessarily
be for the sake of something else?

§ copula: overt: existential: VP NP1s

K74.03–06: ko hy atra niyamaḅ saḅghātair avaśyaḅ parārthair bhavitavyaḅ
yataḅ saḅghātatvāc cakḅurādīnāḅ pārārthasiddhyātmārthatvaḅ sāmḅhyasya
sidhyet.

22.9 G16.23; P184.16

asty eva upalambho dadhyādīnāḅ kḅīrādiḅv anumānam. aśaktād anutpatteḅ.

[S [VP asti [PRT eva]] [NP1s upalambhaḅ [NP6 (dadhi-ādīnāḅ) [NP7 (kḅīra-ādiḅu)]
] [NP1 anumānam [NP5 [NP5 [NP7 e 1 (a-śaktāt)] [NP6 e 1] (an-utpatteḅ)]]]]]

'o ma la sogs pa la 'o la sogs (^{Pk414b.4}) pa dmigs pa rjes su dpag pa kho na ste, mi nus
pa las mi 'byung (^{D270a.1}) pa'i phyir ro. zhe na.

† There is indeed the apprehension of such things as curds in such things as milk,
<namely,> the inference of <something's> not arising from that which has no
potential <for it>.

‡ In fact, there is an apprehension of such things as curds in such things as milk; it is
an inference based on not arising from what has no potential.

§ copula: overt: existential: VP NP1s

§ apposition: NP1 to NP1s

§ implicit argument: implicit argument of “anutpatti”, referentially dependent on implicit argument for
“śakta”.

§ “eva”: “indeed” (V emphasis)

§§ Tibetan translation suggests that this sentence concludes a pūrvapakḅa.

K74.05–11: yad uktaṃ dadhyādikaṃ kṣīrādiṣv apy anupalabhyamānam apīti. tan na. yasmād asty evopalambho dadhyādīnām kṣīrādiṣu. ko 'sāv ity āhānumānam iti. anumānam cāhāśaktād anutpatter iti. yadi hi kṣīrādaḥ dadhyādiśaktir na syāt tato śaktāt kṣīrāder dadhyādi notpadyeta. prayogas tu yad yaj janane na śaktaṃ na tasya tata utpattir yathā śālibījād yavānkurasya. utpadyate ca dadhyādiḥ kṣīrādibhyas tasmād asti dadhyādiśaktiḥ kṣīrādāv iti kāryahetupratirūpako vaidharmyaprayogaḥ. śakter eva ca dadhyādiḥ kāryakāraṇayor abhedād iti manyate.

22.10 ¶ G16.24; P184.18

atha keyaṃ śaktiḥ.

[S [CNJ atha] [VP 0 [AP1 kā]] [NP1s [AP1 iyam] śaktiḥ]]

yang nus pa 'di ci yin.

† Now, what is this potentiality?

‡ And what is this potential?

§ copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s

K74.12: athetyādi siddhāntavādī.

22.11 G16.24; P184.18

sa eva bhāvaḥ uta anyad eva kiṃcit.

[S [S [NP1s E] [VP 0 [NP1 [AP1 saḥ [PRT eva]] bhāvaḥ]]] [S [NP1s E] [CNJ uta] [VP 0 [NP1 [AP1 anyat [PRT eva]] (kim-cit)]]]]]

ci yod pa de nyid yin nam, 'on te gzhan nyid cung zad cig yin.

† Either it is the thing itself or it is something else completely.

‡ Is it that very being, or is it something else?

§ As Apte makes clear (art. 258), “kim” is a correlative for “uta”. I see no reason to take this sentence as a question. “kim” does not occur in the sentence itself, and its function is the gloss is, as far as I can tell, to mark off scope, just like “either”.

§ copula: covert: identity: indeterminate

§ “eva”: “itself” (identity emphasis)

§ “eva”: “completely”

§§ The Tibetan translation has an equivalent for “kim”. This raises the interesting question of whether the translators felt a “kim” was implicit somehow, or whether they took the presence of “uta” alone as having the force of a question.

K74.12–13: yo 'sau dadhyādiko bhāvaḥ paścād upalabhyate kiṃ sa eva bhāvaḥ śaktir utānyad eva kiñcid dadhyāder arthāntaram.

22.12 G16.25; P184.18

sa eva cet tathaivopalabhyeta viśeṣābhāvāt.

[S [S [VP 0 [NP1 [AP1 saḥ [PRT eva]] E1]] [NP1s E2 1] [CNJ cet]] [S [ADV tathā [PRT eva]] [NP1s E3 1] [VP upalabhyeta] [NP5 [NP6 e 1] (viśeṣa<abhāvāt)]]]

gal te de ^(Pk414b.5) nyid yin na ni, de kho na bzhin du dmigs par 'gyur te, khyad par med pa'i phyir ro.

† If the potentiality is the thing itself, then it should be apprehended in the very same way <as the thing itself> because there is no difference <between them>.

‡ If the potentiality were that very being, then it would be apprehended in the very same manner, because there is no distinction.

§ copula: covert: identity: indeterminate

§ ellipsis: E1 is the head of the NP1 in the next to last clause; E2 is the NP1s of the last clause; E3 is the NP1s of the previous clause.

§ intra-s anaphora: only if there is an additional implicit argument in NP5

§ possible inter-s anaphora: NP6 might have antecedents in previous clause

§ "eva": "itself" (NP emphasis)

§ "eva": "very same" (identity emphasis)

K74.13–14: yo 'sau dadhyādiko bhāvaḥ paścād upalabhyate kiṃ sa eva bhāvaḥ śaktir utānyad eva kiñcid dadhyāder arthāntaram.

22.13 G16.26; P184.19

anyac cet katham anyabhāve tad asti.

[S [S [VP 0 [NP1 anyat]] [NP1s E1] [CNJ cet]] [S [ADV katham] [AC [NP7 (anya<bhāve)] [VP 0]] [NP1s tat] [VP asti]]]

ci ste gzhan zhig yin no ^(D270a.2) zhe na, ji ltar gzhan yod na de yod de.

† If it is something else, then how does the one <sc., the thing itself> exists when the other <sc., the potentiality> exists?

‡ If it is something else, then how is it present when the other is present?

§ copula: covert: identity: indeterminate

§ copula: overt: existential: NP1s VP

§ ellipsis: E1 is NP1s of last clause

§ counter-anaphora: "tat" and "anya"; but see K 74.15

K74.14–15: anyac ced iti. dadhyādibhyo 'rthāntaram cec chaktiḥ. tadānyabhāve 'nyasya śaktiākhyasya bhāve. tad dadhyādikam asti. naivety abhiprāyaḥ.

22.14 G16.26; P184.19

upacāra-mātram tu syād

[S [NP1s e] [VP [NP1 (upacāra<mātram)] [CNJ tu] syāt]]

nye bar gdags pa tsam du ni 'gyur ro.

† But <this> must be mere metonymy.

‡ But this would be nothing but metonymy.

§ copula: overt: predicational: indeterminate

§ null subject

§§ Abrams *Glossary of Literary Terms* defines **metonymy** thus: ‘the literal term for one thing is applied to another with which it has become closely associated. Thus “the Crown” or “the Scepter” can stand for the king...’. It defines **synecdoche** as a trope in which ‘a part of something is used to signify the whole.’ An example would be ‘ten hands’ to refer to ten labourers.

K74.16: dadhyādi jananasāmārthyāt kṣīrādaḥ dadhyādīty upacāramātram syāt.

22.15 G16.27; P184.19

ity ayam eṣāṃ parasparavyāghātaḥ.

[S [CNJ iti] [VP 0] [NP1s [AP ayam] [NP6 eṣāṃ] (paraspara<vyāghātaḥ)]]

(Pk414b.6) 'di ni 'di dag gi phan tshun 'gal ba yin no.

† Such is their mutual contradiction.

‡ Such is their mutual contradiction.

§ copula: covert: predicational: indeterminate

§ intra-s anaphora: NP6's antecedents are the Carvāka, the Vaiśeṣika, and the Sāṃkhya (K 74.17)

K74.17: anupalambhamapramāṇīkṛtya punas tasyaiva pramāṇīkaraṇamayam parasparavyāghāta eṣāṃ ātmādivādīnām ity upasamhāraḥ.

23 G16.28; P185.01 D270a.2

**tasmāt tanmātrasambandhaḥ svabhāvo bhāvam eva vā
nivartayet**

yathā vṛkṣaḥ śiṃśapāṃ śākhādimad viśeṣasyaiva kasyacit tathāprasiddheḥ sa tasya svabhāvaḥ.

[S [CNJ tasmāt] [NP1s [AP1 ((tat1<mātra)<sambandhaḥ)-B] svabhāvaḥ] [VP [NP2 bhāvam [PRT eva] 1] [CNJ vā] nivartayet] [S [CNJ yathā] [NP1s vṛkṣaḥ 2] [VP [NP2 śiṃśapāṃ] E]]]

[S [NP5 [NP6 [AP6 ((śākha-ādimat)<viśeṣasya)-B [PRT eva]]] (kasya-cit)] (tathā2<prasiddheḥ)] [NP1s saḥ] [VP [NP1 [NP6 tasya] svabhāvaḥ] 0]]

de'i phyir de tсам dang 'brel pa'i, ngo bo nyid kyis ngo bo nyid, bzlog par 'gyur ba'am. dper na shing gis shing sha pa lta bus ste, yal (*D270a.3*) ga la (*Pk414b.7*) sogs pa dang ldan pa'i khyad par 'ga' kho na zhig la de skad du grags pa'i phyir de ni de'i rang gi ngo bo yin no.

† **therefore, a nature, which depends on some thing, must <, when the nature is excluded,> exclude that very thing** as when a tree <, when excluded,> must exclude a śiṃśapā. Because only something which has such special properties as possessing branches is known to be such <namely, as a tree>, it is its <sc., the śiṃśapā's> nature.

‡ **Because of that, a natural property that is [causally] connected only with that [nature being used as evidence] would rule out the nature itself.** For example, a tree [when ruled out rules out] a Shinshapa tree. Because something whose specific property is possession of branches and so forth is thus known, it [*scil.*, the tree] is its [*scil.*, the Shinshapa's] natural property.

§§ G *yathāprasiddheḥ*; MPK *yathā prasiddheḥ*

§§ G ° *sambandha*; MP ° *sambaddha*; Miyasaka supports G. Tibetan suggests ° *sambaddha*.

§ bv cpd: “tat-mātra-sambandha” non-predicative; however, M 267 ed reads: “tat-mātra-sambaddha” (cf. K 74.19).

§ See 18.19: *svabhāvaḥ tat-mātra-anubandhī*

§ “tat-mātra” glossed as “hetu-sattā-mātra” (K 74.19)

§ intra-s anaphora: K (74.22) takes “tathā”’s antecedent to be “śiṃśapā”

§ ellipsis: E is V of main clause; change of tense

§ unrecoverable meaning: K 74.20 supplies “nivartamānaḥ” for NP1s

§ *yathā*clause: introduces an instance (“as when”)

§ “vā”: pairs with another “vā” in next part of verse (below)

§ “eva”: “mere” (semantic restriction on NP connotation)

§ “eva”: “only” (semantic restriction on NP denotation)

§§ Tibetan translation has same expression for both “svabhāva” and “bhāva”.

K74.19–75.01: yataś cādarśanamātrān nāsti vyatirekas tasmāt
tanmātrasambandhaḥ. hetusattāmātrasambaddhasvabhāvaḥ sādhyatvenābhimataḥ
svayaṃ nivarttamāno bhāvam evaṃ svabhāvabhūtam eva hetutvenopanītaṃ
nivarttayet. vāśabdo vakṣyamāṇavikalpāpekṣī. yathā vṛkṣo nivarttamānaḥ
śiṃśapāṃ nivarttayati. kasmāc chākhādīmad viśeṣasyaiva tathā śiṃśapeti
prasiddhaḥ sa vṛkṣas tasya śiṃśapākhyasya svabhāvaḥ.

23.1 G17.01; P185.04

svaṃ ca svabhāvaṃ parityajya katham bhāvo bhavet. svabhāvasyaiva bhāvatvād iti
tasya svabhāvapratibandhād avyabhicāraḥ.

[S [GC [VP [NP2 [AP2 svaṃ 1] [CNJ ca] svabhāvam] parityajya]] [ADV katham]
[NP1s bhāvaḥ 1] [VP bhavet] [NP5 [NP6 svabhāvasya [PRT eva]] bhāvatvāt]]

[S [CNJ iti] [NP5 [NP6 tasya] (svabhāva<pratibandhāt)] [NP1s avyabhicāraḥ]]

rang gi ngo bo yongs su bor nas kyang ji ltar yod par 'gyur te, rang gi ngo bo kho na
ngo bo yin pa'i (*Pk414b.8*) phyir ro. de'i phyir de ni rang bzhin 'brel pa'i phyir 'khrul
(*D270a.4*) pa med do.

† And how can a thing exist, having abandoned its own nature, because the thing is its very nature? So, there is no deviation because of its <sc., the thing's> natural relation.

‡ And how can a being be present after abandoning its own nature, given that the nature itself is the being? Therefore, owing to a natural connection, it is not erratic.

§ copula: overt: existential: NP1s VP

§ inter-s anaphora

§ interrogative scope: “katham” narrower than NP5

§ “eva”: “very” (NP emphasis)

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ inter-s anaphora

§§ Note differing translations for “bhāva” in Tibetan.

K75.01–04: svaṃ ca svabhāvaṃ vṛkṣaṃ parityajya katham śiṃśapākhyo bhāvo bhavet. kiṃ kāraṇam. svabhāvasyaiva vṛkṣasvātmana eva bhāvatvāc chiṃśapārūpāt. iti hetos tasyātmabhūtasya sādhanasya śiṃśapādeḥ savabhāvapratibandhād eva svabhāve sādhyābhimate vṛkṣādau yathoktena prakāreṇa pratibandhād evāvvyabhicāraḥ.

Verse 23c²d

23.2 G17.04; P185.06 D270a.4

M11

kāraṇaṃ vā kāryam avyabhicārataḥ.

[S [NP1s kāraṇam] [CNJ vā] [VP [NP2 kāryam] E] [NP5 avyabhicārataḥ]]

rgyu yis ni, 'bras bu 'khrul pa med pa'i phyir.

† **Alternatively, a cause <, when excluded,> must exclude <its> effect, because of the non-deviation <of the latter with respect to the former>.**

‡ **Or the cause would rule out the effect, owing to not being erratic.**

§ ellipsis: E is the verb in the previous part of the verse

§ “vā”: pairs with another “vā” in previous part of verse (above)

§ unrecoverable meaning: K 75.5 supplies “nivartamānaḥ” for NP1s; D also supplies “nivartamānaḥ” for NP1s

K75.04–06: kāraṇaṃ vā nivartamānam ity adhyāhāraḥ. kāryaṃ nivarttayati prakṛtam. kasmād. avyabhicārataḥ kāryasya kāraṇāvvyabhicārād ity arthaḥ.

23.3 G17.05; P185.07

kāraṇaṃ nivartamānaṃ kāryaṃ nivartayati.

[S [NP1s kāraṇam [PC1 [VP nivartamānam]]] [VP [NP2 kāryam] nivartayati]]

rgyu ldog pa las 'bras bu ldog par byed do.

† A cause, when excluded, excludes <its> effect.

‡ A cause, when ruled out, rules out its effect.

§ appositive reason: AP1 wrt VP

§ cf. PVin 2, 46.3

K75.06: kāraṇam ity ādinā vyācaṣṭe.

23.4 G17.05; P185.07

anyathā tat tasya kāryam eva na syāt.

[S [ADV anyathā] [NP1s tat] [VP [NP1 [NP6 tasya] kāryam [PRT eva]] [ADV na] syāt]]

gzhan du na de ni de 'i 'bras (*Pk415a.1*) bu nyid ma yin par 'gyur ro.

† ‡ Otherwise, it would not be its effect.

§ copula: overt: predicational: NPs VP

§ counter-anaphora: "anyathā"

§ inter-s anaphora: see K 75.7 on NP1s's antecedent

§ counteranaphora

§ "eva" unclear

§ cf. PVin 2, 46.4

K75.07–10: anyatheti. yadi kāraṇe nivarttamāne kāryam na nivartteta. tadā tat kāryābhimatam tasya kāraṇasya kāryam eva na syāt. tasmāt kāraṇam nivarttamānam kāryam avyaśyam nivarttayati. yady api vāsagrḥādāv agnikāraṇanivṛttāv api na dhūmasya nivṛttis tathāpi dr̥ṣṭakāraṇavyatirekeṇa nānyasmād asyotpattir abhipretyarthaḥ.

23.5 G17.06; P185.07

siddhas tu kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ svabhāvaṃ niyamayati ity ubhayathā svabhāvapratibandhād eva nivṛttiḥ.

[S [NP1s [AP1 siddhaḥ] [CNJ tu] ((kārya+kāraṇa)<bhāvaḥ)] [VP [NP2 svabhāvam] niyamayati]]

[S [CNJ iti] [ADV ubhayathā] [NP5 (svabhāva<pratibandhāt) [PRT eva]] [VP 0] [NP1s nivṛttiḥ]]

rgyu dang 'bras bu 'i ngo bo grub pa ni ngo bo nyid nges par byed de, de bas na gnyi ga rang bzhin 'brel pa kho (*D270a.5*) nas ldog go.

† But, the relation of cause and effect, when established, restricts the nature. Thus, in both ways, there is exclusion only because of a natural relation.

‡ But the relation of cause and effect, when established, necessitates the natural property. Therefore, in either case [the process of] ruling out is due only to a natural connection.

§ appositive reason: AP1 wrt VP

§ cf. PVin 2, 46.5-6

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ “eva”: “only” (semantic restriction on case)

K75.10–13: ata evāha. siddhas tv ity ādi. siddhas tu kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ kāryasya svabhāvaṃ kāraṇe niyamayati. sati tasmīn bhavaty asati na bhavatīty evaṃ tadavyabhicāriṇaṃ karoti. ubhayatheti tādātmyena tadutpattiyā vā yaḥ svabhāvapratibandhas tasmād eva. sādhyanivṛtīyā hetor nivṛtīḥ.

24 G17.08; P185.09 D270a.5

**anyathaikanivṛtīyā anyavinivṛtīḥ katham bhavet
nāśvavān iti martyena na bhāvyaṃ gomatāpi kim**

[S [ADV anyathā] [NP1s [NP3 (eka<nivṛtīyā)] (anya<vinivṛtīḥ)] [ADV katham] [VP bhavet]]

[S [[S [NP1s e 1] [ADV na [VP 0]] [AP1 aśvavān] [CNJ iti]] [VP [NP3 martyena 1] [ADV na] bhāvyaṃ [AP3 gomatā [PRT api]]] [ADV kim]]]

**de lta ma yin na gcig logs^(Pk415a.2) pas, ji ltar gzhan ni ldog par gyur. mi la rta
mi bdog ces ste, phyugs kyang bdog pa min nam ci.**

‡ Otherwise, how should there be the exclusion of one through the exclusion of the other? Must a human not be a cow-possessor too insofar as he is not a horse-possessor?

‡ Otherwise, how could there be the ruling out of one by the ruling out of the other? Given that a man is not an owner of horses, must he also not be an owner of cattle?

§ copula: overt: existential: NPs VP

§ counter-anaphora: “anyathā”

§ counter-anaphora: “anya”

§ copula: overt: predicational: NP3 AP3

§ “iti”: unclear grammar; “iti kṛtvā” (K 75.16)

§ null subject: its denotation is anaphorically determined

K75.14–19: anyatheti yadi pratibandho neṣyate. ekasyāpratibandhakasya sādhyasya nivṛtīyānyanivṛtīḥ. apratibaddhasya sādhanadharmasya nivṛtīḥ katham bhavet. naiva. yasmān nāśvavān ity aśvarahita iti kṛtvā marttyena maṇṣyena na bhāvyaṃ gomatāpi kim. sannidhānāt tathaikasyeti svabhāvenāsambadhasya hetoḥ sannidhānāt katham anyasya sādhyasya sanniddhir naiva sannidhānam. yasmād.

gomān ity eva marttyena bhāvyaṃ aśvavatāpi kim.

25 G17.10; P185.11 D270a.5

**saṃnidhānāt tathaikasya katham anyasya saṃnidhiḥ
gomān ity eva martyena bhāvyaṃ aśvavatāpi kim**

[S [NP5 saṃnidhānāt [ADV tathā] [NP6 ekasya]] [ADV katham] [VP 0] [NP1s
[NP6 anyasya] saṃnidhiḥ]]

[S [NP1s e 1] [[AP1 gomān] VP 0] [PRT iti [PRT eva]] [VP [NP3 martyena 1]
bhāvyaṃ [AP3 aśvavatā [PRT api]] [ADV kim]]]

**de bzhin gcig cig nye ba'i phyir, ji ltar gzhan ni nye bar 'gyur, mi la phyugs
(Pk415a.3) ni bdog ces te, de bzhin (D270a.6) rta yang bdog gam ci.**

† In the same way, how is there the presence of one thing because of the presence of another? Must a human be a horse-possessor too just insofar as he is a cow-possessor?

‡ Similarly, how could there be proximity of one on the basis of the proximity of the other? Given only that a man is an owner of cattle, must he also be an owner of horses?

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ counter-anaphora

§ copula: overt: predicational: NP3 AP3

§ “iti”: unclear grammar; “iti kṛtvā” (K 75.16)

§ null subject: its denotation is anaphorically determined

§ “eva”: “merely” (restriction on case)

25.1 ¶ G17.12; P185.13

tasmāt svabhāvapratibandhād eva hetuḥ sādhyam gamayati.

[S [CNJ tasmāt] [NP5 (svabhāva<pratibandhāt) [PRT eva]] [NP1s hetuḥ] [VP [NP2
sādhyam] gamayati]]

de'i phyir rang bzhin 'brel pa kho nas gtan tshigs kyis bsgrub par bya ba go bar byed do.

† Therefore, only because of a natural relation does the hetu make known the sādhyā.

‡ Therefore it is only through a natural relation that evidence makes known what is establishable.

§ valence: causee argument missing for causative of “gam”

§ “eva”: “only” (semantic restriction on case)

K76.01–03: yata evaṃ tasmāt svabhāvapratibandhād eva sādhyābhimāte vastuni
pratibaddhatvād eva hetuḥ svasādhyam gamayati. na tu sambandhāt.
kāryakāraṇayor asahabhāvena vyāpyavyāpakayoś caikatvena
dviṣṭhasambadhābhāvāt.

25.2 G17.13; P185.13

sa ca tadbhāvalakṣaṇas tadutpattilakṣaṇo vā.

[S [NP1s saḥ] [CNJ ca] [VP 0 [AP1 [AP1 ((tat<bhāva)<lakṣaṇaḥ)-B] [AP1 ((tat<utpatti)<lakṣaṇaḥ)-B] [CNJ vā]]]]

de'i ngo bo'i mtshan nyid dam, de las byung ba'i mtshan (^{Pk415a.4}) nyid yin no.

† And it <sc., the natural relation> has the defining characteristic of being something or arising from something.

‡ And it is characterized either as having something's nature or arising from it.

§ copula: covert: predicational: NPs VP

§ inter-s anaphora

§ unrecoverable denotation: "tat" in "tat;bhāva": possible donkey anaphora; (K 76.4) glosses as "sādhyasvabhāva"

K76.03-04: sa ceti svabhāvapratibandhaḥ. tadbhāvalakṣaṇa iti
sādhyasvabhāvalakṣaṇas tadutpattilakṣaṇo vā.

25.3 G17.13, P185.14

sa evāvinābhāvo drṣṭāntābhyāṃ pradarśyate.

[S [NP1s [AP1 saḥ [PRT eva]] avinābhāvaḥ] [VP [NP3 drṣṭāntābhyāṃ] pradarśyate]]

med na mi 'byung ba nyid dpe de dag gis rab tu ston to.

† The indispensability itself is shown by the two <statements of> corroboration.

‡ The inseparability itself is shown by the two observed precedents.

§ "drṣṭānta": see nts (Gnoli 17.5 - 18.14)

§ "eva": "itself" (pragmatic restriction)

K76.04–09: sa eva svabhāvapratibandho 'vinābhāvākhyāḥ
sādharmaividharmyadrṣṭābhyāṃ pradarśyate.

etad uktaṃ bhavati. sādhyasāadhanayoḥ pratibandhagrāhakam eva pramāṇaṃ
vyāptigrāhakam tenaiva sādhanasya sādhyāyattatāgrahaṇāt sādhyābhāvo grhīta
eva kevalaṃ tad avinābhāvagrāhakam pramāṇaṃ vismṛtatvād drṣṭāntābhyāṃ
upadarśyate. yataś ca pramāṇakhyāpanād evāvinābhāvāsmṛtyā sādhyābhāve
sāadhanābhāvo niścito bhavati.

26 G17.15: P185.15 D270a.6

tasmād vaidharmyadrṣṭānte neṣṭo 'vaśyam ihāśrayaḥ
tadabhāve ca tan neti vacanād api tadgateḥ.

yataḥ
tadbhāvahetu-bhāvau hi dr̥ṣṭānte tad-avedinaḥ
khyāpyete

[S [CNJ tasmāt] [VP 0 [NP7 (vaidharmya<dr̥ṣṭānte)] [ADV na] [AP1 iṣṭaḥ]]
 [ADV avaśyam] [NP7 iha] [NP1s āśrayaḥ] [NP5 [NP5 [S [AC [NP7 (tat<abhāve)]
 [VP 0]] [CNJ ca] [NP1s tat] [ADV na] [VP 0] [PRT iti]]] vacanāt [PRT api]]
 (tat<gateḥ)] [S [CNJ yataḥ] [NP1s ((tat<bhāva)+(hetu<bhāvau)) 1] [CNJ hi] [VP
 [NP7 dr̥ṣṭānte] [NP6 (tat1<(a-vedinaḥ))] khyāpyete]]]

de phyir chos mi mthun dpe la, ^(D270a.7) nges par 'di la gzhi mi 'dod. de dag med
 na'ang de med ces, brjod pa las kyang de ^(Pk415a.5) rtogs phyir. 'di ltar dpe la de'i
 ngo bo dang, rgyu dngos de dag mi shes la, ston te,

† Therefore, in these cases <sc., in the case of inferences from individuals and effects>, it is not necessarily desired that a substratum <be mentioned> in <the statement> of counter-corroboration, because it <sc., counter-corroboration> is known also from a statement that when something is absent something does not exist, for <the statements of> corroboration communicate either <the relation of something> being something or <the relation of something> being the cause <of something> to one who does not know <one or the other>.

‡ Therefore, in this case it is not agreed that the substratum [of the property requiring establishment] is necessarily among the observed precedents of dissimilarity, because knowledge of it arises even from the expression “when that [sc. the property requiring establishment] is absent, then that [sc. the property bestowing establishment] is not [present].” Because: For being its nature and having the nature of a cause are communicated in the observed precedent to one who does not realize them.

§ intra-s anaphora

§ inter-s anaphora

§ unrecoverable denotation: both “tat”’s in iti clause; first “tat” in yataḥ clause

§ possible result clause: “yataḥ” complementizer

§ redundancy: “hi” and “yataḥ”

§ “iha”: K 76.10; Steinkellner 2004 fn. 2 takes it to refer to the tradition of Dignāga.

§ “tat<bhāva”: “sādhana-vyāpakatva” (K 76.15)

§ “dr̥ṣṭānta”: see nts (Gnoli 17.5–18.14)

§ Steinkellner 2004 p. 237 fn. 3 takes “tat” in the citation from Dignāga to refer to vipakṣa: K76.13 takes it to refer to vyāpaka and kāraṇa.

K76.10–17: tasmād vaidharmyadr̥ṣṭānte. tadviśaye 'vaśyam niyamena iha hetau kāryasvabhāvalakṣaṇa āśrayo vastubhūto dharmī neṣṭaḥ svabhāvānupalambhe tviṣṭa eva.

tatra hi viparyayeṇopalambhaḥ khyāpanīyaḥ. kiṃ kāraṇam. āśrayo neṣṭa ity āha. tadabhāve cety ādi. tadabhāve vyāpakakāraṇayor abhāve tadvyāpyakāryākhyam liṅgam neti na bhavaṅīty evaṃ vaidharmyavacanād apy āśrayarahitāt tadgater vyatirekagateḥ. (26)

kiṃ kāraṇam. yata ity ādi. svabhāvahetau sādhyasya tadbhāvaḥ sādhanavyāpakatvaṃ kāryahetau sādhyasya hetubhāvaḥ kāraṇatvaṃ khyāpyate. tadavedina ity tadbhāvahetubhāvāvedinaḥ puṃsaḥ.

27.1 G17.20; P186.04

dr̥ṣṭānte hi sādhyadharmasya tadbhāvas tanmātrānubandhena tatsvabhāvatayā
khyāpyate.

[S [NP7 dr̥ṣṭānte] [CNJ hi] [NP1s [NP6 (sādhyā<dharmasya) 1] (tat2<bhāvaḥ)]
[NP3 [NP6 e 1] ((tat2<mātra)<anubandhena)] [VP [NP3 (tat2<svabhāvatayā)]
khyāpyate]]

dpe la ni bsgrub par bya ba'i chos ni de'i ngo bor de tsam dang 'brel de'i rang gi
(D270b.1) ngo bo nyid ston to.

† For, in Ꞥa statement of Ꞥ corroboratorion, the sādhyā property being something is
communicated as being its nature insofar as the sādhyā property depends merely on it.

‡ For in the observed precedent the establishable property's having something's nature
is communicated as being that thing's natural property through its dependence on
nothing but that thing.

§ unrecoverable denotation: "tat" (possible donkey anaphora)

§ "tat-mātra" glossed as "sādhana-mātra" (K 76.19)

§ intra-s anaphora

§ secondary predication

§ "dr̥ṣṭānta": see nts (Gnoli 17.5 - 18.14)

K76.18: tad vyācaṣṭe. dr̥ṣṭānte hi sādhyadharmasya tadbhāvaḥ
sādhana-svabhāvatvaṃ khyāpyate tanmātrānubandhena.
sādhana-mātrānubandhena.

27.2 G17.21; P186.04

yaḥ kṛtakam svabhāvaṃ janayati so anityasvabhāvaṃ santam janayatīti pramāṇam
dr̥ṣṭāntena upadarśyate.

[S [NP1s [S [RC [NP1s yaḥ 1] [VP [NP2 [AP2 kṛtakam] svabhāvaṃ] janayati]
[NP1s saḥ 1] [VP [NP2 [AP2 (anitya<svabhāvaṃ)] santam] janayati] [PRT iti]]
pramāṇam] [VP [NP3 dr̥ṣṭāntena] upadarśyate]]]

(Pk415a.6) byas pa'i ngo bo nyid skyed par byed pa gang yin pa de ni mi rtag pa'i ngo
bo nyid yin⁶ na skyed par byed do zhes tshad ma dpes rab tu ston to.

† <The statement of> corroboratorion brings to view the epistemic cognition that
whatever produces an artificial nature produces an existing thing whose nature is
non-eternal.

‡ The knowledge that whatever produces a composite nature produces an
impermanent nature is communicated by an observed precedent.

§ intra-s anaphora: "saḥ" 's antecedent is "yaḥ"

§ valence: causee argument missing for causative of "upadr̥ś"

§ "dr̥ṣṭānta": see nts (Gnoli 17.5-18.14)

⁶ Pk: yin; D: med

27.3 G17.23; P186.05

anyathaikadharmsadbhāvāt tadanyenāpi bhavitavyam iti niyamābhāvāt sādhanasya sādhyavyabhicārāśāṅkā syāt.

[S [ADV anyathā] [NP5 [S [NP5 ((eka<dharma)1<sadbhāvāt)] [VP [NP3 (tat1<anyena) [PRT api]] bhavitavyam] [PRT iti]] (niyama<abhāvāt)] [NP1s [NP6 sādhanasya] ((sādhyā<vyabhicāra)<āśāṅkā)] [VP syāt]]

de lta ma yin na chos gcig yod pa'i phyir de las gzhan pa yang yod par ^(Pk415a.7) 'gyur ro zhes bya bar nges pa med pa'i phyir 'khrul ^(D270b.2) par dgos⁷ par 'gyur ro.

† Otherwise, there would be uncertainty about whether or not the hetu deviates from the sādhyā because of the lack of the restriction to the effect that, because of the existence of one property, another too must exist.

‡ Otherwise, there would be doubt about the establishing property's being erratic with respect to what must be established, because of the absence of a restriction whereby because of the presence of one property, another [property] than that must also be present.

§ copula: overt: existential: NP3 VP

§ copula: overt: existential: NP1s VP

§ inter-s counter-anaphora: "anyathā"

§ intra-s anaphora

§ cpd intrusion: "iti" clause wrt "niyama"; NP6 wrt "vyabhicāra"

27.4 G18.01; P186.07

tena ca pramāṇena sādhyadharmasya tanmātrānubandhaḥ khyāpyate.

[S [NP3 [AP3 tena] [CNJ ca] pramāṇena] [NP1s [NP6 (sādhyā<dharmaśya)] ((tat<mātra)<anubandhaḥ)] [VP - khyāpyate]]

tshad ma des kyang bsgrub par bya ba'i chos kyī de tsam dang 'brel pa ston te,

† And <the statement of> the epistemic cognition communicates the sādhyā property's dependence merely upon something's existence.

‡ And the fact that the establishable property has dependence on nothing more than that is communicated by that means of acquiring knowledge.

§ left extraposition from VP of NP3 within MC

§ "tat": either unrecoverable denotation (cf. 17.15, 17.20 above); or antecedent is "sādhanā" of last clause

§ "tat-mātra" glossed as "sādhanā-mātra" (K 77.8)

27.5 G18.02; P186.07

svakāraṇād eva kṛtakas tathābhūto jāto yo naśvaraḥ kṣaṇasthitodharmā. anyatas tasya tadbhāvaṇiṣedhāt.

⁷ D dgos; Pk: dogs

[S [NP5 (sva1 <kāraṇāt) [PRT eva]] [NP1s kṛtakaḥ 1] [VP 0 [AP1 _ [AP1 (tathā<bhūtaḥ)] jātaḥ]]]

[S [NP1s yaḥ 1] [VP 0 [AP1 naśvaraḥ [AP1 ((kṣaṇa<sthiti)<dharma)]] [NP5 [NP5 anyataḥ] [NP6 tasya 1] ((tat<bhāva)<niṣedhāt)]]]

rang gi rgyu kho na las byas pa 'jig pa'i dang tshul can ^(Pk415a.8) skad cig mar gnas pa'i chos gang yin pa de lta bu skyes te, gzhan las de yod pa bkag pa'i phyir ro.

† An artificial thing is produced from its own cause as existing in such a way that it is destructible, possessing the property of persisting <but> a moment, because the artificial thing's being a destructible thing is excluded from any <causes> other <sc., than the causes of the artificial thing>.

‡ A composite thing, which is perishable and has the characteristic of abiding for a moment, is born with such a nature only from its own cause, because of the exclusion of its nature from what is other [than perishable].

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

§ apposition: “kṣaṇa-” to “naśvara”

§ left extraposition from AP1 of NP5 within MC

§ intra-S counter-anaphora

§ intra-s anaphora

§ result clause: no complementizer; rel prn instead

§ secondary predication

§ “tat<bhāva””: “anityatā-svabhāva” (K 77.12); nb: “anityatā” is sādhya here

§ “eva””: “just” (semantic restriction on NP denotation)

27.6 G18.03; P186.08

hetubhāvo vā tasmin saty eva bhāvād iti dr̥ṣṭāntena pradarśyate arthāntarasya

[S [NP1s (hetu1 <bhāvaḥ) _ [CNJ vā] [VP [NP3 [S [NP5 [AC [NP7 tasmin 1] [VP sati [PRT eva]]] [NP6 e 2] bhāvāt] [PRT iti]] dr̥ṣṭāntena] pradarśyate] [NP6 (artha<antarasya) 2]]]

yang na rgyu'i ^(D270b.3) dngos por te, yod pa nyid yin na yod pa'i phyir ro zhes don gzhan rab tu ^(Pk415b.1) ston to.

† Alternatively, <the statement of> corroboration in the form — “because something <sc., an effect> exists only when something <sc., the cause> exists” — shows that the latter is the cause of the former.

‡ Alternatively, the causal relation of another thing is shown by the observed precedent [which says] “because [this] is present only when that is present.”

§ apposition: iti phrase to NP3 (K 77.15)

§ analysis by K (77.13-16) seems wrong; cf 6th sentence back for parallel

§ right extraposition from NP1s of NP6 within MC

§ “dr̥ṣṭānta””: see nts (Gnoli 17.5 - 18.14)

§ counter-anaphora

§ intra-s anaphora

§ “eva””: “only” (semantic restriction on AC)

§§ The Tibetan translation lacks an equivalent of *dr̥ṣṭānta* and does not catch the relationship of *arthāntarasya* and *hetubhāva*. That is, the Tibetan translators did not spot the right extraposition from NP1s of NP6 within MC.

27.7 G18.05; P186.09

tathā prasiddhe tadbhāve hetubhāve vānityatvābhāve kṛtakatvaṃ na bhavati dahanābhāve ca dhūmaḥ.

[S [ADV tathā] [AC [PC7 prasiddhe] [NP7 [NP7 (tat<bhāve)] [NP7 (hetu<bhāve)] vā]] [S [AC [NP7 (anityatva<abhāve)] [PC7 0]] [NP1s kṛtakatvam] [VP [ADV na] bhavati]] [S [AC [NP7 (dahana<abhāve)]] [CNJ ca] [NP1s dhūmaḥ] [VP E]]]

[P: bam po gnyis pa] de ltar de'i ngo bo dang rgyu'i dngos po rab tu grub na mi rtag pa nyid med na byas pa nyid med la me med na yang du ba ste,

† In this way, when <either the relation of something> being something or <the relation of something> being the cause <of something> is established, neither does artificiality exist in the absence of non-eternality nor does smoke exist in the absence of fire.

‡ Thus when either having something's nature or being its cause is attested, then the fact of being composite does not exist when there is an absence of impermanence, and smoke [does not exist] in the absence of fire.

§ copula: overt: existential: NP1s VP

§ ellipsis: E is preceding VP

§ "tat<bhāva": "sādhana-svabhāva" (K 77.17)

§§ Peking edition of Tibetan marks this as beginning of section two.

K76.01–05: yata evaṃ tasmāt svabhāvapratibandhād eva.

27.8 G18.06; P186.10

tathā hi sa tasya svabhāvo hetur vā.

[S [ADV tathā] [CNJ hi] [NP1s saḥ] [NP1 [NP6 tasya] [NP1 svabhāvaḥ] [NP1 hetuḥ] [CNJ vā]]]

'dī ltar de ni rang gi ngo bo dang rgyu yin ^(Pk415b.2) na,

† For in this way, something is either something's nature or its cause.

‡ In other words, something is either another thing's nature or its cause.

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

§ pronoun: as indefinite noun phrase

27.9 G18.07; P186.10

kathaṃ svaṃ svabhāvaṃ hetuṃ vāntareṇa bhaved

[S [ADV katham] [NP1s e 1] [VP [PP [NP2 [AP1 svaṃ 1] [NP2 svabhāvaṃ] [NP2 hetuṃ] [CNJ vā]] antareṇa] bhavet]]

ji ltar rang gi ngo bo dang rgyu med par yod ^(D270b.4) par gyur.

† How could something exist without either its nature or its cause?

‡ How could something exist without either its nature or cause?

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate (no NP1s)

§inter-s anaphora

§null pronoun: as indefinite noun phrase

27.10 G 18.08; P186.11

ity āśrayam antareṇāpi vaidharmyadr̥ṣṭānte prasidhyati vyatirekaḥ.

[S [CNJ iti] [PP [NP2 āśrayam] antareṇa [PRT api]] [VP [NP7
(vaidharmya;ḍr̥ṣṭānte)] prasidhyati] [NP1s vyatirekaḥ]]

de bas na gzhi med pa yang chos mi mthun pa'i dpe la ldog pa rab tu grub po.

† Thus, counter-concomitance is established in <the statement of>
counter-corroboration, even without <the mention of> a substratum.

‡ Therefore, even without a substratum, dissociation is established in the example of
dissimilarity.

Verse 27c²d

27.11 G18.09; P186.12

yeṣāṃ punaḥ prasiddhāv eva tadbhāvahetu-bhāvau teṣāṃ
viduṣāṃ vācyaḥ hetur eva hi kevalaḥ.

[S [RC [NP6 yeṣāṃ 1] [CNJ punar] [VP prasiddhau [PRT eva]] [NP1s
(tat<bhāva>+(hetu<bhāvau))]] [NP6 [AP6 teṣāṃ 1] viduṣāṃ] [VP vācyaḥ] [NP1s
hetuḥ [PRT eva] [CNJ hi] [AP1 kevalaḥ]]]

gang dag la de'i ngo bo dang rgyu'i dngos po dag rab tu grub pa'i ^(Pk415b.3) **mkhas
pa rnam la ni, gtan tshigs 'ba' zhig brjod par zad.**

† Furthermore, for the experts for whom <the relation of something> being
something or <the relation of something> being the cause <of something> is indeed
well established, surely only the evidence itself need be stated.

‡ **But for experts**, for whom the fact [of a thing's] having something's nature and the
fact of [a thing's] being a cause are attested, **only the evidence need be stated.**

§ "tat<bhāva>": no gloss by K

§ benefactive: both NP6's

§ intra-s anaphora

§ ""eva": indeed (V emphasis)

§ "eva": itself (NP emphasis)

§ "hi": see Apte dictionary entry (3) and Apte para 307 (2)

27.12 ¶ G18.12; P186.14

yadarthe dr̥ṣṭānta ucyate so 'rthaḥ siddha iti kiṃ tadvacanena tadā.

[S [RC [ADV (yat1<artham)] [NP1s dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ] [VP -- ucyate]] [NP1s [AP1 saḥ 1] arthaḥ] [VP siddhaḥ]]

[S [CNJ iti] [PRT kim] [NP3 (tat<vacanena)] [ADV tadā]]

gang gi don du dpe brjod pa'i don de grub pa ^(D270b.5) kho na yin pas de'i tshe de brjod pas ci zhig bya.

† <In the case of experts> the purpose for the sake of which corroboration is stated has <already> been achieved. So, what is the point of its statement at the time <of stating the inference>?

‡ The thing for the sake of which the observed precedent is expressed is already established, so what is achieved by expressing in that case?

§ left extraposition from VP of ADV within RC

§ inter-s anaphora

§ "dr̥ṣṭānta": see nts (Gnoli 17.5 - 18.14)

§ inter-s anaphora: "tat" 's antecedent is "dr̥ṣṭānta"

§ "kim" what is the point §§ Tibetan phrase is "de brjod pas ci zhig bya" (what is to be done by stating it?)

27.13 ¶ G18.13; P186.14

tatpradarśane 'pi kiṃ vaidharmyadr̥ṣṭāntāśrayeṇeti manyamāna āśrayaṃ pratikṣipti sma.

[S [AC [NP7 (tat<pradarśane) [PRT api]] [PC7 0]] [PRT kim] [NP3 ((vaidharmya<dr̥ṣṭānta)<āśrayeṇa)]]

[S [NP1s e [PC1 [ADV iti] manyamānaḥ]] [VP [NP2 āśrayaṃ] pratikṣipati [PRT sma]]]

de rab tu bstan na yang chos mi mthun ^(Pk415b.4) pa'i dpe'i gzhis ci zhig bya snyam du dgongs shing gzhi spang⁸ bar mdzad do.

† If it <sc., corroboration> has been shown, what is the point of <the mention of> the substratum in <the statement of> counter-corroboration? Bearing this in mind, he <sc., Dignāga> rejected <the need to mention> the substratum <in the statement of counter-corroboration>.

‡ Bearing in mind that even if it is shown, nothing is achieved by the substratum of the observed precedent of dissimilarity, he [scil., Dignāga] rejected the [need to mention the] substratum.

§ inter-s anaphora: "tat" 's antecedent is "tat" of last clause

§ "dr̥ṣṭānta": see nts (Gnoli 17.5 - 18.14)

§ "kim" what is the point

§ "api": unclear

§ null subject: unrecoverable denotation

⁸ D: spang; Pk: spong

28 G18.15; P187.01 D270b.5

M12

**tenaiva jñātasambandhe dvayor anyataroktitaḥ
arthāpattyaḥ dvitīye 'pi smṛtiḥ samupajāyate**

yad āha arthāpattyaḥ vā anyatareṇa ubhaya-pradarśanād iti.

[S [CNJ tena [PRT eva]] [AC [NP7 (jñāta<sambandhe)] [PC7 0]] [NP5 [NP6 dvayoh] (anyatara<uktitaḥ)] [NP3 arthāpattyaḥ] [NP1s [NP7 dvitīye [PRT api]] smṛtiḥ] [VP samupajāyate] [RC [NP1s e] [VP [NP2 yat] āha [NP5 [NP3 arthāpattyaḥ] [CNJ vā]] [NP3 anyatareṇa] (ubhaya<pradarśanāt)] [PRT iti]]]]

**de nyid kyi phyir 'brel shes na, gnyis las gang yang rung smras pas
don gyis go bas cig shos la'ang, (D270b.6) dran pa (Pk415b.5) yang dag skye bar
'gyur**

yang na don gyis go bas gang yang rung bas gnyi ga rab tu bstan pa'i phyir ro zhes bshad pa gang yin pa ste,

† **For this very reason, when the connection is known from either statement of corroboration, a recollection with respect to the other too arises through implication, which he <sc., Dignāga> stated <by the phrase> “or because both are shown by either through implication.”**

‡ **For this very reason, when the relation is known through the statement of either one of the two, recollection of the second also arises through implication, which he [scil., Dignāga] stated [by saying] “or because both are shown by either one through implication.”**

§ counter-anaphora

§ possible NP extraposition: if first NP3 is VP modifier

§ intra-s anaphora: “yat”'s antecedent is main clause

 null anaphor may be implicit argument

S possible implicit argument: null anaphor

S null subject: unrecoverable denotation

S “eva”: “very” (identity emphasis)

28.1 G18.17; P187.03

tatrāpi dṛṣṭāntena tadbhāvahetubhāvapradarśanam manyamāno 'rthāpattyaikavacanena dvitīya-siddhim āha.

[S [NP7 tatra [PRT api]] [NP1s e [PC1 [NP3 dṛṣṭāntena] [NP2 (((tat<bhāva)+(hetu<bhāva))<pradarśanam)] manyamānaḥ]] [VP [NP3 arthāpattyaḥ] [NP3 (eka<vacanena)] [NP2 (dvitīya<siddhim)] āha]]

der yang dpes de'i ngo bo dang rgyu'i dngos⁹ po rab tu ston par (Pk415b.6) dgongs te, don gyis go bas gcig brjod pas cig¹⁰ shos 'grub par (D270b.7) bshad do.

† There too <sc., in that passage also>, <sc., Dignāga>, bearing in mind that <the relation of something> being something or <the relation of something> being the

⁹ D: dngos; Pk: dngas ¹⁰ D: cig; Pk: cag

cause <of something> is shown by <the statement of> corroborating instance, stated one to be established by the statement of the other through implication.

‡ There too, bearing in mind that one shows having something's nature and being a cause by an observed precedent, he [scil., Dignāga] stated that by expressing one one establishes the second by implication.

§ counter-anaphora

§ inter-s anaphora: NP7's referent is Dignāga's text (K 79.3)

§ null subject: unrecoverable denotation

§ "tat<bhāva": "svabhāva-hetu" (K 79.4)

28.2 G18.19; P187.04

tathā hi yat kṛtakam tad anityam ity ukte anarthāntarabhāve vyaktam ayam asya svabhāvas tanmātrānubandhī pramāṇadr̥ṣṭas tadbhāva-niyamād iti. jñātatadbhāvasya arthāpattyanityatvābhāve kṛtakatvam na bhavātīti bhavati.

[S [ADV tathā [PRT hi]] [AC [PC7 [S [RC [NP1s yat 3] [AP1 kṛtakam]] [NP1s tat 3] [AP1 anityam] [PRT iti]] ukte] [NP7 [NP6 e 1] (an-((artha2<antara<bhāve)))] [NP6 [S [ADV vyaktam] [NP1s ayam - 2] [VP 0 [NP1 [NP6 asya 1] svabhāvaḥ]] [AP1 [AP1 ((tat1<mātra<anubandhī)] (pramāṇa<dr̥ṣṭaḥ) [NP5 [NP6 e 2] ((tat1<bhāva)<niyamāt)]] [PRT iti]] (jñāta<(tat1<bhāvasya))-B] [NP3 arthāpattiyā] [NP1s [S [AC [NP7 (anityatva<abhāve)] [PC7 0]] [NP1s kṛtakatvam] [VP [ADV na] bhavati] [PRT iti]]] [VP bhavati]]

'di ltar gang byas pa de ni mi rtag pa'o zhes smras na, don tha dad pa med na, gsal bar 'di ni 'di'i ngo bo ^(Pk415b.7) nyid de tsum dang 'brel pa tshad mas mthong ba yin no zhes bya bar nges par 'gyur te, de yod par nges pa'i phyir ro. de bas na de'i ngo bo shes pas ni don gyis go ^(D271a.1) bas mi rtag pa nyid med na byas pa nyid med do. ^(Pk415b.8) zhes bya ba 'gyur ro.

† For instance, when it is said that something is not different from something, as in the statement that what is artificial is non-eternal, then, for one who knows the former to be the latter — because he knows the latter to be the nature of the former, having epistemically observed the latter to depend merely on the existence of the former, because of the restriction of the former to being the latter — there is <the ascertainment>, through implication, that artificiality does not exist when non-eternality does not exist.

‡ For instance, when it is stated that that which is composite is impermanent, when there is no other meaning, obviously this, its nature, which is dependent on nothing more than that, has been observed through a means of acquiring knowledge, because there is a restriction by nature. Therefore, for one to whom the nature is known this thought arises through an implication: being complex does not arise in the absence of impermanence.

§ AP1 extraposition: from NP1s to right margin

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

§ copula: overt: existential: NP1s VP

- § copula: overt: existential: indeterminate (no subject)
- § “tathā hi”: see Apte dictionary entry (3) and Apte para 397 (3)
- § “iti” <first>: marks sentential subject of AC
- § “iti” <second>: provides a gloss for NP6 K (82.8) starts his gloss of this sentence with “evam”
- § “iti” <third>: : K 82.9 supplies “niścaya”
- § intra-s anaphora
- § possible constituency violation: K (78.9-11) construes second AC with NP5 and NP5 as reason for next to last AP1
- § bv cpd: NP
- § “tat<bhāva>”: “svabhāva” (K 82.8)
- § “iti”: sentential subject of MC

28.3 G18.23; P187.06

na hi svabhāvasyābhāve bhāvo bhavaty abhedāt.

[S [ADV na] [CNJ hi] [AC [NP7 [NP6 svabhāvasya [NP6 e 1]] abhāve] [PC7 0]] [NP1s bhāvaḥ 1] [VP bhavati] [NP5 [NP6 e 1] (a-bhedāt)]]

rang gi ngo bo med par yod par mi 'gyur te, tha dad pa med pa'i phyir ro.

† For it is not the case that a thing exists when its nature is absent, because it <sc., the thing> is not distinct <from its nature>.

‡ For it is not the case that a being is present in the absence of its nature, because there is no difference [between a being and its nature].

- § copula: overt: existential: NP1s VP
- § intra-s anaphor
- § possible split antecedent: for second NP6

28.4 G18.23; P187.07

anyathā tadbhāve bhavatīty eva na syāt.

[S [ADV anyathā] [S [AC [NP7 (tat<bhāve)] [PC7 0]] [NP1s e] [VP bhavati] [PRT iti [PRT eva]]] [VP [ADV na] syāt]]

de lta ma yin na de yod do¹¹ zhes bya ba nyid du mi 'gyur ro.

† Otherwise, the very fact that when something exists <its nature> exists would not be the case.

‡ Otherwise it would not be the case that something is present when its nature is.

- § copula: overt: existential: indeterminate
- § copula: overt: existential: S VP
- § possible ellipsis: treated here as null subject
- § null subject
- § sentential subject: marked by “iti”
- § “eva”: “itself” (clause emphasis)
- § counter-anaphora: “anyathā”
- §§Pk corresponds to Sanskrit; D is missing a phrase.

¹¹ D: de lta ma yin na de yod do; Pk: de lta ma yin na de yod na yod do

28.5 G18.24; P187.07

tathā tadabhāve na bhavatīty ukte. tata eva tadbhāvatāvedinaḥ. tathā hy ayam asya svabhāvo yena tadabhāve na bhavati. anyathāyogād iti tattatsvabhāvatāpratipattyā anvayasmṛtir bhavati.

[S [ADV tathā] [AC [[NP7 [S [AC [NP7 (tat<abhāve)] [PC7 0]] [NP1s e] [VP [ADV na] bhavati]] [PRT iti]]] 1] [PC7 ukte]] [NP5 tataḥ [PRT eva] 1] [NP1s [NP6 ((tat<bhāvatā)<vedinaḥ)] [NP3 [S [ADV tathā] [CNJ hi] [NP1s ayam 2] [VP 0 [NP1 [NP6 asya 3] svabhāvaḥ]] [NP5 [S [CMP yena] [AC [NP7 (tat2<abhāve)] [PC7 0]] [NP1s e 3] [VP [ADV na] bhavati] [ADV anyathā] [NP6 e 1] (a-yogāt)] [PRT iti]]] ((tat<(tat<svabhāvatā))<pratipattyā)] (anvaya<smṛtiḥ)] [VP bhavati]]]

de bzhin du de med na med do zhes ^(Pk416a.1) smras na, ¹² de'i ^(D271a.2) ngo bo nyid du rīg pa las 'di ltar 'di ni 'di'i ngo bo nyid yin te, des ni ¹³ de med na med do. de lta ma yin na mi rung ba'i phyir ro. de'i phyir de'i ngo bo nyid du rtogs ^(Pk416a.2) pas rjes su 'gro ba dran pa 'byung ngo.

† In this way, when it is said that something does not exist when something <sc., its nature> does not exist, from that alone, one who knows the former to be the latter recollects the concomitance through his awareness of the fact that the latter is the nature of the former, that is, the awareness that the latter is the nature of the former because otherwise there would be no connection so that when the latter does not exist the former does not exist.

‡ In the same manner, when it is stated that it is not present when that is absent, from that alone, one who knows the fact that something has that nature has recollection of association due to understanding the fact that one thing has the nature of another in this manner: “this is the nature of that since that is not present in the absence of this, because otherwise it would be impossible.”

- § copula: overt: existential: indeterminate
- § copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP
- § copula: overt: existential: indeterminate
- § copula: overt: existential: indeterminate (possession)
- § “iti” <second>: apposition indicator; however, K 82.19 glosses as “hetoh”
- § intra-s anaphora
- § null subject: twice
- § possible result clause: “yena” complementizer
- § unrecoverable denotation: first null subject first “tat” in AC
- § “tat<bhāva”>: “sādhyā-svabhāva” (K 82.15)
- § K (82.19) takes last “iti” to be a connective, instead of clause terminator
- § “tathā hi” left untranslated
- § “eva”: “alone” (semantic restriction on NP denotation)
- § counter-anaphora: “anyathā”
- §§ Tibetan [mistakenly] renders *vedinaḥ* as ablative, not genitive
- §§ Tibetan treats *ayoga* as nominalized modal verb, not as noun meaning “connection.”

¹² D: na; Pk: ba ¹³ D: ni; Pk: na

28.6 ¶ G19.01; P187.10

tathā yatra dhūmas tatrāgnir ity ukte kāryaṃ dhūmo dahanasya. yena dhūme 'vaśyam agnir bhavati.

[S [ADV tathā] [AC [S [RC [VP 0 [NP7 yatra 1]] [NP1s dhūmaḥ]] [VP 0 [NP7 tatra 1]] [NP1s agniḥ] [PRT iti]] [PC7 ukte]] [VP 0 [NP1 kāryam -]] [NP1s dhūmaḥ] [NP6 dahanasya] [S [CMP yena] [AC [NP7 dhūme] [PC7 0]] [ADV avaśyam] [NP1s agniḥ] [VP bhavati]]]

de bzhin du gang na du ba yod pa de na me yod do zhes smras na, du ba ni me'i (D271a.3) 'bras bu yin ne,¹⁴ des na du ba yod na gdon mi za bar me yod do.

† Likewise, when it is stated that where there is smoke there is fire, <one ascertains that> smoke is the effect of fire so that when smoke exists fire necessarily exists.

‡ In the same way, when it is stated that where there is smoke there is fire, [one understand that] smoke is the effect of fire, because of which if smoke is present fire is necessarily present.

§ copula: covert: existential: VP NP1s

§ copula: covert: existential: VP NP1s

§ copula: covert: existential: VP NP1s

§ copula: overt: existential: NP1s VP

§ right extraposition from NP1 (predicate) of NP6 within MC

§ intra-s anaphora: possible reason clause

§ K (83.06) reads MC as though embedded within "iti niścayaḥ"; this is in keeping with the other sentences with the AC "iti ukte".

§§ G: tathā yatra; P: tatra yathā. T supports G.

§§ G: yena dhūme; P: yena dharme. T supports G.

28.7 G19.03; P189.11

anyathārthāntarasya tadanubandhaniyamābhāvāt svātantryaṃ bhāvasya syāt.

[S [ADV anyathā] [NP5 [NP6 (artha1 <antarasya) 2] (((tat1 <anubandha) <niyama) <abhāvāt)] [NP1s [NP6 e 1] svātantryam [NP6 bhāvasya [NP6 e 2]] [VP syāt]]]

de lta ma yin¹⁵ na don gzhan de (Pk416a.3) dang 'brel par nges pa med pa'i phyir ngo bo rang dbang can du 'gyur ro.

† Otherwise, because one thing is not restricted to depend on another, the former's existence would be independent of the latter.

‡ Otherwise, a being would have self-sufficiency, because of the absence of the restriction of another object's being connected to it.

§ copula: overt: existential: NP1s VP

§ counter-anaphora: "anyathā"

§ intra-s anaphora

§ cpd intrusion: NP6 wrt "tat-anubandha"

¹⁴ D: ne; Pk: no. ¹⁵ D: de lta ma yin; Pk: de ma yin

28.8 G19.04; P 187.11

atas tadabhāve 'pi svabhāvāvaikalyān nābhāvaḥ.

[S [NP5 atah] [AC [NP7 (tat<abhāve) [PRT api]] [PC7 0]] [NP5 [NP6 e 1] (svabhāva<(a-vaikalyāt))] [ADV na] [VP 0] [NP1s [NP6 e 1] abhāvaḥ]]

des na de med kyang rang gi ngo bo ma tshang ba med pa'i phyir med par mi 'gyur ro.

† Hence, even if it <sc., the cause> did not exist, it would not be that, because of the non-incompleteness of its <sc., the effect's> nature, the other <sc., the effect> would not exist.

‡ Therefore, even in the one's absence, there would be no absence [of the other], because the [other's] nature is not defective.

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate
 § counter-anaphora
 § inter-s anaphora
 § intra-s anaphora
 § cpd intrusion: first null NP6 wrt "svabhāva-"
 § scope: "na" has scope over the NP5 but not over AC
 § possible ellipsis: of "syāt" from previous clause
 §§ ellipsis of "syāt" from previous clause supported by T.

28.9 G19.05; P187.12

kārye tv avaśyaṃ kāraṇaṃ bhavati.

[S [AC [NP7 kārye] [PC7 0]] [CNJ tu] [ADV avaśyam] [NP1s kāraṇam] [VP bhavati]]

'bras bu yin na ni gdon ^(D271a.4) mi za bar rgyu yod do.

† But, when an effect exists, <its> cause necessarily exists.

‡ But when an effect is present, its cause is necessarily present.

28.10 G19.06; P187.12

idam eva hi kāraṇasya kāraṇatvaṃ yad arthāntarabhāve svabhāvopadhānaṃ.

[[VP [NP1 idam [PRT eva] 1] 0] [CNJ hi] [NP1s [NP6 kāraṇasya 2] kāraṇatvam] [RC [CMP yat 1] [AC [NP7 ((artha<antara)2<bhāve)] [PC7 0]] [NP1s [NP6 e 2] (svabhāva<upadhānam)] [VP 0]]]

rgyu rgyu ^(Pk416a.4) nyid yin pa ni de ['di] kho na yin te, don gzhan yod na rang gi ngo bo nye bar 'jog pa gang yin pa'o.

† For the causality of a cause is just the fact that there is the presence of <the cause's> nature when there is the existence of the other <sc., its effect>.

‡ The cause's condition of being a cause consists in just the fact that its nature is on hand in the presence of the other object.

- § copula: covert: identity: VP NP1s
- § copula: covert: existential: indeterminate
- § left extraposition from NP1s of AP1 within RC: i.e., WH movement
- § intra-s anaphora
- § counter-anaphora
- § "eva": just (semantic restriction on NP connotation)
- § "upadhā": (1) to lay upon; (4) to produce; (13) (in gram) to precede without intervention of another syllable (Apte sv)

28.11 G19.07; P187.13

kāryasya api tadbhāva eva bhāvaḥ

[S [NP1 E1] [NP1s [NP6 kāryasya [PRT api] 1] E2] [RC [COMP E3] [AC [NP7 (tat<bhāve) [PRT eva]] [PC7 0]] [NP1s [NP6 e 1] bhāvaḥ] [VP 0]]]

'bras bu yang de yod pa nyid na yod pa yin no.

‡ The causality of the effect also is the fact that there is <the effect's> existence, only when there is its <sc., the cause's> existence.

‡ And the effect's [being an effect consists in its] presence just when that [cause] is present.

- § copula: covert: existential: indeterminate
- § ellipsis: E1 is NP1 of last MC; E2 is head of NP1s of last MC; E3 is COMP of last clause
- § counter-anaphora
- § inter-s anaphora
- § intra-s anaphora
- § "eva": only (semantic restriction on clause)

28.12 G19.08; P187.13

tac cāsti dhūme.

[S [NP1s tat] [CNJ ca] [VP asti [NP7 dhūme]]]

de yang du ba la yod do.

‡ And such exists in <the case of> smoke.

‡ And that [sc., fact of being present only when the cause is present] exists in smoke.

- § copula: overt: existential: NP1s VP
- § inter-s anaphora: "tat" 's antecedent the RC of the last sentence

28.13 G19.08; P187.13

tasmāt kāryaṃ dhūma ity anvayena vidhitatatkāryatvasya dahanābhāve dhūmo na bhavaṭīty arthād vyatirekapatipattir bhavati.

[S [CNJ tasmāt] [NP6 [NP3 [S [NP1s kāryam] [VP [NP1 dhūmaḥ 1] 0] [PRT iti]] anvayena] (vidita<(tat1<kāryatvasya))-B] [NP1s [S [AC [NP7 (dahana<abhāve)] [PC7 0]]] [S [NP1s dhūmaḥ] [VP [ADV na] bhavati] [PRT iti]] [NP5 arthāt] (vyatireka<pratipattiḥ)] [VP bhavati]]]

de lta bas¹⁶ na du ba ni^(Pk416a.5) 'bras bu yin no zhes rjes su 'gro bas de'i 'bras bu^(D271a.5) nyid shes pas me med na du ba med do zhes don gyis go bas ldog pa rtogs par 'gyur ro.

† Therefore, for one to whom its <sc., smoke's> being an effect is known in the form of the concomitance that smoke is an effect, arises, by implication, the belief of the counter-concomitance that when fire does not exist smoke does not exist.

‡ Therefore, one to who smoke's being condition of being an effect is known through association in the form "smoke is an effect" has, as a matter of course, awareness of dissociation in the form "where there is no fire, there is no smoke."

§ copula: covert: existential: NP1s VP
 § copula: overt: existential: NP1s VP
 § copula: overt: existential: NP1s VP (possession)
 § bv cpd: NP
 § intra-s anaphora
 § cpd intrusion: second iti clause wrt "vyatireka".

28.14 G19.10; P187.14

tathāsaty agnau dhūmo nāstīty ukte 'gnir dhūme bhavaty avaśyam ity arthāḥ anvayapratipattiḥ.

[S [ADV tathā] [AC [S [AC [PC7 (a-sati)] [NP7 agnau]] [NP1s dhūmaḥ] [VP [ADV na] asti] [PRT iti]] [PC7 ukte]] [NP1s [S [NP1s agniḥ] [VP [NP7 dhūme] bhavati] [ADV avaśyam] [PRT iti]] [NP5 arthāt] (anvaya<pratipattiḥ)] [VP 0]]

de bzhin du me med na du ba med do zhes smras na, me la¹⁷ du^(Pk416a.6) ba gdon mi za bar 'hgyur ro zhes shugs kyis rjes su 'gro ba rtogs so.

† Likewise, when it is said that when fire does not exist smoke does not exist, a belief in concomitance to the effect that fire necessarily exists in smoke arises by implication.

‡ In the same manner, when it is stated "when fire is not present, smoke is not present," there is, as a matter of course, awareness of association in the form "fire is necessarily present when there is smoke."

§ copula: overt: existential: NP1s VP
 § copula: overt: existential: NP1s VP
 § copula: covert: existential: indeterminate (possession)
 § cpd intrusion: second iti clause wrt "anvaya".

¹⁶ D: bas; Pk: ba ¹⁷ D: la; Pk: las

28.15 G19.12; P187.15

anyathā hi tadabhāve kiṃ na bhaved iti.

[S [ADV anyathā] [CNJ hi] [AC [NP7 (tat<abhāve)] [PC7 0]] [PRT kim] [NP1s
[S [NP1s e] [VP [ADV na] bhavet] [PRT iti]]] [VP 0]]

de lta ma yin na de med na¹⁸ ci ste yod par mi 'gyur.

† For otherwise, when it <sc., the cause> does not exist, how should there be <the recognition> that it <sc., the effect> does not exist?

‡ For otherwise, why would it [sc. smoke] not be present in its [sc., fire's] absence?

§ copula: overt: existential: indeterminate

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ “iti”: marks sentential subject

§ “iti”: K 83.19 supplies “niścaya”

§ counter-anaphora: “anyathā”

28.16 ¶ G19.12; P187.17

nanu ca nityānityārthakāryatvābhāve 'pi śravaṇajñānaṃ na bhavati tadabhāve. na vai na bhavati. tayor eva tataḥ saṃśayāt.

[S [CNJ nanu] [CNJ ca] [AC [NP7 (((nitya+anitya)<artha)1 <kāryatva)<abhāve)
[PRT api] [NP6 e 2]] [PC7 0]] [NP1s (śravaṇa-<jñānam) 2] [VP [ADV na] bhavati]
[AC [NP7 (tat1 <abhāve)] [PC7 0]]]

[S [ADV na [PRT vai]] [S [NP1s E1] [VP [ADV na] bhavati] [AC [NP7 E2]]]
[NP5 [NP7 tayor] [PRT eva]] [NP5 tataḥ] saṃśayāt]]

(D271a.6) rtag pa dang mi rtag pa'i don gyi 'bras bu nyid ma yin yang de dag med na
nyan (Pk416a.7) pa'i shes pa med pa ma yin na ma zhe na, med pa nyid ma yin te, de
las de dag nyid the tshom za ba'i phyr ro.

† And suppose it is argued that, though it is not <known> whether something eternal or something non-eternal is the cause of aural cognition, <nonetheless> if it <sc., the cause> does not exist, aural cognition does not exist. It is not <ascertained> at all that it does not exist when one or the other of them does not exist, because from it <sc., aural cognition> there is doubt with respect to which of those very things—eternal or non-eternal—it is.

‡ Now suppose that even though aural cognition is not the effect of either permanent or impermanent things, nonetheless, when either does not exist, it does not exist. It is not at all the case that it does not exist when either of them does not exist, because from it [sc., aural cognition] there is uncertainty about which of those two [sc., eternal or non-eternal] it is.

§ copula: overt: existential: NP1s VP

¹⁸ D: de med na; Pk: de na

- § unclear: ‘abhāva’ in AC is construed epistemically. See K84.3-4: na jñāyate kim nityasya sataḥ śabdasya kāryam śravaṇajñānam uta anityasya iti.
- § intra-s anaphora
- § copula: covert: existential: indeterminate
- § ellipsis: E1 is NP1s of previous MC; E2 is second AC of last sentence
- § inter-s anaphora
- § null subject: in MC
- § K (84.7–8) construes MC with “iti śakyam vijñātum”
- § “eva”: ‘those very things’ (identity emphasis)

K84.01–10: atra paro vyabhicāramāha. nanu cetyādi. nityānityārthayoḥ kāryannityānityārthakāryantadbhāvastattvam. tasyābhāve ’pi. tathā hi śravaṇajñānam śabdasyaiva dharmatvādasādhāraṇam. tatra na jñāyate kinnityasya sataḥ śabdasya kāryam śravaṇajñānam uta anityasyeti. tataśca na nityārthakāryatvam śravaṇajñānasya nāpyanityārthakāryatvantathāpi śravaṇajñānanna bhavati tadabhāve ’pi nityānityārthābhāve. tadvyatireke vyatiricyata iti yāvat. nityānityārthābhāve tāvanna bhavatyanyeṣu chaṭādiṣvabhāvāt. anityābhāve ’pi na bhavati nityeṣvabhāvāt. na vai na bhavatīti siddhāntavādī. na vai tacchrāvaṇatvannityānityābhāve na bhavatītyevam śakyam vijñātum. yadi tu tadabhāve na bhavatītyevanni’scayaḥ syāt tadā tatkāryatvannitamaṇa syāt. kintu tadabhāve na bhavatītyeva nāsti. kiṅkāraṇam. tayoreva nityānityatvayostataḥ śrāvaṇatvāt samśayaḥ.

28.17 G19.14; P187.18

anyathābhāvena niścītāt katham tadbhāvaparāmarśena samśayaḥ syāt.

[S [ADV anyathā] [NP5 [NP3 [NP6 e 1] abhāvena] niścītāt] [ADV katham] [NP1s [NP3 ((tat1<bhāva)<parāmarśena)] samśayaḥ] [VP syāt]]

de lta ma yin na med pas nges pa’i phyir, ji ltar de dag gi ngo bo la ltos¹⁹ nas the tshom du (^{Pk416a.8}) ’gyur.

† Otherwise, how could doubt come about through consideration of their existence, because of what is ascertained through their absence.

‡ Otherwise, owing to what is ascertained through their absence, how could there be uncertainty [about sound] through pondering their absence?

- § copula: overt: existential: NP1s VP
- § intra-s anaphora
- § inter-s anaphora: “tat” ’s antecedent is NP7 of last sentence
- § possible extraposition: second NP3 to a non-terminal position
- § counter-anaphora: “anyathā”

K84.10-12: anyathā nityānitye vastunyabhāvena niścītācchrāvaṇatvāt kathantadbhāvaparāmarśena śabde samśayaḥ syāt. tasmānityānityābhyām vyāvṛttireva nāsti śrāvaṇatvasya.

¹⁹ D: ltos; Pk: bltos

28.18 G19.16; P187.18

kevalam tu bhāvaniścayābhāvān na astīty ucyate.

[S [NP5 kevalam [CNJ tu] [NP6 e 1] ((bhāva<niścaya)<abhāvāt)] [S [NP1s e 1] [VP [ADV na] [S [VP asti] [PRT iti]]] ucyate]]]

(D271a.7) yod par nges pa med pa'i phyir med do zhes bya ba 'ba' zhid tu zad do.

† But, only because there is no ascertainment of its existence, it <sc., aural cognition> is not said to exist.

‡ It is said only that it [sc., audibility] is not present because of absence of ascertainment of its presence.

§ inter-s anaphora

§ intra-s anaphora

§ null subject: denotation determined by antecedent

§ sentential subject: marked by "iti"

§§ T suggests that scope of "kevalam" is "ity ucyate".

28.19 ¶ G19.16; P187.20

yadā punar dr̥ṣṭāntena nāgnidhūmayoḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ pradarśyate. tadā yatra dhūmas tatrāgnir ity eva na syāt. pratibandhābhāvāt.

[S [S [CNJ yadā] [CNJ punar] [NP3 dr̥ṣṭāntena] [ADV na] [NP1s [NP6 (agni+dhūmayoḥ)] ((kārya+kāraṇa)<bhāvaḥ)] [VP _ pradarśyate]]]

[ADV tadā] [NP1s [S [RC [VP 0 [NP7 yatra 1]]] [NP1s dhūmaḥ]]] [VP 0 [NP7 tatra 1]]] [NP1s agniḥ] [PRT iti [PRT eva]]]] [VP [ADV na] syāt] [NP5 (pratibandha<abhāvāt)]]

gang gi tshe dpes me dang du ba dag rgyu dang 'bras bu'i dngos por mi ston pa de'i tshe ni 'brel pa med pa'i phyir, gang na du ^(Pk416b.1) ba yod²⁰ pa de na me yod do zhes bya ba nyid du yang mi 'gyur na,

† When, moreover, the relation of cause and effect between fire and smoke is not shown by <the statement of> of corroboration, then the very <ascertainment> that where there is smoke there is fire would not obtain because of the absence <of the ascertainment> of the relation.

‡ But when the relation of cause and effect between fire and smoke is not shown by the observed precedent, then there would not be the very [idea] that where there is smoke there is fire, because of the absence of the relation.

§ copula: covert: existential: VP NP1s

§ copula: covert: existential: VP NP1s

§ copula: overt: existential: NP1s VP

§ left extraposition from VP of NP3 within MC, except CNJ and CNJ

§ null subject

§ sentential subject: marked by "iti"

§ intra-s anaphora

§ "eva": "very" (clause emphasis)

²⁰ D: du ba yod; Pk: du yod

28.20 G19.19; P187.21

kuto 'gnyabhāve dhūmo nāstīty arthād vyatirekasiddhiḥ.

[S [ADV kutah] [VP 0] [NP1s [S [AC [NP7 (agni<abhāve)] [PC7 0]] [NP1s dhūmaḥ] [VP [ADV na] asti] [PRT iti]] [NP5 arthāt] (vyatireka<siddhiḥ)]]]

me med na du ba med do zhes ^(D271b.1) shugs kyis ldog pa 'grub pa dang,

† <And> how <then> can there be the establishment of counter-concomitance, namely, that smoke does not exist in the absence of fire, by implication?

‡ [Then,] how could there be establishment, as a matter of course, of dissociation of the form “in the absence of fire there is no smoke”?

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ copula: overt: existential: NP1s VP

§ cpd intrusion: iti clause wrt “vyatireka”.

§ This sentence is within the scope of the last sentence's protasis Cf. K (85.06)

28.21 G19.19; P187.20

tathā vaidharmyeṅābhāvāsiddher anvayasmṛtiḥ

[S [AC [NP7 e] [PC7 [ADV tathā] 0]] [ADV E] [NP1s [NP3 vaidharmyeṅa] [NP5 (abhāva<a-siddheḥ)] (anvaya<smṛtiḥ)] [VP 0]]]

de bzhin du chos mi mthun pas med pa mi 'grub pa'i phyir, rjes su 'gro ^(Pk416b.2) ba dran par lta ga la 'gyur.

† This being so <i.e., in the absence of awareness of the relation>, <how> can there be the recollection of concomitance, since the <mere statement of> counter-comitance does not establish an absence?

‡ In the same manner, how can there be recollection of association, since there is no establishing an absence by means of dissimilarity.

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ ellipsis: E is [ADV kutah] of last clause (K 85.8)

§§ G *anvayasmṛtiḥ*; P *anvayasiddhiḥ*. T supports G.

§§ Tibetan treats everything from “yadā punar” (G19.16) to here as a single sentence.

28.22 G19.20; P187.22

tasmād dṛṣṭāntenāyam eva yathoktasvabhāvapratibandhaḥ pradarśyate. ekasadbhāve 'nyasya prasiddhyartham. tadabhāve 'sambhavāt.

[S [CNJ tasmāt] [NP3 dṛṣṭātena] [NP1s [AP1 ayam [PRT eva]] [AP1 (yathā<uktah)] (svabhāva<pratibandhaḥ) 1] [VP - pradarśyate] [ADV [AC [NP7 ((eka<sat)<bhāve)] [PC7 0]] [NP6 anyasya] (prasiddhi2<artham)] [NP5 [AC [NP7 ((tat1<abhāve)] [PC7 0]] [NP6 e 2] (a-sambhavāt)]]]]

gang gi phyir de med ni²¹ mi srid pas gcig yod na gzhan rab tu grub par bya ba'i phyir, dpeṣ ji skad bshad pa'i rang bzhin (*D271b.2*) 'brel pa 'di kho na rab tu ston pa.

† Therefore, the very same natural relation mentioned earlier is shown by <the statement of> corroboration in order to establish <sc. the existence of> one thing, because, when it <sc., the natural relation> is not <ascertained to> exist, it <sc., the establishment> is not possible.

‡ Therefore, this aforementioned natural connection itself is shown through the observed precedent in order to establish the one in the presence of the other, because, when that [sc., the natural connection] is absent, there is no possibility [of establishing the one when the other is present].

§ left extraposition from VP of NP3 within MC, except CNJ

§ counter-anaphora

§ cpd intrusion: NP6 wrt “prasiddhi”

§ inter-s anaphora

§ “eva”: “very same” (identity emphasis)

K85.10–11: tadabhāve yathoktapratibandhābhāve saty ekasadbhāve
'nyaprasiddher asambhavāt.

29 G19.23; P187.24 D271b.2

**hetusvabhāvābhāvo 'taḥ pratiṣedhe ca kasyacit
hetur.**

[S [NP1s [NP6 e 1] ((hetu+svabhāva)<abhāvaḥ)] [ADV atah] [VP 0 [NP1 [NP7
pratiṣedhe [CNJ ca] [NP6 (kasya-cit) 1]] hetuḥ]]]

de'i (*Pk416b.3*) **phyir rgyu dang rang bzhin dag, med pa 'ga' zhig sgrub pa'i yang
gtan tshigs yin te**

† And hence the absence of something's cause or nature is a hetu for its negation.

‡ And therefore, the absence of a cause or a natural property is evidence for the denial of something.

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

§ K (85.13–14) provides a dubious analysis of “ca”

§§ Tibetan mistranslates “pratiṣedha” as “sgrub pa” (siddhi).

§§ Punctuation in Pk suggests this was not recognized as a kārikā in that edition.

29.1 G19.25; P187.26

tāv eva hi nivartamānau svapratibaddhaṃ nivartayata iti kasyacid arthasya
pratiṣedham api sādhayitukāmena hetor vyāpakasya vā svabhāvasya nivṛttir
hetutvenākhyeyā.

²¹ D: ni; Pk: na

[S [NP1s tau [PRT eva] [CNJ hi] [AP1 nivartamānau 1]] [VP [NP2 (sva1 <pratibaddham)] nivartayataḥ]]

[S [CNJ iti] [NP3 [NP2 [NP6 [AP6 (kasya-cit)] arthasya 1] pratiṣedham [PRT api]] (sādhayitu-kāmena)] [NP1s [NP6 [NP6 [NP6 e 1] hetoḥ] [NP6 [NP6 e 1] vyāpakasya [CNJ vā] svabhāvasya]] nivṛtṭiḥ] [VP - [NP3 hetutvena] ākhyeyā]]

de dag kho na ldog pa na rang gi 'brel pa zlog par byed pas de'i phyir don gzhan 'ga' zhig dgag pa dang sgrub par ^(Pk416b.4) 'dod pas, ^(D271b.3) rgyu'am rang bzhin khyab par byed pa ldog pa'i gtan tshigs nyid du brjod par bya'o.

† For only these two, being excluded, exclude that which is related to them. So, the exclusion of either something's cause or pervading nature, must be communicated as a hetu by one desirous to establish its negation also.

‡ For only these two, being ruled out, rule out that which is connected to them. Therefore, one who has a desire to establish the denial of some thing should state as evidence the cessation of either its cause or its pervasive natural property.

§ modifier giving reason: AP1 wrt VP

§ inter-s anaphora: "tau" 's antecedent is part of cpd in last clause's NP1s

§ intra-s anaphora

§ "eva": only (semantic restriction on NP denotation)

§ left extraposition from VP of NP3 within MC, except CNJ

§ disjunction

§ secondary predication: "hetutvena"

29.2 G20.01; P188.01

apratibandhe hi katham ekasya nivṛttir anyasya nivṛtṭim sādhayet.

[S [AC [NP7 (a-pratibandhe)] [PC7 0]] [CNJ hi] [ADV katham] [NP1s [NP6 ekasya] nivṛtṭiḥ] [VP [NP2 [NP6 anyasya] nivṛtṭim] sādhayet]]

ma 'brel na ni ji ltar gcig log pas gzhan ldog pa sgrub par byed.

† For, should there be no relation <ascertained>, how could the exclusion of one thing establish the exclusion of another?

‡ For, if there is no connection, how would the cessation of one thing establish the ruling out of another?

§ counter-anaphora

§§ The Tibetan translation of "nivṛtṭi" varies.

Verse 29cd

29.3 G20.03; P188.03 D271b.3

yuktopalabhasya tasya cānupalambhanam pratiṣedhahetuḥ.

[S [NP1s [NP6 [AP6 (yukta<upalambhasya)-B] tasya 1] [CNJ ca] anupalambhanam] [VP 0 [NP1 [NP6 e 1] (pratiṣedha<hetuḥ)]]]

dmigs par ni, ^(Pk416b.5) **rigs ldan de mi rigs par yang,** dgag pa'i gtan tshigs yin no.

† Moreover, the non-apprehension of that for which apprehension is suitable is a hetu for <its> negation.

‡ **Moreover, the non-apprehension of that for which apprehension is possible** is evidence for denying it.

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

§ bv cpd: modifies a pronoun

§ intra-s anaphora

29.4 20.04; P188.04

M13

pratiṣedhaviṣayavyavahārahetus taddhetur ity uktaḥ. svayam
tathābhūtānupalambhasya pratiṣedharūpatvāt.

[S [NP1s (((pratiṣedha<viṣaya)-B<vyavahāra)<hetuḥ)] [VP [NP1 (tat<hetuḥ) [PRT iti]]]] uktaḥ] [NP5 [NP6 [NP6 svayam] ((tathā<bhūta)<anupalambhasya)] ((pratiṣedha<rūpa)-B-tvāt)]]

dgag pa'i yul can ^(D271b.4) gyi tha snyad kyi gtan tshigs la de'i gtan tshigs zhes bshad de, de lta bu'i mi dmigs²² pa ni rang nyid kyi dgag²³ ^(Pk416b.6) pa'i ngo bo yin pa'i phyir.

† The cause for action whose object is a negation <sc., an absence> has been spoken of as a hetu for it <sc., denial>, because the non-apprehension of such a thing <sc., of that for which apprehension is suitable> itself is a form of negation <sc., absence>.

‡ The cause of action of which the subject matter is a denial has been said as evidence for it [sc., denial], because the non-apprehension of that which is so [sc., that the apprehension of which is possible] itself has denial as its nature.

§ inter-s anaphora: “tat” ’s antecedent is “pratiṣedha” in previous clause; “tathā-bhūta” ’s antecedent is AP6 of previous clause

§ possible intra-s anaphora: “tat” ’s antecedent is “pratiṣedha”

§ “pratiṣedha” seems to encompass both ontological and linguistic categories

§ secondary predication: “iti”

§ “svayam”: “itself” (emphatic)

29.5 G20.06; P188.05

hetuvyāpakānupalabdhir ubhayasyāpi hetuḥ.

[S [NP1s ((hetu+vyāpaka)<anupalabdhīḥ)] [VP 0 [NP1 [NP6 ubhayasya [PRT api]]]]]

²² D: bu'i mi dmigs; Pk: bu'i dmigs ²³ D: dgag; Pk: 'gog

rgyu dang khyad par byed pa mi dmigs pa ni gnyi ga'i gtan tshigs yin no.

† The non-apprehension of either a cause or a pervader is a hetu for both <sc., denial and the action based thereon> too.

‡ The non-apprehension of either a cause or a pervasive property is evidence for both [sc., denial and the action based thereon].

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

§ “ubhaya”: see K (86.04)

§§ P's *hetur iti* unsupported by Tibetan.

30 G20.07; P188.06 D271b.4

**itīyaṃ trividhāpy uktānupalabdhir anekadhā.
tattadviruddhādyagatigatibhedaprayogataḥ**

[S [CNJ iti] [NP1s [AP1 iyam] [PC1 [AP1 trividhā [PRT api]] uktā] anupalabdhīḥ]
[VP [AP1 anekadhā] 0] [NP5
((((tat1)+(tat1<viruddha)-ādi)<((a-gati)+gati))<bheda)<prayogataḥ]]]

**de ltar mi dmigs 'di rnam gsum, bshad kyang rnam pa ^(D271b.5) du ma ste,
de dang de 'gal la ^(Pk416b.7) sogs pa, mi²⁴ rtogs rtogs dbye'i sbyor sgo nas.**

† So, the non-apprehension, spoken of as also of three kinds, is of many kinds, because of the application of the distinction between non-awareness and awareness of them and their contradictories <respectively>, etc.

‡ So, non-apprehension, even though said to be of three kinds, is of many kinds, because of the application of the distinction between non-awareness of something and awareness of what is incompatible with it and so forth.

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

§ inter-s anaphora: first “tat”/,s antecedent is last sentence’s “hetu+vyāpaka”; but see K (86.08), whose antecedent is unrecoverable

§ intra-s anaphora: intra-cpd anaphora

§ secondary predication:

§ how K (86.06–17) construes syntax is unclear

§ K (86.12) transposes “bheda” and “prayoga” in cpd

§§ P reads: *itīyaṃ trividhātrāpy uktānupalabdhir anekadhā*, which has one syllable too many. Tibetan supports placement of “api” after “uktā” rather than after “trividhā”.

§§ “and so forth” includes observing an effect of what is incompatible with a thing and observing what is incompatible with the cause of a thing (K86:10–11).

30.1 G20.09; P188.08

trividha eva hi pratiṣedhahetuḥ. upalabhyasattvasya hetos tathābhāvaniścāye
vyāpakasya svātmanaś cānupalabdhir iti.

[S [VP 0 [AP1 trividhaḥ [PRT eva] -]] [CNJ hi] [NP1s (pratiṣedha<hetuḥ)] [NP1
[NP6 [AP6 (upalabhya<sattvasya1)-B] hetoḥ [AC [NP7 ((tathā<bhāva1)<niścāye)]

²⁴ D: mi; Pk: ma

[PC7 0]]] [NP6 vyāpakasya] [NP6 (sva-ātmanah)] [CNJ ca] anupalabdhiḥ [PRT iti]]]

dgag pa'i gtan tshigs ni rnam pa gsum kho na ste, rgyu dang khyab par byed pa de ltar nges pa dang, rang gi bdag nyid dmigs su yod pa mi ^(Pk416b.8) dmigs pa'o.

† For the hetu for negation is of just three kinds, namely, the non-apprehension of a cause, a pervader, and the thing itself, whose existence is apprehensible, when they have been ascertained to be that way.

‡ For the evidence for denial is of only three kinds, namely, the non-apprehension, when there is certainty of their having a particular nature, of a cause, or of a pervasive property, or of the thing itself, when the presence of these things would be apprehensible.

§ copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s

§ apposition: extraposed

§ right extraposition from AP1 (predicate) of NP1 appositive within MC

§ intra-s anaphora

§ number: “anupalabdhi” not plural

§ possible constituency violation: placement of AC wrt conjunction (K 86.19); alternatively, possible ellipsis

§ possible ellipsis: [NP6 AP6 N6 AC] [NP6 _ N6 _] [NP6 _ N6 _]

§ “sva-ātma”: “svabhāva”

§ “eva”: “just” (semantic restriction on NP denotation)

§§ G: tathābhāvāniścāy; P tathāniścāy; T de ltar nges pa. See note to G20.10.

30.2 G20.10; P188.09

sa prayogavaśena tattadviruddhādyagatigatibhedaprayogato 'nekaprakāra uktaḥ.

[S [NP1s saḥ] [VP [NP3 (prayoga<vaśena) [NP5
((((tat1)+(tat1<viruddha)-ādi)<((a-gati)+gati))<bheda)<prayogataḥ)]] [AP1
(aneka<prakāraḥ)-B] uktaḥ]]

de ni sbyor ba'i dbang ^(D271b.6) gis de dang 'gal ba la sogs pa ma rtogs pa dang, rtogs pa'i dbye ba'i sgo nas rnam pa du mar bshad de,

† It <sc., the hetu for negation> has been stated to be of various kinds by dint of formulations because of the application of the distinction between non-awareness and awareness of them <sc., cause, pervader, and thing> and their contradictories <respectively>, etc.

‡ It [sc., the evidence for denial] is said to be of many kinds by dint of application because of the application of the distinction between non-awareness of something and awareness of what is incompatible with it and so forth.

§ inter-s anaphora: “saḥ” ’s antecedent is NP1s of last sentence “tat” ’s antecedent is NP6 disjunction of last sentence

§ intra-s anaphora

§ secondary predication

§§ G: enekaprakāra; P anekaprayoga; T supports G.

30.3 G20.12; P188.11

tasyāgatya tadviruddhagatyā viruddhakāryagatyety ādibhedaprayogair yathoktam
prāk.

[S [NP1s e] [VP 0 [AP1 [NP3 [NP3 [NP6 tasya 1] (a-gatyā)] [NP3
((tat1<viruddha)<gatyā)] [NP3 (((e1<viruddha)<kārya)<(a-gatyā))]
(((iti-ādi)<bheda)<prayogaiḥ)] (yathā<uktam) [ADV prāk]]]]

de ma rtogs pa dang, de dang 'gal ba rtogs ^(Pk417a.1) pa dang, 'gal ba'i 'bras bu rtogs
pa zhes bya ba la sogs pa'i dbye ba'i sbyor ba dag gis sngar ji skad bshad pa ^(D271b.7)
bzhin no.

† This was previously stated through the applications of such distinctions as the non-awareness of them <sc., cause, pervader, and thing>, the awareness of what is contradicted by them, the non-awareness of an effect of what is excluded <by them>.

‡ As was explained above, [the many kinds occur] through the applications of distinctions, that is, [one can provide evidence for the denial of something] by non-awareness of it, by awareness of what is incompatible with it, by awareness of an effect of what is incompatible with it, and so forth.

§ asyndeton

§ cpd intrusion: subordinate NP3 wrt "iti"

§ intra-s anaphora: "tat" 's antecedent is "tat" of last sentence

§ number: first "tat" is singular, its denotation is plural (K 86.22)

§ null subject: denotation is the fact denoted by previous sentence alternatively, AP may be appositive to previous clause

31 G20.14; P188.11 D271b.6

**kāryakāraṇabhāvād vā svabhāvād vā niyāmakāt
avinābhāvaniyamo 'darśanān na na darśanāt.**

[S [S [VP 0 [NP5 [NP5 [NP5 ((kārya+kāraṇa)<bhāvāt) [CNJ vā]] [NP5 svabhāvāt
[CNJ vā]]]] niyāmakāt]] [NP1s (avinābhāva<niyamah)]] [S [NP5 (a-darśanāt)]
[NP1s E] [ADV na]] [S [ADV na] [NP1s E] [NP5 darśanāt]]]

**rgyu dang 'bras bu'i dngos po 'am, rang bzhin ^(Pk417a.2) nges par 'byed pa las
med na mi 'byung nges pa ste, ma mthong las min mthong las min.**

† The restriction of indispensability comes about from the restrictor either of the relation of cause and effect or of svabhāva, <and> not from either non-observation or observation.

‡ The restriction of inseparability comes about from the restraint either of the relation of cause and effect or of a natural property, not from either non-observation or observation.

§ copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s

§ asyndeton

§ apposition: disjunction to head of NP5

§ disjunction
 § ellipsis: E is NP1s of first clause
 § negation scope: wide wrt NP5
 § same as PVin 2, 37.23-6

32 G20.16; P188.13 D271b.6

**avaśyaṃbhāvānīyamaḥ kaḥ parasyānyathā paraiḥ
 arthāntaranimitte vā dharme vāsasi rāga-vat**
 ity antaraślokau.

[S [NP1s avaśyam-bhāva-nīyamaḥ - -] [VP 0 [NP1 kaḥ]] [NP6 parasya] [ADV
 anyathā] [NP3 paraiḥ]]

[S [AC [NP7 [AP7 ((artha1<antara)<nimitte)-B] [CNJ vā] [NP6 e 1] dharme [[NP7
 vāsasi] (rāga-vat)]] [PC7 0]] [NP1s E1] [NP1 E2]]

**gzhan du gzhan ni gzhan dag dang, nges par yod pa'i nges pa gang
 don gzhan rgyu mtshan can** ^(Pk417a.3) **gyi chos,** ^(D272a.1) **yin na** ²⁵ **gos la tshon
 bzhin no.**

bar skabs kyi tshigs su bcad pa dag go.²⁶

† Otherwise, in what consists the restriction of the necessary existence of the one through the others? Or in what consists the restriction of the necessary existence <of a property in a property-possessor>, should the property have as its cause something different <from that of the property-possessor>, like the case of dye in clothing?

‡ **Otherwise, in what consists the restriction of the one necessarily being present with the other, or when a property has another object as its causal condition, as in the case of the dye in clothing?** These are transitional verses.

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP
 § cpd intrusion: NP6 wrt “avaśyam<bhāva”
 § right extraposition from NP1s of NP3 within MC
 § right extraposition from NP1s of NP6 within MC, except ADV and extraposed NP3
 § counter-anaphora: (K88.25) takes the antecedent of “anyathā” to be kārya+kāraṇa-bhāva.
 § ellipsis: E1 is NP1s of last sentence; E2 is NP1 of last sentence; following K (88.25–89.02) and M (269.15–18)
 § counter-anaphora

K88.25-89.02: anyathetyāsatyāntadutpattau paraiḥ sādhyābhimataiḥ
 parasyānātmābhūtasya liṅgasya ko'va'syambhāvānīyamaḥ. anarthāntare tu li.nge
 tanmātrānubandhitvam sādhyadharmasyeṣṭavyam anyathā yannimittam
 tasmādarthāntaram mudgarādi nimittam yasya anityatvasyeṣyate tasmin vā
 dharme 'vaśyambhāvānīyamaḥ kaḥ. kimiva. vāsi rāgavat niṣpanne vāsi
 kusumbhādinimittao yo rāgaḥ paścādbhāvī.

²⁵ D: na; Pk: ni ²⁶ D: dag go.; Pk: dag.

33 G20.18; P189.01 D272a.1

api ca

arthāntaranimitto hi dharmāḥ syād anya eva saḥ.

[S [CNJ api ca] [NP1s [AP1 ((artha1<antara)<nimittaḥ)-B] [CNJ hi] [NP6 e 2] dharmāḥ - 1] [VP syāt [NP1 [NP6 e 2] anyāḥ [PRT eva]]] [AP1 saḥ]]

gzhan yang, chos don gzhan gyi²⁷ rgyu mtshan can, yin par gyur na de gzhan nyid.

† **For a property whose cause is distinct <sc., that of its possessor> must be something completely different <sc., from the possessor>.**

‡ **Moreover, a property that has another object as its causal condition would be something else entirely.**

§ copula: overt: predicational: NP1s VP

§ counter-anaphora

§ right extraposition from NP1s of AP within MC

§ “hi”: not compatible with “api ca”; unlike “hi”, it is glossed by K (89.04-05)

§ “eva”: “completely”

33.1 G20.20; P189.03

na hi tasmin niṣpanne ’niṣpanno bhinnahetuko vā tatsvabhāvo yuktaḥ.

[S [ADV na] [CNJ hi] [AC [NP7 tasmin 1] [PC7 niṣpanne]] [NP1s [AP1 [AP1 (a-niṣpannaḥ)] [AP1 (bhinna<hetukaḥ)] [CNJ vā]] (tat1<svabhāvaḥ)] [VP 0 [AP1 yuktaḥ]]]

de grub na ma grub pa’am rgyu tha (^{Pk417a.4}) dad pa ni de’i rang bzhin du rigs pa²⁸ ma yin no.

† For, when something has arisen, it cannot be either that its nature has not arisen or that its nature has a cause different <from the thing’s cause>.

‡ For, when something is produced, it is not possible that its nature is not produced or that its nature has a different cause [from the thing’s cause].

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

§ disjunction

§ intra-s anaphora: possible donkey sentence

§ possible counter-anaphora

§ negation scope: could be wide or narrow, depending in the logical connection of AC with MC

33.2 G20.21; P189.03

ayam eva khalu bhedo bhedahetur vā bhāvānām viruddhadharmādhyāsaḥ
kāraṇabhedaś ca.

²⁷ D: gyi; Pk: ni ²⁸ D: pa; Pk: par

[S [NP1s [AP1 ayam [PRT eva]] [ADV khalu] [NP1 bhedaḥ [NP6 e 1]] [NP1 (bheda<hetuḥ) [CNJ vā] [NP6 bhāvānām 1]]] [VP 0 [NP1 [NP1 ((viruddha<dharma)<adhyāsaḥ)] [NP1 (kāraṇa<bhedaḥ)] [CNJ ca]]]]]

(D272a.2) dngos po rnam s kyi tha dad pa'am, rgyu tha dad pa ni 'di kho na yin te, chos 'gal ba gnas pa'am, rgyu tha dad pa yin no.

† Surely, that very difference between things consists in their having incompatible properties; and the reason for their difference consists in their having different causes.

‡ Surely, the difference among beings is just the possession of incompatible properties, and the cause of their difference is just a difference of causes.

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

§ conjunction: odd

§ disjunction: odd

§ “eva”: “very” (identity emphasis)

§ “adhi+as” (Apte sv): to add to, to append to; to ascribe falsely to K89.10 glosses as “yoga”

K89.08-13: pūrvaniṣpannasya bhinnahetukasya ca li.ngasya svabhāvo yukto yasmād ayam eva khalu lokapratīto bhedo bhāvānām yo viruddhadharmādhyaśo viruddhadharmayogaḥ. niṣpattyanīṣpattī cātra viruddhau dharmāu. tathāyam eva bhedaḥetur bhedasya janako yaḥ kāraṇabhedaḥ sāmāgrībhedaś cātra kāraṇabhedo draṣṭavyaḥ. etena bhedaśvarūpabhedaśkāraṇaṅ cōktam.

33.3 G20.22; P189.04

tau cen na bhedakau tadā na kasyacit kutaścid bheda ity ekaṃ dravyaṃ viśvaṃ syāt.

[S [S [NP1s tau] [CNJ cet] [ADV na] [VP 0 [NP1 bhedakau]]] [CNJ tadā] [ADV na] [NP1s [NP6 (kasya-cit)] [NP5 (kutaḥ-cit)] bhedaḥ] [VP 0]]]

[S [CNJ iti] [NP1 [AP1 ekam] dravyam] [NP1s viśvam] [VP . syāt]]

gal te de dag^(Pk417a.5) kyang tha dad par byed pa ma yin na²⁹ gang yang gang las kyang tha dad par byed pa med pas ril rdzas gcig tu 'gyur ro.

† If these two were not the factors of differentiation, then there would be no difference of anything from anything. So, the universe would be a single thing.

‡ If these two were not differentiators, then there would be no difference of anything from anything. So everything would be the same thing.

Sentence1:

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ inter-s anaphora: “tau”'s antecedent is NP1 in last sentence

Sentence two:

§ copula: overt: predicational: NP1s VP

§ left extraposition from VP of NP1 (predicate) within MC

§ This sentence is within the scope of the last sentence's protasis

²⁹ Pk: ma yin na; D: yin na

33.4 G20.24; P189.05

tataś ca saha utpattivināśau sarvasya ca sarvatra upayogaḥ syāt.

[S [S [NP5 tataḥ [CNJ ca]] [NP1s (saha<(utpatti+vināśau))] [VP 0]] [S [NP1s [NP6 sarvasya] [CNJ ca] [NP7 sarvatra] upayogaḥ] [VP syāt]]]

des na lhan ^(D272a.3) cig skye ba dang 'jig pa dag dang thams cad la thams cad nye bar sbyar bar ^(Pk417a.6) 'gyur ro.

† And because of this, there would be simultaneous arising and destruction and everything would need everything.

‡ And because of this, there would be simultaneous arising and destruction, and everything would be a causal link to everything.

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ copula: overt: predicational: NP1s VP

§ inter-s anaphora: "tataḥ" 's antecedent is last sentence

§ This sentence is within the scope of the next to last sentence's protasis

K89.15–17: traiguṇyasyāviśeṣād aikyam sarvasyeṣṭam eveti ced āha. tataś cetyekatvāt. sahotpattivināśau. ekasyotpāde sarvasyotpādo vināśe ca vināśaḥ syād ity arthaḥ. sarvasya ca sarvatra kārya upayogaḥ kāraṇatvam syād.

33.5 G21.01; P189.05

anyathaikam ity eva na syāt.

[S [ADV anyathā] [NP1s [S [NP1s e] [VP 0 [AP1 ekam]] [PRT iti]] [PRT eva]] [VP [ADV na] syāt]]

de lta ma yin na gcig ces bya ba nyid du mi 'gyur ba 'am,

† Otherwise, the very claim that any thing is single would not be so.

‡ Otherwise, there would not be the very idea [that all things are] the same.

§ copula: overt: existential: NP1s VP

§ counter-anaphora: "anyathā" 's antecedent unclear (K 89.17 seems to give protasis at G20.22 as antecedent)

§ null subject: K (89.18) supplies "sarvam vastu"

§ sentential subject: marked by "iti"

§ "eva": "very" (emphasis)

sahotpatyādy anabhyupagame. sarvam vastv ekam ity eva na syāt.

33.6 G21.01; P189.06

nāmāntaram vā. arthabhedam abhyupagamyā tathābhīdhānāt.

[S [NP1s (nāma<antaram)] [CNJ vā] [VP E] [NP5 [GC [NP2 (artha<bhedam)] abhyupagamyā] (tathā<abhidhānāt)]]

mīng tha dad par zad de, don khas blangs nas de skad du brjod pa'i phyir ro.

† Or, there would be no difference among names, because, having accepted the fact that things are different, one names them accordingly.

‡ Or there would be a different name [than it should have], because after arriving at the conclusion [that things are mutually distinct], one speaks thus [*viz.*, saying they are one].

§ ellipsis: E is VP of previous sentence

§ This sentence falls within the scope of “anyathā” of last sentence

§ “tathā”: K (89.20) glosses as “ekam iti”

§ P: artham; G: artha-bhedam; cf K (89.20) also. §§ T supports P.

athopayogādibhedena parasparabhinnātmateṣyate bhedānām nāmāntaram vā syāt.
bahūnām ekam iti saṃjñā kṛtā syāt. kiñ kāraṇam. artham parasparabhinnam
abhyupagamyā tathābhidhānāt. ekam ity abhidhānāt.

33.7 ¶ G21.02; P189.07

nanv anarthāntarahetutve 'pi bhāvakāle 'nityatāniṣpattes tulyātatsvabhāvatā.

[S [CNJ nanu] [AC [NP7 [NP6 e 1] (an-((artha<antara)<hetu))-B-tve [PRT api]] [PC7 0]] [NP5 [NP7 [NP6 e 2] (bhāva<kāle)] (anityatā1<(a-niṣpatteḥ))] [VP 0 [AP1 tulyā]] [NP1s [NP6 e 2] (a-(tat1<svabhāva)-B)-tā]]

rgyu don tha dad pa nyid med kyang dngos po'i dus ^(D272a.4, Pk417a.7) na, mi rtag³⁰
pa nyid ma grub pa'i phyir de'i rang bzhin ma yin par mtshungs pa ma yin nam zhe na,

† Suppose it is argued that, even if the causes of non-eternality are not different <sc., from those of its possessor>, because non-eternality does not arise at the <same> time <sc., as its possessor> comes into existence, the fact that it <sc., the possessor> does not have it <sc., non-eternality> for its nature would be the same <as in the case where a nature has different causes from its possessor>.

‡ Suppose it is argued that, even if impermanence did not have another object as its cause, since there is no production of impermanence at the time of a [thing's] being, the fact of [that thing] not having that [impermanence] as its nature is the same.

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ intra-s anaphora: twice

§ cpd intrusion: null NP6 wrt B (twice)

K90.06–10: nanv ity ādi paraḥ. anarthāntarahetutve 'pi vināśakāraṇānapekṣatve
'pi tvanmatenānityatāyāḥ. bhāvakāle 'nityatāniṣpatteḥ. bhāvasya sattakāle tasyā
anityatāyā niṣpatter bhāvād uttarakālam anityatā bhavatīti manyate. tulyā
'tatsvabhāvā. yathārthāntarahetutve 'pi niṣpattiḥ syāt. tayor nānātvantarthā
'narthāntarahetutve 'pīti tulyā 'tatsvabhāvatā.

³⁰ D: rtag; Pk: rtags

33.8 G21.03; P189.07

na vai kācid anyā 'nityatā nāma yā paścān niṣpadyeta.

[S [ADV [ADV na] [PRT vai]] [VP 0 [NP1 (kā-cit) [API anyā] 1] [NP1s anityatā [PRT nāma]] [RC [NP1s yā 1] [VP [ADV paścāt] niṣpadyeta]]]]

mi rtag pa nyid ces bya ba gang phyis³¹ 'grub par 'gyur pa gzhan ni 'ga' yang med pa yin te,

† There is nothing else at all called “non-eternality” which might arise later.

‡ There would surely not arise at a later time something else called impermanence.

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

§ intra-s anaphora

§ counter-anaphora

33.9 G21.04; P189.08

sa eva hi bhāvaḥ kṣaṇasthitidharmā 'nityatā.

[S [NP1s [API saḥ [PRT eva]] [CNJ hi] bhāvaḥ [API ((kṣaṇa<sthiti)<dharmā)]] [VP 0 [NP1 anityatā]]]

dngos (^{Pk417a.8}) po skad cig mar gnas pa'i chos kho na³² mi rtag pa nyid yin no.

† For the very thing, which possesses the property of momentary persistence, is non-eternality.

‡ For the very being that has the characteristic of abiding for a moment is impermanence.

§ “eva”: “very” (identity emphasis)

33.10 G21.05; P189.08

vacanabhede 'pi dharmidharmatayā nimittam vakṣyāmaḥ.

[S [VP [NP2 [NP7 (vacana<bhede) [PRT api]] [NP3 (dharmi+dharmatayā)] nimittam] vakṣyāmaḥ]]

chos dang (^{D272a.5}) chos can gyis³³ tshig tha dad pa la yang rgyu mtshan bshad par bya'o.

† We shall discuss the reason for the different expressions for properties and property-possessors.

‡ We shall explain the grounds for the difference in expressions as properties and property-possessors as well.

§ “api”: unclear

§§ Tibetan has no translation for “api”.

³¹ D: phyis; Pk: phyir ³² D: chos kho na; Pk: chos de kho nas ³³ Pk: gyis; D: gyi

K90.19–21: yadi bhāva evānityā kathaṃ tarhi śabdasya dharṃiṇo nityatā dharmā itī vacanabheda ity ata āha. vacanabhede ’pīty ādi. dharmadharmityā yo vacanabhedo vācakānyatvaṃ tatrāpi nimittam uttaratra vakṣyāmaḥ.

33.11 G21.06; P189.09

tām punar asya kṣaṇasthitodharmatām svabhāvaṃ svahetor eva tathotpatteḥ paśyann api mandabuddhiḥ sattopalambhena sarvadā tadbhāvaśaṅkāvipralabdho na vyavasyati sadṛśā-para-utpatti-vipralabdho vā.

[S [NP1s [PC1 [NP2 [AP2 tām] [CNJ punar] [NP6 asya 1] ((kṣaṇa<sthiti)2<dharma)-B-tām] [NP2 [NP6 e 1] svabhāvam] [NP5 [NP6 e 1] [NP6 (sva2<hetoh) [PRT eva]] (tathā2<utpatteḥ)] paśyan [PRT api]]] (manda<buddhiḥ)-B [AP1 [NP3 [NP6 e 1] (sattā<upalambhena)] [ADV sarvadā] (((tathā2<bhāva)<śaṅkā)<vipralabdhaḥ)] [VP E [ADV na] vyavasyati]]

[S [AP1 (((sadrśa<apara)<utpatti)<vipralabdhaḥ)] [CNJ vā]]

rang gi rgyu kho na las de ltar skye ba’i phyir ’di’i rang bzhin ^(Pk417b.1) skad cig mar gnas pa’i chos nyid de ni mthong bzhin du yang blo zhan³⁴ pa yod pa dmigs pas rtag tu de ltar yod par dogs³⁵ pas bslus pa’am, ’dra ^(D272a.6) gzhan ’byung pas bslus pas mi rtogs³⁶ so,

† Still, although he sees something’s property of persisting <but> a moment to be <its> nature, because it arises to be that way from the very same causes as those of its nature, a dull-witted person, being deceived by his apprehension of <a thing’s> existence into the expectation of <its> always being so, does not ascertain its persisting <but> a moment to be <its> nature. Or, being deceived by the arising of another similar thing.

‡ Still, despite observing something’s nature as having the characteristic of abiding for a moment, because of its arising that way from only its own cause, a dull-witted person, being deceived by his apprehension of its presence into the expectation of its always having a particular nature, or being deceived by the arising of another similar thing, is not convinced.

§ bv cpd: NP

§ modifier giving reason: second AP1 wrt VP

§ cpd intrusion: NP6 wrt B ADV “sarvadā” wrt “tathā<bhāva”

§ ellipsis: E is both NP2’s in PC (An instance of Bhartṛhari’s rule)

§ inter-s anaphora: first NP6’s antecedent is the next to last sentence’s NP1s

§ secondary predication

§ “eva”: “the very same” (identity emphasis)

Sentence two:

§ ellipsis: presumably this connects with the previous sentence by ellipsis. Tibetan has this disjunct form a continuous constituent with the other one.

K91.16–92.03: yadi tarhi bhāva evānityatā tadā bhāvapratyakṣikaraṇe sāpi pratyakṣaiveti kasmān na tathaiva niścīyata ity ata āha. tām ity ādi.

³⁴ Pk: blo zhan; D: blo gzhan ³⁵ Pk: dogs; D: dgos ³⁶ D: ’byung pas bslus pas mi rtogs; Pk: ’byung bas mi rtogs

kṣaṇasthidharmatām svabhāvam anityatākhyam paśyann api pratyyakṣikurvāno
'pi na vyavasyati. na niścinoṭī saṃbandhaḥ.

kasmāt kṣaṇasthitidharmatāsvabhāva ity āha. svahetor eva sakāśāt tathā
kṣaṇasthitidharmatayotpatteḥ. kiṃ punaḥ paśyann api na vyavasyatīty āha.
mandabuddhir iti. anādisaṃsārābhyas tayā nityādirūpāvidyāvāsanayā mandā
buddhir yasya sa tathānyathā drṣṭe vastuṇi sarātmanām kimiti na niścayaḥ syāt.
anena tu yoginām saty api sadṛśadarśane mandubuddhitvābhāvāt
kṣaṇikatvaniścayo bhavati uktam bhavati.

yadi tarhi avidyayā nānityatvādhyavasāyo vinaśyaty api bhāve mābhūd
anityatādhyavasāya ity āśa.nkya bhāyam api bhrāntibījam āha. sattopalambhenety
ādi. yaḥ sattāyā evopalambho nābhāvasya tena sattopalabhena.

etad uktam bhavati. uttarakṣaṇotpādakāla eva pūrvakṣaṇavināśāt pūrvottarayoh
kṣaṇayor abhāvenāvvyavadhānān nairantaryenānyatvāgrahāt sarvadā
dvitīyādikṣaṇeṣv api sattāyā evopalambhena tathābhāvaḥ pūrvadrṣṭasya bhāvaḥ
sadbhāvas tasya yā śa.nkā kadācit sa evāyam ity evamrūpā bhūtā bhrāntasyāpi sa
evāyam iti darśanāc cha.nkety āha. tayā vipralabdho vaṃcito na vyavasyati.

33.12 G21.09; P189.11

antyakṣaṇadarśinām niścayāt. paścād asyānupalabdhyā 'sthitipratipatter niścayakāla
iti tadā 'nityatā vyavasthāpyate. kāryotpādana-śakteḥ kāraṇasvabhāvatve 'py
adrṣṭatāt-kāryasya kāraṇadarśane 'py apratipannatadbhāvasya kāryadarśanāt
tatpratipattivat.

[S [NP5 [NP6 ((e1<(antya<kṣaṇa))<darśinām)] [NP3 [PP [NP5 [NP6 e 1] niścayāt]
paścāt] [NP6 asya 1] anupalabdhyā] ((e1<(a-sthiti))<pratipatteḥ)] [ADV [NP7
(niścaya<kāle) [PRT iti]] tadā] [NP1s anityatā] [VP vyavasthāpyate] [[AC [NP7
[NP5 ((kārya<utpādana)<śakteh)-B] (kāraṇa<svabhāvatve) [PRT api]] [PC7 0]]
[AC [NP7 [NP6 ((a-drṣṭa)<(tat2<kāryasya))-B 3] (kāraṇa2<darśane) [PRT api]]
[PC7 0]] [NP5 [NP6 ((a-pratipanna)<(tat2<bhāvasya))-B 3] (kārya<darśanāt)]
((tat2<pratipatti)-vat)]]]

skad cig ^(Pk417b.2) ma tha ma mthong ba rnam la nges pa'i phyir, phyis 'di mi dmigs
pas mi gnas par rtogs pa'i phyir de'i tshes nges pa'i dus yin pas mi rtag pa nyid du
rnam par gzhag go. 'bras bu bskyed pa'i nus pa ^(Pk417b.3) rgyu'i dngos ^(D272a.7) po³⁷
nyid yin yang 'bras bu ma mthong ba rgyu mthong du zin³⁸ kyang de'i ngo bo ma
rtogs pas 'bras bu mthong bas rtogs pa bzhin no.

† Since those who see the final moment <of a thing> understand that it does not
persist on account of their non-apprehension of it after <its original> ascertainment,
they then, at the moment of the ascertainment <of its non-persistence>, determine
<its> non-eternality. In the same way, one is aware of a cause through the
observation of its effect without having been aware of its existence, even though one
observes a cause without having observed its effect, and even though the nature of a
cause is to be capable of producing its effect.

³⁷ Pk: dngos po; D: dngos pa ³⁸ D: 'bras bu ma mthong ba rgyu mthong du zin; Pk: 'bras bu ma mthong
du zin

‡ Because those who see the final moment [of something] have ascertainment. There is a time of ascertainment because of awareness of something's not abiding, because there is no apprehension of it at a later time. Therefore, impermanence is then correctly accounted for, just as there is awareness of a cause, the presence of which one is unaware, by observing its effect, even though one observes the cause when its effect is unobserved, despite the fact that the nature of a cause is the potential to produce an effect.

§ appositive: marked by “iti”
 § bv cpd: NP (twice) (one is the antecedent of the other)
 § intra-s anaphora
 § vat phrase
 § unclear: syntax relating the two bv cpds in vat phrase
 § see Steinkellner (1971, p. 183)

K95.27–96.03: kathaṃ punar gamyate sadṛśāparotpattyā vipralabdho na
 vyavasyatīyā ata āha. antyety ādi. sadṛśakṣaṇāntarāpratisadhāyī kṣaṇo 'ntyakṣaṇas
 taddarśināṃ naṣṭa iti niścayāt. avagamyate prāg apy ayam pratikṣaṇam eva
 naśyati kevalaṃ yathoktād eva vipralambhahetor na niścīyate.

nanv antyakṣaṇadarśino 'pi kathan naśvaratvaniścayo yāvataḥ tadāpi
 sattopalambho 'sti. na hi sattāyāṃ evopalabhamānas tadabhāvam avaitīyā āha.
 paścād ity ādi. na brūmo 'ntyakṣaṇadarśanamātrān niścayo bhavatīti kintv
 antyakṣaṇam dṛṣtvā paścād vi...³⁹

33.13 G21.13; P189.13

anyathārthāntaram evānityatā syī. anyanimittatve 'nimittatve vā.

[S [ADV anyathā] [NP1 (artha<antaram) [PRT eva]] [NP1s anityatā 1] [VP _ syāt]
 [AC [NP7 [NP7 [NP6 e 1] (anya<nimitta)-B-tve] [NP7 E (a-nimitta)-B-tve [CNJ vā]
]] [PC7 0]]]]

de lta ma yin na gzhan gyi rgyu mtshan nyid yin nam, rgyu mtshan med pa can nyid
Pk417b.4 yin yang rung ste, mi rtag pa nyid don gzhan kho nar 'gyur ro.

† Otherwise, whether something else is cause of non-eternality or non-eternality has no cause, non-eternality would be something completely different <from the thing in which it is thought to inhere>.

‡ Otherwise, if it had another causal condition or no causal condition, impermanence would be another object entirely.

§ copula: overt: predicational: NP1s VP
 § cpd intrusion: null NP6 wrt B
 § ellipsis: E is previous null NP6
 § possible ellipsis: with cpd of second NP7 (anya ellipsed)
 § left extraposition from VP of NP1 (predicate) within MC, except ADV
 § intra-s anaphora
 § “eva”: “completely”
 § counter-anaphora: “anyathā”

³⁹ The next leaf of Karṇakagomin's commentary is missing.

33.14 G21.14; P189.14

tathā ca bhāvas tadvān na syāt. tadanupayogāt.

[S [ADV tathā] [CNJ ca] [NP1s bhāvaḥ 1] [VP [AP1 (tat2<vān)]][ADV na] syāt]
[NP5 [NP6 e 2] (tat1<(an-upayogāt))]]

de lta na ni dngos ^{D272b.1} po de dang ldan par mi 'gyur te, de la mi dgos pa'i phyir ro.

† And in this way a thing would not possess it <sc., non-eternality>, since the thing would have no need of <sc., non-eternality>.

‡ And in this way a being would not possess it [sc., impermanence], since there would be no need for it.

§ copula: overt: predicational: NP1s VP

§ inter-s anaphora: NP1s of last clause

§ intra-s anaphora

33.15 G21.15; P189.14

upayoge vā sa evāsya svātmabhūto 'nityateti kim anyayā. svabhāvena vā
'calasyārthāntarayoge 'pi tadbhāvānutpatteḥ.

[S [AC [NP7 upayoge [NP6 e 1] [NP7 e 2]] [PC7 0]] [CNJ vā] [NP1s saḥ [PRT eva]
] - [NP6 asya 1] 2] [VP 0] [AP1 (sva-ātma<bhūtaḥ)] [NP1 anityatā]]

[S [CNJ iti] [NP1s kim [NP3 anyayā]] [NP5 [AC [NP7 [NP3 svabhāvena] [CNJ vā]
[NP6 acalasya] ((artha<antara1)<yoge) [PRT api]] [PC7 0]]
((tat1<bhāva)<anupapatteḥ)]]

'on te dgos na ni de nyid 'di'i rang gi bdag nyid du gyur ^{Pk417b.5} pa'i mi rtag pa nyid
yin pas gzhan gyis ci zhig bya, rang bzhin gyis mi g.yo ba ni don gzhan dang ldan
yang de'i ngo bor mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro.

† Or, if <a thing had> a need <for non-eternality>, it itself, non-eternality, being the thing's nature, would belong to the thing. So, what is the point of something else <sc. different from the thing itself>, since, even if a universal is connected with something else by its nature, it <sc. the universal> does not come about through that thing's coming into existence.

‡ Or, if there is a need, that which is the thing itself is impermanence, so what is gained by a further [impermanence], since, even if that which by nature does not change has a connection with another object, it does not follow that [the unchanging thing] have that [which it requires] as its nature.

§ copula: covert: existential (possession): indeterminate

§ 'eva': 'itself' (identity emphasis)

§ right extraposition from NP1s of AP1 within MC;

§ right extraposition from NP1s of NP1 (appositive) within MC; NB: 'saḥ' cannot modify anityatā; thus, anityatā must be in apposition to it. (Cp. G21.17 below.)

§ inter-s anaphora: NP6's antecedent is NP1s of last clause

Second sentence:

§ inter-s counter-anaphora:

§ intra-s anaphora:

§ unclear: “vā” does not fit; Tibetan has “hi”

33.16 ¶ G21.17; P189.16

sa ca arthhitarād bhavann anityatā ’nyo vā dharmo hetuḥ phalaṃ vā syāt.

ahetuphalasyāsambandhāt. tatra bhāvānumānasyāsambhavāt.

[S [NP1s saḥ [CNJ ca] [PC1 [NP5 (artha1<antarāt)] bhavan] [NP1 [NP1 anityatā] [NP1 [AP1 anyah] [CNJ vā] dharmah]] 2] [VP [NP1 [NP1 [NP7 e 1] hetuḥ] [NP1 [NP7 e 1] phalam] [CNJ vā]] syāt] [NP5 [NP5 [NP6 a-(hetu+phalasya)] (a-sambandhāt)] [NP6 [NP7 tatra 2] (bhāva<anumānasya)] (a-sambhavāt)]]

mi rtag ^{D272b.2} pa nyid dam chos gzhan de yang don gzhan ^{Pk417b.6} las ’byung ba na rgyu yin pa’am, ’bras bu yin pa zhiḡ tu ’gyur grang na, rgyu dang ’bras bu ma yin pa ni ’brel pa med pa’i phyir, de la yod par rjes su dpag par mi srid pa’i phyir ro.

† And it—namely, non-eternality—or any other property, arising from something else, must be either its cause or its effect because <otherwise> there is no possibility of an inference of <the property’s> existence, since that which is neither a cause nor an effect is unconnected <with anything>.

‡ And that—namely, impermanence—or any other property, arising from another object, may be either a cause or an effect, since that which is neither a cause nor an effect has no relation, because in that case there is no possibility of an inference of its presence.

§ copula: overt: predicational: NP1s VP

§ apposition: “anityatā” wrt “saḥ” Malvania reads “anityatā-ākhyah” instead of “anityatā”

§§ Tibetan *grang* usually translates *ākhyā*, but its position in the sentence is strange.

Verse 33cd

33.17 G21.20; P189.18; D272b.2

tatra

paścād bhāvān na hetutvaṃ phale ’py ekāntatā kutaḥ.

[S [NP7 tatra] [NP5 [ADV paścāt] bhāvāt] [VP [ADV na] 0] [NP1s hetutvam] [S [NP1s [NP7 phale [PRT api]] ekāntatā] [ADV kutaḥ]]]

de ^{Pk417b.7} la

phyis ’byung phyir na rgyu nyid ^{D272b.3} min, ’bras bu na yang ga la nges.

† Now, because non-eternality exists after the thing in which it inheres exists, non-eternality is not the cause of the thing. <And> how is <being a cause> invariable with respect to an effect either?

‡ In that case [sc., in the case of impermanence] **There is no being a cause, because it is present at a later time. And if it were an effect, how [would it have] invariability?**

§ copula: covert: existential: VP NP1s

§ copula: covert: existential (possession): indeterminate

§ “api”: either §§ Or “and”

33.18 G21.21; P189.19

M14

sa hi niṣpanne bhāve ’rthāntarataḥ paścād bhavan katham tasya hetuḥ syāt.

[S [NP1s saḥ [CNJ hi] [PC1 [AC [PC7 niṣpanne] [NP7 bhāve 2]] [NP5 (artha<antarataḥ)] [ADV paścāt] bhavan] 1] [ADV katham] [VP [NP1 [NP6 tasya 2] hetuḥ] syāt]]

de dngos po grub nas phyis don gzhan las ’byung na ji ltar de’i rgyu yin.⁴⁰

‡ For how can that <sc. a nature> which comes into existence after something else <sc. the thing in which it inheres> be cause of that which has arisen?

‡ For how can that which comes into being from another object at a later time than a being that has been produced be its cause?

§ copula: overt: predicational: NP1s VP

§ counter-anaphora

§ inter-s anaphora: ‘saḥ’ refers to svabhāva, here anityatā

§ intra-s anaphora

33.19 G21.22; 189.19

phalasyāpi nāvaśyaṃ hetau bhāva iti tadbhāvahetor anaikāntikatvam.

[S [NP6 phalasya [PRT api]] [ADV na] [VP 0 [ADV avaśyam]] [AC [PC7 0] [NP7 hetau]] [NP1s _ bhāvaḥ]]

[S [CNJ iti] [NP1s [NP6 ((tat<bhāva)<hetuḥ)] anaikāntikatvam] [VP 0]]

’bras bu yang rgyu la gdon mi za ba ma yin pas de’i go bar ^{Pk417b.8} byed pa’i gtan tshigs ma nges pa nyid yin no.

‡ Neither does a result necessarily come into existence when its cause exists. So, the reason for its <sc., non-eternity’s> existence would not be invariable.

‡ Also, the effect is not necessarily present when the cause is, so the evidence for its presence is ambiguous.

§ copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s

§ left extraposition from NP1s of NP6 within MC

§ copula: covert: existential (possession): indeterminate

§ inter-s anaphora

⁴⁰ D: yin; Pk: min

kāryaṃ dhūmo hutabhujāḥ kāryadharmānuvṛttitaḥ.

[S [CNJ yasmāt] [VP 0 [NP1 kāryam [NP6 e 1]]] [NP1s dhūmaḥ] [NP5 [NP6 (huta<bhujāḥ) 1] ((kārya<dharma)<anuvṛttitaḥ)]]]

'di ltar, me yi⁴³ 'bras bu du ba ^(D271b.5) ste, 'bras bu'i chos ^(Pk418a.2) kyi rjes 'jug phyir.

† Because smoke is the effect of fire due to its conformity with the property of the effect.

‡ Because **smoke is the effect of fire in compliance with the property of an effect.**

§ copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s

§ intra-s anaphora

34.1 G22.02; P190.04

yeṣām upalambhe tallakṣaṇam anupalabdham yad upalabhyate. tatraikābhāve 'pi nopalabhyate. tat tasya kāryam.

[S [RC [AC [NP7 [NP6 yeṣām 1] upalambhe] [PC7 0]]] [NP1s [AP1 (tat1<lakṣaṇam)-B] [AP1 anupalabdham] yat 2] [VP upalabhyate]] [RC [AC [NP7 [NP7 tatra 1] (eka<abhāve) [PRT api] [PC7 0]]] [NP1s e 2] [VP [ADV na] upalabhyate]] [NP1s tat 2] [VP 0 [NP1 [NP6 tasya 1] kāryam]]]]

de'i mtshan nyid kyir gyur pa mi dmigs pa las gang dag dmigs na dmigs la, de las gcig med na yang mi dmigs pa gang yin pa de ni de'i 'bras bu yin te,

† That which, not having been apprehended, is apprehended when its conditions have been apprehended, <yet> is not apprehended when even one of them does not exist, is their effect.

‡ That which, previously unapprehended and having as its conditions other things when they were apprehended, is apprehended, [but] is not apprehended when even one among those other things is absent, is their effect.

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

§ agreement: fails to hold between rel pron and dem pron wrt number

§ possible ellipsis: null subject in second RC

§ intra-s anaphora: donkey sentence

§ null subject: second RC

§ number: see agreement

34.2 G22.03; P190.05

tac ca dhūme 'sti.

[S [NP1s tat] [CNJ ca] [VP [NP7 dhūme] asti]]

de yang du ba ^(Pk418a.3) las yod do.

⁴³ D: yi; Pk: yis

† And this is <true> in the case for smoke.

‡ And that [character of being an effect] occurs in smoke.

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

§ inter-s anaphora: NP1s's antecedent is the just-stated criterion

K93.09: tac ceti yathoktaṃ kāryalakṣaṇaṃ dhūme 'sti tasmād agner eva dhūmo bhavati.

Verse 34cd

34.3 G22.05; P190.06

sa bhavaṃs tadabhāve tu hetumattāṃ vilaṅghayet.

[S [NP1s saḥ [PC1 bhavan] [AC [NP7 (tat1 <abhāve)] [PC7 0]] 2] [CNJ tu] [VP [NP2 [NP6 e 2] (e1 <hetu)mattām] vilaṅghayet]]

de med par ni de yod na, ^(D272b.6) rgyu dang ldan pa las 'das 'gyur.

† But that which comes to exist in something's absence must give up having that thing as its cause.

‡ **But that which exists in the absence of something would give up the state of having [that this as] a cause.**

§ possible donkey anaphora

K99.26: sa dhūmo bhavaṃs tadabhāve 'gnyabhāve hetumattām bilaṅghayed ahetukaḥ.

34.4 G22.06; P190.07

sakṛd api tathādarśanāt kāryaḥ siddhaḥ. akāryatve 'kāraṇāt sakṛd apy abhāvāt.

[S [NP5 [ADV sakṛt [PRT api]] [ADV tathā] [NP6 e 1] darśanāt] [NP1s e 1] [VP 0 [AP1 [AP1 kāryaḥ] siddhaḥ]] [NP5 [AC [NP7 [NP6 e 1] [NP e 2] (a-kāryatve)] [PC7 0]] [NP6 e 1] [NP5 (a-kāraṇāt) 2] [ADV sakṛt [PRT api]] abhāvāt]]

lan cig de ltar mthong bas kyang 'bras bu grub ste, 'bras bu nyid ma yin na, rgyu ma yin pa las lan cig kyang mi ^{Pk418a.4} 'byung ba'i phyir ro.

† Something is established as what is to be produced because of <its> observation even once in the way <specified above>, since, if it is not an effect <of something>, it would not arise even once from it, it not being the cause.

‡ An effect is established because of being observed even once in that way, because, if it were not an effect, it would not arise even once from what is not its cause.

- § agreement unclear: “kāryaḥ siddhaḥ” instead of “kāryam siddham”
 § copula: covert: predicational: indeterminate
 § inter-s anaphora
 § intra-s anaphora
 § null subject: coref with NP1s of last clause
 § Cp. PVin II 34.3-5

K99.29–100.02: tasmāt sakṛd api na kevalam bhūyas tathādarśanād ity
 anantaroktāt pratyakṣopalambhāt. kiṅkāraṇam. akāraṇād agneḥ sakṛd api na
 kevalam bhuyo ’bhāvāt. na hi bālukābhyaḥ sakṛd api tailam bhavati.

34.5 G22.07; P190.06

kāryasya ca svakāraṇam antareṇa bhāve ’hetumattaiva syāt.

[S [AC [NP7 [NP6 kāryasya 1] [CNJ ca] [PP [NP2 (sva l < kāraṇam)] antareṇa]
 bhāve] [PC7 0]] [NP1s [NP6 e 1] (a-hetumattā) [PRT eva]] [VP syāt]]

’bras bu yang rang gi rgyu med par yod na ni rgyu dang mi ldan pa kho nar ’gyur te,

† And were an effect to come to exist without its own cause, there could be no cause at
 all for it.

‡ And if an effect were present without its cause, then it would entirely causeless.

- § copula: overt: existential: NP1s VP
 § inter-s anaphora
 § “eva”: “at all” (strict meaning)

34.6 G22.08; 190.08

na hi yasya yam antareṇa bhāvaḥ sa tasya hetur bhavati.

[S [ADV na] [CNJ hi] [RC [NP1s [NP6 yasya 2] [PP [NP2 yam 1] antareṇa] bhāvaḥ
] [VP 0]] [NP1s saḥ 1] [VP [NP1 [NP6 tasya 2] hetuḥ] bhavati]]

gang zhig gang ^{D272b.7} med⁴⁴ par yod pa de ni de’i rgyu ma yin no.

† For that without which something arises is not its cause.

‡ For it is not the case that that without which something is present is its cause.

- § copula: covert: existential: indeterminate
 § copula: overt: predicational: NP1s VP
 § inter-s anaphora: donkey sentence
 § possible NP extraposition: of NP6 from RC’s NP1s extraposition means anaphoric arguments have same
 order in both clauses

⁴⁴ Pk: med; D: mad

34.7 G22.09; P190.08

bhavati ca dhūmo 'gnim antareṇa tan na taddhetuḥ syāt.

[S [S [VP bhavati _] [CNJ ca] [NP1s dhūmaḥ] [PP [NP2 agnim 2] antareṇa]] [CNJ tat] [NP1s E] [ADV na] [VP [AP1 (tat2<hetuḥ)-B] syāt]]

me med par yang du ba yod de,⁴⁵ des na (^{Pk418a.5}) de'i rgyu ma yin par 'gyur ro.

† Yet if smoke comes to exist without fire, then <smoke> would not have it <sc., fire> for its cause.

‡ And if smoke were present without fire, then it would not have that as its cause.

§ copula: overt: existential: VP NP1s

§ copula: overt: predicational: indeterminate

§ ellipsis: E is NP1s of protasis

§ right extraposition from VP of PP within its clause

§ intra-s anaphora

§ null subject: see ellipsis

34.8 G22.10; P190.09

anyahetukatvān nāhetukatvam iti cet

[S [NP5 [NP6 e 1] (anya<hetukatvāt)] [ADV na] [NP1s [NP6 e 1] (a-hetukatvam)] [VP 0] [CNJ iti cet]]

gal te gzhan gyi rgyu can yin pa'i phyir, rgyu med pa can nyid ma yin no zhe na,

† It might be argued that <smoke> is not causeless because <it> has a cause different <from fire>.

‡ It might be argued that [smoke] is not causeless, because it has something else as its cause.

§ copula: covert: existential (possession)

§ counter-anaphora

§ intra-s anaphora: NP6's antecedent is NP1s of protasis of last sentence

34.9 G22.10; P190.09

na. tatrāpi tulyatvāt. tadabhāve 'py agnau bhavatīti.

[S [ADV na] [NP1s E] [NP5 [NP7 tatra [PRT api]] tulyatvāt [S [AC [NP7 (tat<abhāve) [PRT api]] [PC7 0]] [NP1s e] [AC [NP7 agnau] [PC7 0]] [VP bhavati] [PRT iti]]]]

de lta ma yin te, de la yang mtshungs pa'i phyir te, de med na yang me⁴⁶ yod na (^{D273a.1}) yod pas so.

⁴⁵ D: yod de; Pk yod do ⁴⁶ Pk: me; D: mi

† <This> is not <so>, because, in this case too, <the situation> is the same, that even in the absence of it <sc., an alleged cause different from fire>, when there is fire, there is <smoke>.

‡ Not so, because the same [is true] in that case, too, in that even when it [the other cause] is absent, when there is fire, [smoke] is present.

§ copula: overt: existential: indeterminate

§ ellipsis: E is last sentence's NP1s

§ inter-s anaphora: null subject's antecedent is last sentence's null anaphora; "tat" 's antecedent is last sentence's "anya"

§ null subject: antecedent null anaphora in last sentence

K100.8–9: naitad evaṃ tatrāpy arthāntare hetau kalpyamāne tulyatvāt. tathā hi tadabhāve 'pi anyakāraṇābhāve 'pi punar agnau bhavatīti tadapy anyat kāraṇam na hetuḥ syāt.

34.10 G22.11; P190.10

kathaṃ vā tato 'nyato vā atajjananasvabhāvād bhavet.

[S [ADV kathaṃ [CNJ vā]] [NP1s e 1] [VP [NP5 [NP5 tataḥ] [NP5 anyataḥ [CNJ vā]] [AP5((a-(tat1<janana))<svabhāvāt)-B]]] bhavet]]

(Pk418a.6) yang de'am gzhan yang rung, de bskyed pa'i rang bzhin ma yin pa las ni ji ltaṅ 'byung bar 'gyur te,

† How could it <sc., smoke> possibly arise <either> from it <sc., fire> or from something else, whose nature does not produce it?

‡ How could something [like smoke] come into being from that, or from something else, which does not have the nature of producing it?

§ copula: overt: predicational: indeterminate

§ counter-anaphora

§ disjunction

§ possible ellipsis: null subject is subject of last iti clause

§ inter-s anaphora: NP5's antecedent is last sentence's NP7

§ intra-s anaphora:

§ null subject

§ see Steinkellner (1971, p. 184, n. 18).

34.11 G22.12; P190.11

svayam atatsvabhāvasyājānanāt. tasya ahetutā syāt.

[S [NP5 [ADV svayam] [NP6 (a-(tat<svabhāvasya))-B 1] (a-jānanāt)] [NP1s [NP6 tasya 1] (a-hetutā)] [VP syāt]]

de'i rang gis de'i rang bzhin ma yin pas mi bskyed pa'i phyir ro.⁴⁷ de rgyu med pa nyid du 'gyur ro.

⁴⁷ D: phyir ro; Pk: phyir

† It <sc., smoke> could not have a cause, because it is not produced by that which itself does not have it <producing smoke> for its nature.

‡ It [sc., smoke] would be causeless, because that which does not itself have that [sc. producing smoke] as its nature would not produce it.

§ copula: overt: existential (possession): NP1s VP

§ bv cpd: NP (is antecedent)

§ inter-s anaphora: first “tat”’s antecedent is “tat-janana” in the last sentence

§ intra-s anaphora

§ see Steinkellner (1971, p. 184, n. 18)

K100.12–13: atatsvabhāvasya svayam adhūmajananasvabhāvasyājānanāt tasya dhūmasyāhetutā syāt.

34.12 ¶ G22.13; P190.17

na vai sa eva bhavati tādrśasya bhāvāt.

[S [ADV na [PRT vai]] [NP1s saḥ [PRT eva]] [VP bhavati] [NP5 [NP6 tādrśasya] bhāvāt]]

(Pk418a.7) de nyid ni ma yin pa kho na ste, (D273a.2) de dang 'dra ba 'byung ba'i phyir ro zhe na,

† It is not at all the case that the very same thing <sc., smoke> arises from the existence of something of the same kind.

‡ It is not at all the case that that [smoke] itself is present, because what is present is something of the same nature [as smoke].

§ copula: overt: existential (possession): NP1s VP

§ inter-s anaphora: NP1s's antecedent is last sentence's NP6

§ negation scope: “na” narrower than NP5

§ “eva”: “very same” (identity emphasis)

§§ Tibetan and K suggest that this is a pūrvapakṣa.

K100.16–18: na vai sa evety ādi vyabhicāravādi. athavāgnijānito dhūmaḥ sa evānyato bhavatīty evaṃ nocyate. yadi sa evānyataḥ syād bhaved ahetutvaṃ tādrśasya vahnijānitadharmasvabhāvatulyasyānyato bhāvāt.

34.13 G22.14; P190.12

anyādrśād bhavan katham tādrśaḥ syāt.

[S [NP1s [PC1 [NP5 anyādrśāt] bhavan] E] [ADV katham] [VP [AP1 tādrśaḥ] syāt]]

mī 'dra ba las 'byung ba ji ltar de dang 'dra bas yin te,

† How can it <smoke> be of one kind, while arising from things of different kinds?

‡ [But] how can that which comes into being from something of a different nature [than fire] be of the same nature [as smoke]?

§ copula: overt: predicational: NP1s VP

§ ellipsis: E is NP1s of last sentence

§ null subject

§ number: Sanskrit has singular (“anyādrśāt”) where English requires plural

K100.19–22: anyādrśād ity ādi siddhāntavādī. tat kiṃ kāryasadṛṣaṃ kāraṇam iṣyate yenaivam ucyate ’nyādrśād bhavan katham tādṛśa iti. nānyārthatvāt. yo hi dhūmajanako vahnir drṣtas tato visadrśād bhavan dhūmaḥ katham tādṛśo bhavati vahnijanitadharmatulyasvabhāvo bhavati.

34.14 G22.14; P190.12

tādṛśād dhi bhavan tādṛśaḥ syāt.

[S [NP1s [PC1 [NP5 tādṛśāt] [CNJ hi] bhavan] e] [VP [AP1 tādṛśaḥ] syāt]]

de ni de dang ’dra ba las byung⁴⁸ ba’i phyir de dang ’dra bar ’gyur ro.

‡ For that which arises from things of one kind must be of the same kind.

‡ For what comes into being from that which has the same nature [as fire] would have the same nature [as smoke].

§ copula: overt: predicational: NP1s VP

§ null subject

§ intra-s anaphora: first “tat” is the antecedent of second “tat”.

34.15 G22.15; P190.13

anyādrśād api tādṛśo bhāve tacchaktiniyamābhāvān na hetubhedo bhedaka ity akāraṇaṃ viśvasya vaiśvarūpyaṃ syāt. sarvaṃ vā sarvasmāj jāyeta.

[S [AC [NP7 [NP5 anyādrśāt [PRT api]] [NP6 tādṛśaḥ] bhāve] [PC7 0]] [NP5 (((tat1<śakti)<niyama)<abhāvāt)] [ADV na] [NP1s (hetu1<bhedaḥ)] [VP 0 [AP1 bhedakaḥ]]]

[S [CNJ iti] [S [AP1 (a-kāraṇam)-B] [NP1s [NP6 viśvasya] (vaiśva<rūpyam)] [VP - syāt]] [S [NP1s sarvaṃ] [CNJ vā] [VP [NP5 sarvasmāt] jāyeta]]]

mi ’dra (^{Ph418a.8}) ba las de dang ’dra ba ’gyur na ni, de dag gi nus pa ma nges pa’i phyir rgyu’i tha dad pa tha dad par byed pa ma (^{D273a.3}) yin pas, mtha’ dag gi sna tshogs nyid rgyu med pa can du ’gyur pa’am, thams cad las (^{Pk418b.1}) thams cad skye par ’gyur ro.

‡ If something of one kind comes into existence from something of another kind too, the differences among causes cannot differentiate <their effects>, because there is no restriction on their <sc., the causes’> potentialities. So, either the diversity of the

⁴⁸ Pk: las ’byung; D: la ma byung

world would be without a cause or everything would be produced from everything <else>.

‡ If something of the same kind [as smoke that is produced by fire] were to come into being from something of a different nature [than fire], then a difference in causes is not a differentiator [of effects], because there is no restriction of their potentials [sc., of the potential of only the firelike cause to produce a smokelike effect and the potential of only an unfirelike cause to produce an unsmokelike effect]. Therefore, either the diversity of the totality of things would be without a cause, or anything could arise from anything.

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

§ intra-s anaphora

§ negation scope: “na” narrower than NP5

Second sentence

§ copula: overt: predicational: NP1s VP

§ disjunction

§ left extraposition from VP of AP1 (predicate) within its clause, except CNJ

K101.15–21: anyādr̥ṣād apy avahnisad.r’sād api yadi tādr̥ṣo bhavet
vahnijanitadhūmatulyasvabhāvo bhavet. tacchaktiniyamābhāvāt. sadr̥ṣāsadr̥ṣayoḥ
kāraṇayor yā śaktis tasyā yo niyamaḥ sadr̥ṣī sadr̥ṣam eva janayaty asadr̥ṣī
vilakṣaṇam iti tasyābhāvāt kāraṇān na hetubhedaḥ kāryasya bhedaka ity kṛtvā
'karaṇam viśvasya vaiśvarūpyam syāt. yataḥ kutaścit kāraṇād utpatter
nāhetukatvam iti ced āha. sarvaṃ vā sarvād ity ādi. aśaktād api ced utpattiḥ
sarvaṃ sarvasmāḥ jāyeta. na caivam.

34.16 ¶ G22.17; P190.15

tasmāt kāraṇabhedābhedaḥkāryābhedābhedaḥ.

[S [CNJ tasmāt] [VP 0 [NP5 (kāraṇa<(bheda+(a-bhedābhyām)))]] [NP1s
(kārya<(bheda+(a-bhedau)))]]]

de lta bas na rgyu'i tha dad pa dang tha dad pa ma yin pa dag gis 'bras bu tha dad pa
dang tha dad pa ma yin pa dag yin no.

† Therefore, the differences and non-differences among effects arises from the
differences and non-differences among <their> causes.

‡ Therefore, the difference or non-difference of effects arises from the difference or
non-difference of their causes.

§ copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s

34.17 G22.18; P190.15

tan na dhūmo 'rthād dr̥ṣṭākāravijātīyād bhavaty ahetukatvaprasaṅgāt.

[S [CNJ tat] [ADV na] [NP1s dhūmaḥ] [VP [NP5 arthāt [AP5
(dr̥ṣṭa<ākāra)<vijātīyāt)]]] bhavati] [NP5 [NP6 e 1] ((a-hetukatva)<prasaṅgāt)]]]

de bas na du ba ni mthong (*D273a.4*) pa'i rnam pa dang rigs mi (*Pk418b.2*) mthun pa'i don las mi 'byung ste, rgyu med pa nyid du thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro,

† Thus, it is not the case that smoke comes into existence from a thing of a kind different from the form observed because of the absurdity of its being causeless.

‡ Therefore, it is not the case that smoke comes into being from a thing that has an observed appearance of a different kind [from that of fire], because that would entail causelessness.

§ copula: overt: predicational: NP1s VP

§ negation scope: "na" narrower than NP5

K101.2122: tan na dhūma iti. tad iti tasmād yata utpadyamāno dhūmo dr̥ṣṭaḥ sa dr̥ṣṭākāro vahnīḥ. tadvijāṭiyād avahner ity arthaḥ.

35 G22.19; P190.17 D273a.4

tathā ca

**nityam sattvam asattvam vā 'hetor anyānapekṣaṇāt
apekṣāto hi bhāvānām kādācitkatvasambhavaḥ.**

[S [ADV tathā] [CNJ ca] [NP1s [AP1 nityam] [NP1 [NP1 sattvam] [NP1 (a-sattvam)] [CNJ vā]] [NP6 (a-hetoḥ)-B 1]] [NP5 [NP6 e 1] (anya<(an-apekṣaṇāt))]]

[S [NP5 apekṣataḥ [CNJ hi] [NP6 e 1]] [NP1s [NP6 bhāvānām 1] ((kādā-cit)-katva)<sambhavaḥ)] [VP 0]]

de lta ma yin te, rgyu med gzhan la mi ltos⁴⁹ phyir, rtag tu yod pa'am⁵⁰ med par 'gyur, dngos po rnams ni res (*Pk418b.3*) 'ga' zhig, 'byung ba ltos⁵¹ pa las yin (*D273a.5*) no.⁵²

† And in this way, **that which has no cause has either eternal existence or eternal non-existence, because it has no dependence on anything else. For things arise as temporary because of their dependence on other things.**

‡ And so **that which has no cause has either permanent presence or permanent absence, because it has no dependence on anything else, for beings have occasional presence because of dependence.**

§§ Tibetan translation suggests "anyathā" rather than "tathā," but G, P and M all have "tathā".

35ab § copula: covert: existential (possession): indeterminate

§ bv cpd: NP (is antecedent)

§ counter-anaphora

§ intra-s anaphora

§ disjunction

35cd

§ copula: covert: existential (possession): indeterminate

§ intra-s anaphora

§ secondary predication: in cpd

§ unclear: "kādācitka"; perhaps "having existence at some time or other"

§ Cf. D's gloss three sentences below.

⁴⁹ D: ltos; Pk: bltos ⁵⁰ D: pa'am; Pk: pa ⁵¹ D: ltos; Pk: bltos ⁵² D: no; Pk: te

35.1 G22.22; P191.01

sa hi dhūmo 'hetur bhavan nirapekṣatvān na kadācin na bhavet. tadbhāve
vaikalyābhāvād iṣṭakālavat.

[S [NP1s [AP1 saḥ] [CNJ hi] dhūmaḥ [PC1 [AP1 (a-hetuḥ)-B] bhavan] 1] [NP5
[NP6 e 1] (nir-apekṣatvāt)] [ADV [ADV na] kadā-cit] [VP [ADV na] bhavet] [NP7
[NP7 (tat1 <bhāve)] (vaikalya <abhāvāt) [(iṣṭa <kālavat)]]]

du ba de rgyu med pa las 'byung na ni ltos⁵³ pa med pa'i phyir nam yang mi 'byung
bar mi 'gyur te, de 'byung ba la ma tshang ba med pa'i phyir 'dod pa'i (Pk418b.4) dus
bzhin no.

† For, if smoke were causeless, and hence independent of anything <else>, either it
would always exist—just as smoke exists at the time it is <normally> accepted to
exist—because there is no deficiency with respect to its coming into existence,

‡ For the smoke would never not be present, because, being causeless, it would be
independent, because of an absence of deficiency in its being present as is the case at
the favorable time [sc., the time that is favorable for smoke to arise because all its
necessary conditions are present].

§ copula: overt: existential: NP1s VP

§ inter-s anaphora

§ unclear: the syntactic relation between PC and first NP5. PC seems to be a reason for NP5. Moreover, the
PC expresses a counterfactual condition.

35.2 G22.23; P191.02

tadāpi vā na bhavet. abhāvakālāviśeṣāt.

[S [ADV tadā [PRT api] 1] [CNJ vā] [NP1s E] [VP [ADV na] bhavet] [NP5 [NP6 e
1] ((abhāva <kāla) <(a-viśeṣāt))]]

yang na ni de'i tshe yang 'byung bar mi 'gyur te, med pa'i dus dang khyad par med
pa'i phyir ro.

† Or, it would not exist, even at the time <it is normally accepted to exist>, because
there is no difference between that time and the time it is absent.

‡ Or it [scil., smoke] would not be present even then [at the time when it is observed],
because there is no difference from the time when it is absent.

§ copula: overt: existential: indeterminate

§ disjunction

§ ellipsis: E is NP1s of last sentence.

§ inter-s anaphora: "tadā"'s antecedent is "iṣṭa-kāla"

§ intra-s anaphora

K102.08 tadāpi ceti dṛṣṭakāle 'pi dhūmo na bhavet. dhūmābhāvakālāviśeṣāt.

⁵³ D: ltos; Pk: bltos

35.3 ¶ G22.24; P191.03

apekṣayā hi bhāvāḥ kādācitkā bhavanti. bhāvābhāvakālayos tadbhāvayogyatā
'yogyatāyogāt tulyayogyatāyogyatayor deśakālayos tadvattetarayor niyamāyogāt.

[S [NP3 apekṣayā [NP6 e 1]] [CNJ hi] [NP1s bhāvāḥ 1] [VP [AP1 (kāḍā-cit)-kāḥ]
bhavanti] [NP5 [NP6 e 1] [NP7 ((bhāva+abhāva)<kālayoḥ)]
(((tat1 <bhāva)<(yogyatā+(a-yogyatā)))<yogāt)]]

[S [AC [PC7 0 [AP7 [NP6 e 1] (tulya<(yogyatā+(a-yogyatayoh)))-B]] [CNJ hi]
[NP7 (deśa+kālayoḥ)]] [NP1s (tat1-vattā) [NP6 itarayoh]] [VP 0] [NP5 [NP6 e 1]
(niyama<(a-yogāt))]]

ḍngos po ltoṣ⁵⁴ pa^(D273a.6) rnamṣ ni res 'ga' bar 'gyur te, yod pa dang med pa'i dus
(Pk418b.5) dag na de 'byung bar rung ba dang mi rung ba nyid dang ldan pa'i phyir ro.
yul dang dus rung ba dang mi rung ba nyid 'dra ba can dag la ni de⁵⁵ dang ldan pa
dang, cig shos dag tu nges par mi rung ba'i phyir ro.

† For things, through <their> dependence on <something else>, are temporary, because the time of <their> existence is connected with an aptitude for their coming into existence and the time of their non-existence is connected with an inaptitude for their coming into existence. For, should two place times be as apt as inapt <for something to come into existence>, either could possess it because there would be no possibility of restriction to either <its presence or absence>.

‡ For beings, owing to dependence, are occasional, because the time of their presence is endowed with the possibility and the time of their absence is endowed with the impossibility of their presence. When a location and time have the same [degree of] possibility and impossibility [for the presence of a thing], then they may possess either one [scil., either the presence of the absence of the thing], because there is no possibility of a restriction [to either presence or absence].

§ copula: overt: predicational: NP1s VP

§ intra-s anaphora

§ "kāḍā" seems to be used metonymically to refer to the complete set of causal conditions

§ (cp. K 102.12, K 103.2)

§ copula: covert: existential (possession): indeterminate

§ inter-s anaphora:

§ unclear: K's gloss of "itara."

K102.1017: paścād arddham vibhajan āha. apekṣayā hīti. yogyadeśakālāpekṣayā.
yasmāt kāryasya yau bhāvābhāvakālau tayor yathākramaṃ tadbhāvasya
kāryotpādasya ye yogyatāyogyate tābhyāṃ yogāt. kālagrahaṇam
upalakṣaṇaparam evaṃ deśadravyayor api vācyam. athaivaṃ neṣyate. tadā tulye
yogyatāyogyate yayoḥ kāryabhāvābhāvavator deśakālayos tayos tadvattetarayor
niyamāyogāt. kāryakālasyaiva tadvattā. kāryavattā. tadanyasyetarā. akāryavattety
asya niyamasyāyogāt. dvāv api tau kāryabhāvābhāvakālau kāryavantau syātāṃ
yogyatāsādṛśyāt. na vā. tulyatvād ayogyatāyāḥ. tasmāt tadbhāvakālasyaiva
yogyatā. tāṃ vāpekṣamāṇābhāvāḥ kādācitkā bhavanti.

⁵⁴ D: ltoṣ; Pk: bltoṣ ⁵⁵ Pk: de; D: da

35.4 ¶ G23.02; P191.03

sā ca योग्यातु हेतुर्भवति किमन्यत्.

[S [NP1s [AP1 sā] [CNJ ca] योग्यातु] [VP 0 [NP1 [NP5 (hetu<bhāvāt)] kim [AP1 _
anyat]]]]

rung ^(Pk418b.6) ba nyid de yang ^(D273a.7) rgyu'i dngos po las gzhan yin nam ci.

† And what else is this aptitude than the existence of a cause?

‡ And what is this possibility if not the presence of a cause?

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

§ constituency violation: “hetu-bhāva” is dislocated from “anyat”

§§ Tibetan syntax is interesting: the literal translation into English would be “And is this possibility something else than the presence of a cause, or what?”

35.5 G23.03; P191.05

tasmād ekadeśakālaparihāreṇa anyadeśakālayor vartamāno bhāvas tatsāpekṣo nāma bhavati.

[S [CNJ tasmāt] [NP1s [PC1 [NP3 ((eka<(deśa+kāla))2<parihāreṇa)] [NP7
(anya<(deśa+kālayoḥ)) 1] vartamānaḥ] bhāvaḥ] [VP [AP1 (tat1<sāpekṣaḥ) [PRT
nāma]] bhavati]]

de'i phyir yul dang dus 'ga' zhig spangs nas yul dang dus gzhan dag na yod pa'i
dngos po ni de dag la ltos pa dang bcas pa zhes bya ba yin ^{Pk418b.7} te,

† Therefore, a thing existing in one place and time to the exclusion of existing in another is said to be dependent on it <the former>.

‡ Therefore, a being that occurs in some location and time by eliminating another location and time is called dependent on them.

§ copula: overt: predicational: NP1s VP

§ counter-anaphora

§ intra-s anaphora: possible donkey sentence

35.6 G23.05; P191.06

tathā hi. tathā vṛttir evāpekṣā tatkr̥topakārānapekṣasya tanniyamāyogāt.

M15

[S [ADV tathā] [CNJ hi] [VP 0 [NP1 (tathā<vṛttiḥ) [PRT eva]]] [NP1s apekṣā]
[NP5 [NP6 (((tat1<kr̥ta)<upakāra)<(an-apekṣasya)) ((tat1<niyama)<(a-yogāt))]]]

'di ltar de ltar yod pa nyid ltos⁵⁶ pa yin no. de dag gis byas pa'i phan pa la mi
(D273b.1) ltos⁵⁷ pa ni der nges par mi rung ba'i phyir ro.

⁵⁶ D: ltos; Pk: bltos ⁵⁷ D: ltos; Pk: bltos

† For in this way, to depend <on something> is just to exist in this way <sc., to exist in those things to the exclusion existing in others>, because that which is independent of something’s assistance cannot be restricted to it.

‡ In other words, the very fact of occurring that way [that is, occurring in one location by being excluded from another] is dependence, because that which is independent of the assistance provided by them [sc. location and time] cannot be restricted to them.

§ copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s

§ intra-s anaphora: possible donkey sentence

§ “eva”: “just” (semantic restriction on NP connotation)

K102.21–103.01: tathā hīti. tathā vṛttir ity ekaparihāreṇānyatra vṛttiḥ. deśādikam apekṣata eva bhāvaḥ. tena tu deśādīnā na tasyopakāraḥ kriyata iti ced āha. tatkr̥topakāretyādi. tanniyamāyṅgād iti. tasminn eva deśātau tena na bhāvyaṃ iti niyamāyogāt.

35.7 G23.06; P191.07

tan niyatadeśakālatvād dhūmo yatra dr̥ṣṭaḥ sakṛd vaikalye ca punar na dr̥ṣṭaḥ tajjanyo ’sya svabhāvaḥ. anyathā sakṛd apy abhāvāt.

[S [CNJ tat] [NP5 [NP6 e 1] (niyata<(deśa+kāla))-B-tvāt] [RC [S [NP1s dhūmaḥ 2] [AC [NP7 yatra 3] [PC7 0]] [VP 0 [AP1 dr̥ṣṭaḥ [ADV sakṛt]]]] [S [NP1s E 2] [AC [NP7 [NP6 e 3] vaikalye] [PC7 0]] [CNJ ca] [VP 0 [AP1 [ADV punar [ADV na]] dr̥ṣṭaḥ]]]] [S [VP 0 [AP1 (tat3<janyaḥ)]] [NP1s [NP6 asya 2] svabhāvaḥ 1] [NP5 [ADV anyathā] [ADV sakṛt [PRT api]] [NP6 e 1] abhāvāt]]]

de bas na yul dang dus nges pa’i phyir gang na du ba lan ^(Pk418b.8) cig mthong la ma tshang na ma mthong ba ni ’di’i des bskyed par bya ba’i ngo bo nyid yin te, gzhan du na don lan ’ga’ yang med pa’i phyir ro.

† Therefore, because smoke’s nature is such that its place and time are restricted, it <sc., smoke’s nature> must be produced by conditions such that, when they exist, it <sc., smoke> is observed at once and, when there is a deficiency <among them>, <it, sc., smoke> is no longer observed, because otherwise it <sc., smoke’s nature> would not come into existence even that once.

‡ Therefore, because location and time are restricted, smoke’s nature is the product of that where it is observed once but is not observed again when there is a deficiency, because otherwise it would be absent even that once.

§ copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s

§ cpd intrusion: null NP6 wrt B

§ ellipsis: within RC

§ donkey anaphora

§ negation scope: “a” wider than ADV in last NP5

§ “sakṛt” has different senses, one of which contrasts with “punar” §§ The two occurrences of “sakṛt” are translated differently in the Tibetan, but the difference is not significant; “punar” is not translated in Tibetan.

§ counter-anaphora: “anyathā”

K103.01–05: tad iti tasmād deśakālagrahaṇam upalakṣaṇam dravyasyāpi parigrahaḥ. yatreti deśādaḥ dṛṣṭaḥ sakṛd iti. yathoktena pratyakṣeṇa yeṣāṃ sannidhāne dṛṣṭas teṣāṃ evānyataravaikalye ca punar na dṛṣṭaḥ. anyatheti yadi tajjanyo 'sya svabhāvo na syāt sa iti dhūmas tatpratiniyato 'gnyādikasāmāgri hi yataḥ.

35.8 G23.08; P191.08

sa tatpratiniyato 'nyatra kathaṃ bhavet.

[S [NP1s saḥ [API (tat<pratiniyataḥ)]] [VP [NP7 anyatra] [ADV katham] bhavet]]
de der nges pa yin na ji ltar ^(D273b.2) gzhan pa las 'byung bar 'gyur.

† How could that which is restricted by them some into existence elsewhere?

‡ How could that which is restricted to something come into being elsewhere?

§ copula: overt: existential: NP1s VP

§ counter-anaphora

§ intra-s anaphora: "tat" 's antecedent is "tat" in last clause K (103.04) gives "saḥ" 's antecedent as "dhūma"

35.9 G23.09; P191.08

bhavan vā na dhūmaḥ syāt.

[S [NP1s e [PC1 bhavan]] [CNJ vā] [VP [ADV na] [NP1 dhūmaḥ] syāt]]
^(Pk419a.1) 'byung ba na ni du ba ma yin par 'gyur te,

† Or, coming into existence <elsewhere>, it would not be smoke.

‡ Or being [elsewhere], it would not be smoke.

§ copula: overt: predicational: NP1s VP

§ present participle has a conditional force

§ inter-s anaphora: e's antecedent is NP1s of previous clause

35.10 G23.09; P191.09

tajjanito hi svabhāvaviśeṣo dhūma iti.

[S [VP 0 [API (tat<janitaḥ)]] [CNJ hi] [NP1s (svabhāva<viśeṣaḥ) [NP1 dhūmaḥ [PRT iti]]]]

du ba ni des bskyed pa'i rang bzhin gyi khyad par yin no.

† For a specific nature called smoke is produced by that.

‡ For a specific nature called smoke is produced by that [fire].

§ copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s

§ apposition: marked by "iti"

§ inter-s anaphora: "tat" 's antecedent is "tat" of next to last clause

§§ Syntax of Tibetan suggests this translation: "Smoke is the specific nature that is produce by that."

35.11 ¶ G23.10; P191.10

tathā hetur api tathābhūtakāryajananasvabhāvaḥ.

[S [ADV tathā] [NP1s hetuḥ [PRT api]] [VP 0 [AP1
(((tathā<bhūta)<kārya)<janana)<svabhāvaḥ)-B]]]

de bzhin du rgyu yang 'bras bu de lta bu bskyed pa'i rang bzhin yin no.

† In this way, the cause too has a nature to produce such an effect.

‡ In the same manner the cause also has the nature of producing an effect of such a nature.

copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

35.12 G23.10; P191.10

tasyānyato 'pi bhāve na sa tasya svabhāva iti. sakṛd api na janayet.

[S [AC [NP7 [NP6 tasya 1] [NP5 anyataḥ [PRT api]] bhāve] [PC7 0]] [ADV na]
[NP1s [AP1 saḥ] [NP6 tasya 1] svabhāvaḥ] [VP 0]]

[S [CNJ iti] [ADV sakṛt [PRT api]] [NP1s E] [VP [ADV na] [NP2 tat] janayet]]

de (*Pk419a.2*) gzhan las kyang 'byung na ni de de'i rang bzhin ma yin pas lan 'ga'
(*D273b.3*) yang bskyed par mi 'gyur ro.

† If it <sc., the effect> were to arise from something else too, then it <sc., that other thing> would not have the nature <of producing the effect of the first>. So, it <sc., that other thing> would not produce it <sc., the effect> even once.

‡ If that [smoke] were to come into being also from something else [other than fire], then the nature [of producing an effect] would not belong to that [non-fire]. Therefore, that [non-fire] would not produce that [smoke] even once.

§ copula: covert: existential (possession): indeterminate

§ counter-anaphora

§ intra-s anaphora

§ inter-s anaphora

§ see Steinkellner (1971, p. 184, n. 18)

Second sentence

§ ellipsis: E is NP1s of last clause

§ inter-s anaphora: Gnoli and Tibetan do not read "tat"; K reads "dhūmam"; Malvania and Pandheya read "tat".

§ modal subordination: AC in last sentence

K103.10–13: yadi tasya dhūmasyāgner anyato 'pi bhāva iṣyate tadā na sa
dhūmajananaḥ svabhāvas tasyāvahneḥ. tathā hi anagner yadā dhūmasyotpattis
tadānagner eva dhūmajananaḥ svabhāvo jātaḥ. yaś cānagneḥ svabhāvaḥ sa katham
agneḥ syāt. tataś cādhūmajananasvabhāvatvād agneḥ sakṛd api na dhūmaṃ
janayet.

35.13 G23.12; P191.11

na vā sa dhūmo 'dhūmajananasvabhāvād bhāvāt.

[S [ADV na] [CNJ vā] [NP1s saḥ] [VP 0 [NP1 dhūmaḥ]] [NP5 [NP6 e 1] [NP5 ((a-(dhūma<janana))<svabhāvāt)] bhāvāt]]

yang na de du ba ma yin te du ba bskyed pa'i rang bzhin ma yin pa las byung ba'i phyir ro.

† Or, it <sc., the putative effect> would not be smoke, because it <sc., the putative effect> would have arisen from that whose nature does not produce smoke.

‡ Or else it would not be smoke, because it would come into being from that which does not have the nature of producing smoke.

§ copula: overt: predicational: NP1s VP
 § inter-s anaphora
 § modal subordination: AC in next to last sentence

35.14 G23.12; P191.11

tatsvabhāvātve ca sa eva agnir ity avyabhicārah.

[S [AC [NP7 ((tat<svabhāva)-B-tve) [NP6 e 1]] [PC7 0]] [CNJ ca] [NP1s saḥ [PRT eva] 1] [VP 0 [NP1 agniḥ]]]

[S [CNJ iti] [NP1s (a-vyabhicārah)] [VP 0]]

de'i rang bzhin ^(Pk419a.3) nyid yin na ni de nyid me⁵⁸ yin pas 'khrul pa med do.

† And if something has that nature <sc., to produce smoke>, then that itself is fire. So, there is no deviation.

‡ And if something has that nature [to produce smoke], then that itself is fire, so there is no errancy.

§ copula: overt: predicational: NP1s VP
 § inter-s anaphora: first "tat"'s antecedent is "dhūma-janana"
 § intra-s anaphora: possible donkey sentence
 § "eva": "itself" (semantic restriction)
 § copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

36 G23.14; P191.13 D273b.3; Pk419a.3

**agnisvabhāvaḥ śakrasya mūrddhā yady agnir eva saḥ.
 athānagnisvabhāvo 'sau dhūmas tatra katham bhavet.**

[S [S [VP 0 [AP1 (agni<svabhāvaḥ)-B]] [NP1s [NP6 śakrasya] mūrddhā 1] [CNJ yadi]] [S [VP 0 [NP1 agniḥ [PRT eva]]] [NP1s saḥ 1]]]

⁵⁸ Pk: me; D: ma

[S [S [CNJ atha] [VP 0 [AP1 (an-(agni<svabhāvaḥ))-B]] [NP1s asau 1]] [S [NP1s dhūmaḥ] [VP [NP7 tatra 1] [ADV katham] bhavet]]]

gal te brgya byin spyi bo me'i, rang bzhin yin na de nyid me.
'on te⁵⁹ de me'i rang (^{D273b.4}) bzhin min, ji ltar de las du ba 'byung.

† **If an anthill had the nature of fire, then it would be just fire. If it did not have the nature of fire, then how could smoke come into existence there?**

‡ **If an anthill had the nature of fire, then it would be just fire. If it did not have the nature of fire, then how could smoke come into being there?**

§ copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s
§ intra-s anaphora
§ "eva": "just" (semantic restriction on NP denotation)
§ copula: overt: existential: NP1s VP
§ inter-s anaphora
§ intra-s anaphora

37 G23.16; P191.15 D273b.4

**dhūmahetusvabhāvo hi vahnis tacchaktibhedavān.
adhūma-hetor dhūmasya bhāve sa syād ahetukaḥ**

[S [VP 0 [AP1 ((dhūma1<hetu)<svabhāvaḥ))-B]] [CNJ hi] [NP1s vahnīḥ [AP1 ((tat1<śakti)<bhedavān)]]]

[S [AC [NP7 [NP5 (a-(dhūma<hetuḥ))-B] [NP6 dhūmasya 1] bhāve] [PC7 0]] [NP1s saḥ 1] [VP syāt [AP1 (a-hetukaḥ)]]]

du ba'i rgyu yi⁶⁰ (^{Pk419a.4}) rang bzhin me, de yi nus pa'i bye brag ldan.
du ba du ba'i rgyu min las, 'byung na de ni rgyu med 'gyur.

† For fire, which has a distinct potentiality for smoke, has its cause as its nature. If smoke were to come into existence from what is not the cause of smoke, then it would be without a cause.

‡ **For fire, which has the nature of being a cause of smoke, has the characteristic of being a potential for it. If smoke were to come into existence from what is not the cause of smoke, then it would be without a cause.**

37ab

§ copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s
§ intra-s anaphora
§ see Steinkellner (1971, p. 183)

37cd

§ copula: overt: predicational: NP1s VP
§ bv cpd: NP
§ intra-s anaphora
§ see Steinkellner (1971, p. 183)

⁵⁹ Pk: 'on te; D: 'o na te ⁶⁰ D: rgyu yi; Pk: rgyu'i

37.1 G23.18; P191.17

iti saṃgrahaślokau.

[S [CNJ iti] [NP1s (saṃgraha<ślokau)] [VP 0]]

zhes bya ba ni bsdu ba'i tshigs su bead pa'o.

† Such are two summary verses.

‡ These are two summary verses.

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§§ Malvania and Pandeya read *iti saṃgrahaḥ*. Tibetan supports Gnoli's reading.

37.2 G23.18; P191.18

kathaṃ tarhīdānīm bhinnāt sahakāriṇaḥ kāryotpatter yathā cakṣūrūpāder vijñānasya.

[S [ADV katham] [CNJ tarhi] [ADV idānīm] [NP1s [NP5 [AP5 bhinnāt]
sahakāriṇaḥ] (kārya<utpattiḥ)] [VP 0] [S [CNJ yathā] [NP1s [NP5
(cakṣur+rūpa)-ādeḥ]] [NP6 vijñānasya] E]]]

'o na da ni ji ltar lhan cig byed pa tha dad pa ^(Pk419a.5) las 'bras ^(D273b.5) bu skye ste,
dper na mig dang gzugs la sogs pa las rnam par shes pa lta bu'o zhe na,

† How then now does an effect arise from distinct ancillary causes, as when there is
the arising of awareness from <a variety of ancillary causes such as> eye and form?

‡ Then how in this case does an effect arise from different coefficients? For example,
how does sensory awareness arise from the eye and a visible property?

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ ellipsis: E is the cpd head of the preceding NP1s

§ number: first NP5 is singular; yet English requires plural

§ yathā clause: introduces an instance ('as when')

§ For an account of the section beginning here and ending at 37.7 see Steinkellner (1971, p. 184, n. 24)

37.3 G23.19; P191.19

na vai kiṃcid ekaṃ janakaṃ tatsvabhāvam.

[S [ADV na [PRT vai]] [NP1s [AP1 (kim-cit)] [AP1 ekaṃ] janakaṃ] [VP 0 [AP1
(tat<svabhāvam)-B]]]]

de'i rang bzhin gcig⁶¹ pus skyed par byed pa ni cung zad kyang med do.

† It is not at all the case that any single causal factor has a causal nature.

‡ There is no single thing having that nature that is productive.

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

§ inter-s anaphora: "tat"'s antecedent is unclear K (104.13) glosses with "janaka"

§§ Syntax of Tibetan is puzzling.

⁶¹ D: rang bzhin gcig; Pk: rang gcig

K104.13–15: na vai kiṃcid ity ādinā pratividhatte. cakṣurādiṣu tatsvabhāvaṃ janakasvabhāvaṃ sad ekaikaṃ parasparānapekṣaṃ na vai janakam. yadi hi syāt tadā pratyekaṃ kāraṇavyabhicārād ahetukaṃ syāt.

37.4 G23.20; P191.19

kiṃ tu sāmāgrī janikā tatsvabhāvā.

[S [CNJ kimtu] [NP1s sāmāgrī [AP1 janikā]] [VP 0 [AP1 (tat<svabhāvā)-B]]]

'on kyang tshogs pas skyed par ^(Pk419a.6) byed pa ni de'i rang bzhin yin te,

† Rather, the causal totality has a causal nature.

‡ Rather, it is the totality having that nature that is productive.

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

§ inter-s anaphora: "tat" 's antecedent is unclear K (104.13) glosses with "janaka" Malvania reads "tat-janana-svabhāvā"

37.5 G23.20; 191.19

saivānumīyate.

[S [NP1s sā [PRT eva]] [VP anumīyate]]

de kho na rjes su dpag go.

† It alone is inferred <from the effect>.

‡ That [totality] alone is inferred.

§ inter-s anaphora: "tat" 's antecedent is NP1s of last clause

§ "eva": "alone" (semantic restriction)

37.6 G23.21; P191.19

saiva ca sāmāgrī svabhāvasthityāśrayaḥ kāryasya.

[S [NP1s [AP1 sā [PRT eva]] [CNJ ca] sāmāgrī] [NP3 (svabhāva<sthityā)] [VP 0 [NP1 āśrayaḥ [NP6 kāryasya]]]]

tshogs pa de ^(D273b.6) nyid 'bras bu'i rang gi ngo bo gnas pa'i rten⁶² yin no.

† The very same totality is the basis for <its> effect through the persistence of its nature.

‡ Just that totality is the basis of the state of the effect's nature.

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

§ "eva": "very same" (identity emphasis)

§ "sthiti": glossed as "sannidhāna" (K 105.21)

⁶² D: rten; Pk: brten

37.7 G23.22; P191.20

ata eva sahakāriṇām apy aparyāyeṇa jananam.

[S [CNJ ataḥ [PRT eva]] [NP1s [NP6 sahakāriṇām [PRT api]] [NP3 (a-paryāyeṇa)] jananam] [VP 0]]

de nyid kyi phyir lhan cig byed pa rnam kyang rnam grangs med par skyed par
(Pk419a.7) byed pa yin no.

† For just this reason, there is production by the ancillary causes all at once.

‡ For that very reason, the coefficients produce in no particular order, too.

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

§ “eva”: “just” (NP emphasis)

§ “api”: unclear

§§ Exact meaning of *aparyāyeṇa* is not clear. Kaṛṇakagomin suggests *parip=atyā nāsti* (without order, without sequence, without method). Tibetan *rnam grangs med par* suggests a translation such as “non-sequentially”. But why?

K106.01–02: yataś ca sāmagrījanikā ata eva sahakāriṇām aparyāyeṇa jananam.
paripātyā jananam nāstīty arthaḥ.

37.8 G23.22; P191.21

yad api kiṃcid vijātyād bhavad drṣṭam gomayādeḥ śālukādi. tatrāpi tathābhīdhāne
'py asty eva svabījaprabhavāt svabhāvabhedāḥ. hetusvabhāvabhedāt. yathā kadalī
bījakandobhavā.

[S [RC [NP1s [AP1 yat [PRT api]] (kim-cit) 1] [VP 0 [AP1 [PC1 [NP5 vijātyāt] bhavat] drṣṭam]] [S [NP5 (gomaya-ādeḥ)] E [NP1 (śāluka-ādi)]]] [AC [NP7 [NP7 tatra [PRT api] 1] (tathā<abhīdhāne) [PRT api]] [PC7 0]] [VP asti [PRT eva] [NP5 [NP6 e 1] ((sva1<bīja)<prabhavāt)]] [NP1s [NP6 e 1] (svabhāva<bhedāḥ)] [NP5 ((hetu<svabhāva)<bhedāt)] [S [ADV yathā] [NP1s kadalī] [VP 0 [AP1 ((bīja+kanda)<udbhāvā)-B]]]]]

gang yang cung zad lci ba la sogs pa rigs mi mthun pa las utpa la la sogs pa 'byung
bar mthong ba de la yang de skad du brjod kyang rang (D273b.7) gi sa bon las rab tu
byung ba can yin pa'i (Pk419a.8) phyir rang gi ngo bo tha dad pa yod pa kho na ste,
rgyu'i rang gi ngo bo tha dad pa'i phyir dper na chu shing gi sa bon dang sdong bu las
skye ba can lta bu'o.

† Even if one calls by the same name all things seen coming into existence from different kinds of things, such as water-lilies coming into existence from cow dung and other things, because they indeed arise from their own seeds, they have distinct natures, because causes have distinct natures, as pliant trees arising both from seeds and bulbs.

‡ Even though one speaks in the same way about something such as a water-lily that is observed arising out of something that is of a different class, such as cow dung,

because it originates from its seed, there is a difference of nature, because there is a difference in the nature of their causes. For example, the plaintain tree that arises from seeds and bulbs.

- § copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP
- § ellipsis (gapping): E is "0 bhavat dr̥ṣtam" of the preceding VP
- § copula: covert: existential: VP NP1s
- § copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP
- § intra-s anaphora: rel pron
- § number: Sanskrit has singular where English requires plural
- § secondary predication: in RC
- § yathā clause: with no "yathā" in RC; introduces an instance ("as")
- § yathā clause: introduces an instance ("as")
- § possible bv cpd: K (106.6-7) treats first MC NP5 as non-predicative bv cpd
- § "eva": "indeed" (V emphasis)

K106.03–10: yad apīty ādinā vijāṭiyād utpattim āśa.nkya pariharati. nānyādr̥ṣāt tādr̥ṣam tasyotpattir iti yad uktam tad evātra darśayatīty arthaḥ. ādiśabdād gośr.ngāc charo gomayād vṛścikaḥ. tatrāpīti vijāṭiyād kāryotpattāv api. tathābhīdhāne pīti vijāṭiyotpannasya śālūkādeḥ śālūkādīr ity abhīdhāne pi svajāṭiyāc chālūkādīlakṣaṇāt prabhava utpattir yasya tasmād svabījaprabhavāc chālūkādeḥ sakaśād asty eva svabhāvabhedāḥ. ki.n kāraṇaṃ. hetusvabhāvabhedāt. hetoḥ sāmagrīdvayalakṣaṇasya svabhāvabhedāt. bījāt kāndāc codbhavo yasyāḥ kadalyāḥ sā tathā. sā ca hetutvabhedāt parasparabhinnā.

37.9 G23.25; P191.22

sphuṭam eva tādr̥ṣam loko vivecayaty ākārabhedāt.

[S [ADV sphuṭam [PRT eva]] [NP2 tādr̥ṣam 1] [NP1s lokaḥ] [VP _ vivecayati] [NP5 [NP6 e 1] (ākāra<bhedāt)]]

de lta bu ni 'jig rten⁶³ gsal ba kho nar nman par tha dad pa'i (Pk419b.1) sgo nas nman par 'byed do.

† Clearly, an ordinary person distinguishes such <distinct things> because of the difference in their images.

‡ Ordinary usage clearly discerns such a thing because of a difference in appearances.

- § possible cpd intrusion: null NP6 wrt "ākāra"
- § inter-s anaphora:
- § intra-s anaphora:
- § number: Sanskrit has singular where English requires plural
- § left extraposition from VP of NP2 within MC, except ADV
- § "eva": emphatic

37.10 ¶ G23.26; P191.24

tasmān na suvivecitākāraṃ kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ vyabhicarati

⁶³ Pk: 'jig rten; D: 'jig rten na

[S [CNJ tasmāt] [ADV na] [NP1s [AP1 ((su-vivecita)<ākāram)-B] kāryam] [VP [NP2 kāraṇam] vyabhicarati]]

de Ita (*D274a.1*) bas na shin tu rnam par phye ba'i rnam pa can gyi 'bras bus ni rgyu 'khrul pa med do.

† Therefore, an effect whose image is very well distinguished does not deviate from <its> cause.

‡ Therefore, an effect the appearance of which is well discerned is not erratic with respect to its cause.

38 G24.01; P192.01

**anvayavyatirekād yo yasya dr̥ṣṭo 'nuvartakaḥ
svabhāvas tasya taddhetur ato bhinnān na sambhavaḥ.**

[S [RC [NP5 (anvaya+vyatirekāt)] [AP1 yaḥ 1] [NP6 yasya 2] [VP 0 [AP1 dr̥ṣṭaḥ]] [NP1s _ _ anuvartakaḥ]] [NP1s svabhāvaḥ [NP6 tasya 2]] [VP 0 [NP1 (tat1<hetuḥ)]]]

[S [CNJ ataḥ] [NP1s [NP5 bhinnāt] [ADV na] sambhavaḥ] [VP 0]]

**rjes su 'gro dang ldog pa las, gang zhig gang gi rjes 'gror mthong
de yi rang (*Pk419b.2*) bzhin de'i rgyu can, de phyir mi mthun las mi 'byung.**

† That whose nature something is seen to conform to, in the manner of concomitance and counter-concomitance, is its cause. Hence, there is no coming about from what is different.

‡ **A natural property of something that is observed to be consequent through association and dissociation [with another thing] has that [other thing] for its cause. Therefore, there is no coming into being from what is different.**

§ copula: covert: predicational: VP NP1s

§ copula: covert: predicational: NP1s VP

§ left extraposition from NP1s of AP1 within RC, except NP5

§ left extraposition from NP1s of NP6 within RC, except NP5

§ secondary predication

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

38.1 G24.03; P192.03

iti saṃgrahaślokaḥ.

[S CNJ iti] [NP1s (saṃgraha<ślokaḥ)] [VP 0]]

zhes bya ba ni bsdu ba'i (*D272a.2*) tshigs su bcaḍ pa'o.

† Such is a summary verse.

‡ This is a summary verse.

§ copula: covert: existential: indeterminate

38.2 ¶ G24.03; P193.04

tasmāt sakṛd api darśanādarśanābhyāṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvasiddher bhavati tatas tatpratipattiḥ.

[S [CNJ tasmāt] [NP5 [NP3 [ADV sakṛt [PRT api]] (darśana+(a-darśanābhyām))]
(((kārya+kāraṇa)1<bhāva)<siddheḥ)] [VP bhavati [NP5 tataḥ 1]] [NP1s
(tat1<pratipattiḥ)]]

de lta bas na lan cig mthong ba dang, ma mthong ba dag gis kyang rgyu dang 'bras
bu'i dngos po grub pa'i ^(Pk419b.3) phyir, des de rtogs kyi

† Therefore, because the relation between cause and effect is established by observation and non-observation just once, the awareness of them <sc., concomitance and counter-concomitance> comes into existence from it <sc., the relation between cause and effect>.

‡ Therefore, because the relation between cause and effect is established by observation and non-observation just once, there is awareness of them because of that [relation].

§ copula: overt: existential: VP NP1s

§ inter-s anaphora: second "tat" 's antecedent is NP5 two sentences back.

§ intra-s anaphora: K (106.20-21) supplies entire cpd as antecedent.

38.3 G24.04; P192.04

na anyathā. anvayavyatirekayor niḥśeṣadarśanādarśanāyattatvāt. kvacid amūrtatve nityatva darśane 'py anyatrānyathādrṣṭeḥ. kvacin nityatvaabhāve 'py adṛṣṭasya punar drṣṭer.

[S [NP1s E] [AP [ADV na] anyathā] [NP5 [NP6 (anvaya+vyatirekayoḥ)]
(((niḥ-śeṣa)<(darśana+(a-darśana)))<āyattatvāt) [NP5 [AC [NP7 [NP7 [AP7 (kva-cit)
] (a-mūrtatve)] (nityatva<darśane) [PRT api]] [PC7 0]] [NP7 anyatra]
(anyathā<drṣṭeḥ)] [NP5 [AC [NP7 [AP7 (kva-cit)] (nityatva<abhāve) [PRT api]]
[PC7 0]] [NP6 (a-drṣṭasya)] [ADV punar] drṣṭeḥ]]]

gzhan du ni ma yin te, rjes su 'gro ba dang ldog pa dag ma lus par mthong ba dang,
ma mthong ba la rag las pa'i⁶⁴ ^(D272a.3) phyir ro. lus can ma yin pa nyid 'ga' zhig la
rtag ^(Pk419b.4) pa nyid mthong yang gzhan la gzhan du mthong ba'i phyir dang, rtag
pa nyid med pa 'ga' zhig la ma mthong ba yang mthong ba'i phyir ro.⁶⁵

† Not otherwise, because <ascertainment of> concomitance and counter-concomitance requires complete observation and non-observation <sc., of all cases> (1) since, even though eternity is observed in some cases of immateriality, observation is otherwise in other cases, (2) since also what had not been observed is observed even in some cases of non-eternity <in the other cases, namely, in cases of materiality>.

⁶⁴ Pk: rag las pa'i; D: rag lus pa'i ⁶⁵ D: ma mthong ba yang mthong ba'i phyir ro; Pk: ma mthong ba'i phyir ro

‡ Otherwise not, because association and dissociation require complete observation and non-observation, since, even though permanence is observed in some case of non-corporeality, observation is otherwise in other cases, and since also what is not observed in some case of the absence of permanence is nevertheless observed [in other cases of the absence of permanence].

§ counter-anaphora: wrt predicate of last clause NP7 ADV in cpd

§ ellipsis: E is NP1s of last clause

§ “iti”: marks end of discussion

§§ Tibetan shows “iti” as end of first “chapter” (bam po). P shows it as end of commentary to verse 38.

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