Kiser, E., and Hechter, M. (July 1991) "The Role of General Theory in Comparative Sociology", American Journal of Sociology, Number 1, pp. 1-20.

• Historical events are often complex and unique, but this does not mean that general theories cannot help explain them. Individual human beings are also complex and unique, but this does not man that general theories are useless in accounting for their behavior. 12

Popper, K. (1981) "Science and Psuedo-Science, and Falsifiability", In R. Tweney, M. Doherty, and C. Mynatt (eds.) On Scientific Thinking, New York: Columbia University Press, Pp. 92-99.

• These Theories [Marx, Freud, and Adler] appeared to be able to explain practically everything that happened within the fields to which they referred. The study of any of them seemed to have the effect of an intellectual conversation or revelation, opening your eyes to a new truth hidden from those not yet initiated. 94
• It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory--if we look for confirmations. 96
• Every "good" scientific theory is a prohibition: it forbids certain things to happen. The more a theory forbids, the better it is. 96
• A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-scientific. Irrefutability is not a virtue of theory (as people often think) but a vice. 96
• Confirming evidence should not count except when it is the result of a genuine test of the theory; and this means that it can be presented as a serious but unsuccessful attempt to falsify the theory. 96
• Some genuinely testable theories, when found to be false, are still upheld by their admirers--for example, by introducing the ad hoc some auxiliary assumption, or by reinterpreting the theory ad hoc in such a way that it escapes refutation. Such a procedure is always possible, but it rescues the theory from refutation only at the price of destroying, or at least lowering, its scientific status. 96-97
• One can sum up all this by saying that the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability. 97
• historically speaking all--or very nearly all--scientific theories originate from myths, and that a myth may contain important anticipations of scientific theories. …if a theory is found to be non-scientific, or "metaphysical" (as we might say), it is not thereby found to be unimportant, or insignificant, or "meaningless," or "nonsensical." But it cannot claim to be backed by empirical evidence in the scientific sense--although it may easily be, in some genetic sense, the "result of observation." 98

Ritzer, G. (1991) "Reflections on the Rise of Metatheorizing in Sociology", Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 237-248.

• the crises in sociology is traceable, at least in part, to a splintering of the discipline. 246
• the kind of reflexive work undertaken by metatheorists can be useful in clarifying our theoretical differences and showing us where greater integration is possible. 246
• Since metatheorizing deals with theory, it is not directly engaged with the social world. However, we must not forget that the theories that are the subject of metatheoretical concern are directly related to the social world. Thus, there is an indirect linkage between metatheorizing and the social world. 247
• Metatheoretical work has at least two roles to play in the society. First, in helping to clarify theories and their relationships to one another, it improves their capacity to deal with the social world. Second, the metatheorist develops a range of tools that are helpful in understanding not only theory, but also social reality. 247
• Thus, while metatheoretical work is removed from the social world, it is far from being irrelevant in our understanding of how that world works. Thus, in my view, metatheorizing is not only a legitimate undertaking in itself, but it is further legitimized by its utility in enhancing our understanding of sociocultural reality. 247

Turner, J. (1991) "Developing Cumulative and Practical Knowledge Through Metatheorizing," Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 249-268.

• Those sciences that have developed considerable cumulative knowledge are secure enough to examine themselves or, as is more often the case, let others look over their shoulder. Those sciences that have failed to develop cumulative knowledge are sufficiently anxious about their failings to ponder what went wrong. 249
• Within sociology, there are many who continue to seek theoretical cumulation, but there are growing numbers who appear content to push the discipline toward relativism, solipsism, and nihilism: to the point where nothing is universal, where all is contextual, and little can be systematized. 250
• My feeling was that metatheorizing pulled us into unresolvable philosophical issues: hero worship of the early masters; textual analysis as an end in itself; history of ideas; proposals for presuppositions without propositions; and endless discourses. 251
• Avoid talking about theorists; instead, talk about theories. 252
• Avoid discussions on intellectual context, place, and time; instead, discuss social processes denoted by concepts, models, and propositions. 252
• Avoid debates over philosophical issues; instead, commit one's energies to the simple assumptions that there is a world out there and that it can be understood with concepts, models, and propositions. 252
• Avoid commitments to ideologies; instead, develop concepts, models, and propositions that denote operative processes in the universe (there will always be someone to expose ideological biases without your help). 252
• Ignore the particulars of history; instead, examine those more general and generic processes that cut across and place (leave something for historians to do; or, if history is used, let it involve an empirical test or assessment of a theory or model). 252
• Evaluate the clarity and adequacy of concepts, propositions, and models. 253
• Suggest points of similarity, convergence, or divergence with other theories. 253
• Pull together existing empirical (including historical) studies to access the plausibility of a theory. 253
• Extract what is viewed as useful and plausible in a theory from what is considered less so. 253
• Synthesize a theory, or portions thereof, with other theories. 253
• Rewrite a theory in light of empirical or conceptual considerations.
• Formalize a theory by stating it more precisely. 253
• Restate a theory in better language. 253
• Make deductions from a theory so as to facilitate empirical assessment. 253
• Success in war has, Spencer argued, some ironical consequences: (1) as territories increase in size, logistical problems of control, communication, transportation, and administration escalate; (2) as the span of territory increases, especially as the result of annexation…of conquered populations, the diversity of the population increases and poses increased internal threat which, in turn, escalates logistical loads; (3) compounding of populations, per se, increases population size which, regardless of internal threats, increases logistical loads; and (4) population growth through compounding trends to concentrate an increased proportion of population members (due to migration) which then creates a new source of internal threat, and hence, escalated logistical loads. These cycles, as they increase logistical loads, lead to even greater concentrations of power; and, as power is concentrated, it is used in waves of further external conflict, thereby escalating even more than those cycles of increasing logistical loads. At some point, these loads become too great, and the empire implodes back upon itself or dissolve from (a) internal conflict, (b) overextension beyond the productive, administrative, and distributive capacities, (c) confrontation with a powerful enemy, or (d) some combination of (a), (b), and (c). Indeed, once this process of collapse begins on one front, the other tend to "kick in" and accelerate dissolution--as can currently be observed in the Russian empire. 256
• The degree of success in war is related to marchland and resource advantage, coupled with mobilization of superior coercive power relative to one's neighbors. 261
• In the area of geopolitics, sociologists have virtually ceded the territory (bad pun intended) over to political scientists, economists, "professional" diplomats, strategic "planners," and military strategists. Thus, much like many areas of practical activity, sociology has failed to capitalize on its potential for influencing practice and policy. This potential is best realized with metatheory that dares to explain something and with the use of explanatory theory by practitioners. 268

Wagner, D., and Berger, J. (1985) "Do Sociological Theories Grow", American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 90, No. 4, pp. 697-728.

• "Theory" in sociology has come to include many kinds of sociological work, from "commentaries on the classics" to "causal modeling." 699
• Development of an orienting strategy may take any of several forms. It may include, for example, the development of ontological and epistemological arguments (often metaphorically stated) concerning the subject matter of sociology, the nature of social reality, and the values and goals of sociological inquiry. It may also involve the articulation of the conceptual foundations employed in the description and analysis of social phenomena. Finally, it is likely to incorporate the formulation of directives for the selection of theoretical problems for investigation and for the construction and evaluation of proposed problem solutions. 700
• orienting strategies are exceptionally stable, sometimes even rigid, in structure. Consider the functional strategy: its conceptual framework, its image of social reality, and its directives for the solution of sociological problems have changed little…701
• Established strategies may become more or less dominant over time, but it is a rare strategy to disappear entirely. 701
• comparatively new strategies such as ethnomethodology seldom replace older strategies; more often they add to the list of metatheoretical options that are available in sociological analysis. 701
• Part of the reason for the rigidity both within and among strategies is that the differences between strategies are, in general, fundamental. Basically, the claims of an orienting strategy are directiveness; they are statements about values (e.g., the value of "function" as a conceptual tool), not statements about facts (e.g., the specific function performed by a particular institutional structure). Such prescriptive arguments are largely non-empirical, and conflicts between them are often unresolvable. 701
• Put directly, most of the claims of an orienting strategy cannot be validated as neither true or false; instead they are accepted or rejected a priori without recourse to conclusive empirical evidence. 702
• When we consider the potential for theoretical growth through orienting strategy activity, we see that (1) there is little change within strategies, (2) there is little change among strategies, and (3) even when change does occur, it is difficult to determine specifically how that change might constitute progress. 702
• Because much of the discussion about theoretical growth in sociology seems to focus on orienting strategies, it is not at all surprising that we do not perceive growth. We have been looking in the wrong place. 702
• while orienting strategies prescribe how to construct and evaluate theories, unit theories are themselves the particular theoretical constructions to be evaluated. 703
• The bulk of activity at the level of unit theories involves empirical testing. To the extent that such testing provides support for our unit theories, growth or progress may be said to have occurred. 703
• This sort of relation, involving increases in the scope, rigor, precision, or empirical adequacy of a theory, is theory elaboration.
• For knowledge to grow, we must both (1) refine our accounts of established problems and (2) reach out to account for new and different problems. Through proliferation, knowledge can spread into such new domains. 708
• conflicts may not be limited to differences in predictions. They may arise with respect to the relevance or interpretation of evidence, the meaning of value of concepts used in the theories, or the importance of accounting for some specific feature of the common explanatory domain. It should not be surprising, therefore, that theory competition is a slow and arduous means of developing theoretical knowledge. 709
• if T(1) and T(2) are competitors, integration is likely to require a new theoretical language (with new concepts) that enables the selection and incorporation of theoretical principles from each competitor in a coherent new formulation. 722
• Theory integration often is the major advance that is the clearest evidence of progress, because it both unifies and deepens our knowledge. Thus, although integration (especially of competitors) is rather rare, when successful its impact may be quite dramatic. Successful integration, however, depends at the very least on the prior development of an established research program. 723
• Integration, perhaps the rarest and most dramatic form of theoretical growth, depends especially on the existence of a well-developed program based on other relations. Such development is probably necessary to determine which concepts and principles in the integrated theories are important enough and promising enough to be included in a single theoretical formulation. 724
• If T(1) and T(2) are variants, integration is likely to involve the specification of conditions for the application of each variant. If T(1) and T(2) are proliferants, integration is likely to involve identification of properties which permit the interrelation of disparate phenomena. Finally, if T(1) and T(2) are competitors, integration is likely to involve the creation of a new theoretical language that enables the theorist to select and incorporate principles from competing theories in a coherent new theory. 724

Hechter, M. (1989) "Rational Choice Foundation of Social Order", In Theory Building in Sociology, Jonathan Turner (ed.), Newbury Park, CA: Sage, pp. 60-81.

• An adequate theory of social order would explain both the emergence of social institutions and variations in the amount of order attained in different societies. 60
• rational choice theorists attempt to account for the genesis of social institutions, as well as other kinds of social outcomes. All rational choice theories of macroscopic events therefore employ some individual-level variables to explain macro-level phenomena. 60
• Like the advocates of invisible hand reasoning, contractarians assume that social order is attained through the action of sovereign self-interested individuals. Unlike invisible hand theorists, however, contractarians are pessimistic about the likelihood that socially efficient equilibria can be attained spontaneously. This pessimism is due largely to their awareness that cooperation is difficult to sustain among self-interested actors who often engage in strategic and opportunistic behaviors, rather than socially responsible ones. 63
• the problem for contractarians is to understand how such self-interested individuals intentionally can establish institutions that promote social order, and, then, why they would ever allow themselves to be constrained by these institutions. 63
• classical sociologists attacked contractarian theory by dismissing methodological individualism in favor of emergent (or group level) explanations, and by de-emphasizing the importance of purposive action in favor of normatively oriented action. 64
• They [classical sociologists] held the sovereignty of the individual to be a myth and insisted on the contrary proposition that institutions put their stamp on individuals. This is because individuals' very thoughts and actions are decisively affected by the institutions to which they are subject. 64
• The less extensive a groups obligations, the greater the member's scope to engage in independent action. Hence the extensiveness of a group's obligations may be indicated by the proportion of private resources that each member is expected to contribute to collectively determined ends. 65.
• If groups are formed in order to supply their members with joint goods, then the survival of any group hinges upon its members' compliance with various rules designed to assure the continued production and distribution of these goods. 66
• Monitoring is problematic because individual behavior is often difficult to observe, let alone assess. 69
• In times of war, young men are asked to risk their lives for their country, police officers have the right to kill criminals, and the state has the right to incarcerate--and sometimes to execute--severe offenders. 74
• it is indeed possible to explain key features of social order with the aid of a group solidarity theory that is built upon rational choice foundations. 77

Coleman, J. (1990) Foundations of Social Theory, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

• A central problem in social science is that of accounting for the functioning of some kind of social system. Yet in most social research, observations are not made on the system as a whole, but on some part of it. 1
• This has lead to a widening gap between theory and research. Social theory continues to be about the functioning of social systems of behavior, but empirical research is often concerned with explaining individual behavior. 1
• The principal task of the social sciences lies in the explanation of social phenomena, not the behavior of single individuals. 2
• A…mode of explanation of the behavior of social systems entails examining processes internal to the system, involving its component parts, or units at a level below that of the system. 2
• In all cases the analysis can be seen as moving to a lower level than that of the system, explaining the behavior of the system by recourse to the behavior of its parts. This mode of explanation is not uniquely quantitative or uniquely qualitative, but may be either. 2
• Just as observations are often most naturally made at levels below that of the system as a whole, interventions must be implemented at these lower levels. 3
• an explanation of system behavior which goes down as far as the actions and orientations of those who will implement the policy is likely to be more useful that one which does not. 3
• An explanation based on internal analysis of system behavior in terms of actions and orientations of lower-level units is likely to be more stable and general than an explanation which remains at the system level. Since the system's behavior is in fact a resultant of the actions of its component parts, knowledge of how the actions of these parts combine to produce systemic behavior can be expected to give a greater predictability than will explanation based on statistical relations of surface characteristics of the system. This need not be so, of course, if the surface characteristics are quite proximate to the behavior to be explained. 3
• an internal analysis based on actions and orientations of units at a lower level can be regarded as more fundamental, constituting more nearly a theory of system behavior, than an explanation which remains at the system level. 4
• an explanation is sufficiently fundamental for the purpose at hand if it provides a basis for knowledgeable intervention which can change system behavior. Later I will suggest that a natural stopping point for the social sciences (although not psychology) is the level of the individual--and that, although an explanation which explains the behavior of a social system by the actions and orientations of some entities between the system level and the individual level may be adequate for the purpose at hand, a more fundamental explanation based on the actions and orientations of individuals is more generally satisfactory. For example, an analysis of the functioning of an economic system based on the actions and orientations of firms and households may be quite satisfactory, but for other purposes those actions and orientations of the firms and households must be explained in terms of the actions and orientations of individual persons who play some part in controlling them. 4
• The image of man demanded by a theory that begins at the level of social systems is homo sociologicus, a socialized element of a social system. The question of moral and political philosophy which address the fundamental strain between man and society cannot be raised. The freedom of individuals to act as they will, and the constraints that social interdependence places on that freedom, nowhere enter the theory. Problems of freedom and equality cannot be studied. Individuals as individuals enter only via their conformity to or deviance from the normative system. With this image of man as a socialized element of a social system, it becomes impossible, within the framework of social theory, to evaluate the actions of a social system or a social organization. 4
• The major problem for explanations of system behavior based on actions and orientations at a level below that of the system is that of moving from the lower level to the system level. This has been called the micro-to-macro problem, and it is pervasive throughout the social sciences. In economics, for example, there is microeconomic theory and there is macro-economic theory; and one of the central deficiencies in economic theory is the weakness of the linkage between them, a weakness papered over with the idea of "aggregation" and with a ubiquitous concept in macroeconomic theory, that of the "representative agent." 6
• At one degree of detail, Weber is simply expressing a macro-social proposition: The religious ethic which characterized those societies that became Protestant in the Reformation (and particularly those that were Calvinistic) contained values that facilitated the growth of capitalist economic organization. 6
• The societies that can be compared are few in number, and those which capitalism developed most rapidly differed not only in religion but in many other ways as well. Statistical comparisons would be subject to many different interpretations, even if the association between Protestantism and capitalism were high. 7
• Finding the same antitraditionalist orientation and the same precept of diligence toward one's calling in Calvinist doctrine, he uses this as evidence that the growth of this religious doctrine provided the value system which allowed capitalism to develop. 7
• The content of the Protestant ethic can be described as values deriving from the religious beliefs of society, and the content of what Weber calls the spirit of capitalism can be described as values governing the economic activities of the society. These values are two components of the value system of a society, governing activities in two different institutional areas. 7
• the shared content of the religious and economic values is not evidence of the effect of the former upon the later, but may be an indicator of other changes which altered both religious and economic value systems. Alternatively, the shared content could arise from the effect of new values in economic activities in reshaping those religious values that were most susceptible to such an effect, that is, the values of Calvinists. 7
• What is necessary to account for the growth or occurrence of any social organization whether capitalist economic organization or something else, is how the structure of positions constituting the organization comes into being, how persons who come to occupy each of the positions in the organization are motivated to do so, and how this interdependent system of incentives is sustainable. 9
• A contemporary instance of the attempt to make the micro-to-macro transition through simple aggregation of individual attitudes or orientations can be found in certain theories of revolution. 10
• The problem addressed by frustration theorists of revolution is the puzzling one of which why revolutions often seem to occur during periods of social change in which conditions are generally improving. The frustration theorists resolve this problem by arguing that the improving conditions in the society create frustration on the part of individual members of the society, leading to revolution. 10
• consider approaches to social theory which base social change on technological change or on forces of nature. If such theory is taken seriously, this implies a fatalistic view of the future, in which humans are the pawns of natural forces. Still other theories do not have an individualistic base but have their foundation at a macrosocial level, taking as given the very social organization that is problematic in a theory based on purposive action of individuals. In theories of this sort the proposed causes of action are not persons' goals or purposes or intents, but some forces outside them or unconscious impulses within them. As a consequence, these theories can do nothing other than describe an exorable fate; they are useful only to describe the waves of change that wash over us. At the mercy of these uncontrolled external or internal forces, persons are unable to purposefully shape their destiny. The paradox arises because such theories imply that the theory itself, a result of purposive action, can have no effect on future action. Any attempt to use the theory purposefully will consequently be, according to the theory, destined to fail. A further paradox lies in the image of man implied by a nonpurposive theory. Since the conception is one into which purpose, goal, and will do not enter, it is incompatible with the very orientation of the theorist, who sets as a goal the development of such a theory. All of this arises because the subjects of the theory are persons, and that includes the theorists and the users of the theory. 17
• much of what is ordinarily described as nonrational or irrational is merely so because the observers have not discovered the point of view of the actor, from which the action is rational. 18
• success of a social theory based on rationality lies in successively diminishing that domain of social activity that cannot be accounted for by the theory. Another way of viewing the theory based on rational actors is to specify that the theory is constructed for a set of abstract rational actors. It then becomes an empirical question whether a theory so constructed can mirror the functioning of actual social systems which involve real persons. 18
• The transmission of information from the macro level to individual actors can greatly affect the actions they take and thus affect system behavior. 21
• the environment, or social context, in which a person acts affects the relative benefit of different actions; and it is the macro-to-micro transition which shapes this social context. 21
• good social theory makes the transition between micro and macro levels successfully. 21
• it is one thing to trace the development of social organization in a particular instance, as a historian might to, and quite another to develop generalizations about such processes. 22
• In an established authority system, the consensual base on which authority rests is reinforced by a set of formal institutions, which may include the police and the military. These institutions provide physical control that supports the rights of control (the legitimacy) and impedes revocation of authority. 466
• Oppressive systems sometimes fail merely because of the passive non-compliance of a subject people. 467
• widespread withdrawal of rights of control (that is, legitimacy) from an authority structure is often not sufficient to bring about a change in that structure or even in the way authority is exercised. 468
• changing an authority system requires revoking the actual power to exercise control. If that power is not given up voluntarily, it must be taken by force. Such an exercise of power against state authority can occur in a variety of ways, which can be termed revolt or revolution. 468
• most social systems have many institutions at various levels--and thus many actors can engage in a power struggle with central authorities. 469
• Many theoretical works on revolution see a critical point in a revolutionary struggle as the point at which the existing system of authority loses legitimacy in the eyes of the population or of important segments of the population. 470
• Authority is, it is sometimes said, legitimately exercised power. 470
• authority is the right to control another actor's actions, and power is the capacity to do so, with or without the right. 470
• If authorities engage in actions other than those for which this consensus exists, they lack the right to do so, are acting illegitimately, and may lose legitimacy. That is, the rights to govern which they do hold may be generally withdrawn, leading to collapse of the consensus which gives legitimacy. 470
• legitimacy is simply the right to carry out certain authoritative actions and have them obeyed. It rests on a consensus among those actors in a society relevant to the continued exercise of authority--which may be the population as a whole or only certain parts of it. 470
• Simple common sense suggests that a revolution will be more likely when citizen's living conditions are worsening. 470 In fact, almost the reverse has been true: when general impoverishment has increased, the population appears to have sunk into an increased passivity. 471
• Tocqueville generalized that " it is not always when things are going from bad to worse that revolution breaks out. On the contrary, it more often happens that, when a people which has put up with an oppressive rule over a long period without protest suddenly finds the government releasing its pressure, it takes up arms against it." (1860) 471
• Revolution is more likely to arise during times of economic improvement for at least some parts of a population or at times of political liberalization, or both. … Common sense or rationality appears to be in eclipse, for common sense would lead to the opposite prediction. 472
• [The frustration theorists] revolution arises as a result of increased frustration. 472
• [The theory of rising expectations] When there is a certain rate of improvement in objective conditions, economic or political, this creates rising expectations, so persons expect to be better off. But the expectations rise faster than the rate of improvement in the objective conditions. Thus there is an increasing gap between people's expectations and reality. The people view the reality from the perspective of increasing frustration, which leads them to revolt. 472
• Brinton (1965) says that the strongest feelings "are roused in those who find an intolerable gap between what they have come to want …and what they actually get. (p.250) 473
• [The theory of relative deprivation] As long as there is no change in objective conditions, all persons are in the same boat. But when there is rapid improvement in conditions, those of some improve more rapidly than those of others. Those for whom conditions are not improving very rapidly see others, perhaps no more qualified, doing much better than they are. It is from this perspective that they perceive a widening gap, which leads them to feel frustration and thus revolt. Given that in a period of economic improvement, there are often more persons left behind than getting ahead, these feelings of frustration can be widespread. 476
• [The theory of status inconsistency] Many who have had little wealth or political power gain economic resources but find that there political position remains unchanged. Their improved economic circumstances lead them to expect a parallel increase in political power, an increase which does not come about. 477
• revolutions are not like spontaneous riots, but are highly organized. 479
• If revolutionary activity and support for the revolutionary activity of others are regarded as rational actions, it becomes evident that such activity will be more likely to occur as those who have an interest in seeing the authority system replaced come to have a belief that they will succeed. 480
• The likelihood of revolution should increase if either of these two factors increases: when the expected gain if the authorities are overthrown is positive and the expectation of overthrowing the authorities is high. 480
• The improved conditions might…increase the perceived chances of success of a revolution, for they add to the power and resources of those outside the regime. 480
• revolutions are preceded by a variety of phenomena, including vacillation and weakness of the authorities, that give those interested in revolutionary activity a stronger belief that overt activity in opposition to the regime will be successful. 480
• the period prior to overt revolutionary is one in which potential revolutionaries and political followers who see themselves as likely to be just as well off or better off under a different regime come to believe that a revolution can succeed. 480
• what is important is perceived power: what the people believe about the relative power of the two sides and about what will happen to them if they support one side or the other. 481
• If opponents of an authority system come to have a strong belief in their own power to overthrow the regime, one consequence will be a sense of frustration that the regime remains in power. 484
• One can see rebellious action as the product of two quantities: dissatisfaction with the existing social order, and belief that action in opposition to that social order will be successful. 485
• By far the most important ideology for twentieth-century revolutions, however, is not religious but secular--Marxism. Its role in Asian, African, and South American revolts and revolutions is apparent. 488
• ideologies provide a utopian vision, as an alternative to the existing allocation of rights in a society. In both Protestant religious ideology and Marxism, there is a vision of utopia; furthermore, the two visions have much in common: Both posit a world of equality, communal sharing, absence of internal social strife, and transformed human nature. The visions of utopia are definitions of what is right that come from authorities that can challenge existing authority: from God, as the supreme being: or from scientific socialism, as an objective source of truth. 488
• Typically a revolution involves only a very small part of the population as activists, either on the side of the revolutionaries or on the side of the authorities. 489
• There are revolts in which large fractions of the population are involved, but these uprisings are preceded by other critical events. The initial actions are taken by a small set of activists who have already withdrawn rights of control over their actions from the authorities. 489
• If government policy distinguishes (or could distinguish) among ethnic groups, economic classes, sexes, or regions, then these distinctions will be relevant to a revolt--for the distinctions that government policy makes create different interests in government actions. 491
• Both sides [authorities and revolutionaries]: 1) Attempt to achieve success to provide a display of power as early as possible in the revolt. 2) Threaten and implement certain and severe punishment for acting in support of the other side. 3) Provide material inducements (both current and promised for after the revolt) to potential participants who might be important to success. 4) Do not engage in indiscriminate terror. Authorities: 1) Maintain strength externally. 2) Do not let an internal challenge to authority go unmet. If unable to meet a challenge, divert attention through compensating use of power in another area. 3) Show no indecisiveness. 4) Undermine alternative ideologies. 5) Reduce opportunities for closure of social structure among members of the opposition. 6) Develop institutions for addressing grievances of the population on a one-by-one basis (that is, without providing a setting for communication and amplification of grievances). Revolutionaries: 1) Find and promulgate a utopian ideology that challenges the values expressed by the current authority structure, and provide an alternative vision for the future. 2) Use any means other than actions universally regarded as illegitimate to demonstrate authorities' weakness. 3) Cut potential recruits off from contact with nonsupporters of the revolt; develop a high degree of closure within groups of supporters. 4) Incorporate existing grievances of the population into proposals for change. 5) Obtain all possible external support. 502

Rule, J. (1997) Theory and Progress in Social Science

• Anyone who delves deeply into the literatures of theoretical social science must eventually sense that the reach of our disciplines exceeds their grasp. 1
• What makes any line of inquiry appear as a promising approach to basic issues--from social stratification, to international conflict, to personality formation--is apt to vary from moment to historical moment, and from one intellectual constituency to another. Such evident transience makes it appear that the theoretical imaginations of social scientists are governed by intellectual tastes far less enduring than the questions they address. 2
• Instead of registering what any conscientious observer might recognize as progress in understanding civil upheaval--or declining productivity, or the origins of deviance, or any number of other widespread concerns--programs of inquiry often devolve into obsessions with issues of concern only to those indoctrinated to the program in question. 2
• The notion that life-forms do not generate spontaneously--as flies were once thought to do from decaying flesh--may not be a salient concern to life scientists today. Nevertheless, I would count the rejection of the spontaneous-generation model a progressive step in the history of today's life sciences; for that rejection helped to constitute necessary premises for subsequent lines of thought. 4
• Every theoretical system in our disciplines registers formal progress, simply by pursuing those intellectual directions that it sets for itself. The question is, do these strictly "local" accomplishments matters in any way to the concerns of the broad public of "outsiders" to the theory? The ability to make such a difference amounts to what I term substantive progress--the development of analytical tools that subsequent thinkers "cannot afford to do without," regardless of their identification (or lack of it) with the theoretical program that gave rise to them. 5
• No view of theoretical success or failure, I hold, makes sense without some vision of the ultimate interests guiding inquiry. 5
• I seek to approach each theoretical program considered here from the standpoint of a theoretical "outsider"--someone who begins with no special stake in the short-term appeal that momentarily surrounds every ascendant theory. 6
• For each analytical accomplishment claimed by enthusiasts of any particular theoretical program, I want to ask "What's in it for us?"--with the "us" understood as referring to the broadest community of those seeking to understand and deal with social, economic, and political life. 6
• The conviction that a particular insight represents an indispensable step in some ordained progression of expanding enlightenment is an indispensable ingredient in the constitution of theoretical fashion. But it is hard to point to many such convictions that have endured. 8
• The difference between compelling, widely adopted theoretical programs and others lies in the ability to command a sense of meaningfulness--to convince intellectual "consumers" that the aspects of social life on which they focus are ones that matter, that deserve our attention. 9
• Any successful confrontation, I will argue, requires consideration of two contrasting principles for the elaboration of theoretical work. I call these expressive and coping criteria for theory--theory as evocation of social experience versus theory as a guide to constraints and possibilities posed by social forces for human interests. 11
• Sociology, especially, seems at a low ebb in public esteem in the last decade of the twentieth century. One reason appears to be precisely the lack of persuasive and consensual theoretical conclusions that can be drawn from sociological work. For many, it would appear, sociology and its sister disciplines have failed to yield long-awaited "answers"--however vaguely such answers are conceived. Or worse, the answers generated by the discipline often seem little more than abstracted expression of the partis pris that sociologists bring to their work in the first place. 15
• What would be lost, in the broadest assessment, should this line of inquiry simply be stricken from the intellectual record? What interests or values shared by the broad publics of "outsiders" to the theory in question stand to be served by its pursuit? Should the distinctive successes, accomplishments, or "advances" registered by the program be expected to matter to those who do not embrace its distinctive worldview? In short, can the world afford to get along without the insights distinctive to this approach? 15
• For if the experience of the thinker is indeed the only test of the satisfactoriness of theoretical ideas, then the "theories" of the paranoid schizophrenic are as valid as those of the most attentive analyst of empirical evidence. Such strictly internal criteria of theoretical adequacy not only preclude anything like intellectual progress; they offer no hope of any theoretical correction or revision through empirical inquiry or critical reflection. 16
• we must conclude that the success or failure of theoretical systems in the study of social life is not to be judged purely in terms internal to the system themselves. 17
• Against efforts to uphold any One True Faith, the position taken here is overtly polytheistic. 17
• every theoretical program is prey to the tendency to fruitless obsession with issues of relevance only from within its own frame of reference. 18
• the virtues that we publicly proclaim for our theoretical work more likely have to do with their perceived status as steps--however modest or indirect--towards some larger goal. Thus our obsession with defining our work as a "contribution" to some broadly attested, wider form of enlightenment. To this end, we invoke sacred sources of authority for the problems we pursue, seeking to portray our work as a necessary stepping stone in a long journey whose endpoint is beyond question. 27
• One may think of individual contributions as "bricks" to the edifice of knowledge." But bricks that enter into no particular structure, or those fitted into structures soon abandoned, scarcely contribute to anything. 27
• any judgment of what constitutes the most urgent problems for analytical attention implies some particular analysis of its own. 34
• just as changing political and cultural contexts bring new and often persuasive analytical ideas to light, so similar changes seem to consign analytically promising theories to oblivion--at least until the tectonic shifts of intellectual life propel them back to the surface. 37
• for any item of evidence that threatens to shake a treasured world view, some paradigm could be constructed that would rule such evidence out of court. Indeed, one can imagine ways of looking at social life in which all conceivable empirical data are interpreted so as to sustain one's overarching theory. 40
• [Lewis Coser, 1975, presidential address to the ASA]our discipline will be judged in the last analysis on the basis of the substantive enlightenment which it is able to supply about the social structures in which we are enmeshed and which largely condition the course of our lives. If we neglect that major task, if we refuse the challenge to answer these questions, we shall forfeit our birthright and degenerate into congeries of rival sects and specialized researchers who will learn more and more about less and less. 43
• Are there any enduring standards, any perennial analytical interests that might form the basis for judgments as to whether our overall grasp in understanding the social world is growing? I believe that there are, and that these criteria are implicit in the existential tensions predictably generated by the exigencies of social life itself. 44
• I hold that no program of social inquiry--no model of closure--will long claim attention if it fails to address a core of historically enduing questions. These questions occupy a special place in the theoretical life of our disciplines because they emerge predictably from certain endemic tensions of social life itself. I call them first order questions. Consider a few examples: What causes deviance? What social influences--from family constellations to community milieux to political institutions--shape the development of adult personality? … What conditions favor economic growth? … What conditions foster international peace, and which lead to war and other forms of conflict? What are the limits to the changes in family organization that are now sweeping the world's most prosperous societies? How much social stratification, and what forms of it, are necessary to ensure productive and cohesive social relations in complex societies? … Where does civil violence come from? 45
• They [first order questions] are the kinds of questions that draw people to study social life in the first place, and that are constantly raised anew in the minds of nonspecialists seeking reasoned bases for action in the face of endemic social tensions. … Their very centrality to enduring dilemmas of social action promise that students of social life will return to them again and again. 46
• The task of the sociology of science, in this [constructivist] view, is to analyze the process of intellectual change and to demonstrate how such change is successfully packaged as progress. Implicit in this program is the assumption that progress has no existence other than in the minds of those who "construct" it. 57
• The assessment of discoveries in science is crucial for any sociology of science, and not just because it offers and index of progress. For certainty of what constitutes a discovery would also afford judgments on the quality of individual "contributions." 58
• Science is a process of discovery…and those who contribute the most to the discovery process are bound to win the most attention, in the form of footnotes. 59

Collins, R. (1989) "Sociology: Proscience or Antiscience?," American Sociological Review, Vol. 54, February: 124-139.

• the core activity that gives the field of sociology its intellectual justification is the formation of generalized explanatory principles, organized into models of the underlying processes that generate the social world. It is these that determine how particular conditions result in particular kinds of outcomes. It is these generalized explanatory modes that constitute a science. 124
• the charge that sociology knows nothing, that we have no valid generalizations, is patently untrue. (i) The longer, more intensely, and more exclusively persons interact with each other, the more that they will identify with one another as a group, and the more pressure they will exert and feel for conforming to local patterns of behavior and belief, provided that they are not unequals in power or competitors for scarce resources. 125
• Symbolic interactionist theory converges on the same point: if a person's concepts are derived from the stance of a generalized other based on his her social experience, then what individuals think must be influenced by their patterns of interaction. 125
• (ii) Human cognitive capacity is limited: accordingly, the more complex or uncertain a situation, the more that participants fall back upon a taken-for-granted routine and focus on the particular area that presents the most dramatic problems. 125
• (iii) On the macrolevel of the state, an important principle is: A political crisis arises when a state's apparatus of military control is broken down by internal dissension among elites: this breakdown is especially likely when there is a military defeat and/or the economic strain of long-term military expenses beyond the organizational capacity of the state to collect revenues. 126
• we can accept with confidence the basic principle of state military/fiscal crisis leading to disintegration of the apparatus of coercive control, and that in turn leading to a revolt of subordinates. 126
• The vituperation against "positivism" is partly the expression of an oppressed intellectual minority against their long-standing oppressors after finally gaining a foothold in respectability. 127
• It is sometimes held that deterministic explanations are impossible because social action consists of situational interpretation, subjectivity, reflexivity, and emergence. … In recent years this line of criticism has become very prominent, so much so that one might characterize the late 20^th century as a time of neo-Idealist revival. 127
• the achievement of the interpretive microsociologists should broaden our sense of acceptable methods for sociological science. Clearly, a scientific method for our field cannot rule out studies of the subjective; sociological science cannot be founded on an exclusionary behaviorism (although we should avoid going to the opposite extreme of ruling out the importance of behavior, including unconscious behavior). A science does not have to be built out of "hard data" in the narrow sense. What makes it scientific is its ability to explain the conditions under which one kind of pattern holds rather than another, in whatever realm those patterns. May be found. 127
• even a very positivistic model must include general orienting concepts within which its specific hypotheses and operationalized variables are located. 127
• Specific hypotheses make sense only in terms of some such background assumptions about what kind of world we are dealing with. 128
• The notion of a complete rigid formalization, operationalization, and measurement of everything in a scientific theory is a chimera. There are informal concepts and intuitive leaps at several points. There is always a metatheoretical stance about what we are doing intellectually in the first place. Scientific theory sketches a model of the aspect of the world under consideration: hypotheses are derived from this, by a process of deprivation that itself involves intuitive leaps. When operationalizing concepts for empirical tests, we always make another intuitive leap in deciding that particular measurements or other observations actually bear upon the theory. 128
• all sciences have these places where there are intuitive leaps. 128
• a successful science is possible even incorporating areas of fundamental uncertainty, dealt with by tacit and informal understandings. Tacit knowledge is knowledge too, as long at it works. 128
• The fact that we are always involved in interpretations (and at many levels) does not mean that we can accept every interpretation offered at face value. 128
• The crucial criterion is that the best theory (with its ancillary assumptions and heuristics) is that which maximizes coherence; it brings together the most successful explanatory models into a consistent overall picture of how the world operates. 128
• An extreme, all-or-nothing empiricism is impossible; but a flexible empiricism, working with imprecisions and intuitive concepts where necessary, and making a great deal of room for theoretical work that ties things together, is a central part of science. One needs to work non-positivistically, so to speak, to be a successful positivist. 129
• Many sociologists in the interpretive camp…claim that their major substantive finding is the impossibility of deterministic theories. In their empirical investigations, they discover, above all, emergence, unpredictability, situationality, human capabilities for subjectively reflecting upon and changing social conditions. 129
• Culture does not simply organize itself; it is organized by social processes. 131
• Historicism is the claim that only historical particulars exist, and no general laws can be found that apply at all times and places. This argument arises to some extent in conjunction with other antipositivistic criticisms, as a kind of oppositional united front. 132
• I have no sympathy with the blanket claim that historical particularism is all that is possible; on the contrary, we cannot even see particulars without general concepts. 133
• Sociology will never be a science fitting the old sociological positivist ideal, but none of the natural sciences fits that ideal either. 134
• Modern philosophy is science does not destroy sociological science; it does not say that science is impossible, but gives us a more flexible picture of what science is. 134
• Theory is always undermined by data, and a wide-open pluralism of theories is the consequence that presumable will always be with us. 135
• All theories are not equally valid: the question is which theory works in the largest number of contexts that are coherent with one another. 135
• Sociology is engaged in many different enterprises. The extreme diversity of what we do tends to keep what we already know hidden under a cloud of dust. Our problem, in a sense, is too much knowledge, especially since so much of it is on the practical/descriptive side, which becomes unwieldy if it is not boiled down into theoretical generalizations. 136-7

Collins, R. (1998) The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change, pp. 19-71.

• Intellectuals are people who produce decontextualized ideas. These ideas are meant to be true or significant apart from any locality, and apart from anyone concretely putting them into practice. 19
• Truth" is the reigning sacred object of the scholarly community, as "art" is for literary/artistic communities; these are simultaneously their highest cognitive and moral categories, the locus of highest value, by which all else is judged. 19
• intellectual truth has all the characteristics Durkheim stated for the sacred objects of religion: transcending individuals, objective, constraining, demanding respect. 19
• situation is just the interaction of conscious human bodies, for a few hours, minutes, or even micro-seconds; the actor is both less than the whole situation and larger, as a unit in time which stretches across situations. 20
• The micro-situation is not the individual, but it penetrates the individual, and its consequences extend outward through social networks to as micro a scale as one might wish. The whole of human history is made up of situations. No one has ever been outside of a local situation; and all our views of the world, all our gathering of data, come from here. 20
• if one refuses to admit anything beyond the local, one arrives at some version of skepticism or relativism; if one idealizes what happens in situations as the following of rules and uses these inferred rules as a tool for constructing the rest of the world, one arrives at a type of idealism. 20-21
• It is true that nothing exists which is not thoroughly local; if it did not exist locally, where would it possibly be found? But no local situation stands alone; situations surround one another in time and space. 21
• The following are the ingredients of an interaction ritual: 1) a group of at least two people are physically assembled; 2) they focus attention on the same object or action, and each becomes aware that the other is maintaining this focus; 3) they share a common mood or emotion. … To the extent that these ingredients are maintained, they build up social effects: 4) The mutual focus of attention and the shared mood cumulatively intensify. Bodily motions, speech acts, and vocal micro-frequencies become attuned into a shared rhythm. 5) As a result, the participants feel they are members of a group, with moral obligations to one another. Their relationship becomes symbolized by whatever they focused on during their ritual interaction. 6) Individuals who participate in interaction rituals are filled with emotional energy, in proportion to the intensity of the interaction. Durkheim called this energy "moral force," the flow of enthusiasm that allows individuals in the throes of ritual participation to carry out heroic acts of fervor or self-sacrifice. 22-23
• Purely local groups such as the tribe or the circle of friends are primarily concerned with their own solidarity and identity; they do not make the kind of universalistic and transcendental claim for their symbols that intellectuals do for their "truth." 24
• Without face-to-face rituals, writings and ideas would never be charged up with emotional energy; they would be Durheimian emblems of a dead religion, whose worshippers never came to the ceremonies. 27
• To be oriented toward the writings of intellectuals is to be conscious of the community itself, stretching both backwards and forwards in time. Intellectual events in the present--lectures, debates, discussions--take place against an explicit backdrop of past texts, whether building upon them or critiquing them. Intellectuals are peculiarly conscious of their predecessors. And their own productions are directed toward unseen audiences. Even when they lecture to an immediate group, perhaps of personal students, disciples, or colleagues, the message is implicitly part of an ongoing chain, which will be further repeated, discussed, or augmented in the future. 27
• The entire macro-social structure, of non-intellectuals as well, is anchored on ritual interactions. 28
• The lowering of ritual density is a prerequisite for innovation; but it must also be linked to the intermittent support of the rituals of intellectual communities to give it content and energy. 34
• Writing is a vicarious participation in the world of symbolic memberships; insofar as one is able to work out a satisfactory relationships among ideas, one is creating social coalitions including oneself. Successful writing builds up emotional energy. Even over a very short-run period of minutes or hours at one's desk, the process of writing can be a self-enhancing emotional flow. 36
• Social structure is everywhere, down to the most micro level. In principle, who will say what to whom is determined by social processes. 46
• Thinking is, most centrally, internalized conversation. 49
• The most notable philosophers are not organized isolates but members of chains of teachers and students who are themselves known philosophers… 65

Cohen, B. (1989) Developing Social Knowledge

• There have always been significant critics who have argued that, while natural phenomena can be studied scientifically, human phenomena have not been, are not now being, and can never be studied scientifically. In part, the skepticism about scientific social science arises from the same mysterious aura that surrounds the natural sciences. In part, the skepticism arises from the false belief that all natural phenomena are amenable to scientific investigation and from the argument that, unless all human phenomena are similarly amenable, a scientific study of human phenomena is impossible. In part, the skepticism has an ideological base: there are those that believe that human behavior should not be studied scientifically, and this leads them to argue that it cannot be studied scientifically. 4
• The concern of a science of humanity behavior, then, is to resolve differences of opinion about matters of fact through the use of procedures whose validity does not depend upon the prejudices of the user. 7
• While it is possible to obtain collective agreement of the "facts," it is more difficult to collectively agree on explanations or interpretations of whether a given fact is relevant to the issue under consideration. 8
• What standards must an explanation meet before it is preferred to alternatives? This is one of the most crucial questions that an analysis of theory and method in sociology, or in any other science, must address. 9
• scientific knowledge is theoretical knowledge, and the purpose of methods in science is to enable us to choose among alternative theories. 13
• Scientific sociological knowledge is more than a collection of facts, more than a body of shared opinions or prejudices, more than a perspective for viewing the world, and more than conventional wisdom. 13
• theoretical knowledge does not consist solely of facts and cannot be generated simply by collecting facts. 15
• While many sociologists have adopted the strategy of fact gathering, and many aspects of the structure of the discipline of sociology promote this strategy, we contend that piling study upon study will not generate useful theoretical knowledge, even if each study exemplifies the ideals for conducting empirical research. 16
• Empiricism emphasizes the importance of observation and of creating knowledge by amassing observations and generalizing from these observations. 16
• [Spencer (1976)] defines theory as "a generalization based on observed facts that explains a supposed causal relationship between those facts." 16
• sociological theory and sociological method are inseparable. 22
• Part of the difficulty is sociological research results from the attempt to apply methods because they are quantitative or because they are qualitative, rather than because they are suitable to the problem at hand. 23
• Here we will treat methods as proposed solutions to problems of the collection, interpretation, and use of observations in the service of substantive sociological considerations. From this formulation, two conclusions follow: first, methods are instruments that serve substantive ends, and so different substantive ends require different instrumental solutions; second, the substantive end determines when quantitative solutions are needed and when qualitative solutions are required. 23
• Problems are not problems unless they are collectively recognized, and solutions are not solutions unless they meet collective tests. 25
• action decisions depend not only on the facts or on factual statements but also on the values held by those making the decisions. 29
• action decisions require assessing the factual consequences of each course of action for each of the values involved, and require balancing the values themselves according to which values are more, and which are less, important. 29
• The role of research is to make factual statements about particular consequences of particular alternatives. Since research cannot possibly investigate all the possible consequences of all the possible alternatives, there will always be uncertainty about the possible consequences of a decision alternative, and there may always be unforeseen consequences. 32
• Better decisions can result from the recognition that not all consequences can be known and not all values maximized, combined with the desire to use knowledge, even if limited, as a safeguard against decisions based solely on the decision maker's prejudice. 32
• value biases play a crucial role in the determination of all questions. For example, it would be impossible to investigate the consequences of affirmative-action program without the investigator's moral attitudes toward affirmative action influencing the outcome of the investigation. Some critics would go so far as to claim that the male chauvinist and the women's liberationist, investigating questions about affirmative action, would inevitably obtain results confirming their own value biases. While not all would go that far, they all share the conviction that values are an integral part of deciding cognitive questions, and hence that there is little point to distinguishing between value judgments and factual statements. 34
• What people usually mean by value bias is (1) that the content of the values held by the decision maker effects the content of the resulting decisions and (2) that the content of values affects the content of the factual statements the decision maker employs in the process. 34
• Natural science surmounted value biases through institutionalizing a set of norms and by socializing generations of scientists to these norms. 36
• Cultural bias operates in the most mundane areas of perception as well as in the most subtle. 38
• In practice, no science works perfectly. But clearly, the experience of the natural sciences suggests that corrective mechanisms can work to produce an approximation to objectivity. 39
• one can be a Positivist, and Anti-Positivist and a Post-Positivist simultaneously. If Positivism means a commitment to using evidence, then this author is a Positivist; if it means that nonobservable entities are inadmissible, then the present writer is an Anti-Positivist; If Post-Positivism represents a concern with the theoretical relevance of observables, then this analysis is a Post-Positivist; and so on. 44
• [Crews, 1987] "To be a good contemporary antipositivist, then, is to resist the encroachment of science on human studies--to deny…that the natural sciences offer [us] an adequate or even relevant model…. Or, more radically, one can deny that science itself is really empirical. 44
• While a theory may determine the relevance of a set of observations and the procedures for collecting and analyzing the observations, it does not deny the factual truth of all the relevant observations. 46
• as long as there are some observations whose truth value is not determined by the theory, then there are some observations that can provide an evaluation of the theory independent of the wishes and desires of either the proponents or the theory, and that after all is one meaning of objectivity. 46
• Even when an observer has a unique basis for selecting and recording his observations, the observations can be traced to preexisting ideas. …the phenomena does not speak for itself; observations are not determined by the things observed. At the very beginning of the process--the decision about what to observe--ideas play a crucial role, even though the ideas may be only partly conscious and not at all articulated. 70
• Observation is an active process; physical sensations from reality do not record themselves; every observation involves inference on the part of the observer. We do not, for example, observe anger. We observe facial expressions, tones of voice, things that are said, and we infer that a person is angry. … In short, observation depends upon shared collective modes of inference. 70
• A scientific theory is a set of interrelated statements, some of which are definitions and some of which are relationships assumed to be true, together with a set of rules for the manipulation of these statements to arrive at new statements. 71
• Science starts with ideas, and an idea is not a theory. An initial idea may be somewhat vague, may have many implicit elements, and may not be connected to many other ideas. An idea is the raw material from which theories emerge, and the process that leads to the emergence of theories is a long and difficult one. A theory emerges from the development and collective evaluation of many ideas. 72
• The problem is how to get from the crude idea to the collectively accepted theory. 72
• Through the process of evaluation, an idea is extended, modified, sometimes rejected, almost always superseded by a better statement of the idea, and always related to other ideas. The point which must be emphasized again and again is that the evaluation of ideas is a process, one successful culmination of which is a theory. 72
• No ideas or collections of ideas can capture all aspects of a single human being or a total society. 74
• When ideas are transformed into statements that can be collectively evaluated by reason and evidence, they become scientific knowledge claims. 75
• A scientific knowledge claim is an abstract, universal, and conditional statement in the form of a declarative sentence that has a subject and a predicate (i.e., is a grammatical sentence) where the predicate asserts something about the subject of the sentence. 75
• The more abstract an idea is, the more it is removed from an individual's experience. Hence, difficulties in communication arise because there are no points of reference in shared experience in which to hang the ideas. 77
• A universal statement is a statement whose truth is independent of time, space, and historical circumstances. 78
• A singular statement is a statement whose truth depends on a particular time, place, and historical circumstance. 78
• One the one hand, knowledge claims must be universal and abstract; hence not tied to particular objects in space and time; on the other hand, empirical research generates only singular statements directly tied to spatial, temporal objects--and therefore not knowledge claims. Yet empirical research must have an impact on knowledge claims; otherwise knowledge claims are not modifiable by experience, and we do not have empirical science. The resolution of the problem involves linking knowledge claims to singular statements; that is, knowledge claims are not themselves singular, but must be tied to singular statements in such a way that the singular statements can affect the evaluation of the knowledge claims. 79
• It is possible to have valid sociological principles as long as they are valid for those cultures which satisfy the scope conditions. This does not require that all cultures, or indeed any culture, satisfy the scope conditions. The significance of the idea of scope conditions is simply that wherever scope conditions are met, a knowledge claim is applicable. 83
• Given any observation statement pr set of observation statements, it is always possible to construct alternative explanations for the given statement or statements. 243
• If there are many explanations, they are all in one sense true explanations of the single instance; that is, they are all logically true in that the observation statement is deducible from all of them. 243
• No set of rules exists that allows one to go from the truth of a singular premise to the truth of a universal statement. Simply put, there is no way that the truth of a singular statement, or even the truth of a large number of singular statements, can guarantee the truth of a universal statement. 245
• inductive leaps cannot be justified logically, but are acts of creative imagination. The statements that arise from our "inductive" thinking are conjectures that must be tested by means other than the psychological processes which generated them--the fact that we thought of these statements does not confirm their validity. 247
• Experiments allow greater control [than nonexperimental research] of factors that might represent alternative explanations, but no experiment--or series of experiments--enables us to eliminate all alternative explanations. 253
• 1) Experiments are more easily reproducible that nonexperimental studies. 2) Experiments allow the researcher to eliminate more alternative explanations than nonexperimental research. 3) Experiments enable the researcher to separate and isolate factors that are not separable in nature and thus to make comparisons that are not possible where the factors are confounded. 261
• one cannot generalize from a single study and that one cannot prove that an explanation is true even for the instance of the single study. 262
• The challenge of novelty and the excitement of being the first to explore new territory attract many of us and make it difficult to pursue the more mundane aspects of building cumulative knowledge. ….we all want to be revolutionaries rather than the plodders who carry out ordinary normal activities. 329