

**Nineteenth-Century
Rhetoric
in
North America**

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There is no art whatever that hath so close a connexion with all the faculties and powers of the mind, as eloquence, or the art of speaking, in the extensive sense in that I employ the term . . . if the logical art, and the ethical be useful, eloquence is useful, as it instructs us how these arts must be applied for the conviction and the persuasion of others. It is indeed the grand art of communication, not of ideas only, but of sentiments, passions, dispositions, and purposes.

George Campbell, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*

Belles Lettres and criticism chiefly consider him [man] as a Being endowed with those powers of taste and imagination, that were intended to embellish his mind, and to supply him with rational and useful entertainment. They open a field of investigation peculiar to themselves. . . . They bring to light various springs of action that without their aid might have passed unobserved; and that, though of a delicate nature, frequently exert a powerful influence on several departments of human life . . . they strew flowers in the path of science.

Hugh Blair, *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres*

The finding of suitable ARGUMENTS to prove a given point, and the skilful arrangement of them, may be considered as the immediate and proper province of Rhetoric, and of that alone.

Richard Whately, *Elements of Rhetoric*

Foundations of Nineteenth-Century Theory:

The New Rhetoric

— recycles rhetoric
theory with
theories of the mind

The theoretical substance of nineteenth-century rhetoric was founded on a composite of classical assumptions and epistemological and belletristic premises initially popularized in the late eighteenth-century English tradition known as the "New Rhetoric." The New Rhetoric evolved from the efforts of theorists such as George Campbell (*The Philosophy of Rhetoric*) and Hugh Blair (*Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres*) to reconcile the principles and practices of rhetoric with theories of the mind, logic, and language that had emerged from the Baconian-Lockian tradition.¹ Nineteenth-century rhetoric relied substantially on Campbell and Blair's innovations and on the subsequent extension of their revisions by Richard Whately in *Elements of Rhetoric*. In theoretical terms, the nineteenth-century tradition can be understood as executing a refined synthesis of those theoretical commitments that promoters of the New Rhetoric were the first to combine: a philosophical approach to rhetoric that examined the nature and aims of rhetoric in terms of the processes of the "mental faculties"; the view that the study of rhetoric applies to all major forms of communication, oral and written; an aesthetic/ethical commitment to the critical study of rhetorical theory and the development of taste; and a neoclassical approach

5 to rhetoric as the art of adapting discourse to purpose, audience, and occasion.²

George Campbell and the Epistemological Rationale for Rhetoric

The philosophical redefinition of the aims of rhetoric within the New Rhetoric constituted a reexamination of the processes and forms of rhetoric in terms of contemporary theories of the mind and communication. Campbell, the most influential eighteenth-century proponent of this epistemological approach, defines rhetoric as "eloquence," or "that art or talent by which the discourse is adapted to its end"—a definition conditioned by the stipulation that the nature of rhetorical adaptation is constrained by "those principles of our nature" that affect "modes of arguing, or forms of speech" (1). Campbell's major effort is to outline the epistemological realities embodied in the obligations of rhetoric "to enlighten the understanding, to please the imagination, to move the passions or to influence the will." Campbell's redesign of the aims and procedures of rhetoric proved to be one of the most powerful accomplishments of the New Rhetoric, an accomplishment that shaped the philosophical context in which rhetoric would be defined throughout the nineteenth century. Nineteenth-century theory would be indebted not only to Campbell's general restructuring of the philosophical foundations of rhetoric but also to the reexamination and reiteration of standard elements and principles of theory that *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* provides. Nineteenth-century treatises modeled on the theoretical architecture of *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* also embodied those neoclassical commitments that were distinct features of Campbell's treatise: an attention to the materials of argument, the divisions of rhetoric, the canon of style, and the working presumption that the art of rhetoric lies in adaptation to aim, audience, and occasion. Campbell's advocacy of the study of rhetoric as an inquiry providing scientific insight into human nature and

the organic principles that governed communication inspired a legion of supporters among nineteenth-century rhetoricians in North America who regarded *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* as an authoritative commentary on the philosophy and practice of rhetoric.

Campbell clearly regards his treatise as a philosophical work; he seeks to "exhibit . . . a tolerable sketch of the human mind" and to "disclose its secret movements, tracing its principal channels of perceptions and action, as near as possible to their source" as a means of coming to a more scientific and critical understanding of "the radical principles of that art, whose object it is, by the use of language, to operate on the soul of the hearer, in the way of informing, convincing, pleasing, moving, or persuading" (xliii).³ One of the characteristic assumptions underlying Campbell's method is the notion that the principles of rhetoric are a consequence of the nature of mental activities and that to study one is to come to know the other. Campbell understands the essential relationship between the rhetorical process and the mind in these terms: particular faculties activate discrete intellectual and emotional responses; particular rhetorical forms and techniques facilitate these functions. Campbell explains that if a speaker wishes to instruct an audience or to "explain some doctrine unknown, or not distinctly comprehended by them, or by proving some position disbelieved or doubted by them," an appeal must be made to the understanding, through perspicuity or argument; when a speaker wishes to affect the imagination, it must first be engaged by "exhibiting to it a lively and beautiful representation of a suitable object . . . the principle scope for this class being in narration and description" (2-3); if the speaker seeks to influence the conduct of his hearers (persuasion), the will must be addressed, an appeal that requires "an artful mixture of that which proposes to convince the judgement, and that which interests the passions, its distinguished excellency results from these two, the argumentative and the pathetic incorporated together" (4). The rhetorician must understand not only the unique characteristics of the faculties but also how the mental processes are linked together in an intimate, dynamic chain:

In general it may be asserted, that each preceding species . . . is preparatory to the subsequent; that each subsequent species is founded on the preceding; and that thus they ascend in a regular progression. Knowledge, the object of the intellect, furnisheth materials for the fancy; the fancy culls, compounds, and by her mimic art, disposes these materials so as to affect the passions; the passions are the natural spurs to volition or action, and so need only to be right directed. (2)

The challenge facing the rhetorician in responding adequately to such complex mental activities is learning how to adapt rhetorical materials in such a way that this chain of mental activities is engaged in the proper sequence with the desired result. In Campbell's philosophy of rhetoric, the aims of enlightening the understanding, pleasing the imagination, moving the passions, and influencing the will constrain the nature of rhetorical proof, shape the substance of types of discourse, and constrain the stylistic processes of rhetoric.

Within the general provisions of examining rhetorical practice in terms of faculty psychology, Campbell's theory of rhetoric is predisposed by certain other assumptions regarding the principles of human nature, including the assumption that those ideas that develop in the mind do so as a consequence of the essentially "associative" nature of mental activities (resemblance, contiguity, and causality); the view that the mind relies on empirical experience as a source of knowledge and as a guide to the logic of associative relations; and the notion that *vivacity* or liveliness of ideas is the quality primarily responsible for attention and belief.⁴ Campbell's perception of the impact of vivacity on the logical workings of the mind is closely related to his acceptance of the epistemological assumption that the mind draws inferences and deductions through the logical dynamics of associative links. The veracity of any rhetorical utterance comes about as a result of the rhetorician's ability to replicate the laws of association in the structure of discourse and to infuse language with those qualities most likely to bring tangible referents and experiences to mind. Campbell redefines the rhetorician's burden as one directly responsible for shaping discourse in

such a way that the empirical truth of an explanation or argument is indisputable. Consequently, Campbell views rhetorical evidence and style in terms of an obligation to scientific principles of probability and verisimilitude.

Campbell views rhetoric as a process that presupposes rather than generates "truth," arguing that "logic forges the arms that eloquence teacheth us to wield" (34). It is the function of rhetoric to present logical substance, substance that is simply information in isolation of an apprehending mind that recognizes factual truth only when empirical veracity has been established by the force of rhetorical content and form. By taking into consideration the circumstances of the subject and the hearers, the rhetorician "manages" logical substance in such a manner that the ends of discourse are achieved and "doubts, disbelief, and mistake" overcome (33). Campbell's idea of truth is synonymous with empirical credibility, or that which appears to be consistent with, or can be inferred from, experience; the managerial obligation that rhetoric has to logic consists of presenting only that substance that conforms to normative conceptions of "the nature of things" and doing so in forms that reify the experiential circumstances associated with the subject or idea. This view of rhetoric as a process of selecting content and managing form implies a distinctly different function for invention from that outlined in classical theory. From Campbell's philosophical point of view, notions of experience and the probable are based not on consensus, public opinion, or a "mean" determined by the common good or utility but on what most closely approximates self-conscious empirical and rational experience: "to eighteenth-century British writers on rhetoric, the syllogistic structure was not the natural form of thought, and although some arguments would appropriately fall into that form, and could be analyzed and discussed in terms of their major premise, their minor premise, and their conclusion, the basic pattern of rhetorical argument for the new age was that which would lead the audience to recognize intuitively the truth of the author's statement or would lead him to establish its truth from related facts or truths" (Howell 443-44).

Although not actually addressing invention per se, Campbell out-

lines those principles of natural logic and categories of rhetorical evidence that he contends constrain the processes of moral reasoning on which rhetorical conviction and persuasion depend. Deeming syllogistic or dialectical reasoning as contrary to the natural dynamics of inquiry, Campbell attends instead to analytic methods of reasoning from experience, consciousness, and common sense, methods that he defines as the only means by which we can acquire natural knowledge regarding "actual existences" (62). Ascribing rhetorical proof to the realm of "moral evidence," Campbell explains that unlike logic, which sets out abstract principles, rhetoric deals with the "actual connections" between abstract or scientific truth and the realities of human intellection and responses. As a consequence, the rhetorical process of proof is essentially a matter of identifying those modes of presentation that appeal to the common sense or the consciousness of the hearers, the former being the intellectual ability to intuit or deduce reasonable certainties and probabilities from the knowledge accrued from experience and the latter being the natural state of self-awareness of empirical and sensory existence that compels each person to validate personal perception and feelings as valid sources of true knowledge. The inventional obligation of rhetoric is to develop subject matter in conjunction with those types of evidence that appeal most directly to natural intellection: evidence from direct experience; evidence from analogy (which Campbell defines as reasoning from "indirect experience or 'more remote similitude'"); and evidence from testimony, the presentation of individual observation and experience (40-70).⁵ In an attempt to reconcile the obligations of rhetoric with the more sophisticated cognitive and psychological insights of eighteenth-century philosophy, Campbell does not contest the traditional notion of invention as discovery so much as he redefines the nature of what the rhetorician is to discover; Campbell shifts theoretical emphasis from the formulaic character of enthymemic proof to a concern with the identification and presentation of argumentative or explanatory evidence or materials. One way to understand what Campbell does with the notion of rhetorical evidence is to see his efforts to categorize rhetorical evidence in terms of epistemological appropriateness as the designing of a new set of common

topoi consisting of the categories of natural logic: experience, analogy, and testimony.

In addition to providing a rationale for a substantive redefinition of the principle of rhetorical proof, a philosophical regard for the empirical and rational foundations of mental response also governs Campbell's analysis of other rhetorical principles. In his discussion of pathetic and ethical appeal, the divisions of rhetoric, and the canon of style, Campbell conflates discrete features of traditional theory with modern pronouncements on the epistemological dynamics that constrain usage and audience response. Campbell's debt to the rhetorical tradition indicates the degree to which the New Rhetoric was based on a revision of traditional elements of theory. Campbell tends to co-opt features of classical rhetoric when discussing how rhetorical forms appeal to the understanding, the imagination, the passions, and the will; nevertheless, his attention to traditional elements of theory (argumentation, ethos, pathos, the divisions, the canon of style) would have the long-range effect of reinscribing these elements within rhetorical theory.

Reiterating classical advice that the rhetorician must adjust the "fitness of arguments" to the "different orders of men" addressed, Campbell's observes that the "sense" advanced must fall within the hearer's "sphere" of knowledge or else the faculties of reason will not be engaged. One means of ensuring such an appeal to the hearer's frame of mind is to gratify the imagination through "vivacity, beauty, sublimity and novelty." Such qualities attract the attention of the imagination, which in turn engages the hearer's beliefs. Just as it is necessary to stimulate the imagination to induce belief, the rhetorician must appeal to the passions if action is the intended end of speaking. Within the dynamics of persuasion, the faculties work in particular concert:

In order to persuade, there are two things which must be carefully studied by the orator. The first is to excite some desire or passion in his hearers; the second is to satisfy their judgment that there is a connexion between the action to which he would persuade them, and the gratification of the desire or passion which he excites. . . .

passion must be awakened by communicating lively ideas of the object. . . . a passion is strongly excited by sensation. (210)

Accordingly, the rhetorician must attempt to shape rhetorical content in terms of the circumstances chiefly instrumental in operating on the passions: probability, plausibility, importance, proximity of time, connection of place, relation of the principals to the hearers, and interests of the hearers or speaker in the consequences. Paralleling many features of classical advice on pathetic appeal, this analysis of "circumstances" functions in Campbell's theory of rhetoric in much the same way as does Aristotle's treatment of character and emotions in book 2 of the *Rhetoric*, as a guide to the nature of pathetic response and the constraints that such affective disposition places on the shape and content of persuasive discourse (212-23).⁶

Campbell again recasts traditional classical advice in his discussion of "the consideration which the Speaker ought to have of Himself," an impression "obtained reflexively from the opinion entertained of him by the hearers or the character which he bears with them" (224). Campbell reiterates the importance of securing goodwill and authority (ethos) but discusses these issues in terms of a larger burden that falls to the speaker, that of generating sympathy, an emotional reaction analogous to the compulsion toward resemblance that controls the imagination. Perceiving the gaining of sympathy as a necessary step in affecting the passions, which in turn engage the will, Campbell views ethos in terms of its epistemological function as a natural strategy for securing the attention of the interrelated mental faculties and not as an optional mode of appeal that may or may not be suited to subject or occasion: "Whatever . . . weakens that principle of sympathy must do the speaker prejudice in respect of his power over the passions of his audience. . . . Now, the speaker's apparent conviction of the truth of what he advanceth, adds to all his other arguments an evidence, though not precisely the same, yet near akin to that of his own testimony" (224).

Campbell credits classical sources such as Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria* and quotes frequently from Horace's *Art of Poetry* throughout his discussion of how the orator should regard himself and his hearers. Moreover, he is consistently in the debt of a more general classical principle in his discussion of the divisions and the canon of style: the dictate that the rhetorician must design arguments with constant reference to subject, hearer, and occasion. As he supplements traditional advice with attention to the epistemological dynamics governing rhetorical occasions, usage, and style, Campbell extends the theoretical perimeters of these standard topics by associating rhetorical adaptations of form and style with specific dynamics of the faculties and also by drawing attention to those aspects of human nature that are inevitably implicated in compositional practices. Offering a definition of the divisions as forensic rhetoric, political rhetoric, and pulpit oratory, Campbell briefly discusses the requirements of these divisions in very general advice on how the speaker is to adapt arguments to the subject, audience, and occasion. Elaborating in greater detail on the occasional variables that influence consideration of ethos and pathos, Campbell's discussion of the divisions pays more attention to the dynamics between speaker and audience in various rhetorical scenes than it does to the formal and argumentative requirements of "orations delivered at the bar, those pronounced in the senate, and those spoken from the pulpit" (99). Although Campbell rehearsees traditional advice regarding the importance of presenting an "admirable character" and of assessing the "age, rank, fortune, education, and prejudices" of the persons addressed, his discussion of the preacher's obligation to arouse the passions in order to change the heart and disposition is indicative of the epistemological rationale that consistently accompanies the neoclassical affirmations offered in *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*. Following the discussion of the ends of preaching is an elaborate philosophical explanation of "the simple passions of which the mind is susceptible" (the pleasant and the painful) in which Campbell accounts for the epistemological chain of events with which the orator or poet is involved. When the strong passions must be excited,

there is an attraction of association among the passions, as well as among the ideas of the mind. . . . pain of every kind generally makes a deeper impression on the imagination than pleasure does, and is longer retained by the memory. . . . under the name pity may be included all the emotions excited by tragedy [pity and terror]. . . . pity is not a simple passion, but a group of passions strictly united by association, and as it were blended by centering in the same object. (132)

In his discussion of the modes of discourse, Campbell repeatedly makes the point that in order for discourse to affect the faculties and thereby ensure conviction or persuasion, the ideas presented must appear credible, in the sense that the members of the audience must be able to associate the information or premises with their own empirical experience or be able to intuit or deduce such an association. An insistence on the rhetorician's obligation to the empirical veracity of experience and the associative nature of mental activity predisposes Campbell's revision of rhetorical theory, even when neoclassical assertions are prominent, as in the case of his discussion of grammatical purity and the major qualities of style. Campbell makes the point that rhetoric has as close a kinship with the laws of grammar as it does with the laws of natural logic because the credibility of discourse also depends on grammatical "purity," or the conventional status of words and syntax. Paralleling quite closely traditional guidelines regarding appropriateness in style, Campbell observes that the rhetorician must make use of grammatical materials to present ideas in forms corresponding to the "fixed principles" of "reputable custom," "national use," and "present use" (260-70).⁷ What marks Campbell's discussion of the grammatical aspects of style as a feature of the New Rhetoric is the justification he offers for compulsory attention to grammatical convention: Campbell assumes that adherence to grammatical custom contributes to the success with which eloquence conveys sentiments into the minds of others because grammatical laws embody "the relations which subsist among the things signified" (261). While the rhetorician's general effort is a far more encompassing one than that of the grammarian, the orator can only add the "higher qualities of

eloquence" to structures that already reflect a prerequisite level of conventionality sufficient to allow the hearer to associate words with their referents. In Campbell's epistemological view of rhetorical dynamics, grammatical deviations (such as barbarisms and solecisms) are problematic because they inhibit the processes of association, whereas "grammatical truth" or "purity" facilitates these connections:

Language is the sole channel through which we communicate our knowledge and discoveries to others, and through which the knowledge and discoveries of others are communicated to us. By reiterated recourse to this medium, it necessarily happens, that when things are related to each other, the words signifying those things are more commonly brought together in discourse. Hence the word and names themselves, by customary vicinity, contract in the fancy a relation additional to that which they derive purely from being symbols of related things. Further, this tendency is strengthened by the structure of language. . . . The consequence is, that similar relations in things will be expressed similarly; that is, by similar inflections, derivations, compositions, arrangement of words, or juxtaposition of particles, according to the genius or grammatical form of the particular tongue.⁸ (259)

Although rhetorical style depends on the foundations of grammatical purity, the general aim of rhetorical style in speaking and writing is to provide those "higher qualities" that give grace and energy to discourse. Campbell defines these major qualities of style as *perspicuity* and *vivacity*. Perspicuity (clarity) is essential to any effort to inform the understanding, intelligibility being to "the understanding what light is to the eye" (216). Within the dynamics of faculty psychology, an appeal to the understanding is always necessary whether the speaker or writer's aim is simply to inform (conviction) or whether engaging the understanding is subordinate to "pleasure, emotion or persuasion." Offenses against perspicuity can occur in diction or syntax: the use of obscure words, faulty arrangement of words, contradictory uses of terminology, vague pronoun references, the "injurious" use of technical words and phrases, long sentences, and any form

of ambiguity. More general violations in composition can be caused by any form of what Campbell describes as *the unintelligible*, an offense against reasoning that can result in conveying "no meaning at all." A major cause of the unintelligible is confusion of thought: when the speaker or writer has only "half-formed" thoughts on a subject, these confused and imperfect perceptions are reflected in sentence structures that obscure meaning. Other stylistic problems that render speech unintelligible include "specious verbiage" ("the puerile"), the recapitulation of "learned nonsense," an overly "profound" subject or register, and subject matter that credits the "marvelous" over the dictates of common sense (216-55).

The theory of perspicuity set out by Campbell reasserts classical teachings regarding clarity: in fact, what Campbell treats under perspicuity, classical texts such as the *Ad Herennium* discuss under the heading of "Taste" (purity and perspicuity) and "Artistic Composition" (4.11.16-18).⁹ It is the attention to the epistemological realities associated with claims on the understanding that constitutes the innovative aspect of Campbell's treatment of perspicuity as a preferred quality of style. The same type of attention shapes Campbell's discussion of vivacity, that quality of style which has the most influence on the imagination and thereby an influence on the passions and the will. In his treatment of vivacity, Campbell co-opts features of traditional theories of style (diction, tropes, arrangement of sentences) within a larger discussion of which rhetorical styles affect the faculties most successfully. It is a standard feature of classical advice on style to suggest that "proper terms" (Aristotle describes these as "special names") convey greater specificity; what Campbell adds to this precept is an attention to the function such diction serves in creating vivacity, or vivid ideas. "The more general the terms are; the picture is the fainter; the more special they are, it is the brighter . . . it will sometimes have a considerable effect on enlivening the imagery, not only to particularize, but even to individuate the object presented to the mind" (286-90). Focusing on comparatively few tropes and foregoing distinctions between figures of diction and thought, Campbell discusses tropes in terms of their primary functions of creating vivacity (a sense of felt experience) and enhancing intelligibil-

ity.¹⁰ Campbell's discussion of tropes is analogous to traditional advice on how the figures of diction and thought confer "distinction" on style; however, the quality of distinctiveness that Campbell considers significant is the figurative effect that renders an image sufficiently lively "to fix the attention" of the imagination on the particular (e.g. antonomasia [*pronomination*] or on a more general association (synecdoche [*intellectio*] and metonymy [*denominatio*])).

Hugh Blair and the Belles Lettres Rationale for Rhetoric

The context in which Campbell reviews the nature and function of figurative language indicates the general theoretical commitment of *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*—the intention to explain the dynamics of rhetoric in terms of the principles of human nature. Campbell's ambition to document how these principles are implicated in the rhetorical process also occupied other eighteenth-century commentators. Joseph Priestley's *Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism* (1777) relies on the assumption that "two sources of the principles of human nature and pleasures of the imagination . . . explain the efficacy of rhetorical devices . . . the association of simple ideas [and] a moderate exertion of the faculties" (xliv). Although Priestley's treatise did not achieve the same degree of influence as Campbell's text, his interest in an epistemological approach to rhetoric suggests the degree to which this perspective had become the foundation of rhetorical theory by the late eighteenth century, serving as a guiding set of assumptions not only for Campbell's manifesto but also for those works that reconcile modern philosophy with a critical approach to rhetoric. The distinctive characteristic of the belles lettres approach to rhetoric, embodied in the widely circulated works of Lord Kames (*Elements of Criticism*, 1762) and Hugh Blair (*Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres*), was a theoretical attention to taste as a human faculty and to those qualities of rhetorical style that most effectively move the faculties of reason and the passions to higher thought and emotion, a state synonymous with

the exercise of taste. The philosophical drive of the eighteenth-century belles lettres movement can be understood as the desire to "discover . . . a foundation for reasoning upon the taste of an individual" and to design a "science of rational criticism" that could serve as the foundation for a general art of rhetorical composition (Kames 11-12).¹¹ The articulation of a rational philosophy of taste and its implications for critical standards and rhetorical practice was the aim of Blair's *Lectures*, and this work more than any other was responsible for popularizing the belles lettres approach to rhetorical theory and practice in the nineteenth century.¹²

In *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres* Blair offers a synthesis of classical teachings and contemporary theories of aesthetics and rhetoric, a synthesis that reiterates several features common to the theoretical stance of *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* and the New Rhetoric in general: the assumption that the procedures and practices of rhetoric are founded on and responsible to the faculties of reason; the view that the rhetorical process presumes and manages the materials of logic and grammar; the assumption that the art of rhetoric involves the arrangement, style, and presentation of sense but not the invention of truth; an attention to the divisions of formal oratory (eloquence of the bar, eloquence of popular assemblies, and eloquence of the pulpit); and a general debt to classical concerns with intention, audience, and occasion. Blair's corroboration of these theoretical features emphatically confirmed the New Rhetoric as an emerging tradition that was both innovative and recapitulative in its theoretical interests. Distinctive elements of Blair's theory of rhetoric contributed to the substance the orientation of nineteenth-century theory and pedagogy: a definition of rhetoric as encompassing the study and practice of oratory, writing, and criticism; an explanation of the doctrine of taste and an elaboration of those critical standards for rhetorical composition that conform to its dictates; an explicit attention to the importance of *imitatio* in the development of taste and rhetorical skills; and a theoretical approach to the divisions of oratory and the canons of rhetoric that incorporate both neoclassical and belletristic viewpoints.

Campbell explicitly refers to oratory throughout his treatise and

implies by his frequent references to writing in his discussion of style that his discussion of the philosophical principles of rhetoric applies to both public speaking and composition; however, among the New Rhetoricians it is Blair who is responsible for popularizing a definition of eloquence as the art of public speaking and composition. By presenting his treatise as a discussion of "the arts of speech and writing" (3), Blair reiterates the same rationale for the study of rhetoric advocated by Adam Smith in his course of lectures on "a system of rhetoric and belles-lettres" given at Edinburgh and the University of Glasgow at midcentury (1745-60): "the best method of explaining and illustrating the various powers of the human mind, the most useful part of metaphysics, arises from an examination of the several ways of communicating our thoughts by speech, and from an attention to the principles of those literary compositions which contribute to persuasion or entertainment."¹³ Like Smith, who considered rhetoric to be the study of how the principles of communication can be adapted to the arts of speaking, Blair perceived the study of rhetoric and belles lettres as including the traditional divisions of "Oratory and 'Public Speaking'" (eloquence of popular assemblies, the bar, and the pulpit) and "the most distinguished kinds of Composition both in prose and verse" (historical writing, philosophical writing, dialogue, epistolary writing, fictitious history, and pastoral, lyric, didactic, descriptive, epic, dramatic, and comic poetry). Blair's definition of the range of rhetorical genres makes considerably more explicit the scope of study implied by Campbell's view of eloquence as "the grand art of communication" addressing "ideas, . . . sentiments, passions, dispositions," the dissemination of "valuable knowledge," and the enforcement of "right rules of action upon others" (xliv).

Blair's belletristic orientation prompted yet another innovative revision of the aims of rhetoric and nature of theoretical study. Intending his treatise for the edification of those who "propose, either by speech or writing, to address the Public" and for the instruction of those who wished to "improve their taste with respect to writing and discourse, and to acquire principles which will enable them to judge for themselves in that part of literature called the Belles Lettres," Blair considers the study of rhetoric to

does an extension of elocution
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comprehend both the study of eloquence and criticism (5). Conflating eloquence and composition in one system, Blair merged the traditional domains of rhetoric and poetics under the auspices of the study of taste and its application to communication and the critical study of literature. Blair's incorporation of such a critical component into rhetorical theory made theory responsible for articulating fundamental principles that govern the impact of all genres and for promoting the pedagogical standard that a complete education in rhetorical theory and practice involves the acquisition of a critical sensibility.

A theoretical commitment to the doctrine of taste and the epistemological views that doctrine assumes is the philosophical ground for Blair's conflation of the study of oratory with the critical and pragmatic study of composition and literature. Whereas Campbell is mostly concerned with identifying the dynamics of the mind that dictate the principles of rhetoric, Blair pursues a more pragmatic interest. He focuses on defining those rhetorical principles that allow writers and speakers to improve their intellectual powers and habits of mind and that enhance their ability to communicate ideas:

All that regards the study of eloquence and composition, merits the higher attention upon this account, that it is intimately connected with the improvement of our intellectual powers. For I must be allowed to say, that when we are employed, after a proper manner, in the study of composition, we are cultivating reason itself. True rhetoric and found logic are very nearly allied. The study of arranging and expressing our thoughts with propriety, teaches us to think, as well as to speak accurately. By putting our sentiments into words, we always conceive them more distinctly. . . . so close is the connection between thoughts and the words in which they are clothed. (6-7)

Blair awards to the acquisition of taste, or the development of critical judgment, a special function in strengthening the powers of the mind and the arts of expression. "Taste" designates that common faculty

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of the mind that can be understood as an innate response to beauty, a response that enhances the powers of the imagination and the passions by directing intellectual and emotional attention to the beauties of nature and art. Aiding the understanding by enhancing the powers of the imagination and the intensity of sensory impressions of experience, taste embodies a natural response to harmony, to elegance, and to the sublime (qualities of beauty).¹⁴ The cultivation of taste and the study of critical principles (rhetoric) extends philosophical insight into human nature by foregrounding those "delicate springs of action" that lie outside the scrutiny of science proper:

The exercise of taste and of found criticism, is in truth one of the most improving employments of the understanding. . . . For such disquisitions are very intimately connected with the knowledge of ourselves. They necessarily lead us to reflect on the operations of the imagination, and the movements of the heart; and increase our acquaintance with some of the most refined feelings which belong to our frame. (10)

Blair's regard for the edifying function of taste goes beyond an argument for its influence on the powers of reason to include an advocacy for its impact on the development of moral character and civil commitment. Ascribing to taste a specific role in educating the mind to a liberal state in which it may respond to elevated sentiments such as "public spirit, the love of glory, contempt of external fortune, and the admiration of what is truly illustrious and great," Blair draws a direct link between the cultivation of taste and the development of intellectual, moral, and civil virtues. Defining rhetoric as a discipline that directs the cultivation of taste, Blair views the study of rhetoric and belles lettres as a process of edification, a means by which the individual can prepare for the discharge of "the higher and more important duties of life" (12-13). The strictly epistemological or "scientific" view of rhetoric within the New Rhetoric (represented by Campbell) made a case for the cognitive foundations of rhetoric that would constrain nineteenth-century theory; Blair's belletristic ideology established an equally influential claim for the role of the rhetoric in the cultivation of liberal and

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vs. Romantic

the moral culture, a claim that would find wide acceptance in the nineteenth-century tradition in North America.

The general rationale of Blair's *Lectures* is founded on a presumption of the intellectual and moral worth of attending to taste as an "improvable faculty" and on the assumption that the study of rhetoric and belles lettres will inevitably result in the acquisition of taste in its most perfect state. The epistemological/aesthetic rationale on which the belletristic approach to rhetoric relies assumes that the composition of eloquence and written discourse is obligated to taste insofar as the aims of rhetoric entail a necessary obligation "to please" the imagination. Blair argues that the imagination serves reason in a special way because it allows the mind to apprehend aspects of truth (the sublime and the beautiful) that cannot be directly perceived by the understanding. The study of belles lettres is the means of understanding those principles that guide the exercise of taste and appeal most powerfully to the imagination. Blair defines the major principles of taste as: sublimity, grandeur in subject, passion, and/or form that fills the mind with "great ideas"; beauty, an aesthetic quality of style, sentiment, or object created by the collaboration of several qualities (color, regularity, and motion) which inspire "an agreeable serenity" and lasting pleasure; and novelty, a comparatively less intense influence on the imagination but one that produces "a vivid and agreeable emotion" in response to the unusual, the uncommon, or the new (22-96).¹⁵ As natural qualities reflecting the substance of experience, sublimity, beauty, and novelty represent primary qualities of taste and the first principles of criticism. Other pleasures of taste include imitation and description, which please the imagination by recalling the primary beauty or sublimity of the object exhibited and intensifying the connection between perception and experience. Blair points out that eloquence and poetry rely on imitation and description more than does any other art and can represent the world of natural and moral experience in "colors very strong and lively" (93). This particular assumption reveals an essential characteristic of the belletristic approach to rhetoric—a concern for the degree to which particular types of discourse engage the imagination, that faculty with the greatest disposition toward tasteful

qualities of sense and form. By identifying the critical principles that best appeal to the faculty of taste and applying these to outline proper practices in rhetorical composition, the study of belles lettres encourages the development of taste to higher levels of excellence.

In the belletristic rationale for rhetoric, it is the critical ability to judge and appreciate the qualities of taste that ultimately confers success on the efforts of those writers and orators who strive to move the passions or the imagination; therefore, the study of the principles of taste is a mandatory aspect of rhetorical training. The cultivation of taste is achieved by the study of critical principles and by practice in deploying these principles in criticism, composition, and oratorical performance. Blair insists that the study of "the most admired productions of genius" (an exemplary canon) ensures the acquisition of taste because such models reveal qualities of sense, sentiment, and form that have exerted "long-lasting and universal appeal" to human nature. One of the most distinctive aspects of belletristic theory is the assumption that the study of rhetoric necessarily involves the study of "the proper models for imitation": "by them we are enabled to collect, what the sense of mankind is with respect to those beauties, which give them the highest pleasure. . . . In every composition, what interests the imagination and touches the heart, gives pleasure to all ages and nations. There is a certain string, which being properly struck, the human heart is so made, as to accord to it" (17). Belletristic rhetorical theory insists that great works illustrate not only tasteful rhetorical effects but also the admirable ideas and elevated sentiments that the would-be writer or speaker should aspire to express. In this sense, the principle of *imitatio* is as crucial an element of belletristic rhetorical theory as it is of traditional poetics.¹⁶

The articulation of the doctrine of taste, the formulation of rhetoric as a critical theory, and the designation of rhetoric as a general art of communication are Blair's innovative contributions to the New Rhetoric. However, Blair further contributes by offering reviews of traditional elements of rhetorical theory such as the divisions of oratory and the offices of arrangement, style, and delivery. Like Campbell, Blair relies substantially on neo-Ciceronian premises and definitions in his treatment of such

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issues; however, he supplements standard advice regarding these elements of theory with attention to the epistemological and aesthetic principles that affect communication and affective response. This theoretical stance indicates the degree to which belletristic rhetoric shared in the revisionist intentions of the New Rhetoric.¹⁷ In his treatment of the divisions of rhetoric, Blair combines neoclassical assumptions with updated notions of what types of affective dynamics influence the composition and presentation of the major modes of public speaking. Blair approaches the "scenes" of oratory in terms of classical analogues, observing that "Eloquence of Popular Assemblies" involves both deliberative and demonstrative elements and that "Eloquence of the Bar" compares with the classical category of judicial rhetoric; however, "Eloquence of the Pulpit," a distinctly "modern" form of oratory, "cannot be properly reduced under any of the heads of the ancient Rhetoricians" (47). Blair's treatment of each form of oratory in terms of aim, audience, subject, method (arrangement), style, and delivery is distinctly neoclassical, yet his discussion also attends to the particular epistemological realities associated with the form and impact of oratorical composition. (Blair pays particular attention to the range of affective response involved in preparing the sermon.) Throughout his discussion of the major divisions, which is far more detailed in its treatment of characteristic features of oratory than is Campbell's, Blair consistently reiterates Ciceronian admonitions regarding the consideration of aim, audience, and occasion, while also stressing the strategic relevance of "natural" appeals to the mental faculties:¹⁸

In all kinds of Public Speaking, but especially in Popular Assemblies, it is a capital rule to attend to all the decorums of time, place, and character. No one should ever rise to speak in public, without forming to himself a just and strict ideal of what suits his own age, and character; what suits the subject, the hearers, the place, the occasion; and adjusting the whole train and manner of his speaking on this idea. All the ancients insist much on this. (58)

The end of all preaching is, to persuade men to become good. All persuasion . . . is founded on conviction. The understanding must

be applied to in the first place, in order to make a lasting impression on the heart: and he who would work on men's passions, or influence their practice, without first giving them just principles, and enlightening their minds, is no better than a mere declaimer." (105)

Blair's approach to the "conduct of a discourse" (arrangement) exemplifies a similar theoretical tendency to assert principles of classical doctrine in conjunction with the characteristic philosophical rationale of the New Rhetoric, a rationale that explains rhetorical strategies in terms of what best inspires the mind's natural inclinations to process ideas and feelings in terms of experience. In his discussion of arrangement, Blair offers a neoclassical definition of the parts of an oration as "the Exordium or Introduction; secondly, the State, and the Division of the Subject; thirdly, Narration, or Explication; fourthly, the Reasoning or Arguments, fifthly, the Pathetic part; and lastly, the Conclusion" (157). Just as Campbell reasserts classical elements of the canon of style on an epistemological foundation, so too Blair reiterates classical advice on oratorical structure in combination with observations regarding the parity between the aims of arrangement and effective impact on the faculties. To read Blair's discussion of the discrete functions of the parts of an oration is to encounter a host of traditional assumptions regarding arrangement: the function of the introduction is to gain the interest and favor of the audience and to introduce the significance of the subject; the function of the division (when appropriate) is to outline the method of discussion; the "Argumentative or reasoning Part of a Discourse" should be arranged with a concern for the hierarchical placement of material arguments and the "inconspicuous" placement of weak arguments (157-202).²⁰

Although Blair frequently cites "ancient" sources in his treatment of arrangement, he just as frequently supplements time-honored advice with comments directing the speaker's attention to the epistemological influences that must be considered when composing a speech. For example, in his approach to "the pathetic part of a discourse" Blair argues that when the aim of the orator is to persuade or move the will, the passions—"the great springs of human action"—must be moved or the dynamics of the

mind that induce action will not be engaged. In addressing exactly how the passions can be affected, Blair observes that the best rhetorical strategy for putting the hearer in a conducive frame of mind is vivid engagement of the emotions: "To every emotion or passion, Nature has adapted a set of corresponding objects; and without setting these before the mind, it is not in the power of the Orator to raise that emotion. . . . The foundation, therefore, of all successful execution in the way of Pathetic Oratory is, to paint the object of that passion which we wish to raise, in the most natural and striking manner; to describe it with such circumstances as are likely to awaken it in the minds of others" (192). In this description of the function of the pathetic part of an oration, Blair assigns a special role to the passions in inducing a sufficient recognition of experiential fact to provoke the will into action. By so doing, Blair underscores his treatment of this traditional element of oratorical structure with a philosophical attention to natural processes of mental activity—in this case an assumption of the essentially empirical basis of intellectual and emotional response.

Blair's theoretical interest in the natural is also revealed in the ways in which he revises standard treatments of style and delivery. Frequently reiterating the traditional principle that a consideration of audience and the constraints of occasion must influence all aspects of composition, Blair treats style primarily in terms of how the "author's manner of thinking" can be conveyed, stressing those qualities that enhance appeal to the mental faculties. Although there are significant parallels between Blair's discussion of the major qualities of style (perspicuity and ornament) and Campbell's treatment of perspicuity and figurative language, Blair reviews these features in terms of the aesthetic impact they create as well as in terms of how style ensures distinct impressions and comprehensible syntax.²¹ For example, Blair discusses perspicuity ("purity, propriety, and precision") in diction and sentence structure as a quality of style embodying "a sort of negative virtue, or freedom from defect." Blair regards clarity as an important principle of positive beauty. "We are pleased with an author, we consider him as deserving of praise, who frees us from all the fatigue of

searching for his meaning . . . whose style flows always like a limpid stream, where we see to the very bottom" (186).

Blair's conflation of an aesthetic view of rhetorical effects with a cognitive philosophy of language is obvious in his tendency to foreground the activities of the imagination and its sensitivity to the natural and the beautiful. The focus predisposes Blair's discussion of ornament and figurative language (lecture 13), in which he argues that just as hearers and readers are pleased by clarity, so too are they affected by the imagination's response to "Ornament," or the grace and beauty of sentence construction and the figures. Observing that uniformity in sentence length is tiresome, Blair points to the advantages of mixing the "style periodique" and the "style coupe" to derive an elegant style based on "variety and harmony," qualities that increase the attention of the imagination to language and ideas. In his recommendations for the use of these general styles and for the necessary character of sentence structure (204–73), Blair acknowledges the epistemological importance of comprehensibility (pe. spicity) but stresses the function of sentence arrangements that stimulate the mind's response to beauty: unity (the presence of a connecting principle: one object must reign and be predominant), strength (rendering a lively impression), and harmony (agreeableness to the ear). "The fundamental rule of the construction of Sentences, and into which all others must be resolved, undoubtedly is, to communicate, in the clearest and most natural order, the ideas which we mean to transfer into the minds of others. Every arrangement that does most justice to the sense, and expresses it to most advantage, strikes us as beautiful" (245). Arguing that the imagination "revolts" when sense is expressed in harsh and disagreeable sounds, Blair insists that sentence structure should strive to provide the pleasure of "melody" through words composed of "smooth and liquid sounds" and "musical" arrangement (248, 252). These suggestions do not in any way contradict traditional advice regarding the style of sentences; in fact, Blair's views on sentence construction reiterate the Aristotelian case for the value of periodic style and the importance of "rhythm" in composition (*Rhetoric* 3.8.). What makes Blair's treatment of stylistic issues distinctive is the way in which

he interprets traditional tenets from the perspective of both epistemological and belletristic doctrines.

Blair's discussion of figurative language reveals the degree to which the belles lettres rationale characteristically conflates classical features and epistemological and aesthetic perspectives. Classifying figures as either figures of passion or figures of imagination, Blair observes the distinction between figures of words and figures of thought, but he considers this traditional distinction less significant than the principle that "Figurative Language always imports some colouring of the imagination, or some emotion of passion, expressed in our Style" (276). Observing that figures should arise from the subject and be based on "solid thought and natural sentiment," Blair is primarily interested in making the point that figures intensify impressions of experience and thus affect the emotions and the imaginative responses that spur belief and action: "[A figure] sets mirrors before us, where we may behold objects, a second time, in their likeness. It entertains us, as with a succession of the most splendid pictures" (28). Essentially in agreement with Campbell that certain figures (metaphor, allegory, personification, apostrophe, comparison [simile], antithesis) are best suited to stimulate the associative processes of the faculties, Blair's more extensive discussion of these figures defers to classical views of style while focusing on the elevating effects of those tropes that convey ideas through similitude and resemblance. Citing classical sources on several aspects of ornament—including the appropriateness of "simple" figures when expressing dignified ideas, the importance of not mixing "kinds" of metaphor, and the function of "orationis lumina" (figures that add luster and beauty to discourse)—Blair incorporates classical precepts in a larger discussion explicitly concerned with the aesthetic function of the "capital" figures in stimulating the natural processes of the mind, an interest clearly displayed in his treatment of "Comparison":²²

The pleasure we take in comparisons is just and natural. We may remark three different sources whence it arises. First, from the pleasure which nature has annexed to that act of the mind by

which we compare any two objects together, trace resemblances among those that are different, and differences among those that resemble each other; a pleasure, the final cause of which is, to prompt us to remark and observe, and thereby to make us advance in useful knowledge. This operation of the mind is naturally and universally agreeable. . . . Secondly, the pleasure of Comparison arises from the illustration which the simile employed gives to the principal object; from the clearer view of it which it presents; or the more strong impression of it which it stamps upon the mind: and thirdly, It arises from the introduction of a new, and commonly a splendid object, associated to the principal one of which we treat; and from the agreeable picture which that object presents to the fancy; new scenes being thereby brought into view, which, without the assistance of this figure, we could not have enjoyed. (333-44)

Blair's discussion of style illustrates a prominent philosophical assumption of the New Rhetoric: the faculties of the mind are predisposed to process ideas in terms of resemblance and association. In addition to his articulation of the doctrine of taste and the unique role of rhetoric in its cultivation, one of Blair's major contributions to eighteenth-century rhetorical theory is his reconciliation of aesthetic response in terms of this basic epistemological assumption and his subsequent definition of the particular functions that rhetorical strategies—in this case, the use of figures—have in inciting the mind's natural reaction to pleasurable experience.

Blair's inclusion of delivery in his discussion of "general heads relating to Eloquence of Public Speaking" reiterates the theoretical and pragmatic relevance of this traditional canon to the general study of rhetoric and represents another instance in which neoclassical principles are reshaped by considerations of the philosophical and aesthetic imperatives of the natural. Blair's regard for the importance of the canon of delivery is clear: "it is intimately connected with what is, or ought to be, the end of all Public Speaking, Persuasion; and therefore deserves the study of the most grave and serious Speakers, as much as those, whose only aim is to

please" (204). Blair's definition of delivery as "the management of the voice and gesture" is reminiscent of classical and postclassical definitions of this canon, but his major interest is in recommending practices of delivery that increase the impression ideas and emotions make on others: judgments regarding delivery must be governed by taste as well as by a concern for what is natural and typical (*Ad Herennium* 3.11). Many of Blair's specific recommendations regarding delivery are drawn from Thomas Sheridan's *Lectures on Elocution* (1762) and reflect the interests of eighteenth-century elocutionary theorists who advocated a theory of delivery drawn from the study of the natural disposition of voice, expression, and gesture in ordinary conversation. Blair assumes, as did the leading elocutionists of his time, that this "natural manner" is far more effective in engaging the passions and the imagination than affectations and actions learned by rote and applied indiscriminately to any subject or any occasion: "the capital direction, which ought never to be forgotten, is to copy the proper tones for expressing every sentiment from those which Nature dictates to us, in conversation with others; to speak always with her voice; and not to form to ourselves a fantastic public manner, from an absurd fancy of its being more beautiful than a natural one" (220).²³

Blair's interest in delivery betrays epistemological and aesthetic values typical of the New Rhetoric's philosophical preoccupation with the realities of human nature; however, his reiteration of the constituents of delivery as management of the voice and of gesture and his acknowledgment of the usefulness of classical advice on this canon align his treatment of delivery with traditional approaches. As with his comments on arrangement, style, and the divisions of rhetoric, Blair's examination of the canon of delivery reiterates the significance of a systemic element of rhetorical theory and proclaims the major theoretical interest of the belles lettres rationale: a concern for how the varied dynamics of natural response to the beautiful affect the forms of language and the presentation of discourse.

The articulation of the doctrine of taste and the function of rhetoric and belles lettres in its cultivation constitute the major innovations in the *Lectures*; however, Blair's contribution to the New Rhetoric must also be

evaluated in terms of how the *Lectures* affirm traditional elements of the classical system. Just as Campbell's innovative redesign of the philosophical foundations of rhetoric relies on and makes use of a variety of classical precepts and assumptions, so too does Blair's particular effort to outline a critical theory of rhetoric conflate neoclassical elements and belletristic theoretical assumptions. Blair's *Lectures* extend the New Rhetoric's project of philosophical redress by reconciling rhetorical principles with an aesthetic view of affective response. In the pursuit of this aim, Blair outlines a theory of rhetoric that is both more synthetic and distinctly more systematic than Campbell's philosophical treatise. Blair's belletristic approach to rhetoric reviews and revises more classical elements of theory and outlines a discussion of the modes and processes of rhetoric that imitates the systematic and prescriptive approach of the neoclassical tradition. Nineteenth-century theory proved highly dependent on Blair's more inclusive revision of traditional elements of theory (arrangement, style, delivery, divisions of rhetoric) as well as on his belletristic rationale, which assumed the obligation of rhetoric to the cultivation of taste, the relevance of critical study to the acquisition of a complete rhetorical sensibility, and the extension of the range of rhetorical genres to include oral and written discourse. The nineteenth-century tradition would also be influenced dramatically by the ideological claims of belletristic philosophy. In the *Lectures* Blair popularizes the assumption that there is a cause-and-effect relationship between the cultivation of taste (through the study and practice of rhetoric) and the acquisition of intellectual, moral, and civil virtue. Although this position represents the general stance of the New Rhetoric, Blair is more explicit in his declaration of the implicit virtues conferred by the study of rhetoric because his formal epistemological-aesthetic interests direct more theoretical and pragmatic attention to how the faculties of taste and the imagination affect the development of higher thought and emotions. Subsequently, the case made in the *Lectures* for the liberal influence of the study and practice of rhetoric is more distinct. Nineteenth-century rhetorical theory and education relied not only on the belletristic and neoclassical theoretical elements featured in the scheme of Blair's treatise but also on the belletristic rationale

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that the *Lectures* advance: that the study of belles lettres and rhetoric supports the development of taste, intellectual ability, and moral virtue by defining how the principles of taste should be applied to the sense and form of conventional discourse.

Fundamental Assumptions of the New Rhetoric

The major treatises of the New Rhetoric award explicit attention to how affective constraints (characteristic functions of the faculties—the understanding, the passions, the imagination, and the will) govern the effects of discourse. While belletristic theory focuses on the aesthetic capacity of rhetoric to evoke tasteful responses, Blair's *Lectures* define the processes, forms, and effects of rhetorical practice in terms of the principles of human nature; thus, Blair's work parallels Campbell's effort to account for the philosophy of rhetoric. As the texts primarily responsible for popularizing the tenets of New Rhetoric, Campbell's *Philosophy of Rhetoric* and Blair's *Lectures* not only established the epistemological point of view as a normative foundation for rhetorical theory but also awarded a priori status to specific assumptions derived from this perspective: (1) The aims of rhetoric in general and of particular modes and techniques of rhetoric are linked necessarily to affective intentions. (2) Due to the philosophical veracity of its procedures and aims, the study of rhetoric can be understood as a science, that is, as an enterprise that reveals basic principles of nature (human nature). (3) Rhetorical discourse stands in a unique relationship with the faculty of taste; therefore, rhetoric must also be understood as an art, or a means of adapting critical principles to composition. (4) Through the study and practice of rhetoric, the faculty of taste can be cultivated, an education essential to the intellectual and moral health of individuals and of society in general.

For both Campbell and Blair, these imperatives served as a basis for the reevaluation of particular traditional assumptions and the reinscription of others. The most significant alteration to the traditional scope of rhetorical

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theory provoked by the rationales of the New Rhetoric was the extension of the domain of rhetoric to include all forms of belles lettres as well as the modes of public speaking. It is extremely important to an understanding of the integrity of the New Rhetoric to note that this restructuring of rhetorical praxis was prompted first and foremost by the implications of a basic philosophical position: the assumption that rhetorical theory and practice are agencies by which the nuances of reasoning and affective response can be verified. The dynamics of communication are implicit in the principles of human nature and vice versa; therefore, all forms of communication are philosophical endeavors implicated in and by their generic forms and subjects. From this point of view, which already presupposes the scientific and aesthetic importance of rhetoric as a body of revealed and revealing theory, all forms of communication are relevant to the study of the interrelationship between human nature and language. In *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* Campbell posits exactly this rationale for the range of rhetoric and implies by his attention to public speaking and frequent references to poetry and explanatory discourse that his view of the theoretical and pragmatic domain of rhetoric necessarily comprehends "the general rules of composition" in the "same medium, language" (xlix). Blair's *Lectures* outline what the general study of rhetoric involves: the critical and pragmatic study of all forms of discourse including public speaking, historical writing, philosophical writing, epistolary writing, fictitious history, dialogue, poetry, and drama. One way to understand the systematic impact of Blair and Campbell's extension of the range of rhetoric is to view this innovation as a substantial redefinition of the divisions component of rhetorical theory.

In addition to reformulating a working understanding of the types of discourse that the study of rhetoric must address, the New Rhetoricians also redefined the canon of invention. By redefining invention as the management of rhetorical evidence and the selection and arrangement of types of arguments, Campbell and Blair maintain a Ramistic view of rhetoric and logic as closely related but distinct disciplines; however, it is obvious in *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* that eighteenth-century reformulations of the

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circumstances influencing "the passions." Although the New Rhetoricians treated principles comparable to ethos and pathos, these appeals were considered qualities of discourse relevant to style and the selection of materials, not as inventional modes in and of themselves in the Aristotelian sense. Campbell and Blair stipulate that sensitivity to affective disposition and the presentation of an attractive character in the speaker facilitate emotional responses prerequisite to achieving persuasion, a rhetorical effect that depends on the engagement of the passions in the inducement of the will and the establishment of a general "communicative principle" that Campbell defines as sympathy (90-96). By treating "the consideration which the Speaker ought to have of the Hearers" and "the consideration which the Speaker ought to have of Himself" as inevitable considerations in persuasion, "the pathetic part" of discourse, and the effect of stylistic qualities such as vivacity and beauty, Blair and Campbell reiterate traditional wisdom regarding the necessity for an orator to convey sincerity, goodwill, and authority as well as to assess (and appeal to) the particular nature of the hearer's habit of mind.

Other standard features of the classical system such as the canons of style and delivery were subjected to revisions in the New Rhetoric, which redefined constituents of these canons in terms of particular epistemological or aesthetic functions. The New Rhetoricians' treatment of style addressed three major issues: perspicuity, vivacity, and ornament (beauty). Considering these aspects of style in terms of epistemological dynamics such as intelligibility and aesthetic appeal, Campbell and Blair collectively identify constituents of style that contribute most to appeals to the understanding (conviction) and the passions (persuasion): grammatical usage and syntax; clarity in diction, sentence structure, and sentence arrangement; rhetorical qualities of sentence arrangement (unity, strength, harmony); and the use of figures (metaphor, allegory, personification, apostrophe, comparison, simile, and antithesis) to create force and elegance. Blair's account of how delivery renders words fully significant by embodying natural sentiments in tones and gestures is similarly constrained by a pervasive interest in the organic principles of human nature. Typical of the New Rhetoric's

canon of invention were also the consequence of the philosophical context that directed the revisionist efforts of the New Rhetoric in general. The New Rhetoric proceeded on the assumption that conviction and persuasion are promoted only by the dynamic reactions of the faculties. Such reactions are compelled by an inherent predisposition to experience, consciousness of empirical and sensory experience, and "commonsense" intuitions regarding the association between new ideas and experience already accrued. Campbell observes that it is the function of rhetoric to identify the materials of rhetorical discourse and to "manage" the substance of arguments (evidence) in such a way as to convince the hearer that the matter presented is indicative of experience. Blair shares the view that it is not the function of rhetoric to "discover reasons" but rather to "manage those reasons with most advantage" (180). Blair gives no attention to what constitutes the "most advantage"; however, the compatibility of his position on invention with Campbell's can be inferred from the emphasis Blair places on the implicit worth of the orator's own "thorough knowledge of the subject, and profound meditation on it" as a source of arguments (182). Blair prefers the speaker's own experience and "consciousness" as an inventional source over the classical "commonplaces," which he regards as potentially useful but still an "artificial" source. Blair's position reveals another instance of the philosophical reverence for the natural that underlies the treatment of argumentative invention in the New Rhetoric. Rhetoric selects, shapes, and arranges the information that logic derives; the inventional force of the rhetorical process lies in the manner in which information is adapted to the hearer or reader's perception of what constitutes truth, which as Campbell points out, "consisteth in the conformity of our conceptions to their archetypes in the nature of things" (Campbell 35).

Between their two treatments of arguments, Campbell and Blair collectively formulate "the disposition and conduct of Arguments" as an inventional or managerial obligation dealing with the following issues: analytic and synthetic arrangement of arguments; arrangement of arguments according to topic and strength; the selection of argumentative proof or "moral evidence" derived from experience, analogy, and testimony; and

no discovery (Aristotle)
so logic & the natural response (Blair)

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recapitulation of traditional principles of theory within a changed philosophical framework, Blair's account of delivery as "the Language of Nature" reasserts its importance to the study of rhetoric while shifting theoretical and pragmatic attention to a consideration of the natural as a superordinate guide to effective practice.

It is important to observe the degree to which the New Rhetoric revised the traditional rhetorical system if we are to understand the extent to which the philosophical imperatives of the eighteenth century imposed on the definitions of rhetorical principles and praxis that emerged in the English tradition after 1750. However, it is equally important to note which classical presumptions and canonical features the New Rhetoric preserved. Several unaltered neo-Ciceronian elements figure prominently in the substance of the New Rhetoric: (1) the theoretical commonplace that effective rhetoric proceeds from a thorough understanding of purpose, subject, audience, and occasion; (2) the assumption that the study of theory, diligent practice, and imitation are a fundamental means of "improving in Eloquence"; (3) an attention to the activities or canonical nature of the rhetorical process (attention to the substance and form of arguments, the arrangement of discourse, style, and delivery); (4) theoretical and pragmatic attention to the nature and conduct of formal species of oratory; and (5) the classical view of rhetoric as crucial to individual development and cultural harmony. Such reinscription of classical precepts demonstrates the characteristic dependence of the New Rhetoric on a synthesis of traditional precepts and principles derived from a general epistemological rationale and/or a belletristic perspective.

Richard Whately and the Promotion of the Epistemological Rationale

In agreement with the general epistemology of Campbell and Blair's treatises, Richard Whately reiterates the governing philosophical rationale

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of the New Rhetoric in *Elements of Rhetoric* (1828), the only post-eighteenth-century British treatise equal to Campbell and Blair's works in the nineteenth-century tradition in North America. Whately contributed to the influence of the New Rhetoric by reasserting several of its crucial elements: (1) a concept of rhetoric as the art of writing and speaking; (2) a notion of the inventional function of rhetoric as the management of proofs (selection and arrangement of arguments); (3) the assumption that the rhetorical process follows from the investigative procedures of logic; (4) a theoretical approach to arguments that distinguishes between appeals to the understanding and appeals to the feelings, passions and the will; (5) a treatment of style that examines the major qualities of style—perspicuity, energy (vivacity) and elegance—in terms of appeals to the understanding and the feelings; (6) a treatment of delivery that emphasizes the "natural" method in management of the voice and gesture; and (7) an affirmation of the general relevance of classical theory to the modern study of rhetoric.²⁴

In addition to affirming the philosophical and canonical authority of major features of the Campbell-Blair system (features already bearing the mix of neoclassical elements with the distinctive rationales of the New Rhetoric), Whately also made a unique contribution to the development of rhetorical theory by supplementing and extending the implications of key theoretical principles. *Elements of Rhetoric* provides a more formal and detailed treatment of conviction (arguments to the understanding) and the arrangement of arguments and outlines a more systematic treatment of persuasion (influencing the will). These features of Whately's theory of rhetoric were incorporated into nineteenth-century treatises in conjunction with his general theoretical and pedagogical interest in the rhetoric of composition.²⁵

Intended to outline "A System of Rules for Argumentative Composition," Whately's text pretends neither to the philosophical depth of *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* nor to the critical and pragmatic scope of *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres*.²⁶ Concerned primarily with establishing a "regularity of system" in the procedures for the discovery and arrangement of arguments, Whately relies on the fundamental theoretical assumption

that rhetorical discourse makes unique demands on the understanding in the process of conviction, and on the imagination, the passions, and the will in the process of persuasion. Upholding Campbell's stipulation that conviction and persuasion have different ends and therefore require different means, Whately provides an extensive treatment of the classes of arguments suited to the aims of conviction: to give satisfaction to a candid mind; to convey instruction to those who are ready to receive it; and to compel the assent or silence the objections of an opponent (108). Whately's discussion of conviction focuses on two classes of arguments: a priori arguments, or arguments from cause to effect that establish fact, and a posteriori arguments, or arguments from sign, example, and testimony from which factual cause or condition can be deduced (33-52). Whately's account of the forms of moral evidence (experience, analogy, testimony) is both more systematic and more concerned with pedagogical application than is Campbell's; however, his treatment of conviction is not innovative, as its claims regarding rhetorical proof reiterate Campbell's explanation. Like Campbell, who stresses that the function of rhetorical proof is to establish the validity of an idea in terms of experience and common sense, Whately stresses that arguments must "convince" hearers and readers of the factual nature (verifiable by the senses) or probable nature (verifiable by judgment or common sense) of particular propositions. For Whately, who frequently cites his *Elements of Logic* as a reference in his discussion of conviction, the function of rhetorical proof is to identify and present those proofs or reasons that establish a particular proposition as logically sound.²⁷ What distinguishes this treatment of conviction is the degree of formalization that Whately confers on the theoretical descriptions of arguments from testimony and example, his unprecedented discussion of presumption and burden of proof as important considerations in the process of conviction, and his attention to the function and form of refutation in the conduct of arguments to the understanding (53-167). These innovations contributed significantly to nineteenth-century treatments of conviction and argumentation.

Campbell mainly concerns himself with identifying those types of evidence that ensure successful engagement of the deductive and associative

dynamics of the understanding; Whately is far more explicit regarding the logical formulations of what he defines as "Arguments from Signs" or arguments from testimony and example. Observing that argument from testimony is related mostly to jurisprudence, Whately observes two kinds of "Testimony" that can be used to support the truth of a premise: testimony regarding "matters of fact," in which a witness testifies to matters verified by the senses, and testimony regarding "matters of opinion," in which a witness offers a judgment based on common sense or deduction. As a form of argument from signs, testimony convinces by presenting evidence of an effect from which a cause or condition can be inferred. The hearer's willingness to accept the evidence of testimony as "signs" supporting the asserted proposition can be affected by certain variables: the intellectual character of the witness ("credulity" and "incredulity"), the number of witnesses speaking to the weight of the evidence, the degree to which the testimony appears to be "undesigned" or free from fabrication, adequate evidence on "very minute points" of the argument, uncontradicted negative testimony, and the presentation of "concurrent" testimonies that establish the same conclusion (58-76). Whately presupposes rather than explicitly attends to the epistemological realities governing the process of conviction and the requisite nature of rhetorical proof; nevertheless, his guidelines for the design of appeals to the understanding clearly reflect the philosophical assumptions regarding the workings of the mind so fundamental to the revisionist project of the New Rhetoric. In his treatment of arguments from example (another form of arguments from sign), Whately makes the point that such arguments rely on the power of inference, or the tendency of the understanding to extrapolate a generalization from a "fair example" of a class (86): "The third kind of Arguments to be considered . . . may be treated under the general name of Example; taking that term in its widest acceptation, so as to comprehend the Arguments designated by the various names of Induction, Experience, Analogy, Parity of Reasoning, &c., all of which are essentially the same" (85-86). The argument from example is successful only to the degree that the analogic connections claimed appear reasonable to the common sense of the hearers. Whether attempting to

convince using arguments establishing a "parallel case" or simply attempting to explain or make an idea more clearly understood ("illustration"), the rhetorician making use of arguments from example must be able to construct cases that substantiate the point in question by appealing to the hearer's empirical sense of what is "probable in terms of the constraints of experience or resemblance" (85-95).²⁸

Under the heading "Of the various use and order of the several kinds of Propositions and of Arguments in different cases," Whately also offers advice regarding the selection and order of arguments in terms of different epistemological aims. He observes that a priori arguments (from cause to effect) are best suited when "instruction" (explanation) is the aim, whereas arguments from sign (testimony and example) are best used when it is necessary to silence the objections of an opponent through refutation. Claiming that arguments from analogy are "unanswerable," Whately points out that arguments from sign provide the most weight in "controversy" and that the use and order of such arguments must be assessed in terms of "presumption and burden of proof" (108-12). Whately's discussion of presumption and burden of proof provides an insight into exactly what factors of experience and common sense influence recognition of the true and the probable. Defining presumption as "a pre-occupation of ground" that stands "till sufficient reason is adduced against it," Whately points out that a proper analysis of which side of an argument holds the presumption and which side has the challenge of "burden of proof" is a determination that can affect the whole character of the discussion. Presumption, by far the strongest argument to make use of in conviction, lies with "every existing institution" and against "anything paradoxical, i.e. contrary to the prevailing opinion." To make use of presumption is to co-opt the "deference" or authority that listeners generally accord to matters carrying presumption; deference is crucial to perception of the truth and will not be secured in matters of fact or of opinion if the authority of presumption is denied (114-15). Presumption may be rebutted by posting an opposite presumption, shifting the burden of proof to the other side: "the identification of another presumption that rebuts the former one necessarily entails

an analysis of prevailing opinion and general conventional notions of fact" (124-25).

Whately explains that refutatory arguments also may be used to assert unpopular or paradoxical truths or to combat "deeply-rooted prejudices." Treating refutation as a standard part of the conduct of an argument, Whately identifies two modes of refutation: proving the contradictory nature of the opposing proposition and overturning the arguments on which the opposing proposition relies. Refutation can be lodged by the "direct method," the denial of the premises or reasons of the opposing proposition, or by the "indirect method," objecting to the conclusiveness of the reasoning (149). Just as in the consideration of the substance of arguments from cause and effect and sign, the logic of refutatory argument draws directly on affective predisposition: "It is generally the wisest course . . . not only to employ such arguments as are directly accessible to the persons addressed, but to confine oneself to these, lest the attention should be drawn off from them" (166).

Whately's discussion of the arrangement of arguments attends only to conviction and offers advice based on conventional philosophical assumptions regarding how the understanding functions. Whately insists that the progressive method of argumentation, "beginning with the more general remarks, and gradually narrowing as it were, the circle, till the particular point in question was reached," is the most effective means of engaging the hearers' attention and positive response as "the interest is the better kept up by advancing successively from the more to the less general" (144). Whately recommends that the strongest arguments, those from cause to effect, take precedence in arrangement because they prepare the way for the receptions of other arguments (arguments from sign) by establishing or refuting factual conditions in terms of the "natural" and the "plausible" (137). The ordering of premises and conclusion (the proposition to be established) also must be based on how the attention of the understanding is best engaged and on presumptive or deferential factors that might influence the hearers. When the conclusion is well established, the opinion or proposition can be stated initially and followed by the proofs or reasons. If

the conclusion is not well established, Whately recommends that it is better to state the proofs first, or at least some of them, and then introduce the conclusion, "thus assuming in some degree the character of an investigator":

When the Conclusion to be established is one likely to hurt the feelings and offend the prejudices of the hearer, it is essential to keep out of sight, as much as possible, the point to which we are tending, till the principles from which it is to be deduced shall have been clearly established; because men listen with prejudice, if at all, to arguments that are avowedly leading to a conclusion which they are indisposed to admit; whereas if we thus, as it were, mask the battery, they will not be able to shelter themselves from the discharge. (142)

Whately's treatment of the arrangement of arguments reiterates Blair's general advice regarding the arrangement of arguments according to strength and the effectiveness of conducting an argument to the understanding by proceeding step by step toward a full statement of the proposition, thus proving it "by instalments" (the "progressive" method).²⁹ Whately's formal discussion of the order of premises and conclusions in the structure of an argument provides guidance not provided by either Campbell or Blair. Similarly, the attention Whately pays to the placement and nature of refutation in arrangement reintroduces a classical feature of argument not treated previously in the New Rhetoric. While Whately's treatment of arrangement affirms the status of issues such as the merits of the *progressive method* and the doctrine of *caeteris paribus*, his discussion of the preferred order of argumentative materials, like his treatment of the nature of arguments, is more comprehensive and more formal than either Campbell's comparatively vague coverage or Blair's extremely brief explanation. The popularity of Whately's theory of arrangement in the nineteenth-century tradition was no doubt partially a consequence of its essential compatibility with Blair's widely imitated approach to this canon but must also be traced to the fact that it is more detailed and more systematic than either Blair's or Campbell's.³⁰

Whately's approach to conviction contributed very specific elements to the theoretical substance of the canon of invention reconstructed by Campbell and Blair as the process of managing argumentative materials: a distinction between classes of arguments, the different ends and uses of arguments directed to the understanding, the imperatives of presumption and burden of proof, the nature and function of refutation, and the structure of proposition and premises. Following the example of Campbell and Blair, who treat the conduct of discourse with the arrangement of argumentative materials, thus collapsing the traditional distinction between *inventio* and *dispositio*, Whately treats the matter of the distinctive structural units of argument as a topic related to the arrangement or "order" of the argument. Breaking with Blair, who reiterates the traditional six-part structure for discourse, Whately restricts his discussion of arrangement to an explication of the function of introductions and conclusions in the conduct of argument. Whately presupposes that the type and combination of arguments used imposes order on the argumentative material that falls between the introduction and the conclusion. While Whately's advice regarding conclusions parallels Blair's in its attention to the problems of conclusions that stop suddenly or go on too long, his discussion of introductions offers yet another systematic innovation that would become a standard feature of subsequent nineteenth-century theory.³¹ Citing his agreement with Aristotle that formal introductions are not always necessary, Whately argues that it is necessary "to premise something before we enter on the main argument" (168), using formal introductions, "prefaces," "advertisements," or "titles." Whately argues that particular types of introductions are designed for specific purposes in conviction: the *introduction inquisitive* establishes why the subject is significant; the *introduction paradoxical* establishes the validity of a point despite its seeming improbability; the *introduction corrective* clarifies that the subject at issue has been neglected or misunderstood; the *introduction preparatory* explains some peculiarity in the mode of reasoning to be adopted; and the *introduction narrative* provides necessary background description for the reader or hearer (170-71). Whately's designation of this range of introductory forms gives more systematic attention to the structure

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of argument and also extends the range of the canon of arrangement by focusing specific attention on its function in discourses intended to be read. Despite the fact that Whately's approach is less traditional in its attention to Ciceronian structure, his discussion of the introduction in terms of a wider range of formats and varied intentions of arguments proved highly influential on nineteenth-century theory, particularly on rhetorics that treated the forms of conviction (explanation, instruction, the gaining of assent) as major modes of composition.

In addition to his innovative treatment of arrangement, Whately's definition of the major classes of arguments and his outline of how the substance of such arguments should be arranged were widely adopted by nineteenth-century theorists. Whately's "system of rules" for argumentative composition was reiterated by every major nineteenth-century treatise that discussed conviction as a major rhetorical process; these rules were particularly popular with rhetoricians who treated invention. Other components incorporated into nineteenth-century theory included Whately's treatments of persuasion and style. Whately's approach to these standard elements of the New Rhetoric remains compatible with Campbell and Blair's pronouncements but tends, as is the general disposition of his method, to "systematize" these theoretical issues in a pedagogically useful manner. Overall, Whately's discussion of persuasion reinforces the normative status of central assumptions of Campbell and Blair's accounts of how to address the will: (1) Whately treats ethos and pathos as issues bearing directly on address to the feelings, or persuasion, and provides detailed discussion of strategies for "raising a favorable impression" and adjusting eloquence "for whom it is intended" (215-25); and (2) he defines description and comparison in terms of the specific functions that such rhetorical modes have on exciting the feelings. This approach restates Campbell and Blair's shared premise that description ("copious" detail and expansion) facilitates the formation of vivid and distinct ideas, whereas comparison heightens emotion by presenting "a parallel between the case in hand and some other that is calculated to call forth . . . emotions" (197). Whately's treatment

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of persuasion as the art of influencing the will reiterates Campbell's discussion of "circumstances influencing the passions"; however, Whately confers a more systematic outline on his discussion of "Address to the Feelings" by defining two major parts of persuasion—conviction and exhortation—and by providing an explicit list of the "Active Principles" of human nature that affect the feelings: "Affections, Desires, Self-love, and the Moral faculty" (184-88). Whately's assumption that persuasion involves appeals to the understanding and the passions is entirely consistent with the stance of the New Rhetoric; however, his emphatic distinction between the "intellectual faculties" (addressed through conviction) and the emotional faculties, or "Feelings, Propensities, Sentiments" (addressed "indirectly" through rhetorical forms), categorizes epistemological circumstances and rhetorical aims more formally than either Campbell or Blair's discussions of the psychological-rhetorical foundations of conviction and persuasion. This systematic categorization would prove the most popular framework for treatments of "address to the will" (persuasion) in nineteenth-century treatises.

Like his treatment of persuasion, Whately's approach to style reinforces standard features of the New Rhetoric. Whately's treatment of style combines epistemological and belletristic principles in a condensed equivalent of Campbell and Blair's treatments of this canon. Offering nothing unique in his treatment of the features of this canon (choice of words, their number, their arrangement), Whately draws heavily on the New Rhetoric in his definition of perspicuity, energy (his term for vivacity), and elegance as the major qualities of style (274-329). Whately's discussion of style is most conspicuously indebted to Campbell's treatment of vivacity, paying only passing attention to elegance on the assumption that the rules laid down for energy "conduce" as well to beauty. Whately's use of the term *energy* and his more systematic discussion of how to achieve this quality proved more popular in nineteenth-century theory than did Campbell's original treatment of vivacity. Whately's version of the triad perspicuity, energy, and elegance was widely adopted as a framework for the general

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qualities of style, although nineteenth-century treatises tended to offer a standard Blairian treatment of elegance rather than imitate Whately's nominal treatment of beauty.³²

Whately's influence on the nineteenth-century tradition becomes noticeable at midcentury, whereas the influence of Campbell and Blair on the structure and content of rhetorical treatises in North America is obvious as early as the 1820s. Blair's *Lectures* and Whately's *Elements* served as the material for numbers of treatises outlining abbreviated versions of these theories; even more frequently, nineteenth-century theories combined systematic elements of Blair and Whately's theories with Campbell's philosophical doctrine, thus depending on the authority of all three works. The combined impact of Campbell, Blair, and Whately set powerful theoretical precedents for the nineteenth-century tradition, precedents that ensured the longevity of the philosophical assumptions of the New Rhetoric. The nineteenth-century tradition in North America relied substantially on the unique epistemological and belletristic rationales of the New Rhetoric and promoted these theoretical rationales as well as the neoclassical and innovative features of the late eighteenth-century British tradition.

Nineteenth-century theory incorporated all of the key assumptions of the epistemological rationale of the New Rhetoric:

1. The procedures and forms of rhetoric are compatible with the principal channels of perception and action in the mind (the faculties), which function as a consequence of associative relations drawn from experience and common sense.
2. Rhetorical proofs, arrangement, and style must embody associative relations (resemblance, contiguity, causality) in order to engage the faculties of the mind in their discrete and interactive functions.
3. Intelligibility, liveliness of ideas, and intensity of emotional impressions are rhetorical effects that engage the attention of the faculties in identifying tangible referents and experiences and deducing links between new information and sensory detail and knowledge already held. Certain rhetorical forms and techniques facilitate these effects in appealing to the understanding and the passions:

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epistemology
(the grand)

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- rhetorical proofs drawn on experience, analogy, or testimony
- persuasive appeals to the passions drawn on probability, plausibility, circumstances of time and place, relation of the subject to the hearer, and interest of the hearer in the subject
- the use of description, comparison, and narration
- arrangement of arguments
- grammatical purity
- qualities of perspicuity, vivacity (energy), and elegance (the sublime and the beautiful)
- the use of associative figures such as metaphor, simile, analogy, etc.
- comprehensibility in delivery and the use of "natural" gestures

Indebted primarily to Blair's theory of taste, nineteenth-century rhetoric also incorporated the fundamental principals of the eighteenth-century doctrine of taste:

1. Taste, an innate response to the beautiful, is one of the intellectual powers. It embodies a response to harmony, to elegance, and the sublime that facilitates the function of the understanding and the imagination. The cultivation of taste is synonymous with the development of intellectual virtue and moral character.
 2. Taste, an improvable faculty, is directly affected by the study of rhetoric, which provides an education in the nature and effects of those principles of discourse that embody the qualities of taste.
 3. The rhetorical process is obligated to taste insofar as the form and substance of rhetoric must please the imagination or move the passions to higher emotion. These epistemological effects aid the understanding and prompt the will. Particular modes of rhetorical discourse and certain styles incorporate principles of taste and facilitate the powers of the imagination:
- rhetorical subject matter or genres attending to the "sublime" (the grand) in natural or moral objects (sentiments)
 - descriptive style drawn from simplicity and conciseness
 - boldness and variety in style drawn on the use of associative figures and ornament

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epistemology -
new't these
part of
not just
science of
mind

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- rhetorical subject matter or genres attending to the beautiful in natural and moral objects (sentiments)
- imitation and description in style that attends to color, figure, and motion
- rhetorical subject matter or genres attending to novelty
- perspicuity and ornament in style

The classical rationale of the New Rhetoric affirmed neoclassical definitions and features that were incorporated into the nineteenth-century tradition:

1. The study and practice of rhetoric benefits the individual and society.
2. Rhetoric involves the adaptation of discourse to aim, audience, and occasion.
3. Rhetoric is the counterpart of logic.
4. The study of rhetorical principles, practice, and imitation are the fundamental means of improving in rhetoric. *(Collier)*
5. The processes of rhetoric are invention, arrangement, style, and delivery.

The major systematic features of the New Rhetoric became standard features in nineteenth-century theory:

1. A definition of rhetoric as the art by which discourse is adapted to its aim.
2. Definitions of the aims of rhetoric: to enlighten the understanding, please the imagination, move the passions, influence the will.
3. Scope of rhetoric: oral and written discourse.
4. Divisions of rhetoric: oratory (the bar, the pulpit, public speaking) and composition (historical writing, philosophical writing, epistolary writing, fiction, poetry, and drama).
5. Invention: selection and management of proofs
—Address to the understanding (conviction): types of rhetorical proof (experience, analogy, testimony, cause to effect) which appeal to the understanding; presumption and burden of proof; refutation

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- Arrangement of arguments according to progressive strength, induction and deduction, amplification of particulars
- Address to the feelings or exhortation (persuasion): types of appeal to the passions (subsequently the will), probability, plausibility, circumstances of the hearers (pathos), and impression of the speaker (ethos).
- 6. Conduct of the discourse (arrangement): introduction (inquisitive, paradoxical, corrective, preparatory, narrative), division of subject, narration, reasoning or argument, the pathetic part, conclusion.
- 7. Style: grammatical qualities (purity in usage and syntax); rhetorical qualities: perspicuity in diction, sentence structure, and sentence arrangement; vivacity (energy) and beauty (with regard to the use of metaphor, allegory, personification, apostrophe, comparison, simile, antithesis).
- 8. Delivery: management of the voice (volume, articulation, pace, pronunciation, emphasis, pause, and tone); management of gesture and expression.

*Campbell - philosophy - mind emphasis
& nature of mind (heard)*

Blair - aesthetic - teacher → civic

Whately - Systematic, pedagogical