Who Rules the City?
How Growth Coalition Elites Believe they Influence Decision-Making

by

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ABSTRACT

This study explores the cultural and structural processes through which urban elites seek to control the destiny of an American city. I first provide a sketch of how growth coalition elites come to understand power in the community and how they believe they influence decision-making. Understandings and beliefs are decidedly cultural realms. In this study, culture is defined as situated or positional knowledge, in that what becomes knowledge is determined by the position actors occupy in the social structure. To rule the city, what must be won are not just proposals and programs, but the city itself, as a cognitive structure. Which positional culture of the city will prevail? Which is prevailing, and why? Second, I link this cultural account to a structural account of how elites rule, drawing on social network analysis techniques in order to bring to the fore the ties of influence that work to weave together the city’s various apparatuses of control. Ultimately, these two themes seek to establish the relationship between elite network arrangements and their positional cultures that together condition action, and are conditioned by action. The challenge in this paper, then, is to weave together cultural and structural methods to provide an answer to the questions: Who rules the city? How do they rule? And, how do growth coalition elites believe they influence decision-making? To carry out this study, 95 interviews were conducted with community elites that were identified through interorganizational affiliation and prestige networks of a city with a population of over 500,000 people. Respondents were asked to comment on their involvements in the city as well as identify their associates and affiliations in the city.
Table of Contents

List of Tables ................................................................................................................................................ v
List of Figures .................................................................................................................................................. vii

I. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 1
   1.1 BACKGROUND—Urban Networks and Urban Cultures ...................................................................... 1
   1.2 Problem Definition: The Community Power Structure & Urban Political Economy ...................... 5
   1.3 General Assumptions and Scope ........................................................................................................ 7
   1.4 Research Objectives ............................................................................................................................. 10
   1.5 Dissertation Overview ....................................................................................................................... 12

II. Theoretical Framework: A Cultural and Network Approach to Urban Political Economy ..................... 13
   2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 13
   2.2 William Sewell’s “Theory of Structure” ............................................................................................... 15
   2.3 Community as a Growth Coalition ....................................................................................................... 21
   2.4 Community as a Cognitive Structure .................................................................................................. 23
   2.5 Growth Machine and the Politics of Resource Distribution ............................................................... 28
   2.6 Challenges to the Growth Coalition .................................................................................................... 30
   2.7 The Local Growth Coalition in Global Context .................................................................................. 33
   2.8 Competing Theoretical Approaches to Urban Studies ......................................................................... 37
   2.10 Network Approach to Defining Community Elites ........................................................................... 41
   2.11 Network Approaches to Locating Elites ............................................................................................. 51
   2.12 Summary ............................................................................................................................................. 65

III. Method: Network Approaches to Studying Community Elites ................................................................. 66
   3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 66
   3.2 The Community ................................................................................................................................... 66
   3.3 Construction of an Affiliation (Positional) Network—Directories and Other Data Sources ............. 68
   3.4 Analysis of Community Affiliation Network Data ............................................................................. 70
      3.4.1 The general structure .................................................................................................................... 72
      3.4.2 Connectedness (reachability) and cohesive subgroups ................................................................. 74
      3.4.3 Measuring centrality—degree ....................................................................................................... 79
      3.4.4 Measuring centrality—closeness .................................................................................................. 82
      3.4.5 Measuring centrality—betweenness ........................................................................................... 83
      3.4.6 Comparing centrality measures .................................................................................................. 85
      3.4.7 Procedural issues with affiliation networks .................................................................................. 90
   3.5 Contacting the Elite ............................................................................................................................... 93
      3.5.1 Contacting the original 100 ........................................................................................................... 93
      3.5.2 The interview instrument ............................................................................................................. 96
      3.6 Measuring Prestige: The Reputational Method and Procedural Issues ........................................... 97
   3.7 Summary ............................................................................................................................................. 102

IV. Comparisons of the Community Affiliation Network, Respondent Affiliation Network, & Prestige Network .......................................................................................................................... 105
   4.1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 105
   4.2 The Community Affiliation (CA) Network ......................................................................................... 107
   4.3 The Respondent Affiliation (RA) Network .......................................................................................... 114
V. Elite Community Issues ................................................................. 142

5.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 142
5.2 THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF ISSUES .................................. 142
5.3 ASKING THE QUESTION AND ANALYZING IT ............................. 145
5.4 THE ISSUES ................................................................................ 148
  5.4.1 Economic development issue ................................................... 150
  5.4.2 Water issues ........................................................................... 154
  5.4.3 Education issue ...................................................................... 158
  5.4.4 Healthcare issue ................................................................. 165
  5.4.5 Socially disadvantaged issue ................................................. 166
  5.4.6 Crime issue ........................................................................... 169
5.5 SUMMARY .................................................................................... 173

VI. Issue Networks and Community Context ....................................... 180

6.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 180
6.2 INDIVIDUAL & ORGANIZATIONS OR JUST ORGANIZATIONS ....... 182
6.3 COMPARISONS OF ISSUE NETWORKS ......................................... 200
  6.3.1 Density ................................................................................ 202
  6.3.2 Degree ................................................................................ 203
  6.3.3 Sub-networks ......................................................................... 211
  6.3.4 K-core ................................................................................ 213
  6.3.5 Cutpoints & bi-components ................................................... 221
  6.3.6 Center and periphery—closeness and betweenness .................. 224
    6.3.6.1 Closeness ..................................................................... 224
    6.3.6.2 Betweenness ............................................................... 227
  6.3.7 Issue networks interpretation ................................................. 234
6.4 ISSUE NETWORKS AND AFFILIATION NETWORKS ......................... 236
  6.4.1 Density ................................................................................ 237
  6.4.2 Degree centralization ............................................................ 237
  6.4.3 Cohesive subgroups .............................................................. 242
  6.4.4 K-Cores .............................................................................. 244
  6.4.5 Cutpoints & bi-components ................................................... 248
  6.4.6 Center and Periphery—Closeness and Betweenness ............... 250
    6.4.6.1 Closeness ..................................................................... 250
    6.4.6.2 Betweenness ............................................................... 252
  6.4.7 Issue networks and affiliation networks interpretation ............. 253
6.5 SUMMARY ..................................................................................... 255

VII. Networks of Action: Networks as Resources and Schemas .................. 261

7.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 261
7.2 NETWORKS OF ACTION: NETWORKS AS RESOURCES AND SCHEMAS .................................................................................................................. 262
7.3 APPLYING THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: COMMUNITY ELITE’S COGNITIVE APPROACHES TO COMMUNITY ACTION ................................................. 266
  7.3.1 Peripheral and central community elites .................................. 268
  7.3.2 Macro-level cultural schemas ............................................... 275
  7.3.3 Economic resources schema .................................................. 277
  7.3.4 Political resources schemas .................................................... 281
    7.3.4.1 Political resource: Accessible elected officials schema ...... 281
List of Tables

Table 1. Summary of study populations of reviewed methodologies........................................62
Table 2. Partial display of Community Affiliation (CA) network’s cohesive subgroups. ...77
Table 3. Correlations of centrality indices for largest cohesive subgroup (N=4,604). ........86
Table 4. Centrality indexes and ranks for individuals. ..........................................................89
Table 5. Community Affiliation (CA) network (individuals) analyses.................................108
Table 6. Respondent Affiliation (RA) network (individuals) analyses..............................123
Table 7. Community Affiliation (CA) network and Respondent Affiliation (RA) network analyses................................................................................................................126
Table 8. Top 100 from the Community Affiliation (CA) network largest component. ....130
Table 9. Number of community members by prestige score (indegree).............................132
Table 10. Prestige network..................................................................................................133
Table 11. Comparison of top 100 of Community Affiliation (CA) network with Prestige network and interviews complete. .................................................................135
Table 12. Affiliation list represented in the Prestige network .............................................136
Table 13. Ranking by respondents of partial list of issues. .................................................149
Table 14. Coded responses to the community issues questions into 16 community issues. After each issue is the number of respondents that identified the issue in parentheses. (Items in bold are discussed in the text of this chapter). ..........................149
Table 15. Economic development schemas. ........................................................................151
Table 16. Water schemas. ..................................................................................................155
Table 17. Education schemas. ............................................................................................159
Table 18. Density and degree measures for issue network. ..............................................204
Table 19. Sub-networks in issue networks...........................................................................213
Table 20. K-core measure for issue network ......................................................................214
Table 21. Cutpoints and bi-components for issue networks. ............................................221
Table 22. Issue network centralization measures..................................................................225
Table 23. Organizations incident with all four issues, displaying closeness scores and relative ranking in parentheses..................................................................................226
Table 24. Issue networks betweenness centralization and centralization index ranges. ...............................................................................................................................228
Table 25. Top 10 organization degree scores for the issue, Community Affiliation, and Respondent Affiliation networks. .................................................................241
Table 26. Organizational centrality measures for issue, Community Affiliation, and Respondent Affiliation networks. .................................................................242
Table 27. Component measures for issue, Community Affiliation, and Respondent Affiliation networks..........................................................................................244
Table 28. K-core measures for issue, Community Affiliation, and Respondent Affiliation networks........................................................................................................245
Table 29. Community Affiliation, and Respondent Affiliation networks highest core organizations in common. .......................................................................................248
Table 30. Cutpoints for issue, Community Affiliation, and Respondent Affiliation networks. ..................................................................................................................................................249
Table 31. Organizations by network closeness centrality scores (ranking on network in parentheses). ........................................................................................................................................................................251
Table 32. Closeness and betweenness centrality scores for issue, Community Affiliation, and Respondent Affiliation networks. ........................................................................................................................................................................253
Table 33. Prestige network k-cores and number of respondents in each. ........................................................................................................................................................................270
Table 34. Low and high prestige respondents and their type of organizational affiliation. ........................................................................................................................................................................272
Table 35. List of business organizations and number of references by 14 respondents. ........................................................................................................................................................................312
Table 36. Respondent power broker/business schemas........................................................................................................................................................................322
Table 37. Structural processes: Political leadership models. ........................................................................................................................................................................326
Table 38. Matrix Format of Hypothetical Affiliation Dataset. ........................................................................................................................................................................365
List of Figures

Figure 1. Cohesive subgroup of 55 individuals.................................................................78
Figure 2. Star and circle networks.....................................................................................79
Figure 3. Cohesive subgroup of 55 individuals (k-cores in parentheses)............................110
Figure 4. Nesting of k-cores for cohesive subgroup of 55 individuals...............................110
Figure 5. Removal of v3 from cohesive subgroup of 55 actors............................................113
Figure 6. Removal of v25 from cohesive subgroup of 55 actors.........................................113
Figure 7. Respondent Affiliation (RA) network of individuals..............................................118
Figure 8. Highest core (21-Core) for Respondent Affiliation (RA) network (N = 35)...........121
Figure 9. Cutpoints and bi-components for Respondent Affiliation (RA) network (N = 95). .........................................................................................................................124
Figure 10. Prestige scores for community members.............................................................132
Figure 11. Reproduction of Laumann et al.’s Figure 1 (1985, p. 3). “Schematic Diagram of causal relations in a Model for National Policy Domains.” ........................................145
Figure 12. Water politics revolve around water scarcity for economic growth, tribal users, agricultural users, and the ability of these groups to influence the management of water resources.................................................................156
Figure 13. Public education’s relationship to civil society, the reduction in crime, economic development, and the need for its reform..........................................................165
Figure 14. Interrelationship of issues....................................................................................176
Figure 15. Education network of both individuals and organizations (EDU IO network). .................................................................................................................................191
Figure 16. Education network of organizations only (EDU ORG network). .........................192
Figure 17. Economic development network of both individuals and organizations (ED IO network)................................................................................................................193
Figure 18. Economic development network of organizations only (ED ORG network). ....194
Figure 19. Comparison of betweenness scores in original network data of individuals and organizations (ED IO network) and reduced network of organizations only (ED ORG network) for the economic development issue.........................................................198
Figure 20. Water issue network by degree............................................................................206
Figure 21. Healthcare issue network by degree....................................................................207
Figure 22. Degree centralization of direct ties to economic development network for non-local Development Corporation.................................................................209
Figure 23. Degree centralization of direct ties to economic development network for Development Corporation’s PR Firm........................................................................210
Figure 24. Economic development 6-core (N = 15). ..........................................................217
Figure 25. Education 4-core (N = 19). .............................................................................218
Figure 26. Water network. Organizations marked with a “3” or a “2” indicates higher dense clusters. All organizations not marked by a number have a core of 1. ................219
Figure 27. Healthcare network. Organizations marked with a “2” are in the 2-core. All other organizations are in a 1-core.................................................................220
Figure 28. Healthcare betweenness centralization network ........................................ 230
Figure 29. Economic development betweenness centralization network .................. 231
Figure 30. Education betweenness centralization network ...................................... 232
Figure 31. Water betweenness centralization network ........................................... 233
Figure 32. Community Affiliation (CA) network 10-core (N = 27 organizations) .......... 246
Figure 33. Structure of community action. ................................................................. 277
Figure 34. Composite of respondent power broker/business schemas ...................... 323
Figure 35. Community action, situated knowledge (schemas), and resources (networks). ............................................................................................................................................. 335
Figure 36. Theoretical framework: Creating social order through meso- and micro-level interaction systems ........................................................................................................................................ 344
Figure 37. Theoretical framework: Creating social order through meso- and micro-level interaction systems ........................................................................................................................................ 351
Figure 38. Hypothetical Affiliation Dataset Formatted for Pajek ............................... 365
I. Introduction

1.1 Background—Urban Networks and Urban Cultures

Charles Tilly (1974) characterizes the city as a node in a network. He states, “strictly speaking,” the city is “the location of nodes in a great many networks” (1974, p. 5). He adds that the centrality of the city is “one of the main reasons for singling out cities for special study, as well as one of the main obstacles to their study” (1974, p. 5). Ultimately, he argues, “Decisions about cities some few men are making now will shape the lives of millions of other people” (1974, p. 6). The centrality of the city in socially networked space, in geographical space, in terms of increasing influence over the lives of more and more of humanity, and the concentration of decision-making power in the hands of only a relatively small number of individuals, makes cities crucial places to study.

This study approaches the city, the urban community, as a contested, dynamic, and unfolding arena over its controlling mechanisms (including the legal system, the political system, public education, the built environment, cultural institutions, as well as the increasing control over our private lives) and its economic capacities. The city is shaped by deliberate attempts by contesting interest groups to exert control over its form. Understanding the form the city takes, the influence it has over its citizens, requires uncovering what is behind the “structures” (networks of influence) and “superstructures” (cultural forms/ideologies) that seek to normalize these apparatuses of control and expand the economic realm. To state all of this more directly, this study seeks to establish (1) a
political economy of the city that takes as vital the (2) nexus of influential actors (interorganizational and prestigious elites) that (3) produces, and is reproduced by, a schematic structure of the virtues of growth. This structuring of the community through net-work that is fundamentally cultural (a way of thinking and being), by those endowed with the greater resources and the desire to engage in the structuring process (i.e., the urban elite), direct their ambition outwardly into the community to bring into alignment the various mechanisms of control (the local and regional political apparatus, as well as civil society) to advance the priority of economic growth as cultural hegemony.

To understand this community structuring process of urban community elites, this study draws significantly on the theoretical works of Molotch (1976; 1993), Molotch and Logan (1984) and Logan and Molotch (1987) and their growth coalition theory, as well as the cultural and structural work of Sewell (1992). But first, to help elaborate on the cultural significance of network structures, this study begins with some of the precepts of Stephan Fuchs’s (2001) cultural theory of society.

For Fuchs, a sociology of culture is unlike, what he calls the faddish cultural sociology that resembles postmodernism and deconstructionism. Instead, “the sociology of culture is … a comparative and explanatory theory of differences between observes” (2001, p. 1). Fuchs adds that “Observers are positioned in a culture; they are ‘cultured’ observes” and “What they see, and do not see, depends on where they are located in the networks of society and culture” (2001, pp. 1-2). For Fuchs, there is not one culture or a collective consciousness, but rather a plurality of cultures that are constructed and maintained through “net-work.”
The significance of Fuchs’s orientation is the attention he draws toward “the modes of relating to the world” and not constants, universals, or essentials (2001, p. 2). When these *modes*, “forms of life,” or “lifeworlds” look like constants or universals, they are so because observers or cultures are holding them constant. For example, to understand the existence of classes, he says, “Whether or not classes ‘exist’ is the wrong question, since we should add: exist for whom, when, how much, and under which conditions?” (2001, p. 14). He adds, “Allowing for variation means expecting to observe ‘class’ not as a stable and essential fact about society, but as a variable outcome obtained under certain conditions, but not others, and sometimes obtained to a larger degree than at other times” (2001, p. 14). When a culture becomes so widespread and strong it may become the “dominant” or hegemonic culture (2001, p. 2).

In fact, to sustain a particular network configuration, a network of actors may exert considerable energy ensuring that a particular mode of thinking remains dominant. This is especially the case when cultural hegemony is not achieved and cultures are more fragmented. Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, Adamson writes, “is not a static concept but a process of continuous creation which, given its massive scale, is bound to be uneven in the degree of legitimacy it commands and to leave some room for antagonistic cultural expressions to develop” (1980, p. 174). The dominant or dominating network cultures, however, seek to push its mode of thinking to the realm of the common sense or universal (2001). What matters most, at any particular point in the history of a society, community, or other level of social organization, is the ability of actors to create networks of influence (social structures)—and/or exert control over the existing networks of influence—by normalizing the cultural (ideological) mechanism of those networks.
This process of normalizations is never complete, as contesting groups within the various levels of social structure are always present: for instance, the competition between local land-based elites and non-local commodity-based elites in a community, or competition between non-elites like community groups and local land-based elites).

Other observers touch on this positional dimension of culture. For Harvey (1973), the relationships formed by individuals and organizations in the city create for those actors a common image of the city. For Sampson and Wilson these common images or cognitive structures are called “cognitive landscapes,” and they define them as “ecologically structured norms (i.e., normative ecologies) regarding appropriate standards and expectations of conduct” (1990, p. 50). Sampson and Wilson argue that, “in structurally disorganized slum communities it appears that a system of values emerges in which crime, disorder, and drug use are less than fervently condemned and hence expected as part of everyday life” (1990, p. 50) They add that, “These ecologically structured social perceptions and tolerances in turn appear to influence the probability of criminal outcomes and harmful deviant behavior” (1990, p. 50). The social networks of disorganized communities evolve a cultural framework or lifework that enables individuals to survive in that environment. Similarly, in other contexts (i.e., an organization, an academic department, a country-western bar) the social networks evolve cultural frameworks to give participants order (Fuchs, 2001, p. 4).

For Swidler (1986, p. 273) a similar argument is made about the cultural influences over action. She argues that, “Culture influences action not by providing the ultimate values toward which action is oriented, but by shaping a repertoire or ‘tool kit’ of habits, skills, and styles from which people construct "strategies of action." Swidler
elaborates on this point by arguing that, “To adopt a line of conduct, one needs an image of the kind of world in which one is trying to act, a sense that one can read reasonably accurately (through one's own feelings and through the responses of others) how one is doing, and a capacity to choose among alternative lines of action” (1986, p. 275). In this sense, she adds, “Action is not determined by one's [sic] values. Rather action and values are organized to take advantage of cultural competences” (1986, p. 275, emphasis in original).

As Fuchs states, “Generally, how an observer observes depends on how that observer relates to what is being observed” (2001, p. 6). In addition, “Persons and minds are social and cultural institutions, and the question is how these institutions emerge, work, and reproduce” (2001, p. 6). For this study the answer to this problem lies in the positions observers have in their networks.  

1.2 Problem Definition: The Community Power Structure & Urban Political Economy

The sociology of culture framework of Fuchs (2001), as well as Sampson and Wilson (1990) and Swidler (1986), is not separate from more structural conditions, such as social density or interorganizational linkages. On the contrary, these authors note the central role of the external world on action. This study searches for an understanding of the city through the collective actions of elites as nodes in social networks and the

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1 Fuchs defines positions and networks in the following way: “In relationalism, things are what they are because of their location and movement in a network or system of forces; they do not assume a fixed and constant position in the network because of their essential properties. A network is a field of relationships between nodes that vary with their relationships. A cell becomes part of the liver, not the brain, not because its inherent nature is to become a part of the liver, but because a complex interaction between the selective activation of its DNA, and the network of other cells to which it becomes linked, makes it so” (2001, p. 16).
cultural work they undertake to maintain their dominance in the dense cluster of actors that is a city.

Urban political economy has emerged as the dominant theoretical tradition for explaining the urban context. While the overly structured theory is seen as a failure with respect to culture and action by some, over the last fifteen years efforts to correct this failure have been called for. Urban political economy that integrates culture and action seeks to understand human action as culturally embedded in social networks over economic and political conditions. As Molotch (1993, p. 30) argues, “Economic orders, as well as every economic action within them, are thus ‘embedded’ … in the social relations that make them possible.” Central to this study are those embedded social relations.

This study also borrows from Molotch his sense of “urban,” which he argues “arises from the fact that economic activities ultimately are rooted in some place and utilize the earth’s resources not only for location, but also as raw material and waste site” (1993, p. 31). He adds that, “As with other aspects of material production, distribution, and usage, the place system is socially organized” (1993, p. 31). The social organization of places is political in the sense that “the economy and its special arrangements are themselves contingent and subject to collective transformation” (1993, p. 31).

For Molotch, “Urban political economy is the link between social organization and economic activity as mediated by earthly resources, particularly in the settlements where production, distribution, and consumption produce noticeable densities of human activity” (1993, p. 31). Molotch states that “Rather than being passive ‘factors’ of production or ‘sites’ of consumption, places ‘come alive’ with the breath of those who
need them for specific purposes: gaining status, getting elected to office or...making a living off the manipulation of place itself” (1993, p. 31).

With these definitions in mind, this study seeks to do several things. First, it identifies the actors that make up the urban power structure by asking, who are the actors that are in a position to recreate the urban space according to their collective interests? Second, this study establishes the agenda of those who make up that urban power structure by asking, what are the issues that concern urban elites? Third, it emphasizes the relational aspect of the community power structure generally and specifically their agenda. Finally, this study supports the growth coalition theory as a variant of urban political economy that integrates culture and agency with a networked view of urban space. It is a premise of this research that to comprehend urban space it is essential to understand those that are in the position, and use their position, to influence (exert power over) the form the urban space takes.

1.3 General Assumptions and Scope

This study endeavors to contribute to urban political economy through the analytical tools of social network analysis. Although great efforts were taken to determine the network structure of the community, the manner in which the data were collected, at one particular time, results in a snapshot of the community. The networks in this study are not, however, static structures. Instead they are dynamic (constructed) in that they are constantly shifting in composition, both organizationally and individually.

For instance, one of the most central individuals and the organization he represented at the beginning of data collection receded from local public life during the
course of the study. Many respondents, during the interview period, commented that this particular individual, if the study had been carried out a year or two earlier, would have been one of the most influential community members. In his wake, the dynamic of the power structure shifted and other individuals filled the gap that he and his organization (a regional branch of a national bank) left.

Networks are dynamic, and as attention to issues shift, as individuals and organization shift their focus or location, so do the networks. The obvious corrective to this problem is to study the network structure of power over time, noting shifts in the composition of individuals, organizations, and issues. Unfortunately, identifying the key organizations and individuals in a large city is a huge undertaking. Anticipating who is on the rise as influential or what issues will likely capture elites’ attention next are goals beyond the reasonable scope of this study.

The image of the power structure that emerges from an analysis like this, which results from the combination of interorganizational affiliations of individuals and individual prestige nominations, also suffers from other limitations. The absence of certain community actors from participation in the study undoubtedly leads to a partial picture of the “true” power structure. Stork and Richards (1992) discuss problems with non-respondents in sociometric survey studies. While this study does not rely solely on survey data, it does employ this method and, following their recommendations to reduce non-respondent influence, uses multiple methods for finding respondents. Regrettably, some of the structurally central and highly prestigious members of the community either chose not to participate or were unreachable. Some key organizations and their leaders did not participate in the study. There were cases, however, where some leaders were
unreachable but their organizations were represented nonetheless by influentials who were also affiliated with the organization. Still, at best, what is revealed is an approximation of the power structure.

What distinguishes this study from much of the urban political economy tradition is the utilization of qualitative data. It is not enough to establish the structure of interaction around predetermined (by the researcher) issues. By adopting an emic perspective, one that seeks to uncover inductively, from the perspective of the participants, the issues and the relationships formed around those issues, a more sophisticated picture of the urban scene is possible.

Harris (1976, p. 330) summarizes the emic and etic perspectives in the following way: “The operations suitable for discovering patterns with respect to what goes on inside of people’s heads have come to be known as ‘emic’ operations, while those which are suitable for discovering patterns in the behavior stream have come to be known as “etic” operations.” Morris et al. (1999, p. 781) summarize the two perspectives in the following way, “(1) the inside perspective of ethnographers, who strive to describe a particular culture in its own terms, and (2) the outside perspective of comparativist researchers, who attempt to describe differences across cultures in terms of a general, external standard.”

What emerges in the pages that follow is a glimpse into the urban power structure, but one that is far from complete. Resource constraints on the part of the researcher preclude a more comprehensive picture of the dynamic and comparative nature of social networks and cultural processes that occur within and across urban centers. On the other hand, this study was able to uncover (1) the urban power structure of a large metropolitan
center, (2) the community agenda of those in positions of power, and the (3) cultural framework drawn on by elites to enhance their control of, and advance their agenda in, the community.

1.4 Research Objectives

This research seeks to contribute to both the sociology of culture and the structural approach of social network analysis to identify and understand the community power structure of a large metropolitan center. To accomplish this goal the specific objectives of this research include the following:

1. The study began as a descriptive project to uncover (inductively) the structures and “agendas” of the elites that make up an interorganizational leadership matrix in a large metropolitan center. What emerged through that inductive process were overwhelming parallels with the growth coalition variant of urban political economy theory. By not seeking substantiation of a particular theoretical perspective at the onset, this study minimized researcher bias in uncovering the power structure. Instead, the organizational structure of the community emerged from casting the largest net possible over the organizational infrastructure of the city to allow interorganizational elites to emerge on their own.

An alternative approach would have been to (deductively) predetermine which positions in the community are influential beforehand, as Clark’s (1968) classic comparison of 51 cities does. Some of Clark’s positions include the mayor, the president of the Chamber of Commerce, the president of the largest
bank, and the editor of the largest newspaper. While there are clear overlaps with the lists obtained in the deductive methods of Clark with the inductive method chosen for this study, the inductive approach allows for a more complete picture of the interorganizational structure, determined by actual structural relationships in the community.

2. This research blends quantitative and qualitative approaches as well. Utilizing social network analysis techniques this study (a) identifies structurally central organizations and individuals in the community, and (b) constructs through sociometric survey questions community elites’ relationships on key issues. These quantitative measures allow for replication in other cities to provide meaningful generalizations about community power structures. At the same time, this study also offered community elites the opportunity to provide the cultural content that flows through these network structures, which illuminates the cultural side of urban political economy. What emerges are the normative and cognitive assumptions that elites draw on to activate others in bringing the community’s resources (human and non-human) to bear for their individual, organizational, or collective aims.

3. Finally, this study blends both the emic and etic perspectives. Etic is arriving at knowledge from the perspective of the researcher. The emic perspective is the indigenous perspective. To this end, the researcher’s obligation is to be true to all of the variability in the construction of community, the relationships revealed, and meanings offered by respondents. Every effort was taken in this study to be honest in this endeavor. With the advantage of the indigenous
perspectives of the respondents, the researcher is in the privileged position of moving beyond the emic to the etic perspective. This etic perspective offers a picture of how elites think about the community and what the elite networks look like, and an overall framework for understanding these two dimensions.

1.5 Dissertation Overview

The organization of this dissertation is as follows. Chapter II presents both the political economy perspective of the city as a growth machine and a theory of structure that overcomes the “semiotic and materialistic visions of structure” (Sewell, 1992, p. 1). The lack of attention to agency and culture within the political economy framework is overcome with the consideration of this dynamic theory of structure. Chapter III provides a background to the social network analysis of affiliation and prestige methods used to uncover the community power structure. Chapter IV compares these two methods and evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of each. Chapter V identifies and organizes into a theoretical framework the community issues most relevant to the community elite. Chapter VI analyzes the social networks of the community elite around the most important of these community issues. Chapter VII explores the cognitive structures actors as agents in the community use to exert influence in the community. Finally, Chapter VIII provides a conclusion to the study that blends the sociology of culture with the political economy of networks as well as offers recommendations for future research.
II. Theoretical Framework: A Cultural and Network Approach to Urban Political Economy

2.1 Introduction

In a review of the field of urban sociology, John Walton (1993, p. 307) argues that “political economy has been the most unifying and vigorous paradigm in urban sociology during the last two decades.” He also adds that its success has led the field to stagnate of late. Through his review of the field, he defines urban sociology as “a sociology of space—the processes in which socioeconomic change and inequality operate in and through space” (1993, p. 306). Walton argues that,

The success of urban political economy lies in its capacity for structural explanations of a variety of urban conditions. The structural logic of capitalist accumulation, for example, requires an expanding metropolitan market linked by transportation and infrastructure as well as an adequately housed labor force within economical commuting distance of factories and offices. These requirements embody social class contradictions (e.g. over land use, rent, access to public services) that occasion social struggles (e.g. between capital and labor or between property and industrial capital). State mediation of these conflicts follows the contours of political power that describe each conflict (1993, p. 317).

For Walton, the accomplishment of urban political economy resulted in repetitiveness. Walton cites Pahl’s (1989, p. 709) criticism and caution of successful paradigms: the “inevitable danger in any field is that after the initial conceptual push many may feel inclined to embrace the new paradigm and doze a little” (1993, p. 318). According to Walton, “Densely developed theories of structural causation have laid to rest earlier anecdotal (community studies) and metaphorical (human ecology) treatments of the city, and in the process may have laid themselves in a new procrustean bed”² (1993, pp. 317-318).

² An arbitrary standard to which exact conformity is forced.
He credits the problems of urban political economy to two developments: overconfidence in the paradigm and economism, which he defines as “the tendency for political economy to become enamored of the seeming causal potency of economistic analysis—to collapse complex social issues into elusively precise technical and organizational terms” (1993, p. 318). To overcome these problems, Walton draws on the insights of Ray Pahl (1989) who, like Giddens (1979) “adopts… a model for analyzing society that explores the connections between structure, consciousness, and action—the SCA model” (1993, p. 318). Pahl, according to Walton, argues that the problem with urban sociology “is that it has stopped looking for these links, preferring instead to pluck down prefabricated concepts … such as social class in which the connection, for example, between location in the social structure and interest-based action is presumably given” (1993, p. 318). Pahl’s comments underscore Walton’s desire to reorient urban political economy toward culture and action:

My contention has been that scholars have behaved as if the links in the SCA chain were self-evident. Once it is understood that such links have yet to be discovered an important programme of research designed to advance theoretical understanding can be opened up. From informal social networks through families, kinship links and the whole range of formal and informal associations of civic society people are engaged in voluntary solidaristic and collective activity for a variety of goals (Pahl 1989: 719).

In his final analysis, Walton contends that the “New synthesis based on socially constructed value conflicts in tandem with an expanding empirical terrain suggests that the new urban sociology will be with us for some time to come” (1993, p. 319). “Culture and action” he believes, “will guide the next generation of research” (1993, p. 319).

This study embraces the urban political economy paradigm, in particular Logan and Molotch’s urban growth regime theory. However, it is also part of the new synthesis called for by Walton and Pahl, which seeks to contextualize the structural approaches of
political economy in a dynamic theory of structure that centers on culture and action. To do so, this study takes as a starting point William Sewell’s “Theory of Structure.”

Urban political economy begins with space. Urbanization, according to Walton, “is the demographic expression of agricultural commercialization, industrialization, market concentration, and state formation” (1993, p. 307). To understand urban space, this study mirrors the analytical aim of Pahl and Walton: “to show how action is based on meanings constructed under conditions of choice and constraint” (Walton, 1993, p. 318). To this end, William Sewell’s “Theory of Structure” is utilized as a sensitizing framework because it seeks to see structure in terms of a cultural resource. The urban political economy framework of Logan and Molotch fits appropriately into the cognitive structuring of culture and action that occurs among contentious groups that vie to (re)create the urban landscape in their interest.

2.2 William Sewell’s “Theory of Structure”

By way of a definition of structure, Sewell states that,

Structures, then, are sets of mutually sustaining schemas and resources that empower and constrain social action and that tend to be reproduced by that social action. But their reproduction is never automatic. Structures are at risk, at least to some extent, in all of the social encounters they shape—because structures are multiple and intersecting, because schemas are transposable, and because resources are polysemic and accumulate unpredictably. Placing the relationship between resources and cultural schemas at the center of a concept of structure makes it possible to show how social change, no less than social stasis, can be generated by the enactment of structures in social life (1992 p. 19).

In this definition Sewell combines, as Giddens’s theory of structuration attempts to do, cultural meanings (schemas) and human and nonhuman resources, as they reproduce each

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3 To cite Kinglsey Davis’s remarks about the city in historical context, “compared to most other aspects of society—e.g., language, religion, stratification, or the family—cities appeared only yesterday, and urbanization, meaning that a sizeable proportion of the population lives in cities, has developed only in the last few moments of man’s existence” (1955: 429 cited in Walton, 1993, p. 207).
other, of both the cultural understanding of the resources and the resources themselves, through social action. According to Sewell,

Resources are of two types, human and nonhuman. Nonhuman resources are objects, animate or inanimate, naturally occurring or manufactured, that can be used to enhance or maintain power; human resources are physical strength, dexterity, knowledge, and emotional commitments that can be used to enhance or maintain power, including knowledge of the means of gaining, retaining, controlling, and propagating either human or nonhuman resources. Both types of resources are media of power and are unevenly distributed. But however unequally resources may be distributed, some measure of both human and nonhuman resources are controlled by all members of society, no matter how destitute and oppressed. Indeed, part of what it means to conceive of human beings as agents is to conceive of them as empowered by access to resources of one kind or another (1992, pp. 9-10).

In this passage Sewell draws our attention to the unevenness of the distribution of resources that are distributed throughout society. With this notion of human and nonhuman resources which are used, maintained, and controlled as media of power, he arrives at human agency. Significantly, however, individuals are not powerful. What makes them powerful, or agents with varying degrees of empowerment, is the access they have through their social network.

In his conclusion, Sewell summarizes his theory of structure as “mutually sustaining cultural schemas and sets of resources that empower and constrain social action and tend to be reproduced by that action.” He adds that, “Agents are empowered by structures, both by the knowledge of cultural schemas that enables them to mobilize resources and by the access to resources that enables them to enact schemas” (1992, p. 27). Sewell argues that,

Structure is dynamic, not static; it is the continually evolving outcome and matrix of a process of social interaction. Even the more or less perfect reproduction of structures is a profoundly temporal process that requires resourceful and innovative human conduct. But the same resourceful agency that sustains the reproduction of structures also makes possible their transformation-by means of transpositions of schemas and remobilizations of resources that make the new structures recognizable as transformations of the old (1992, p. 27).

To elaborate on what he means in this last sentence, Sewell argues that structures vary along two dimensions: “depth, which refers to the schema dimension of structure,
and power, which refers to the resource dimension” (1992, p. 22). Utilizing the concepts of depth and power, Sewell argues, illuminates the “dynamics and durabilities” of structures. On the concept of depth, Sewell states, “To designate a structure as ‘deep’ implies that it lies beneath and generates a certain range of ‘surface’ structures, just as structures underlie and generate practices” (1992, p. 22). Relatively unconscious, deep structural schemas are pervasive and “taken-for-granted mental assumptions or modes of procedure that actors normally apply without being aware that they are applying them” (1992, p. 22). A deep structure appears hegemonic in that it is drawn upon unquestioningly to make sense of the world.

In terms of power, Sewell argues that “Different structures also vary enormously in the resources, and hence the power, that they mobilize” (1992, p. 22). Sewell notes, also, that the type of power mobilized varies by the type of structure. For example, Sewell contrasts military structures, which operate primarily on coercion, with “apostolic succession” which “is based primarily (although far from exclusively) on persuasion” (1992, pp. 22-23). So where does the power of community elites come from? The answer lies in the various networks elites participate in. To draw on Fuchs again, people are social and cultural institutions, and as such, elites produce and reproduce themselves as the social and cultural institutions to the extent that they are in the position to mobilize resources and cultural schemas to be powerful. In other words, elites are cultural and social institutions that cannot be understood adequately without considering at the same time the social ties that serve to create and recreate social structures and the cultural schemas to make sense out of them.
The utility of Sewell’s two concepts of depth and power comes in explaining the durability of particular structures. Structures can be schematically deep but carry little power, such as language (1992, p. 23-24), or can also be rather powerful but schematically shallow and contested, such as political structures like the state (1992, p. 24). Structures can also be both schematically deep and powerful, such as capitalism, which, according to Sewell, is “a spectacular case of a power-laden yet long-enduring structure” (1992, p. 25).

It is on Sewell’s next point that his dynamic theory of structure merges nicely with the central argument of the growth machine theory of Logan and Molotch (1987). Sewell states that, “Unlike most Marxists, I see the core schemas not as those defining the wage-labor relationship but as those governing the conversion of use value into exchange value” (1992, p. 25). This core schematic structure, deeply embedded, is the very same dynamic in, and crux of, the growth machine theory. According to Logan and Molotch,

> For us, the fundamental attributes of all commodities, but particularly of land and buildings, are the social contexts through which they are used and exchanged. Any given piece of real estate has both a use value and an exchange value. An apartment building, for example, provides a ‘home’ for residents (use value) while at the same time generating rent for the owners (exchange value). Individuals and groups differ on which aspect (use or exchange) is most crucial to their own lives. For some, places represent residence or production site; for others, places represent a commodity for buying, selling, or renting to somebody else. The sharpest contrast...is between residents, who use place to satisfy essential needs of life, and entrepreneurs, who strive for financial return, ordinarily achieved by intensifying the use to which their property is put (1987, p. 1).

For Sewell (1992, pp. 25-26), “the core procedure of capitalism—the conversion of use value into exchange value or the commodification of things—is exceptionally transposable. It knows no natural limits; it can be applied not only to cloth, tobacco, or cooking pans, but to land, housework, bread, sex, advertising, emotions, or knowledge,
each of which can be converted into any other by means of money.” Sewell argues (1992, p. 26) that,

…the commodity form, by making almost all resources readable as exchangeable commodities, organizes a virtually universal intersection of structures, which means that changes in any one structure—an increased or decreased accumulation of resources or a new procedure—can affect an indefinitely vast number of other structures that intersect through the medium of money.

Capitalism produces a structure that is enduring (deep) and powerful (turning use values into exchange values or the commodification of everything) and constitutes a fundamental conflict between those that pursue exchange values and those that wish to enhance use values. Logan and Molotch argue that “the pursuit of exchange values in the city does not necessarily result in the maximization of use values for others. Indeed, the simultaneous push for both goals is inherently contradictory and a continuing source of tension, conflict, and irrational settlements” (1987, p. 2, emphasis in original).

The pursuit of exchange value gives rise to a growth coalition, which Molotch and Logan define as a “wide range of elite groups” who, unlike those that use the city as a place to live and work (use value folks), find consensus around the issue of growth (1987, pp. 50-51). The city “can increase aggregate rents and trap related wealth for those in the right position to benefit” (1987, p. 50). Molotch suggests that, in an imagined or hypothetical community where the growth coalition has been destroyed, “a given industrial project will perhaps be evaluated in terms of its social utility—the usefulness of the product manufactured—either to the locality or to the society at large” (1976, p. 328). Molotch argues that “production, merely for the sake of local expansion, will be less

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4 Irrational settlements refers to the development of places that is not dependent upon the resources available in a location but the power of constituents of a particular place (urban area) to win out over other constituents of a competing place. In fact, a place may not have the physical resources to sustain growth, but nevertheless grow because the elites in the community are able to woo development to the local area. Resource rich areas, like the Appalachia region, with weak elites may not be able to compete and lose ground to less resource rich areas with better organized elites.
likely to occur” and “there will be some pressure to increase the use value of the country’s production apparatus and for external costs of production to be borne internally” (1976, p. 328).

The utility of Sewell’s theory of structure is in its definition of structure as a dynamic and evolving outcome of social interaction. What is produced and reproduced in the community as structure is a process of interaction among agents (individuals) acting in collective fashion, through net-work. Those able to exert control over the social structure through the social relations in which they are embedded are empowered to act to reproduce or transform relations to their benefit, materially and symbolically. As Sewell states it, “Agents are empowered by structures, both by the knowledge of cultural schemas that enables them to mobilize resources and by the access to resources that enables them to enact schemas” (1992, p. 27).

Sewell’s theory of structure and Logan and Molotch’s theory of the urban growth machine serve as a united analytical framework for understanding the urban scene. Ultimately, if Sewell and Logan and Molotch are correct, the city appears to be the expression of the deep and powerful schema of capitalist commodification of place by the urban business elite and their allies that reproduces the urban growth machine, pushing for the conversion of use values to exchange values. In “The City as a Growth Machine,” Molotch summarizes the growth machine and what holds it together. He argues that:

A city and, more generally, any locality, is conceived as the areal expression of the interests of some land-based elite. Such an elite is seen to profit through the increasing intensification of the land use of the area in which its members hold a common interest. An elite competes with other land-based elites in an effort to have growth-inducing resources invested within its own area as opposed to that of another. Governmental authority, at the local and nonlocal levels, is utilized to assist in achieving this growth at the expense of competing localities. Conditions of community life are largely a consequence of the social, economic, and political forces embodied in this growth machine (1976, p. 309).
2.3 Community as a Growth Coalition

Molotch argues that “We need to see each geographical map—whether of a small group of land parcels, a whole city, a region, or a nation—not merely as a demarcation of legal, political, or topographical features, but as a mosaic of competing land interests capable of strategic coalition and action” (1976, p. 311). As a starting point, he argues that three conditions about land exist. First, he states that, “to the degree to which the land’s profit potential is enhanced, one’s own wealth is increased” (1976, p. 311). Second, “one has interest in an adjacent parcel, and if a noxious use should appear, one’s own parcel may be harmed” (1976, p. 311). Finally, what emerges is a “concern for an aggregate of parcels” in that “one sees that one’s future is bound to the future of a larger area, that the future enjoyment of financial benefit flowing from a given parcel will derive from the general future of the proximate aggregate of parcels” (1976, p. 311). What emerges, he argues, is a community.

Molotch argues that “communities exist in a nested fashion (e.g., neighborhood within city within region)” and “because of this nested nature of communities, subunits which are competitive with one another at one level (e.g., in an interblock dispute over where a bus stop should go) will be in coalition at a higher level (e.g., in an intercity rivalry over where a new port should go)” (1976, p. 311). Community is the result of “the degree to which otherwise competing land-interest groups collude to achieve a common land-enhancement scheme…whether at the level of a residential block club, a neighborhood association, a city or metropolitan chamber of commerce, a state development agency, or a regional association” (1976, p. 311). The goal of any of these levels of association is to “use government to gain those resources which will enhance the
growth potential of the area unit in question” (1976, p. 311). Due to the scarcity of developmental resources and the finiteness of the degree of growth, “government becomes the arena in which land-use interest groups compete for public money and attempt to mold those decisions which will determine the land-use outcomes” (1976, p. 312). Molotch states that “Localities thus compete with one another to gain the preconditions of growth” (1976, p. 312, emphasis in original). Governments influence labor, raw material and transportation costs. They set tax rates, as well as “help determine the cost of access to markets and raw materials” (1976, p. 312).

Molotch argues that “localities are generally mindful of these governmental powers and, in addition to creating the sorts of physical conditions which can best serve industrial growth, also attempt to maintain the kind of ‘business climate’ that attracts industry: for example favorable taxation, vocational training, law enforcement, and ‘good’ labor relations” (1976, p. 312). “In addition,” Molotch argues, “a key role of elected and appointed officials becomes that of ‘ambassador’ to industry, to communicate, usually with appropriate ceremony, these advantages to potential investors” (1976, p. 312).

Molotch states, “I aim to make the extreme statement that this organized effort to affect the outcome of government distribution is the essence of local government as a dynamic political force.” (1976, p. 313). Molotch argues that Edelman provides the “appropriate conceptual preparation for viewing government in such terms” (1976, p. 313). Included in Edelman’s (1964) two types of politics are symbolic politics, “which comprises the ‘big issues’ of public morality and the symbolic reforms featured in the headlines and editorials of the daily press” (1976, p. 313), and the politics of distribution,
which is characterized by the “process through which goods and services actually come to be distributed in the society” (1976, p. 313). It is this latter form that Molotch argues is largely unseen as it is “relegated to negotiations within committees (when it occurs at all within a formal government body),” but it “is the politics which determines who, in material terms, gets what, where, and how” and “is the kind of politics we must talk about at the local level” (1976, p. 313, emphasis in original).

Most heavily involved in this form of politics are the “local businessmen, particularly property owners and investors in locally oriented financial institutions … who need local government in their daily money-making routines” (1976, p. 314, emphasis in original). Molotch includes two other groups, including “prominent lawyers, syndicators, and realtors…who need to put themselves in situations where they can be most useful to those with the land and property resources” and “those who, although not directly involved in land use, have their futures tied to growth of the metropolis as a whole” (p. 1976, p. 314).

2.4 Community as a Cognitive Structure

Molotch (1976) and others, including Edelman (1964), Kaniss (1991), and Friedland (2001), note that the local media, city government, public schools, the Chamber of Commerce, and various other civic organizations in a city actively promote a sense of community that revolves around the city. According to Friedland (2001), Kaniss (1991) and Molotch (1976) both argue “that an imagined community does exist, but is constructed artificially to meet the functional needs of commercial media and local elites” (2001, p. 383, also Demers, 1996). The local mass media (which for Molotch is limited to
Molotch states, “the local institution which seems to take prime responsibility for the sustenance…civic resources—the metropolitan newspaper—is also the most important example of a business which has its interest anchored in the aggregate growth of the locality” (1976, p. 315). For Molotch, the local newspaper is the “voice of the community” and that voice is a rallying point for growth for the local community elites.

In addition to the community as a culturally organized cognitive structure, the community is also, according to Molotch, a coalition of individuals and organizations “that actively generates the community ‘we feeling’ (or perhaps more aptly, the ‘our feeling’) that comes to be an influence in the politics of a given locality” (1976, p. 314). The community feeling manifests itself, Molotch argues, in ‘boosterism’ of various sorts: the Chamber of Commerce, locality-promotion ads in business journals and travel publications, city-sponsored parade floats, and stadia and other forms of support for professional sports teams carrying the locality name” (1976, pp. 314-315). Molotch does not claim that “there are no other sources of civic jingoism and growth enthusiasm in American communities, only that the growth-machine coalition mobilizes what is there, legitimizes and sustains it, and channels it as a political force in to particular kinds of policy decisions” (1976, p. 315).

Molotch states that “perhaps the key ideological prop for the growth machine, especially in terms of sustaining support from the working-class majority, is the claim that growth ‘makes jobs’” (1976, p. 320). He argues that,

This claim is aggressively promulgated by developers, builders, and chambers of commerce; it becomes a part of the statesman talk of editorialists and political officials. Such people do not

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5 This interest in growth is likely only greater in the study community where the only daily newspaper is locally owned and the owner happens to be a significant land developer.
speak of growth as useful to profits—rather, they speak of it as necessary for making jobs (1976, p. 320).

Molotch argues, that “the systematic evidence fails to show any advantage to growth: there is no tendency for either larger places or more rapidly growing ones to have lower unemployment rates than other kinds of urban areas” (1976, p. 321).

Like the role of newspapers, universities, utilities and other public or quasi-public agencies “become growth ‘statesmen’ rather than advocates for a certain type of intralocal distribution of growth” (1976, pp. 316-317). Unlike developers, mortgage bankers, and local businesspeople, who are directly concerned with growth, the “branch executives of corporations headquartered elsewhere” are tied to the growth ideology but not as directly tied to local growth (1976, p. 317). The social worth of these regional executives, as far as the growth coalition is concerned, is tied to the number of people they employ.

It is instructive to bring into this discussion of the “community as a cognitive structure” the work of Althusser on *ideological state apparatuses* (1971). Although Althusser’s focus is on the state, the underlying theoretical point resonates at the level of community as well. In fact, the “state,” as an apparatus of production and reproduction—control—must resonate somewhere, why not the city, the front lines of ideological work? For Althusser, what must be reproduced is not just the material means of production, “the reproduction of the means of production” (1971, p. 124), but the reproduction of labor power as well. The reproduction of labor power, for Althusser, occurs outside of the firm. It is in the minimum wage (historically determined by class struggle), as well as in public education (and other state institutions like the police), which is doubly the reproduction of skills necessary for economic production and, on the ideological front,
a reproduction of [labor’s] submission to the rules of the established order, i.e. a reproduction of submission to the ruling ideology for the workers, and a reproduction of the ability to manipulate the ruling ideology correctly for the agents of exploitation and repression, so that they, too, will provide for the domination of the ruling class ‘in words’ (1971, p. 128).

What Althusser develops, along this line of thinking (with the addition of the infrastructure/superstructure edifice of Classical Marxism), is the concept of ideological state apparatuses (ISAs). Not to be confused with the (repressive) state apparatus (the government and its various administrative arms, including the police, the courts, and prisons), ISAs are “distinct and specialized institutions,” which include the education ISA, the legal ISA (which also belongs to the repressive state apparatus), the communications ISA (mass media), the cultural ISA (arts, sports), the family ISA, the trade-union ISA, and the political ISA (the party system) (1971, p. 137). While the repressive state apparatus is entirely in the public domain, Althusser notes, many of these ISAs are in the private sphere, but the important distinction between the two is that the repressive state apparatus functions by ‘violence’, whereas “the ideological state apparatus functions ‘by ideology’” (1971, p. 138, italics in original). He states, “to my knowledge, no class can hold State power over a long period without at the same time exercising its hegemony over and in the State Ideological Apparatus” (1971, p. 139, italics in original). Today, in contemporary “bourgeois” capitalism, Althusser believes public education has become the dominant ideological state apparatus, what he calls the “educational ideological apparatus” (1971, p. 144: 145). All children in society, from

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6 Althusser addresses the apparent strangeness of calling private institutions “ideological state apparatuses” by drawing on Gramsci, who argues that “the distinction between the public and the private is a distinction internal to bourgeois law, and valid in the (subordinate) domains in which bourgeois law exercises its ‘authority’. The domain of the State escapes it because the latter is ‘above the law’: the State, which is the State of the ruling class, is neither public nor private; on the contrary, it is the precondition for any distinction between public and private” (1971, pp. 137-138). According to Althusser (and by implication, Gramsci), the bourgeois state sets up the rules for what is private and what is public. In this way, private institutions, from the family, to the Church, and the mass media, can operate (but may not be simply reducible to) ideological state apparatuses.
every class, whether in private or public schools, implicitly and explicitly are subject to the reproduction of labor and social order.

These ideological state apparatuses, generally, and public education specifically, for our purposes, as they manifest themselves at the city/community level, are of particular interest to the local business elite and their political allies, insofar as the alignment of these apparatuses are ideological compatible with growth, and capitalism more generally. The public education system, it will be shown in this study, holds for many of the local elites, a central place among the ISAs.

At the local level (but also at every other level of organization) Althusser’s ideological state apparatuses (ISAs) and (repressive) state apparatuses (RSAs), separated by the use of force, do not always reach hegemonic control by the dominant group (local growth coalitions). Rather, the local public and private apparatuses of control are contested and unfolding realms that, at times, reveal themselves to the attentive public when certain forms of growth are rejected by neighborhood association, mobilized cultural groups (against the destruction of encroaching development), and environmentalists, to name only some of the most obvious challengers.

The utility of Althusser’s two types of apparatuses (as well as the discussion of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony from the introduction) add a useful layer of explanation for the motivation of local land-based elites to promote and ideology of boosterism around an imagined community, as well as philanthropic giving and an emphasis on an effective education system and police force. To paraphrase the comments of two community elites, the health of the business community is dependent on the health of the workforce. Thus, the ideological state apparatuses which work toward recreating the
community—healthcare, education, welfare services for the indigent, crime control, as well as the physical/legal/political infrastructure—preoccupy local land-based elites (the subject of Chapter 5).

2.5 Growth Machine and the Politics of Resource Distribution

Most people become involved in politics, according to Molotch (1976, p. 317), “for reasons of land business and related processes of resource distribution.” In other words, people come to politics for distributive issues, not symbolic ones, to use Edelman’s distinctions. Drawing on Edelman, Molotch summarizes the local political process as follows:

The distributive issues, the matters which bring people to power, are more or less deliberately dropped from public discourse. The issues which are allowed to be discussed and the positions which the politicians take on them derive from the world views of those who come from certain sectors of the business and professional class and the need which they have to whip up public sentiment without allowing distributive issues to become part of public discussion (1976, p. 318).

Leaders of the growth coalition tend to be heavily represented in local government, from the city-council to planning commissions, zoning boards, water authorities, and other regulatory agencies, not to mention their service on the Chamber of Commerce committees and commissions concerned with growth related issues.

The heavy representation of growth coalition leaders in local government does not rule out social conservatives or moral entrepreneurs as political participants. That said, politicians that make their careers on moral issues are not necessarily different from growth oriented political elites. In fact, Reinarman (2006) refers to moral entrepreneurs as *poli-tico-moral entrepreneurs* “in order to emphasize the fact that the most prominent and powerful moral entrepreneurs in drug scares are often political elites” (2006, p. 144). Moral entrepreneurs, generally, are those that work to create and enforce rules against
moral or social evils (2006, p. 144, see also Becker 1963). For Reinarman, the political elites who acted as moral entrepreneurs in the case studies of drug scares in the past 200 years in United States, “typically find drugs a functional demon in that (like ‘outside agitators’) drugs allow them to deflect attention from other, more systemic sources of public problems for which they would otherwise have to take some responsibility” (2006, p. 144).

Returning to Molotch’s argument, he claims that, “It is also the case that certain moral zealots and ‘concerned citizens’ go into politics to right symbolic wrongs; but the money and other supports which make them viable as politicians is usually nonsymbolic money” (1976, p. 218). In other words, he argues that morally-oriented political candidates will make up a small minority in elected positions. What really matters in local politics, according to Molotch, is the resource distribution motivation to run for office. Contributing to this argument is Reinarman’s contention that political elites portray themselves as moral crusaders and seek political office to deflect attention away from systemic issues like inequitable resource distribution and other structural inequities.

Analogous to this line of thinking is the Marxian notion of inner and outer forms of politics (Collins 1994, p. 71). Included in the outer form of politics are “the personalities of politicians…corruption, reform, liberalism, and conservatism.” As Reinarman suggests, it is on these and other moral grounds that local elites may run for office. The inner form of politics, however, concern the local elites more. Inner politics include zoning laws and other technical regulation too boring or complicated to report in newspapers or television news programs (Collins 1994, p. 71). This inner politics is similar to distributive power motivation Edelman focuses on and Molotch draws on.
Although in this discussion the focus is on inner politics, or the politics of distribution, reducing the local political climate to pure political-economic motivations neglects moral or social motivations of elites for seeking political influence. Considering only inner politics as the motive for political involvement on the part of local elites leads to an overly deterministic and partial picture of the local political landscape.

2.6 Challenges to the Growth Coalition

There is resistance to the local growth coalition, but it does not emanate from the working class as a class-based resistance movement. Instead, resistance comes from those community-based organizations that oppose some types of growth, what Molotch calls “countercoalitions.” These resistance groups, depending on the locality, are “rooted in the recent environmental movements and [rely] on a mixture of young activists…, middle-class professionals, and workers, all of whom see their own tax rates as well as life-styles in conflict with growth” (1976, p. 328). Neighborhood associations serve as an example of these countercoalitions, who according to Domhoff, adopt a Not In My Back Yard (NIMBY) attitude to growth as they try to maintain their “quality of life” (2005, online article accessed July 9, 2008). According to Domhoff,

> The residents of a city want the local government to spend a greater share of its budget on municipal services, parks, and other amenities. But the growth coalitions want the lion’s share of the money to go to physical infrastructure and anything else that aids growth. Once people are in the city, the growth coalitions do not worry much about them. Its members are very shortsighted if spans of decades are taken into consideration (2005, online article accessed July 9, 2008).

Molotch adds two other groups that may oppose growth coalitions, including leadership in corporations that “use the local community only as a setting for life and work, rather than as an exploitable resource,” such as research and electronic firms, and “certain very wealthy people (particularly those whose wealth derives from the
exploitation of nonlocal environments) who continue a tradition (with some modifications) of aristocratic conservation” (1976, p. 328).

Additional challenges to growth come from the countercoalitions that may form to oppose urban redevelopment/renewal (in-fill) and urban sprawl (out-growth). For instance, a growth-control coalition made up of homeowners, environmentalists, local politicians, and planners successfully prevented an east-west freeway in Marin County north of San Francisco in 1966, which set the county down a trajectory of controlled growth (Nelson Dyble, 2007). Nelson Dyble notes that, “Marin’s transportation infrastructure has remained almost unchanged since 1966 because of the public understanding of the relationship between limited access, scarcity, and high property values” (2007, p. 39). Marin County’s efforts to limit growth in the 1960s does not appear to be an aberration, but part of a broader national trend to limit urban sprawl. As Nelson Dyble states,

In truth, Marin is not exceptional. Its history and politics are similar to those of exclusive suburban communities around the country, where serene residential sanctuaries are protected from development by formidable political and institutional barricades that have been constructed by local growth-control coalitions. Since the late 1960s, many suburban residents have recognized the threat that metropolitan area growth posed to the value of their property and their lifestyle since the late 1960s, and seized control of local politics and government to stave it off (2007, p. 39).

Moving away from the growth-control coalitions in the affluent suburbs to the city center are urban poor neighborhoods. Poor residents are often times inadequately organized to resist urban renewal or gentrification projects. Affluent outsiders buy poor properties, and their very presence generates the kind of neighborhood effects (such as increased property value) that make it increasingly likely that other residents will make deals with outsiders (Logan and Molotch, 1987, p. 115).
In a quantitative analysis of the housing market in New York City, Newman and Wyly discovered that “displacement is a limited yet crucial indicator of the deepening class polarisation of urban housing markets” (2006, p. 23). They add that “the main buffers against gentrification-induced displacement of the poor (public housing and rent regulation) are precisely those kinds of market interventions that are being challenged by advocates of gentrification and dismantled by policy-makers” (2006, p. 23). In interviews conducted with community organizers and residents in the city, the researchers found that displacement remains a politically salient issue. In addition, the authors highlight an “array of methods used to resist displacement in a policy climate emphasising selective deregulation and market-oriented social policy” (2006, p. 23). Some of the strategies include such grass-roots organizing at the neighborhood level as protesting, prayer vigils, negotiations with landlords, letter-writing campaigns. Many of these efforts were intended to highlight a property-right vs. housing right debate (2006, p. 50).

To summarize this section, the challenges to the growth coalitions come predominantly from neighborhood associations, and social and environmental activists who seek to enhance use value conditions as well as keeping communities affordable (as the New York City example suggests). However, in some cases more affluent residents as well as land-based elites in the community (especially in the suburbs) may resist urban sprawl as they benefit from limited growth in attractive physical environments, as the San Francisco example suggests. Limited growth or controlled growth strategies are always susceptible to being undermined by the relative weakness of neighborhoods promoting them when they run up against the better structurally situated local growth coalition to push their growth agenda ideologically and politically.
2.7 The Local Growth Coalition in Global Context

Molotch and Logan (1984, p. 484) expand on the notions of exchange value and use value to argue that when value-free land development and value-free production—which both boil down to unregulated markets—“are joined at the local level, communities forfeit control over both the content of production and its location.” They further note that, “Communities do not judge a product in terms of its social worth, nor a machine in terms of its human value… instead, they invite capital to make anything—whether bombs or buttons, tampons or tanks—in their own back yards” (1984, p. 484).

Molotch and Logan highlight some key differences between capital (industry) and rentier (growth coalitions) in capitalism, particularly the delocalization of capital, which has posed problems for growth coalitions (Molotch and Logan, 1984, p. 484). They note that the Sun Belt cities of the southern and southwestern United States are largely “exporters of headquarters to the northern cities” and that “the expansion of production in the Sun Belt cities has not been matched by an expansion of control” (1984, p. 484). In turn, “local firms which become part of larger corporations become less useful to the local growth machines” (1984, p. 484). The multiplier effects, or “growth spinoff” for localities diminish as the operations of companies become less dependent on management and local operation. Management is recruited from within the organization, perhaps from other locations, and raw materials and support services, are increasingly supplied “by other branches of the firm or by other companies specified by headquarters” (1984, p. 484). Molotch and Logan state “Just as branch operations have been tried and found wanting as ‘growth poles’ in underdeveloped regions… so they function in
advanced societies as economically isolated business activities, failing to stimulate local
growth in other economic sectors” (1984, p. 484).

In addition to the loss of economic spinoffs of the modern capitalism form, owners of local branches live and work elsewhere (1984, p. 485). “Under the old order, local industrial figures were prominent civic leaders, with little reluctance to assert their presence in all civic realms” (1984, p. 485). As a result of the close tie of capital to place in the past the “good works—orphans, hospitals, university buildings, and rescue missions—were the trickle-down benefits of locally-based wealth” and had “important symbolic benefits for growth ideology” (1984, p. 485). In the contemporary period corporate elites have relocated to large remote cities like New York City, which, according to Molotch and Logan, “further weakens visible ties between local corporate activity and civic benefits” (1984, p. 485). The local media, real estate, and financial institutions have also shifted from local ownership to become more delocalized.

Local growth coalitions have in some instances resisted these shifts in capitalism by opposing non-local corporations. Molotch and Logan reference opposition to oil drilling off of Santa Barbara, California, the MX missile in Nevada and Utah, and nuclear power in Midland, Michigan. In response to these challenges and similar challenges elsewhere, corporations have emphasized that local managers become active in local affairs, sitting on pro-growth oriented boards, seeking political candidates that favor growth, and forming their own pro-business organizations (1984, p. 490).

Molotch and Logan note another relevant trend in contemporary capitalism. They state, “Coordinating the activities of capital and rentiers is easier when the two groups become functionally identical” (1984, p. 492). In other words, there has been an increase
since the mid-1970s in cosmopolitan capital, or non-local corporations investing in real 
estate. In effect, what emerges is a form of the company town, where “the positive effects 
of one function (say, demand for housing stimulated by a manufacturing plant) are caught 
by the adjoining land parcels which are under the same corporate ownership” (1984, p. 
492). In larger developments “capital achieves a monopoly over a unique environment, 
which translates into extra rent collections which justify their expenses” (1984, p. 493). 
They note that, “To undertake a large development a great deal of money and financing is 
necessary to acquire large scale and expensive sites, to hire consultants, and to develop 
‘up front’ infrastructures” which “must be maneuvered through government agencies” 
(1984, p. 493). These resource intensive projects are very costly, and are limited to only 
large corporate development firms. Finally, they argue that, “Capital’s projects require 
government involvement in infrastructure development, zoning changes, and, quite often, 
tax subsidies” (1984, p. 493). They add, “to overcome local resistance to fulfilling such 
needs, corporations step up their investments in the local social structure in the form of 
campaign contributions and charitable or cultural philanthropy” (1984, p. 493). Molotch 
and Logan (1984, p. 493) spell out the implications of this shift from local to capital land 
use:

The involvement of capital in locality goes far beyond the simple role of the speculator who 
 attempts to anticipate future land use trends. Instead, capital tries to determine those trends by 
  affecting the decisions of government and other institutions. Rather than land speculation, this is 
 really social structural speculation.

The improvements to the original conception of the growth coalition of Molotch 
(1976) by Molotch and Logan (1984) and Logan and Molotch (1987) give the theory a 
sophistication that accounts not only for the land-based growth interests of the local 
business community, but also of the larger context of contemporary global capitalism. It
notes the strains of essentially three groups. First, the capitalist producers, who are largely untied to local communities but that may choose to—and have increasingly attempted to commodify land through mixed use mega-developments—invest in the local community. Second, the local growth coalition that is tied to the land, that at times recruits and covets capitalist producers through intensive industrial recruitment campaigns, but that in some contexts remains skeptical and reticent to risk too much to recruit companies. Third, the anti-growth coalition of neighborhoods, their associations, environmental groups, and others who sympathize with the use value interests of the resisters.

The capitalist producers perhaps represent the best example of purely exchange value interests, as bottom-line profits mandate corporations to seek to maximize profitability regardless of use value concerns, human, environmental, or otherwise. The land-based growth coalition possibly represents a middle-ground between the extreme exchange value non-local capitalists, represented at the local level by branches and branch managers, and use value oriented residents. The land-based business class, while working concertedly to maximize the exchange value of property by maximizing rents, simultaneously may sympathize and align themselves with some of the modest initiatives of the use value interests in the community. After all, the local growth coalition, by and large, also live in the community, were educated in the local schools, utilize the community’s cultural amenities, and care about the overall health of the community. In fact, the health of the community translates into increased property values. Investment in these use value concerns, as long as they do not interfere to a great extent with growth, is consistent with the theory and may in fact aid in bringing about growth.
2.8 Competing Theoretical Approaches to Urban Studies

In contrast to the urban growth coalition theory, the assumption of pluralist and the public (rational) choice perspectives is that the purpose for, and hence consequence of, the structure of the community is based on instrumental interests which weigh the costs or consequences of action against the perceived benefits.

The most famous pluralist statement is made by Dahl in his study of New Haven (1961). Dahl says, “most citizens have political resources they do not employ in order to gain influence over the decisions of public officials; consequently there is a great gap between their actual and potential influence” (1961, pp. 305-306). According to Dahl, for the average citizen, “In liberal societies, politics is a sideshow in the great circus of life” (1961, p. 305). Dahl’s understanding of liberal societies, which he generalizes to from a study of one city, rests on the belief that political influence is widely dispersed, and that political influence is noncumulative and just one of many forms of influence (Altschuler and Luberoff, 2003, p. 52). To explain differences in political power, Dalh does not equate political power to access to economic resources, but to a strong motivation to learn politics and the amount of effort put into politics (1961, p. 307). For Dahl, skills, numbers, and activist intensity were not routinely dominated by the economic actors. “Nor was political influence a private sector monopoly” (2003, p. 52). The argument offered by Dahl as to why so few people engage in politics was public apathy, which, Dahl took to mean, a reflection of broad public agreement. “Elected officials, Dahl judged, are both acutely sensitive to this potential and deeply imbued with the American
‘democratic creed.’ Consequently, they are quite sensitive to ‘the real or imagined preferences of constituents…in deciding what policies to adopt or reject’” (2003, p. 53).

The public choice or rational choice method is most notably articulated by Paul Peterson in *City Limits* (1981). According to Altschuler and Luberoff, (2003, p. 57) “The essence of Peterson’s argument is that American local governments serve their constituents well, by and large, and that this flows directly from the rationality of their individual participants.” Altschuler and Luberoff add, that “In short, there is a basic harmony between the interests of the collectivity and those of its individual members, from political leaders to ordinary citizens” (2003, pp. 57-58). As Peterson puts it, “The interests of cities are neither a summation of individual interests nor the pursuit of optimum size. Instead, policies and programs can be said to be in the interest of cities whenever the policies maintain or enhance the economic position, social prestige, or political power of the city, taken as a whole” (1981, p. 20). His deductive logic imposes upon the city a rational assumption of individual and collective action. Ultimately, what is served by business-government collaboration is the public interest. For instance, Peterson explains the process in the following way:

Insofar as the city desires diversified economic growth, no single company can be allowed to pursue policies that seriously detract from the area’s overall attractiveness to capital or productive labor. Taxes cannot be so low that government fails to supply residents with as attractive a package of services as can be found in competitive jurisdictions. Regulation of any particular industry cannot fall so far below nationwide standards that other industries must bear external costs not encountered in other places. The city’s interest in attracting capital does not mean utter subservience to any particular corporation, but a sensitivity to the need for establishing an overall favorable climate (1981, p. 28).

In short, the answer to the question of what motivates, is rational self-interest. That is, the tying of organizations and individuals to others in the community looks as it does because individuals and organizations benefit the most from this configuration: a functional adaptation to human and non-human resources. In the end, the city is reified to
resemble a rational actor following a course of action that will allow for the greatest profit, exposure, and access to resources for the greatest good.

There are, however, many criticisms of these overly simplistic views of human and collective behavior. For instance, Domhoff’s critique of Peterson and the public choice theorists centers around the lack of attention to concentrated power, because, according to Domhoff, “all you need are the following assumptions: (1) “People seek to maximize their individual ‘utilities’ (i.e., their self-interest),” (2) “People are rational,” (3) “People have enough time and information to make informed choices,” (4) “People are able to shop elsewhere—or move elsewhere, in the case of local politics—if they don’t like what they find at the local store (or their current residence),” and (5) “Everyone ends up free to choose, and they are dealt with fairly” (Domhoff, 2005, online article, retrieved July 10, 2008). Domhoff rejects each of these and argues that, while individuals are able to make rational decisions, humans are nonrational in many aspects of our lives. For instance, he offers, when it comes to politics and religion.

Finally, in addition to the pluralist and public choice theories are the neo-Marxist and regime theories. Castells rejects the reduction of everything to class struggle, but instead reduces everything to urban social movements (according to Domhoff). Domhoff summarize Castells work on urban social movements in *The City and the Grassroots* (1983) as the struggle for three goals: “collective consumption trade unionism” (that is, urban amenities and housing), the search for cultural identities (“community”), and the

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“decentralization of state power” to city government and neighborhoods.” Which, Domhoff says, “in turn relate to the three themes that dominate all of recent world history.” To quote Castells, (1983, p. 326):

> The three goals that are crucial factors in the fulfillment of urban social movements are precisely the three alternative projects to the modes of production and modes of development that dominate our world. The city as a use value contradicts the capitalist form of the city as exchange value. The city as a communication network opposes the one-way information flow characteristic of the information mode of development. And the city as a political entity of free self-management opposes the reliance on the centralized state as an instrument of authoritarianism and a threat of totalitarianism. Thus the fundamental themes and debates of our history are actually the raw material of the urban movements.

Local government expresses the interests of the dominating capitalist class in cities, “for expansion, for social control of the masses, for collective services, and for the reproduction for social and economic arrangements in each generation” (Altschuler and Luberoff, 2003, p. 63). According to Altschuler and Luberoff (2003, p. 64), when publics mobilize “The benefits provided to mass publics…are best understood as instruments of social control, designed to head off threats of civic disruption. And such benefits tend to be withdrawn when mass mobilization wanes—as it invariably does within a few years. Even so, the long-term trend is toward escalation in the costs of social control, producing ever more serious fiscal crises. This is a major ‘contradiction of capitalism.’”

According to Domhoff, Marxists see people only as workers and reduce all conflicts to class struggles. “That is, most Marxists fail to distinguish the defense of neighborhood use values from class struggles over exploitation and surplus value” (Domhoff online article). He quotes David Harvey on this point: “Conflicts in the living space are, we can conclude, mere reflections of the underlying tension between capital and labor. Appropriators and the construction faction mediate the forms of conflict—they stand between capital and labor and thereby shield the real source of tension from view.
The surface appearance of conflicts around the built environment—the struggles against
the landlords or against urban renewal—conceals a hidden essence that is nothing more
than the struggle between capital and labor (Harvey, 1976, p. 289 quoted by Domhoff).

This study does not seek to evaluate all of the competing urban theories. Instead,
what is advanced is the urban growth coalition variant of regime theory by Logan and
Molotch, in which the basic dichotomy in the community is over exchange value and use
value that crystallizes around two competing coalitions: the urban growth coalition that
seeks to form a growth machine and the opposition of use value interest groups like
neighborhood associations and environmental groups, which are not motivated by
economic concerns alone.

A social network approach was used to carry out the empirical investigation of
identifying the city’s community elite. However, instead of drawing on the growth
collection theory and deductively predetermining who the elites in a community are likely
to be, the study takes an inductive approach by identifying community elites as they are
found in social networks of influence (in terms of position, reputation, and issue-based)
in the community. The following two sections situate this study within the network
approaches to defining and locating community elites.

2.10 Network Approach to Defining Community Elites

The network approach to defining community elites takes as its starting point a
political economy framework, which seeks to explain community power in terms of the
network positions that both limit and enable actors in the community. Elites form the
leadership structure of organizations, which are, in turn, nested in interorganizational
relationships (IOR) in the community. Power in the community thus resides with those
that can govern the IOR in the community. What follows in this section is a brief
overview of the network approaches to defining elites.

Galaskiewicz (1979) defines elites as institutional actors that have the compulsion
or desire to control (have power over) the various networks, or structures, in the
community. According to Laumann and his collaborators (Laumann and Pappi 1973;
Laumann et al. 1977; 1978; Laumann and Marsden 1979) an elite can be identified by the
social structure of the decision making processes, defined as “the regularized pattern of
communication and exchange of information pertinent to community affairs among
community leaders” (1973, p. 595) within a community. For Laumann and his
collaborators, the elite are those leaders or high ranking officers of organizations that are
in a structural position of power, and who use that position to bring about a particular
outcome on some community issue. The elite are those in the structural position to have
influence on the affairs of the community. Like Laumann and his colleagues, Freeman et
al. (1963) take community leadership to reflect those who are in the most likely position
to be able to influence community decisions, by first selecting community problems or
issues (a common approach for interorganizational studies: Clark 1968; Gould 1989;
Laumann et al. 1977), then interviewing those in positions of decision-making, in both
their organizations and the community, about their involvement and the involvement of
other organizational actors.

For Perrucci and Pilisuk (1970) “the resources relevant to the existence of power
are dispersed and reside in the interorganizational connections that may be mobilized in
specific situations, particularly dealing with allocations of scarce values” (1970, pp.
1042-43). According to Perrucci and Pilisuk, power in a community is concentrated in
the hands of those that occupy multiple organizational positions. They argue that “no one person…can be sufficiently instrumental in initiating or shaping the final outcome of any one or several issues” so that in order to influence decision-making, actors must “draw upon the resources of others as well as their own in order to exercise their power” (1970, p. 1042). They state that “It is not the potency of the individual but the shape of the web (in which he is a node) which depicts the structure of enduring community power” (1970, p. 1044).

Bonjean and his collaborators (Bonjean and Olson 1964; Bonjean 1971; Bonjean and Grimes 1974; Grimes, Bonjean, Lyon, and Lineberry 1976) determine leadership structures—or community elites—by the extent to which: (1) individuals hold elected or appointed government positions (legitimacy), (2) are recognized by others in the community as being important decision-makers (visibility), and (3) there is agreement among actors on policy issues and general values (consensus). For Bolland (1985, p. 155) the agenda-setting capacities of local community leaders are influenced by the density of the network (ratio of observed-to-possible linkages among network members), isolation (number of individuals who are disconnected from the primary network), heterophily (proportion of network linkages that connect individuals with dissimilar attributes), and topological distance (average distance among members).

Topological distance, for Bolland, is determined by the unity of a network. He says, “If the density of a network were unity, all of its members could communicate directly, and the topological distance of the network would be 1.0” (1985, p. 156). He adds, however, that “in reality, network density often deviates considerably from unity, and intermediaries are often required to transmit messages from one part of the network
Topological distance is related to the concept of network differentiation, “which is the extent to which a network is dominated by distinct cliques (i.e. densely-connected subnetworks whose members interact with one another relatively more frequently than with other members of the network)” (1985, p. 156).

Benson (1975, p. 234) defines powerful actors in a community network as those who have a large group of support for their organization, can mobilize that support, and have a high social ranking. For Benson, then, elites, or central actors, will be those who occupy positions that others have to go through in order to accomplish a goal, or are connected to the larger community of organizations (e.g., political parties, racial and ethnic groups, and religious groups).

In an attempt to determine where community power resides, Perrucci and Pilisuk (1970), conclude that interorganizational elites (those individuals in a community who are members of more than one organization) are more likely than organizational elites who do not have common memberships to be both recognized as more powerful (reputational power) and have more actual power in community affairs. They note that, consistent with Laumann et al. (1977), power is a property of interorganizational ties, which “can be described in terms of resource networks” (1970, p. 1040). Interorganizational leaders are more likely, they discovered, to be identified as participants in past community issues, to have a reputation of power, to have similar values, and see other leaders socially (1970, p. 1040). Perrucci and Pilisuk see power as an institutional variable. They argue that these interorganizational leaders have the (potential) power to direct and maintain the directions of public policy. Additionally, through the domination of the media by political backing, public relations campaigns, and
lobbying, they can “guard the agenda of public controversy” to prevent certain issues from reaching the “status of a community issue” (p. 1041). To summarize Perrucci and Pilisuk’s main contribution, then, community power is in the connections among interorganizational elites. In these connections issues between influentials can be discussed and resolved without them going to “print.” It is when they are unresolved that they show up on the radar of the local media and thus become community issues.

Drawing on the work of Laumann and Pappi (1973, 1976), and in a similar vein as Perrucci and Pilisuk (1970), Laumann, Marsden, and Galaskiewicz (1977), refer to the social structure of community as “the regularized pattern of communication and exchange of information pertinent to community affairs among community leaders” (p. 595). The community elite can be identified as those who have the capacity to act within informal social roles, including “ascertaining available support for a proposal, soliciting support, advocating, organizing and mobilizing supporters, and arbitrating and negotiating” (1977, p. 597). For Laumann et al. (1977), the focus of community studies should be on the nature of the exchanges between organizational leadership. Through these ties we can see, they argue, not only the roles different organizational elite actors play, but also the values that are likely to characterize the community of elites, and consequently, the community.

According to Brass, et al., (2004), organizations are like individuals, in that they “extend ties in the direction of valuable information and resources,” but are “constrained by their managers’ levels of experience and of trust in potential contacts” (p. 807). Similarly, Laumann, Marsden, and Galaskiewicz concern themselves with the communicative exchange among elites as the “essential precondition for the resolution of
local issues‖ (1977, p. 595). The authors focus their attention on what Laumann and Pappi call instrumental issues, ―which deal with the allocation of scarce resources,‖ and expressive (consummatory) issues, ―which involve basic values and commitments guiding the conduct of community affairs‖ (1977, p. 601). They speculate that these expressive issues are more likely to result in the use of the mass media because they tend to have “an ‘all or nothing’ character” resulting from “clearly held value commitments that may become threatened by particular outcomes, resulting in more heated controversy, and ‘mobilization of contending population subgroups’” (1977, p. 601). In line with Coleman (1974), Galaskiewicz (1976), and Turk (1973), they find that “as systems grow, the relative importance of organizations versus persons as actors should increase” (1977, p. 624).

The utilization of a network method for finding community power relationships is found in Galaskiewicz’s (1979, p. 1347) study of the structure of community organizational networks where competition over resources produces interorganizational network structures. According to his view of interorganizational ties:

Structural patterns in interorganizational networks are the product of a competitive process in which organizations strive to meet certain needs through the exchange of certain resources. Money, information, and support are three resources that are used in this process. Through their exchange, networks are formed and these networks, in turn, define a hierarchy of relations among actors (1979, p. 1347).

Employing a political economic framework, Galaskiewicz argues that the routinization, or institutionalization, of transactions reduces uncertainty among organizational actors. However, as a result of these tactical connections, hierarchies among organizations form (1979, p. 1347). These routine transactions constitute network connections, of which he identifies three: (1) money networks, including manufacturing, retail, and financial institutions; (2) information networks, including law firms, the
media, and voluntary associations; and (3) support networks, including health, education, welfare, and religious organizations. He concludes that in order to understand the structure of the larger community (or the macrosocial level) a nuanced understanding of the alliances and competition among organizations on the micro level is necessary. In fact, he argues that the macrosocial level of the larger community is a byproduct of this competition among organizations at the microlevel (p. 1361).

In addition to reducing uncertainty among organizations, according to Galaskiewicz (1985), Oliver (1990) and Longoria (2005), organizations collaborate with other organizations to comply with the expectations of the organizational environment to appear legitimate. To state it another way, collaboration may occur because organizations seek to appear legitimate to other organizations and the rhetoric of the importance of collaboration from service industries and the community at large is a powerful motivator. Oliver (1990) describes this motivation as follows:

Institutional environments impose pressures on organizations to justify their activities. These pressures motivate organizations to increase their legitimacy in order to appear in agreement with prevailing norms, rules, beliefs, or expectations of external constituents. Legitimacy can originate from an organization’s motives to demonstrate or improve its reputation, image, prestige, or congruence with prevailing norms in its institutional environment. (p. 246)

The characteristics of elites can be summarized as follows. Community elites can be defined as people who occupy leadership positions within an organization, and have ties to other leaders in other organizations (Galaskiewicz 1979; Laumann and Pappi 1976). Elites occupy central positions in decision-making networks within communities (Gould 1989; Galaskiewicz 1985). Elites who occupy multiple leadership positions in the community are more powerful than those who occupy only a leadership position in their own organizations (Perrucci and Pilisuk 1970). Community elites are central in the interorganizational ties of a community, because, as elites, they are critical “in
maintaining or increasing the integration among groups, since their departure would severe the ties between groups” (Brass et al., 2004, p. 808). Actors who perform bridging roles, in that they link otherwise disconnected groups within a larger network, “are likely to know more and to have influence in the larger, external networks” (2004, p. 808). Elites will have legitimacy, visibility, and will be able to build a consensus around their issues to achieve their goals (Bonjean and Olson 1964; Bonjean 1971; Bonjean and Grimes 1974; Grimes, Bonjean, Lyon, and Lineberry 1976). Finally, elites can be identified by their ability to accomplish their agenda, which is a function of their relationship to the network, as well as the configuration of the network, of which they form a part (Bolland, 1985).

This literature indicates that finding those community members that appear most structurally central in the interorganizational ties of a community results in the identification of the community elites. Interorganizational networks appear more influential as they allow individuals access to communication channels that carry with them influence.

Another way to talk about influence is to invoke the concept of power. For Fuchs, power “is constructed as the ability to make a difference, and as the cause for this difference” (2001, p. 259). For Fuchs, “power is never ‘had,’ or not had, by a node in a network, regardless of whether this node is a scientific statement, a person, an office, an organization, or a state” (2001, p. 259). According to Fuchs, power resides in the relationships in a network, not the nodes.

However, when a network is organized by actors to be powerful, to exert influence over a community in terms of the outcome or trajectory of a community issue
or policy, then those that constitute the network, and who occupy central locations within it, become important for increasing our understanding of the operation of the community. Identifying powerful or influential actors requires identifying those networks of influence. The argument made here is that leaders in interorganizational networks in a community are more likely to be perceived as powerful (influential) and more likely to be in positions to flex their collective power, or exert influence, in the community.

This perspective does not assume that organizations or individuals that constitute these “power networks” or “influence networks” act according to some rational choice or economic logic. The extensive organizational literature that explains macrostructures in terms of aggregated exchanges among rational individuals and/or organizations in order to reduce uncertainty and increase trust and commitment (Kollock, 1994; Lawler, 200; Barden and Mitchell, 2007), or exercise power (Cook and Emerson, 1978; Yamagishi et al., 1988; Yamagishi and Cook, 1990; Whitmeyer, 2001) suffer from the error of reductionism (Fuchs, 1989, p. 170). According to Fuchs, “the rational choice or economic paradigm asserts that macrostructures “aggregate” the effects of individual actions directed toward the maximization of rewards and minimization of costs” (1989, pp. 169-170). This, according to Fuchs, is a fatal error, because, “it would be just as inappropriate to say that because individuals ‘consist of’ cells, we can ‘reduce’ the meaning of ‘individuality’ to associations among cells” (1989, p. 177). He adds, “ontologically, interactions are not ‘more real’ than individuals or organizations; and methodologically, ‘consisting of’ does not imply ‘being reduced to’” (1989, p. 177). In other words, social networks serve as the level of analysis because they are interesting.

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8 The error of reductionism, according to Lorimer, (1999, p. 8), “supposes that the complex object is somehow composed of simple, homogeneous ‘natural’ parts, which exist prior to and in isolation from the object.”
and important in themselves, and that the interorganizational and issue-based networks of elites cannot be disaggregated to the individuals that constitute them. Networks have emergent properties; they are novel in themselves and irreducible to a more simple level.

Similarly, Fuchs argues that the microsociology of symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology also suffer from an error of reductionism in that interactions are not reducible to individual behaviors, but that “interaction systems” such as interaction rituals or situated encounters “constitute the only social reality ‘sui generis’” (1989, p. 170, emphasis in original). Instead, Fuchs argues that “there are no ‘microfoundations’ of macrosciology but only different sociological ‘language games’ suitable for various analytical purposes” (1989, p. 170). The appropriate unit of analysis for the present study, is captured in Fuchs’ concept of interaction systems, which tries to “account for the emergent and irreducible properties of interaction systems sui generis” (1989, p. 180).

To elaborate on this point, according to Fuchs, it is interaction, not individual action, that is the proper unit of analysis, for “only interaction systems institutionalize copresence, and hence only interaction systems establish the double contingency characteristic of social systems in general” (1989, p. 180). Elites, operating within networks of influence seek to routinize interactions (institutionalize copresence) among themselves in order to survive (1989, p. 175). This is done symbolically through rituals, which “define membership, promote group solidarity and emotional security, and thus motivate individuals to continue participation” (1989, p. 175). Among community elites, board meetings, weekly or monthly business breakfasts and lunches, trade association meetings, golf games, service on governmental taskforces, and participation in various community events, reinforces group membership by increasing their copresence. At a
more symbolic level, contributing money through philanthropy to various community causes (like the United Way) reinforces elite membership among elites and the community at large.

Fuchs’ non-reductionist contribution to our understanding of elite networks can be interwoven with Sewell’s theory of structure as both authors see the importance of the power of relationships among members of a group to reconstitute itself (give it structure) through cultural and relational means. Individuals are not reducible to one network configuration. Instead, individuals are members of many network relationships, and to the extent that they are embedded within these various networks, the social capital (access to resources: Barden and Mitchell, 2007, p. 1440) bestowed on the individual is transferable, or to use Sewell’s term, transposable, from one network context to the next. Fuchs states, that because “groups must survive the end of particular encounters, they must take into account that their members have to fulfill various and possible conflicting obligations outside the group, they must schedule recurrent gatherings to make sure that everybody will show up” (1989, p. 175). The recurrent gatherings (structures) empower actors. To reiterate a quote by Sewell stated above, “Agents are empowered by structures, both by the knowledge of cultural schemas that enables them to mobilize resources and by the access to resources that enables them to enact schemas” (1992, p. 27).

2.11 Network Approaches to Locating Elites

At least three approaches to locating elites have been presented in the literature, including (1) the issue approach, (2) the reputational approach, and (3) the positional approach. What follows is a brief overview of efforts focusing on one or more of these
approaches. The purpose of this review is to note similarities and differences between what others have done and what is done in this study.

In an early study of the positional and the reputational approaches, Schulze and Blumberg (1957) found that “the two approaches produced sharply disparate results” (1957, p. 290). Situated in a Midwestern community they call Cibola in the Midwest with a population of 20,000, they interviewed eighty percent of the 180 voluntary associations, which served as their “nominating panel” for the reputational approach (p. 292). Those mentioned most by the panel constituted the “public leaders” of the community.

By comparison, the structural or positional approach, constituted identifying the “persons occupying the top formal status in the major local industrial and credit units” (1957, p. 292), which included “the heads of all industries employing 75 or more workers, the heads of all banks with total assets in excess of one million dollars, and in addition, persons who were members of the boards of directors of two or more of these industries and/or banks and who thus served in the formal ‘interlocking’ of the dominant economic units” (1957, p. 292). They found “almost no overlap between the public leaders and the economic dominants” (1957, p. 292). They say, “specifically, the 17 economic dominants included but 2 of the 18 public leaders in the community” (1967, p. 292).

For identifying persons filling the top political and civic positions in the community, Schulze and Blumberg identify fourteen “objectively defined public statuses” which include the “mayor, president of the chamber of commerce, chairman of the Community Chest, president of the largest labor union, county chairmen of the Republican and Democratic parties, commander of the largest American Legion post,
regent of the DAR, president of the women’s club, chairmen of the library and the school boards, the parent-teacher’s association, the bar association, and the publisher of the largest locally owned newspaper” (1957, pp. 292-293). For the political and civic leaders identified this way only 4 were common to those identified by the panel.

They conclude, “that the heads of voluntary associations definitely make a distinction between those persons who occupied the top formal political and civic offices and those who, in their opinion, wielded the most influence and exerted the greatest public leadership in the community” (1957, p. 293). As for the lack of perception on the part of the heads of voluntary associations mentioning economic dominants, the authors suggest that “considerable social distance” existed between them and the “‗real’ centers of local power and influence” (1957, p. 293).

In a similar vein, Walton’s (1966) often cited comparative study of thirty-three studies across fifty-five communities revealed that, based on the method—reputational, decision-making, or case study approaches—the community power structure would likely be pyramidal, factional, coalitional, or amorphous (1966, p. 434). Walton claimed that sociologists using the reputational approach were likely to find pyramidal power structures, while political scientists were more likely to find decentralized power structures through the use of a decision-making method (Nelson, 1974, p. 532). Nelson (1974) challenges this conclusion—which is echoed in Curtis and Petras’ (1970) replication of Walton’s work—on the grounds that the classification rests on a secondary analysis of studies that provided incomplete or insufficient data to categorize the thirty-three studies consistently into the four types of community power structure.
Seiler (1975) also reanalyzed Walton’s data to test the reputational and non-reputational methods and did not find support for Walton’s conclusions. She concluded that Walton’s data cannot determine whether one method of identifying community leadership structures is more valid than the others (1975, p. 275). She claims that the reputational method “tends to locate pyramidal and non-pyramidal power structures” (1975, p. 272).

Clearly, from Schulze and Blumberg, Walton, Curtis and Petras, and Nelson’s warnings about method, a clear definition of the dependent variable, community power structure, and a blended approach that incorporates reputational as well as non-reputational approaches is superior.

In an effort to overcome the shortcomings of the reputational approach and issue approach, Laumann and Pappi (1973), in their study of a German town with a population of 20,000, which they referred to with the pseudonym Altneustadt, opt for a “structuralist, or positional approach,” which follows “Parsons’ view of the community as a territorially grounded social system embracing all aspects of social life” (1973, p. 215). They reject both the reputational approach because, they argue, it only measures reputation and not power. They reject the issue approach because, they argue, it “is conservative insofar as it is impossible to detect the impact of nondecisions on the status quo” (1973, p. 215).

The structuralist approach “asks instead, ‘which positions possess authority or generalized influence in that their incumbents can make binding decisions in their respective institutional sectors or will be consequential in the resolution of community-level issues?’” (1973, p. 215). From this starting point they “first identified prospective community influential as incumbents of the highest positions of authority in organized
collectivities whose primary responsibilities are in one of the four functionally
specialized institutional subsectors at the community levels of analysis” (1973, p. 215).

The four subsectors include,

- business firms and banks as economic organizations with *adaptive* primacy; top governmental
  administrative positions, judges, and legislative decision-making bodies as having *goal-attainment*
  primacy because they make binding decisions for the community as a whole; voluntary
  associations including unions and political parties as having *integrative* primacy as foci of interest
  group demands on the polity; and positions in education, health, religious and cultural
  organizations as having *pattern-maintenance* primacy (1973, p. 215).

Based on this design, Laumann and Pappi “obtained a list of fifty-one community
influentials in Altneustadt, of whom forty-six were successfully interviewed” (1973, p.
216). In addition, they asked respondents to “indicate those on the list whom they
considered ‘now in general very influential in Altneustadt’ and rank-ordered the number
of votes received by each person on the list” (1973, p. 216). They add, “In an effort to
validate this influence rank-order at least indirectly….At the beginning of the interview
before any mention of our list of influentials, respondents were asked to name persons
and groups perceived to be on the supporting and opposing side of five major community
issues” (1973, p. 216). They note, that “Most people mentioned frequently were on our
influential list” (1973, p. 216). Laumann and Pappi used the structuralist approach but
supplemented it with the reputational approach.

Laumann, Marsden, and Galaskiewicz (1977) use Laumann and Pappi’s (1973)
structuralist/reputational method of Altneustadt in Germany and apply it to two American
communities. The first is Towertown, which was similar in many respects to Altneustadt,
with a population of 32,000 and a larger state university and “middle-class character”
(1977, p. 599). The second community was River City, with a population of 80,000 but
with more racial and ethnic minorities and “working-class in life-style and orientation”
of leaders by positional methods, supplemented by ‘reputational leaders’ named by
respondents on the initial list” (1977, p. 600) was used. “Elite populations of 78 and 148
members were identified in Towertown and River City, respectively, 77 and 136 of
whom were actually interviewed” (1977, p. 600).

In addition, “In each community, five local issues were selected for intensive
study” (1977, p. 600). Issues were broken down into two general categories, drawing on
Laumann and Pappi’s (1973) distinction between instrumental issues and expressive
(consummatory) issues, mentioned previously. They reference Molotch (1977) who
draws from Edelman’s (1964) work, who “contrasts the politics of goods and services
distribution, related to ‘growth’ issues, with ‘symbolic’ politics dealing with issues of
public morality” (1977, p. 601). The five issues for each town were selected by the
researchers, and, based on respondents’ and newspaper accounts, were coded by the
researchers as either instrumental or consummatory.

Finally, Laumann, Marsden, and Galaskiewicz “gave each respondent a list of the
persons in the elite and asked a simple sociometric question: ‘Could you please indicate
the three persons with whom you most frequently discuss community affairs?’” (1977, p.
602). In addition, they asked respondents in both communities “who acknowledged
taking an active part in attempting to influence the outcome of a particular issue to
indicate all the persons on the list with whom they had discussed that topic” (1977, p.
602).

For Laumann, Marsden, and Galaskiewicz, then, a blend of all three approaches
was used, where the initial structuralist approach which resulted in identifying interview
subjects was supplemented with both the reputational approach, where respondents were
asked to identify others in the community, and the issue approach, where respondents were asked to identify others they communicated with on particular issues.

Similarly, Galaskiewicz’s (1979) in his study of Towertown’s organizational networks, began with a structuralist approach. He made his target population “all industries, banks, savings and loans, newspapers, radio stations, service clubs, fraternal organizations, business associations, unions, law firms, health agencies, high schools, welfare agencies, churches, professional associations, county offices, municipal offices, and political parties” and excluded “commercial establishments, transportations facilities, public utilities, real estate offices, block clubs, community organizations, and elementary schools… due to time and budget constraints” (1979, p. 1350). Interviews with the highest ranking officers were conducted on 73 of 109 identified organizations. Respondents were presented with a list of the 109 organizations and asked “a series of questions on the organization’s ties to the others on the list” including whether “their organization routinely gave money, information, and support and those from which they received each resource” (1979, p. 1350). Incorporating the reputational approach as well, respondents were also asked which organizations they felt were especially influential in the community affairs to get at centrality.

Utilizing the same method, Galaskiewicz and Krohn (1984) expanded on Galaskiewicz’s 1979 study by incorporating into their study River City. In addition to the executives in the 73 organizations interviewed in the Towertown study conducted in 1979, the River City site included interviews with 104 of the 192 identified organizations. Perrucci and Lewis (1989) replicated and extended the structuralist and reputational approaches of a study done by Perrucci and Pilisuk’s (1970) of the influence
structure of a Midwestern community in 1969. Following the procedures of Perrucci and Pilisuk (1970), Perrucci and Lewis’s research design included four tasks:

(1) to identify a population of organizations in the community with 10 or more employees or members; (2) to identify persons who hold upper executive positions in many organizations and match them with persons with upper executive positions in few organizations; (3) to interview persons from both groups in order to determine (a) actual participation as influentials in community decision-making, (b) reputations for power in the community, (c) value similarity on social and political issues, and (d) personal relationships; and (4) to determine from the pattern of interlocking ties among organizations whether or not an “inner circle” or dense network of ties exists (1989, p. 209).

The sources for the list of organizations included the Chamber of Commerce directory, local newspaper annual reports of business and commerce, the telephone directory, city directory, Standard and Poor’s Directory, and the community service directory. Once the set of organizations was identified, which culminated in 1,015 organizations with 10 or more employees or members, the list of “persons in upper executive positions was obtained,” which “included presidents, vice-presidents, directors of boards, and/or managers where appropriate” (1989, p. 210). Individuals were identified through the same technique used to identify organizations but telephone and mail questionnaires were also used. In the end 3,981 organizational leaders were identified. Individuals were designated as interorganizational leaders (IOL) if they held “upper executive positions in five or more organizations” (1989, p. 210). In all, 20 individuals in a city with a population of 75,000 people met this criterion.

The interviews, for Perrucci and Lewis, consisted of three sections: “The first section was devoted to general demographic characteristics of the leaders, their residence patterns, and their level of general social participation in community affairs” (1989, p. 210). “The second section was devoted to (1) identifying persons who were involved in shaping two salient community issues (issue-specific power); (2) the free generation of names of persons reputed to be ‘most influential in initiating, supporting, and shaping
policy decisions which have the most effect on the community as a whole (reputational power); and (3) the identification of the 10 most influential persons from a list of 54 persons” from the original study conducted in 1969 (1989, p. 210). The final section of their interview “was devoted to respondent’s attitudes on matters of local and national policy including taxes, federal intervention in community life, and military expenditures” (1989, p. 211).

Other studies that blend either the possitional, reputational, or issue based approaches include Boje and Whetten’s (1981) comparative study of client referral networks in 17 communities in a large mid-western state and Bolland’s (1985) study of six communities on urban agenda-setting networks. Through a process of field interviewing and compilation of lists of social service agencies in the communities, Boje and Whetten selected the top agency administrators of 316 organizations. Drawing on the method of Laumann and Pappi (1976), Galaskiewicz (1979), and Rogers and Maas (1979), respondents were asked “to identify the network members they felt were particularly influential in shaping the formation of policies related to employment and training activities” (1981, p. 387). This study begins with a structural approach to identify key organizations and then proceeds to identify reputational leaders through the interview process.

For Bolland (1985), interviews in each of 13 study sites across four states were conducted with between 35 and 62 of a total of between 100 and 150 identified political participants. Political participants were identified through newspaper reports and informant interviews (1985, p. 161). Using a snowball sampling technique, respondents were asked, “how many days in an average month during the past year they had contact”
with the other identified political participants presented to them on a list (1985, p. 161). In addition, respondents were also asked, “to identify the 10 people on the list who had the greatest impact on the policy arena and to rank them in order of their importance” (1985, p. 161). Policy arenas were predetermined by the researchers and consisted of two areas, education and health care. The range of populations of the cities included in studies was from between 7500 and 100,000 (185, p. 160).

One final study worthy of mentioning is Clark’s (1968) study of 51 American communities. The 51 cities included in the study represented 22 states and ranged in population size from 50,000 to 750,000, with a mean of 250,786 (1968, p. 577). The decision was made to interview eleven “strategically placed informants in each community” including: “the mayor, the chairmen of the Democratic and Republican parties, the president of the largest bank, the editor of the newspaper with the largest circulation, the president of the chamber of commerce, the president of the bar association, the head of the largest labor union, the health commissioner, the urban renewal director, and the director of the last major hospital fund drive” (1968, p. 579). In each community these informants were interviewed on the same four issues: “urban renewal, the election of the mayor, air pollution, and the anti-poverty program” (1968, p. 579). Respondents were asked to identify on each issue “1. Who initiated action on the issue?” “2. Who supported this action?” “3. Who opposed this action?” “4. What was the nature of the bargaining process; who negotiated with whom?” and “5. What was the outcome? Whose views tended to prevail?” (1968, p. 580). Clark’s study does not incorporate a reputational approach, but instead utilizes a structural approach where each
community is characterized by the perspectives of less than a dozen key position-holders in the community.

This review of some of the most referenced community power structure studies has focused on the utilization of one or a combination of three approaches, including a structural or positional approach, an issue based approach, and a reputational approach. These approaches as well as the size and locations of the communities across these studies varied and are summarized in Table 1.

Many of the studies reviewed above occurred in the Midwest in communities with rather small populations are likely homogeneous with regard to ethnicity and religion. The German town of Altneustadt also was a small community. Clark’s study had an average population of 250,786 and included 51 communities that spanned 22 states but had the most restricted method for identifying elites. The communities in Bolland’s predominantly western cities study ranged in population from 7,700 to 100,700. Although these studies take varied approaches to identifying community power structures, ranging from positional, reputational, and issue based, they are all quantitative endeavors.

The present study builds on these earlier studies by replicating some of the techniques for identifying the community power structure. In particular, this study begins with a positional approach, cataloging the leadership configuration of organizations in the community. This is followed by a reputational approach in that respondents identified as structurally central were asked to identify others that they felt were influential in the community. Finally, leaders identified by both the positional and reputational approaches were asked to identify issues and individuals or organizations they felt were influential on those issues.
### Table 1. Summary of study populations of reviewed methodologies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author and Year</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Number of Communities</th>
<th>Population of Communities</th>
<th>Location of Communities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schulze and Blumberg's (1957)</td>
<td>Positional; reputational</td>
<td>1 (Cibola)</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>Midwest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. Clark (1968)</td>
<td>Positional; Issue based</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>250,786 (Avg.)</td>
<td>22 States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perrucci and Pilisuk (1970)</td>
<td>Positional; reputational</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>Midwest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laumann and Pappi (1973)</td>
<td>Positional; Reputational; Issue Based</td>
<td>1 (Altneustadt)</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laumann, Marsden, and Galaskiewicz (1977)</td>
<td>Positional; Reputational; Issue Based</td>
<td>2 (Towertown; River City)</td>
<td>(32,000; 80,000)</td>
<td>Midwest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galaskiewicz (1979)</td>
<td>Positional; Reputational; Issue Based</td>
<td>1 (Towertown)</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>Midwest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boje and Whetten’s (1981)</td>
<td>Structural; reputational</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Not given</td>
<td>Midwest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galaskiewicz and Krohn (1984)</td>
<td>Positional; Reputational; Issue Based</td>
<td>2 (Towertown; River City)</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>Midwest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolland (1985)</td>
<td>Positional; reputational</td>
<td>7 (13 studies within)</td>
<td>7,700-100,700 (Range)</td>
<td>4 States (Washington, Montana, Colorado, Ohio)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perrucci and Lewis (1989)</td>
<td>Positional; reputational</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>Midwest</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hunter (1985, pp. 605-606) contrasts two propositions that arise from studies of community elite structures. The structural position model, the first, posits “that the structure of local elites is more a function of a community’s size and ecological position in the metropolitan region” than a function of the “social class composition of community residents.” The social class composition model posits that when a high proportion of a community’s residents are classified as managerial or professional, there is a decreased likelihood of conflict within the community (Hawley, 1963).

Hunter (1985) draws his observations about elite community power structures from previously community studies of satellite communities. As such, the findings of these studies—of which many are reviewed above—suggest two conclusions. The first
draws on Simmel’s (1967) proposition that “large numbers create a ‘critical density’ in which diversity becomes structurally, not simply individually, organized” (1985, p. 606). To this point, Hunter states that “in larger satellite communities individuals having diverse interests are sufficiently numerous to create a greater number of clearly identifiable cliques than are found in smaller more homogeneous dormitory suburbs” (1985, p. 606). The second conclusion Hunter draws, is that, as communities grow in size, institutions become increasingly diversified (Hunter, 1985, p. 606; Berry and Kasarda, 1977). Related to the increased size of the community is the increased complexity of the power structure (more institutional interests), economic structure (more institutional economic actors), and status structure (more “voluntary organizations that serve as a basis of cross-cutting linkages among elites”) (1985, p. 606). Unfortunately Hunter’s conclusion that, “larger and more institutionally differentiated satellite communities have more complex class, status, and power structures…than…smaller dormitory suburbs,” is drawn from differences found in communities of populations that ranged from 5,000 to 80,000 people.

This study differs, however, from these earlier studies in that it focuses on a larger urban center, instead of, for instance, rural college towns like Cibola, Towertown, and Altneustadt. Even Bolland’s study of a community that surpassed 100,000 people is much smaller than the present study. The larger comparative study of Clark (1973) gets closer to the population of this study but his study only focused on a small fraction of the leadership community in each city investigated. Instead of satellite cities of larger urban centers or smaller cities, this study seeks to understand the community power structure of a large urban center.
Across all of these studies in search of community power structures, the variability in the size of the community appears to consistently influence the configuration of the community power structure. Clark’s (1973) comparative study found that as communities grow in size the power structure becomes more decentralized. In addition, Hunter (1985) found that, although all four of the communities he studied revealed a “pyramid” structure of “reputed power,” the two largest communities had a “more complex ‘deferential’ power structure among several distinct cliques,” compared to the smaller community that had a “‘hierarchical’ power structure dominated by a single elite clique” (p. 614). The present study, unfortunately, lacks a comparative dimension in that it does not study several communities of varying sizes. It does, however, work towards an understanding of a large community’s elite power structure by utilizing positional, reputational, and issue based approaches.

The implication of community size found in previous community studies is that community size matters, in that the larger the community, the more differentiated and complex the power structure. It stands to reason that the present study should find a community power structure that is decentralized, complex, differentiated, and comprised of several cliques; this topic is addressed in the next chapter. To tie this discussion in with the urban growth coalition theory, it is possible that a small exclusive group of growth oriented economic actors will have greater difficulty maintaining control over the powerful economic and political networks in larger cities. It might occur that the growth coalition will appear more amorphous, unstructured, or fluid, as the number of organizations and individuals increases to a point that hinders the leadership community’s efforts to establish concerted pressure for growth oriented causes. To
invoke the concept of copresence, the larger the city, the more difficult it will be to reproduce a homogenous elite because reinforcement of the group through copresence becomes increasingly difficult. It should be expected then, that central to the leadership structure in larger communities will be those organizations that bring together in copresence the community elite, like business organizations. This, in fact, appears to be the case in this community, as is demonstrated in Chapter Seven.

2.12 Summary

The preceding discussion of an approach to understanding community power structures as a emergent property of the interrelationship of network configurations and cultural schemas that constrain and enable actors lay beyond the dyadic reductionism of exchange theory. Instead, to proceed with a truly cultural understanding of the community elite, a sophisticated understanding of the web of relationships that give actors the context for understanding action must be undertaken. From a practical point of view, uncovering the actors who comprise the webs of influence in the community must be carried out before it is possible to understand the cultural significance of these powerful networks for the community.
III. Method: Network Approaches to Studying Community Elites

3.1 Introduction

Below is a detailed discussion of how the elites in the community were located, contacted, and interviewed. Additionally, the steps taken to analyze the collected data are discussed. The first part of this chapter serves as a brief overview of the community and the sources of data for the identification of community leaders. The second part of the chapter details the steps taken to analyze these data. The presentation of the identified leaders is reserved for Chapter Four. The third part explains the process of contacting the identified elites. The fourth part discusses the prestige method employed in the interviews. The results of this method are compared with the affiliation technique in Chapter Four as well.

3.2 The Community

Laumann, Marsden, and Prensky (1983) identify “realist” and “nominalist” approaches to specifying the boundaries of a study population. The realist approach “focuses on actor set boundaries and membership as perceived by the actors themselves” (Wasserman and Faust 1994, p. 31). The nominalist approach, “is based on the theoretical concerns of the researcher” (1994, p. 32). The boundary for the population in this study, like the nominalist approach, was determined deductively to be those based in the city. The realist approach was used as well, but as a secondary technique to capture those
community elite that were not identified through the nominalist approach. For instance, the more inductive reputational and the issue-based approaches asked respondents to mention any relevant individuals and/or organizations in the community, which allowed for the location of those influential individuals to be located outside the city limits. The nominalist approach was adopted as a starting point over the realist approach for the obvious reason that there was not a ready-made list of community elites to ask about the boundaries of their ties. That list needed to be made. To accomplish this initial task, community directories were consulted. The published lists of individuals, once analyzed, reveal those actors most central in the community, and by implication more influential.

The community is located in the Southwestern United States and is the largest city in the state. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the projected population of the city in 2007 was just over 500,000, with a total metropolitan population of a little over 800,000. The city also ranked just outside the top 30 largest cities and in the top five fastest growing cities in the United States. In 2006 the Hispanic population of the city was approximately 44% while the African American population was 3.1%, the American Indian population was 5.2%, and whites constituted 65% of the population. The median family income in 2006 inflation-adjusted dollars was just over $55,000 while the national average was $58,526. The per capita income in 2006 inflation-adjusted dollars was approximately $24,000 while the national average was $25,267. Poverty in the city was higher than the national average with just over 10% of families below the poverty level compared to 9.8% for the nation. The city is home to the largest state university and has an international airport.
In order to identify community elites in this metropolitan area, it was first necessary to specify the criteria for qualification as elite. It seems to be the consensus in the community power literature that individuals in decision-making positions in their organizations are in the best position to exert influence in the community. This makes sense intuitively. Individuals who occupy top positions in more than one organization are in a position to exert more influence than those that only occupy a leadership position in their own organization. Thus, one approach to looking for evidence on elites is in the dynamics or relationships among interorganizational actors in a community.9

Identifying these interorganizational elites in the community included two steps. First, establishing the community structure was undertaken through the use of directories and other secondary data sources. Second, the data was analyzed and the most central members of the community were identified.

3.3 Construction of an Affiliation (Positional) Network—Directories and other data sources

Affiliation networks are two-mode networks; in this study the two modes are a set of individuals and a set of organizations. Affiliation networks “describe collections of actors rather than simply ties between pairs of actors” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p. 291). Wasserman and Faust elaborate on this point by stating, that, “Since activities usually contain several actors, rather than simply pairs of actors, an affiliation network contains information on collections of actors that are larger than pairs. Thus, affiliation

9 This is not to say that individuals unaffiliated with a formal organization cannot be influential in community affairs, but rather that in highly differentiated urban communities formal organizations and their leaders are likely to be central to the decision-making process underlying community affairs, among other influential behavior.
networks cannot be analyzed thoroughly by looking at pairs or dyads of actors or events” (1994, p. 294). Affiliation networks are relational in three ways: “first, they show how the actors and events are related to each other; second, the events create ties among actors; and third, the actors create ties among events” (1994, p. 295). Theoretically, multiple memberships or affiliations in different organizations are important in an individual’s social identity (Simmel, 1955). As Simmel stated it, “Thus one can say that society arises from the individual and the individual arises out of association” (1955, p.150). The individual “is determined sociologically in the sense that the groups ‘intersect’ in his person by virtue of his affiliation with them (1955, p. 150).

The intersection of persons in interorganizational space serves as the starting point for identifying community elites. Borrowing from Domhoff’s (2006) power elite study at the national level, this study utilized as many published resources on organizations in the community available. Identification of interorganizational relationships was done by cross-referencing the various highest ranking officers or administrators in the following community organizational directories: Dun and Bradstreet Million Dollar Directory, the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, the Foundation Directory, and the Foundation Grants Index (Domhoff, 2006).10 Although a measure of continuity of leadership from year to year is a reasonable expectation in a community, a check on the changes in leadership within the organizations in the 2003 version was accomplished through the utilization of Reference USA’s online database and

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10 All of these directors were found in the library system at the University of New Mexico. The Foundation Grant Index was the only directory on CD-Rom. All the other directories were bound-paper copies. The most current available copy of the Dun and Bradstreet Million Dollar Directory was 2003.
the state’s weekly business magazines annual list of power brokers.\textsuperscript{11} The weekly business magazine’s annual lists contained within it 69 lists, including 1,549 businesses and 1,887 contacts.\textsuperscript{12} This publication served as a third check on the initial list of directories.

The community affiliation network that was ultimately created consisted of 7,552 leaders in 2,408 organizations. (For a detailed account of data collection steps and related issues see Appendix 1.)

\textbf{3.4 Analysis of Community Affiliation Network Data}

Through the use of network analysis it is possible to identify the \textit{structure} of community leadership. “The main goal of social network analysis is detecting and interpreting patterns of social ties among actors” (de Nooy et al., 2005, emphasis in original). Wasserman and Faust note that “actors and their actions are viewed as interdependent rather than independent, autonomous units,” that “relational ties (linkages) between actors are channels for transfer or “flow” of resources,” that “network models focusing on individuals view the network structural environment as providing opportunities for or constraints on individual action,” and that “network models

\textsuperscript{11} The \textit{Reference USA} serves as a Yellow Page style directory for the community, and any time lags between the publication of the directories and my collection of the information in them should be diminished when updated organizational membership with the \textit{Reference USA} queries on businesses, government officials, non-profit organizations, lawyers, etc. was carried out. To match \textit{Dun and Bradstreet Million Dollar Directory}, \textit{the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory}, \textit{the Foundation Directory}, and the \textit{Foundation Grants Index}, which included organizations based on size, both in terms of revenue and members, the \textit{Reference USA} database was searched to query on the same dimensions. Additionally, websites of the organizations that were identified in the directories were searched to verify their leadership rosters. Most organization websites include links or lists of their executives and board members.

\textsuperscript{12} While inclusion for membership in the state’s business weekly publication differs from the selection requirements for the directories used in this study—i.e., the selection process is more idiosyncratic as well as includes organizations and leaders outside of the city—sifting through the various relevant lists for organizations and organizational actors from the city was a useful exercise.
conceptualize structure (social, economic, political, and so forth) as lasting patterns of relations among actors” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p. 4).

Ultimately, the utility of network analysis is to find the leaders in the community by identifying those who were most central. de Nooy, Mrvar, and Batagelj (2005) state that, “[s]olidarity, shared norms, identity, collective behavior, and social cohesion are considered to emerge from social relations,” and hypothesize that “people who match on social characteristics will interact more often and people who interact regularly will foster a common attitude or identity” (2005, p. 59). Wasserman and Faust state that “[a]ctors who are most important or the most prominent are usually located in strategic locations within the network” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p. 169). Some of the techniques used to identify the structure and the central actors in a network are degree, closeness, and betweenness. The type of technique used is determined by the type of network under study.

There are two types of “relational quantifications”: directional or nondirectional and dichotomous or valued. The data used in this study are both nondirected and dichotomous. “In a directional relation, the relational tie between a pair of actors has an origin and a destination; that is, the tie is directed from one actor in the pair to the other actor in a pair” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p. 44). Nondirected relations are simply the presence of a relationship with no inherent direction. A dichotomous relation simply notes the presence or absence of a relation for two actors where a valued relation may measure such attributes as the frequency, duration, intensity, and amount of a relation (1994, p. 44).
The first step to finding the central actors is to find out if the entire network is connected. If it turns out it is connected then a search for the most central actors of the entire network is done. If it turned out it is not connected, and there are sub-networks, or components, the task is to inspect all components to determine their character and composition.

3.4.1 The general structure
Affiliation networks are two-mode networks, consisting of a set of organizations and a set of individuals. Affiliation networks also consist of subsets of actors, instead of pairs of actors (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p. 291). To determine the general structure of the community the entire network of individuals and their organizational affiliations (organizations) needed to be converted to allow for measurements of centrality. Two-mode networks can be converted into one-mode networks of individuals X individuals and organizations X organizations. For the individual one-mode network, organizations serve as the ties between individuals, and for the organization one-mode network, individuals serve as the ties between organizations. While consideration of both the individual and organizational one-mode networks is considered in this study, the individual one-mode network is discussed more here because the concern at the present moment is to identify the community structure of individuals and determine if there is a set of actors that “qualify” as community elites.

13 Using the social network analysis freeware Pajek, the following steps were taken to accomplish this. First, the two-mode network was converted to a one-mode network. The first mode consisted of 7552 actors or leaders and the second mode consisted of 2408 organizations to which the actors belong. Once this dataset of actors (individuals) and events (organizations) was loaded into Pajek, it was converted from a two-mode network to a one-mode network (Net>Transform>2-Mode to 1-Mode > Columns/Rows), where the new network transformed the network to reflect the relationships actors have with other actors (the same process can be done for organizations which produces a new network of organizations that are connected to other organizations).
The density of the overall network of individuals (n=7,552) was 0.003. The density of a network is “the proportion of possible lines that are … present in a graph” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p. 101). The denser the network, the higher the proportion of possible lines is present in the network. A network can range from 0, where all of the actors are isolates and no lines are present, to 1, where all possible lines are present. When all possible lines are present, the network is said to be complete. One conclusion that can be drawn from this is that the ratio of observed lines to possible lines is very small (0.003) in the affiliation network. This network is not very dense, which is not too surprising given the size of the network of actors. It would be extremely surprising, and highly impractical, if a community of over half of a million people had a leadership network structure that was complete in that every actor was connected to every other actor. The leadership community would be very busy establishing and maintaining relationships.

The network of individuals can be further summarized by looking at the number of lines (or value) of connection between actors (this can be done for the network of organizations as well). de Nooy et al. define line multiplicity as “the number of times a specific line (ordered or unordered pair of vertices) occurs in a network” (2005, p. 322). (A vertex is a node or actor (organization, individual, concept, word, publication) that can be connected to other vertices by one or more lines or isolated from all other vertices, in which the vertex would have no lines connecting it to the rest of the network.) The vast majority (98.9%) of the people are connected to the network because of one connection to the network (one organizational affiliation). Only a few (1.1%) individuals are affiliated with the network through two or more connections (organizations).
Running the same data on organizations instead of individuals reveals that 2,111 organizations (88.9%) had no more than one person that served as a connection to another organization. Additionally, 184 organizations (7.7%) were connected by two people (or share at least one person in common, from the actors in the dataset). At the other extreme sixteen individuals connected a pair of organizations.

The general look of the entire network structure indicates that there are clearly a small number of individuals that are much more densely connected than the majority of actors. Such a large affiliation network of organizations and individuals begs a number of questions. For instance, are there subsets of actors that are more cohesive than others? Can smaller networks be found that are denser than the larger network? Answers to these questions can be obtained by searching for cohesive subgroups. Another method, discussed in Chapter Four is K-cores.

### 3.4.2 Connectedness (reachability) and cohesive subgroups

The connectedness of a network is important, especially if actors or events are channels of information exchange. If every organization is connected to every other organization through co-memberships of actors forming a path, what is called reachability, then information can get from any part of the network to any other part of the network (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p. 317). In the event that this is the case, the network is connected. A little over 18% of the entire network, or 1388 individuals, are isolates, in that they are not connected to two or more organizations. Clearly, this affiliation network is not connected as every organization is not reachable by a path of individuals.
It is also important to consider whether or not cohesive subgroups exist in the network. In other words, are there smaller subsets of actors in the network that maintain a minimum level of reachability? Cohesive subgroups, generally, are “subsets of actors among whom there are relatively strong, direct, intense, frequent, or positive ties” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p. 249). Cohesive subgroups are theoretically important because of “social forces operating through direct contact among subgroup members, through indirect conduct transmitted via intermediaries, or through the relative cohesion within as capered to outside the subgroup” (1994, p. 251). In their introduction to cohesive subgroups, the authors of Exploring Social Network Analysis with Pajek (de Nooy et al. 2005) say,

Social networks usually contain dense pockets of people who ‘stick together’…. Social interaction is the basis for solidarity, shared norms, identity, and collective behavior, so people who interact intensively are likely to consider themselves a social group…. This phenomenon is called homophily: birds of a feather flock together (2005, p. 61, emphasis in original)

Cohesive subgroups are essentially smaller chunks of a larger network that interact with a relative frequency greater than non-members of the subgroup in the network. There may be a very large number of cohesive subgroups. At one extreme, imagine a community whose organizations (banks, schools, businesses, civic associations, and the like) do not share directors. Each organization, made up of varying sizes of members would be, in effect, its own cohesive subgroup. This community would have no overlap of memberships. It is the overlap of interorganizational ties at a minimal level of relatedness that is of concern. The goal of using cohesive subgroups is to “describe the subsets of actors all of whom are connected at some minimum level” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p. 322).
Determining the number of cohesive subgroups in Pajek is very simple, although there are a couple of theoretical concepts that need to be considered first. Cohesive subgroups can either be defined as strongly connected or weakly connected, which corresponds to whether the network is directed or not directed. The affiliation data in this study are not directed so searching for weak or strong components does not matter. One other consideration is determining the minimum number of actors in a cohesive subgroup. The default in Pajek is three because a cohesive subgroup of one actor, an isolate, is not that interesting. Two actors are not that interesting either, so the minimum number of actors was kept at the default number of 3 (the triad).

A search for cohesive subgroups with at least three actors resulted in 257 cohesive subgroups. The vast majority were very small and trivial. Table 2 displays a partial listing of cohesive subgroups. The largest cohesive subgroup contained 4604 people (61% of the actors). This subgroup, where everyone could reach everyone else either directly or indirectly, became the network of interest. The next largest component had 55 actors in it (7.3%), while the third largest component had 26 actors (3.4%) and four components had 21 actors a piece (2.8% each). The components drop off to less than two percent of the total network after these small groups.

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14 A network is strongly connected if all of the actors can reach each other and but moving from one actor to the other requires obeying the direction of the line that connects them. In an undirected or weakly connected network, all the actors are connected but there is no inherent direction to the lines that connect actors. A friendship network can illustrate the difference. For a strongly connected network both friends would have to identify each other in the network. For a weakly connected network simply mentioning someone as a friend assumes that the other would also consider the other as a friend. There is no weight or value associated with the lines that connect them.

15 There were several steps taken to find the components of the network. First the data was converted from its original 2-mode (organizations by individuals) format to a simpler 1-mode (individuals by individuals) network to analyze. In a drop-down menu Pajek permits searching for cohesive subgroups or components by defining components by the minimum number of actors in it.
Do the smaller components matter? Without much work, it became obvious that the 4604 actor component contained the most central actors in the community. However, it is possible that the second largest component, which had a mere 55 people, or the 26 people in the next largest component, could have turned out to be a small circle of very influential actors. This does not seem to be the case. When the prestige list was compiled none of the 55 people were named as influential. The same is true for the next largest component.

Table 2. Partial display of Community Affiliation (CA) network’s cohesive subgroups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohesive Subgroups</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>% of Network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>4604</td>
<td>60.964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0.728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.185</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If only 55 people are in a subgroup, meaning that nobody else from the community sits on a board or shares a co-membership with them, it is also likely that the organization(s) that the individual is affiliated with are also rather isolated. A closer look at that second largest subgroup of 55 people reveals that only two people have an interorganizational tie, and their ties link three organizations, which consist of two
companies and a social service organization. The rest of the people that make up the subgroup have centrality scores of 0, which means that they are affiliated with their organization and no other in the community, and by virtue of their connection to their organization, are linked through the co-memberships of only these two actors to the rest of the subgroup. Figure 1 shows the representation of this subgroup. Note that the two large clusters are linked by only two individuals. These two individuals are not formally connected to any other organizations in the community. On the one hand, these two actors, at least within this small graph, are potentially influential in that they sit between many actors. On the other hand, their influence in the community, as far as can be told from the data, is restricted to these three organizations, for none of these actors are connected to the much larger subgroup of 4604 actors.

![Figure 1. Cohesive subgroup of 55 individuals.](image)

This small cohesive subgroup illustrates the limited usefulness of the smaller subgroups for understanding the community power structure. With a high degree of confidence, then, believing that the other subgroups do not amount to anything substantively, it is safe to proceed with uncovering the actors who appear, at least by
affiliation, most central in the community. What follows is a brief overview of the various centrality measures—degree, closeness, and betweenness—and the results obtained using these various methods.

### 3.4.3 Measuring centrality—degree

Wasserman and Faust (1994) state that “the simplest definition of actor centrality is that central actors must be the most active in the sense that they have the most ties to other actors in the network or graph” (1994, p. 178). To easily illustrate centrality, Wasserman and Faust compare a star to a circle (Figure 2). In the figure of the star the node numbered 1 is most central as all other actors must go through it to communicate with any other actors. For the circle, no single actor is more central than any other. This most basic measure of centrality is degree.

![Figure 2. Star and circle networks.](image)

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16 It is important to point out that one cannot say that just because one does not have an extensive interorganizational network that they are *not* influential. On the contrary, someone who appears isolated organizationally in the community may enjoy enormous political, cultural, or economic influence in a community. A celebrity, for instance, who resides in a community other than the one in which they work comes to mind. In this case, the individual’s celebrity carries weight where they reside but their organizational affiliations, professional associations and so on, are in another community.
According to de Nooy, “The degree of a vertex is the number of lines incident with it” (2005, p. 62). “An actor with a large degree is in direct contact or is adjacent to many other actors” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p. 179). An actor that is completely isolated will have a degree of 0. For the star graph, actor one has a degree score of 7-1=6 and each of the other actors has a score of 1. This is a measure of ego density, which is “the ratio of the degree of an actor to the maximum number of ties that could occur” (1994, p. 179). Each actor in the circle graph has a degree of 2—there are two other actors connected to each actor. In short, the higher the degree score, the more connection an actor has.

De Nooy et al. (2005) discuss degree in affiliation networks. According to de Nooy et al., “The degree of a firm specifies the number of its multiple directors” and that “The degree of a director equals the number of boards he sits on, which is called the rate of participation of an actor” (2005, p. 104). Further, “…the density of a two-mode network, which is the actual number of lines divided by the maximum possible number of lines, must be computed differently for one-mode and two-mode networks” (2005, p. 104). So, “whenever two firms share a director in the two-mode network, there is a line between them in the one-mode network” (2005, p. 104).

Group degree centralization “quantifies the range or variability of the individual actor indices” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p. 180). The degree index ranges from a maximum value of 1, “when one actor chooses all other g – 1 actors, and the others actors interact only with this one, central actor” (1994, p. 180), to 0, when all degrees are equal. The former is represented by a star and the latter is represented by a circle.
The degree centralization of the entire community affiliation network was 0.067, a rather small value. This indicates that the difference between the largest and smallest individual-level indices is not very great (1994, p. 182). There is, in other words, little variability. The variance of degrees was also computed. The arithmetic mean indicates the “dispersion or heterogeneity of an actor index” (1994, p. 181). For the community network the mean was 25.82. The median was 12. However the variability was quite large, with a standard deviation of 42. A little over 15% (n = 1,148) of the actors in the network had a degree score of zero. With respect to degree centralization index scores, the most central actor had a score of 0.071, while 300 people had a low score of 0.0001 (excluding the 1148 isolates). The standardized mean was 0.0034 with a standard deviation of 0.006.

Degree centralization of the largest cohesive subgroup was also computed. A frequency table (which is too big to reproduce here) was produced for the largest component, which calculated and displayed the number of actors (individuals) with their degree scores and an overall centralization measure for the subgroup. The centralization of the subgroup was 0.107, much larger compared to 0.067 of the entire community network. Standardized scores ranged from 0.0002 (50 people) to 0.116 (one person). The range of degree scores varied from 0 to 534. What explains such a high number of connections for this person? As the president of the university, he occupied a central position in a large and centrally located organization in the subgroup with direct connections to many other individuals who, in turn, were connected to many other individuals in other organizations. The average degree of all vertices was calculated from the degree distribution (de Nooy et al., p. 65). The proportion of possible ties present was
0.009. This means that, less than 1% of the total ties were present. The standard deviation was 0.011. A hierarchical list of actors based on the degree centrality measure was produced to compare with the closeness and betweenness measures.

### 3.4.4. Measuring centrality—closeness

According to Wasserman and Faust the closeness measure “focuses on how close an actor is to all the other actors in the set of actors” (1994, p. 183, emphasis in original). An actor is central “if it can quickly interact with all others” (1994, p. 183). “As a node grows farther apart in distance from other nodes, its centrality will decrease…” (1994, p. 184). In essence, who ever has the shortest path (minimum distance) to communicate or interact with others will be more central to the network. The actor at the center of the star network has maximum closeness because it is adjacent to all the other actors and has the shortest possible paths to all the other actors (1994, p. 184). For the center actor of the star graph, the closeness score is 1. For the circle graph, all actor indices are equal to 0.5.

A network must be connected to compute a closeness centrality score. This means that “each pair of vertices are connected by a path” (de Nooy et al. 2005, p. 324). A path is the shortest route between two points, with the added feature that no actor is repeated in the path (2005, p. 322). Because the largest component was connected and undirected, it met the minimum requirements for computing closeness.

In addition to the actor closeness centrality, the entire network can be measured for its level of centralization as an index. According to Wasserman and Faust, the closeness centralization index “reaches its maximum value of unity when one actor ‘chooses’ all other g – 1 actors (that is, has geodesics of length 1 to all other actors), and
the other actors have geodesics of length 2 to the remaining \((g - 2)\) actors” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p. 186). According to de Nooy, “Closeness centralization is the variation in the closeness centrality of vertices divided by the maximum variation in closeness centrality scores possible in a network of the same size” (2005, p. 127). The star network has maximum closeness centralization. The index is at a minimum value of 0 when “the lengths of geodesics are all equal” (1994, p. 187). The circle network resembles minimum closeness centralization.

The closeness centralization score for the largest cohesive subgroup does not appear highly centralized: 0.28. Closeness centrality indices for the 4,604 actors ranged from 0.134 to 0.417, compared to the degree scores, which ranged from 0.0002 to 0.17. Average closeness centrality was 0.276 and the standard deviation was 0.043. As with the degree centrality measure, a closeness centrality score was computed for each individual in the largest component.

### 3.4.5 Measuring centrality—betweenness

Wasserman and Faust (1994) explain that “interactions between two nonadjacent actors might depend on the other actors in the set of actors, especially the actors who lie on the paths between the two” (1994, p. 188). They add that, “these ‘other actors’ potentially might have some control over the interactions between the two nonadjacent actors” (1994, p. 188). Betweenness centrality “of a vertex is the proportion of all geodesics between pairs of other vertices that include this vertex” (de Nooy et al., 2005, p. 131). Recall that a vertex is the smallest unit with a network, in this case, individuals. Betweenness centralization “is the variation in the betweenness centrality of vertices divided by the maximum variation in betweenness centrality scores possible in a network.
of the same size” (2005, p. 131). Referring back to the star network, the center actor has what is called “maximal betweenness centrality” (de Nooy et al., 2005, p. 132), which means that in order for any other two actors to communicate they must go through the center of the star, or that single actor. All the other actors have a betweenness score of 0 because they are not located between anyone else. In their introduction to betweenness, de Nooy et al. (2005) compare degree and closeness to betweenness. They say, “degree and closeness centrality are based on the reachability of a person within a network: How easily can information reach a person?” In contrast, betweenness “rests on the idea that a person is more central if he or she is more important as an intermediary in the communication network” (2005, p. 131).

There are several questions the betweenness measure can answer, as de Nooy et al. present them. First, “How crucial is a person to the transmission of information through the network?” Second, “How many flows of information are disrupted or must make longer detours if a person stops passing on information or disappears from the network?” Finally, “To what extent may a person control the flow of information due to his or her position in the communication network?” (2005, p. 131). One assumption in calculating betweenness centrality is that all lines have equal weights and that “communication will travel along the shortest route (regardless of the actors along the route) (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p. 190).

The largest cohesive subgroup’s betweenness centralization was 0.0436. Betweenness centrality scores ranged from 0.000 (N = 3498) to 0.044 (1). Of the 4,604 actors in the subgroup, 75.98% had a betweenness score of 0, and 1 person had an index score of 0.044. An additional 23.54% (N = 1084) had a betweenness index score of
0.146. The subgroup had an average betweenness score was 0.0006 and a standard deviation of 0.002. The betweenness measure indicates that the subgroup is not highly centralized.

Although betweenness was ultimately chosen as the centrality measure for selecting a list of elites, it is not without its limitations. For instance, Gould and Fernandez (1989) discuss several potential problems with using betweenness, although their concern is with the brokerage function. The first is that betweenness “takes geodesics (shortest paths) of any length into account and treats them equally” (1989, p. 95). They add, “In other words, in a network with many actors, geodesics involving extremely long chains of intermediaries may contribute substantially to an individual’s betweenness score; in fact, such paths may actually make up most of an actor's score. This would not be a problem except that long paths do not seem, either empirically or intuitively, to play a very important role in purposive social interaction” (1989, p. 95). They conclude, that “Even if paths of greater length exist, it is unreasonable to assume that people are generally capable of tracing these paths out in practice” (1989, pp. 95-96).

3.4.6 Comparing centrality measures
A brief analysis of the standardized indexes of each of the centrality measures was completed, where 1 for each indicates a highly centralized network and 0 indicates equal or similar relations among all actors. For instance, when an actor does not fall in between two actors, it has a betweenness score or 0 (the points on the star). When an actor falls in between all other actors, the actor’s betweenness centrality score equals 1 (a star). The largest cohesive subgroup’s betweenness centralization (0.0436) was smaller than its degree centralization (0.107), but larger than its closeness centralization (0.28).
For each of these centrality measures a hierarchical list of individuals was created. For the density measure the actors that occupied positions in the densest clusters in the network rose to the top. For the closeness measure the actors that appeared nearest to the most other actors rose to the top. For the betweenness measure the actors that occupied the most central location, where their removal would mean communication could not flow between others, rose to the top. There were considerable overlaps between the lists.

In fact, a simple correlation (Table 3) of the three indices indicated a statistically significant overlap, although, the degree and closeness centrality indexes were correlated at a much higher level than either of the correlations that involved the betweenness measure. This suggests that to some extent, the betweenness indices are measuring actor centrality differently than the degree and closeness indices.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>Closeness</th>
<th>Betweenness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.701**</td>
<td>.429**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closeness</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td>.364**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betweenness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level

A high correlation for the degree and closeness measures is not surprising, because they are both based on direct ties (Valente, et al., 2008, p. 19). Valente et al., state, that “we might expect that the pathway of influence transmitted from nodes high in degree and closeness centrality will be similar. Both can quickly transmit information and influence through direct or short paths to others and interact with many others directly” (2008, p. 18). In their analysis of 58 social network studies, the authors found “strong but varied correlations among the … centrality measures...” (2008, p. 24). For their study,
the average correlation among the centrality measures was 0.53 with a standard deviation of 0.14. They conclude, that “The level of correlation among measures seems nearly optimal - too high a correlation would indicate redundancy and too low, an indication that the variables measured different things” and that the correlation between degree, betweenness, and closeness “indicates that these measures are distinct, yet conceptually related” (2008, p. 24).

Although the degree and closeness indexes show the highest correlation (.701), a visual inspection across the highest 15 indices of the three centrality measures, for instance, reveals that the closeness and betweenness measures show the greatest overlap of actors. A little over half of the betweenness and closeness lists are shared: 8 of the top 15 on the betweenness list are also on the top 15 on the closeness list. Among the degree and closeness lists, 6 of the top 15 indices are common, while only 4 of the top 15 actors on the degree and betweenness indexes are shared. The degree index seems the most different (at least at the high end of centrality) of the three measures. A search for overlap between the three lists at the highest level of centrality (top 15) reveals that there are a number of actors that are unique to each list, in that they do not appear on the top 15 lists of the other two indexes: 6 for the betweenness index, 7 for the degree index, and 2 for the closeness index. However, when searching further down the lists, many of the non-overlapping actors within the top 15 on the betweenness list appear in the top 100: 7 on the degree list and only 1 on the closeness list are not on the top 100. The rest are within the top 77 on the closeness list. Table 4 shows the ranking of the top 15 actors on the betweenness index and where they correspond on the degree and closeness indexes. It is a reasonable inference that, despite these differences, there remains a great deal of overlap.
between the most central actors on these three lists. If the top 15 actors on the degree and
closeness lists were not of the top 15 betweenness actors, nearly all of them were in the
top 100 (only 5 on the degree list and 3 on the closeness list were not on the top 100
betweenness list).

The centrality indexes for the largest cohesive subgroup, when sorted
hierarchically, did not appear to have simple cutoff points that indicated that people
above a certain point are the elites and those below it not. In addition, there was
considerable variability across individuals within each centrality measure, even if the
scores scaled somewhat continuously. In other words, there were few sizeable jumps
down in scores from one actor to the next. Because of the similarities across the centrality
measures and the generally continuous scaling of the scores within each measure, the
betweenness measure serves as an adequate measure for determining the community
elites. This is especially the case because betweenness centrality is a good proxy for
access to information. Because the data lacked a logical cutoff point, the top 100
individuals using the betweenness measure served as the initial interview pool.
Table 4. Centrality indexes and ranks for individuals. Organizational affiliations are used as proxies for individual names. Centrality index scores range from 0.000 to 1.000, with 1.000 as the most central. Letters in parentheses that occur on more than one centrality measure represent the same individual. For instance, the University President is highest on all three centrality measures and his organizational position is prefaced with an (A).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree Index</th>
<th>Individual's Organization</th>
<th>Centrality Index Score</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>(O) Tourism Exec.</td>
<td>0.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>(P) Congressional Delegate</td>
<td>0.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>(Q) State Legislator</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>(R) Finance Exec.</td>
<td>0.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>(S) State Gov. Econ. Dev.</td>
<td>0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>(B) Car Dealer Owner</td>
<td>0.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>(T) City Councilor, Non-Metro</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>(J) County Commissioner</td>
<td>0.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>(U) Mayor's Office (1)</td>
<td>0.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>(V) Lawyer (1)</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>(W) University Admin.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>(X) Lawyer (2)</td>
<td>0.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>(Y) Lt. Governor</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>(Z) Mayor's Office (2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>(F) Bank Exec. (2)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>(L) Bank Exec. (3)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>(D) Bank Exec. (1)</td>
<td>0.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>(K) Research Corp. Exec.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>(I) Title Comp. Exec.</td>
<td>0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>(M) Private Utility Exec.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>(H) Land Developer</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>(G) State Bus. Org. Dir.</td>
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<tr>
<td>72</td>
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<td>164</td>
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<td>4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>(P) Congressional Delegate</td>
<td>0.386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>(AA) Architect</td>
<td>0.386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>(K) Research Corp. Exec.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>(AB) Comm. Col. Pres.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>(R) Finance Exec.</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>(AC) Econ. Dev. Cons.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>(X) Lawyer (2)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(I) Title Comp. Exec.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>(M) Private Utility Exec.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>42</td>
<td>(H) Land Developer</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>(O) Tourism Exec.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>(J) County Commissioner</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(B) Car Dealer Owner</td>
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<td>(C) Econ. Dev. Corp. Exec.</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>(D) Bank Exec. (1)</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>(E) Trade Assoc. Exec.</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>(F) Bank Exec. (2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>(G) State Bus. Org. Dir.</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>(H) Land Developer</td>
<td>0.022</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>(J) Title Comp. Exec.</td>
<td>0.021</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>(J) County Commissioner</td>
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<td>(K) Research Corp. Exec.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>(L) Bank Exec. (3)</td>
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<td>(M) Private Utility Exec.</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>(N) Med. Supply Exec.</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>(O) Tourism Exec.</td>
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3.4.7 Procedural issues with affiliation networks

Affiliation studies are not without their limitations, although every effort was taken to minimize potential problems. What are the implications of an affiliation network method? What does it mean to have started with associational actors, and then to proceed with a prestige study to identify those that are perceived by the respondents to be influential? Are there alternative methodologies that would have been a lot more expedient yet would have netted the same or similar results or different results?

One potential limitation is that some people were excluded from the analysis because of the initial lists used as starting points for data collection. In other words, despite the fact that affiliation studies capture all of the individuals in the population of organizations and that the relevant population was defined broadly to capture as many organizations in the community as possible, those unaffiliated with an organization or affiliated with an organization not identified by the databases used were not included in the analysis. If such an individual were left out, it is possible they could still be included in the study if they possess referent power, in which the person possess charisma, is liked by others, and others want to be around them, or expert power, in which others look to that person for answers, guidance, or direction\(^\text{17}\) (French and Raven, 1959).

It is possible, too, that if a community member’s name was not on the list of 100 influential community members that was presented to respondents, the respondents may not have thought that that individual or the part of the community that that individual

\(^{17}\) French and Raven’s other three types of power include coercive (force or threat of force), reward (the ability to give others what they want), and legitimate (the power one possesses given the role(s) they occupy) power. The referent and expert forms of power seem most applicable in this context, as they are the forms of power respondents may be more likely to think about when thinking about others they feel are influential. Coercive, reward, and especially legitimate power, appear to be more tied to organizational position, and those who possess those forms of power were likely identified through the affiliation network method.
presented was of interest to the research. If, for instance, the archbishop of the Catholic Church for the region made the initial list, respondents may have nominated him or at least considered other religious community leaders in their thinking about leadership in the community. While the Archbishop of the Catholic Church was identified he was not mentioned enough to reach the minimal threshold for inclusion on the list of individuals presented to the respondents, which was three. In any event, religious leaders and labor unions are absent from the study.

On the other hand, when respondents were asked to add any people that they were tied to or that they perceived as influential that should have been on the list they were holding, the respondents were free to identify anyone they wanted. That that process did not result in the inclusion of religious leaders, unions, or other individuals from other sectors of the community suggests that the respondents, as a group, did not think those individuals were significant enough to mention. It may be, that the structure of the questions and the initial introduction of the study to the respondents as to its nature, may have influenced the type of responses elicited. In addition, respondents were asked to identify individuals or organizations they felt were influential in achieving goals in the community and who they communicate with on self-identified community issues before they were presented with the list of influential community members. Unfortunately, it is difficult without asking to know the decision-making process of the respondents when filling in the missing names from the list. And, regrettably, it was not practical to ask them to discuss their decision-making process.

There is evidence, however, that the context in which interviews are administered influences respondents’ answers. For instance, high school students were more likely to
report drug use when questioned at school than when questioned at home (Zanes and Matsoukas, 1979). Over 80% (N = 79) of interviews were conducted at respondents’ offices. Other locations included the lobby of a hotel after a business meeting (2), a restaurant or coffee shop (7), the respondent’s home (1), or over the phone (6). Like the high school students who reported different patterns of drug use depending on the context, the context of the office may have influenced the respondents’ thinking about the type of individuals and organizations that they felt were influential.

Additionally, it is possible that interviewer disposition and expectations may have inadvertently influenced respondents’ answers. In terms of respondent disposition, being young, white, male, dressed professionally, and affiliated with a local university, possibly set a tone for the interview. As Singleton and Straits (1999, p. 267) note, “the race of the interviewer has been shown to have a considerable impact on certain types of responses.” If this research was conducted by an African American, Native American, or someone from a discernable ethnic group, the names and organizations mentioned may have differed. The authors add that, with regard to age and sex and other visible characteristics, respondents may place the interviewer into a category (young, white and male), and give answers based on that category (1999, p. 269). In terms of expectations established at the onset of the interview, respondents listened to a list of their interorganizational affiliations gathered through the affiliation network data collection procedures discussed above, and were asked to confirm the list. Respondents may have drawn on the precedent of those official ties (not social or cultural ties) in answering subsequent questions.
To summarize then, both published (secondary data collection—i.e., library research) and perceptual (reputational) data was collected in this study.\(^\text{18}\) The advantages of using both of these approaches are many. Published directories like *Dun and Bradstreet Million Dollar Directory* made for easy and accessible starting points in identifying the organizational actors. The organizational literature suggests that larger organizations have both the structural position and an interest in flexing their organizational resources (influence) in the community. These large organizations were identified through those initial published data sources. The perceptual data served as a useful check on the published data.

3.5 Contacting the Elite

3.5.1 Contacting the original 100

The next step was collecting the interview data. This entailed two steps that were repeated. What follows is an outline of the steps that culminated in 95 interviews over the course of 8 months from October 2006 to May 2007. Once the network of leaders was identified, a strategy was needed to contact and interview them. Primary organizational addresses and phone numbers of each of the one hundred people were searched for on the internet. This was fairly painless for most of the respondents, but good address and phone numbers were more difficult to find for some people.

\(^{18}\) Originally, it was planned to search for biographical information from websites and library resources, and to interview members of the local print media (Domhoff, 2006) for a deeper understanding of each of the respondents before interviewing; however this approach was abandoned due to time constraints. While searching the websites of the organizations that were identified, I came across brief biographical sketches of some of the people that eventually became respondents. Unfortunately, this was not done systematically because while collecting the interorganizational data it was not known who would eventually make it on the interview list. By the time the final interview list of 100 was generated, a full year and a half had elapsed and, not knowing at the time how willing this population would be to participate, then I proceeded to the interview phase.
Some of the harder to reach people were affiliated with national organizations that had local or regional divisions. National banks are a good example of this, when their headquarters were located elsewhere and only a regional branch existed in the state. Websites and phonebook listings rarely gave contact information for regional presidents and other executives. In other cases some individuals had moved on from the organization identified in the secondary data collection phase and no new organizational information was available. This was a bigger problem than the bank issue. Several people had retired in the time that had elapsed from the end of collecting all the affiliation data and the beginning of interviewing.\footnote{This point brings up an important limitation to my chosen method; the leadership structures of a community of this size are constantly shifting. Some individuals are winding down their community involvements and others are ramping up their community involvement. Clearly a longitudinal design is superior. On the other hand, if they are influential they will be connected to the community, if not formally through organizations then informally through the reputational approach, which turned out to be a nice corrective of this shortfall in the secondary data collection method.}

Once the addresses and phone numbers of the original 100 identified people were collected, a cover letter and consent form were created (see Appendix 2). In order to keep the interview schedule and workload manageable, materials for one-third of the list of 100 people were mailed at a time. The first third were the individuals that were the most centrally located (according to my initial data analysis), the second third were less centrally located and the last third less centrally located still. Although the goal was to contact and interview 40\% of the original 100 community members, over 60\% were interviewed. Included in the cover letter was the respondent’s organizational or, in a few cases for those that had retired, home phone number. I informed the recipients in the letter that I would be contacting them by phone in a few days of receipt of the letter to talk about the research and hopefully set up a time to conduct the interview. In more than
a few cases the recipients of the letters called me and scheduled a time to meet. This community was so willing to participate that 20 interviews were completed in the first month and the initial goal of 40 interviews for the study was exceeded by December 2006.

Once the initial phone call was made to the respondent an interview was set up, usually at the respondent’s place of business, although interviews were conducted at coffee shops and restaurants as well. If a respondent was not reached a message was left on her/his voicemail or with an office assistant. Follow-up phone calls were carried out until resolution was achieved. In most cases an interview was scheduled but in some the recipient either refused to participate or contact was never successfully made. In a few cases an interview was scheduled but later canceled due to unforeseen scheduling conflicts (e.g., family emergencies). Once the majority of the recipients of the first set of letters were scheduled the second third of letters were sent out and the whole process began again. This was done a third time in order to complete the process for the original 100 list. If there is a pattern in non-participation that may have resulted in a bias in the pool of respondents, it is in the absence of non-local leaders that made it into the initial 100 list. The ten non-locals that were not interviewed resided in either the state capital (8) or in a city known for its research labs (2). Reasons given for not participating in the research (when they could be reached) ranged from the sensitive nature of the research (1 respondent) to the level non-local nature of the actors’ organization (5). The remaining non-participants were either unreachable because they changed organizations, moved out of the community, were away on business for the majority of the interview timeframe, or were in the community but were not accessible for interviewing. The background of these
respondents was varied and did not constitute a systematic bias in the range of types of organizations represented. This process constitutes the first wave of the interview process, and the reputational data collection process outlined below constitutes the second and third waves. Appendix 3 summarizes the interview process.

3.5.2 The interview instrument

The interview itself originally consisted of the following parts: organizational affiliations, community issues and perceptions, media relationships, and inter-organizational financial relationships. In the end, for this study, only the organizational affiliations and community issues and perceptions sections were used and are discussed here. For a further discussion of the rest of the instrument and directions for further research see Appendix 4.

This population, while very accommodating and willing to meet, was also very busy. Most were very willing to give an hour and several gave much more than an hour. Interviews were not taped or digitally voice recorded. It is possible that this group would have consented with voice recording the interviews but the subject was not broached with the respondents. Instead, for the first handful of interviews responses were handwritten. This approach proved too inefficient so the questionnaire was reorganized into a table in Microsoft Word and a laptop was used to type respondent’s answers as they were questioned. This allowed for tabbing to the next question very quickly and minimized a lag in recording time and, in turn, helped with the flow of the interview. This approach worked well. The brief pauses in the flow of the interview while responses were typed up allowed for the respondent to reflect on the question and their answer.
The first question used in the analysis of the community power structure was also the first question in the instrument. Respondents were asked to list all of their organizational affiliations, regardless of location. These lists constituted the data for a new network analysis of respondent affiliations, which are discussed in Chapter Four.

The second question analyzed was broken down into three parts. The first part of the question was asked in the following way:

“This next question is to help me understand leadership, or involvement in decision-making processes in the city. What are some of the major community issues that have come to the attention of your organization and/or you in the last year?”

The second part of the question asked respondents to discuss their involvements, if any, on the identified issues. Chapter Five discusses these two parts of the question. Finally, respondents were asked to recall and identify all individuals and/or organizations that they associated with concerning the issues they identified. Several issues rose to prominence and are discussed in Chapter Six.

A final question included in this study asked respondents to discuss how things get done in the community. Inevitably many respondents countered with “what kinds of things?”, and were directed to think along the lines of how policies are changed, kept the same, etc. This question is dealt with in detail in Chapter Seven.


The final step in generating the list of community elites is a reputational or prestige method. Attention to status is a persistent theme in sociology. In the interorganizational literature status, or prestige, is measured by perceived reputation among peers. This method is well established in the interorganizational literature (Hunter 1953; Bonjean et al. 1964, 1971, 1974, 1976; Clark 1968; Freeman et al. 1963;
Galaskiewicz 1979; Galaskiewicz and Shatin 1981; Laumann and Pappi 1973; Laumann et al. 1977; Perrucci and Pilisuk 1970; Domhoff 2006) and is a useful check on the secondary data collected for the affiliation network. A comparison of the two methodologies is discussed in detail in Chapter Four.

Floyd Hunter’s classic book *Community Power Structure* (1953), which serves as an archetype of urban power studies, employs a method that asks those in high ranking positions in community organizations to identify other high status individuals, which ultimately resulted in a pyramid structure of rank-ordered power. In his study of Atlanta, published in 1953, Hunter found a small group of businessmen at the top, followed by public officials. The implication of Hunter’s study, according to Altshuler and Luberoff (2003, p. 51) was that “the capitalists were in charge, and local government was their servant.” However, as was stated near the beginning of the chapter, the pyramid structures that appear to result from reputational studies are not necessarily artifacts of the reputational method.

Wasserman and Faust (1994) define “a prestigious actor as one who is the object of extensive ties, thus focusing solely on the actor as a recipient” (1994, p. 174), what is referred to as indegree. Indegree is defined by De Nooy et. al (2005) as the number of arcs received by a vertex (2005, p. 320). To state it more plainly, a high indegree means that many people identified an actor as prestigious. Conversely a low indegree represents low prestige.

At the end of the interview respondents were asked to identify individuals in the community that they felt were influential, which was defined for them as an ability to get an agenda accomplished in the community. First they were presented with a list of the
original 100 individuals identified through the initial affiliation data collection phase. Respondents were then asked to list those that they felt were, from their perspective, influential. In addition, respondents were asked to identify any other people that were not on the list who they felt should have been. Those individuals who were “nominated” by at least three respondents made it onto the interview roster. In the end, there were 399 people identified that were not on the original 100 community member list.  

In the affiliation network generated to find the original list of interviewees the relationships were undirected, which means that there was no inherent hierarchy in the relationships, just co-membership. Prestige networks, in contrast, are directed. The more nominations an actor received by the interview respondents, the more they represent prestigious members of the community. Of course, those that are felt by the respondents to be prestigious may not match up with the lists created by others in the community, but overlaps would be likely. For instance, elected officials and visible business leaders are likely, but not necessarily, seen as prestigious by others in the community just as they were for the respondents.

A procedural comment is necessary to clarify how the reputational data collection process took place. To begin, the initial “wave” of interviews—in total there was three waves—comprised the individuals identified through the affiliation analysis outlined at the beginning of this section. As was stated earlier on, each of those respondents were

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20 A list of identified community members and who identified them were recorded in an Excel spreadsheet, with unique identifying numbers. The steps to analyze the most prestigious community members—those with the highest indegree—were fairly simple. A new one-mode network was created with individuals on one dimension and who they “nominate” on the other dimension. Once in Pajek, the data was checked to make sure that there were no loops (individuals who nominated themselves, which occurred by one respondent) or multiple lines (one respondent nominating the same person more than one. There were no multiple lines in the data.). Allowing someone to “vote” for another person multiple times artificially inflates their prestige.
asked to identify people on the list of the most centrally located from the affiliation study and anyone that they felt were missed in that process. As those interviews were wrapping up, and the pool of reachable people were running out, analysis of the reputational or prestige data was undertaken. This first analysis of the prestige data constituted the second wave of interviews. In this second wave 10 of the 26 people (38%) that met the criteria of influential—three nominations—were interviewed. From those 10 interviews the same prestige question was asked and the newly identified names were added to the database. The prestige data was once again analyzed and twenty-two additional names met the three-nomination threshold, of which thirteen (60%) were interviewed.

The initial one hundred leaders identified through the affiliation process and the forty-eight leaders identified through the influential question resulted in 148 potential interviews. In the end only 95 of those 148 people were interviewed for a completion rate of 64%. Given this completion rate generalizations to the entire community elite cannot be made. Any conclusions made in this study are provisional and suggestive of the “real” issues, relationships, and agendas of the community power structure.

Several methodological issues arose using the reputational method. For instance, in calculating and locating prestigious people each vote is, in a sense, equal. A vote for someone who is very prestigious in the community is equal to a vote for someone that is only prestigious in a particular actor’s circle. Does this non-weighted prestige measure weaken a researcher’s claim to identifying prestigious people? Not really. If individuals are very prestigious in the community, then multiple people will identify them as such. If, on the other hand, an individual identifies a person he or she feels is prestigious but that
evaluation is not echoed among the rest of the respondents, the nominated person will have a lower prestige score as fewer people identify that person as influential.

Another issue is, whether people are really voting or nominating people that are influential or simply identifying people that are “popular.” A distinction needs to be made between influence (power) and popularity (status). Simply being popular carries with it a degree of attention from the community, which may allow that individual to get his or her agenda accomplished. On the other hand, it is possible to be very influential but operate on a much more anonymous, secretive, or behind closed doors level. While the larger community, or even the leadership community, may not identify those with the power to enact changes through the behind closed doors approach, they may exert much more influence than the “popular” people. For instance, a local media personality may be very popular and get a lot of votes in the general population as someone who seems important. The same likely would hold up for elected officials. Yet these people may not hold a candle to the amount of power—agenda-accomplishing potential—wielded by those that work with those elected officials or whom the elected official rely on for perspective, knowledge, and direction, or provide the content and substantive knowledge used by the media personality.

Who is captured by the reputational method? When asked to identify the names of already identified influential people on a list, on a few occasions, respondents made note not to vote for people because of their popularity in the community. For instance, respondents said something along the lines of “just because this man or that woman hold this position, they really carry no real power, the real power holders in this community are….” In other cases, respondents complicated the identification of prestigious elites by
noting, for example, that the leaders on the list “all have niches in their own right, but very few have a community wide influence.” With few exceptions, respondents editorialized their prestige designating process. To give a typical example, an elected official spoke of the list in the following way:

[Lawyer X] can really get things done especially for his clients, but I don’t see a political agenda that I can discern. [Lawyer Y] is in front of city council a lot but not particularly effective in advocating for his clients. [High Level Elected Official A] hasn’t been particularly effective in getting important pieces of legislation enacted. [Business Organization Director M] on some issues. [Architect O] because he is thoughtful, pleasant, honest. [Congress Men G and F] are effective….

Influence was defined to the respondents generally, and as such, respondents put themselves through a cognitive exercise of working through their knowledge of the leaders in the community with what was presented to them as “influential.”

3.7 Summary

The goal of this study is to uncover and explain the relationships and agendas of the community power elite. The initial steps to achieve this goal were collecting, compiling, and analyzing an affiliation network—much like an interlocking directorate study (Mizruchi, 1996)—of the largest organizations (both in terms of personnel and assets). The “assumption” behind affiliation studies of this kind is that those that are more central in the network are more “important” or influential in the community. Structurally, organizations and their representatives are located to be effective leaders, brokers, movers and shakers. In addition, a reputational approach was added to supplement the affiliation study. This chapter documented some of the research in both of these areas and Chapter Four systematically discusses the similarities and differences found using both approaches. It also briefly discusses the organizational affiliations of the respondents.
A study of a community’s interorganizational structure reveals interesting insights in its own right, addressing the levels of connectedness, cohesiveness, and centralization of key actors. Stopping at this point, however, disregards the meanings, types of information, purposes, and motives for the structure. In other words, a purely structural analysis disregards or is unable to address the behavioral aspects of human action. How do actors come to understand their environment? What motivates the alliances formed around key issues? Why do some issues rise to prominence over other issues?

The affiliation and reputational studies take the analysis of the community power structure a great distance, but grounding the actors identified in those studies in concrete relationships around community issues further improves on the method. This study utilizes a variant of the issue based approach in that respondents were asked to identify issues and other individuals and organizations they communicate with around those issues, instead of predetermining issues for respondents. Chapters Five and Six tie these issues to the behavioral urban growth coalition theory.

By utilizing positional, reputational, and issue based approaches to identify the elites in the community, and hence the community power structure, identifying the opposition to the power structure is not possible. In this way this study is not a complete picture of the dynamics of the community. If this study is able to address the urban growth coalition theory at all, it is only able to address half of it. What is regrettably left out in this study is a systematic and comparative study of the counter-hegemonic forces to growth coalitions. Do anti-growth groups, including, according to the theory, neighborhood associations, environmentalists, and others mobilized around use value concerns constitute a force of resistance to local growth machines? To what extent and to
what ends? These questions beg answers which unfortunately must be deferred to a later study. Presently, what follows is an effort to uncover and organize the urban community power structure, the elites that rise to the top of it (Chapter Four), the issues that they converge on (Chapter Five and Chapter Six), and how they organize cognitively the community in order to effectively act in it (Chapter Seven).
IV. Comparisons of the Community Affiliation Network, Respondent Affiliation Network, & Prestige Network

4.1. Introduction

The study takes two approaches to understanding community elites. First, individuals, in general, are seen as nodes in relationships that range across professional, political, and private life. Elites, specifically, are a special type of actor in that the positions they occupy afford them access to resources that, in turn, enable them to bring about outcomes that are of concern to them. In other words, to understand elites (or any other social category) is to gain knowledge of their relationships. Recall Fuchs’ argument discussed at the beginning of this study, that “Observes are positioned in a culture; they are ‘cultured’ observes” and “What they see, and do not see, depends on where they are located in the networks of society and culture” (2001, pp. 1-2). Understanding these networks is the task of the next three chapters.

Second, understanding elites comes from the elites themselves who work to understand the environment around them and themselves from the advantage of the positions they hold (however temporary or enduring they may be). As an actor’s positions in an environment changes, so to does his or her understanding of that environment, his or her role in it, and him or herself. Recall Simmel’s position about social circles made above; that individuals are “determined sociologically in the sense that the groups ‘intersect’ in his person by virtue of his affiliation with them” (1955, p. 150). The network analyses in this chapter take to task the first approach to understand the community elite, by undertaking an incursion into the community’s interorganizational
structure to reveal its levels of connectedness, cohesiveness, and centralization. This second approach to understanding elites is reserved for chapters Five, Six, and Seven.

This chapter serves as an extension of the previous chapter in that its goal is to assess the various methods employed to identify the interorganizational power structure of the community. To do so, this chapter, first, is a description of the leaders that emerged through the community affiliation network analysis discussed in Chapter Three. This description includes a sketch of the types of organizations and sectors of the community that respondents represent as well as a second analysis of the affiliations of the respondents in the study. This second affiliation network analysis is then compared to the community affiliation network. Next, the leaders that emerged through the prestige method are compared to the community affiliation network. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the importance of conducting an evaluation of the affiliation and prestige methods for locating elites and the issues that surround both methods.

There are three networks presented in this chapter: the Community Affiliation (CA) network, which consisted of the leaders who emerged as most central in the largest component in the two-mode network derived from the various databases and internet research described in the last chapter and analyzed with social network analysis software; the Respondent Affiliation (RA) network, collected during respondents’ interviews and analyzed in the same way as the CA network; and the Prestige network, which is a much smaller list of leaders that was partially derived from interviews with community leaders and partially derived from the community affiliation network analysis.
The goals of the chapter are first to describe the leadership structure that emerged in the Community Affiliation network, and to compare it to (a) the Respondent Affiliation network and (b) the Prestige Network that emerged through the interview process, and the leaders that were ultimately interviewed. The CA network and the RA network are studied for structural characteristics, including centrality measures, \( k \)-core, and cutvertices. The CA network and the Prestige network are compared in two ways: (1) by the types of organizations that the leaders were primarily affiliated with at the time of data collection, and (2) their relative ranking based on the different methods.

4.2 The Community Affiliation (CA) network

Some of the analysis of the community affiliation network was presented in the last chapter to aid in the discussion of the method for identifying the most structurally (organizationally) central individuals in the community, and ultimately, to find a pool of interviewees. In that section the density, degree, closeness, and betweenness measures were presented. Cohesive subgroups were offered as well. Table 5 presents a summary of these measures as well as two additional measures to determine structural cohesion: \( k \)-core and cutpoints and bi-components. In this section a brief overview of these various measures is discussed. This section is followed by a brief discussion of the same measures for the Respondent Affiliation network, and is followed by a section that highlights similarities and differences between the two networks.

Recall that the overall structure of the CA network had 7,552 individuals spread across 257 components, of which one component dominated with 4,604 connected individuals. The density of the network was very low, 0.003, which was not surprising given the size of it. To state another way, only 0.34% of the potential connections
between each of the 7,552 individuals in the network are present. The density of the largest component was 0.00862, or 0.86% of the potential connection are present. The degree centralization of the entire CA network was 0.067. For the largest component the degree centralization was 0.107. The average number of connections for an individual in the entire community network was just under 26 people. The closeness centralization for the largest component was 0.28 and the betweenness centralization was 0.043.

Table 5. Community Affiliation (CA) network (individuals) analyses

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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Isolated individuals largest component</td>
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<tr>
<td>Density</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betweenness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Degree (mean)</td>
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<table>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>Number of individuals in largest k-core</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proportion in 3-core and higher</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of network connectivity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of cutpoints</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of bi-components</td>
<td>580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of cutpoints to total points</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(Degree mean: on average, actors are connected to X (mean) others)*

*Subnetwork of 4604 individuals*

Another way to determine the overall cohesion of the network is to determine if there are subsets of actors in the network that are more densely connected to each other than others. A technique called k-core, where k represents the minimum degree within a network of actors, is used to find those subsets. de Nooy et al., (2005) define a k-core as a “maximal subnetwork in which each vertex has at least degree k within the subnetwork”
(2005, p. 70). To state it another way, “each point is directly connected to at least \( k \) other points” (Crowe, 2007, p. 478). Individuals that are not connected to any other individuals, called isolates, are “0-cores” because they are not connected to any other points. \( K \)-core analysis allows us to see if there are clusters of structural similarity within the network.

\( K \)-core can be illustrated by using with a simple example. Recall Figure 1 from Chapter Three, and reproduced as Figure 3 below. Figure 3 is the same network only stacked or nested by the different level of cores. The first core includes all nodes, and is labeled “1-Core.” The second core excludes actor 1 or, vertex 1 (v1), and is marked labeled a “2-Core.” Vertex 1 only has one neighbor—v3—so it is excluded from the 2-core. The third and fourth cores exclude vertex 2 (v2) because it only has two neighbors—v3 and v25. The sizes of the two organizations that make up core 3 (21 actors) and core 4 (31 actors) are not equal, but are both complete, in that everyone in the organization is connected to each other in that organization. Or, to state it another way, they are all incident with that event. In addition to the indirect connection of v2 between the two larger cores (21-core and 30-core), who is connected to v25 and v3, v25 and v3 are directly connected. When the tie between v3 and v25 is removed, the two dense clusters become complete cohesive subgroups themselves.

This cohesive subgroup of 55 actors simply serves to illustrate the concept of \( k \)-cores, that the higher the level of \( k \) the more connected the actors are to each other. If all actors in a network were connected to all others the level of \( k \) would equal the number of actors minus one as each actor would be connected to every other actor, minus themselves. As the density measure already made clear, the CA network is far from maximally connected, or complete. However, there exists a subset of actors within it that
are densely connected. Within the CA network is a complete subgroup, consisting of 200 individual without missing linkages. Unfortunately this network of 200 individuals is too dense to display visually. Suffice it to say that there are pockets in the community network that are very densely connected. In addition, 76% of the entire CA network of 7,552 actors are in a 3-core or higher.

Figure 3. Cohesive subgroup of 55 individuals (k-cores in parentheses).

Figure 4. Nesting of k-cores for cohesive subgroup of 55 individuals.
One final consideration of structural cohesion is the measures of cutpoints and blocks or bi-components. Cutpoints are actors, in this case individuals, that when removed cut the graph into more than one connected graph. Hanneman (2005) introduces the topic in the following way:

An alternative approach to finding the key ‘weak’ spots in the graph is to ask: if a node were removed, would the structure become divided into un-connected parts? If there are such nodes, they are called ‘cutpoints.’ And, one can imagine that such cutpoints may be particularly important actors -- who may act as brokers among otherwise disconnected groups. The divisions into which cutpoints divide a graph are called blocks. We can find the maximal non-separable sub-graphs (blocks) of a graph by locating the cutpoints. That is, we try to find the nodes that connect the graph (if there are any). Another name for a block is a ‘bi-component.’

According to de Nooy et. al, (2005, p. 141) “In a bi-component, no person can control the information flow between two other persons completely because there is always an alternative path that information may follow.” According to Wasserman and Faust (1994, p. 113), “in a communications network, an actor who is a cutpoint is critical, in the sense that if that actor is removed from the network, the remaining network has two subsets of actors, between whom no communication can travel.”

Cutpoints are indicators of lapses in communication or a lack of redundancy in a network, in that when an individual is removed, information can no longer travel between two parts of the network. Crowe explains that, “Cutpoints determine the extent of non-redundant contacts: contacts that are either not directly connected or have contacts that are different from one another” (2007, p. 478). Further, “A cutpoint is a node in which its removal would increase the number of components by dividing the sub-graph into two or more separate subsets between which there are no connections” (Crowe, p. 478, citing Scott, 2004, p. 107).

According to Crowe, “Each sub-graph that either stands alone or is connected to a larger graph by a cutpoint is referred to as a block” (2007, p. 478). In Pajek cutpoints are
called cut-vertices or articulation points and blocks are called bi-components. Hanneman (2005) also interchanges the term block with the term bi-components, whereas Wasserman and Faust (1994) only use the term blocks. Several blocks, according to Crowe (2007), indicates a coalitional network structure, while one with few is indicative of a bridging network. In Figure 3, v3 and v25 serve as cutpoints for the network, as their removal from the network splits it into two subgroups. As Figure 5 illustrates, the removal of v3 severs v1 from the network, rendering it an isolate. The actor represented as v2 does not serve as a cutpoint because he is still connected to v25. Without the removal of any other vertex, the removal of v2 does not qualify as a cutpoint because information can still flow through the network without him there, through v3 and v25. Figure 6 illustrates what network looks like when v25, the other cutpoint, is removed. Vertices 1 and 2 remain connected to the network, but the subset of 30 actors (on the left) are now isolated from the rest of the network.

If a network is highly dense and contains no bridges it is theorized to have a high level of social solidarity. A bridge is “a line whose removal increases the number of components in the network” (de Nooy, et. al, 2005, p. 318). When an individual is removed from the network the lines incident with him or her are also removed. This person serves a bridging role in the network if when they are removed they cause the network to become disconnected. Networks with low density and many missing links, where lines that connect actors are missing so that information must flow through particular actors are theorized to be weakly connected, but offer their members access to new information, in the same way that weak ties connect more closely tied subgroups (Granovetter, 1973).
There were 197 cutpoints in the entire CA network of 7,552 individuals, creating 580 blocks. The proportion of cutpoints to total points (individuals) was 0.026. In other words, 2.6% of the individuals in the network serve as bridges to others in the network.

![Figure 5. Removal of v3 from cohesive subgroup of 55 actors.](image1)

![Figure 6. Removal of v25 from cohesive subgroup of 55 actors.](image2)

For the subnetwork of 4604, there were 182 cutpoints, creating 176 blocks. The proportion of cutpoints to total points for the largest subnetwork was 0.04.

This brief discussion of the structure of the CA network reveals that while there are many subgroups, one predominates. The predominant subgroup is connected in that each individual can get to every other individual either directly or through intermediaries. A large percentage of the entire CA network are connected with only 23% in less than a 3-core, of which 15% are isolates. As an indicator of missing communication links, a
small percentage, 2.6% the entire CA network serve as bridges or brokers to other actors in the network.

4.3 The Respondent Affiliation (RA) Network

At the beginning of the interview respondents were asked to list all of the organizations they were affiliated with, either as directors or non-directors. A non-director relationship most often was simply a member or *ex officio*. For instance, they may be members of a non-profit that is a coming together of local business leaders around economic issues, but not on the board. Nonetheless, they attend the meetings and potentially absorb the information and create the relationships the same way as their board memberships.

Although the affiliation information for each respondent was collected in the CA network—recall, in fact, that it was the analysis of those affiliations that determined their participation in the study in the first place—the respondents were asked to identify the organizations they were affiliated with because for two reasons. First, the list of interorganizational affiliations of each respondent allowed for a check on the list of organizational affiliations collected in the CA network. Because of the length of time it took between collecting the CA network and conducting the interviews—about a year—it was possible for affiliations in community organizations to have shifted. Second, for those individuals who were contacted through the prestige method it was the first opportunity to see which organizations they belonged to. This method provided the best current and exhaustive listing of interorganizational relationships.
For these two reasons, was to determine the network structure of the interviewees. For instance, how centralized (degree, closeness, betweenness) are the interviewees? Do some of those interviewed seem to lie outside of the interorganizational network? Are there cohesive subgroups that might help us understand the structure of leadership in the community? The RA network provides an updated data set and an opportunity for comparison to the CA network.

Inevitably there are always problems with any data set. One problem had to do with recall. It was not uncommon for respondents to pause when asked to recall all the organizations they were affiliated with, only to recall them later in the interview. If this occurred those organizations were included in this analysis. What about the organizations respondents failed to recall? Some respondents said that they belonged to so many that they could not possibly recall them all and they, in effect, gave up the effort to recall them. This occurred less frequently, but was a potential problem with all of the interviews. It did occur on occasion that respondents provided hardcopy lists of their organizational affiliations. As in any sociological study, where data is dependent upon the human limitations—such as, error in recall, inability to recall, miscommunication (Willis, 2005), fatigue, and laziness—conclusions must be tentative and provisional. However, research suggests that self-report data of this sort, recalling organizational affiliations, is likely to yield fewer errors the more routine the relationships are. In other words, people are generally incapable of recalling specific attendees or specific meetings they attended, but they often times can accurately “recall and report their typical social relations” (Marsden, 1990, p. 447). Additionally, some research suggests that as the proximity or
importance of the organization or individual decreases for the respondent, so to does the accuracy in recalling ties to them (Sudman 1988; Hammer 1984).

What can be concluded from an analysis like this? At best this kind of analysis of the most centrally located organizations and individuals that participated in the interviews sensitizes or orients us to the actual interorganizational structures of the community. What is clear, and understood at the onset of this study, is that unless all of the highest ranking respondents identified through the CA and RA networks and the Prestige network were interviewed, what is generated is a partial picture of the community. Certain individuals representing different parts of the community, if interviewed, would yield a quite different structural configuration of the data than others. For instance, it is possible that a key bank and its leadership, if interviewed, could move that bank to a much more central location in the community. On the other hand, through the prestige procedure discussed in the previous chapter, and elaborated below, the community affiliation members interviewed could capture a significant portion of those prestigious people.

The RA network comprises the 304 organizations with which the 95 respondents were collectively affiliated. The RA network was converted to a one-mode network of individuals for analysis. The network is connected, with 7 isolated individuals (represented by the ring of dots circling the cluster of dots in the middle of Figure 7). A brief description of each of these isolated individuals reveals that, with the exception of the development consultant (highlighted with a rectangle in the bottom left section of the graph) and the executive director of the building association (highlighted with a triangle

21 Although, as Marsden (1990, p. 444) notes, using one or several individuals affiliated with an organization to represent or accurately recall all the ties of the organization to other organizations in the community is understudied.
in the top center of the graph), the isolates are organizationally marginal in the community (outside their particular industries).

A closer look at the building association director in the triangle reveals that he is connected to only one other organization in the community—a non-profit community organization dedicated to housing issues. A closer look at the development consultant in the rectangle to the bottom left reveals that he is connected to three other organizations: an art commission, a cancer foundation, and his religious organization. The two lawyers located in bottom-center of Figure 7 are connected to each other by the State Defense Lawyer Association. In addition, Lawyer 1 is also connected to his children’s parochial school and Lawyer 2 is connected to both the state zoo board and a law organization. Finally, the private hospital administrator serves on the board of a private college in the city. The two individuals that are not highlighted represent very different segments of the community. First, the director of the environmental organization often represents, aligns, and associates with the segments of the community that oppose the business community and their supports in elected positions. It is not too surprising that he and his organization sit outside of the interorganizational structure. The other individual is a United States congressional delegate who did not reveal any organizational affiliations in the community. The congressperson is linked in other ways to the local community, just not formally on any organizational boards, at least none that the congressperson mentioned.
Figure 7. Respondent Affiliation (RA) network of individuals.
The density of the network is 0.26, much denser than the CA network but it is also a much smaller network. The degree of the network is 0.333. At the low end, five actors had a degree of 0 (including the director of the environmental organization, the development consultant, the building organization director, the hospital executive, and the congressional representative. The two isolated lawyers each had a degree of one, as did an elected official and a vice president of a technology corporation with extensive ties to the Department of Homeland Security) and at the high end one actor had a degree of 55, a longtime active community member in the insurance industry with extensive political and cultural ties at the community and the state levels. The average degree was 24 (the median was also 24) with a standard deviation of 16. In other words, actors were on average connected to 24 other actors.

Because the RA network contained 7 isolated actors, the closeness and betweenness centralization measures were calculated for a smaller network of 88 individuals who were all connected. The closeness centralization score for the network was 0.294 and index scores ranged from 0.35 to 0.71. The average for the subnetwork of 88 individuals was 0.57 and the standard deviation was 0.08. In comparison, for the largest component in the community affiliation network, the closeness centralization was 0.28 and scores ranged from 0.13 to 0.42 with a mean of 0.28 and a standard deviation of 0.04. The betweenness centralization was 0.04 with scores ranging from 0 (16 people) to 0.45 (7 actors), the median was 0.04 and the standard deviation was 0.12.

Like the CA network, the RA network can be analyzed to determine the network structure in terms of $k$-core and cutpoints. The largest value of $k$ in the network was 21 composed of 35 individuals. The proportion of individuals in a 3-core or higher was 0.95.
This network configuration indicates that the interview respondents are organizationally very cohesive. Figure 8 represents the highest core \((k=21)\) for 35 respondents.

All 35 respondents represented in this dense cluster of interorganizational actors directly or indirectly benefit from growth. Certainly the developer, the architect, the engineer, the two individuals from the development corporation, the two individuals from each of the two largest construction companies in the city, and the two individuals from a title company are directly interested in land values. These individuals are closely followed by a group of individuals that benefit from growth but may or may not be directly involved with land development, including the two local bank representatives and the four individuals representing three national bank subsidiaries. Also included in this second group is the representative from a local hospital, the mortuary, the auto dealer, and the insurance company executive. Finally, the two members from the Chamber of Commerce, the president of the community college and the school superintendent, the general manager of the subsidiary of the national radio corporation, and the directors of the three business organizations occupy a support role for the community and are part of creating a climate for economic growth.

The representative from the research corporation performs a community outreach function for the corporation with particular attention given to public education. Partially a personal passion and partially as a public relations approach, the corporation, acting through this individual, has connections to many of the growth oriented organizations. To exhaust the discussion, the individual in public relations revealed in the interview that
Figure 8. Highest core (21-Core) for Respondent Affiliation (RA) network (N = 35)
contracts come from interpersonal relationships developed on boards. It is his business strategy to involve himself with as many boards as possible. Not coincidentally, his firm also handles the public relations for a national company on one of the largest development projects in the region.

Finally, the network contained 2 cutpoints and four bi-components or blocks. The proportion of cutpoints to total points or actors was 0.042. In other words, 4.2% of the 88 actors served as bridges to other actors in the network. Recall that a bridge is a line that is critical to the connectedness of the network, for when the relationship is removed, the network is split into more than one connected graph (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p. 114). Figure 9 shows the bi-components of the interview affiliation network. Note the two lines that terminate near the bottom-left side of the large cluster of the graph. Each of those lines represents the bridge that is formed by the two cutpoints (individuals) marked by a dot or node closer to the center of the graph. The removal of either of these individuals (in one case a county commissioner connected to another county commissioner and the other case a local business woman connected to another local business woman) isolated those individuals from the network. The individuals that spread out around the large connected figure represent the 7 isolated actors from the larger 88 actor subnetwork.

This analysis, along with the other analyses of this RA network reveals that, compared to the larger CA network, it is dense with few relational gaps. It appears that actors share a great deal of ties across community organizations. Table 6 provides a summary of the preceding discussion of the various structural measures utilized. This analysis results in several conclusions. First, that the 95 respondents in the RA network
are represented on just over three hundred organizations. Second, that over one third—thirty-five of the ninety-five—are very densely connected to each other, sharing at least twenty-one interorganizational ties. Third, that the RA network is highly centralized compared to the CA Network—with only seven isolated individuals. Fourth, that the RA network has more variation in terms of degree than the CA Network (0.333 compared to 0.067). Fifth, and finally, that the RA network appears to have a high redundancy of paths between organizational actors, in that an actor can get to others through several different channels.

Table 6. Respondent Affiliation (RA) network (individuals) analyses.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Network data</th>
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<tr>
<td>Density</td>
<td>0.259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>0.333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closeness</td>
<td>0.294**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betweenness</td>
<td>0.036**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree (mean)</td>
<td>24.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicators of network closure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Largest k-core</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of organizations in largest k-core</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion in 3-core and higher</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicators of network connectivity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of cutpoints</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of bi-components</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of cutpoints to total points</td>
<td>0.042</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(Degree mean: on average, actors are connected to X (mean) others)*

**Subnetwork of 88**
Figure 9. Cutpoints and bi-components for Respondent Affiliation (RA) network (N = 95).
4.4 Comparisons of the Community Affiliation (CA) Network and the Respondent Affiliation (RA) Network

Comparisons can be made between the two affiliation networks. Table 7 combines Tables 5 and 6 to compare the network configuration for both of the CA network of individuals and the RA network of individuals. The RA network is obviously much smaller than the CA network, comprising only 95 individuals and 304 organizations compared to 7552 individuals and 2408 organizations. The interview affiliation network is much more cohesive than the much larger community network. It also only had one component compared to the community network’s 257 components. The interview network contained 7 isolated individuals while the largest component in the community network contained none.

The overall density of the CA network of individuals was 0.003 while the density of the RA network was 0.259. Stated another way, the density of the CA network indicates that only 0.3% of the total lines connecting actors are present while for the interview network almost 26% of the lines connect the individuals. The respondents in the RA network are much more centralized in terms of common board memberships than the entire CA network that they are a small subset of. Because network size plays a large role in determining density, the vastly different sized networks make comparisons on density problematic.
Table 7. Community Affiliation (CA) network and Respondent Affiliation (RA) network analyses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network data</th>
<th>Community Affiliation (CA) Network (Individuals)</th>
<th>Respondent Affiliation (RA) Network (Individuals)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total individuals</td>
<td>7552</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of organizations</td>
<td>2408</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of components</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of individuals in largest component</td>
<td>4604</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isolated individuals in largest component</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density</td>
<td>0.00342</td>
<td>0.259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closeness</td>
<td>0.280*</td>
<td>0.294**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betweenness</td>
<td>0.043*</td>
<td>0.036**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree (mean)</td>
<td>25.82</td>
<td>24.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicators of network closure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Largest k-core</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of organizations in largest k-core</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion in 3-core and higher</td>
<td>0.768</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicators of network connectivity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of cutpoints</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of bi-components</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of cutpoints to total points</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.042</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(Degree Mean: on average, actors are connected to X (mean) others)*

Comparison of the two affiliation networks using degree centralization reveals that the RA network has a much higher score, 0.333, than the CA network, 0.067. The average number of associates in the community network was nearly 26; however the median was 12 and the standard deviation was just over 42. The average number of connections in the interview network was just over 24, with a much higher median of 24 and a much smaller standard deviation of 16.2. The range of scores in the CA network
was between 0 and 534 while the range of scores in the RA network was between 0 and 55.

The RA network serves as a dense subset of the much larger CA network. Across the indicators of structural cohesion the RA network appeared dense and tightly clustered. In terms of cutpoints and blocks, there were few relational gaps and in terms of k-cores, there was a highly dense pocket of actors and nearly the entire network was connected to at least three other actors. This density is an indicator that the respondents in the study represent a group of community actors that potentially share a great deal of time and ideas, which in turn creates the potential for enhanced trust and social support among them.

4.5 The Largest Component of the Community Affiliation Network

The largest component of 4,604 individuals in the affiliation network became the component of interest, as was discussed in the last chapter. The other 2,946 individuals identified though the affiliation network method were disregarded in the analysis. In addition, as was stated above, of the 4,604 people in the largest component an additional 3,498 individuals had a betweenness score of zero, suggesting that they do not sit in between others along shortest communication paths. Based on the logic of centrality—that those with higher scores than others represent “central” or active people in the network—these 3,498 due to their structural remoteness were disregarded as key community actors. Those left included 1,106 actors in the largest component with a betweenness score greater than zero. To interview and analyze over one thousand people was unrealistic, so the decision to cut the list off at the somewhat arbitrary number of 100 was made.
Two questions presented themselves when interviewing the 100 most structurally central community members in the largest component of the community affiliation network: Is the affiliation method sufficient to capture the most central people in the community, and not just those that sit on a lot of boards? And, what is gained over the affiliation method by using a prestige method in the interviews?

Discussing everyone who made it into the component of interest with a score greater than zero would take up far too much space and not speak directly to the purpose of the method: finding the community elites. The assumption in affiliation studies is that there are a small number of influential community members, and that the larger ones structural connections the larger ones range of influence (Perucci and Pilisuk, 1970). This community elite study is much larger than most communities studied (Galaskiewicz, 1979), save for Clark’s (1968) comparative study of 51 communities that ranged from 50,000 to 750,000. As such, it is in the position to provide insight into the assumption that regardless of the community size the number of influential people remains relatively constant. Following that assumption, it can be hypothesized that *those most active in the community will still be a relatively small number of people*. This assumption can be tested by noting the number of people who are structurally connected *and* hold a position of relatively high prestige amongst their peers.

Further evidence of the extensiveness of the networks of influence that extend outside of interorganizational structures (board co-memberships or association co-memberships) in a community can be found by investigating the extent of informal networking for support, friendship, advice, worship, financial transactions, and so on.
While all possible network ties are not investigated in this study, networks of support and advice are. Chapters Five and Six focus on those networks.

Instead of discussing everyone with a centrality score greater than zero, what follows is a look at the individuals with the highest centrality scores (betweenness) and the organizations they represent. Table 8 summarizes the type of community leaders that make up the top 100 of the largest component of the CA network. The largest group is the private sector (68%), followed by the nonprofit groups such as trade association and educators (20%), and making up the smallest group is the public sector (12%), made up of elected and non-elected representatives.

The private sector was broken down into 14 subcategories. Most of the categories are rather small. In fact, only three have over ten percent of the sector: 21% of the private sector respondents were lawyers, another 12% were in real estate, and the largest group, 32% of the private sector, were classified as businesspersons (including two representatives from a car dealership, two business consultants, two representatives from an economic development corporation, three representatives from a research corporation, a representative from an electrical contractor firm, a representative from HR at a government contractor of security technology corporation, the CEO of a mortuary, and a VP of a tourism company). Banks and other financial institutions make up another nine percent of the private sector. The media and the health related organizations make up another 6% of the private sector. By reorganizing the private sector a little differently, we can see that 14 people represent the developing, planning, construction, or selling and buying of real estate (or 21% of the private sector).
Table 8. Top 100 from the Community Affiliation (CA) network largest component.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Organization</th>
<th>Affiliation—Top 100 (N=100)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Architect</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businesses</td>
<td>22 (32%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Network</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>3 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developer</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>6 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Relation</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>14 (21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobbyists</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>4 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>4 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate</td>
<td>8 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>N = 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent of Total</strong></td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Government (elected)</td>
<td>2 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Government (non elected)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Government (elected)</td>
<td>1 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Government (non elected)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Government (elected)</td>
<td>5 (42%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Government (non elected)</td>
<td>3 (25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Government (elected)</td>
<td>1 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Government (non elected)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Government</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal Government (elected)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>N = 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent of Total</strong></td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private Non-Profits and Education (Civic)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>7 (35%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-profit</td>
<td>8 (40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think Tank</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Associations</td>
<td>5 (25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>N = 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent of Total</strong></td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From the second largest group of leaders, the nonprofit and education sector, the largest group are the non-profits (40%) followed by those in primary and higher education (35%), followed by trade associations (25%). Respondents in education represented the university, the community college, and the city-wide public school district. Only one foundation and no think tanks or religious group made it into the top 100. Finally, the public officials, which make up 12 percent of the top 100, were divided into four categories: federal, state, county, and city. Each of these categories were further broken down into elected and non-elected positions. For the top 100 in the affiliation network, 77% were from the state level, five elected and three non-elected. Only one elected representative to the federal government made it on the list. Two elected city official and one elected county official round out the list. No native or tribal government representatives or regional government representatives made it onto the top 100.

4.6 The Prestige Network

In the course of conducting interviews 196 community members were identified as influential by at least two respondents. The distribution of received votes is depicted in Figure 10. The most “prestigious” actor—a car dealership owner—received 50 nominations (the square dot in Figure 10), where 52% of the respondents identified this person as influential. The second highest ranking community member—an economic development company director—received 49 nominations (51% of those interviewed identified this personal as influential). The third highest ranking community member—the mayor—received 43 votes (45%), the fourth—the president of a title company—received 33 votes (34%), and the fifth—a developer—received 30 (31%). There are abundant ties to economic development among the most prestigious community
members, including a land developer, an economic development company president, a title company president, and an auto dealership.

Figure 10. Prestige scores for community members.

In general, there were few community members that received a great number of votes. In fact, as Table 9 shows, 26 people did not receive any votes, 274 people received only one vote, 61 people received 2 votes, 29 people received 3 votes, and 106 people received four or more votes, of which only 5 received 30 or more votes.

Table 9. Number of community members by prestige score (indegree).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Individuals</th>
<th>Prestige (Indegree)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>274</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>4+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong> 496</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The prestige network was analyzed in terms of indegree, or the number of votes received. Table 10 shows a summary of the structure of the prestige network. The indegree of the
prestige network of 496 individuals, including the 29 individuals that had an indegree of 0 (they did not receive prestige votes, but were included because they were interviewed), was 0.091, with a mean of 3.37 and a standard deviation of 5.98. On average, people were nominated by a little over 3 other people. In only one case did someone nominate himself. This low mean score is an indication of the relative equivalence of the elites in the community. There were relatively few individuals who were highly prestigious.

### Table 10. Prestige network.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network data</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total individuals</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of components</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of individuals in largest component</td>
<td>474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isolated individuals largest component</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality measure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indegree</td>
<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indegree (mean)</td>
<td>3.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.7 Discussion of the Similarities and Differences in the Affiliation and the Prestige Networks

Table 11 compares the top 100 of the Community Affiliation (CA) network, to the Prestige network and the interviews completed in terms of the types of organizations represented. The distribution across the public, private, and civil sectors for the prestigious network closely resembles the affiliation network. While the affiliation network was 68% private, 12% public, and 20% nonprofit, the prestige network was 63%, 15%, and 22% respectively. The private sector decreased by five percent, while the public sector increased by 3% and the civic sector increased by 2%. There are small differences between the affiliation network and the prestige network in terms of the
breakdown of organizations represented. Further, there does not seem to be any major bias in the distribution of the interviews by type of organization, comparing the affiliation column to the prestige column. For instance, 68% of people in the affiliation network were from business, compared to 63% in the prestige network, and 72% for the interviews completed. For public (government) the percentages are 12%, 15%, and 7% respectively. Finally, for the civic organizations, the percentages are 20%, 22%, and 21% respectively.

How far down the affiliation list does one have to go to capture a large percentage of the prestige list? For instance, taking the top 1% of the affiliation list, which is the first 46 people, and searching the prestige list for common names, it is discovered that 19 people (41%) were common, and, incidentally, had an indegree of 9 or higher. That means that 25 people in the top 1% of the affiliation list were not in the prestige list. The top 58 people in the prestige list were also found in the affiliation list. Although there does not appear to be any clear guideline for determining if these are big differences or not, the extent of overlap suggest that both methods are identifying a sufficiently similar group of leaders.

Of the 496 people in the prestige network, 186 (over one-third) were not in the CA network largest component. Conversely, among the prestige network there were 7 people in the top 100 that were not found in the CA network. The third column in Table 12 summarizes the number of people in the rest of the Prestige network that are not found in the CA network.
Table 11. Comparison of top 100 of Community Affiliation (CA) network with Prestige network and interviews complete.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Organization</th>
<th>CA network—top 100 (N=100)</th>
<th>Prestige network—2 or more nominations (N=192)</th>
<th>Interviews Completed (N=96)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Architect</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>2 (2%)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businesses</td>
<td>22 (32%)</td>
<td>31 (26%)</td>
<td>15 (22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Network</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>3 (2%)</td>
<td>3 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>3 (4%)</td>
<td>7 (6%)</td>
<td>5 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developer</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
<td>3 (2%)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>6 (9%)</td>
<td>22 (18%)</td>
<td>9 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (2%)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
<td>8 (7%)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Relation</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
<td>3 (2%)</td>
<td>3 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>14 (21%)</td>
<td>18 (15%)</td>
<td>13 (19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobbyists</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (2%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>4 (6%)</td>
<td>9 (7%)</td>
<td>5 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>4 (6%)</td>
<td>3 (2%)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate</td>
<td>8 (12%)</td>
<td>7 (6%)</td>
<td>7 (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>N = 68</td>
<td>N = 121</td>
<td>N = 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent of Total</strong></td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Government (elected)</td>
<td>2 (17%)</td>
<td>6 (21%)</td>
<td>4 (57%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Government (non elected)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Government (elected)</td>
<td>1 (8%)</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
<td>2 (29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Government (non elected)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>3 (10%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Government (elected)</td>
<td>5 (42%)</td>
<td>5 (17%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Government (non elected)</td>
<td>3 (25%)</td>
<td>4 (14%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Government (elected)</td>
<td>1 (8%)</td>
<td>4 (14%)</td>
<td>1 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Government (non elected)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Government</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal Government (elected)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>N = 12</td>
<td>N = 29</td>
<td>N = 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent of Total</strong></td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private Non-Profits and Education (civic)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>7 (35%)</td>
<td>16 (38%)</td>
<td>6 (30%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-profit</td>
<td>8 (40%)</td>
<td>13 (31%)</td>
<td>9 (45%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think Tank</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (2%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Associations</td>
<td>5 (25%)</td>
<td>10 (24%)</td>
<td>5 (25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>N = 20</td>
<td>N = 42</td>
<td>N = 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent of Total</strong></td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A way of discussing the similarities and differences of the two lists is to break the prestige list down into quintiles and identify the percentage of people in the CA network that are represented at different ranks within the Prestige network. For instance, as can be seen in the top of the second column of Table 12, 53% (n=53) of the top 100 people in the affiliation list were also in the top 100 of the prestige list. In other words, there was a 53% overlap between the two lists when just looking at the top 100 most central actors. Additionally, 17% of the top 100 people in the affiliation list were found in the second 100, 8% in the third hundred, none in the fourth hundred, and 22 percent in the bottom of the list.

**Table 12. Affiliation list represented in the Prestige network.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quintile of Prestige</th>
<th>Number/Percent of top 100 on CA list on Prestige list</th>
<th>Number on Prestige network within quintile not on CA network</th>
<th>Percent of quintile not on the CA list as a percent of total not on CA list</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-100</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101-200</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201-300</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301-400</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>401-496</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The twenty-two people from the top 100 in the CA network that end up at the bottom of the Prestige network suggest, if the opinions of the community members interviewed can be used as a true or accurate barometer of influence—a better barometer than multiple memberships in the community—then a little over a fifth of the top one hundred on the affiliation list should not be there. Of those twenty-two people, nine were interviewed. (A discussion of the similarities and dissimilarities between these low-prestige respondents and the high-prestige respondents around the issue of community action is discussed in Chapter 7).
The other column in Table 12 shows the percent of each quintile in the Prestige network that was not found in the affiliation list. For the first one hundred people in the Prestige network 7 were not found in the CA network, which is 1.41% of the prestigious list, or just under 4% of the top 100 prestigious people that were not in the CA network. To continue down the table, 19 percent (n=35) of the second hundred most prestigious people were not in the CA network; 26% (n = 49) of the third hundred, 28% (n = 52) of the fourth hundred, and, 23% (n = 43) of the remaining 96 people were not in the CA network.

The overlap between the Prestige network and the CA network suggest that the two methods are identifying a large number of common people. However, even with the degree of overlap between the two lists, the fact that discrepancies on the lists emerged suggests that a blended methodology is superior.

### 4.8 Summary: Implications and Issues Related to the Two Methods

What is gained by doing a prestige study on top of the affiliation study? The objective in this chapter has been to document the differences between the affiliation technique, what is also called an interlocking directorate approach, and the prestige technique. To conclude this chapter some summary comments on the comparisons between the two networks are made, followed by a discussion of strengths and weaknesses of each approach.

An affiliation method can be improved by taking an emic perspective—the view of the community from the perspective of the participants. By inquiring from study subjects who they feel should be in the study, who they feel are influential, the research
transcends the armchair approach of analyzing the co-memberships of individuals in a community that may or may not have any real cultural, political, economic, or social meaning. This is the hope of a prestige method: a check on this armchair approach by getting firsthand knowledge from the participants under investigation who they feel should be included on a list of influential community members. If it turns out that the people that are being identified through the prestige method are the same people that were identified in the CA network, then confidence in the armchair approach is achieved. If, however, the lists differ significantly then affiliation researchers should take notice and question the completeness of their method.

Nobody in the community has a complete picture of the influence structure. The prestige method is dependent upon the perspective of the respondents, who may not know who is “really” influential. Respondents may have assessed the legitimacy of community members when making nomination, which might have excluded certain sectors of the community, like labor union leaders, activists, and others who may be influential in those other sectors. It may also be the case that respondents did not even think to include other forms of influence, and instead opted for those that are influential to certain goal to the exclusion of others.

There is a significant amount of overlap between the top one hundred in the CA network and the prestige network. However, there is also enough difference in the two networks to justify the added effort to question respondents about who is prestigious in the community. To summarize some of the similarities in the two lists, 70% of the top 100 in the affiliation list are among the top 200 in the prestige list. And, significantly, there were only 7 people that made it into the top 100 in the prestige network that were
not somewhere in the affiliation network. It appears, then, that while the affiliation method is a constructive start, it is insufficient, at least in this study, to capture some of the influential members in the community. With more time and resources in carrying out this research one could interview deeper into the affiliation network and reduce the amount of “missed” leaders that emerged in the prestige approach.

What is a significant difference between the two lists? Is a twenty percent difference in the lists enough to validate the extra work necessary to carry out a prestige study? Does the difference have to be great or is a ten percent difference enough? These are not easy questions to answer.

Another flag that is raised concerns the completeness of the affiliation method that culminated in the initial community structure in the first place. In the previous chapter the work involved in arriving at the two-mode matrix of organizations by individuals was discussed. Was that method sufficient to capture the interorganizational structure of the community? Short of interviewing members of the local media and asking them for the lists of the most influential members of the community (a method that initially was considered in this study but was subsequently abandoned due to time constraints), this research has made every effort to stay abreast with the dynamics of the community interorganizational structures up to the time that data collection was done. Unfortunately, a community is dynamic and changes are inevitable. The time lag between data collection in the libraries for what culminated in several months of analysis of the affiliation network could have resulted in a nontrivial difference between what was ultimately found in that analysis and what the actual structural relationships were at the time the interviews.
One concern about the two-part method employed in this study is that, as in a snowball sampling study, where and how the first set of participants are found will influence who ultimately ends up in the study, and, specifically for this study, who is identified as influential. The beginning points for this study were directories of the largest businesses, all law firms, the various levels of government, and active foundations. From these starting points, listings of leaders were obtained through the directories themselves or through online searches of the organizations. This approach is not without flaws. It deemphasizes labor unions, charities, religious organizations, political action groups, social clubs, and countless other types of organizations. If these leaders were included on the list of the community leaders assembled from the CA study, some of them might have ended up with a high prestige score. On the other hand, the fact that, when asked to identify any community members that should have appeared on the list of community leaders, representatives from these non-business and political groups were not mentioned might be an indicator that those interviewed—for the most part—did not feel that those segments of the community represented powerful leaders (at least not powerful in the contexts they were thinking about).

It is possible, that if some of the prominent religious members in the community were included on the list that the respondents would have checked or mentioned their names as influential in the community. This issue could have been addressed by giving respondents lists that included members from the faith community, the unions, and other sectors of the community and asking them to identify those that they felt were influential in the community. Unfortunately the absence of religious and other organizations from
civil society was not anticipated in the configuration of the community power structure that emerged from the affiliation and prestige methods.

Yet another concern about the data emerges from the preceding point. Respondents were asked to identify people in the community who they felt were influential. Some of the respondents answered the question with some observations about the list. It was said that some of the people on the list were not influential, some were influential but only within their particular segment of the community, and some were influential on a broader level. When asked which level of influence was wanted, respondents were asked to provide all forms of influence, but that ultimately the broader level of influence was what the question intended to elicit. So, not only who made it on the list could be problematic, but how respondents interpreted the meaning of significance also may be a source of difficulties.
V. Elite Community Issues

5.1 Introduction

One of the best ways to understand the leaders in a community is to find out three things: First, what are leaders concerned about? Second, with whom do leaders associate, if anyone, on those concerns? And third, how do leaders act toward those concerns? This chapter seeks to answer the first question while the following two chapters seek answers to the other two questions respectively. This chapter begins with a brief theoretical introduction to the social construction of issues, which is followed by a discussion of the interview data used to understand this social construction. Next, the dominant issues are presented. In anticipation of what follows, the core issues that emerge are heavily dominated by an economic development world-view. All issues relate to economic development, whether it is on the input side—creating the infrastructure and social environment conducive to economic development—or on the output side, where economic development is seen as the solution to social problems. In the final section of the chapter a model is constructed that summarizes the interrelationship between the various issues presented here.

5.2 The Social Construction of Issues

Of concern to this study are the points of inter-organizational action as they manifest themselves around socially constructed issues. Issues of concern to the local elites serve as a starting point for understanding the structure of the community as well as the efforts to maintain or change it by the local elites. Issues, or social problems, are

According to Laumann, et al. (1985), “State policies are the product of complex interactions among governmental and non-governmental organizations, each seeking to influence the collectively binding decisions about events that have consequences for their interests (p. 1). Citing an earlier study by Knoke and Laumann (1982: 256), Laumann et al., describe a policy domain as “identified by specifying a substantively defined criterion of mutual relevance or common orientation among a set of consequential actors concerned with formulating, advocating, and selecting courses of action (that is, policy options) that are intended to resolve the delimited substantive problem in question” (1985, p. 2).

They introduce two assumptions. The first assumption is that “corporate entities—such as trade associations, professional societies, labor unions, public interest groups, government bureaus, and congressional committees—are the key State policy-domain actors” (1985, p. 2). It is reasonable to apply their national-level analysis to the state and city levels as well. The other assumption in their theoretical model is the adoption of “a social choice perspective, which assumes that supra-individual structural arrangements among these corporate entities must be taken into account in formulating an adequate explanation of policy-domain event participation” (1985, p. 2, emphasis in original).
From these two assumptions they build a model of state policy formation that begins with three predetermined variables: issue interests, monitoring capacities, and influence reputation. Organizations vary in the degree to which they are interested in various issues, and their ability to monitor the issues. Influence reputation is defined as “an organization’s capacity to affect policy decisions attributed to it by other domain actors” (1985, p. 3). They state that, “An organization’s imputed influence varies with the trustworthiness and credibility of the information about its interests and intentions that it communicates to other domain participants” and “probably reflects both past impact and anticipated future performances in shaping collective domain policy decisions” (1985, p. 3). The notion of trustworthiness and credibility is supported in the present study and is discussed in Chapter Seven.

These three variables, they hypothesize, affect “an organization’s locations within two intervening domain structures” (1985, p. 3) which include communication networks and resource exchange networks. “In trying to manage [the] uncertainties [of authoritative action], an organization attempts to establish predictable, stable relationships of interorganizational information and resource exchanges that permit it better to negotiate its external policy environment” (1985, p. 3). They argue that their “model shows that a broader range of issue interests, a higher monitoring capacity, and a more substantial influence reputation each allow an organization to become more centrally located within both networks” (1985, p. 3). In their model, reproduced below (Figure 11), they hypothesize that “an organization will try to influence the outcomes of a broader range of policy events if it is more centrally located in the communication and
resource networks, if it has a larger resource endowment, and if it maintains a wide range of domain interests” (1985, p. 3).

Laumann et al.’s schematic diagram is not testable given the data presented in this chapter. Instead it serves as a sensitizing model for the issue networks presented below and is revisited in the concluding section of the chapter.

**5.3 Asking the Question and Analyzing It**

The community issue topic was presented in the following manner. First, a statement was read to the respondent: “*This next question is to help me understand leadership, or involvement in decision-making processes in the city.*” Next, respondents were told that they would be presented with all parts of a three-part question and then, returning to the first part, respondents were instructed to work through each part of the question in turn. The three parts of the question were: (1) “*What are some of the major community issues that have come to the attention of your organization and/or you in the*
last year?” (2) “Have you or your organization been involved in any of these major issues?” If the respondent said yes then the follow up question “What was the nature of your or your organization’s involvement?” was asked. These data are presented in the Chapter Seven. Finally, (3) “Are there any organizations or individuals in our community that you or your organization has sought support from?” If so, then respondents were asked “who or what organizations are they?” This final part constituted the network data that are presented in Chapter Six.

Breaking the question down into three parts offered respondents the opportunity to think through their and their organization’s involvement in the community. All three parts of the question were stated before respondents were given a chance to answer so that respondents could reflect and respond with issues that could address each sub-question. This did not always occur, however. Some respondents simply listed general concerns even though neither they nor their organization specifically worked on them. By and large, though, the respondents did list issues that could address each part of the question. Sometimes respondents quickly listed three or four issues, then returned to the first issue and listed and mentioned how they worked on it. They then proceeded to the rest only to return to the first issue again to answer the final part of the question and referred to individuals and/or organizations they associate with on the issue. Other respondents spoke about one issue at a time, addressing all parts of the question, and then proceeded to the second issue, addressed all parts of the question, and so on. The variability in approaches to answering the questions does not appear to jeopardize reliability. Instead, reading all of the parts of the question before respondents were given
an opportunity to answer might have allowed for increased reflection and more thoughtful answering.

Analysis of interview transcripts was done qualitatively although simple quantification of issues and sub-themes within issues, which helped structure the presentation of the discussion. Working in Atlas Ti allows for what is called open coding, simply selecting a chunk of text, which could be as short a word but as long as an entire transcript, and applying a label or a code to it. Coding becomes to the qualitative analyst one of the primary tools for finding patterns across interviews. The other tool is “memoing” which are text documents attached to the coded text. Memoing captures a researcher’s thoughts, impression, definitions, and so forth, about the code. General memos can also be generated that might be analytical, methodological, or reminders, for example, about the data.

Several readings of the interview data were necessary to adequately understand the issues. Interview transcripts were read through, usually within a day, but sometimes within two days of interviewing. The second time through, the next day, the iterative process of coding and memoing was done. The first level of codes was fairly simple. Respondents often explicitly said that they were concerned about economic development, or the minimum wage, education, healthcare, crime and so on. In those cases the word or words and the relevant text around it were selected and coded.

After this second pass through the transcripts a third pass was conducted to be sure that coding was consistent through all 95 interviews. Once these “issue areas” were coded, extracting particular issues and the relevant code material was possible, which eased analysis. For instance, a new text document was created for the part of the
transcripts that dealt with the respondents’ discussion of economic development. These new text documents served as the primary documents from which new, more sensitive codes around each issue area were developed. All of the quotes around each issue area—for instance economic development—were read through again, first just to get a sense of the range of the discussion, then a second time to identify “sub-themes.” It was at this “sub-theme” level that the number of quotes became manageable enough to write about. Although many issues were uncovered, only six are discussed in this chapter, and only four issues had sufficient responses to conduct a network analysis.

5.4 The Issues

Through the methodology discussed above, sixteen issues were uncovered. The six most frequently mentioned issues, which are discussed in detail below, include economic development, education, water, healthcare, crime and the socially disadvantaged, which covers issues such as discrimination and poverty. In terms of priority—if the frequency of mentioned issues is any indication of priority—these issues serve as a baseline for entrée into the ways leaders in the community think, work, and develop and maintain ties with others in the community. Economic issues, mostly economic development, were mentioned by 65 respondents and mentioned first by 29 respondents. Education issues were mentioned by 60 respondents and first by 29 respondents. Water issues were mentioned by 26 respondents and first by 8 respondents. Crime issues were mentioned by 19 respondents and first by 5 respondents. Healthcare issues were mentioned by 17 respondents and first by 4 respondents. Finally, twenty-five
respondents mentioned issues related to socially disadvantaged populations. Table 13 below illustrates this breakdown of issues by priority.

Table 13. Ranking by respondents of partial list of issues. Total column means total number of times issues was mentioned across the 95 respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
<th>4th</th>
<th>5th</th>
<th>6th</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socially Disadvantage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The remaining ten issues, summarized in Table 14, identified by respondents were comparatively small, and due to space and time considerations are left out of the analysis. However, the Quality of Life and government issues are discussed in Chapter Seven.

Table 14. Coded responses to the community issues questions into 16 community issues. After each issue is the number of respondents that identified the issue in parentheses. (Items in bold are discussed in the text of this chapter).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic (65)</th>
<th>Healthcare (17)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education (60)</td>
<td>Government (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socially Disadvantaged (25)</td>
<td>Quality of Life (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Rights/Legal Issues (2)</td>
<td>Philanthropy (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty (8)</td>
<td>Regionalism (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination (3)</td>
<td>Creative Class (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language Barriers (2)</td>
<td>Community Attitude (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disabilities/Rights (2)</td>
<td>Social Services (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity (8)</td>
<td>Tourism (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water (26)</td>
<td>Social Trust (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime (19)</td>
<td>Arts and Culture (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The respondents employed a range of schemas to organize their knowledge around the various issues. Collectively, these schemas constitute the attempts made by community elites to reproduce, to employ Althusser’s (1971) terminology, ideological (state) apparatuses—particularly the education ISA, but also the alignment of private and
public resources to ensure the smooth operation of healthcare services and the city’s infrastructure (water), while at the same time reducing order-disruptions, such as crime and social disadvantage groups.

5.4.1 Economic development issue

There emerged several schemas across the 65 respondents that prioritized economic development. Table 15 summarizes these schemas and the number of respondents who spoke about each schema. Some respondents simply mentioned that economic development was an important concern but did not elaborate on it. Alternatively, some respondents mentioned several different schemas. In those cases their responses were included in each schema. Briefly, these six schemas are: Growth management and sustainability (GMS), growth to stay competitive (GC), industrial recruitment (IR), self-development (SD), growth as a cause (Cause), and growth as an effect (Effect). Each of these schemas is developed below.

Growth management and sustainability (GMS) was the most often mentioned schema, noted by 22 respondents. These respondents felt that economic growth must be balanced with ecological constraints. These respondents are not anti-growth, nor are they of the opinion that economic growth solves all. Rather, they take a pragmatic approach and see the need to reflect on what kind of growth is best for the community, given ecological limitations of the community and the state. Issues falling under this umbrella include water, transportation, environmental building, sprawl, and infrastructure in general. Particularly on the minds of these respondents is the need to balance water needs with growth needs. It is no surprise that in the southwestern United States water issues...
loom large on the respondents’ minds. In fact, the issue of water is developed in the second section of this chapter.

Table 15. Economic development schemas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Growth management and sustainability (GMS)</td>
<td>Growth must be balanced with ecological constraints—water, transportation, green growth, quality growth, sprawl, and infrastructure.</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth as effect of (Effect)</td>
<td>Growth depends on quality of water, education, infrastructure, cooperative government (dependent variable)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth causes (Cause)</td>
<td>Growth to solve social problems (independent variable)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Recruited (IR)</td>
<td>Attracting new companies/industries to the community.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-development (SD)</td>
<td>Focusing on growing local companies.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth to stay competitive (GC)</td>
<td>Growth appears to be essential for the life of the community. To compete with other communities in the state or in a more abstract sense, without growth, death.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another aspect of growth management came from a few respondents in the business of economic development. They saw growth as inevitable and their concern was what type of growth would predominate. Outside of the physical ecology of water, transportation, and pollution, a consensus across those concerned with growth management was the need for high paying jobs with benefits. Several acknowledged the need to grow all sectors of the economy, but the focus for these respondents was on “quality,” high paying jobs. This aspect of growth management segues into seeing growth as an independent variable: that growth of the economy has the power to alleviate social problems and is discussed below.

Economic development was seen as a dependent variable and constituted the second largest schema: economic growth depends upon the ability of the community to
manage the region’s ecological (water, transportation, pollution) and social resources (education system, cooperative government policies). The respondents that made it into the study from the community were predominantly from the business, legal, financial, and public sectors. (Citizen groups, non-profits, and activists are overwhelmingly absent, as was discussed in the previous chapter.) As such, the respondents equated economic development and the success of their enterprises, directly or indirectly, with the success of the community’s ability to develop a successful support structure. It is important to note, however, that the claim here not that any particular respondent’s interest in education, governance, water management, and the like is of concern only for economic reasons. Nearly all of the respondents interviewed live in the community and have interests in the community outside of pure economic self-interest, as many indicated.

The third and fifth most prominent schemas are industrial recruitment (IR) and self-development (SD), respectively. The eleven IR respondents felt that economic development means bringing in jobs to the community, compared to only six SD respondents who mentioned support of existing businesses. Attracting new industry to the community is a priority for these IR individuals—particularly, but not exclusively, attracting high-tech industry. One respondent (an elected official who is also in real estate) noted that the community has recently gone through three development phases. The first phase was in the 1980s with the recruitment of a large high-tech manufacturing company. The second was in the 1990s with the recruitment of call centers. The third phase currently underway includes the introduction of a handful of manufacturing companies and a burgeoning film industry. All of this new development, according to respondents, resulted from the coordinated efforts of economic development
organizations, the chamber of commerce, local and state government, and active business leaders.

Not unrelated, the next schema sees economic development as an independent variable. Nine respondents saw economic development as the answer to many of the ills or shortcomings in the community. For this group crime, poverty, social problems in general, and the government’s ability to manage them through taxation, all depend on the quality of economic development. The logic is simple in that the more the economic base is expanded, the more tax revenues come into the community, resulting in more resources that government can devote to alleviating social problems in the community.

An important point mentioned by several respondents is related to the government’s role in the community. Respondents who mentioned the role of government (at any or all levels) noted that government has played too big of a role in the community because economic development has been small or inadequate. One respondent in banking, one in development, and another in insurance mentioned that the private sphere needs to, as the banker put it, “get off the government tit.” This reliance on government funding and government support by industry, they contend, results in a lack of adequate economic growth. This is also likely an artifact of the small business sector and the reliance on government funded research labs located in the city and the state. Specifically, the community under study has no Fortune 500 companies in it. This lack was mentioned by several respondents. (The lack of large corporate headquarters in the community is touched on again in Chapter 7.) The argument posited by these respondents is that economic growth results in the promise of less dependence on government.
Finally, the smallest schema is growth to stay competitive, mentioned by five respondents. These respondents felt that growth is essential to stay competitive with neighboring communities and other regions in the state. One respondent (a county commissioner) worried that if the city council maintains its anti-growth stance the city might become like the hole in the middle of a donut, where new businesses would locate to the suburbs or neighboring counties, leaving the city without growth. Another respondent equated lack of economic growth with death. Several respondents mentioned that the city recently made it on a couple of business friendly lists and that the prestige of these rankings has the potential to increase the city’s overall competitiveness for bringing in new industries. One respondent thought the recent high rankings would attract companies to the community, which will result in an upward shift of wages. The respondent added, however, carrying the logic of increased wages one step further, that if this were to occur the city would likely see a decrease in its desirability on the business friendly lists, like Forbes.

5.4.2 Water issues

The study site lies in the southwestern United States, so concern for water is not surprising. Of the 95 interviews conducted, 26 respondents (27%) identified water as a concern. Across those 26 respondents five water schemas emerged, including conservation (9 respondents), the politics of water allocation (8 respondents), urban growth use (14 respondents), agriculture use (4 respondents), tribal use (4 respondents), and infrastructure generally (9 respondents). If these responses are any indication of the perception of issues in the community in general, then it appears that water has emerged within the last ten years as a key issue. Within the last 10 years there seems to have
emerged two kinds of concerns around water, environmental and economic. None of the respondents who identified water as an issue contradicted the importance of conserving water in the arid region where this community is located. The second concern revolves around the economics of water, including growth, agriculture, and infrastructure. Table 16 summarizes these schemas and Figure 12 attempts to visualize the interrelationships of the issues around water.

Table 16. Water schemas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Water Schema</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water Politics</td>
<td>Allocation issues, intergovernmental agencies working on issue</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservation</td>
<td>Environmental concern for sustainability of water supply</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>Economic growth dependent upon water supply</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Related to water politics, water for agriculture or for urban development</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal</td>
<td>Tribal use tied to cultural heritage</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>General concern of the availability of water; spoken in same breath as</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>transportation, pollution, and sewer.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Political activity around water (B) takes place within a generally agreed upon understanding of (A) its limited quantity and the need for conservation. The politics of water lead to four issues. The first and second issues are interrelated: First, some respondents see water as an (1) infrastructural issue that corresponds to other infrastructural issues like sewage, transportation, and pollution. An interesting dimension to the management of water is ensuring an adequate water supply for the urban area and the legacy of a regional master-planned water diversion project. This water project, fifty years old now, diverts water across the continental divide and was touted by respondents as a great plan with foresight. Some argue that the community lacks this sort of “big idea” today.
The second issue is the relationship between water and (2) economic growth. Some respondents simply believed that growth depends on the availability of water: a developer said that “the future of the city is tied to the quality of growth and water issues.” Another respondent in the development industry said “we need to sustain a reasonable rate of growth…. One of the necessary things you need for that is a good quality water supply.” A lawyer said that “in terms of economic development, the biggest issues are planned growth and availability of water.” The CEO of a private business said that “in the mid 80s and early 90s there wasn’t a lot of discussion about water” but “we all acknowledge in the last ten years it [water] has risen as a potential gate to development in the [state].”

Economic growth interests and urban use are put into competition with (3) Agricultural use and (4) Cultural/Tribal use of water. The business community—from...
developers, to construction companies, to those in real estate, to economic development specialists—is trying to affect water policy. It might be an overstatement to argue that among the respondents the politics of water is simply seen as a battle between pro-growth advocates fighting in the political arena against water conservationists, agriculturalists, and non-urban users in the state. However, given the substantial amount of attention to economic growth and the sectors of the communities the respondents represent, conflicts around water were apparent. In fact, all four of the respondents who spoke about agricultural water use felt that urban growth needed to be balanced with agricultural use. Specifically, an advocate and lobbyist for the development community felt strongly that manufacturing jobs were more important than farming. This comes down to the politics of water allocation. One respondent said that, “we don’t have a water problem in the state, we have an allocation problem” and argued that agricultural use is out of balance with urban use. Another respondent felt that there needed to be an authority that rises above the conflicting interests of agriculture, urban development, and Native American tribal use. From the construction industry this respondent argued that a strong governor is necessary to bring about resolution to the separate thinking of these three factions.

Several questions around water were raised by the respondents including: What is an acceptable rate of growth given the availability of water? What kind of growth should the community push for? What is the future of agriculture in the region, given the competition for water with urban developers? When conservation efforts run their course, where can the community turn to find new water sources? How are the politics of allocation—between tribal use, agricultural use, and urban use—going to shake out? Water, at some level, has the capacity to define the community in this regard.
5.4.3 Education issue

Another issue that has the capacity to define the community, an issue even more broadly shared by the respondents than water, is education (the dominant ideological state apparatus (Althusser 1971)). Education is one of the biggest issues for the respondents. It might be said that it is the other side of economic development. By that I mean that for economic development to take off, in order to grow the economy, a workforce educated through the state’s public education systems, from primary school to the community college to the local university, has to meet the needs of not only existing local businesses—in fact, the existing businesses are secondary in this regard—but more importantly businesses that could potentially relocate to the community. Education also appears to be the answer to other social problems, like crime, poverty, and social inequality. Education is largely seen by this community as an independent variable, and that its quality has the power to determine the health of the community, and central to this health is the ability to grow the economy. Nevertheless, across all the respondents, very few mention how education should be reformed or what an adequate education system should look like other than to emphasize testing. In this section the economic development and education reform schemas around education are discussed as well as inequality and quality of life schemas. Table 17 summarizes these four schemas and the number of respondents who noted each one.
Table 17. Education schemas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schemas</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>Development of an educated workforce</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform</td>
<td>Efforts to reform public education system to produce higher proficiency graduates</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inequality</td>
<td>Education to reduce social inequality, reducing achievement gap among racial minorities</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of life</td>
<td>Democracy and a reduction in crime</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The two largest schemas around education were economic development and the need for reform. These two schemas were not always discussed together—only 18% (n=11) of the 60 who spoke about education mentioned education reform with economic development. Of the 29 respondents who did speak about economic development, 17 (59%) did not explicitly reference the need for educational reform. This means, however, that 41% of the economic development minded respondents explicitly mentioned a need for education reform. It should come as no surprise that the vast majority (46 people or 77%) of those who mentioned education geared the discussion around economic development or reform, given the background of the respondents and their already demonstrated interest in economic development. For instance, it was already mentioned that among those who emphasized economic development there is a 41% overlap between the two schemas. For the 26 people who mentioned reform, 14 (54%) did not mention economic development. The remaining 46% did. The other co-occurring schema with education reform is social inequality, noted by 3 respondents (12%).

As was mentioned in the preceding paragraph, there is an explicit relationship between education reform and economic development. A case can be made that there is an implicit relationship between these two issues as well. When the ties between
community leaders around education are taken into consideration the connection between economic development and reform becomes clearer. A common path to reforming education seems to be through economic development-related organizations, like the two chambers of commerce and a city-wide economic development organization and a broader purpose organization that brings together the business community to discuss common issues and concerns and to host celebrity guest speakers. Other respondents concerned about education reform took a more direct approach and made contacts with administrators at the three levels of public education in the community (the citywide public school district, the one community college, and the public university in the city). Either way, through business organizations or directly with administrators of the local public education institutions, the organizations which the education respondents represent overwhelmingly come from the business community and reflect this economic development agenda.

What specifically is meant by economic development as it relates to education? The presumed correlation between education and economics described by the respondents was quite obvious in the interview transcripts. For instance, a respondent from a local corporate research laboratory with ties to the Department of Defense plainly said, “the only sustainable competitive advantage in a knowledge based economy is innovation and innovation starts with education.” A respondent who had worked for most of his career in the healthcare industry believed that the education system in the state did not produce graduates who could compete in the economy. He thus felt education reform was a priority. A respondent from the real estate industry believed that education reform was the number one priority for the community. Failure, he argued, would impact the
community’s ability to attract relocating companies. A lawyer who represented several of the organizations of the respondents in the study also equated a strong education system with the economic health of the community. Economic health for him is the ability to recruit companies to the community. A respondent from the public relations industry considered the education system to be lacking in workforce readiness. Another respondent in public relations believed that education standards are a subset of job growth and noted that education is linked to job recruitment. The general manager of several local radio stations believed that having a good education system is the key to recruiting businesses to the community. The CEO of a human resources firm saw the relationship between economic development and education as reciprocal: recruiting good businesses to the community increases the tax base, which, in turn, can “help fund our troubled education system.” To these ends, she supports and lobbies one of the political delegates in the state which is economic development oriented.

Respondents from all three levels of public education (K-12, community college, and the university) stressed the need to align their organizations with the economic environment. The respondents in public offices who spoke about education also stressed the need to move the public education institutions in the community toward economic development goals. References to economic development and education abound in those transcripts.

Reform, as was stated above, is a general schema that explicitly and implicitly relates to economic development. However, reform was not limited to economic development interests. Discussions of reform also sometimes referred to ameliorating inequalities in the community. The wish that these few respondents spoke about was to
reduce the achievement gap between racial and other minority groups. One respondent worked with one of the chambers to reduce the gap between what he called “the haves and the have-nots.” Another representative from one of the chambers noted the importance of closing the achievement gap between racial groups in the state, and worked with the Governor, the Mayor, the state Secretary of Education, and the city’s print media to draw attention to the issue. Another respondent mentioned the role of public education as an equalizer for racial as well as sexual inequalities. A respondent from the banking industry saw education as a correction to the inability of poorer families to properly prepare their children for learning, although he acknowledged and lamented the complexities and failures of public education to close the gaps between well-prepared and ill-prepared students.

Finally, a code was created that captures the relationships education has with the community that fall outside of economic development, what is called Quality of Life. The 18 respondents that are coded under this schema spoke about different dimensions of the quality of life in the community. For instance, the CEO of one of the banks in the community said “good quality of life starts with how well you educate your population.” The chairman of an insurance company equated education with the strength of democracy. The chairman of a state-wide policy planning organization also equated a democratic society with an educated population. Both of these men also associated education with economic development. A founding partner of an engineering consulting firm spoke about a general need to have an educated population. A principal in an architectural firm stated that “the state of our public education system is of critical
importance to our society’s success.” It is possible that these comments were post-hoc rationales for justifying development interests in education.

A final dimension of the quality of life schema is highlighted by the four respondents who saw education’s role in reducing crime. For example, a local developer felt that a strong education system reduced the need to build more prisons and a representative from one of the chambers in the city noted that those with high school education are less likely to commit crimes than those who fail to graduate from high school.

Public education is seen by the respondents as a central precondition to economic development and the quality of life in the community. The sheer number of respondents who felt that public education is in need of reform reflects a general perception among respondents that public education is not doing an adequate job of creating an environment conducive to economic development: a crime-free environment with a high quality of life and an adequately trained workforce. Not every respondent who identified education mentioned the need for reform, however. It cannot be inferred whether they too felt that reform was necessary but when asked to identify community issues that concerned them, implicit in the question is a problem. In other words, if education was not a problem, it likely would not have been mentioned.

Figure 13 is an analytic model derived from the respondents of the relationships between public education, economic development, crime, quality of life, and the need for reform. Note the thick and thin lines that connect education and economic development. The vast majority of respondents note that economic development depends on the quality of public education so a thick line connects the two. There were a couple of respondents,
however, who felt that the relationship was reversed, that the quality of public education depends on the ability of the community to attract quality employees who carry with them the potential to increase the tax base which would in turn fund public education. The thin line back to education from economic development captures this sentiment.

The lines from education to quality of life and to crime are not demarcated with thick or thin lines to show the strength of the relationship. However, the negative symbol on the line that connects crime to education indicates that crime, according to respondents, is a function of the quality of the education system. The quality of life, which captures the level of inequality in the community and the strength of civil society, is positively affected by the strength of the education system. In other words, according to the respondents, the strength of civil society, democratic participation, an informed citizenry, and the general welfare of the different status groups within the community, including racial groups and women, is dependent upon the strength of the education system. Finally, the reform box at the top of the model simply notes the schema’s relationship to the rest of the model, in that to meet the rest of the goals of the respondents, which include the quality of life, a reduced amount of crime, and economic development, education must be reformed.
5.4.4 Healthcare issue

Healthcare is an issue of considerably less importance to the respondents than economic development and education, although some respondents make ties among the three. Healthcare seems to be a tie-in issue to the general health of the community. As is shown below, a few respondents note the relationship between public health and education and public health and work. The issue is important for a minority of respondents, and for those concerned with it, this concern appears to be from a quality of life rather than an economic perspective. That said, it is easy to envision the impact of the healthcare system on small businesses, and the general health of economically disadvantaged populations. This does not go unnoted by the respondents.

Respondents often mentioned the inadequacy of the healthcare services in the state. An independent business owner and advocate and lobbyist for small business felt that healthcare was the number one issue in the community, especially concerning the ability of small businesses to afford healthcare for themselves and their workers. The

Figure 13. Public education’s relationship to civil society, the reduction in crime, economic development, and the need for its reform.
general manager of a local television station shared the same concern, that the uninsured population was a problem for the state, and that small businesses cannot afford to support healthcare for their employees. In a related vein, a local elected county official mentioned that, along with education, healthcare is the biggest issue in the community, and that the path to improving the healthcare system is through the creation of jobs with insurance benefits. For the CEO of one of the local healthcare delivery organizations in the state, the cost and availability of healthcare services was one of his top three concerns for the community. For him, developing and maintaining ties on healthcare issues occurs at the state level, serving on healthcare reform boards for the governor, and advocating and proposing a universal state healthcare system with some state legislators.

Some respondents focused their attention on service delivery and the uninsured. One respondent mentioned the importance of preventative medicine and the role business can play in spearheading awareness programs. In fact, in his retail business, the respondent hired a nurse to provide preventive healthcare in-house. Several respondents mentioned healthcare as an issue because of its importance for economic development and for the readiness of children to learn in an educational environment. One respondent, a lawyer and former state legislator, noted that “we should have the best healthcare, for without a healthy child they can't learn.” Finally, one respondent, a vice president for one of the healthcare delivery organizations, was concerned with the community’s ability to deal adequately with the related concerns of mental health and homelessness in the city.

5.4.5 Socially disadvantaged issue

Individually, the six issue areas that comprise this section are rather minor, compared to the attention respondents gave to economic development and education.
Together, however, they comprise the fourth largest issue. Included under this category are concerns among the elite for those less advantaged, including racial and ethnic minorities, women, those with disabilities, “underprivileged children,” “the disadvantaged,” those in poverty or who are hungry, those who are not native English speakers, and those who have had their civil rights infringed upon.

Also included in this section is the diversity theme. By-and-large, diversity is not seen by the respondents as a problem, but rather as a cultural asset. A couple of Hispanic respondents, however, make it a point to educate their fellow board members on the importance of diversity and to address ethnic or racially inappropriate comments made during board meetings. As one Hispanic respondent put it,

*One of the things that is important to the people on the board and me is getting Hispanics on boards (all the boards). There are very few Hispanics on the boards, [the University Foundation], the museum board.... I have a particular point of view I bring.... I'm fairly outspoken in the groups that I belong to; my presence on some of these boards where I am the only Hispanic is a contribution. If someone is biased against Hispanics or any group, I am not reluctant to speak out.* (Public Relations)

There is a general consensus among the respondents that there is a need to address poverty and hunger in the community. Living in one of the poorer states in the country, the respondents recognize the responsibility of those in a position to support those non-profit organizations that address poverty and hunger. For a few respondents this issue is central to their charitable giving and to their community organizing. The answer to these problems, for those respondents who offered one, comes from the coordinated efforts of philanthropic organizations and individuals in the community. Respondents coordinate their efforts by serving on the boards and contribute financially to the city’s community foundation, the Chamber of Commerce, Hispanic Cultural Center, food banks, the local United Way, and religious organizations. These organizations, especially the community
foundation and the local United Way, are considered by many of the respondents who spoke of social issues, as the focal points in fighting poverty, hunger, and other social problems.

The onus of righting the inequities in the community does not come from the government, but rather from non-profits who rely on private organizations and personal philanthropy. Not one respondent made an argument for a government (structural) answer to “fixing” socially disadvantaged groups. There is a sort of free market ideology at work among these respondents, in that economic development is an obvious priority but that, at least for those eight respondents that concern themselves with the unequal distribution of social, human, and cultural capital, those who have benefited from economic prosperity are assumed to have a responsibility to give back to the community. The local elites, as if drawing on the classic utilitarian tradition, see giving back to the community as a private charitable responsibility that should be a choice, not a government mandate. Social responsibility should be a virtue of leadership not a mandate by government.

In addition to philanthropic organizations like the community foundation and the United Way, several respondents see as vital the role of advocacy organizations and legal organizations in the community. Included in the list respondents mentioned the League of United Latin American Citizens, the Center for Civic Values, the Anti-Defamation League, ACLU, and the Rape Crisis Center. Respondents mentioned several ways that they involve themselves with these organizations and their respective causes. For instance, respondents contributing financially, offer pro bono legal service, discuss related issues with the directors of these organizations, and assist in drafting legislation on behalf of these organizations or the communities they represent.
5.4.6 Crime issue

Crime related issues were mentioned by 17 respondents. The respondent from the aforementioned local private research lab with ties to the Department of Defense captured the spirit of many of the respondents on the issue: “Crime is an issue, whether it is perceived or real.” The perception of most of the respondents is that the city has a crime problem. Some feel it is a huge problem and dedicate their resources to the victims of crime, through giving, volunteering, or working with the local United Way. Others showed concern about DWI offenders, while others were concerned with violent crime, domestic violence, and gangs. Several respondents did not mention any particular aspect of crime, but rather simply mentioned that “there is a very serious crime problem,” or that “it is important for people to feel secure,” or that “crime… nags at the community. We have a high crime rate.” A medical doctor at one of the local hospitals felt that “there is a very serious crime problem” and that “we need to deal with that in a meaningful way.”

Unlike the other issues mentioned thus far, respondents seemed more willing to offer explanations for crime and answers to the perceived crime problem in the community. A lawyer said that in the community there is a disconnection between young people and the larger community that is related to the influence of drugs and alcohol. A respondent from the construction industry felt that crime results not only from drugs, but from economic and cultural barriers as well: “the root cause of crimes, a lot of times are economic, we build a lot of prisons, and it is a very sad state of affairs, a lot of them can’t speak English, or are on drugs, or are poor.”
Solutions to the perceived crime problem varied. A member of one of the chambers of commerce felt that the best way to fight crime is to think of crime regionally rather than locally—fighting crime across the metropolitan counties. A high-ranking elected city official mentioned his decisions to hold town halls in communities across the city, take a “broken windows” theoretical orientation, and engage in community policing. Along the same lines, a real estate developer and a director of a non-profit agency both emphasized the need for neighborhood outreach and funding victim advocacy organizations. A general manager of several local radio stations helped publicize local law enforcement initiatives over the airwaves. A lawyer and a banker both felt that a strong public education system was important for reducing the attractiveness of crime by youth. Work on DARE and Junior Achievement and reforming public education to reduce the achievement gaps between ethnic minorities and poor children were stated as initiatives on which some respondents had worked.

Just like with the other issues in this chapter, the economic dimension is never far from the forefront of the discussion. Respondents identified a reciprocal relationship between crime and economic development. From an economic development perspective, more economic development in the community results in greater overall health of the community, which includes a reduction in crime. To paraphrase a representative from one of the chambers of commerce, keeping young people employed and engaged will reduce the crime problem. One the other side of the reciprocal relationship is the argument that reducing crime (and other social problems) creates an environment favorable to economic development. The CEO of a local bank said that, “My own approach and the approach I’ve tried to instill in the bank is that economic development is only as healthy as the
state of the people in the economy. If you have poor care of the homeless, crime, quality of life, if you don’t have those things in order you can’t attract companies to come here.”

The efforts of city leaders to promote the city as a safe place to do business are captured by two actions. The first is a story that was relayed to me by the president of a city-wide economic development non-profit that captures the relationships between perceived crime and economic development. While recruiting a particular company, groups of employees affected by the relocation were assembled for presentations about the city. During those presentations employees in several of the groups asked about the crime rate in the city. When the respondent asked the third such group of employees where they had heard that the city had a high crime rate, they said that they saw the city featured on the television show Cops “all the time.” Apparently the frequency with which the show featured the city (8 episodes in 1996, 12 episodes in 2000, 2 episodes in 2003, one episode in 2004, and no episodes after 2004) helped negatively shape the perception of the city for these employees. The respondent shared this with his board and executive committee and the mayor of the city at the time. He asked this mayor to prevent producers of the show from filming future shows in the city. Others in the community also picked up on this relationship between the television show and industrial recruitment efforts, even though nothing was done until the next mayor was elected. The newly elected mayor agreed with the development community when approached by them, and the show no longer was able to film in the city. The respondent, other community leaders, and the mayor recognized the economic impact of the perception of the community that the show promoted and ultimately the policy was changed.
In a related way, the second story is about the mayor’s approach to crime control. Adopting the “broken windows” theory, efforts are put into improving the general appearance of the city’s public spaces, such as cleaning up litter, graffiti, and abandoned cars. Briefly stated, the theory, in part, argues that structural conditions such as a community’s loss of jobs, ethnic heterogeneity, high residential mobility, and racial segregation can lead to a breakdown of social control (both informal and formal), which can result in higher crime rates (Cullen and Agnew, 2006, p. 463). To use the broken window analogy:

Disorderly behavior unregulated and unchecked signals to citizens that the area is unsafe. Responding prudently, and fearful, citizens will stay off the streets, avoid certain areas, and curtail their normal activities and associations. As citizens withdraw physically, they also withdraw from roles of mutual support with fellow citizens on the streets, thereby relinquishing the social controls they formerly helped to maintain within the community, as social atomization sets in. Ultimately the result for such a neighborhood, whose fabric of urban life and social intercourse has been undermined, is increasing vulnerability to an influx of more disorderly behavior and serious crime (Kelling 1997, p. 20).

There appears to be three pathways to crime for a community: disorder and fear of crime, fear of crime and the reduction of informal social control, and informal social control (collective efficacy) and crime (Gault and Silver, 1999, p. 240). Whether or not the broken windows approach has helped the city realize its goals of reducing crime and improving public safety is beyond the scope of the present discussion—and would require a great deal of data collection and analysis. The point, though, is that the approach does fall in line with creating the pretense of a safe community, which, in turn, advertises to the business world that the city is an attractive place to relocate their businesses.

Both of these policies might have contributed to the recent positive attention the city has received from business magazines in terms of high rankings as a business friendly environment. Of course, a cheap labor force does not hurt.
5.5 Summary

This chapter seeks to understand the social construction of community issues among community elites. In particular, what issues are of concern to the elites? How have they been constructed? How do respondents relate issues to other issues? And, can an overall framework for how elites integrate issues be created that pushes us toward understanding how policy is shaped in the community?

This chapter began with the argument that community issues are a social construction. According to Hilgartner and Bosk, “The collective definition of social problems occurs not in some vague location such as society or public opinion but in particular public arenas in which social problems are framed and grow” (1988, p. 58). Laumann, Knoke, and Kim’s (1985) schematic diagram of a causal model of national policy events was also presented, which takes as a starting points three variables, including an organization’s interest in a particular issue, its ability to monitor the issue, and the influence of an organization as a function of its reputation. These three variables contribute to what they call “domain structures,” which include communication networks and resource exchange networks. All five of these variables ultimately, in their study, culminate in participation of an organization in the policy, or more generally for the present study, the articulation or construction of an issue.

The social construction of issues through communication networks crates the environment to empower actors. To recall the discussion of Sewell’s theory of structure in the second chapter, individuals are not powerful, what makes them powerful is the access they have through their social network. The structure of the leadership community, according to Sewell, is a process of “mutually sustaining cultural schemas and sets of
resources that empower and constrain social action and tend to be reproduced by that action” (1992, p. 27). Recall, too, his comments that, “Agents are empowered by structures, both by the knowledge of cultural schemas that enables them to mobilize resources and by the access to resources that enables them to enact schemas” (1992, p. 27). To reiterate, as well, the implication of Fuchs’ (2001) comment that people are social and cultural institutions: elites produce and reproduce themselves through their position to mobilize resources and cultural schemas in the social and cultural institutions in the community. The issues discussed in this chapter, as they find their articulation in the communication exchanges among elites, form the social structural and cultural backdrop for action.

As Table 13 indicated, there is considerable overlap of issues across the respondents. Economic development and education issues, followed by water, crime, and healthcare, find their salience for respondents in the communication networks formed while seated next to each other on boards, at breakfast meetings, at general membership meetings, during phone conversations, and the like. Although these issues are not unique to this city or privy only to this subpopulation of elites—all collectivities seek means to integrate the physical and social conditions with which they are faced—the commonality among the respondents in terms of their choice of issues, the priority they assign to issues, and the views they take toward these issues arguably finds its articulation in part through the mass media, but also through interpersonal communication contextualized by an interorganizational environment, as some respondents made known. For instance, the chairman of a state business organization, addressing the importance of business organizations said,
I really believe that networks are the way to get things done. I belong to [city business organization]. That is a process when CEO’s come together on a by-weekly basis and provide a venue for finding out what is important to our community. Networks carry information. If I just read the newspaper and watched TV news I wouldn’t get that important information. The governor, the two senators, the mayor of [state capital], county commissioners, business leaders [all attend].

As is demonstrated in the next two chapters, particular government, business, and civic organizations serve as vehicles for information sharing and agenda setting. In terms of the process of issue articulation and participation by elites in the community using Laumann et al.’s (1985) causal model, representatives from organizations, seeking to influence the political climate, monitor the issues that concern them, and ultimately enter into communication and exchanges of their human and nonhuman resources with other influential organizational actors in the private, public, and civic spheres.

Because of the convergence of issues across respondents and the ascendance of economic development and education in particular as a central issue, I have developed from the respondents an analytical model for addressing the relationships among issues. While many respondents mentioned directionality in how they conceptualize the influence of various issues on each other, a test of the relationships is not possible with the present data. The analytical model is presented in Figure 14 and discussed in detail below.

Economic development, which is in bold to highlight its centrality for the respondents, is centered in the middle of the model. It is the issue mentioned most often, with 65 respondents (or 68% of respondents) commenting on it and 45% of them identifying it as the most important issue, or at least mentioning it before any other community issue.
Vertically, economic development sits in the middle of the model, dependent on the ability of government to manage key business-impacting inputs, such as water and other infrastructural resources and the quality of the public education system. The quality of the public education system, in turn, is dependent on the ability of government to manage it. Finally, government, according to some respondents, can take either a pro-growth perspective or a growth management perspective. The advocates of a pro-growth perspective come predominantly from the private sphere while advocates of the planned growth perspective come predominantly from the public sphere, specifically, city government. Direct efforts (in terms of directly speaking with political leadership) and indirect efforts (in term of organizing the business community) on the part of businesses and business organizations to influence government on water and infrastructural issues, education issues, and the general approach government takes toward growth are
illustrated in the vertical line leading from economic development back to government management.

Horizontally, on the right side of the model leading away from economic development are the two economic development strategies mentioned by respondents, including industrial recruitment and self-development. Economic development is also impacted by the quality of the physical environment and the general health of the community, as depicted by the arrow leading from the healthcare concept on the left of the economic development concept. This relationship was noted by respondents from all segments of the community. Quality healthcare is also related to the quality of the education system, which in turn positively impacts the quality of economic development.

Moving vertically down the model toward the bottom, positive economic development, mostly of the industrial recruitment variety, which is dependent on the quality of the management by government bureaucracies in the top half of the model, results in the reduction of social problems, notably poverty and crime. Nine respondents considered economic development to be the answer to many of the ills or shortcomings in the community. For this group, crime, poverty, social problems in general, and the government’s ability to manage them through taxation, all depend on the quality of economic development. As the economic base is expanded, the more tax revenues come into the community, resulting in more resources that government can devote to alleviating social problems in the community. Crime also negatively impacts economic development, as was noted by the government and business representatives. The negative arrow from crime back to economic development depicts this relationship. Finally, economic development, when sufficiently high, improves in a general way the quality of
life (located near the center of the bottom of the model) in the community, as does a quality public education system.

This chapter began with an introduction to the concerns of the interviewed leadership community. Three questions were raised: First, what are leaders concerned about? Second, with whom do leaders associate, if anyone, on those concerns? And third, how do leaders act toward those concerns? The answer to the first question is addressed at some length in this chapter. The leaders in this study are concerned with many issues, but a few rose to the top of the list, including economic development, education, water and other infrastructural issues, healthcare, crime, and lack of social power or social capital. For each of these issues sub-themes were identified and an overall analytical model was developed that centered on economic development.

Economic development is an ideological centerpiece for the urban growth coalition. The obvious dominance of economic development as an issue for the respondents in this community attests to this claim. Interestingly, education is seen by many as the primary means through which the community can improve itself to realize its growth potential. The interorganizational elite appear to be saying, that, with economic development (i.e., industrial recruitment), many, if not all, of the community’s ills will find solutions. Of course, the equation to a robust and productive community is not so simple, as relatively low crime levels (or at least the appearance of low crime levels) as well as a strong public education system must be in place as well. Organizations committed to economic growth dedicate their resources, in the form of philanthropy particularly though the Chamber of Commerce for education, the United Way for crime, and various community foundations in the form of philanthropy to improve the condition
of the “disadvantaged.” In other words, using Molotch and Logan’s theoretical lens of a growth machine, the machine is multifaceted and operates in the civic as well as political spheres.

The next chapter seeks an answer to the second part of the question posed at the beginning of the chapter, specifically, with whom do respondents associate with on the issues they identified? While not all of the issues discussed in this chapter lent themselves to network analysis, four of the most central issues did, including the economic development, education, water, and healthcare.
VI. Issue Networks and Community Context

6.1 Introduction

This chapter analyzes networks around some of the community issues that were identified by the respondents in Chapter Five. Recall that respondents, when asked to identify community issues they thought were important, were also asked to identify who they associated with on those community issues. Respondents were free to identify organizations, individuals, or both. The network data could be analyzed in two ways: how the data were originally collected, with individuals and organizations both contained in the matrix, and a simplified network of just organizational affiliations. This chapter begins with a discussion of these two different views of the issue networks. This discussion is followed by a structural comparison of the issue networks, including economic development, education, water, and healthcare. Finally, the last part of the chapter reflects on the organizational structure of the two affiliation networks presented in Chapter Four, considering the very large Community Affiliation (CA) Network and the smaller Respondent Affiliation (RA) Network to ascertain whether the associations around community issues reflect the network structure of the leadership community generally. In anticipation of what follows, associations around the core issues that were presented in Chapter Five are heavily dominated by economic development oriented organizations. Relating the issue networks back to the CA and RA networks reveals that the same economic development organizations dominate all lists, and all networks mimic each other in structure, with one dense core set of organizations.
The analysis of the issue networks has several advantages over a purely qualitative analysis. Tentative or provisional answers to two different levels of structure can be answered with network analysis. The first level is the “micro-level” domain of the issues themselves. First, are there sub-networks among the respondents, or is every respondent connected to every other respondent? Second, how cohesive is the network around an issue? Is the network dense or sparse? Third, are there any individuals or organizations that, if taken out of the network, would cause the network to split apart or cause the network to take on a significantly different character? Finally, at the “macro-level,” structural comparisons between issue networks can be made. Looking across all of the issue networks, does there appear to be a core group of organizations that seem central? Network analysis can allow us to see which actors or organizations appear more central to the network.

Yet another “macro-level” consideration addressed in the chapter is the comparison between the issue networks and the larger affiliation structures of the leadership community. While the issue networks potentially reflect formal associations in the form of board memberships and informal associations in the form of phone conversations, emails, shared meals, meetings, conferences, committees, and any number of other non-public communication contexts, the affiliation networks reflect “official” ties only. In the final section in this chapter a provisional exploration into the points of convergence and divergence of the informal issue networks and formal affiliation networks is addressed. Do the issue networks look similar to or different from the larger CA and RA networks discussed in Chapter Four?
6.2 Individual & Organizations or Just Organizations

In Zey-Ferrell’s (1981) review of the dominant structural approach to organizational analysis in vogue at the time of her writing, she describes ten shortcomings or critiques. While not all are relevant to the present discussion, a few speak directly to the challenges of this study of interaction of individuals and organizations.

Zey-Ferrell criticizes the assumption/finding that organizations operate rationally. Drawing on Weick’s (1976) and Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) demonstration of “the importance of nonrational human, institutional, and societal elements which are little accounted for by …structural approaches,” she raises the question, “If rational, efficiency-seeking organizational structures do not explain the functioning of organizations, then what does?” (1981, p. 185). Her answer is, “The preference, motivation, and values of people within these organizations and the external institutional, class, and societal environments do” (1981, pp. 185-186). She argues that organizational analyses “should center on the multiple rationalities and larger questions concerning the relationship of organizations to society, class structures, and only partially rational humans” (1981, p. 186). Further, she argues that the perpetuation of the “dream of one rationality” put forth by structural analysts at the time, “serves the interests of administrators and managers to have organizations appear to be rational, adaptive, goal-oriented systems of voluntary, well-treated laborers and executives responsible for the success of the enterprise” (1981, p. 186).

In addition to her criticism of the rationality of organizations, is Zey-Ferrell’s criticism of the reification of organizational goals. She poses the questions, “Do
organizations or do individuals have goals? And, are those goals which are labeled
organizational goals in actuality the goals of dominant coalition and/or management?”
(1981, p. 186). She notes that “people, not organizations, have motivations and goals”
and that “within the organization the dominant coalition and/or managers only can offer
incentives they perceive will motivate the employee to conform to goals they feel are
paramount” (1981, p. 187). Additionally, organizations have been conceptualized by
structural theorists as boundary maintaining systems, in that “only persons who
contribute to the achievement of organizational goals are considered a part of the
organizations” (1981, p. 187). “By defining the boundaries in terms of the existing goals,
analysts are able to demonstrate that organizations actually exist as entities and units of
analysis” (1981, p. 187). Accordingly, for Zey-Ferrell, “organizational goals…are a
means some members use to control and manipulate others to attain personal or group

Another caution or criticism Zey-Ferrell notes concerning the structural
approaches to organizations reflects the notion that organizations operate under a
consensus of values and interests. An alternative model to this unitary view is the
pluralistic or political view. Zey-Ferrell says, “Perhaps Allison (1971: 144) states the
pluralistic view best when he writes that, in contrast to other models, the political model
sees ‘no monolithic group,’ no unitary actor or leader who sits at the top of the
organization. The political model sees rather ‘many actors as players—players who focus
not on a single static issue but on many diverse problems as well; players who act in
terms of no consistent set of strategic objectives but rather according to various
conceptions of national, organizational, and personal goals.’” (1981, p. 189). According
to this political model, “Emphasis is placed on diverse individuals and groups and the organization is regarded as a loose coalition of actors who bring various sources of power to bear on organizational outcomes” (1981, p. 189).

Zey-Ferrell also challenges the structural assumption that humans are “nonvolitional,” that humans are “sponglike, malleable organisms, who absorb and adapt to their environments rather than as volitional actors pursuing self-interests” (1981, p. 194). An alternative view comes from Blumer (1953: 199), who sees humans as “capable of self-interaction.” (1981, p. 194). She states, “humans shape and mold their destinies as well as the social structures in which they exist” (1981, p. 194). For Zey-Ferrell, as for Blumer, “actions are based on the meanings developed in interaction processes” (1981, pp. 194-195). She argues for paying attention to “the essence of the action perspective which holds that we cannot hope to understand organizations unless we study both the social actions which constitute organizations and the meaning behind these actions, by analyzing the attitudes, beliefs, and values of those who participate in these organizations” (1981, p. 195).

Finally, for purposes here, Zey-Ferrell criticizes the use of organizations as the level of analysis because, among other things, it “results in approaches in which an organization is viewed as an actor rather than as a group of individuals acting in their own interests…or acting in defense of their class interest” (1981, p. 199). Instead, she argues, “organizations should be viewed both as arenas within which social groups and individuals carry out their actions and realize their interests and, at the same time, arenas of larger social action in which society plays out its actions” (1981, pp. 199-200, emphasis in original).
Zey-Ferrell’s cautions, criticisms, and alternative conceptions of organizational studies to the structural approach underscore the importance of not conflating the interests of individuals and organizations. However, she argues also that organizations tend to be dominated by those in a position to dominate them. This is not to say that people not in a position to dominate are unimportant, but rather, to highlight the importance, from an interorganizational perspective, of actors that crisscross organizations in leadership positions. In fact, these leaders can be seen as representatives of the organization and can and do speak for the organization. According to Perrucci and Pilisuk (1970), power or influence, in a community, is concentrated in the hands of those that occupy multiple organizational positions. They state that “It is not the potency of the individual but the shape of the web (in which he is a node) which depicts the structure of enduring community power” (1970, p. 1044). So, the individual should not be neglected, but it is the structure of the network of which individuals form a part (acting through organizations) that explains community power.

When asked with whom they associate, or to be more specific, who they gave and got advice from on different issues, respondents sometimes identified individuals only, individuals and organizations, or only organizations.22 As is discuss in the next chapter, one respondent, who listed several organizations in her network, said that it is hard to think individually. Other respondents only listed individuals while others in their network

22 The network data for this chapter does not distinguish direction of ties. Respondents were not asked to distinguish between who they gave advice to and/or received advice from. Instead, the presence or absence of a connection between two organizations was sought; not the direction of the connection. However, while distinguishing between receiving and giving support would have allowed for a deeper analysis into the hierarchical structure of the community elite, separating these questions out for each issue would have extended the length of the interview beyond a reasonable length. Reciprocity in advice relationships between organizations cannot be assumed. In other words, giving advice to an organization does not necessarily mean that that giver is also a receiver of advice from the recipient of his or her advice.
listed an individual and the organization the individual was affiliated with. It would be easier to analyze these data if respondents only listed organizations or only listed individuals (and if the research design had foreseen this). As it stands, for a respondent who mentioned an organization it is impossible to know for sure with whom at the organization they directly associate. To interact with an organization really means associations with individuals who make up that organization. Organizations act, although it is important not to reify the organization. How do organizations act that allows respondents to think of associating with an organization without thinking about a particular individual or aggregate of individuals who occupy positions at the organization? So while a respondent might say that it is difficult to think individually, the respondent’s viewpoint is justifiable. In general though, the respondent simply might mean that an organization is what is important, not any one individual within the organization.

Alternatively, the respondent might mean that there are many actors in the organization that are important and it is (only) through the organization that they are important. Unfortunately, discerning why a respondent is inclined to list organizations instead of individuals is not possible with the instrument used. To resolve this complexity, two networks were created. The first network retains the data in their original form, keeping separate organizations and actors, even if an identified actor is part of an identified organization. The second network subsumes all individuals associated with an organization to the organization. For instance, if the executive director of an organization and the organization are both identified by respondents, the executive director’s associates were tied instead to the director’s organization. The logic behind this
simplification of the data is that it is reasonable to assume that if actors associate with the executive director of an organization they are, in effect, associating with that organization. This might not always be the case, which is why both the original data and the simplified data are both presented. The truth probably lies somewhere in the middle, in that individuals probably associate with both the organization generally and the individual specifically for different reasons. For example, organizations and individuals provide different resources in some cases.

To illustrate the differences between these two views of the same network the education network is illustrated below (see Figures 15 and 16). The first graph shows the two components in the education network that retain the individual and organizational references (what will be referred to as the EDU IO network) and the second graph shows the reduced network of only the organizations (what will be referred to as the EDU ORG network). Most obviously, in comparing the two graphs, is that the first graph is not connected and the second graph is. For the first graph there are two cohesive subgroups: one very large and one very small, which is marked with a rectangle at the top of the figure. The actor at the center of the small cohesive subgroup in the top graph belonged to a much larger organization so the six actors he associates with link to the organization of which he became incident with in the graph below. In fact, two of the associates of the Research Corporation employee are University administrators. In the second graph (Figure 16) the Research Corporation and the University are directly connected, which is not true of the first graph (Figure 15). However, the direct association between the University and the Research Corporation is not due only to the relationships between these two University administrators and the Research Corporation employee. The two
organizations are also more directly tied through the relationship between the president and director of the Research Corporation. In the larger EDU IO network in Figure 15 everyone is connected to everyone else either directly or by other actors along some path.

A second observation that can be made between the two network views is what seems to look like a few active regions. On the EDU IO network the cluster near the middle represents the University in the city, while the cluster in the lower right of the same graph represents the president and CEO of one of the main chambers of commerce in the city. Correspondingly, on the EDU ORG network the University is on the right side and the active node on the left side is the same Chamber of Commerce. The City moves to a more central location in the EDU ORG network when the Mayor’s associations and those who associate with the City are merged.

To make one final comparison, the president of the Community College near the bottom of the EDU IO network connects directly to ten other actors, including the president of the University. Note also that the University and the Community College are not directly tied to each other in the EDU IO network, but are in the EDU ORG network, due to the direct connection between the presidents of both institutions. On the second EDU ORG network the Community College is the dense node near the middle of the graph.

All six of the individuals affiliated with the University in the EDU IO network are labeled. They each occupy different relationships in the graph. In fact, none of them directly associate with each other. For instance, the dean of the Law School directly connects to two law firms and a state business organization, while a lawyer connects two of the University Regents to the network. The University administrator (circled on the left
side of the graph) connects to economic development organizations, a different business organization, a research institute and two national labs located in the state.

With just these last two cases there seems to be some parallelism between the graph that retains the individuals and organizations as separate actors (the EDU IO network) and the graph that reduces actors to their organizational affiliation (the EDU ORG network). The Chamber president associates with the Mayor and the City. We can say, for instance, that when people associate with the Chamber of Commerce and the Chamber associates with others in the community, ties are established through the president and CEO of the Chamber of Commerce. We cannot say, however, that the Chamber is reducible to the individual who occupies the position of president and CEO.

Although from looking at the graphs in Figure 15 and 16 it is not obvious that the networks are that similar; the “organization only network” does seem to mimic, albeit in a more condensed form, the picture that retains organizations and individuals in their original collected form. The structural position of any particular leader does differ from the structural position of the organization in the simplified organizational view, but on balance the subsuming of individuals under their organization is defensible. To further substantiate this claim, it is simple enough to compare the relative centrality of an individual in the original network to his or her organization’s relative place among organizations in the simplified organizational network. This is discussed below.

The two permutations of the economic development network, referred to as the ED IO network (Figure 17) and the ED ORG network (Figure 18), also can be compared to strengthen the case for collapsing the issue networks to the organization level for simplicity in analysis. For instance, the research corporation in ED IO network in Figure
6.2A is the tenth most central organization when its three members (marked by a box with a “1”) are folded into the ED ORG network in Figure 18. It is the sixty-third most central organization when the individuals are kept separate from the organization. The economic development corporation’s degree score is driven by its president’s relationships in the community. The other executive’s (highlighted in Figure 6.2A to the left) degree score is 4, compared to the president’s score of 26—the highest in the network.

It appears in some cases that, at least for the most central organizations and individuals, what shifts from the original data of organizations and individuals (the ED IO network) to the organizations only (the ED ORG network) display is a swap of the name of the executive with the name of the organization. The president of the economic development corporation, the architect, the developer, and the lawyer serve as good examples of this swapping. In other cases, especially when the organization is multifaceted, with several high ranking members who associate with others in the community about economic development, the organization becomes more central to the overall economic development issue. Examples of this ascension are the University, the City, and the research corporation.
Figure 15. Education network of both individuals and organizations (EDU IO network).
Figure 16. Education network of organizations only (EDU ORG network).
Figure 17. Economic development network of both individuals and organizations (ED IO network). Boxes marked with a “1” are all connected to the Research Corporation. The two boxes without a “1” highlight an economic development organization and its president. The two boxes with rounded edges represent the president and another executive the Economic Development Corporation. The two actors highlighted with a triangle represent the Chamber of Commerce and its president. The two circles represent the mayor of the city.
Figure 18. Economic development network of organizations only (ED ORG network). Boxes marked correspond to the same highlighted organizations and their members in Figure 17. Labeled organizations represent the ten closest organizations on the betweenness centrality measure.
A detailed examination of these two economic development network views underscores these general shifts. The very large organizations like the university and the city as represented by an organization and by several leaders show the greatest difference in relative ranking on the betweenness centrality measure. For example, the university in the ED ORG network is the second most central organization, while it is in the forty-fourth most central position in the original ED IO network. Why the large shift in ranking? Very few respondents mentioned that they associate with the “university” or the city. Rather, they mentioned one of the representatives from the university or the city. In fact, there were a dozen individuals in the original economic development network, none very central, but reduced to their primary organization affiliation those dozen people elevated the centrality of their respective organization. In fact, the most central university individuals are the twenty-second most central actor (the dean of the law school) and the thirty-fifth most central actor (the director of economic development for the university) in the original ED IO network.

In contrast, the most central organization in the ED ORG network (a city-wide economic development organization) is also the most central actor in the ED IO network. The president of the economic development organization, however, is the twenty-eighth most central actor in the ED IO network. In this case, the organization seems to be the actor most interacted with, not the president.

What does it mean to say that an organization is an actor to be interacted with? The economic development organization is seen by the respondents in this study as a place to network, a place that carries with it the power to affect change (i.e., recruit businesses, influence government entities, and provide resources).
To further discuss the relative shifts of individuals and organizations between the two network views, the third most central organization (a law firm) in the ED ORG network is represented in the ED IO network by an individual in the fifth most central position. The fourth most central organization is in the ED ORG network is an economic development corporation, while in the ED IO network the president and CEO of that organization is the second most central actor. The fifth most central actor in the ED ORG network is one of the chambers of commerce. In the original ED IO network the chamber is the eighth most central actor and the president and CEO is the twelfth most central actor. The sixth most central organization in the ED IO network is a development company and gets its high betweenness score from its president who is the third most central actor in the ED IO network. The seventh most central organization in the ED ORG network is the city. As a stark contrast, the city as an actor in the ED IO network is the fifty-eighth most central actor. There are two individuals affiliated with the city that are more central than the city in the ED IO network: the mayor and a city councilor.

The eighth most central organization in the ED ORG network is a private research lab. Its high location in the condensed network is largely due to the high position of one of its leaders, who is the sixth most central actor in the original ED IO network. The ninth most central organization in the ED ORG network is an architectural firm and corresponds to one of its principals who is the fourth most central actor in the ED IO network. The architectural firm as an organization (not represented by an actor) is not in the original ED IO network. In effect, in some cases the individual is the organization. Similarly, the city’s convention and visitor’s bureau, the tenth most central organization in the ED ORG network, corresponds to the nineteenth most central actor in the ED IO
network (the vice president of tourism and communications). The eleventh most central organization in the ED ORG network is a state wide business organization and occupies the exact same position in the original ED IO network. The twelfth most central organization in the ED ORG network is a mortuary and corresponds in the ED IO network to the ninth most central actor (its president and CEO).

Although the shift in all 107 organizations can be presented, only the top dozen are looked at to illustrate the relative shift of organizations and their individual representatives or with their individual members subsumed into their organizations. Figure 19 shows the highest betweenness scoring organizations and individuals from the original network data (left column) and organizations (right column) and the relative shift in betweenness centrality between the two networks views. Quick scans down the lists of organizations and actors on the other measures of centrality—degree and closeness—reveal very similar patterns.

A similar pattern emerges with the two different views of the education issue network. Analyzed the same way, the shift from individuals to their primary organizational affiliation generally results in an upward shift of the relative centrality of the organizations. However, for the education networks, like the city-wide economic development organization for the economic development networks, the most central organization—the university—is the most central actor in both networks. The most central organizations in the education network are also the most central actors in the original network, even more so than in the economic development network. A simple interpretation of this might be that when subjects think about establishing contacts around education they think of the university as an entity more so than when they think about
network strategies around economic development. As a result economic development respondents are more likely to mention specific university actors rather than generally mention the university.

Figure 19. Comparison of betweenness scores in original network data of individuals and organizations (ED IO network) and reduced network of organizations only (ED ORG network) for the economic development issue.

There is another way to compare the two types of economic development and education networks: by examining overall network density and the various measures of centrality. Starting with the density measurements of the two different views of the
economic development networks, the original economic development data (which keeps individuals and organizations separate) had an overall density of 0.03 while the simplified economic development network (which reduces individuals to their primary organizational affiliation) had an overall density of 0.06. The simplified network is denser because multiple individuals are reduced to one node. The density of the network will increase when individuals are reduced to their organizations. Collectively, the organizations become busier or more active.

For the two education network views the same difference is found. For the original education network the density is 0.02 and the simplified network is 0.06. Interestingly, the economic development networks and the education networks have very similar densities and structures.

This rather lengthy discussion of the differences between these two versions of the same network data serves as a justification for the decision to simplify the networks around issues to organizations as actors. There is an interesting theoretical aspect to this discussion: when community members think about networks, do they tend to think about organizations or individuals? It appears that, at least for the economic development and education issues (the two largest issue networks), respondents either think at the micro-level of individual relationships, at a more meso-level of organizations, or—probably depending on the organization and the actor—at both levels.

Although some information is lost, substantively, the simplified network is better. Every individual in this study represented an organization and involved themselves in other organizations to effectively act in the community—whether their points of contact with those organizations were CEOs, presidents, fellow board members, or some other
executives. People act through organizations and organizational interests greatly govern action. Organizations serve as arenas for action and, as such, it seems justifiable, from a societal perspective, to keep the analysis at the organizational level.

The cost of collapsing these networks to the organizational level obscures intra-organizational dynamics and power struggles. These may be crucial for studies on other topics or a longer duration study. On this topic, however, collapse individuals and organizations is a good choice.

### 6.3 Comparisons of Issue Networks

Of the issues discussed in this chapter only four had sizable enough networks to be worth analyzing. The issues that are analyzable include economic development, education, water, and healthcare. It is safe to say that these are in no way comprehensive of the network structure of the community because what is captured are the links that people cared to mention. They also do not capture the issue network from people outside of the study. There are many ways to work on, for instance, the water issue, whether hierarchically at one or more of the various political levels—state, region, sub-regional, or local—or horizontally through various individual or organizational alliances or social relations. It might be, and likely is the case, that many groups and individuals work on these issues outside of the networks in this study. What was captured during the interviews is a glimpse into the network structure of elite leaders around these four issues.

The network structures of the four key issues are revealed through four techniques. The first and most primitive view of the networks is simply to look at their
density, followed by each network’s degree centralization. The next step is a search for sub-networks that may split an issue network into two or more parts. Searching for sub-networks allows for easy identification of isolated organizations as well. Within sub-networks (when they arise) a more sophisticated procedure is performed to identify actor network similarity. Specifically, within a sub-network a number of organizations that have a similar connectivity to other organizations are identified through the use of $k$-cores.

Additionally, a measure of network connectivity was conducted on the issue networks with the use of cutpoints and bi-components, or blocks. The utilization of the term “blocks” should not be confused with block modeling, which is an algebraic technique for finding structural regularities in networks (Bonacich and McConaghy, 1980). Here the term block is simply used to note connected sections of a network that are created if a node is removed. A block, or bi-component, is a sub-network that is created when a node (actor) is removed. Determining the connectivity of these networks—of which cutpoints, blocks, and bridges are useful analytic tools—leads to the question, if these issues networks are communication networks, what is lost when an organization is removed from the network?

These relationships around these issues represent “communication networks” between individuals representing organizations. In other words, it is safe to assume from a close reading of the transcripts that in identifying relationships between themselves and other organizations, respondents are not limiting themselves to non-communicative transactions. This means, that when respondents were asked who they seek advice from, or who asks their advice on a given issue, they were identifying individuals within
organizations or organizations that were composed of individuals that proved to be useful resources on a given issue. When the respondents only mentioned an organization as a resource, they were not listing it for its published literature or something of that nature.

The interorganizational environment represents communication networks between individuals within the context of an interorganizational environment, including a phone call, a shared breakfast, email correspondence, or associating with co-members of a board. Analysis of the cohesiveness of these issue networks with the analytical tools of cutpoints, blocks, and bridges enables a picture to form of the flows of communication between elites on these issues.

Finally, the fourth technique involves determining the level of centralization of the various networks. Included in this analysis is the closeness and betweenness centralization and centrality scores of the organizations.

### 6.3.1 Density

Comparisons of the overall density of the issue networks reveal that the most dense issue networks are healthcare and water, with density scores of 0.093 and 0.084 respectively. These densities, however, are most likely an artifact of the smallness of the network rather than the tightness of the organizing around the issue. That said the economic development and the education networks are not that different, with density scores of 0.057 and 0.06 respectively, which means that only 5.7% and 6% of all possible links are present.

The slightly higher density of water and healthcare networks might be due to the smaller number of actors in the networks. With each added actor, the total number of possible ties increases. However, because the unit of analysis is organizations and not
individuals, it is not unrealistic to imagine a large dense network of organizations. Organizations can comprise many individuals who may establish many ties to other organizations, thereby increasing the overall density of the network. Density serves as a starting point for understanding the cohesiveness of the networks.

6.3.2 Degree

Comparisons of normalized degree centralization index scores for the four networks were made and are summarized in Table 18. The healthcare network appears the most centralized, with a degree score of 0.457 and ranges in degree from 0.038 (17 organizations with only one neighbor) to 0.500 (1 organization with 13 neighbors). The average normalized degree was 0.077 (2 neighbors), with a standard deviation of 0.089. For the cohesive sub-network of 23 organizations within the healthcare network the degree centralization scores ranged from 0.045 to 0.590 with a standard deviation of 0.113. For the water issue network the degree centralization was 0.225, with a normalized range of neighbors from 0.033 (14 organizations with only one neighbor) to 0.333 (1 organization with 10 neighbors) with an average normalized degree of 0.095 (2.84 neighbors) and a standard deviation of 0.084. The economic development network had an overall degree centralization of 0.228. The number of neighbors organizations had ranged from 0.009 (38 organizations with 1 neighbor) to 0.274 (1 organization with 29 neighbors, a city-wide economic development non-profit organization). The organizations with the next largest number of neighbors are the University and a private economic development corporation with 25 and 22 ties respectively. The normalized average number of ties for the economic development network was 0.049 (slightly more than 5 neighbors) with a standard deviation of 0.054. Finally, for the education network
degree centralization index was 0.338 with a range of indices from 0.013 (29 organizations with 1 neighbor) to 0.380 (1 organization with 20 neighbors, the University). The average centralization score was 0.051, slightly larger than that of the economic development network average. After the University, the organizations with the next largest number of neighbors were the Chamber with 20 neighbors and the Community College with 17. While the education network was more centralized than the economic development network, the economic development network maintained a larger number of neighbors (5 compared to 4 for the education network).

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<th>Table 18. Density and degree measures for issue network.</th>
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The dissimilarity in degree scores across the issue networks indicates that there are organizations that are highly central—have a large number of ties or neighbors, while others score very low. There are also many organizations across the issues that have one or two neighbors. The central actors in the economic development network and the education network are economic development oriented organizations as well as the University. Developers, their business organizations and government agencies are central to the water network. Finally, a nonprofit hospital has the greatest proportion of realized ties in the healthcare network. Figures 16 and 18 above highlight the densest
organizations while Figure 21 and Figure 22 illustrate the degree scores of the water and healthcare networks.

Growth coalition forces are prominent in all four issue networks, with business organizations like the two Chambers, developers, engineering firms, construction companies, and economic development corporations and organizations well represented. Local and regional government, banks, law firms, a car dealership, the University, public relations companies, and the research corporation also join together with issue specific organizations to ensure their views are heard and their positions advanced. For instance, the water issue network appears to be a collection of the growth coalition of developers, construction companies, engineering firms, business and building organizations, water consultants, real estate organizations, a title company, and an architect. Two law firms are also represented in the network. City, county, and regional government are also present. It appears that those with big investments in land-based property values are mobilizing around water issues.

The two isolated organizations circled at the top of Figure 20 illustrate an interesting and potentially profound development for the local growth coalition. To reiterate what was noted on the issue of non-local land-based corporations in Chapter Two, Molotch and Logan (1984, p. 493) note,

The involvement of capital in locality goes far beyond the simple role of the speculator who attempts to anticipate future land use trends. Instead, capital tries to determine those trends by affecting the decisions of government and other institutions. Rather than land speculation, this is really social structural speculation.
Figure 20. Water issue network by degree.
Figure 21. Healthcare issue network by degree.
The two organizations are business partners. The New York Stock Exchange publicly traded Development Corporation, whose headquarters is in the Midwest, contracts with a local public relations firm to run its local PR campaign for a massive planned community in the southwestern quadrant of the city, with a 40-year build-out, 20 square miles of land, 18 million square feet of office, industrial and retail space, 37,500 homes, a University campus, as well as parks, open space, and other amenities. One respondent—an economic development consultant with ongoing business relations with the developer (located in the upper left corner and highlighted with an oval in Figure 20)—called it a “900-pound gorilla.” The presence of a national real estate development corporation in the community represents a trend, Molotch and Logan say began in the 1970s which blends cosmopolitan (non-local) capitalism with local growth coalitions. The result is the infusion of financial and human capital into a locale by a corporation with large financial assets to advance their growth agenda.

Although these two companies—the non-local development corporation and the public relations firm that represents them locally—appear isolated from the rest of the water network, they score relatively high on the economic development network centralization measures. For instance, they both rank in the top 15 of the 107 organizations on the degree centralization. In other words, they are relatively central on the economic development issue, but not on the water issue.

To briefly elaborate on this discussion, the relationships the Development Corporation and the PR Firm have to the rest of the economic development network can be quickly visually inspected. As Figure 22 illustrates, the Development Corporation on the economic development issue has direct ties to seven other organizations in the
community, including the university, the community college, a business consultant, the Chamber of Commerce, as well as three other business organizations. The PR Firm’s direct ties to the economic development network are illustrated in Figure 23. It is directly connected to 9 other organizations, of which, only two organizations (the University and a state-wide business organization) are directly tied to the Development Corporation as well. While the Development Corporation seems to associate more with development organizations, the PR Firm appears to associate more with law firms. On economic development, however, the two companies do not associate (at least the representatives that were interviewed from the two companies did not mention an association on economic development when asked with whom they associate). It seems strategically prudent for the Development Corporation to hire a local PR firm to handle its image in general. In also seems wise for its relationship to the local business community (both for its financial investment by hiring a local company as well as the access to information on the business climate it is afforded by the local PR firm).

![Diagram](image.png)

*Figure 22. Degree centralization of direct ties to economic development network for non-local Development Corporation.*

209
The isolation of the Development Corporation (and its local PR firm) on the water issue may be indicative of the relatively early stages of the corporation’s project as well as the corporation’s local contact person that was interviewed from the corporation, rather than an apparent lack of interest in water issues. In other words, the corporate representative, although from the state, is not local to the city and, while concerned about water issues, at the time of the interview had only discussed his concerns with his local PR firm. It also may be the case that water as a serious issue has only emerged in the last 10 to 15 years, and there appears to be a lack of leadership among the business community about future directions in water policy (as a handful of respondents indicated). If this is the case, there may not be a great deal for the business community to do to influence water policy at this time, short of following the issue as it unfolds and

Figure 23. Degree centralization of direct ties to economic development network for Development Corporation’s PR Firm.
asserting their business perspective in the intergovernmental committees and commissions that are dealing with intra- and inter-state water policy.

### 6.3.3 Sub-networks

To further understand the structure of these issue networks each was analyzed to see if they were connected or if there were sub-networks (components) contained within them. A network that is broken down into two or more sub-networks might be an indicator of factions where no links between the clusters exist, coalitions where there are dense pockets of actors who are connected to each other by one actor (such as a weak tie), or bridges, where actors are loosely connected through weak ties (Crowe, 2007).

These three types of networks differ from a complete network in that they are less dense and hence less bonded. Density was covered above as a primitive measure of network cohesiveness.

Bonded networks, Crowe states, are “typically characterized as having dense relationships and networks within communities” (2007, p.471). Conversely, at the other end of the continuum from bonded networks are bridging networks that are characterized by “weaker relationships and networks across social groups and communities” (2007, p. 471). Bonded networks are dense with strong ties and bridging networks are loosely connected with weak ties (2007, p. 471). Crowe divides these bonding and bridging network structures along a continuum from dense to loose. At the high end of density is the complete network of bonded social capital. At the other end are less dense structures: a “factional network structure which consists of two or more connected groups that are not connected to one another” (2007, p. 472). The other two types of structure fall under
the bridging type of social capital and include coalitional and bridging networks. Crowe describes coalitional structures as “dense networks of organizations …connected to each other in a non-redundant fashion” (2007, p. 472). Finally, bridging network structures, the loosest structure, allow “organizations to access sources of information and other resources that lie outside of an organization” (2007, p. 472).

While the objective for Crowe is predicting economic development strategies of various communities with different network structures, this brief introduction to component structural analysis serves as a starting point to understanding the various issue networks. Her overview is also useful for this study’s attention to economic development. This study, in other words, can serve as a partial test of her typology of bonding and bridging network structures that, hypothetically, lead to different economic development strategies.

Sub-network analysis of the four issue networks reveals that they all contain only one large component\(^2\) (when the minimum size of component is set to 3 organizations); however the water and healthcare networks both contain two two-actor pairs that are isolated from the larger connected network. The number of organizations in each network varied from 107 in the economic development network to only 27 in the healthcare network. The education network consisted of 80 organizations and the water network consisted of 31 organizations. The water and healthcare networks contained a small number of isolated (but connected) organizations: 2 in the water network and 4 in the healthcare network. The lack of sub-networks across these four issues is suggestive of a

\(^{23}\) The definition of a component is a connected sub-network of at least three actors. Although components can be defined with a smaller number of actors, an isolated actor or even two actors connected but isolated from each other are not as interesting as components of three or more actors. The water and healthcare networks contain 2 and 4 organizations respectively which fall outside of the minimum of three organizations to form a component.
community structure based on broad consultative processes, compared to a factional or coalitional structure indicative of two or more components. (This is akin to Crowe’s consensus category, but the assertion that the network is more consensual is indeterminable with the present data.) Table 19 reproduces the component information for the issue networks.

### Table 19. Sub-networks in issue networks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational data</th>
<th>Economic Development</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Water</th>
<th>Healthcare</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of organizations</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of sub-networks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of organizations in largest sub-network</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further steps were taken, however, in analyzing the structure of these issue networks to find if (1) there were sub-networks of individuals who were more structurally similar than others within the same connected network and (2) if the issues contain bridging actors who, when removed, break the connected network into smaller networks. K-core and cutpoint analyses were conducted to address these two aspects (Crowe 2007, Seidman 1983).

#### 6.3.4 K-core

K-core identifies clusters or core sets of actors within a network that share at least $k$ ties with each other. The higher the order of $k$ for a subset of actors the more densely connected the actors are. When organizations are isolated, with no connections to other organizations, the $k$-core value is zero. Conversely, a high $k$-core score in a network represents a highly connected group of actors.
The economic development network has the highest order of a $k$-core with $k=6$, in which 15 organizations are connected to at least 6 other organizations. The education network has the second highest order of $k$-core with 4, where 19 organizations are connected to at least 4 other organizations. The water and healthcare issue networks are somewhat smaller. The water issue network has the third largest order of $k$-core, $k=3$, where 5 organizations are connected to at least 3 others. The healthcare issue network has the smallest maximum $k$-core with a 2-core, where 9 organizations are connected to at least 2 others. Substantively, a $k$-core analysis helps uncover clusters of actors that appear connected at a particular level. The fifteen organizations in the economic development network that are connected to at least six other organizations represent a cluster of highly connected organizations.

Nearly half (48%) of the organizations in the economic development issue network are connected to at least three other organizations. The education network looks fairly similar on this measure, with just fewer than 40% of the organizations connected to a minimum of three other organizations. In contrast, the water and healthcare issue networks have much smaller proportions, at 17% and 27% respectively (see Table 20 below).

**Table 20. K-core measure for issue network.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of network closure</th>
<th>Economic Development</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Water</th>
<th>Healthcare</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Largest $k$-core</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of organizations in largest $k$-core</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion in 3-core and higher</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Looking across the specific organizations that constitute the largest cores for the issues reveals that ten of the fifteen organizations (two-thirds) in the economic development network are also in the most dense education network, constituting 53% of the education organizations. One organization, a local developer, is in the highest core of all four issue networks. The only other overlapping organization from the largest cores of the economic development and education networks is an architectural firm, where one of the principals is in the highest core for the education and water issue networks as well. With the exception of the community college, the city’s public school district, and a couple of business education organizations, the configuration of organizations around education looks very similar to the configuration of organizations around economic development.

In fact, it appears as if the same core set of organizations, when concerning themselves with community issues outside of economic development expand their view of the community to include those few business friendly education organizations. Thus, on economic development and education the same movers and shakers are present. The Chamber, the city, an economic development organization, a developer, the university, an economic development corporation, a mortuary, a research corporation, a law firm, a state business organization, and a regional branch of a national bank all associate at the highest level with each other on both economic development and education. Of those most active economic development organizations, seven reappear in the education cluster, where they associate with developers, government agencies, construction companies, an architectural firm (the same one from the education network) and water consultants on water issues. Eight of the same organizations, all from the economic
development core, reappear associating with healthcare organizations in the healthcare network. Figure 24 through Figure 27 shows the highest level of $k$-core for the four issues.

The presence of growth coalition forces appears to dominate the issue networks. In fact, with the possible exception of the two hospice organizations in the healthcare network, the most connected subset of actors across issue networks are make up entirely of growth coalition organizations. Or, to state it another way, the issues of concern to the growth coalition, defined as the interorganizational elite, include economic development, education, water, and healthcare.
Figure 24. Economic development 6-core (N = 15).
Figure 25. Education 4-core (N = 19).
Figure 26. Water network. Organizations marked with a “3” or a “2” indicates higher dense clusters. All organizations not marked by a number have a core of 1.
Figure 27. Healthcare network. Organizations marked with a “2” are in the 2-core. All other organizations are in a 1-core.
6.3.5 Cutpoints & bi-components

As previously mentioned, cutpoints are actors, in this case organizations, that when removed cut the graph into more than one connected sub-graph or component. To revisit Hanneman’s statement, “…one can imagine that such cutpoints may be particularly important actors –who may act as brokers among otherwise disconnected groups.” A large number of actors (between 20% and 26% across the four networks) thus represent potential brokers in the networks. All four networks look very similar in that there is one core group of organizations that form a bi-component, which possibly indicates the presence of a highly dense and bonded core group of organizations with a nontrivial number of links to less central organizations in the community. Table 21 shows the indicators of structural gaps or holes for the four issue networks. Only one bi-component exists in each of these issue networks because the minimum size of a component was set at 3 organizations, because less than three actors are substantively less interesting (de Nooy, 2005).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of network connectivity</th>
<th>Economic Development</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Water</th>
<th>Healthcare</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of cutpoints</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of bi-components</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of cutpoints to total points</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24 The healthcare network (Figure 6.7D) appears to have 3 cohesive sub-networks, but the two pairs of associated organizations do not qualify as bi-components because they do not contain at least 3 organizations. By relaxing this definition to allow for less than three organizations, the healthcare network contains 3 bi-components. Similarly, the water network contains 2 bi-components without the minimum of 3 organizations limitation for qualification as bi-components.
In terms of social capital and economic development, the economic development network appears to be a combination of bridging and bonding capital (Crowe, 2007). A bridging network structure, to reiterate, contains a higher proportion of cutpoints to total points. In Crowe’s study, the community of interorganizational actors that approximated the four issue networks here in terms of proportions of cutpoints to total points—0.2 or higher—indicated a bridging form of economic development that takes the form of industrial recruitment. Conversely, bonding networks, with comparatively lower proportions of cutpoints to total points—less than 0.2—are more indicative of self-development strategies. The key point is that bonding networks imply more solidarity or social bonds, while bridging networks are potentially more fragmented, but increase access to new information.

If Crowe’s network characterization typology is correct, although she does not find this configuration in her study, the city’s organizational network is both bonding and bridging. In her typological continuum at one end are networks that are dense and bonding, and at the other ends are networks that are loose and bridging. It seems, then, that the economic development network in this study might represent a community in transition, in that the development strategy might be shifting from self-development to industrial recruitment. In the event that a bonding and bridging network configuration around economic development is possible, the strategy among interorganizational actors

25 If it is possible, however, that this study’s data collection technique might have contributed to an incomplete network structure in that, if carried to its logical saturation point and interviews were conducted with representatives from all organizations that were mentioned by respondents, the organizational network structure might end up being simply dense and bonding. In other words, all those bridging organizations might actually be connected to other organizations if more community members were included in the study or more respondents contributed network information on the topics. There are a number of organizations that, if the organizations that connects them to the rest of the interorganizational environment were removed, those organizations would become isolates.
would likely include both industrial recruitment and self-development. Crowe argues that, “It is possible for communities to increase both forms of economic development by maintaining a certain level of cohesiveness among subcomponents and increasing the number of organizations that serve as cut-points connecting non-redundant sources of information” (2007, p. 469). It is assumed that a healthy community has both types of development strategies that contain bonded and bridging networks.

The education, water, and healthcare networks, mimic on a smaller scale the economic development network structure. In each of these three networks a similar proportion of actors serve cutpoints. Yet the number of bi-components remains constant at one. In general, then, the organizations that engage with one another on any particular issue in this community have the potential to find reinforcement (bonding) among their fellow members. In addition, as indicated by the presence of cutpoints, several bring with them to the interorganizational environment the potential for supplementary ideas. A highly redundant network, with few, if any, cutpoints—where the removal of any particular individual is inconsequential to the continued flow of information from any one actor to another—leads to a dearth of fresh ideas or information. In other words, a bridging (cosmopolitan) network, while lacking in the social solidarity of bonded (localized) networks with few gaps, has at hand more divergent sources of information (Granovetter, 1973). All four issue networks appear to carry both bonding social capital, in that that there is a minimal number of components and bi-components in each network, and bridging (cosmopolitan) social capital, as shown by the presence of cutpoints.
6.3.6 Center and periphery—closeness and betweenness

Actor centrality and network centralization of the issue networks are considered next (de Nooy, 2005, p. 123). This section looks within and across the various issue networks and asks the question, are there central actors that appear within particular issue networks and across issue networks? Both closeness and betweenness are considered.

6.3.6.1 Closeness

Recall the discussion of closeness from Chapter 3; closeness centrality of an actor, in this case an organization, “is the number of other vertices [organizations] divided by the sum of all distances between the vertex and all others” (de Nooy et. al, 2005, p. 127). Closeness centralization “is the variation in the closeness centrality of vertices divided by the maximum variation in closeness centrality scores possible in a network of the same size” (2005, p. 127). The configuration of the actors in a network can indicate the speed with which information travels in a network. If every organization in the network is close at hand, disseminating or receiving information about a particular issue is very easy.

Comparison across issue networks is complicated by the significant differences in the size of the networks, the largest of which contains 107 organizations, 80 organizations more than the smallest network of 27. Possible comparisons can be made between the economic development (107) and education networks (80), which differ in size by 27 organizations, and between the water and healthcare networks which differ in size by only four organizations (31 and 27 respectively). Doing so reveals that the economic development network and the education network are similarly centralized in
terms of closeness (0.35 and 0.36 respectively). The water and healthcare networks are similarly centralized as well, at 0.41 and 0.46 respectively. The healthcare network is not connected, in that it has three components—one with 23 organizations and two with two organizations each. The closeness measure cannot be performed on unconnected networks, so the largest component is used. The same is true for the water network, where one component contains 29 organizations and one component contains 2 organizations (see Table 22).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Centralization</th>
<th>Economic Development</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Water</th>
<th>Healthcare</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Closeness</td>
<td>0.349</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.408*</td>
<td>0.458**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betweenness</td>
<td>0.231</td>
<td>0.372</td>
<td>0.323*</td>
<td>0.750**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*subnetwork of 29
**subnetwork of 23

At the level of organization, the most central organizations in each issue network can easily be identified and particularly highly central organizations across the various issues can be discovered. Predictably, organizations cross issue lines. Four organizations are incident with all four issues, including a city-wide economic development organization, one of the chambers of commerce, a developer, and the county government (see Table 23). Only the economic development organization ranked first on any issue, not surprisingly economic development, but its next highest ranking was tenth on the water network. The chamber’s highest ranking was fourth, also on the economic development network. The developer’s highest ranking was third for both the water and healthcare networks. Finally, with an average ranking much lower than the average
ranking for the other organizations, the county government’s highest ranking was thirteenth on the water network. It also had the lowest ranking of the four cross-cutting organizations, with a ranking of 28 on the education network. There are 22 organizations that are represented on at least three of the issue networks and 35 organizations that are represented on at least two issue networks, twenty-five or 71% of which share membership on the economic development and the education networks.

Table 23. Organizations incident with all four issues, displaying closeness scores and relative ranking in parentheses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Economic Development Organization</th>
<th>Chamber</th>
<th>Developer</th>
<th>County Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>0.52 (1)</td>
<td>0.49 (4)</td>
<td>0.47 (6)</td>
<td>0.42 (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.40 (15)</td>
<td>0.45 (8)</td>
<td>0.41 (14)</td>
<td>0.37 (28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>0.33 (20)</td>
<td>0.35 (16)</td>
<td>0.49 (3)</td>
<td>0.37 (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare</td>
<td>0.37 (10)</td>
<td>0.4 (6)</td>
<td>0.47 (3)</td>
<td>0.31 (18)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An additional 22 organizations are incident on at least 3 issue networks, including 11 organizations directly tied to economic development, three law firms, two banks, a car dealership, the city, the University, a utility company, a private non-profit healthcare system, and the local United Way. Within the 11 organizations tied to economic development are five state-wide business organizations, two construction companies, an engineering firm, an architectural firm, a title company, and an economic development corporation.

These findings reveal a picture of the interorganizational elite that, through their overlapping interactions on these four and other issues, appears to reflect the growth coalition theory. The leadership in the business community knows each other; they speak
with each other routinely on a variety of issues, they call on each other to discuss issues related to their industry but also to the business environment in general. In fact, several respondents echoed the sentiments of a prominent architect in the community, who said that “Much of it is not a need based relationship; it is not to do business but to create a business environment.” The interorganizational elites are structurally close to each other, and as such, may be culturally close to each other as well—which is discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Aligning their resources and articulating their agendas, the elites make themselves relevant in their industry and in the political sphere.

To briefly illustrate this point, a president of the insurance division of one of the largest banks in the state rationalized routine meetings with competitors during an interview in the following way. The respondent said, “I go out to lunch once a month with competitive insurance agents, and we talk about challenges we go through, and one person said we shouldn’t be talking about that because we are competitors but we realized that the state is the competitor.” Clearly, this can be seen as collusion among actors in an industry. This quote also can be seen as a justification for collusion, that the state is the competition, not others in the industry.

6.3.6.2 Betweenness

There is one final centrality measure to consider. Betweenness “rests on the idea that a person is more central if he or she is more important as an intermediary in the communication network” (de Nooy et al., 2005, p. 131). A high betweenness score indicates a powerful role for an organization in a network, for without it, others might be cut off from the network. Networks highly centralized on the betweenness measure are dominated by a few actors, whose removal would quickly fragment the network.
The economic development network has a network centralization of 0.23 and betweenness centrality scores range from 0.00 to 0.25. The education network has a network centralization of 0.37 and a range of scores from 0.00 to 0.39. The water network has a centralization of 0.32 for the largest sub-network of 29 organizations and a range of scores from 0.00 to 0.38. Finally, the healthcare network has a centralization of 0.75 for the largest sub-network of 23 organizations and a range of scores from 0.00 to 0.81 (see Table 24).

### Table 24. Issue networks betweenness centralization and centralization index ranges.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Betweenness Measures</th>
<th>Economic Development</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Water</th>
<th>Healthcare</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centralization</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.32*</td>
<td>0.75**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality Score Range</td>
<td>0.00-0.25</td>
<td>0.00-0.39</td>
<td>0.00-0.38*</td>
<td>0.00-0.81**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Subnetwork of 29 Organizations  
** Subnetwork of 23 Organizations

In a network that resembles a star, where the center of the network is one organization and all other organizations must go through it to communicate with each other, network centralization will be highest. The more paths any one actor has to get messages to other actors, the less centralized the network will be. Ignoring the large variation in network size the healthcare network is much more centralized than the other three networks. At the organizational level, one hospital in particular lies in-between many other organizations, and is represented by the largest vertex. This is clearly shown in the healthcare graph in Figure 28 below. The largest vertex sits in-between the largest number of organizations. The next largest vertex sits between a smaller number of organizations, and the lines that terminate without a vertex marker on one end are the
organizations that do not sit in-between any other organizations. In the healthcare network 14 of the 23 organizations (61%) have a betweenness score of 0.00. In the water network 48% (n = 14) have a betweenness score of 0.00, while in the education network it is 90% (n= 49), and in the economic development network the percent is 63% (n= 67). Figure 28 through Figure 31 show the betweenness centralizations of the four issue networks.

Comparisons of the relative betweenness centrality of organizations across the issue networks were made as well. The most central organization in the economic development network, an economic development organization (0.25), is rather peripheral in the other three networks, with scores of 0.01 for education and 0.00 for both water and healthcare. By contrast, the university is the second most central organization in the economic development network (0.13), the most central organization in the education network (0.39), and is the second most central organization in the healthcare network (0.27); it does not appear in the water network. Another way of discussing these data is to say that in the education network nearly 40 percent of the shortest paths between organizations include the university, compared to 13% of the shortest paths in the economic development network, and 27% in the healthcare network. In the economic development network, the most central organization, the economic development organization, is involved in one quarter of all the shortest paths (geodesics). The non-profit hospital in the healthcare network illustrates this best, as approximately 80% of all shortest paths go through the hospital.
Figure 28. Healthcare betweenness centralization network
Figure 29. Economic development betweenness centralization network.
Figure 30. Education betweenness centralization network.
Figure 31. Water betweenness centralization network.
Clearly the most centralized issue network is healthcare. In fact, only four organizations incident with the non-profit hospital have ties to other organizations in the community, connecting the hospital to 11 other organizations. The other nine organizations directly connected to the hospital do not lie on a path between any other organizations. The pictures of the economic development, education, and water networks are much more complicated, but central actors emerge nonetheless. Interestingly, some of the same organizations appear central across each network: the chamber of commerce, the university, one of the developers in the community, one of the architectural firms in the community, one of the economic development corporations, a business and a development organization, and the city and county governments all appear to varying degrees across the issue networks. This repetition represents the power players that get things done. This group extends beyond the corporate community to include public officials and administrators, the academic community, and elite non-profit business oriented organizations.

6.3.7 Issue networks interpretation

These structural techniques reveal that the issue networks are dominated by organizations concerned with economic growth. Prominent in each of the networks, across the various measures of network structure, are the land-based development oriented community, working through business organizations oriented to economic development, education, water, or healthcare. Organizations like the Chamber of
Commerce set their goals on education, healthcare, crime reduction, as well as economic development. The ties between education and economic development are extensive. The University is structurally prominent in the economic development network and tied closely to the city, economic development organizations, the Chamber, and developers.

Not only do the issue networks appear dominated by economic development oriented organizations, the structures of these issues share some network characteristics. For instance, very few organizations are removed from the main social network. In fact, there are no isolated organizations in any of the four issue networks. This indicates the potential for more cohesive leadership around these issues on the part of community elites, as communication channels between all parts of the network are possible. The centralization and the structural holes measures indicate, as well, that there appear to be subsets of structurally central actors in the networks. In fact, the healthcare network is the most extreme in terms of centralization, with a betweenness score of 0.75. Clearly, the not-for-profit, private healthcare organization occupies a prominent role in the healthcare

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26 The local newspaper (Aug. 8, 2008) reported that the 2008-2009 chairman of the board of directors for the Chamber of Commerce addressing 400 people during a luncheon held at the University’s sports facility, will focus on education, economic development, transportation, crime and safety during his term. Four former chairmen of Chamber of Commerce were interviewed for this research, as well as the president and CEO. Education reform was the top issue of each of their tenures as chairman as well. As one former chairman, the chairman and CEO of a bank, explained, economic development is only possible if the community properly prepares the workforce.

27 Although the Community College does not appear central in the structural analysis of the economic development issue, several respondents—including the college’s president—stressed the central role it plays in industrial recruitment. The president stressed the efforts of the college’s foundation board to make connections with the largest businesses in the community. At the time of interview the college was in the process of selecting an architect do design a $60 million construction project that put the college into negotiations with the Mayor’s office and the city council. The president of the college noted—not accidentally—that architects sat on the foundation board. Another illustration of the role of the Community College in industrial recruitment is the retooling of its aviation program at the request of an aviation company, which some respondents regard as an important accommodation made by the community to bring the company to the community. The community college is significant, but as a junior partner to industry.
network. The $k$-core measure, used as an indicator of structural holes, reinforces the appearance of a subset of central actors, with nearly half of the economic development organizations and over a third of the education organizations connected to at least three other organizations. However, the water and healthcare networks appear less concentrated.

Finally, the analysis of cutpoints and bi-components to indicate the presence of network gaps reveals that the organizations are joined together (each network only has one sub-network of at least three organizations) but contain organizations that serve as resources for new information for the group (as indicated by the proportion of organizations that serve as cutpoints to the total number of organizations in the network, which ranges from 0.2 to 0.23). To borrow Crowe’s (2007) typology, the organizations in the community that coordinate with other organizations on one or more of these issues give the appearance of a community power structure that is both bonding and bridging or transitional from one form to another.

6.4 Issue Networks and Affiliation Networks

Do the issue networks look similar to or different from the larger Community Affiliation network and Respondent Affiliation network already analyzed above? The following measures are used to answer this question: the densities, degree centrality, cohesive subgroups, $k$-cores, cutpoints and bi-components, and closeness and betweenness centrality measures of the networks. Recall that the much larger affiliation

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28 The CEO—who also serves as the president, and chairman of the board—is a past chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, as was as a board member of several of the prominent business organizations in the community, and the local United Way.
network initially compiled for this study, which comprised 7,552 individuals and 2,404 organizations is referred to as the *Community Affiliation (CA)* network and the smaller affiliation network of respondents produced during the interviews is referred to as the *Respondent Affiliation (RA)* network.

Affiliation networks have two modes, actors by events. In Chapter Four, to simplify analysis, the affiliation networks were converted to one-mode networks of individuals affiliated with each other through common board memberships. In order to make meaningful comparisons between the issue networks, which are organizational networks, and the affiliation networks were converted to one-mode networks of organizations affiliated with other organizations through common individual board members.

### 6.4.1 Density

The density of the CA network is 0.0008 and the density of the RA networks is 0.046. Because the community network is so much larger—2,404 organizations—an extremely small density is not surprising. Degree centralization is a better measure for gauging relative cohesiveness of the networks as it computes the proportion of the maximum possible number of lines in the network.

### 6.4.2 Degree centralization

The CA and RA organization networks have degree centralization scores of 0.039 and 0.296, respectively. The RA organizational network appears to possess organizations that are more active than organizations in the CA organizational network. This is not too surprising given that the respondents in the study were picked for interviews because,
according to their peers, they were the most connected individuals in the community and the most prestigious, so their organizational affiliations were most likely to be reflected in the network. For the most part, the same organizations central to the issue networks appear at the top of the community network and the interview network: the city-wide economic development organization, the chamber of commerce, the university and the community college, other city and state level business organizations dedicated to economic development, education, and general business concerns, and the city government.

Specifically, the economic development organization so prominent in the economic development issue network appears as the organization with the highest degree score in the CA network, and the eighth highest degree score in the RA network. The University, with an average ranking of 4 on five of the six networks, and the Chamber, with an average ranking of 4.4 on five of the six networks, are both clearly prominent organizations. In fact, the only network in which they do not appear in the top ten is the water network. It is not clear why the Chamber would not be a more active player on water issues, as water appears to be increasingly on the minds of the local business community. Perhaps the lack of a clear solution to water scarcity for the city and the state renders many organizations to the sidelines to watch how government agencies and water consultants find solutions. As for the University, it is a large property owner, which commands a significant amount of attention by the building community, as it contracts the construction of new buildings (during the research the University had constructed an architecture building, a campus in the community to the north of the city, and a children’s hospital) and sells off property for development (it was one of three major actors in the
large—“900 pound gorilla”—planned community under construction on the south side of the city discussed earlier in this chapter). Water issues should be of concern to it. Perhaps the representatives from the University used in this study focus more on economic development, leaving water issues to others.

In general, however, the overlap among these organizations reinforces the growth coalition theory premise that the prominent organizations in the community will be those with the greatest interest in the growth of land use-values. Organizations that do not appear on the issue networks but appear on the community and interview networks—further down the degree ranking lists—include some of the community’s foundations and non-profits, such as museums and the state symphony, as well as charitable organizations dedicated to indigent needs. That these organizations are less central to growth possibly explains their lower ranking. Table 25 shows the most ten most central organizations in terms of degree.

The average number of associations between organizations for the CA network is approximately 2, while for the RA network it is much higher at 14. This suggests that the respondents’ organizations in the study are fairly connected. To state it another way, the interorganizational structure created by the 95 respondents appears as a dense cluster with a high degree of overlapping members. This dense collection of interorganizational actors serves as a highly active subset of the much larger, more loosely connected, community network. It is nearly as dense as the economic development issue network and has a higher degree centralization score; higher than the economic development, water, and healthcare networks. The interorganizational environment appears, on balance, to be more structurally cohesive than the issue
networks, at least when considering density and degree measures. Table 26 shows the
density and degree centralization scores for the four issue networks and the CA and RA
networks.
Table 25. Top 10 organization degree scores for the issue, Community Affiliation, and Respondent Affiliation networks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Development</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Water</th>
<th>Healthcare</th>
<th>CA Network</th>
<th>RA Network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>University</td>
<td>Chamber</td>
<td>Developer</td>
<td>University Hospital</td>
<td>Chamber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Econ. Dev. Corp.</td>
<td>Community College</td>
<td>Title Corp.</td>
<td>County</td>
<td>State Business Org. 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Chamber</td>
<td>Research Corp.</td>
<td>Architect</td>
<td>Developer</td>
<td>State Exec. Assoc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Title Corp.</td>
<td>Public School District</td>
<td>Home Builders Ass.</td>
<td>Cardiovascular Hospital</td>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>Mortuary</td>
<td>Water Consultant</td>
<td>State Hospice</td>
<td>State Business Org. 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Architect</td>
<td>Utility</td>
<td>Law Firm 2</td>
<td>Public Relations</td>
<td>Community College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Research Corp.</td>
<td>Architect</td>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>For-Profit, Private Healthcare Org.</td>
<td>Community Foundation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Centrality measure</th>
<th>Economic Development</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Water</th>
<th>Healthcare</th>
<th>RA Network</th>
<th>CA Network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total organizations</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2,408</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.0008</td>
<td>0.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>0.228</td>
<td>0.338</td>
<td>0.255</td>
<td>0.457</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree (mean)</td>
<td>5.23</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.4.3 Cohesive subgroups

Cohesive subgroups in the Community Affiliation and Respondent Affiliation organizational networks were found: 10 in the CA network and 3 in the RA network. The largest component in the CA network was composed of 865 organizations (35%). Approximately 63% of the CA network are isolates (n= 1,512). The other nine cohesive subgroups combined make up just over one percent (1.3%) of the 2,404 organizations. The largest subgroup in the RA network is composed of 287 organizations (94% of the network). There are also cohesive subgroups of 6 and 4 organizations, and 7 organizations are isolates. Both the CA network, which should reflect the organizational community at large, and the RA network, which should reflect the organizational networks of the leadership in the community, has one cohesive subgroup in addition to some much smaller subgroups that make up a very small percentage of the affiliations.

The CA and RA networks both have more than one cohesive subgroup, which is different from the issue networks, which all have just one subgroup. Although the CA and RA networks have 10 and 3 subgroups respectively, the relative minuteness of the cohesive subgroups outside of the largest ones is an indicator, to use Crowe’s (2007) typology, of a community structure based on consensus, as opposed to a factional or
coalitional network structure of two or more cohesive subgroups. The CA and RA organizational networks are larger and are composed of more subgroups, but in general, are structurally similar—at least in terms of cohesion—to the issue networks.

Excluded from the large cohesive subgroup in the RA network, recall from Figure 6 and Figure 7, is a for-profit, private hospital, a building association, a development consultant firm, an environmental organization, a congressional delegate, and two law firms. Outside of the largest cohesive subgroup in the CA network are 9 very small components and a large group of isolated organizations. Of the 1,512 isolated organizations approximately 53% are law firms. The remaining 704 isolated organizations include many neighborhood associations, auto dealerships, retail businesses, franchises, charter schools and other private education institutions, unions, environmental organizations, civic organizations like bowling associations, scouts, the American Legion, the city bridge club and soccer associations, and religious organizations. The other components include a triad of credit unions, a triad of venture capitalists, a triad of law firms, another half-dozen law firms, a triad comprised of two auto dealerships and a law firm, a triad comprised of two radiochemistry laboratories and a law firm, a quintuplet made up of a religious based community association, a local restaurant, a real estate company, and a telecommunication manufacturer, and finally, a triad of construction and building organizations. There does not appear to be a discernable pattern to these small components, as they range from technology firms, to law firms, to civic organizations. They appear to share only their exclusion from the larger component and their small size. These small components and isolates are idiosyncratic appendages to the actual networks of influence. As secondary influentials,
these actors influence some actors but are not “linked in” otherwise. Table 27
summarizes the components of each of the six networks.

**Table 27. Component measures for issue, Community Affiliation, and Respondent Affiliation networks.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational data</th>
<th>Economic Development</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Water</th>
<th>Health-care</th>
<th>CA Network</th>
<th>RA Network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total organizations</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2408</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of components (3 + organizations)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of organizations in largest cohesive subgroup</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of isolated organizations in largest cohesive subgroup</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 6.4.4 $K$-Cores

The Community Affiliation organizational network’s highest order of $k$-core is a 10-core, in which 27 organizations were connected to at least 10 other organizations.

The proportion of organizations in 3-core and higher is 0.14. Figure 32 shows visually the community networks highest core. Readily apparent is the abundance of business organizations. In fact, nearly half, 13 of the 27 are business organizations. The University, its alumni association and its foundation, the Community College’s foundation, a community foundation, an economic development corporation, a research corporation, a national bank subsidiary, a developer, the state’s largest utility company,
a community mental health center, the symphony, and the state make up the remaining organizations.29

The RA network’s highest order of $k$-core is complete, $k=25$ with 26 organizations connected to 25 other organizations, with a proportion of organizations in 3-core or higher at 0.94. Clearly the RA network is made up of many organizations (94%) densely connected to each other. For the CA network, only 14 percent of the 2,404 organizations are connected to at least three other organizations. In comparison to the issue networks, the RA network is much more cohesive; the next highest network in terms of proportion of organizations in a 3-core or higher is the economic development network at 48%, followed by the education network at 39%, the health care network at 27%, and the water network at 17%. Table 28 summarizes the $k$-core measures for the six networks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of network connectivity</th>
<th>Economic Development</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Water</th>
<th>Health-care</th>
<th>CA Network</th>
<th>RA Network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Largest $k$-core</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of organizations in largest $k$-core</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion in 3-core and higher</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

29 The national bank subsidiary only appears in this figure. Although two former executives from this bank were contacted for interviews, the bank’s involvement in the community decreased significantly with their retirement. One of the executives remains active in the community, on the museum board and with other business organizations. The other executive, once a regent for the University, moved out of state but maintains a residence in the community. Many respondents stated that if this study had been conducted a couple of years earlier, before the executive’s retirement, his role in the community would have been central. At the time of the study the most active banks included two local banks and two national bank subsidiaries.
Figure 32. Community Affiliation (CA) network 10-core (N = 27 organizations).
Implications for organizational involvement in the community can be drawn of these cores across the networks. The 27 actors in the 10-core in the CA network represent a possible inner-circle of organizations that, due to their high level of interaction, likely have influence over the political direction of the community. Tying into these organizations would likely serve an organization well in pushing its agenda. Looking at Figure 32, business organizations, economic development oriented organizations, and educational institutions figure prominently in the CA network. These represent the largest organizations in the community, both in terms of personal and assets (for instance, the utility company to the bottom left side of the figure, and the research corporation and the University, both to the top right of the figure, represent the three largest). Getting to know the influential actors in these organizations seems prudent.

The RA network, with its complete group of 26 organizations further emphasizes the point. A visualization of the RA network’s highest core does not need to be produced because it is complete, in that everyone in the core is connected to everyone else. But a comparison of the organizations that made it into the highest core for the CA network and the RA network reveals some commonalities. Table 29 lists the common organizations. Again, the dominance of business organizations and economic development organizations is evident. The University and its foundation and alumni association are prominent in the CA organizational network highest core but are absent in the RA organizational network highest core. This could be due to the instability in the executive leadership of the University at the time of the study, with an interim president and a new dean of the business school.
6.4.5 Cutpoints & bi-components

The CA network contains 11 cutpoints and 21 bi-components (see Table 30). The proportion of cutpoints to total points is 0.005 and nearly 78% of the organizations are isolates. One bi-component stands out with approximately 19% of the organizations incident with it. The next largest bi-component is made up of auto-related organizations and consists of 14 organizations. One bi-component consists of 6 organizations and the rest has five or fewer. The cutpoints for the CA network include a law firm and a state law organization, five business organizations, a think tank, a museum, a university related organization and a private business. Not knowing these bridging actors still affords organizations acting in this community a great deal of access to the network of interorganizational actors. These organizations that serve as bridges also serve as potential sources to influence both at the city-level and the state-level.

The Respondent Affiliation network contains 10 cutpoints, and 13 bi-components. The proportion of cutpoints to total points is 0.03. There are 10 isolates. Most of the bi-

Table 29. Community Affiliation, and Respondent Affiliation networks highest core organizations in common.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chamber of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic Chamber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Education Org.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Education Compact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development Org.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community College Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing Non-Profit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development Corp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women Economic Development Incubator</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Not knowing these bridging actors still affords organizations acting in this community a great deal of access to the network of interorganizational actors. These organizations that serve as bridges also serve as potential sources to influence both at the city-level and the state-level.

The Respondent Affiliation network contains 10 cutpoints, and 13 bi-components. The proportion of cutpoints to total points is 0.03. There are 10 isolates. Most of the bi-
components are rather small, ranging from between 2 and 5 organizations each. One bi-component consists of 244 of the 294, or 80%, of the organizations. The organizations serving as cutpoints, in that removing them would increase the number of cohesive subgroups in the network, include the city and county governments, the university, a lawyers’ association (not the same one identified in the CA network), a research corporation, and the same five business organizations. Two business associations serve as cutpoints and overlap the two networks. A similar interpretation to the one made for the CA organizational network can be made for the RA organizational network. Although a few of the organizations that serve as cutpoints differ between the two networks (the city, the county, and the University do not serve as bridges in the CA network), there remains significant overlap; particularly the five business organizations incident in both. These business organizations appear to be central actors in the business community.

**Table 30. Cutpoints for issue, Community Affiliation, and Respondent Affiliation networks.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of network connectivity</th>
<th>Economic Development</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Water</th>
<th>Healthcare</th>
<th>CA Network</th>
<th>RA Network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of cutpoints</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of biocomponents (3 + organizations)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of cutpoints to total points</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The CA and RA organizational networks both have a much smaller proportion of cutpoints to total points, likely a result of the large size of the networks. Looking just at the RA network, though, the percent of cutpoints to total points is 3.3%, suggesting a network structure that is both bonded and dense.
6.4.6 Center and Periphery—Closeness and Betweenness

As with the issue networks, the final network structure consideration is the concept of actor centrality and network centralization. In this section comparisons are made between the community networks, the interview network, and the issue networks with respect to the question: are there central actors that appear in the two affiliation networks and the issue networks? For the Community Affiliation (CA) network the largest cohesive subgroup (n= 865) was extracted from the larger 2,404 interorganizational network. For the Respondnet Affiliation (RA) network the largest component (n= 287) was extracted from the larger 304 interorganizational network.

6.4.6.1 Closeness

Closeness centralization is complicated by the significant differences in the sizes of the various networks. The closeness centralization of the sub-network of 865 organizations in the CA network is 0.296, while the closeness centralization of the sub-network of 287 organizations in the RA network is 0.363. It is difficult to summarize the entire networks, but the shift across the four issue networks and the two affiliation networks illustrates the general pattern. The city-wide economic development organization has the most number-one rankings with closeness centralization indices that range from 0.33 for the water issue network to 0.58 for the RA network. But the University has the highest overall ranking across the networks, with an average ranking of 2.8 for the networks it is in (it was not in the water network). There is considerable overlap of organizations across the top most central organizations in terms of closeness for the six networks. Table 31 shows the centrality scores of five of the most central organizations on the closeness measure and their relative ranking on each network.
Table 31. Organizations by network closeness centrality scores (ranking on network in parentheses).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Economic Development</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Water</th>
<th>Healthcare</th>
<th>CA Network</th>
<th>RA Network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City-Wide Economic Development Org.</td>
<td><strong>0.52 (1)</strong></td>
<td>0.40 (15)</td>
<td>0.33 (20)</td>
<td>0.37 (7)</td>
<td><strong>0.42 (1)</strong></td>
<td>0.58 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>0.50 (2)</td>
<td><strong>0.53 (1)</strong></td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0.40 (5)</td>
<td>0.39 (6)</td>
<td><strong>0.59 (1)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Org.</td>
<td>0.42 (18)</td>
<td>0.29 (69)</td>
<td><strong>0.57 (1)</strong></td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0.36 (22)</td>
<td>0.53 (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Profit Hospital</td>
<td>0.33 (60)</td>
<td>0.37 (27)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td><strong>0.58 (1)</strong></td>
<td>0.33 (69)</td>
<td>0.49 (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Org.</td>
<td>0.41 (20)</td>
<td>0.40 (16)</td>
<td>0.37 (12)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0.37 (13)</td>
<td>0.58 (2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These high-ranking organizations that stretch across the various networks reflect the importance of economic development oriented organizations to the community. They are never far away from others in the issue networks or the affiliation networks. Take the city-wide Economic Development Organization, for instance. It ranks in the top 20 on all six networks, and number one on the economic development and the CA networks. This organization is clearly very central to the business community and the interorganizational elites. The University, while not primarily considered an economic development organization, represents to the business community, a key element to the growth and image of the city. In other words, the University represents a large payroll, large property holdings, construction contracts, as well as a lure for industrial recruitment. Its size, organizational complexity, and reach into the community by academics and administrators results in its very high closeness rankings on all six networks.
6.4.6.2 Betweenness

The CA organizational network has a centralization score of 0.14 and betweenness centrality scores that range from 0.00 to 0.14. The RA network has a network centralization of 0.15 and betweenness centrality scores that range from 0.00 to 0.15. Nearly 60% (511 organizations) of the CA network has a betweenness score of 0.00 and nearly 40% (345 organizations) more have a betweenness score below 0.05. The remaining 9 organizations have betweenness scores between 0.047 and 0.14, just over 1% of the total organizations. The mean betweenness score is 0.003. The RA network looks very similar in that 73% of the network (209 organizations) has a betweenness centrality score of zero and another 24% of the network (69 organizations) has a betweenness centrality score above 0.00 and as large as 0.05. The remaining 4% of the network, 9 organizations, have betweenness scores above 0.05 and as high as 0.15. The average betweenness score for the network is 0.005. In terms of betweenness, in comparison to the issue network the affiliation networks are much less centralized. These large sub-networks of the affiliation networks are very dense and lack any real communication gaps. Table 32 shows the closeness and betweenness centralization scores for all networks. The tighter the organizational networks are, the more quickly communication flows through them.
### Table 32. Closeness and betweenness centrality scores for issue, Community Affiliation, and Respondent Affiliation networks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Economic Development</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Water</th>
<th>Healthcare</th>
<th>CA Network</th>
<th>RA Network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Closeness</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.349</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.408*</td>
<td>0.458**</td>
<td>0.296***</td>
<td>0.363****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Betweenness</strong></td>
<td>0.231</td>
<td>0.372</td>
<td>0.323*</td>
<td>0.750**</td>
<td>0.139***</td>
<td>0.148****</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*subnetwork of 29
**subnetwork of 23
***subnetwork of 865
****subnetwork of 287

### 6.4.7 Issue networks and affiliation networks interpretation

The structures of the CA network and RA network most differ from each other in terms of centrality. The average number of organizational affiliations in the CA network is just shy of two, while in the RA network organizations are connected to an average of 14 other organizations. Compared to the issue networks, in terms of average degree, the CA network appears more structurally similar to the healthcare and water issue networks. The economic development network has the highest mean, with an average of 5.23 associates. The RA network of just over 300 organizations appears to have the highest average number of actors sharing organizational ties. However, in terms of degree generally, the healthcare issue network appears the most centralized with a degree score of 0.457, compared to 0.296 for the RA network and 0.039 for the CA network.

The analysis of the cohesive subgroups of the CA and RA organizational networks reveals that they contain more cohesive subgroups than the issue networks, which only have one. The CA network has 10 components and the RA network has 3. The RA network appears to resemble the issue networks more closely than the CA network in terms of subgroups within the network, with 94% of the organizations in the largest cohesive subgroup compared to 100% for the issue networks. In comparison, as a
percent of the total organizations in the CA network, the number of organizations in the largest cohesive subgroup is only 36%. The implication of this is that the method for capturing the elites cast a net around the community that contains a large percentage of organizations outside of the core elite, but that there is a core elite that are structurally different from the rest of the community organizational environment, and that that core is dominated by economic development oriented organizations.

To further illustrate this point of network connectivity and the domination of economic development oriented organizations, the $k$-core analysis reveals that the RA network is very connected, with a high $k$-core relative to the other networks. In fact, 94% of the organizations in the interview network are in a 3-core or higher, compared to only 14% for the CA network. The economic development network had the second highest percent of organizations in a 3-core or higher with 48%, followed by the education network with 39%. The CA network had the smallest percent of organizations in a 3-core or higher. (This small connectivity of the organizations in the CA network is not too surprising given the large number of organizations in the study and the manner in which the data for the network was collected.) These cores are dominated developers, banks, business organizations, and the University. While across the issue networks and the affiliation networks, the core organizations shift, a general pattern of influence on the part of economic growth-driven organizations is found.

Finally, the number of bi-components and cutpoints as measures of network connectivity for the CA and RA networks reveals many more bi-components than in the issue networks. The CA network has 21 bi-components with 11 cutpoints and the RA network has 13 bi-components with 10 cutpoints, compared to the presence of only one
bi-component in each of the four issue networks. The proportion of cutpoints to total points for the CA and RA organizational networks varies from the issue networks as well. The proportion for the CA network is only 0.005 and the RA network is 0.033. This suggests that the CA and RA networks are bonded and dense.

6.5 Summary

The last chapter began with an introduction to the concerns of the interviewed leadership community. Three questions were raised: First, what are leaders concerned about? Second, with whom, if anyone, do leaders associate on those concerns? And third, how do leaders perceive the community working, and what actions do leaders take about their concerns? The answer to the first question is addressed at some length in the previous chapter. The leaders in this study are concerned with many issues, but rising to the top of the list are economic development, education, water and other infrastructural issues, healthcare, crime, and concern for those with little social power or social capital. This chapter sought an answer to the second question, and focuses on the network structures of four key issues identified by respondents.

Analyzing the issue networks required reorganizing the sociometric responses of respondents for the various issue networks to reflect relationships between organizations, which was possible because the data collection process allowed for respondents to identify both individuals and organizations in their networks. This modification of the data was not without consequences. In Zey-Ferrell’s critique of structural analyses, organizations cannot be seen as rational, unitary, goal oriented actors, but instead are “arenas in which individual, group, and societal interests are played out…” (1981, p. 201). That said, she draws on Braverman (1974), Stone (1974), Friedman (1977),

255
Edwards (1978), and Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) who all “demonstrate how management and the dominant coalitions within organizations have maintained the status quo and perpetuated their elite status and ideologies within organizations” (1981, p. 201). She notes that Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) “demonstrate that not only are ‘the ruling ideas in every age the ideas of the ruling class,’ but that the ruling ideas themselves successfully reinforce the rule of that class” (1981, p. 201). The elites interviewed in this study are more representative of their organizations than their non-elite counterparts would be, so these individuals are treated as proxies for their organizations. The decision to proceed with an analysis of organizations as the unit of analysis instead of individuals seemed justifiable.

The organizational analysis revealed similar network structures for each issue; in general a core set of organizations were active on the issue with other organizations more peripheral. For instance, the water network was dominated by developers, their organizations, and government regulatory agencies. The healthcare network was dominated by a few hospitals and the county government. The economic development and the education issue networks overlapped organizationally with the University and economic development organizations centrally located in both networks. Additionally, the economic development network centered around a law firm, an economic development company, a developer, and the city. Across the issues, however, there existed a great deal of organizational overlap by economic growth-oriented organizations. The business community clearly sees the University, the research labs, economic development organizations, and business associations as central to the development of the city.
Structurally, the issue networks appear to be fairly cohesive. Only the water and the healthcare networks had isolated organizations, but none of the four networks had more than one large component. Within the networks an attempt was made to find more cohesive subsets of actors with the use of $k$-core analysis. This analysis revealed that there were densely connected groups of organizations within each issue network, which ranged from a subset of 15 organizations connected to each other through at least six ties for the economic development network, to seven organizations connected to each other with at least two ties to each other for the healthcare network. Interestingly, only two organizations, a developer and the university, appeared in the highest core for each of the four networks, while the Chamber of Commerce, the city, and a law firm appeared in three of the highest cores. This overlap of organizations in the highest redundant circles within the issues at least structurally suggests that information about one issue can be shared with organizations connected to other issues, through two or more routes as there is more than one organization that is represented on the various issues. The cohesiveness and overlap of the various networks suggests that political action on the part of the community elite is facilitated by a tightly overlapping group of growth-oriented organizations.

In addition to measures of centrality and structural cohesiveness, a search for network connectivity was conducted. In this case, a search was made for organizations that occupy such central positions in the issue networks that their removal would cause a hole to exist which would isolate actors from the network. Across all four issues the proportion of cutpoints to total points was very similar, ranging from 0.2 to 0.26 with only one large group of actors. This suggests that, across all four issues, the same
proportion of organizations serve as bridges or brokers in the network. The implication of these findings is that the organizations incident with these issue networks likely are densely connected but also characterize network structures that are bridging. This network structure suggests a community approach by organizations that, on the one hand, include tight relationships with several other organizations, and on the other hand, efforts on the part of some organizations (about one-fifth to one-quarter) to maintain ties with apparently more structurally remote organizations tied to the issue. Such bridging organizations seem structurally located to play a powerful role in action on issues, capable of informing (and thus politically mobilizing) organizations and sectors of the community that otherwise would remain outside the flow of information and action. Though comparative data would be needed to know whether they constitute a “power elite” or a more fluid “community elite,” such organizations likely play a key role in brokering political action.

In addition to analyzing the social networks around these four issues, structural comparisons were made between the Community Affiliation (CA) organizational network and the Respondent Affiliation (RA) organizational network. This was done to test whether the issue networks mimic the structure of the affiliation network of the entire leadership community that was generated from the initial affiliation data collected for the study, and the interview affiliation network that was collected during the interview. Comparing the structures of the issue networks, CA network, and RA network allowed for an assessment of the variability in the leadership structure.

The types of organizations centrally located in the CA and RA networks overlapped with the centrally located organizations in the issue networks. The University
and economic development organizations, which include private businesses such as developers and construction companies as well as nonprofits, figure prominently in all networks. The repetitiveness of these organizations across these various networks gives weight to the urban growth coalition theory. If the community is viewed as an interorganizational environment operating as a machine, the machine is dedicated to the pursuit of growth—at least, its core members’ interests appear to be focused on urban growth. The local growth machine is made up, at its core, of business organizations like the Chamber of Commerce and trade associations, key economic development organizations, developers, construction companies, architects, and engineers, who in turn sit on the boards of the regents and foundation of the University, the Community College, hospitals, think tanks, foundations, and civic organizations (like the museum and symphony), and occupy the seats of local and regional government agencies and elected posts. This community is a growth-oriented community committed to industrial recruitment and real estate expansion.

In Zey-Ferrell’s (1981) assessment of what is needed in organizational analyses, she argued that a “model would … necessitate the development of (1) theories of individual and group interests and values which can be integrated with theories of organizational power, processes, and conflicts, (2) theories in which the micro-, meso-, and macro-levels of social structures are interrelated through a view of organizations as arenas in which individual, group, and societal interests are played out…” (1981, p. 201). In the next chapter the focus shifts in these two directions, to the perspectives of respondents on how things get done in the community. In that chapter the importance
respondents place on economic development oriented business organizations becomes even more apparent.
Chapter Five focused on specific issues central to community elites. The interrelationship of those issues revealed the centrality of economic development, providing credibility to Logan and Molotch’s growth machine theory. An image of community commodification, where most social and non-social aspects of the community are seen through a use value lens, began to emerge. Chapter Six gave further credence to the growth machine metaphor with a focused study of the organizational dynamics around four key community issues, including economic development, education, water, and healthcare. The organizational actors that emerged in that analysis play the central role for the growth machine of advancing the interests of the business community. What materialized is a dense, centrally located, group of economic actors allied with civic and political institutions, which is structurally poised to influence community decisions through their coordinated commitment to growth and looser ties to less central organizations.

This chapter expands on these earlier chapters by first framing Logan and Molotch’s central conflict in the growth machine theory—over exchange values and use values in the community—with Sewell’s dynamic theory of structure that “restores human agency to social actors” and “overcomes the divide between semiotic and materialist visions of structure” (Sewell, 1992, p. 1). Second, this theoretical framework is then utilized to understand how community elites act toward the community.
7.2 Networks of Action

Like the issue networks discussed in Chapter Five, respondents’ construction of the community is a product of their position in networks. To recall the discussion of Sewell’s theory of structure in Chapter Two and Chapter Five, individuals are not powerful in themselves; they siphon off power from their position in their social networks. Respondents in this study appear to realize this. Sewell helps us to see the interrelationship and self-sustaining forces of human and non-human resources and cultural schemas that give access to, and make sense of, the position of community elites. Seen in this way, the structuring of the community is the result of a process of “mutually sustaining cultural schemas and sets of resources that empower and constrain social action and tend to be reproduced by that action” (1992, p. 27). Recall, too, the previous discussion of Sewell’s comments that, “Agents are empowered by structures, both by the knowledge of cultural schemas that enables them to mobilize resources and by the access

30 Community action occurs in the embedded relationships of actors, and this chapter, above all else, seeks to illuminate how respondents conceive of these relationships. I prefer the phrase network of action to the word interaction because it draws attention and brings into association two concepts: (social) networks and (social) action. Individuals and organizations, to be effective, rely on their social networks. (This study does not analyze other types of networks, such as telecommunications, information technologies, or any number of other relationships individuals or organizations may engage in to be more effective in their realms of activity.)

All of the 95 respondents were asked the question, “How do things get done in the community?” Predictably, this very open-question led some respondents to say “It depends on the issue,” which was met, in turn, with prompts like, “Can you give me an example or two about how certain issues in the community were initiated or tackled?” and, “Is there a hierarchy to decision making, is initiative more bottom-up, or is there a middle road or some combination of forces?” Ultimately, my goal was to keep the question as open-ended as possible to allow respondents to offer a response not influenced by the way I posed the question. Arguably any prompt can tip the respondent in the direction of the prompt, but out of the desire for responses during interviews, it seemed unavoidable to prompt respondents in some cases. For the majority of interviews, however, this problem did not arise.
to resources that enables them to enact schemas” (1992, p. 27). Recall, as well, the implication of Fuchs’ (2001) comments that people are social and cultural institutions: elites produce and reproduce themselves through their position to mobilize resources and cultural schemas in the social and cultural institutions in the community.

Respondents integrate cultural schemas and social networks through the use of interpersonal and interorganizational “networking” as the central vehicle for getting things done in the community. Of the 95 respondents, 53 made direct reference to the importance of social networks, invoking the terms establishing and maintaining networks or coalitions or relationships. Many went into specific detail about establishing and maintaining ties with others, while others merely mentioned that relationships are a way to achieve an end. Respondents referred to both behind-the-scenes networks and public networks. Irrespective of the type, however, it is clear that the relationships formed by the leadership community through interorganizational ties contribute greatly to the ability of this segment of the community to accomplish its goals.

What can be said about the nature and extent of social networks as a vehicle for achieving goals in a community? To answer these questions, the bulk of this chapter constitutes an assemblage of schemas of community action determined by the respondents. But first, these schemas, of which social network practices are central, must been seen in relation to preexisting and emerging structural contingencies. In other words, a clear definition of structure is needed that provides the necessarily dynamic character that simultaneously considers human agency and systemic dimensions of urban space, both the virtual/semiotic and material.
To carry out this framing, William Sewell’s “Theory of Structure” (1992) proves useful for several reasons. First, he builds on the strengths of Giddens’s theory of structuration and Bourdieu’s 1977 “Outline of a Theory of Practice” to develop a theory that considers structure a “profoundly cultural phenomenon” and “insists that structure always derives from the character and distribution of resources in the everyday world” (p. 27). Second, his theory attempts to account for or explain individual agency. And third, his theory links to Logan and Molotch’s (1987) growth coalition theory by presenting an explanation for the stability of social structure that at the same time accounts for societal dynamism.

Before moving on to the way the community elite in the present study conceive of their resources and use their knowledge to act to transform their surroundings, an unpacking of Sewell’s definition of structure is helpful. Sewell introduces the need for his theory and the axioms that make it up in the following way,

It is my conviction that a theory of change cannot be built into a theory of structure unless we adopt a far more multiple, contingent, and fractured conception of society—and of structure. What is needed is a conceptual vocabulary that makes it possible to show how the ordinary operations of structures can generate transformations. To this end, I propose five key axioms: the multiplicity of structures, the transposability of schemas, the unpredictability of resource accumulation, the polysemy of resources, and the intersection of structures. (1992, p. 16)

The first axiom, “the multiplicity of structures,” means, according to Sewell, that, “Societies are based on practices that derive from many distinct structures, which exist at different levels, operate in different modalities, and are themselves based on widely varying types and quantities of resources,” (1992, p. 16) and that “social actors are capable of applying a wide range of different and even incompatible schemas and have access to heterogeneous arrays of resources” (1992, p. 17). In the second axiom, “the transposability of schemas,” Sewell gives a definition of agency, “as entailing the
capacity to transpose and extend schemas to new contexts,” which, he argues, “is inherent in the knowledge of cultural schemas that characterizes all minimally competent members of society.” He argues that “the real test of knowing a rule is to be able to apply it successfully in unfamiliar cases” (1992, p. 18).

The third axiom, “The unpredictability of resource accumulation,” implies that “the very fact that schemas are by definition capable of being transposed or extended means that the resource consequences of the enactment of cultural schemas is never entirely predictable” (1992, p. 18). The forth axiom, “The polysemy of resources,” means, “Any array of resources is capable of being interpreted in varying ways and, therefore, of empowering different actors and teaching different schemas” (1992, p. 19). Sewell restates his definition of agency differently to account for the varied interpretations of the nature of resources. He says that agency “is the actor's capacity to reinterpret and mobilize an array of resources in terms of cultural schemas other than those that initially constituted the array” (1992, p. 19). Included in his model of structure, then, is a great deal of unpredictability on the part of actors, as they carry with them different degrees of access to resources and schemas, and different abilities to employ those resources and schemas in action. Finally, the last of the five axioms is “The intersection of structures,” about which Sewell states, “One reason arrays of resources can be interpreted in more than one way is that structures or structural complexes intersect and overlap” (1992, p. 19). This is akin to Simmel’s (1955) discussion of social circles. We are shaped by the circles we associate in, but, Sewell emphasizes, the overlap and intersection of these social networks or social circles allows for human agency to find its expression.
Additionally, Sewell argues for a particular definition of agency, one that is “profoundly social or collective” (1992, p. 21). He argues,

> The transposition of schemas and remobilizations of resources that constitute agency are always acts of communication with others. Agency entails an ability to coordinate one’s actions with others and against others, to form collective projects, to persuade, to coerce, and to monitor the simultaneous effects of one’s own and others’ activities. Moreover, the extent of the agency exercised by individual persons depends profoundly on their positions in collective organizations (1992, p. 21).

At the core of personal agency, Sewell argues, are “collectively produced differences of power...implicated in collective struggles and resistances” (1992, p. 21). The collective forces of individuals and organizational actors organized within and across segments of the community to form an elite strengthens their power to reproduce the social structure.

For Sewell, the reproduction of structures is never automatic. They are always at risk, at least to some extent, “in all of the social encounters they shape—because structures are multiple and intersecting, because schemas are transposable, and because resources are polysemic and accumulate unpredictably” (1992, p. 19). Sewell’s theory also implies the ability of non-elites to undermine elite power—but always within the context of existing structure, reinforced by elite schemas. The latter is the focus of this chapter.

### 7.3 Applying the Analytical Framework: Community Elite’s Cognitive Approaches to Community Action

What are the schemas utilized by the community elite to enable them to reproduce an enduring and powerful interorganizational environment to influence the economic development, political climate, and civic infrastructure of an urban environment? The matrix of interorganizational actors revolves around land-based growth-oriented businesses and their associations which seek to maximize exchange values, as well as
other institutions that benefit financially or politically from that growth, including the media, retail businesses, education institutions, and politicians.

To summarize the subsequent discussion, the alignment of interorganizational resources—the growth coalition—is carried out, the community elites contend, to achieve both economic growth and community vitality. The city and the state are seen as lacking powerful economic actors. To compensate for this economic lack, the community elites see strength in numbers, reaching out to each other (especially through business organizations) to construct a business climate. With a strong business climate, elites believe, the strengths of the political and civic spheres are better kept in check, and economic growth persists or even advances. Economic growth equates to progress, and the use-value-oriented civic organizations (neighborhood associations) and their sympathetic political representatives (city councilors or county commissioners) are seen as adversarial. At each level of politics—state, regional, county, or city—the community’s business elite seek to articulate a growth agenda and align economic and organizational resources to help steer the political machine in a growth-friendly direction.

The following section draws on Sewell’s cultural schema conceptualization of action, and illustrates how the community elite judge the community as a place to carry out their actions. What is detailed in this section constitutes the backdrop or context that, on the one hand, presents challenges for action, and on the other hand, offers opportunities for action. In addition, these coalitions of actors as cultural systems result in virtual strategies of action. To borrow from Sewell, we see in this section variability in the strategies of action, but that that variability is a function of the social position actors
occupy. Community elites engage in behaviors that strive to transform the community to further their pursuit of progress.

The structural edifice built in the previous chapters indicates a community elite that is organized to make possible economic growth in the city. The interorganizational affiliation networks and the issue networks provide many opportunities for interaction and coordination among community elites. Core organizations and individuals emerge in the community to influence its direction. Business organizations and economic development associations serve as key nodes in the cultural transfer of the growth orientation. It should be expected, therefore, in what follows, that elites will adopt similar schemas for action in the community, that what variability exists among them will be rather superficial to the deeper structural concerns of economic growth, and that all apparent claims to non-growth motives rest upon a structural preoccupation with growth.

7.3.1 Peripheral and central community elites
Fuchs explains that “The more loosely coupled and pluralistic the network is, the more different internal observers it tends to accommodate, each constructing their own causes and histories. Levels of consensus and agreement vary accordingly, and together with the degrees of coupling and redundancy. In weak and loosely coupled specialties, there likely is no single official story or history” (2001, p. 258).

The network analyses in the previous chapters indicated a community elite centralized around the public University, business organizations, economic development organizations, and developers (Chapter Four). Additionally, the issues of concern to elites revolved around building the community through infrastructural fixes and educational reform to influence growth generally, and industrial recruitment specifically (chapters
Five and Six). These were the dominant actors and the dominant voices in the networks, but what about the more peripheral actors in the networks? If Fuchs’ claim that consensus and agreement among actors varies with the degree of “redundancy” in the network, are the more marginal actors in the community likely to have different or even competing schemas of action in the community? The variability in prestige among respondents is used as an indicator of a pluralistic leadership structure.\(^{31}\)

Two questions help focus this short analysis. First, is there a difference in terms of the part of the community from which these low-prestige actors and high-prestige actors originate? And second, is there a difference in the way these two groups of actors approach community action?

The 95 community elites interviewed in this study have been divided into two groups: a high-prestige group of respondents which constitutes 74 people in at least a 3-core in the Prestige network, and a low-prestige group of respondents which constitute the remaining 21 people in a 2-core or less. Recall that a \(k\)-core is a group of actors that are connected to at least \((k)\) actors in a network. Thus, the high-prestige group is spread across four cores in the network. The low-prestige group includes a 2-core, which includes 61 actors—of which 8 were interviewed, a 1-core, which includes 258 actors, of which 5 were interviewed, and the 0-core which includes 33 actors, of which 8 were interviewed. Table 33 summarizes the \(k\)-core information of the high-prestige and low-prestige respondents in the Prestige network. The majority of low-prestige respondents are also interorganizationally marginal. Of the 21 lowest prestige scoring respondents

\(^{31}\) Prestige score rankings correspond closely to interorganizational centrality scores in the Respondent Affiliation (RA) network but serves as a better indicator of hierarchical differences in the community because a number of interorganizatinally marginal actors (such as the Mayor, who, by the virtue of his position does not sit on, or maintain memberships with, many organizations) rank high in prestige.
(those respondents who were in less than a 3-core), 15 are outside of the two highest k-cores (20-core and a 21-core) in the Respondent Affiliation (RA) network.

**Table 33. Prestige network k-cores and number of respondents in each.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>k-cores</th>
<th>Number of respondents in respective k-cores</th>
<th>Total prestige network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low k-core</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-core</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-core</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-core</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High k-core</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-core</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-core</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-core</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-core</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents with low prestige are generally from law firms (19%) and business organizations (29%). The largest sub-group in the high prestige group are in land development (19%) followed by financial organizations (14%) and law firms (12%). Business organizations, city and county government, and local mass media and public relations organizations each constitute 9% of the high prestige organizational affiliations. For the low prestige respondents, beyond law firms and business organizations, only 2 (9%) of the respondents are affiliated with land development and only 1 (5%) respondent is affiliated with financial organizations. The rest are spread across a number of different types of organizations, including education (5%), local businesses (1%), national businesses (9%), and healthcare (5%). None of the low prestige respondents are affiliated with government (compared to 9% of the high prestige respondents), mass media or public relations, or public utilities (compared to 3% of the high prestige respondents). Alternatively, the non-profit sector—foundations, environmental organizations, and
cultural centers—is present among the low prestige respondents where it is not among the high prestige respondents.

These generalizations suggest that there are some basic differences between low and high prestige respondents. Most obviously, higher prestige respondents tend to come from growth-oriented organizations and the business sector that finances them, collectively 30%, compared to only 14% of the low prestige respondents. Additionally, high prestige is bestowed upon government actors and communication organizations (the local media and public relations firms). These organizations are absent among the low prestige actors. The centrality of government actors makes sense in light of the revelations by respondents of the lack of strength of the business community in general (discussed in later sections of this chapter): government actors are influential in this community because the business community is relatively weak.

Among the core influential local businesses are an automotive dealership owner, the CEO of a mortuary, the CEOs of two furniture companies, and executives of the local publicly traded utility company. Core non-locally owned businesses include executives of a research lab and its sister economic development corporation (both owned by an American transnational corporation). The automobile dealership, the publicly-traded utility, and the research lab carry with them high-prestige individuals, possibly due to their substantial economic clout, relative to the rest of the local businesses. They each contribute a large amount of money in the form of philanthropy and, especially for the research lab, payroll. As a result of their service to the community and their financial might, these businesses, as well as a small number of others—two or three of the local law firms and as many as four of the banks—are elevated to a higher level of prestige by
their fellow elites. Table 34 summarizes the low and high prestige respondents’ organizational affiliations.

Table 34. Low and high prestige respondents and their type of organizational affiliation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Organizations</th>
<th>Number of respondents with lowest prestige (2-core and lower)</th>
<th>Number of respondents with highest prestige (3-core and higher)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land Development (Architects, Construction, Engineers, Real Estate, Developers, Development Consultants)</td>
<td>2 (9%)</td>
<td>12 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial (Banks, Title Companies)</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>10 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>4 (19%)</td>
<td>9 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Orgs.</td>
<td>5 (24%)</td>
<td>7 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (University, Community College, Public School District)</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>5 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Businesses (automobile, mortuary, furniture, business consultants)</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>6 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Businesses (Government Contractors, Economic Development Corporation, Research Labs)</td>
<td>2 (9%)</td>
<td>4 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Service Org.</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare/Insurance</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>4 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media/Public Relations</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundations</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Centers</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21 (100%)</td>
<td>74 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ascribed to low prestige among their peers are non-economic and non-political organizations, such as foundations, cultural centers, and environmental organizations. Although each of these three types of organizations are only represented by one respondent, their low levels of prestige among their peers suggests that the community is oriented toward growth and the financial institutions in the community to bring growth about (exchange values), rather than bestowing prestige on more use-value oriented institutions. In other words, those with the highest prestige in the community are those that contribute directly to economic growth, while those with the lowest prestige are oriented more directly toward the “quality of life” of the community.

While dichotomizing the Prestige network into a high-prestige group and a low prestige group lends support to the relative importance respondents place on economic-oriented activity and non-economic community-oriented activity, it has yet to be shown if the respondents in each of these two groups differ in their cognitive orientation toward community action. In short, the least prestigious respondents do not appear to see the community fundamentally differently than the more prestigious respondents. In fact, collectively, the schematic orientations of the low prestige respondents toward to the community serve as a prelude to much of the schematic framework of the community elites in general that is laid out in the rest of this chapter.

To summarize in a few words the predominant schemas of the low prestige respondents, community action is: dominated by local and state level political leadership, but can be counterbalanced by “grassroots leadership” in the business community. Unfortunately, for the business community, the absence of large corporate headquarters, the strength of neighborhood association, and the anti-growth orientation of some of the
city council, makes influencing the political system difficult. All of these schemas are discussed in latter parts of the chapter.

What separates many of the low-prestige respondents from the high-prestige respondents is the level of detail with which they address the community. For instance, four of the 21 low-prestige respondents spoke indirectly about community action, or even said that they do not know how things get done in the community. Their answers, instead, address their organization’s role within its respective industry (three lawyers talked about their firm’s involvement with the State Bar Association and interactions with other lawyers around law-related concerns, while a healthcare executive talked about community health intervention strategies that resulted from relationship building across healthcare organizations).

Another schematic difference between the low and high prestige respondents is in the definition of grassroots. For the majority of the low-prestige and all of the high-prestige respondents, grassroots (as is discussed later in the chapter) is taken to mean activity among the business elites. By contrast, among a small number of the low prestige respondents, one (an environmentalist) addressed the need to educate the general public as well as the business and political leadership. Another respondent (a lower-level executive from the research lab) mentioned that during the planning phase of a project collaboration between resource holders and non-resource holders can be successful. Finally, a lawyer heavily involved with his own neighborhood association saw its bottom-up nature as true democracy. For each of these three respondents grassroots is defined as organizing the general public, rather than the business community.
This brief analysis serves as bridge between the structural (social network) analyses of the previous chapters and the cultural analysis of this chapter. That there is a relationship between the organizational and cognitive orientations among low and high prestige respondents indicates that network position and cultural orientation are linked. Peripheral actors appear to see community action differently than the business-oriented core.

7.3.2 Macro-level cultural schemas

The subsequent sections illustrate how the community elite act given their cognitive schemas. The first two sections capture how elites frame their mobilization of (1) interorganizational relationships and (2) interpersonal relationships to achieve their goals in the community. The interorganizational and interpersonal relationships forged by community elites serve as a counterbalance to the perceived political and civic challenges to their pursuit of economic progress which result in (3) action schemas. These action schemas constitute the third section. A final section (4) illustrates the foregoing discussion; a failed tax initiative which serves to illustrate some of Sewell’s axioms of structural change and stasis. As this case illustrates, the multiplicity of structures, where social actors applied different schemas and had access to different resources, resulted in the failure of a tax that both sides ultimately agreed had overall value, but could not agree on how it was packaged. What the example underscores is that this conflict among the community elite—and conflicts among community elites in general—illustrates a superficial divergence of opinion. The deeper structure of the pursuit of the commodification of place is not challenged. Instead, the conflict among elite factions is over how best to pursue this goal.
Figure 33 attempts to capture the cognitive framework of constraining and enabling resources with which elites concern themselves when engaging in community action. To begin, at the macro-level, there are non-human and human “realities” with which elites must contend in order to be influential in their sphere of action. In other words, any given locality has political, economic, ecological, and social constraints and opportunities. This macro-level context constrains and enables actors at the meso- and micro-levels of interorganizational and interpersonal action. These interorganizational and interpersonal levels of action constrain and enable the shaping of action schemas, which are, in-turn, reinforced and sustained to give the impression of a stable community (power) structure. The desire to increase control over the resources in the community compels organizations to seek interorganizational linkages in the community. Largely through trade and business organizations, but also through non-profit and public institutions, organizational leadership, through financial contributions as well as social and political clout, builds alliances with other organizations to create an interorganizational environment. In turn, the relationship-building on the part of these interorganizational actors increases role expectations among them. Trust, solidarity, and emotion work, are all considered when engaging in community action. What sustain the interorganizational structure are micro-level interpersonal networks with which actors seek both instrumental and normative goals.
This section is broken down into three subsections, including the meanings attributed to (1) economic resources, (2) political resources, and (3) cultural groups as resources. All of these forms of resources both constrain and enable actors. Of the 95 respondents interviewed, fifty-four commented on the economic, political, and/or cultural resources they consider in putting together a strategy of action.

A key schema for the community elites is that they consider the economic resources, both corporate and individual, in the state and the city to be inadequate. Additionally, elites structurally juxtapose the community cognitively into two contingencies: the weakness of economic actors and the strength of political ones. Strategies of action, then, are initiated with the intent to shore up economic resources to influence community decisions. Each of these two schemas is treated in turn.

7.3.3 Economic resources schema

One of the most prominent schemas concerning the economic conditions of the state and the city is the lack of corporate headquarters. This message came from a broad swath of the community: two lawyers, one banker, one lobbyist, one real estate
developer, one construction developer, and a general manager of a local network
television affiliate. For the general manager of a local television affiliate, the connection
between economic power and political power is clear:

...we don’t have a lot of corporate headquarters…with corporate headquarters you can really get
the money to lobby to get things done. (General Manager of local network affiliate)

A consequence of the lack of a major corporate presence is the inability of the business
community to wield much influence politically, and the crux of this ineptness resides in
the lack of a clear economic cadre to drive the business agenda. This lack of a small
unified elite with substantial financial resources (compared to communities with several
Fortune 500 companies) results in an insubstantial business elite that is stretched thin.

The fragile nature of our local economy: we don’t have a strong local corporate presence. We
have zero corporate 500 presence. [A large computer hardware manufacturing company] has a
presence (a manufacturing presence) here, but they are headquartered in California. Look at
other cities, the stadium is named after a big corporation. We don’t have that here. What you do
have is local companies and upper strata individuals. But they are getting hit up for
everything. (Lawyer)

The concern over the lack of a counterweight to the dominance of political elites is clear:

...We don’t have big private owned companies with deep pockets. So government influence is very
important here. I would like to see that diminished. We need to get off the government tit. (Banker)

From these passages one can clearly see that business elites view the lack of a
large corporate presence as a detriment to the community. According to these
respondents, at least two things happen with a large corporate presence, which do not
happen in this community. First, the community becomes structured (organized) around
those large corporations and, second, as a result, the community is less structured
(organized) around government. Clearly, some of the respondents do not see the
dependence on government resources and the power of politicians as a positive attribute
of the community. In the absence of large corporations, according to one respondent, the
community lacks leadership and, according to others, that leadership instead falls to
government. Another respondent noted that the lack of corporate headquarters means that local companies get asked to financially fill the gap.

It might be that the business community finds it harder to take action in this community, compared to communities with a stronger corporate presence, but this community might be more democratic. Certainly, as is demonstrated below, the business community is acutely aware of and concerned with the political strength of use-value oriented groups like neighborhood associations.

Although the local business community does not contain economic behemoths, there still remains a nucleus of economic actors that, consistent with the growth coalition theory, derive from land-value sectors of the community. No purer example of this can be found than the developer-driven community. A developer-driven community means that organizations or individuals who want to accomplish anything in the community need to court key developers and the banks that finance development.

A lawyer at one of the largest firms in the city said that in the community a small number of active individuals carry influence to the political arena. The president of a construction company, with obvious interests in the growth machine, characterized the leadership community in the following way:

*I think you get a coalition of the business people, a very small group of a hundred who are very active: banks, utility companies, private businesses.... Those groups exert pressure on elected officials. (Construction)*

That a coalition of one hundred business people is considered “very small” suggests that the business elites are rather weak. In cities of the same size or larger, with a strong corporate presence, the number of movers and shakers need not necessarily approach or exceed this amount. In comparison to the pyramid power structure indicative of the early community power studies (Walton, 1966), with a small core of elites at the tip of the
pyramid and a scaling of lesser influential actors below, in this community is simply
missing that tip; so the power of non-political elites comes from more varied sources,
albeit firmly within the growth machine. What this community lacks in quality (financial
depth), it makes up for in quantity (financial players)—with corresponding difficulties of
coordination but also potential democratic advantages.

Some respondents noted non-business economic resources as well. Two
mentioned that the city lacks not only large corporate headquarters but “big money
families” as well. One respondent in public relations said,

[The city] is a middle class sort of town, so you have people with money but not many with big
money and interests to put that money behind, like [other regional cities]. You have some people
here that influence with their money ... and they were real philanthropists. I moved away from
[the city] in 1972 and in [larger regional city] they have big old money. In [this city] it is public
money that goes into major events. (Public relation)

Again, whether speaking about corporate wealth or private wealth, the absence of wealth
results is the reliance on public resources. Speaking about the lack of money in the
community, a lawyer in the city said,

There is no, for good or ill, there is no—and often it is for ill—there are no background power
brokers here that can get together and get things done. There isn’t anyone in [the city] that has
that much money to put on the line. Good news is it is a more open process. (Lawyer)

And, the director of a business organization said that the community is growing, and with
growth comes more work in establishing social relations.

I think [the city] is changing because we are bigger so it is not like everyone knows everyone. I am
often amazed that I don’t know everyone when I go into a room. It isn’t done quite as... it is not
backrooms... but it was that everyone knew everyone and they could talk on the fly but now it
really is establishing relationships. (Lobbyist)

As was mentioned a moment ago with regard to the lack of a large corporate presence,
and can be reiterated with respect to the lack of a large private presence in the community
as well, the community may be more democratic and less under the influence of
economic elites. However, contradicting the lawyer and the lobbyist a bit, an economic
developer felt that things occur in the community through both public and more private channels, with business organizations, utilities, and think tanks operating behind the scenes, and the local university, developers, and private businesses operating in the public realm.\(^{32}\)

The economic resources of the state and the city are perceived by some of the respondents as meager. The lack of a strong corporate presence has had at least two consequences: increased reliance on government financial support and a large effort on the part of the local elite to bridge this gap by establishing ties with each other to articulate community goals.

**7.3.4 Political resources schemas**

A second macro-structural schema that operates among the community elites involves the political conditions that must be navigated or negotiated to bring about change or to get things done. This section includes a discussion of several cognitive structures around political resources, including (1) the accessibility of elected officials, (2) the power of elected officials, (3) the conflict and consensus in the community, (4) public and private channels of influence, and (5) the form of government.

**7.3.4.1 Political resource: Accessible elected officials schema**

A prevalent schema among respondents was the accessibility of elected officials at the state and city levels:

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\(^{32}\) Although speaking about the local media’s role in influencing the political process, a respondent in public relations also commented on the public/private realms of influence: "When you don’t have a single driving force you see inertia and people operating on the margins or behind the scenes." Without a strong (critical and effective) media presence, the wheels of power travel unnoticed by the public.
This community is the size and the structure that you can call the Mayor and he will get back to you. I think the structure of the city is conducive to work. It is called grass roots; people can form a committee to change things, all you need to do is form a committee. (Real estate)

This real estate executive highlights the relationship between accessibility to political officials and power, where access equals power. Others who shared the accessibility point-of-view said:

[The city] is small enough that we can get things done, but we are still like a banana republic in some ways. (Business consultant)

One of the strengths of this community is the accessibility one has. There is a narrower band, fewer steps on the ladder to get from John Q Public to the highest ranking elected official in the state, the governor, the mayor. The business community is equally approachable. It is one of the great things about the state. We have active engaged leaders who are responsive. (Economic developer)

I think that there is an amazing amount of activity at the state legislature, there is an amazing amount of access the community has to the legislature. I think the role of the governor and the state legislature is where it is at. There is less power at the private sector. (University Dean)

The accessibility of elected officials is attributed to at least two conditions: the first is that, while the state is geographically large, the populations of the state and the city are rather small. The second is that at the time of data collection, the political leadership at the state and local levels were perceived to be rather engaged and active with economic development, which, as was demonstrated in Chapters Five and Six, is a central concern to the respondents.

7.3.4.2 Political resource: Elected officials as powerful schema

In addition to the perceived accessibility of elected officials, respondents also concerned themselves with the relative power of elected officials. Elected officials are accessible but powerful. Some respondents mentioned that there are few power brokers or close knit nuclei of people who hold sway over the community. One respondent, in real estate, took an historical look at how things get done in the city, and noted changes
from decade to decade. Before the 1950s there was a small group with political power. The growth of the community, however, led to shifts in the political makeup of the city and the city adopted a commission style structure with a city manager. This was later changed to a mayoral type of government with seven districts. The current debate around changing this present system in an effort to merge city and county services is just the latest phase of the growth of the community, and one that is not yet resolved.

The clearest illustrations of the strength of the political system are seen in the following quotes:

*Just taking a snap shot right now, if you look at [the city] as a city and [the state] as a state, they are strong charismatic leaders (the mayor and the governor). Both those guys have the power and are not afraid to twist arms. At the present time things do flow from the top down.* (Lawyer)

*[The governor] wants to be involved in everything that is going on, he tries to be a player and mediator, everything from minimum wage to land use issues. He is a force; he can help you out or not. He hasn’t been difficult to me, it is better to be on his good side.* (City elected official 1)

*I think we are blessed to have a very ambitious and bold governor and pro-business mayor, and aren’t afraid to make something happen.* (Business organization CEO)

These three respondents not only highlight the strength of the mayor and the governor as political forces in the community, they also indicate an emboldened, if not coercive, tendency in their approaches. For instance, evoking images of “twisting arms,” being a “force” and “difficult,” and “bold” and not “afraid to make something happen” all give the impression of strength in the top offices of the city and the state. The perceived strength of the central political leadership at the city and state levels highlights a complex relationship with local business elites. The political leadership is potentially an effectual resource to draw upon, and at the same time, an obstacle to organized in order to influence. Through trade associations and business groups, the business community finds its forum to attract and influence the strong political leadership. As a bank executive put
it, not only do organizations need to act, but coalitions of organizations need to act to get things done:

*Coalitions of organizations need to come together, because except for the mayor or the governor nobody has enough clout to get things done themselves.* (Banker)

Some respondents saw limitations in the ability of the business community to effectively organize to take advantage of the political climate. For instance, the president of one of the institutions of higher education said,

*This community hasn’t been very good about getting big things done. The little things that get done are done by strong politicians who have the wherewithal to get things done. The mayor and the governor get things done, and they are strong political leaders, unlike the grass roots business efforts.* (Higher education administrator)

Regardless of the perception of the ability of the business community to capitalize on the political environment, there is a widely held belief among elites that the strong political leadership holds great potential for economic growth. In spite of the deference the political elites seem to command from the business community, the business community sees them as an asset, as one respondent characterized it,

*Strong political leadership makes a difference, so there are jobs ready to bring a coalition together to move the community in a certain direction. I think in the wake of [the governor] bringing strong leadership to issues, and this has filtered down to the mayor who is now operating on a higher level.* (Public relations)

The political reality, as depicted by these respondents, is that government officials, and in particular the governor and the mayor, command considerable influence over their respective domains. It seems that in the absence of a strong corporate or business leadership with economic assets, the state and the city become organized around strong political influencers, such as the governor and the mayor. For some of the respondents this equation needs to be changed so that government recedes in influence. However, political leadership is not always portrayed in a negative light, but rather as a force to consider with the potential for promoting economic growth. Because the mayor
and the governor are pro-growth, the friction between the pro-growth business community and the political apparatus is minimized. One respondent, a banker, amusedly took the view that,

[The governor] has a better time [bringing about change] but he is almost a benevolent dictator, which can be good [when he acts in business’ interest].

7.3.4.3 Political resource: Form of government schema

The power of the political elite, and the mayor in particular, stems from the form of city government. For some of the non-political elites, the very form of local government necessitates particular approaches for effective action. Beginning in the first half of the twentieth century, a group of initiatives was introduced in many cities across the country that were intended to limit the strength of ethnic-based political machines that emerged as a result of urbanization in the second half of the nineteenth century (Domhoff, 2006, p. 145). In addition, the local growth coalitions increasingly competed with the Socialist Party, which, in 1912, elected 1,200 members in 340 cities, including 79 mayors (Domhoff, 2006, p. 145). To counter the influence of the ethnic-based political machines, which were usually affiliated with the Democratic Party and controlled many city governments, local growth coalitions introduced off-year elections, nonpartisan elections, citywide elections, the elimination of salaries for city council members, and created a city-manager form of government. According to Domhoff, “It was claimed that a city is like a corporation, and the city council like a corporate board of directors, so the city council should set general policy and then turn the management of the city over to a trained professional called a city manager” (2006, p. 146). According to a study by Renner and DeSantis of municipal government structures published in 1993, by that point
(15 years ago) 52% of American cities had adopted the council-manager form of government.

The importance of these developments for the balance of political power in a community rests in the shift of power players in many cities over the last hundred years. According to Domhoff (2006, p. 147), prior to World War I, “thousands of blue-collar and lower white-collar workers were serving on city councils, but by the 1940s there were very few such people being elected.” Instead, “business people and their lawyers, often legitimated for office by service on well-publicized committees of the local chamber of commerce, are now overwhelming presence on most city councils” (2006, p. 147). In addition, “they are the most frequent appointees to the nonelected boards and commissions that matter the most to the local growth coalition: planning and zoning commissions, off-street parking authorities, water boards, and other local entities concerned with municipal infrastructure or retail sales” (2006, p. 147).

One respondent, a recent newcomer to the city and the state, was unaccustomed to the mayoral form of government in the city. He argued that this form of government, as opposed to the city-manager style, results in a more politically driven community and less of a business driven community. To this end he said,

...one of the things that is hard for me to adjust to, this is a city mayor form of government, in [the city I moved here from] you have a city-manager, and the mayor and the city council turns over things to the CEO. In this form of government decisions are made politically from a political framework instead of a business framework. I find it confusing and I don’t know how to do it. I worked with city managers in [former city], and it works from a public policy perspective; things get political but it doesn’t affect the work that gets done as much. (Executive Director of Cultural Center)

That the city in this study has not adopted the city-manager form of government is possibly another indicator of the relative weakness of the local growth coalition. The city council, at least at the time of this study, was not dominated by growth coalition members
and their allies. In fact, one of the contentions of some of the business elites about the city council is that a large amount of effort on their part is expended to bring certain members of the city council around to growth initiatives. The president of a development trade association spoke about this effort:

[Democratic city council member] is the councilor for this area, and he started to work with the developers. If you don’t like development in your area you can stop it in its tracks for $50. I think [the Councilor] began to see that developers were not all greedy and that they were trying to make things better. I have a lot of respect for [him]. Our politics will never agree but I respect him. I know he has to run against [Republican Congresswoman], but he has my respect. There was a big bill that all houses and properties had to be retrofitted with low flow and energy reduced products. We went to [him] over that legislation. We rewrote the bill so that there would be rebates for low flow toilets. That is how things work, you knock on the door and say wait a minute. If you can’t find the person that is creating the problem you find others that can work. If it isn’t policies, you find the decision makers and you ask them what they are trying to achieve and is there a better way to achieve it.

For some in the business elites, there appears to be a sense that to compensate for the inability of the growth coalition to dominate local politics, continued effort on the part of its members is expended to ensure that growth interests are being served. For instance, developers working with a Democratic councilman a big step in achieving growth coalition goals.

As far as the other reforms introduced in other cities to limit the power of non-growth coalition members, city elections are not nonpartisan, city council elections are not citywide, and, although the salary is not enough to survive on, city council members are compensated for their service (about $10,000 annually).33 According to some respondents, the modest pay of elected officials results in a diffuse or decentralized power structure in the city. One respondent characterized the leadership in the community as,

33 Although County Commissioners are compensated at a higher rate than City Councilors—the salary for county commissioners is about $30,000 annually—none are able to rely on this income solely. In fact, one of the County Commissioners interviewed for this study also owns a real estate business and another is employed by the Public School District. Another County Commissioner, who also served as an outside consultant on the study, works part-time as a research associate for the State.
This decentralization of power, in that political decisions are not made only to serve a particular segment of the community, might make the city appear to some respondents more democratic.

Nonpartisan elections, it is argued, are favored over partisan ones because all citizens have common interests, and partisan politics should not play a role at the city level. The community is seen, by the advocates for nonpartisan election, as largely undifferentiated, unified, and homogenous. “This reform” according to Domhoff, “makes it necessary for candidates to increase their name recognition because voters can no longer rely on labels like Democrat or Socialist to identify those candidates with whom they sympathize” (2006, p. 146). That elections are partisan provides yet another illustration of the challenges to the growth coalition. That the city has partisan elections, a mayoral form of government and not a city-manager form, that councilors are paid (although modestly), and that the election of councilors is not citywide, provide at least the possibility for neighborhoods to exert political influence by electing councilors that oppose the growth coalition forces. In fact, as one councilor commented,

The biggest issue is everything that relates to growth of this town, everything is connected, from schools to potholes. How we manage that growth, where we put our resources, especially where we haven’t been putting our money in, in the past. It is really the largest issue: land use…. My background is in neighborhood redevelopment. The [neighborhood redevelopment trust] has become a model project for the country, where a neighborhood took control of its future…. I work very closely with neighborhood leaders…. I don’t have a relationship with the Chamber of Commerce, or those kinds of organizations. The Chamber of Commerce and others in the development community put together a PAC to oppose me.

The councilor overtly opposes pro-growth actors like the Chamber of Commerce and developers, who, according to her, organize to oppose her and her neighborhood orientation. Her use-value orientation of managed growth takes some control away from...
the growth coalition and puts it back in the hands of communities (or—in the view of developers, in the hands of politicians).

7.3.5 Identity groups as resources schema

Because the city and the state in this study are in the southwestern region of the United States, there are substantial Hispanic and Native American populations as well as much smaller African American and Asian American populations. Although there were only four respondents who focused on ethnicity in response to the question of how things get done, identity groups constitute another resource at least some respondents were attuned to in their thinking about the community.

Two of the four respondents saw the Hispanic community, and certain Hispanic leaders, as key resources, and as necessary to effective action. For instance, one respondent, the director of a retail trade organization, said that,

*You have to pay more attention to political correctness here. There is a very strong Hispanic community here; the Hispanic Chamber is very strong and good, they have a lot to offer and you have to pay attention to them, you need to pay attention to them. (Trade Organization)*

This quote suggests that the Hispanic community, on the one hand, is an asset to the business community; there is utility in the Hispanic community and the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce in particular. On the other hand, the quote also suggests that the strength of the Hispanic community also makes them a political force that has the potential to limit the power of the business community. The business community must pay attention to such things as political correctness and the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce is not something that the business community can choose to pay attention to—the business community *needs* to pay attention to it. There appears to be some ambiguity toward the Hispanic community as it is part of the business community and as cultural force of opposition to commodification forces of the growth coalition.
This Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, for its part, is not at odds with the business community and its flagship organization, the Chamber of Commerce. In fact, with regard to economic development and the Hispanic Chamber’s growth orientation, the director of the chamber Hispanic Chamber said,

*I think that the beauty of this job is that we can do economic development, we can help small businesses be more successful, and that is a significant contribution, it is about creating wealth…. We do the not so sexy economic development. We are here [physically located] in a pocket of poverty. We want to be here so people can improve their skills and be productive. The [Citywide] Chamber is a partner, we don’t view them as a competitor; we see them as a partner.*

It is as if the two chambers have divided up the community, with the Hispanic Chamber focusing on internal development, including job retraining, English proficiency training, and other buffering programs like job skills for the domestic workforce, while the city-wide Chamber focuses on the business community’s needs in general. Where they overlap most is in the realm of education. The goal of both organizations is economic development and creating wealth. The path to achieve these goals for the Hispanic Chamber is through work with small businesses. Seeing the Hispanic Chamber as an economic growth specialist jives with the image of the Hispanic community as an asset to the larger growth-oriented community. Seeing the Hispanic community as a powerful force to not overlook stems from the respect the Hispanic Chamber and notable Hispanic individuals have earned in the community at large.

Speaking about the role of the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce in the city, the director of the Hispanic Chamber spoke about the ability to use networks that have been established over the last few decades:

*We can pick up the phone… Friday we are working on an initiative for veterans. The [congressional representative] calls me directly and asks me to be involved in it. We can pick up the phone and call anybody, I have the mayor’s cell phone number, I can call the governor’s aide directly. The speaker of the house is our friend. I can’t think of anybody that I can’t call directly or that I would feel reluctant to call. I don’t abuse that privilege but the beauty of it… I think it goes back to this: this organization is [over 30] years old and we are well respected. And even*
Clearly, the political community, as well as the business community, is aware of the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce and its political goals. The Chamber’s director’s access to political power serves as a testament.

Another respondent, from a public relations company, identified a number of notable Hispanic men in the community that, strategically, are recruited by people working on initiatives to serve as visible supporters of those initiatives. In fact, the Hispanic celebrity as chair of a cause need not do anything. The purpose of a celebrity chair is merely to bring attention to the cause, and to show that in this community there are some Hispanics who occupy a “position of royalty.” This perceived power of the Hispanic community, and particular Hispanic men, elevates this segment of the community from a powerless minority group to a culturally relevant political action group. To say it another way, there is utility in paying attention to the Hispanic community and its prominent institutions. These two respondents identified the Hispanic community and its chief business organizations as an important cultural component of the community.

7.3.6 The intersection of cognitive structures

The previous three sections on the economic, political, and human resources of the community indicate how community elites conceive of the community’s resources: economically weak, politically strong, and culturally diverse (at least with regard to the

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34 Although this discussion only focuses on the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, the Hispanic Cultural Center located in the community also carries with it political, social, and economic cache. Several respondents mentioned either the executive director, the chairman of the foundation board, or the cultural center itself as influential in the community.
Hispanic community). Perceiving the community in such a way structures how community elites advance their interests. Again, Sewell’s *Theory of Structure* provides a framework for understanding the role of cultural schemas in this effort. What follows in this section, is an attempt to integrate into a coherent picture the cultural approaches elites described for how things get done in the community given these economic, political, and cultural constraints and opportunities.

Sewell’s “intersection of structures” axiom, recall, conceives of structures as intersecting and overlapping. For instance, Sewell argues, “the structures of capitalist society include both a mode of production based on private property and profit and a mode of labor organization based on workplace solidarity” (1992, p. 19). In turn, “The factory figures as a crucial resource in both of these structures, and its meaning and consequences for both workers and managers is therefore open and contested” (1992, p. 19). What is attractive about Sewell’s conception of structure is that he places resources and cultural schemas at the center of the discussion of structure. In doing so, he focuses the attention of analysts to the efforts put forth by actors to make sense of, or give meaning to, their actions—and, in the process, reproducing the social structure or changing it. What is seen through this theoretical lens, then, is the dynamic nature of action, where actors act in accordance with the cultural schemas that develop through their interaction with others around the available resources. The schemas that emerged from comments made by community elites are organized as a cognitive process culminating in action schemas at the interorganizational and interpersonal levels.
7.3.6.1 Entitled leadership schema and the dismissal of the public

The first schema is the notion that elites are justifiable (felicitous or well suited) leaders. This belief allows the elites to dismiss the general public in the decision-making process. From this initial posture, the business elites, with their available but limited resources see their role as stewards of the community. Acting in the community’s interests, the business elite seek to create a business environment to oppose those forces that undermine their efforts. The business elite do not always agree upon the best way to achieve their noble goal of advancing the community’s interests, framed in use-value rhetoric. For the most part, however, the business elites, and the community elite in general—which include political and educational elites as well—constitute a normatively regulated superstructure, operating above the general public, outside their notice.\(^{35}\) Elites, internally united by common foes (i.e., neighborhood association, environmentalists, agricultural interests, and tribal governments), sustain themselves through a flow of emotional energy of trust and duty to their common business interests.

It might be that the rest of the respondents had already moved beyond the point one respondent made about non-elites in the community. His comments possibly speak to the attitudes of the business community with respect to the larger community:

\(^{35}\) There were a few community elites who understood how to use the media to their advantage and calculate the media into their strategy. But, outside of advertising, the business elite, for the most part, treated the local mass media with reverence and doggedly avoid their attention. When asked how they publicize their agendas, the vast majority of the business community, and especially the directors of business organizations, use interpersonal communication at meetings, email list-serves, or direct mailings and avoid the local news outlets. Only when it is necessary and usually very late in the process of building momentum around an initiative, is the local print or broadcast media brought into the process. In fact, ignorance was a common response of the community elites with regard to how to approach the mass media. They simply have had no experience with how best to approach them, so they avoid them. They recognize the power of the media and are fearful of being misrepresented.
The majority of people are pretty uninformed on critical issues, it is just how they choose to live and delegate all the responsibility to elected officials; what is good about that is you can move a little quicker, but what is bad is that people are uninvolved and don’t understand the issues. You can stop 10 people and none with them will know who their school board representative is. (Health Insurance)

This passage, made by a long-time member of the industry in the state, captures the sentiments of Daniel Yankelovich in *Coming to Public Judgment: Making Democracy Work in a Complex World*:

The danger, rather, lies in the eroding ability of the American public to participate in the political decisions that affect their lives. The fateful decisions are made in Washington. In corporate boardrooms, on Wall Street, in state legislatures, and in city halls. They are shaped by economic experts, military experts, scientific experts, trade experts, PR experts, media experts. Less and less are they shaped by the public (1991, p. 2).

The assumption made by the health insurance respondent echoes Yankelovich’s belief that a culture of technical control has developed in America, where “the American people lack the relevant knowledge” (1991, p. 9) to make informed decisions. The respondent regarded this development in both a positive and negative light. On the positive side, elected officials and members of the community like himself could move more quickly to influence policy. On the negative side, citizens were uninvolved and ignorant about their community. A search through the transcripts of all of the other respondents for similar sentiments was unsuccessful. All references to non-elites by the respondents concerned social problems and community issues like education, healthcare, crime, and economic development. In these contexts the community at large was seen as a problem that needed to be solved, usually through political or legislative means with particular guidance of the business community.

It is illustrative to juxtapose the comments of a local developer to the comments of the health insurance administrator. While the developer spoke problematically about
the intrusive influence of political leadership in the community, his comments are insightful for the present discussion:

It is top down and it is because of the excessive influence of the politicians in the community. The Governor, the Mayor, the city council, or any other elected official. It isn’t the business community that bands together then presents it to elected officials. It should be the business community and philanthropists that should be organizing the community. In many cities across the nation that have wealthy philanthropists and some heads of the large corporations that can get the ear of the press and the politicians. That doesn’t happen here. Nothing gets done without the politicians. (Developer)

His comments make fairly plain his attitude toward the community at large, specifically the line that reads “It should be the business community and philanthropists that should be organizing the community.” No mention is made anywhere in his interview of non-elite in the community. On the contrary, he states that the community is best organized by the business community and philanthropists. While the health insurance administrator mostly laments, but also sees the lack of broad participation in decision making of the community as a more efficient means to an end, the developer implicitly and remorselessly writes off non-elites as a non-factor in decision making.

Taken together, these two schemas—the health insurance administrator’s and the developer’s—of the larger non-elite community can be seen as two ends of a continuum and may serve as a baseline way of portraying the attitudes or dispositions of the community business elites. At one end of this continuum the leadership in the community may see the public as regrettably unengaged and at the other end completely irrelevant to the decision making process—which is best left to the business community and political leadership. The lack of attention to the general public in the discussions of the issues that concern the leaders in this study may serve as a testament to this claim.
7.3.6.2 Exchange value schema: Appealing to rational self-interest

Three respondents expressed an exchange value/rational self-interested schema. Each saw actors as rational and even selfishly motivated. A lawyer, an engineer, and an economic development specialist and former state cabinet appointee, all felt that for an initiative to succeed, the proponents of it must appeal to those that are most likely to financially benefit. The engineer, lamenting the economic motivation in community decision making, believed that the biggest drawback is the zero-sum logic of the community; the belief that if one faction or entity is getting something than another group must be being denied something. He thought that actors in the community do not think about the greater good or how some new initiative might benefit the community at large. The lawyer, an associate of the engineer, who has worked on common initiatives in the community, thought that the best way to achieve something in the community is to appeal to the groups or organizations that will benefit financially most from it. Summarizing his comments, he said,

*The trick of doing good government kinds of projects that don’t have a direct and immediate economic benefit is that you don’t have the special interests that help fund that kind of initiative.*

(Lawyer)

The economic development specialist said that, accomplishing an agenda requires,

2 things: (1) people driving their agendas and (2) the others give in. There are a lot of compromises. We make sausage a lot here (it is not a pretty process). These people fight amongst themselves over positions and points and the non-tangible. The human nature aspect is underestimated, the sociology of it all. (Economic development)

For this respondent, all community processes are reducible, in the end, to individually driven agendas.

From the perspective of these three respondents, the economic benefits (exchange value) for action must be considered when considering an initiative in the community.
This line of thinking, however, appears to be unpopular among the elite. A much stronger schema for engaging in the community is that action is based on built trust and caring; a moral commitment to improving the use-value of the community.

### 7.3.6.3 Action as higher loyalty schema: Normative and Affective Action—Trust and Caring (Use Value)

In stark contrast to the exchange-value sentiment in the previous section, many respondents adopted a use-value attitude to community action. These respondents see their efforts in the community as altruistic, not self-serving and profit-maximizing. Many of these respondents said they act in the community out of a moral obligation, which grows out of their mutual obligations to other elites through interpersonal and interorganizational relationships. The portions of the quotes which speak to this moral commitment are highlighted in bold. The altruistic aspect is captured by the CEO of a private business:

*On the business side it is all voluntary, and you believe in making a better environment for the next generation. It is pretty altruistic as far as I can tell. (Business CEO)*

The community as a higher loyalty than profit is captured by the president of a local bank. The decision-making process for the president of one of the largest banks in the community puts community before profits:

*We feel strongly about doing things right because we are part of this community, we do things with absolutely our community in mind. We don’t do things that are the absolute best things for our business because it might not be the best thing for our community. (Banker)*

For many elites, what motivates them is increasing the livability of the community, not what makes the business elite money. These two quotes demonstrate the use-value schema of decision-making. Here two schemas are clearly transposed in that some actors use the same cognitive structure to rationalize community decisions (like
education reform) to rationalize business decisions. Business is virtuous, benign, compassionate, and concerned about the quality of life in the community, just like the use-value contingencies of citizen groups, neighborhood associations, and environmentalists.

In an attempt to explain their virtuous, altruistic and community-minded nature, the business elite claim it comes from at least two places. The first, captured by the chairman of a local insurance company (quoted in the business model section below), is that it is human nature to do something for the community. The other, more common, explanation is in the embedded nature of elites in normative social relations, where intentions and obligations to the business community trump the pursuit of increasing property values, although these goals need not be contradictory. The following quote by the public affairs director of a retail business captures this sentiment nicely, because she emphasizes both the importance of directing ones intentions toward the community and conforming to the standards of the community, i.e., being a “team player.”

I don’t know if it is because it is a frontier kind of town, but people are very in tune to why you are here. If I see people only when they need money then I will note it. If you are here for your own good then you will run into a lot of resistance. The way to get things done in this community you have to figure that out, that you have to benefit the community. Outsiders have to figure that out. You have to be a team player for the right reasons. (Public Affairs, Private Business)

For the elites, relationships play a central role in initiating and sustaining action. The ability to call on a colleague sustains the business elite as a class, as the CEO of a public relations firm argues:

Sometimes [the CEO of business organization] calls me and says I have a problem and we will talk and I will mention some people and [she] will have volunteered me to a task force; people comfortable with other people to get something done. [A car dealer] called me and the [president of financial company] to work on a fundraiser for [local museum]. She was tasked to fundraise for the … Museum and she called me to work on that for 4 or 5 months to fund raise for them. It has to do with relationship with people you know and people you like, and coming together to get something done. (Public Relations)
What allows for the building and sustaining of relationships is attributed to several different sources. As the public affairs director previously mentioned, the community’s frontier mindset may play a role. Another source might be in the multicultural nature of the community that allows for a more inclusive appearance, as the public relations director of one of the utilities claims:

*I have lived in [East Coast cities] ... it was very hard to integrate in those communities, even as a corporate lawyer. Here, I’ve been here for [just over 10 years] and I have been able to do so much, there is openness for people willing to show up and do things. It is even different from [the Midwest].* (Public Relations Director of large business)

She adds that the openness of the community can be attributed to the plurality of cultures in the state:

*...we have no single culture, it is a blessing, we have really rich traditions that live side by side that are integrated sometimes and other times they are not. There is no one thing there, but many things.* (Public Affairs, Private Business)

The tone of these respondents to the larger community is not self-interested and materialistic. Rather, notions of caring, trust, credibility, and benefiting the community are invoked. It is interesting to note that the three previously cited community actors are all representatives of the public affairs or public relations industry, an industry dedicated to giving a voice to businesses and the business community. Just as corporate responsibility appeals to the consciousness of the attentive consuming American public generally, so to does the appearance of a virtuous commitment by local elites to the local community (of selfless philanthropy and recruiting businesses to bring in jobs).

Internally to the community elites, respondents feel that through relationship building, a sense of cohesion emerges among the elite. What is exchanged, possibly, is social capital, a currency of exchange that is produced and maintained by elites in association with each other. (For an elaboration on the social capital theme see Appendix
5.) What gets created, in the end, is a culture of action among elites that perpetuates a sense of civitas (as one respondent referred to it), or civic-mindedness.

To elaborate on this civic-mindedness of elites, and further remove the motivation for action away from exchange values, community involvement is seen by some as an emotional commitment to the community. For one respondent, the chairman of an insurance company, “The key is to have a passion for it, and focus on a few things that you have interest in.” For the president of a business organization

Big things happen because people have a passion for it. Whether they suffered a crisis or they come to understand a need for change. (Business Organization)

An executive of a private company said,

Normally you have a champion, someone who has a passion for something, with a great reputation and they make calls and things start to happen. Ultimately it starts with the champion, then it has to do with the team that gets put together. (Businessperson)

For the president and CEO of a local bank it takes impassioned leadership that can rally people with financial resources. According to him, things get done with

...usually one person, almost always one person decides that it needs to be done and it can be done, and they are within this group, at a stage that their commitment is credible to a wide range of people. “You have to throw yourself into it and have a long term commitment and have others financially support it. (Bank)

He cites two examples. The first was the redevelopment of the downtown where one impassioned person rallied 25 to 50 prominent business people to raise money to work on infrastructural issues. The second was the efforts of one prominent individual in the community to rally the community around keeping a nearby military base open. To summarize, what is needed is a passionate committed leader with ties to others who can finance the project. Passion and commitment on the part of community leaders is not seen as economic self-interest. Rather, community involvement is virtuous and altruistic and for the greater good.
In contrast to the picture of the use-value orientation of the community elite, one respondent—who happens to appear outside of the leadership circles in the community, though his position affords him recognition as a community leader—believed that the city does not seem to have this **civitas**:

*Well I think it is sort of like the [City] community needs to reorient itself to what I will call the Greek civitas: the sort of sense of community and sense of civic-ness, of being whole as a city or a community. I see the way the city has developed geographically does not promote this coming together. In [city in nearby state] you see more of it. I get the sense that [The City] is not comfortable with itself. [City] is trying to emerge as a major metro area, but its urban form is very dysfunctional, disjointed. We need an urban development, infill, the lofts downtown and the regeneration of the core is essential that everyone can relate to. It is a sense of commitment to the sense of civitas.*

(State Cultural Center Executive Director)

From the position of a relative newcomer, one who is not fully integrated into the community elite structure yet, the community seems disjointed, without a clear direction, and without a sense of **civitas**. From within the community elite circle, however, what is promoted is an image of moral obligation to the community, which downplays naked economic self-interests.

To summarize the previous two schemas, the business elites appear to disregard the general public in the politics of community life and instead focus on creating a stronger business community to oppose, in the political arena, those that oppose their growth agenda. Community elites do not, however, appear one-dimensional in their attempts to coordinate the business community. In fact, to use Logan and Molotch’s core concepts of use-values and exchange-values, the business community appears to adopt both views, which gives emphasis to Sewell’s transposable schemas axiom. In other words, the business elites, without question, see their role in the community in terms of enhancing exchange-value: economic growth is a clear and persistent theme. There are some within the community elite, however, that also transpose (vis-à-vis Sewell) the use-value schema, applying it to their business efforts. In doing so, their actions to increase
the commodification of the community appear to be a noble/virtuous undertaking to improve the quality of life (use value) of the community.

Some of the elites expressed that passion, caring, and commitment propels their actions. They act in coordination with those who can move their cause forward. Forward movement of a cause is often, but not exclusively, financial in nature. Social networks bring with them social capital that can in turn create an environment that compels actors to act through trust and obligation. Action can take many forms, including rational self-interest, normatively regulated motivation, trust and commitment as social capital, or affective drives. These different forms of action should not be seen as mutually exclusive but as repertoires of action, or tool kits (Swidler, 1986) that actors carry around with varying degrees of sophistication to bring about either personal, organizational, or collective community goals. To use Sewell’s (1992) terminology, actors come to act toward their resources with different schemas, transposing the use-value schema to give meaning to their exchange-value goals.

### 7.3.6.4 Community in conflict schema

A fundamental dichotomy manifests itself in the city around two differently disposed groups with very different resources that appeal to the same use-value schema for activity in the community. The business elite, on the one hand, are internally coordinated around the explicit goal of growth and employ the use-value schema for these ends. There does not appear to be widespread or even localized conflicts across the networks of the leadership community. (Although, differences of opinion around how best to organize the community to pursue the growth initiative periodically occur. One of these conflicts among the community elite that emerged during the study period is
discussed near the end of the chapter.) Instead, the conflict over resources in the community congeals the business community in the relentless fight against an anti-growth coalition. The closest any respondent got to identify this coalition was the mention of neighborhood associations and the anti-growth faction of the city council. However, it is likely that opposition to growth in the community manifests itself in other forms as well (e.g., from the non-profit sector and activists).

In *City as a Growth Machine* (1976) Harvey Molotch summarizes the orientation of the politically mobilized local elites:

I speculate that the political and economic essence of virtually any given locality, in the present American context, is growth. I further argue that the desire for growth provides the key operative motivation toward consensus for members of politically mobilized local elites, however split they might be on other issues, and that a common interest in growth is the overriding commonality among important people in a given locale -- at least insofar as they have any important local goals at all. Further, this growth imperative is the most important constraint upon available options for local initiative in social and economic reform. It is thus that I argue that the very essence of a locality is its operation as a growth machine. (Italics in original; 1976, pp. 309-310)

Molotch’s model seems particularly relevant to this community, as growth appears to dominate the political, economic, and social agendas of the respondents. The pro-growth orientation of the respondents is a resource for action. Growth is a conscious and deliberate point of reference for many of the respondents that structures and constrains their actions and views on social and political life. The respondents consciously adopt a schema that juxtaposes a growth and anti-growth dichotomy of the community because it, like Molotch argues, pulls the community of elites together against a common enemy, the anti-growth coalition (real or perceived) and the fraction of the political leadership sympathetic to it.

For instance, a member of the community elite in real estate expressed his frustration with the anti-growth orientation of the city government’s efforts to thwart the efforts of commercial developers to bring the city in line with “the inevitability of human
consumption patterns.” Echoing this sentiment, another real estate developer saw the community in terms of this growth and anti-growth and the efforts of political leadership locally to hinder business:

...at the end of the day everyone in all these [business] organizations wants a community that is favorable for growth. The city council wants to regulate to make it difficult to grow and build properties because the council has an anti-growth perspective. (Real Estate Developer)

One city councilor who appears to thwart growth said that she works closely with neighborhood leaders, often times in opposition to the business community:

I work very closely with neighborhood leaders; there are several people that have expertise in different areas. In the end I am responsible for my own decisions. I don’t have a relationship with the Chamber of Commerce, or those kinds of things. The Chamber of Commerce and others in the development community put together a pact to oppose me…. (City councilor)

An elected official more supportive of growth believed that the philosophy of the political leadership, and in particular the mayor, is critical to understanding the trajectory of this community. With strong political leadership, aligned with the growth coalition of the business community, the community has embraced growth. Nevertheless, he argued that there will always be an ideological struggle that manifests itself in the political orientations of the Democratic and Republican parties and is fought out in the city council. Ultimately, for this elected official, there persists a conflict between those who want growth and those who do not, or who at least want infill or restriction on the form growth takes. For instance, he invoked the term smart growth, assessing the impact economic growth has on the established neighborhood as well as the predicted environmental impact.

The CEO of a construction company described the leadership community as organized internally against the forces that resist change:

There is great access to the state legislatures who will listen to you. I think you get a coalition of the business people, a very small group of a 100 who are very active, banks, utility companies, private businesses.... Those groups exert pressure on elected officials. You also have a governor
that has been very accessible and willing to listen to issues that he thought would put him in the forefront. Most politicians want to sound pro business because it is hard to say ‘I don’t want to bring jobs here.’ There certainly are groups here for no growth. The active entrepreneurs are the active ones here working against other individuals that would like to see things stay the way they are. (Construction)

As if he was speaking directly for advocates of the growth coalition theory, he saw a coordinated business community exerting pressure on the political arena to advance their interests in opposition to those that oppose growth.

A long-term community leader saw, in addition to the conflict between the growth and anti-growth coalition, conflict over the type of growth in the community:

_The factions: No growth, some growth, lots of growth: The evil development group that wants to pave over the city. There are two organizations, one that controls the rail yards, and one that controls the museum. They competed with each other and nothing changed. [Children’s Museum] and the Museum competed and [Children’s Museum] won out. Everything seems to have either these big factions or these little factions. We seem to have a little bit more of that than other communities. Instead of saying what is good for the state we see this competition between the localities, [Suburb] and [The City]. The city is divided up into [many] neighborhood associations, and nothing can happen for the entire city because all the little groups fight against each other. (Construction)_

One final respondent, an executive for a large telecommunication company, highlighted the growth-benefits-all aspect of economic development:

_I think that the public concept is often times big business is not good for [the State] but the reality is big business hires a lot of employees and provides benefits and education opportunities and those employees in turn spend money in those communities. Big business has a profit that builds a tax base to support the advocacy groups. You can’t have one without the other. How we treat those big companies is crucial, those that come to [the state] and survive, and those that already exist. (Telecommunications Executive)_

The lifeblood of civil society, the respondent seems to be saying, is contingent upon the health or strength of corporations. The more freedom corporations are given to pursue profit, the more civil society will benefit.

This discussion can be summarized as follows: the community is bifurcated into elites and non-elites. The non-elites are divided into two groups: the organized resisters of growth and “progress” and the uninformed and indifferent masses. For their part, politically motivated elites act to maximize the commodification of the community and
present their intentions as altruistic. Whether the appeal of elites’ schema of growth as progress and altruistic is a façade (as Logan and Molotch argue), or authentically felt, is difficult to discern from the respondent’s transcripts. In a sense, this is irrelevant here: the structural location and interests of growth coalition elites work to shape their perceptions of the community’s needs, suppressing any sense that growth might not be best for all. In this way, elites can experience themselves as altruistic and progressive while also promoting their own interests. Either way, elites find themselves joining forces through networks of mutual interest to exert pressure on political leadership to oppose perceived anti-growth coalitions. These efforts are treated in the following sections.

This section began with Sewell’s intersection of structures to give emphasis to the cooptation of the use-value schema to, in part, legitimate the socially unpopular exchange-value schema, in which the community is valued for its utility as a commodity. The urban environment is contested terrain, a culture war of competing claims to the use-value schema, where elites seek to merge their exchange value motivations with the use-value schema—while simultaneously preserving their sense of integrity and community-mindedness.

**7.4 The Meso-Level Schemas: Inter-Organizational Linkages Matter**

From identifying community leaders by their shared affiliations in community organizations to the sociometric interview questions that reveal a deeper understanding of the nature of networked action, this study seeks to understand not only the structure of the community but also the cultural content that travels along the network paths. What becomes readily apparent at the meso-level and the micro-level are the belief in, and
practice of, establishing network relations to achieve goals. The respondents are acutely aware of the importance of networks; some even referenced and suggested the reading of the popular social network book *The Tipping Point* (2000) by Malcolm Gladwell. The discussions of social networks are split into two schematic levels: a meso-level which centers on respondents’ belief in the importance of interorganizational networks and a micro-level that centers on the importance of interpersonal networks. In what follows is a presentation of the importance respondents place on action through networks.

To affect change or resist change, people do not act alone. They join organizations or utilize their organizational assets. Like any community, not all organizational linkages are alike, carry the same clout or influence, or successfully achieve their goals. This section discusses the character of the interorganizational linkages in the community. In particular, the focus of the discussion revolves around the “necessary” or “best” interorganizational configurations to carry out action. Attention is also given to the interrelationship between the macro-level and this in-between level where organizations reside. It also ties in the micro-level of interpersonal relationships.

7.4.1 The centrality of business organizations schemas: Getting on the agenda

To get things done in the community, respondents understand the central role of business organizations. In retrospect, after completing the interviews and mulling over the responses, it is not surprising to see this schema emerge among this community. After all, business organizations serve as a venue for many of the respondents in this study to voice their concerns, as well as places for them to articulate goals, and to make meaningful ties with other members of the business community, a point emphasized in
Chapter Five. While not all the respondents in this discussion explicitly mentioned that
they have or would actively seek to get on the agenda of the six or seven prominent
business organizations, all of the respondents gave importance to including business
organizations in their efforts.

A respondent in the health insurance industry understands that, “The business
groups are powerful, and once you have them informed and rally around an issue you
can get a lot done.” A key insight (also referenced above in Chapter Five) by a former
leader and member of a business organization also spoke about the centrality of business
organizations:

> I really believe that networks are the way to get things done. I belong to [a business organization]
where CEO’s come together on a by-weekly basis and provide a venue for finding out what is
important to our community. Networks carry information. If I just read the newspaper and
watched TV news I wouldn’t get that important information.

Later the respondent continued to answer the question,

> How do things get done? By process and individual leadership. You have to have a process to
carry it through, then you have to have the governor, leaders in organizations, and corporate
leaders, it is through collaboration. There are always power players and understanding that is
important in how to get things done. (Director of Business Organization)

In yet another illustration of the centrality respondents place on business
organizations, a representative from the public relations industry included business
organizations as part of a larger process of getting things done: “You would try to get on
the program at a handful of meetings.” He proceeded to list three prominent business
organizations in the community. The other parts of his overall agenda for action included
attention to the particular cultural groups, key business people, and the media. A
prominent community member in the insurance industry also included business
organizations as central to the process of achieving goals. For example, he made
presentations at two oft-mentioned business organizations as well as key leaders of the
city’s public school district. In addition, a lawyer in the community also mentioned the importance of giving presentations to the two most powerful economic development organizations in the community. Finally, the president of a construction association noted the number of business organizations in the city and stated that she attempts to recruit them to causes she feels would benefit them.

_We have quite a few associations in [the City]: what I tend to do is call them all and tell them I have a problem, are you in or not? Then those that want to work with me so be it. There is an electrician, sheet metal, those kinds of associations…. The community at large, it is a combination of grass roots efforts and organized efforts led by business and government entities. In the construction community change happens by organizations seeking good for their own organizations. Sometimes they work with others other times they go it alone. (President of Construction Association)_

Across these respondents is a belief in the central role business organizations play in the community. For these respondents, how community elites should act in the community should include the active recruitment of these important organizations to their cause.

### 7.4.2 The centrality of business organizations schemas: Building networks with business organizations

Several respondents spoke of business organizations in less active ways, although still believing that they are central to how the community works. These respondents recognized the importance of building ties to business organizations but did not specifically mention getting on their agenda. A member of the banking community drew attention to the community’s business organizations as part of an overall process of achieving the goals of one of the non-profits for which he is a member of the advisory board. In addition to courting the business organizations in the community, he included individual business people, the university, political leadership, and private citizens in his
organization’s efforts to generate revenues. An executive for a telecommunication company said, “It is difficult to function and think individually.” Rather, she thinks of the community in terms of organizations, with particular emphasis on business organizations:

“I think the business organizations within this community do a lot of that image construction.” She added, that

I would probably start with an organization that I think would be open to the issue and concern and ask them to make a commitment to that cause. You have the outreach there, and one organization goes to another.

In addition, the director of a business organization dedicated to educational reform simply stated that it is through his board and their ties throughout the community that things get done.

The general manager of an affiliate of a national radio corporation mentioned that if you want to get anything done you have to include the decision makers and financial backers that can get behind a cause and fund it. The avenue to get to those decision makers and financial backers, because they are all connected, is through business organizations like the Chamber of Commerce.

Decision makers in high places that get behind causes, they are all connected, the 2,500 members of the Chamber and the 400 members of the [banking industry]. ... If you want to get anything done you need the key financial backers. (Media)

The CEO of a regional bank also emphasized the network role of business organizations. He said,

I think there are certain pieces that organizations play in bringing leaders together. [Leadership Organization] almost creates an energy to address issues as you learn about them. If you look at the major ... topics the Chamber of Commerce is a great one, they do a retreat every year and bring in experts to set their priorities and spend time at the legislature and go all over the state, brand the topic. Same with the [other Chamber of Commerce], [Economic Development Organization], any of these organizations. They bring people together and move it. (Banker)

The chairman of a construction company saw that it is through business organizations that things get taken up. In general,
Things get taken up for a need, even when it is something completely different from what the community has. It takes a group of people; within a group of people it takes a champion or a leader. (Construction)

Two of the groups of people he refers to are among the most prominent business organizations in the city. Like the chairman of the construction company, a developer in the city saw leadership in the context of organizations. He mentioned two industry organizations that he associates with to bring about changes:

We [the business and industry organizations the respondent works with] try to write legislation with lobbyists and try to Actually get things done. It is time consuming and costly, but it gets things done.... My style is to figure out what needs to get done, collaborate, bring in people that are credible, then see if you can influence the political side of it. Bring logic to it. (Developer)

The executive director of a trade organization spoke about the importance of collaboration with large organization as well as the challenges:

Collaboration is a utopian goal; the leaders of the various organizations will look to who can help them and push their cause. It could be accidental or strategic. When the major groups endorse the issues things happen. [Large influential organizations like the Chambers in the city] filter their views down through their organizations and they tell the story and it has a trickle down effect. (Director Trade Org)

The agendas of business organizations emerge from the relationships members bring to the organizations. They articulate and advance the goals of the business community in general. Through their ties to each other, they function to keep business leaders abreast of the latest news in the community.

As centers for information collection and dissemination, business organizations are a primary vehicle for leadership network coordination. The issues that surfaced in Chapter Five and analyzed again in Chapter Six—economic development, education, infrastructural resources focused around water, healthcare, crime, and other social issues—find their form in business organizations.

According to fourteen respondents, the prominent business organizations in the community (summarized in Table 35) serve two functions. First, they build a business
environment. This sentiment was captured in the comments of a builder in the community when he said “Much of it is not a need based relationship; it is not to do business but to create a business environment.” Building a business environment is only part of the picture. Second, they build community. This sentiment is captured by the public relations liaison for a profitable local retail company when she relayed the mantra of her employer, “It is no good being a great company in a crummy community.” Business organizations seek to also build their community. Improving the public education system and the healthcare system, influencing the management of key ecological resources like water and energy, reducing crime and minimizing the damaging effects of poverty all contribute to a better business environment. The culture and structure of the business community can be seen as an emergent property, culminating in a coherence that is greater than the sum of its parts.

Table 35. List of business organizations and number of references by 14 respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization Name</th>
<th>Number of times referenced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-wide business org</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State commercial and industrial org</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City-wide economic development org</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business education org</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-wide think tank</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State branch of national industrial &amp; business org</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Builders association</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Builders association 2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.5 Micro-Level Schemas: Grass-Root Elites and the Primacy of Individuals

In this section the focus shifts to the respondents who believe that it is individuals who initiate action. Individuals, in the end, have to decide to act, have to persuade their peers that action is necessary, and have to negotiate the delicate politics of inter-personal communication. Micro-level dynamics reflect those negotiations of interpersonal responsibility and commitments that compel others to act. Out of the transcripts two schemas emerged: (1) Grass-Root Elites and (2) Primacy of Individuals.

7.5.1 Grass-Root Elites

As was alluded to earlier in the chapter, it appears paradoxical to find that more than a dozen respondents specifically used the label “grassroots” to refer to efforts of the elites in the community. In only one or two cases was a respondent’s definition of grassroots congruent with the common definition of grassroots. Ordinarily, the term grassroots suggests political action outside of an elite—action emerging from below, from the general public. At least fifteen individuals fall under the category of grassroots leadership. Earlier in this chapter it was argued that the starting point for action for the vast majority of the respondents is the imaginary split in the community between the active and attentive elite and the inactive and inattentive general public. A couple of respondents diverged from this conception and truly took grassroots to mean political action from among the general public. In most cases, however, is the implicit standard among the respondents that “grassroots” really means the activities of the business community, who organize into politically relevant groups around initiatives that are of interest to them to put pressure on the political system. Schematically, this grassroots orientation sounds like elite populism.
Action begins for most of the respondents with individual initiative and collaboration. Appendix 6 catalogs the references to the notion of grass-roots action from the respondents who explicitly referred to it. Across these quotes respondents emphasized the importance of seeking out others who could help achieve goals. One respondent referred to non-profits as grass-roots, while another respondent referred to a law trial association as grassroots. Clearly, at least for some of the respondents, already established organizations are seen in grass-root terms. For others, people find a champion in the area of interest, then try to form a committee around it. Although the respondent does not explicitly refer to it as grassroots, a local businessman said that things get done by individuals organizing and disbanding only to reorganize when a new need emerges:

...by committee, either informal committees or formal ones. People come together to accomplish a goal and then disband, only to reform on other issues, often times the same individuals.... Most of it does get done by committee, when a need is identified, the person closest to it, if it is an education issue people will turn to [Education specialist and businessman]. It is done by a formal committee or a more informal committee but a group of people will come together and work the issue. (Business)

Two respondents are categorized under the heading of true grassroots organizing. One respondent, a lobbyist for the broadcasting industry, remained very general in his comment, that “Nothing is as powerful as grassroots.... I don’t think there is one entity that is more powerful than any other.” The other respondent, a lawyer, was more specific in his comments, focusing on neighborhood associations. He said,

...a lot of it comes from grass roots. One of the other organizations I belong to is a neighborhood association. I’ve served on various committees within that organization. We obviously deal with much more grassroots issues than the community as a whole. There are a lot of neighborhood associations that have a significant influence in and around their neighborhoods. (Lawyer)

While the lawyer was not referring to individual interactions, he is included in this section because of the explicit reference to grassroots organizing. In fact, many of the respondents discuss grassroots in a similar way. This schema serves as second bridge
between the meso-level world of organizations and the micro-level world of interpersonal interaction. The first schematic bridge was the previous schema that emphasized the intertwining of business organizations and individuals that sustain and mutually reinforce each other.

7.5.2 The politics of interpersonal action schema

The previous section noted that some respondents thought in terms of grassroots, but that for them grassroots usually meant individuals already organized into business groups or committees. However, in some cases the role of individuals in these grassroots efforts was acknowledged as well. The second micro-level schema shifts the focus away from organizations to individuals. These respondents believed that establishing and maintaining ties with influential individuals was the best course of action for effective community participation. For some those influential individuals were elected officials at the federal and state levels. For others it was the specific leaders of large and influential organizations, and for one respondent influential individuals were recalled when flipping through articles and pictures in a local business magazine. While a handful of respondents simply mentioned central and influential individuals, others elaborated on the role of building and drawing on personal relationships with effective others.

The primacy of individuals and interpersonal relationships in networks was stressed by a number of respondents. As it turns out, three of the seven respondents who have been sorted into this schema were city or county elected officials. For a city elected official, "A lot of it has to do with personal relationships and how you spin what you want done, how you characterize it." He posed the question, “Who do you have to stroke? If you have a development project, the high and middle managers you have to
stroke them, where a road is going to go.” Evidently for this respondent schmoozing or
stroking those with decision making power is how things get done. In a somewhat related
way, a county elected official said, “Usually what happens, it is knowing who to go for,
for the scope of this issue.” For some issues, for instance, individuals who have formed a
coalition go straight to the mayor while for “something smaller we go to another
government entity.” One final political representative, a city elected official said that,
“For me they get done because I get the request and I have to do the political finagling.
People talk and get political and do something.” These three respondents see the world
in political terms: finagling, spinning, stroking. Staying in the realm of politics, one
respondent, working from outside of the political apparatus, saw community action in
similarly political terms. He referenced Gladwell’s The Tipping Point (2000) and added,
“You look for someone who will provide you credibility, someone who knows that city
councilor very well, or whoever.” He too listed nearly a dozen individuals he routinely
associates with. Included in his list are two members of the development community,
three members of financial institutions, two leaders of central business organizations, and
the architect referenced in the previous section. (Six of the eight were respondents for this
study.)

Some respondents focused on other key leaders. For the president and CEO of one
of the most prominent business organizations in the community, it is typically when
individuals bring key assets to an initiative that ultimately things get done:

Things only get done when you have the right leadership at the table; that is people who want to
move the ball down the field, as opposed to people who get stuck in process. Leadership is a huge
component. You can put up a big group of people that are well respected but if they are overly
cautious or the issues are too controversial they will not get it done. That is the first and most
important piece....You don’t need a lot of people standing up and supporting you but you need
some key people supporting you. (Business Organization)

A long-term lawyer in the community also stressed the importance of key leadership:
"My MO is find a decision maker who is well informed and cares about what ever it is you are dealing with. I know who the leaders are and I go to them. Mostly I get asked. (Lawyer)"

One of the first steps in defining the parameters of the elite network in a community is to determine the extent of their associations. Leadership can be conceptualized on a continuum in a community, where at one extreme is a small cadre of individuals who are densely connected to each other and have highly articulated goals and highly coordinated action. At the other end of the continuum is a decentralized leadership structure where no subset of individuals carries more power than any other group. From the perspective of the respondents in this study, neither of these two extreme ends of the continuum seems to reflect reality. Instead there might be clusters of individuals who, while still connected to the rest of the leadership community, identify more with their cluster. This appears to be the case with the regional president of a national financial institution. She began to list community leaders, all of whom were also interviewed in this study, and then said “There is a group and we always call on each other.” Across the 95 respondents in the study 40 identified her somewhere in the course of the interview. The subset of actors she listed who “always call on each other” included seven actors. Unfortunately respondents were not asked to count the number of interactions they had with various community members over a period time. If they had been it might be possible to more clearly see the emergence of these leadership sub-networks.

Three remaining respondents focused on individuals as beginning points for building the momentum around an initiative. The first respondent, the CEO of a large charitable organization, said,

"The way things get done here is you network with individuals and present a case that is presentable. Keep asking people. There is a very small number of people (60) but at a maximum of"
20 that are everywhere that get things done. It is all personal relationships. The political area has various ways of using clout, but from the standpoint of community it is networks.” (Nonprofit)

The second respondent, the CEO of a local bank, said,

I would get the best minds together in the community, brainstorm the issue, develop a strategic plan around what needs to be done, what resources are needed, how much money you need to raise, what are the outcomes you are looking for, realistic timeline for accomplishing, then who else needs to be involved. (Bank)

Finally, a lawyer in the community, believed it comes down to the ties one has with other individuals,

Getting other people that you know that can help, use contacts that you know who can be of assistance….Sit down and make a nice diagram of what you need to get the high level political officials to help you get it done. Then you put together a group of people that know a lot of people that can get it done and then push your agenda. The power in this community is in the numbers. This is not a wealthy community so you have to tap into a lot of different strata to get things done. You can use the media if you are good at that but I turn that over to others to do that for me. (Lawyer)

These three respondents tap into the common perception held by many of the respondents that social networks are central, if not the ultimate mechanism underlying all community action. While organizations seem to dominate the thinking of most of the community elites, individuals still remain important. Individuals must at some point interact with other people, as organizations are simply stages for individual action. Some see the stage as the means through which action is carried out, while others see the individuals that position themselves on the stage as the means through which action is carried out.

7.5.3 A blended schema: Organizations and individuals both matter

This final schema serves as a segue to the micro-level of interpersonal action.

Some elites believe that individuals act, but their actions are “structured” by their cultural and structural resources available to them. Action is achieved through actors on organizational boards. Individuals join organizations or form new ones to articulate goals
and move to commit to a course of action. A lawyer in the community illustrates this
theme nicely by situating individuals on boards to move a cause:

How do things get done? My focus has been in the private or non-profit [sector]. In the non-profit sector, you have to build a board of doers; committed, sophisticated, and understand that their job is to move the cause of that institution. All the boards I sit on my skill sets are as organizer and changer. (Lawyer)

A former healthcare executive characterized the action of community members in a similar way. He said things get done,

By Committee, either informal committees or formal ones. People come together to accomplish a goal and then disband, only to reform on other issues, often times the same individuals. (Healthcare)

He added,

Most of it does get done by committee, when a need is identified, the person closest to it, if it is an education issue people will turn to[the public relations director of a technology company]. It is done by a formal committee or a more informal committee but a group of people will come together and work the issue. [For bringing back professional] baseball people ... came together and got the mission accomplished and disbanded, or they will stay longer like education and water issues. You will see a lot of the same players across these issues.

A president of a local bank mostly spoke about the importance of interpersonal relationships, but said that those relationships are formed through work on boards. She believed that in the end, “The best way to affect change is to get on the boards,” but she does not neglect the interpersonal building of alliances:

Networking and calling your list, it can’t be understated the value in our community of really getting to know people, beyond sitting on the boards with people, developing trust and that is the way things get done. That is the way you can get them to take your calls and lobby to get your support. (Banker)

This section seeks to establish organizations as interfacing mechanisms, the boundary or plane between interpersonal interaction and systemic constraints. In particular, I have sought to show that business organizations are a common resource or tool used by elite community members to effect change. Not all the respondents interviewed in this study come from the business community, but a majority do. As such, it is not surprising that business organizations play a vital role in community affairs. The
intertwined business organizations and individuals sustain and mutually reinforce each other. Individuals typically come to these organizations to increase their visibility in and awareness of the community and in doing so they influence the membership of the business community and make them aware of their perspectives, concerns, and agendas.

7.6 Action Schemas: Resource Alignments to Achieve Goals

This chapter has used Sewell’s theory of structure and Logan and Molotch’s growth coalition theory to produce a view of the community elite that conceives of the community as economically weak, politically strong, and culturally diverse. In response to this economic weakness, the community elite, for the most part, are coordinated through business organizations, not large corporations, as well as through interpersonal interactions that create normative and affective commitments to community goals. In Figure 33 human and non-human resources at the macro level, which can be political, economic, social, or ecological in nature, create an environment that constrains and enable actors at the meso-level of interorganizational action and the micro-level of interpersonal action. These sub-levels, in turn, constrain and enable actors to form action schemas, which are repertoires of interaction used to control the social environment. This section focuses on the specific action schemas that respondents felt amounted to their best plan of action for achieving their goals.

Ultimately, action schemes focus on the ability to exert political influence. As such, responses by community elites are categorized into two larger groups and a much smaller third group. The first and second group varies only in the location of the political participants in the schema, in that the first group, respondents do not include political
leadership as a variable and the second group does. The first group of respondents rather focuses their attention on power brokers or recognizable leaders in the community in an effort to influence the political system. The distinction between the two groups is a subtle one. All of the models are efforts to influence the political outcome of issues important to the politically motivated community elite. Where the two groups are distinct is in the location of political actors. The respondent in the first schema treat political actors as something to be acted toward, while the second group treat political actors as integral in the initial momentum building process, or brought on with the initiative movers.

7.6.1 Power broker/Business schema

The respondents’ models in this section leave out direct mention of political officials, elected or otherwise. Political actors are instead implicitly the target of their thinking. Their emphasis, instead, is on the forces at work that put pressure on the political system, at all levels of government. Nine respondents offered their views on how things get done by powerful individuals and powerful organizations, and are summarized in Table 36. Each respondent’s model includes business groups or business people who carry with them a recognizable degree of influence in the community. This key variable is highlighted in bold in the table.

While no respondent articulated a schema that included all the conditions identified by the respondents in each of the nine models in Table 36, Figure 34 shows an overall model that combines the various schemas. Although it is difficult to tell from the respondents the sequence of the concepts, it is safe to say that the model for bringing about change, for these respondents, begins with a decision to act. The decision to act is followed by the articulation of goals, building a base of supporters, and forming a board.
or committee. In addition, recognizable leaders need to be brought onto the project in an effort to attract the attention of the business community, political leaders, and the attentive public. Possibly at the same time financial support must be secured. At this point, although again it is difficult to order these in any systematic way, once the group has gotten this far, respondents indicated that the group should recruit community power brokers and coordinate with the business community around the issue. To this end, input from the two powerful economic development organizations in the community should be sought.

Table 36. Respondent power broker/business schemas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent</th>
<th>Power Broker/Business Schemas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Engineer:</td>
<td>Respect leaders/Power brokers + Lobby = Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Lawyer:</td>
<td>Financial Support + Recognizable leaders = Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Lawyer:</td>
<td>Present case to the 2 powerful business orgs + Lobby = Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Lawyer:</td>
<td>Find decision makers + Build board of doers = Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Lawyer:</td>
<td>Leadership within issue areas + Personal connections = Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Engineer:</td>
<td>Craft policy + coordinate business community + Exert pressure on elected officials = Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Insurance Executive:</td>
<td>Articulate goals + Build your base + Present to business organizations = Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Banker:</td>
<td>Decision to change something is made at the micro-level + Form groups + Pay attention to power brokers = Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Organization Director:</td>
<td>Key leadership + key advocates (4 or 5 powerful people) + Fight = Change</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, after all of this maneuvering and coordinating of the business community around a well articulated goal, actions must take place to bring about change. Action manifests itself in two ways for the respondents, including fighting and lobbying. It is not until these very last step two steps (separated from the rest of the model by a diagonal
dotted line) that we see attention paid to the political system. What occurs above the
dotted line is private organizing among business leaders. Below the dotted line occurs in
the public realm of civil society. Fighting can refer to challenging whoever opposes the
initiative, for instance, elected officials, activists, neighborhood associations, and other
community groups.

![Diagram of respondent power broker/business schemas.]

**Figure 34. Composite of respondent power broker/business schemas.**

While it is insightful and interesting to create a model that combines each of the
individual’s models, no respondent articulated their actions in the community in this way.
For a more elaborate discussion of each individual model see Appendix 7. What is
learned from the presentation of the respondents’ views toward community action in this
section is the awareness the business elite in the community have towards mobilizing
resources to effectively influence political decision-makers. In the power broker models, emphasis is placed on the efforts of the business elite to organize the business community. There exist, the authors of the models seem to be saying, business individuals and business organizations that are necessary to recruit to an initiative early on. Getting these constituencies on-board increases the likelihood of success in the political arena. The stronger the efforts on the part of the business community to garner support among its own members, and especially some of the key business organizations and key business people, the more likely it is that the political leadership will listen and sign on.

7.6.2 Political leadership schemas

In the second set of models, government actors are made aware of the desires of business elites or community elites almost immediately. In fact, some community elites, like a former president of the community college and a lawyer (the first two models in this section), doubted the ability of the business community to accomplish anything and instead chose to seek out strong political leadership directly. Apart from these two that felt that the best path was direct political action, the rest of the political leadership models included some combination of organizing the business community while simultaneously informing and appealing to the political leadership.

Table 37 orders respondents’ views toward community action they discussed during their interview. The models are organized from the most simple to the most complex, based on the number of factors considered in each model. Each of these models includes political leadership or government officials, which are highlighted in bold in the table.
The two extremes in this section range from direct appeal to political leadership to a much more elaborate combination of factors, of which political leadership is one of seven factors. The first two models cut straight to political leadership. For the two respondents the best course of action is through direct action with political actors, such as elected officials or strategically relevant bureaucrats. A high-level administrator of an institution of higher education compared the effectiveness of political leadership to the ineffectiveness of the “grassroots” efforts of the business community. At the other extreme, the most elaborate model comes from a community member in public relations industry and includes seven different factors. The first step, according to the respondent, is defining the goals, and then getting those connected to it on the board. Next comes educating yourself on the debate around the issue, then finding a visible and powerful spokesperson. Getting the mayor behind the initiative is next, followed by building relationships with business organizations and using the local mass media. For a more elaborate discussion of the intermediate models see Appendix 8.

All of the eight models in this section pay special attention to some part of the political process. The first and second models, probably overly simplified, included only strong political leadership and mid-level bureaucrats due to the perceived weakness of any other segment of society, especially business, to bring about changes. Beyond these first models, the procession of the models from simplicity to complexity also includes strong political leadership, but is elaborated to also include business organizations, CEOs, non-profits, bankers, and the media. What unites these models is the direct attention paid to political actors.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 37. Structural processes: Political leadership models.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1  <strong>Educator:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2  <strong>Lawyer:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3  <strong>Lawyer, Business Consultant, &amp; Engineer:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4  <strong>Organization Director:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5  <strong>Banker:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6  <strong>Public Relations:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7  <strong>Banker:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8  <strong>Public Relations:</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.6.3 The inevitability of change models

A final category of models is characterized by their inevitability, although there are variations around the theme. The first, proposed by an administrator of a healthcare organization, believed that there is a natural flow of events in the community, and it is through social ties that changes evolve:

It is networking and knowing people. We are responsible to go out and get clients. It comes through a natural flow of events, it is kind of an evolutionary process. We sit down and talk to people and then things develop from there. (Healthcare)

The second of the three respondents saw action as random rather than as evolving.

It would seem like a lot of the activity in the community is not the cabal of a small group of people setting an agenda. It is actually a string of random ideas that rise to the surface. (Retail)

Finally, a member of management for a subsidiary of a national radio company, saw change not as evolutionary or random, but inevitable nonetheless. For this respondent, issues arise and even after they are defeated they keep resurfacing:

Any more, there are key organization ([Utility, regional branch of a national bank]) that get things done. The way things happen here, luckily, by a great amount of consensus, there are a lot of objections that make things stop. So they come around in 5 years, or 10 years later as a different name. It is really pliable. The Street car deal had been bounced around for a long time, same with the rapid ride system that coordinated with the rising cost of gas. (Media)

Possibly what unites these viewpoints of inevitability is a sense that the business community is powerless, or at least very limited, in its ability to accomplish its goals. In addition, it may be that the respondents feel relatively powerless in their position in the community. What gives these respondents’ comments a sense of inevitability is the contrasting images of the community as either the product of evolution or of “random ideas.” Although pliable can also be understood to mean that the community is receptive to change by change agents, the context in which the comment was made indicates that only through a great deal of consensus building are policies changeable, and even then,
much of what gets initiated also gets stopped. External conditions not controlled by the business community, like rising gas prices, ensure that certain issues of concern to the community elites, like infrastructural expenditures, will regularly resurface.

From all of the indications presented in this chapter, the business elites see their position in the community as a class in competition with, in some cases, itself, but for the most part with political leadership that, if not consistently reminded about business interests, will move the community away from enhancing the exchange value initiatives supported by the business community. The strength of neighborhood associations, the Democratic Party, and liberal values in the city, present challenges to the business elites that sometimes result in factions forming among them over how best to achieve their growth-enhancing initiatives. The following section provides a brief illustration of one of these conflicts among the community elites over how best to enhance use value amenities as a way to stimulate industrial recruitment.

7.7 Competing Networks of Action: Quality of Life Tax

During the eight months it took to interview community elites for this study two factions emerged among the community elites around a proposed tax increase for the city. One of the factions consisted of a group of business leaders (several of them interviewed for this study) who initiated and campaigned to build voter support to implement the tax increase. The other group, (again, several of them interviewed for this study) opposed the measure. The tax would have amounted to an increase of approximately fifty dollars a year per citizen to fund artistic, civic, and cultural programs. Despite a broad base of support in the non-profit sector, the initiative ultimately failed.
The opposing faction was spearheaded by the largest Chamber of Commerce and the City’s Mayor. Neither the Mayor nor leadership at the Chamber opposed the general principle of increasing funding for programs that enhance the community’s quality of life, or the use-value aspect of the community. Rather, the opposition to this tax reflected the particular form of the initiative and the priorities of the Mayor’s office. Specifically, the opposition mounted by the Chamber rejected the language of the tax for its inability to specify how the money would be used, the apparent lack of oversight the city would have over the allocation of the funds generated by the tax, and the amount of tax itself. The Mayor’s priorities, different respondents mentioned, were focused on a downtown stadium and expansion of the mass transit infrastructure.

One of the advocates for the tax increase, a lawyer, described the maneuvering on either side of the issue as a “Petri dish of how things work.” To him, the two ingredients to getting anything done this community are, first, people willing to be “the face” of the initiative, and second, financial supporters. Another supporter of the initiative, the president of a title company, noted that the community did not have large corporate funders to keep the arts going so the burden of funding the arts fell to grassroots efforts. Although the initiative had a broad base of support from organizations in the community and had the support of well connected personalities, what was lacking, according to one of the proponents, was support of the City’s Mayor and the Chamber of Commerce. According to one respondent, there is a ceiling on how much the city can tax their citizens, and, because he feared the money would be diverted from the stadium and the street car he wanted, the mayor opposed the tax. The Mayor got the Chamber of Commerce who in turn campaigned against the tax measure, to support his opposition. In
fact, the two local newspapers carried guest editorials and articles from both sides of the tax but the Mayor’s office and the Chamber was overrepresented.

According to one of the architects of the proposed legislation, the Mayor used two strategies to hamper supporters’ ability to move the initiative forward effectively. First, according to one organizer of the initiative, the mayor prevented initiative supporters from using public facilities to get recruit supports of the initiative. Second, when the Chamber joined the mayor in opposing the initiative, businesses kept the pro-initiative faction from getting up in front of employees. Another advocate of the initiative, realizing the strength of the mayor’s office, said that “Next time the coalition will go to the mayor first and ask how he wants it done.” The opinion that the united opposition of the Chamber and the Mayor’s Office were effective in defeating the tax was a common sentiment among the business elite interviewed. According to one businessman,

When the city and the chamber swung in opposition [of the tax]—while there is no super small group of leaders you call—when you have tax related money you want to make sure the mayor and the county commissioners are all on board. They didn’t do it.

The opposition’s point of attack focused on the supporters’ inability to articulate effectively how the money would be used and how effective the tax would ultimately be.

On this point, the businessman said that the community,

...is mission driven. I was ambivalent about it. I didn’t have a level of comfort or understanding on the effectiveness of the distribution of the funds or the checking of the efficiency of the programs they were giving the money to. It lacked, it was politically based and could have drifted in many directions. It was governance by initiative and the community doesn’t want to go in that direction.

The ambivalence of some of the business elite, who were not convinced that the proposed tax would achieve the community goal of sustaining the arts, but also did not want to turn their backs on an important component of the quality of life (use-value) for
the community, probably contributed to the failure of the initiative (not to mention the desire to not anger the Mayor).

The evidence presented in this study indicates that the relative weakness of the business community forces it to be highly unified in order to be able to sway the political process in its favor. Without that unity and especially without the backing of the one of the most powerful business organizations and one of—if not the—most powerful political officials, an initiative will struggle to garner support in the rest of the community.

Another respondent, a lawyer, who was asked to support the initiative, argued that the proponents failed to convince the business community of its necessity and usefulness, or even to provide documentation about how it would have been implemented.

A little over twenty years ago, the community passed a similar quality of life tax. Some of the respondents that worked on achieving its passage came out in opposition this time. Business and political elites, for the most part, do not oppose public financing for the arts, cultural centers, and museums. They are in the interest of the business elite, which aim to recruit businesses to the community to further economic growth to, in turn, increase their own wealth (and, perhaps, according to the virtuous scheme above, serve the community). For the political elite, industrial recruitment and economic growth means increased popularity and legitimacy, and hence, reelect-ability. Both the political and business elite seek to create a city that appears business-friendly. A tension is thus created between a quality built and cultural environment which may enhance the desirability of the city for management of relocating businesses, and fear that the tax burden to sustain them may turn relocating business toward other cities.

Although one respondent, closely aligned with the Chamber but who did not officially oppose the tax, said that there is a case to be made that increasing taxes does not help and that the proposed tax was regressive and would have not been helpful.
Another important point concerns the ambivalent to hostile posture of some of the community elites to the proposed tax. Those that were the most ardent supporters of the tax initiative appear to have been more closely connected and committed to use-value oriented parts of the community. Several of the supporters had arts backgrounds, contributed money to the arts, or sat on the boards of the organizations that would have been recipients of the funds. Those ambivalent or hostile to the tax appeared, in their answers to other community related questions, to concern themselves with the economic effects the legislation would ultimately have had for the community. Their opposition reflected their views on the question, what is exchanged? Is the quality of the community really enhanced by the increased burden of the tax? If the answers were negative, support was unlikely.

Although he did not take a stance on the tax initiative (by the time of his interview it had been defeated and old news), the comments made by the executive director of an ethnic cultural center in the city provide interesting insight into the disposition of some of the business and political elites in the community. The debate that was sparked between the Mayor and the Chamber of Commerce and coalition of business elites that tried to enact the quality of life tax underscores a more fundamental point, according to the cultural center director. For him, the city’s inattention to the arts as an economic development strategy represents a very large missed opportunity for growth:

For me, I don’t think that the city, its leaders including government and business, have a real understanding of cultural development policy. Culture and the arts have played, and are playing, more critical roles in economic development...which are roles that go beyond the arts’ traditional role of lifting and raising the quality of life.... The arts have always been viewed as unquantifiable, quality of life what is that? You can go with your family to the park or the museum, or something like that that is hard to quantify. Leaders have this reduced view or constricted appreciation of the true value of arts and cultural institutions, because they view it as a ‘isn’t that nice’ kind of framework. If you look at Richard Florida’s The Rise of the Creative Class... he posits that roughly 30 percent of the workforce is already involved in some kind of creative job, artists, record stores.... The decisions of where these people live can have a physical
As long as the arts and cultural institutions are seen as enhancements to the city’s marketing package, he believes, the city will miss a significant economic development opportunity: converting culture into profit. He adds that, “We have to change the perception that the arts are a quality of life embellishment, and rather as a solid business opportunity.” Here the two perspectives of the growth coalition theory merge: use values (funding for the arts) are couched in exchange value terms (economic development around a creative—artistic—class).

The conflict among the community elite around the quality of life tax illustrates two key observations. First and most importantly for the argument made by this study, is that the deep and enduring structure of profit and commodification was left unchallenged by the proposed tax. Elites stayed unified on the basis of economic development, if nothing else. The conflict was not deep, and over the means, not the ends. The community elite who supported the tax increase, the community elites who opposed it, and those who were ambivalent or who sat outside of the debate but provided a critique of both sides, saw the initiative in terms of its capacity to stimulate growth. Second, the community may appear as if there is not a unified elite structure, something akin to Dahl’s community structure of New Haven. On the contrary, what appears to be a conflict among the elites is best understood as a superficial skirmish about how best to achieve the deep and enduring goal of growth. In the eyes of the elites, quality of life (use-value) is not necessarily incompatible with economic growth. In fact, if the community can proceed carefully, a balance can be struck between wealth creation and community health.
7.8 Summary

A community’s social structure is the product of a cultural process borne out of the “character and distribution of resources” accessible to actors (Sewell, 1992, p. 27). Sewell’s five axioms of social change and stasis center around the access human actors (not organizations) have to resources, which include both human and non-human forms. These axioms are utilized in this chapter to uncover how community elites (who are conditioned by an already established, but continually unfolding, social web of resources and cultural schemas) comprehend the community as a realm for action. These dynamic forces are mutually sustaining and reinforcing (Figure 35). In other words, action is predicated upon an actor’s understanding of the realm in which he or she intends to action, which, in turn, is influenced by the social position in which the actor finds him or herself.

Knowledge is situated; actors are cultural observers, and “What they see, and do not see, depends on where they are located in the networks of society and culture” (Fuchs 2001, p. 2). Actors and their schemas are not completely determined by any one network configuration, as all actors are in multiple network configuration, or social circles, all of the time. Actors transpose cultural knowledge (schemas) from these various social circles (kinship, friendship, spiritual, professional, mediated, civil, and imagined) to help them enhance their control over their present condition.
Respondents, when asked to expound on how things get done in the community, construct a picture of the community that celebrates the core virtues of the respondents’ networks. For Fuchs’, “There might be ‘ideas and beliefs’ in a network, but these are temporary and selective condensations of some of the network’s current states, as summarized by an observer, maybe for frontstage presentations. Often, frontstages explain what the network does in rational and meritocratic terms that celebrate the network’s core virtues” (2001, p. 257). What has transpired over the pages of this chapter is not necessarily how community action occurs, but rather how particular actors, occupying powerful positions (relative to the general public), come to see the context and process of creating and recreating the community. The goal of this chapter, then, is to take head-on the cultural configuration of the resource-rich elite that conditions how the community is shaped. One of the dominating schemas (or outcomes) of this endeavor is a celebration of virtuous struggle on the part of a business community to realize its collective goal of constructing a quality community.

What is behind this collective goal of a quality community is a cultural edifice or structure that, like the previous chapters, reflects Logan and Molotch’s (1987) growth coalition theory. However, a reading of the regime theory of the growth machine of Logan and Molotch gives the impression of the urban scene as more static than dynamic,
as growth coalition forces reinforce the cultural schemas and resources in such a
concerted way that losing to the use-value contingent, for the most part, is rare.

The conflicts among the elites in the community that are played out in the local
media, when they occur—as is illustrated in the final section of the chapter with the failed
tax initiative example—are superficial to the primary point of economic growth.
Although the reproduction of the power structure in a community is never automatic—the
growth coalition does fail from time to time, and does contain rifts and bad feelings—the
growth coalition as Logan and Molotch characterize it, with actors’ apparent economic
and political hegemony, does tend to reproduce itself. Through self-report by community
elites, an answer to how the community is structured, which may be indicative of all
growth coalition dominated communities, is found.

This chapter began by emphasizing the importance community leaders place on
relationships for achieving goals in the community. Following the respondents’
schematic organization of the community into nested levels of action, the focus of this
chapter has been on (1) the macro-level of the context in which actors engage in
establishing ties at (2) the meso-level of interorganizational interaction or at (3) the
micro-level of interpersonal interaction. The context of action for organizations and
individuals at the meso- and micro-levels is, according to respondents, economically
weak, politically strong, and culturally fractured along growth concerns. The central
image that emerges from respondents given this macro-level context of resource
constraints, is that of a need for a communication network centered around, at the meso-
level, business organizations, and at the individual level, moral commitments based on
personal relationships that are in some cases profound.
Community elites see, at the macro-level, at the level of community or city, and at the level of the state, limitations in the economic, political, and cultural resources available to build a quality community. In particular, a dominant schema among respondents is the perception that the lack of large corporate headquarters in the city and the state hinders elites’ ability to mobilize large financial and political capital. This absence is seen as having several consequences. It limits the business community’s ability (1) to be independent from government and (2) to shape the political and social landscape. The local economy is seen as fragile. No cadre of business leaders exists. Without large corporate headquarters, economic resources to lobby politicians, to fund charities, or to support the arts are scarce. This lack of economic power in private hands (corporate or personal) constitutes, for one respondent, a strength in that the power structure is more open and not dominated by corporate or elite family cabals. But for most respondents it is clearly seen as a liability.

Ultimately, however, according to many respondents, the weaknesses of the economic actors result in strengths for political actors. In particular, the mayor of the city and the governor of the state are seen as possessing enough clout or political muscle to get things done. Many respondents believe that the Mayor and the Governor are politically strong, but that elected officials at the city and the state level are generally accessible to them. There is a sense among some respondents that the city and the state are still small enough that the management of resources can be accomplished by a relatively small leadership community. Many respondents mentioned that in their network of associates (public and private) there may be 1,500 people, but only 100 to 500 are really influential.
Coupled with the schemas of a weak business community and strong political actors, is the schema among some respondents that the community is fraught with conflict. Conflicts exist within the business community, within the political leadership, between the jurisdictions at a regional level, and between citizen groups (especially neighborhood associations but also anti-growth groups) and business/development groups. Ultimately, as several respondents characterized it, the community is perceived to be split between economic growth-oriented actors and no-growth or restricted growth-oriented actors. Although some of the elected officials and business people serve as exceptions, as a group, respondents in this study sit squarely in the growth-oriented camp. Schematically, economic growth is seen by the majority of respondents as the answer to many of the community’s ills.

A further contextual consideration worth revisiting are identity groups as resources. In particular, according to some respondents, the ethnic composition of the city and the state is such that the large Hispanic community—at least the Hispanic upper-class—commands attention and respect. Similar consideration of the large Native American population or any other racial minority groups, however, was not mentioned, perhaps because they only recently have emerged as economic powers. Racial minorities, the vast majority of ethic minorities, and the poor are seen as problems brought on by poverty and a failure in the public education system. Gender inequalities in status and power were also addressed by a couple of business women.

The meso-level of interorganizational ties highlights the centrality of business and non-profit organizations that serve as meeting places for business and political leadership.
These organizations, for the most part\textsuperscript{37} are well respected among the respondents. These organizations contribute to the building of a business environment in the community as well as build the community in their eyes generally. They hone and groom new political leaders, instill among the business community the knowledge of others about the politics, economics, and social climate in the state, and keep leaders abreast of developing trends and the changing of political and economic winds. With this common socialization, leaders in their respective occupations come together on behalf of their organizations in boardrooms, at breakfast and lunch meetings, prayer groups,\textsuperscript{38} and over phone and email correspondence to coordinate their wishes for the community. Organizations, in this way, serve as interfacing agents for interpersonal communication where moral obligations and trust obligate individuals to pursue each others’ ends.

From this schematic setup of the community as economic weak and politically strong, many respondents offered how they approach community action. These action schemas were broken down into three categories: First were power broker or business models, where the political sphere was seen as the ultimate goal but the process included the alignment of resources to best influence the political leadership. Second were political leadership models, where political leaders or elected officials were central to the models. Finally, the inevitability of change models, which emphasized an evolutionary process based on the configuration of network ties among leaders in the community, by random ties that seem to rise to the surface, or by some other force of inevitability outside of the

\textsuperscript{37} Two respondents—one from higher education and one from construction—said that they were ineffective.

\textsuperscript{38} Prayer groups were mentioned by two respondents. One respondent organizes his prayer group, of which several of the respondents are participants.
immediate control of community actors, like the rising cost of fuel that has precipitated the reemergence of discussions around mass transit in the city.

This discussion employs a theory of structure that considers the material and non-material resources available to actors as well as the cultural schemas they create to be effective. Ultimately a comprehensive theory of structure requires consideration of the social ties of action. What this chapter demonstrates is that the resources and cultural schemas that make up the structure of the community are created and recreated by the networks of action by those in the privileged position to act. The elites in this study are bound or restricted not only by the configuration of the economic, political, and cultural realities of the community (and the other levels of structure, including nation and world system), but intimately by the very organizations and individuals they interact with to assert and reassert control over the various levels of structure that most impact them, their associates, and their collective interests.
Chapter 8—Conclusion

This conclusion has three goals. First, it summarizes and integrates the theories drawn upon in previous chapters. Second, it situates the study city within the larger context of cities in late capitalism. Third, it argues that the U.S. city is at a pivotal point in its development that may threaten to undermine the very forces that have worked to bring it to this point. The local growth coalition's growth paradigm could ultimately work against it, as global market factors “de-localize” wealth, or transfer the wealth out of the community. The data presented in this study suggest a number of warning signs for the local growth coalition as exemplified by a long-standing local elite whose business was bought by a large out of state financial company and then was hired on as a consultant.

8.1 Theoretical synthesis

8.1.1 The problem and the challenge

Traditional urban political economy, the kind that Walton (1993) and Pahl (1989) criticize as overly simplistic and reductive, explains urban environments as a natural consequence of the “structural logic of capitalist accumulation” (Walton, 1993, p. 317). This “structural logic” frames/precedes all action, as all outcomes or societal configurations are reducible to the success or failure of the struggles between competing actors in a locality over the accumulation process. Urban political economists traditionally frame the struggle over the urban environment as a competition between two self-interested groups: those who wish to extract greater exchange values or extrinsic rewards (higher rents) from the land, and those who wish to enhance the use values or
intrinsic rewards (quality of life) of the land. This traditional mode of explanation, while insightful, oversimplifies and marginalizes the dynamics of culturally and structurally situated actors by relying on deductive mono-causal explanations.

In the search for simplistic explanations of real-world problems, complex human relationships and behaviors are often times collapsed into neat parsimonious models, distorting the complexity of social reality. Pahl’s (1989) and Walton’s (1993) cautions to urban political economists two decades ago are indicative of an emerging scientific and cultural shift toward understanding social relations as the evolution of complex dynamics (complexity theory) with emergent properties (Byrne 1998). Central to the argument made here is that individuals act, but from a given starting point; not from circumstances of their own choosing (Byrne, 1998, p. 6), but within networks of action that are novel in themselves and irreducible to a more simple level, like rational self-interest. In other words, networks are not simply aggregations of self-interested individuals, but are interaction systems, *sui generis* (Fuchs, 1989, p. 180), with emergent properties. According to Fuchs, it is interaction, not individual action, that is the proper unit of analysis, for “only interaction systems institutionalize copresence, and hence only interaction systems establish the double contingency characteristic of social systems in general” (1989, p. 180). The fundamental nature of human behavior is social, and the social is composed of networks that have emergent properties, irreducible to the individuals that constitute them.

From Fuchs’ (2001) conceptual setup, the theory presented here attempts to overcome the simplicity of traditional instrumental explanations of urban political economy by orienting the urban environment around the emergent qualities of interaction
These interaction systems situate human action in dynamic relation to the cultural orientations that emerge from social networks. Individuals act in patterned ways, in essence, because, as Fuchs argues, they become cultural institutions, adopting similar cultural repertoires (cognitive schemas) of action, as they situate themselves (or are situated in) similar social networks. Changes occur in the social order as actors transpose cognitive schemas from one interaction system to another. The challenge set forth here is in showing how this more complex model to be superior to traditional urban political economy.

What needs to be understood is that the dominant explanations of the forms urban environments take are actually consequences of complex social arrangements, in and of themselves. What is appealing about traditional political economy is its simplicity. A more general framework is necessary that treats the competition over exchange and use values as one consequence of interaction systems, not as the cause of interaction systems. For this reason, as locality changes, the social relationships that align themselves to capitalize on the emerging levels of social ordering will change as well. With those shifts in the network configuration, changes in the cognitive schemas of actors toward their environment will shift as well. What underlies all action networks is the desire to control the environment. As the environment changes, so too will the dynamics of control.

**8.1.2 The theoretical solution**

To arrive at a more complex, and less reductive, theoretical framework for understanding how cities (or localities) are ordered—the kind of synthesis of structure, consciousness, and action called for by Pahl and Walton—a theory must put into dynamic relation cultural orientations, social networks, human action, and social structure. To this
end, the theoretical model presented in Chapter 7 as Figure 33 and elaborated on below in Figure 36, serves as a useful heuristic architecture. Treatment of the model in Chapter 7 was brief, but now, an elaboration of its theoretical influences is needed.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 36. Theoretical framework: Creating social order through meso- and micro-level interaction systems.**

What is taking place in Figure 36 is the ordering of the external environment to the interaction system. In order for actors to act, they must understand what they are acting toward. Meaning is created by the actions taken by actors in interpersonal and interorganizational networks. In a nested way, these cognitive adaptations in networks that occur at the meso-level of interorganizational interaction (Luhmann’s organization systems, 1995) and the micro-level of interpersonal interaction (Luhmann’s interaction systems) help actors exert and enhance their collective control over the macro-level conditions of their physical and social environment (Luhmann’s societal system). The macro-level societal system, or the outcome of all of the competing sub-networks of interaction that collectively constitute it, reflects the physical and social “realities” toward
which actors continually organize their actions. The goal of the interaction system is to enhance control over the environment. This model follows the logic of a semi-autopoietic (semi-self-creating or semi-self-referential) system (Luhmann, 1995), which has emergent qualities, and is referred to by complexity theorists as a complex adaptive system.

As a complex adaptive system, the urban environment evolves through the resolution of conflicting interaction systems. Interaction systems are made up of three interdependent parts: (1) network resources, which are interpersonal and interorganizational social networks; (2) actors’ schemas, which are actors' cultural orientations toward their environment; and (3) actors’ actions to maintain or enhance their control of their environment, which are informed by parts (1) and (2) of the interaction system. In addition, however, an actor is a product of his or her participation in other interaction systems. This multiplicity of influences allows for a dynamic quality of interaction systems, as actors serve as transmitters of ideas, values, and practices between interaction systems. This dynamic quality of actors is of particular significance, and draws on Sewell's (1992) concept of the transposability of schemas.

Not all interaction systems are equal. In fact, during periods of stability in the social system one interaction system dominates, penetrating other interaction systems organizationally, culturally, and cognitively. If unchallenged (or weakly challenged), the participants in the dominant interaction system, with its influential network configuration, actively engage in a cultural production oriented toward ideologically justifying themselves in virtuous terms. During times of instability in a society, competing interaction systems vie for ideological and material “rights” to structure the social order.
What appears to be stability in the social order is the deep penetration of the dominant interaction system.

This line of thinking is analogous to Sewell’s (1992) theory of structure. Sewell summarizes his theory of structure as “mutually sustaining cultural schemas and sets of resources that empower and constrain social action and tend to be reproduced by that action.” He adds that, “Agents are empowered by structures, both by the knowledge of cultural schemas that enables them to mobilize resources and by the access to resources that enables them to enact schemas” (1992, p. 27). Sewell argues that,

Structure is dynamic, not static; it is the continually evolving outcome and matrix of a process of social interaction. Even the more or less perfect reproduction of structures is a profoundly temporal process that requires resourceful and innovative human conduct. But the same resourceful agency that sustains the reproduction of structures also makes possible their transformation-by means of transpositions of schemas and remobilizations of resources that make the new structures recognizable as transformations of the old (1992, p. 27).

Sewell’s theory of structure is about the structuring of the social order, which is a dynamic process of culturally oriented actors evolving out of social interaction with resources. These resources, he notes, are embedded in social relationships. As Fuchs (2001) argues, people are not in themselves powerful, but rather power comes from their positions in social relationships.

Sewell argues that structure is dynamic and evolving. This evolving structure of control is carried out by interaction systems, which in less complex social systems are conditioned by a higher degree of overlap of social networks and a greater redundancy of paths with which actors receive and transmit information. This redundancy results in a greater overlap of cultural orientations toward the environment, and, consequentially, the greater overlap of repertoires of action. As social systems grow, and increase in complexity—become more socially differentiated—the number of interaction systems increases. The increased number of interaction systems leads to the potential for an
increased number of cognitive schemas and repertoires of action, and more conflict. Charles Tilly’s (1974) characterization of the city as “the location of nodes in a great many networks” (1974, p. 5) gets at this complexity of conflicting interaction systems.

A city/locality, however, is not only the outcome of conflicting interaction systems at the local level. Increasingly, localities are becoming “linked-up” with an emerging world society (Luhmann, 1995). Internally, a locality's interaction systems must adapt to external penetration by the world society as the actors in interaction systems in the locality take part in the macro-level societal system, which manifests itself in trans-local political, economic, and cultural penetration. The local, in effect, is becoming global. How a city is, can be uncovered by determining the composition of the most influential local interaction system, the urban elite. The shift in composition of the dominant or most influential interaction system, whether it is local or non-local, may reveal insights into this degree of linking of the social order in a city. The more isolated the dominant interaction system in a locality is, the less evidence will be found of linking to trans-local or even trans-national actors. The more linked the locality, the less control the local elites may have over the local social system.

To state all of this more succinctly, cities/localities are socially meaningful entities worthy of study (no matter the size) because they are the product of, and condition for, conflicting interaction systems at the levels of interpersonal interaction (people working collectively) and interorganizational interaction (individuals in and across organizations working collectively). Additionally, these conflicting interaction systems come into contact with trans-local and trans-national actors that impact their ability to control (influence) the environment and social order. Cities/localities are not
completely self-creating, but rather are complex adaptive systems that evolve to reproduce the internal structuring of interpersonal and interorganizational cultural orientations toward action within larger social and ecological forces, in particular, the trans-local/global linking or penetration of non-local interaction systems.

A summary of the theory presented here starts with the macro level context of the social order or societal system (at its various levels) as a contested stage for action. Action is not carried out by rational individuals seeking to maximize extrinsic or intrinsic rewards, but rather through social networks at both the meso-level (organizational) and micro-level (interpersonal), which together constitute an interaction system. These interaction systems are network configurations that endeavor to minimize risk of the unknown, and, in a related way, strive for control. To do so, actors within these interaction systems are constituted with cultural orientations (cognitive schemas) that structure subsequent action. Additionally, these interaction systems are to be understood as competing cultural/structural systems of action where one interaction system dominates, and participants define themselves in relation to competing interaction systems. For instance, a city’s business elites may constitute an interaction system and define themselves as a community in direct competition over the social order with interaction systems of environmentalists, neighborhoods, indigenous groups, farmers, and politicians.

Significantly, however, one interaction system is not insulated from the others in a locality. In fact, individuals may belong to several interaction systems, some of which may be in direct opposition to each other. For instance, a business leader may also be a member of his or her neighborhood association. What typically occurs in these cases is
actors transpose schemas from one interaction system to another, in an effort to make congruent these role strains, or even role conflicts. This ability of actors to transpose cultural orientations across interaction systems adds complexity to the overall social order, as individuals possess a degree of power over their set of interaction systems.

This theoretical synthesis draws on two very compatible theories. First, it utilizes Fuchs' (1989, 2001) network approach, which draws heavily from Luhmann's (1995) structural theory architecture. Second, it utilizes Sewell's theory of structure (1992), which attempts to draw on the strengths of Giddens's theory of structuration and Bourdieu’s 1977 “Outline of a Theory of Practice” to develop a theory that considers structure to be a “profoundly cultural phenomenon” (Sewell, 1992, p. 27). Stated simply, the overlap of Fuchs' systems approach and Sewell's cultural/structural approach is in Sewell's insistence "that structure always derives from the character and distribution of resources in the everyday world" (1992, p. 27), and Fuchs' interaction systems as those resources. Interaction systems (networks of action) do not operate in isolation, however, and the adaptation of Sewell’s transposability of schemas to be understood as the actor’s carrying over from one interaction system to another elevates the importance of individual actors in the production of the social order. The often-mentioned adage that individuals act, but not in contexts of their own choosing, is taken as axiomatic in this theoretical synthesis.
8.2 Application of new theoretical integration (deductive statement)

The utility of a theory is in its relevance and applicability to empirical reality. According to Mouzelis (1995), the judgment of a theory must be based on its ability to answer the following questions:

1. How adequate is it in relating the micro level of individual action to the macro level of society as a whole?
2. How adequate is it in conceptualizing the relationship between the conscious agency of individual and/or collective social actors and the social conceived of in terms of social structure? And,
3. How adequate is it in terms of providing an explanation for discontinuous and fundamental changes in the character of the social system as a whole? (Mouzelis, 1995; Byrne, 1998).

With these criteria in mind, I interpret the findings from my case study in light of the theoretical integration presented above (see Figure 37). On the left side of the figure are the macro-level social systems that constrain and enable the dominant interaction system in the city, the urban growth coalition. From the growth coalition’s own account, these external conditions put constraints on their abilities to order the city in a manner consistent with their cultural orientation of the virtues of growth.

According to the interaction system of the growth coalition, constraints to realizing economic expansion in the city come from at least five macro-level sources: 1) a fractured business community, 2) a lack of larger corporate headquarters, 3) a relatively strong political system, 4) strong neighborhood associations and other anti-growth forces, and 5) an inadequate infrastructure.

First, the business community, while its members all speak with the same voice on the need for economic growth, is in conflict over how to accomplish this goal. Some elites see the business community as fractured and unorganized. They believe this rupture
comes from two of the other four sources of constraint: the lack of corporate headquarters and a strong local political system. An additional source of fracture among the elites comes from a feeling of ineptitude on the part of the urban elites in carrying out the building of a strong business community. This ineptitude stems from a general sense of insecurity in their ability to fill the business role and exert influence in the city, due to factors I will describe below.

Figure 37. Theoretical framework: Creating social order through meso- and micro-level interaction systems.

The second barrier to a quality community, in their view, is the lack of corporate headquarters. Without large corporations headquartered in the community, many felt that the business community lacked clear leadership and the financial resources to minimize the necessity of government involvement in local affairs. Some of the most vocal elites on this issue would like to see the community put more of its faith in the free market even
though they also realize the necessity of government involvement. As the quality of life
tax proposal discussed in Chapter 7 illustrated, the business community has the capacity
to internally work against itself. Both sides of that controversial legislation supported its
spirit, but could not coordinate on the appropriate path for achieving it. The role of local
government should not go unmentioned, though. The proposed tax dispute was not
simply a battle between two “factions” of the local business elite. As far as the
proponents of the legislation saw it, the Mayor’s opposition was a major contributing
factor to its ultimate failure with city voters.

The divisiveness within the business community offers the potential for strong-
willed public officials to act as arbitrators for the business community or as a divisive
force playing one faction off of the other. The Governor and the Mayor are seen by many
local elites as strong-willed power forces in the city (recall the respondent who referred to
the Governor as a benevolent dictator). The relative weakness of the business elites offers
the potential for political elites to concentrate their power. Fortunately, from the
perspective of growth coalition elites, this strong political leadership is growth oriented
and is seen as a necessary force to oppose some of the city’s councilors, county’s
commissioners, and neighborhood associations, which oppose their type of growth.

As the political leadership changes, so too does the ability of the growth coalition
of business elites to effectively push through their agenda. There is the potential, at least,
for local politicians to limit some of the business community’s profit-shaping policy
goals. A strong local political system and a weak business community—or at least a
business community without clear and strong leadership—are subject to politically
motivated decision-making processes that lay outside of the industrial recruitment variant of the economic development they so deeply cherish.

The fourth barrier keeping the elites from realizing their goal of economically developing the city comes from perceived resistance from other actors in the urban environment. Neighborhood associations, indigenous populations, and, to a lesser extent, environmental groups are seen by the growth coalition as politically powerful, with strong allies in local government. The anti-growth/limited growth/planned growth faction of the local political delegation is rooted in the Democratic Party, and draws its support from well-organized neighborhood associations that seek to put limits on developers of growth-for-growth’s-sake projects, such as Wal-Marts and other “big box” development (i.e., exchange value without regard for locals’ use value). The local growth coalition’s fear of these groups underscores the general insecurity concerning its structural position in the city.

Finally, there are infrastructural concerns among the elites that need to be dealt with before the city can realize its maximal growth potential. The growth potential of the community reverberates across the elites in the study: they believe that the city is on the cusp of a great demographic shift being brought about by the tipping of the population over into a larger market niche. The population in the metropolitan area surpassed 800,000 in the last few years. Several elites mentioned that once the population reaches one million the community will enter a new market, and be better able to attract larger businesses, more retail outlets, higher-end retail shops, as well as a larger media market. For a number of elites, the population marker of one million appears to be a take-off point for growth and economic development, and in the community’s sense of itself.
Local business elites, at least a vocal portion of them, appear to be working toward that crucial demographic point which, they believe, will launch the city into an explosion of growth.

To bring about this market shift, elites identified a number of major infrastructural limitations in the city that need to be overcome. These include (1) an inadequate kindergarten through college public education system; (2) a high crime rate, particularly of violent crime; (3) the decreasing availability of an adequate water supply; and (4) the absence of a functional (affordable) healthcare system. All of these issues are use-value concerns for the community at large all of whom would like to have a quality education, a community free of crime, clean and reliable water, and sufficient health coverage. For the elites, efforts on their part to improve these community conditions are more instrumental (exchange value) in nature. In other words, by improving the infrastructure, the community can sustain more development. In fact, some urban elites reverse the causal process and argue that economic growth is the solution to these infrastructural shortcomings (especially crime and social inequality).

Economic development becomes, for the urban elite, the goal of all their efforts to control the infrastructural dimensions (macro-structural conditions) of the city. There is a tension between urban infrastructure and economic development; with increased economic development more financial resources become available for improving infrastructure, but improving infrastructure is generally considered to be a prerequisite to industrial recruitment. Elites actively work on both ends of this “growth problem,” from proposing education reform legislation, to contributing to economic development organizations tasked with business recruitment, to building support for the arts and other
cultural and historical community assets. As such, the local business elites feel financially stretched.

On the other hand, the macro-structural context also enables the urban elite in the dominant interaction system to have a degree of order-shaping influence over the macro-structural context. Briefly, the business community may appear fractured and lacking in large corporate headquarters, but it is also an intimate business community. Although there are signs that this intimacy is beginning to abate, the business community is well connected with each other and with the political and civic leadership. The network data presented in this study, particularly the Respondent Affiliation (RA) network, suggests an extremely tight-knit elite. The qualitative data support this conclusion as well. The apparent conflict between the growth coalition and anti-growth forces is countered by the nearly unanimous support for growth within the business community, as well as within the local and state political apparatus and civic organizations. Finally, support from political and civic organizations for economic growth, coupled with the interwoven leadership structures across business, civic, and political organizations, enables the growth coalition to penetrate the cultural apparatuses of the city.

In this macro-structural context, returning to the model in Figure 37, the dominant interaction system of the urban growth coalition—the right side of the figure—illustrates the mutually conditioning dominant interorganizational networks (meso-level) and the dominant interpersonal networks (micro-level) of the elites. This meso-/micro-level configuration of elites facilitates the growth coalition goals of building a business climate by transposing exchange values into use values through coordination of use value schema, a cultural orientation of developing a quality community (use values) as the
ideological side of exchange value. The goal of this logic is to increase the predictability and profitability of the macro-structure.

To this end, the arrow directed back at the societal order from the interaction order signifies the efforts growth coalition actors take to penetrate the social order organizationally and culturally. The city, in effect, is a contested terrain in which the growth coalition reinforces its members’ networks through business meetings, leadership training retreats, board meetings, and other points of contact. The double-sided arrow between (inter)organizational action and interpersonal action illustrates the close connection between personal networks and organizational networks among the growth coalition. In effect, the people we meet in our organizational roles become our personal relationships.

On these two levels, then, the local elites fuse organizational and personal orientations (cultural orientations) toward the city which reinforce those network ties. What develops is something akin to a social class or a status group, in that to become part of the dominant interaction system, an actor must be able to draw upon resources. These can be financial, social, political, or cultural in nature. Armed with comparable assets and eager to take part in the interaction system, actors begin the enculturation process, where they learn about the social order, including the history of the locality, the challenges ahead, and the organizations and individuals worth knowing.

To make this more concrete, it is useful to highlight one state-wide nonprofit 501(c)(3) training organization that graduated several of the respondents in this study. Founded in the mid-1990s, the organization's website claims that it identifies leaders throughout the state to enhance their knowledge of the state and leadership skills. The
organization claims that it is dedicated to developing informed leaders who can define problems, understand issues, and assume positions in the state of high responsibility. Funded by donations from corporations, foundations, and individuals, the organization is nonpartisan and does not endorse political candidates or take stands on political or social issues. Graduates of the ten-month training program learn about issues facing the state and actively participate in sessions on health and human services, economic development, education, the environment and the state's natural resources, and government, including crime and justice and political leadership.

According to the local elites who graduated from the program, the process was as much about establishing social networks with other leaders as much as it was about learning about the issues that the state faces. For the purposes of the theory developed here, the organization is quintessential. The organization demonstrates the point of contact between organizations, actors, and the cognitive structuring of a particular cultural orientation consistent with the actors and organizations involved. It is in organizations like this one that actors learn to assimilate their priorities with the priorities of other participants, enhance their personal and organizational social networks by establishing relationships with other influential leaders, and learn effective strategies for influencing the localities in which they operate.

Returning to the three criteria of good theory presented by Mouzelis (1995), the theoretical integration and its application to the study city can be assessed. First, the micro level of individual action is taken as emergent with the social. Actors respond to the constraining and enabling character of the larger society by engaging in interaction systems that give order to their actions as well as cultural understanding. Individuals and
collective actors operate as cultural institutions, effective because of their position in networks. Finally, the theory attempts to account for "discontinuous and fundamental changes in the character of the social system as a whole" by noting the evolution of the social system (in this case the city) as competition between interaction systems with different degrees of influence. Of particular interest to cities like the one in this study is the penetration of trans-local influences on the local setting (Mouzelis, 1995; Byrne, 1998).

8.3 The Future of the Urban Growth Machine

The attractiveness of Logan and Molotch's urban growth coalition is in its ability to amass empirical support. This study found strong evidence of an urban growth coalition. A core set of deeply entrenched businesses and their ambassadors dedicated to economic growth and urban development work hard to extend their influence well beyond the business world. They extend themselves into the areas of civil and political society to enhance the city’s desirability for the relocation of industry.

As long as the political will is on their side, the growth coalition will continue striving for constant growth. But, ironically, this will ultimately lead to its own marginalization. As trans-local capital enterprises seek new markets, local growth coalitions experience a shift in the local power structure. Personnel and raw materials arrive from other locales and profits are recouped in the cities of corporate headquarters. The warning signs are there: Non-local banks and financial institutions dominate the financial sector (old-timer local elites have been bought out by national companies and remain on as “local business consultants”). National development corporations are
actively developing large master-planned communities, but their profits flow out of the community. The intimacy of the local elite is showing signs of erosion as no longer does everyone at the meeting know everyone else. Non-local representatives of national subsidiaries are starting to make their appearance. The local elite, for the most part, remain entrenched in their unyielding support of the urban growth machine, but it may be at their own peril. The interaction system of growth oriented elites forms the staging areas from which action proceeds (a cultural-structural-action nexus). The direction action (community involvement) takes is not, on one extreme, purely random or, on the other extreme, purely instrumental. Rather, as was demonstrated in this study, community involvement revolves around the dominant schema of growth advanced by the dominant organizations and individuals designed to bring the mechanisms of social control in alignment with the growth coalition’s belief in progress, quality of life, and growth.

As local land-based capitalism is the dominant structuring context of the urban environment, the dominant interaction system will be the local growth coalition, which has capitalized on the exchange value of the land. But as this land-based local coalition succeeds in its execution of the growth paradigm, the community, through recruitment of non-local influences, will shift to reflect the penetration of non-local representation of capital enterprises in the dominant local interaction system. This change in the network configuration of the dominant interaction system will result in a shift in the understanding of the urban environment of the land-based elite, who may wake up from their expansionist enthusiasm of the local, and shift toward a more protectionist stance. This remains to be seen. If it occurs, it will be because, as exterior elites capture the exchange value of the city, local elites will come to emphasize its use value, as non-elites do now.
However, the locality is on the cusp of this shift from local to trans-local economic penetration and control—what Logan and Molotch call satellite cities (1987). The local growth coalition in this city, driven by the paradigm of growth, have come to interpret unquestioningly or unconsciously, the commodification of all aspects of the city; including the education system, social services, healthcare, and culture. Yet, ultimately, they may come to embrace its use value, when their own action undermines the control of the city. Thus, paradoxically, the pursuit of economic growth by the urban elite may result in the loss of their control of the urban environment.
Appendix 1: Getting the data into Pajek

At the end of data collection 7,552 leaders were collected across 2,408 organizations. By the end of time devoted to digging in directories and hunting down organizations on the internet, eighteen Excel spreadsheets were created which needed to be merged into one master sheet. In order to do this the data needed to be moved and merged into SPSS. Before doing this, however, each of the eighteen sheets were repeatedly sorted by organization and individual and each organization and list of individuals were scanned closely to find and merge any redundant organizations and individuals. This process could only be taken so far as the same individual could appear on more than one spreadsheet if they belonged to two different organizations that were being housed on two different spreadsheets. What was needed was the ability to sort by organization and name to clean up any redundancies of both organizations and individuals.

This leads to the next step, merging the data in SPSS. SPSS is able to handle much larger data sets, and would have been used if it were available at the computers in the libraries where the data was initially collected. Merging all of this data was no small task. Stat Transfer was used to convert the Excel spreadsheets—one at a time—into SPSS files. The next several weeks passed “playing” with getting the data merged so that SPSS would not freeze up, requiring me to restart the program and begin the whole process over again.

Finally, once the data was all merged together in one SPSS spreadsheet, the whole dataset—with organizations on the columns and individuals on the rows—was sorted and
the remaining redundancies in organizations and individuals could be cleaned up. This cleaning process was very tricky and several issues arose.

For instance, different permutations of a first name—like Jim and James—with the same sir name needed to be verified if they were the same person. The implication of leaving them as separate people would be a lower score in the network analysis. Combining their data—if they were in fact different people—would inflate their score in the network analysis. So a great deal of care and attention, and consequently time, was spent on sticky cases like these. Another thorny issue was dealing with common first and last names. For instance, are all John Smith’s that appear in the dataset the same person or is it possible that there are more than one? Yet another cleaning issue that came up was with women who hyphenated or used their married names in some contexts and their maiden names in other contexts. For instance, if someone’s maiden name was Archer and their married name was Williams and sometimes they went by Archer and other times they went by Williams (perhaps during the course of data collection some of the older directories collected information of the individual before she married while others were more contemporary and reflected her married name) then it would be difficult to know that Sara Archer and Sara Williams was in fact the same person.

On the organizational side, it occurred that an organization in one of the databases was logged with a different or variant of the name used in a different database. When cleaning what eventually was reduced to a little over 2,400 organizations, finding all of these potential redundancies was very difficult. When there was a suspicion that two organizations in the dataset could be the same organization, verification could come from a check on the membership similarities or visits to the organizations’ websites and a
search for different usage of the organization’s names could be checked (individuals on
the websites could also be used to see if there is any co-memberships). It does not seem
likely that an organization would use two different names and have two different domains
on the internet, but what might occur is that names of organizations may change over the
time of the publications of the databases yielding two names for the same organization.
Of course, human error on my part or the part of the database creators is also possible. It
is due to these issues that so much time and effort was expended to clean this data.

At some point the decision had to be made to move on and hope that there were
not too many errors. Before the data could be put into any network analysis software to
be analyzed however, one more issue needed to be resolved. The final network, as I
stated above, was 7552 leaders by 2408 organizations. Of the social network software out
there the only one I could find that could handle a dataset this size was Pajek
(http://vlado.fmf.uni-lj.si/pub/networks/pajek/). Unfortunately, Pajek was not able to take
the data in the matrix form. Instead it needed to be converted to one vector with all of the
organizations and individuals, with their spatial coordinates—which are used for spatially
relating people and/or organizations—followed by a listing of the relationships. For
instance, if Jim Williams was given the code of 1 and he belonged to Community
Organizing which was given a code of 10, then the data would look like:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vertices 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 “Jim Williams” Coordinate X Coordinate Y Coordinate Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 “Community Organizing” Coordinate X Coordinate Y Coordinate Z</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Edges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Converting 2408 columns and 7552 rows of data from one large matrix in SPSS
down to one vector could have been done manually by searching down each column of
the large SPSS matrix and noting the individuals affiliated with that organization and then recording the coordinates of that location. For instance, the first person and the first organization, starting from the upper left corner of the matrix, would be in coordinate 1, 2409. The first individual was given the number 2409 because an organization and an individual could not have the same identifying number when analyzed in Pajek. Any number less than 2409 was an organization and any number above 2408 was an individual. It was estimated that in order to covert this large matrix to one vector this way would have taken several hundred hours. Fortunately, Dr. Aki Roberts was able, in less than an afternoon, to complete the task in SAS. Many thanks are due to Aki.

Once the data was in a vector the steps to format the data for Pajek were relatively simple. First, a blank network needed to be created in Pajek (Net>Random Network>Total No. of Arcs) and saved and reopened in Excel. This was done to create the special coordinates that the organizations and individuals would be associated with. Then the names of the individuals and organizations needed to be pasted over Pajek’s placeholder variable names next to the coordinates. Figure 38 illustrates an example of the format of the data and Table 38 illustrates the matrix view of the same data.
The list of organizations and individuals was followed by the relational data. Once in this format, the data was saved as an ASCII file. The data now, after months of cleaning and formatting, was ready to be read by Pajek as two-mode data: organizations by individuals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>*Vertices</th>
<th>6 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 &quot;Org. 1&quot;</td>
<td>0.1000 0.5000 0.5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 &quot;Org. 2&quot;</td>
<td>0.3000 0.1536 0.5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 &quot;Org. 3&quot;</td>
<td>0.7000 0.1536 0.5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 &quot;Ind. 4&quot;</td>
<td>0.9000 0.5000 0.5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 &quot;Ind. 5&quot;</td>
<td>0.7000 0.8464 0.5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 &quot;Ind. 6&quot;</td>
<td>0.3000 0.8464 0.5000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>*Edges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 38. Hypothetical Affiliation Dataset Formatted for Pajek.**

**Table 38. Matrix Format of Hypothetical Affiliation Dataset.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Organization 1</th>
<th>Organization 2</th>
<th>Organization 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual 4</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual 5</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual 6</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2: Interview Material—Cover Letter and Consent

Cover Letter

Dear ,

Hello. I am a researcher working on my doctoral degree in the Sociology Department at the University of XX. For my study of community leadership, I am interviewing prominent business, political, and community leaders in [the community] about their involvement in our community. I am contacting you now because you are one of those people.

My study focuses on two community issues. First, it explores how people in business, politics, and society provide leadership for the wider community. Second, it seeks to understand how influential people from these parts of our community draw upon the media to promote their community goals. This study, then, is an analysis of the relationships organizational leaders have with each other and the various print, radio, and television media in a community.

To my knowledge this is the first study of its kind to look at leadership in [the State]. I hope that the findings will help us better understand community leadership. But I also believe there will be a practical payoff, as organizations in [city] will be able to use the results to work more effectively toward community goals. When this study is complete, it will be possible to see more clearly how our community works and how it might work better.

I will try to contact you at in the next day or so to arrange a time when we can meet. If a different number would be preferable, if you will be hard to reach by phone, or if you would like more information, please feel free to contact me at the phone number or email address listed below. You may also contact the faculty member overseeing my work, Professor… at…. I know that you are a very busy person, so I have put together a short interview that should only take half of an hour of your time.

I look forward to the opportunity to speak with you.

Thank you,

[Researcher & Contact information including phone numbers]
**Consent Form**

- **INTRODUCTION**
  You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Colin Olson, from the Sociology Department at the University of New Mexico. The results of this study will contribute to my dissertation. You were identified as a possible volunteer in the study because you represent a leader in our community. Through interviews with other community leaders you were identified as a person of influence.

- **PURPOSE OF THE STUDY**
  My study is about community leadership. I hope to, with the help of your participation, get a sense of both whom the leaders in our community are and their relationships to our community mass media. I am hoping to conduct an interview with you and other influential leaders in the community.

- **PROCEDURES AND ACTIVITIES**
  You will be asked to complete an interview that is divided into 3 sections. The first section is a couple of questions about your organizational affiliations and your role or roles in them. The second section is about your ties or relationships with the local mass media. The third section is about your relationships with other organizations in the community. I am required to tell you that you will not receive payment for your participation in this study.

- **POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS**
  The potential risks and discomforts to you are minimal. All protection measures are to ensure your anonymity and reassure to you that your information will be kept confidential.

- **POTENTIAL BENEFITS**
  The potential benefits of this study are great. A study of this nature has, to my knowledge, never been conducted on a community of this size. The ability to test the theoretical assertions in previous studies of communities much smaller is exciting. Existing research also is lacking in the area of media studies of communities of any size. The potential of this study is for us to see, with your help, the dynamics of the leaders in our community. Once the study is completed you will be provided with a copy of the final paper.

- **CONFIDENTIALITY**
  Any information obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified with you will remain confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission or as required by law. The presentation of this data will be in a general form and the true
names of the individuals and the organizations will not be reported. I will give each individual (and their affiliated organizations) a pseudonym, and I will keep a list of the true identities of the participants under lock and key in a separate location from my research.

- PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL
  You can choose whether to participate in this study or not. If you volunteer to participate, you may withdraw at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you might otherwise be entitled. You may also refuse to answer any questions you do not want to answer and still remain in the study. I sincerely hope you will choose to take part in this research—I think something very interesting may be discovered. I hope you will sign this form on the line below so that we may begin our dialogue. Thank you very much for your time and consideration.

- IDENTIFICATION OF INVESTIGATORS AND REVIEW BOARD
  If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to contact John Roberts at Sociology Department, MSC05 3080, 1 University of New Mexico, Albuquerque NM 87131-0001, (505) 277-2501. If you have other concerns or complaints, contact the Institutional Review Board at the University of New Mexico, 1717 Roma NE, Room 205, Albuquerque, NM 87131, (505) 277-2257, or toll free at 1-866-844-9018.

  SIGNATURE OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANT

  I understand the procedures described above. My questions have been answered to my satisfaction, and I agree to participate in this study. I have been provided a copy of this form.

  Name of Participant  (please print)

  Signature of Participant  Date

  SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR

  In my judgment the participant is voluntarily and knowingly providing informed consent and possesses the legal capacity to give informed consent to participate in this research study

  Name of Investigator or Designee

  Signature of Investigator or Designee  Date

368
Appendix 3: Interviews

The following graph depicts the number of interviews per month across the eight months of interviewing, which began in October 2006 and was finished by May 2007. It illustrates nicely the “waves” of interviews completed. In the first month of interviewing twenty-two interviews were completed, followed by seventeen in November and an additional ten in December. Over the first two months of 2007 another nine were completed bringing the total to 58 interviews. These five months constitute the effort given to contacting the original 100 leaders in the community. The lull in interviews in January and February were the result of efforts to compile the reputational data from the 58 interviews. This initial reputational data constituted the “second wave” of interviews. The spike in March 2007, which amounted to an additional twelve interviews, is explained by the effort to interview this second wave. The eight interviews completed in April 2007 represent the end of the second wave leaders. The seventeen interviews in May 2007 represent the third and final wave of leaders, compiled from the second wave interviews completed in March 2007 (the eight April 2007 interviews were not included in computations for the third wave reputational numbers).
Numbers of Interviews by Month
Appendix 4: The Interview Instrument

Several sections of the interview instrument were cut from the analysis and some sections were cut from the interview itself. The following is a discussion of these changes to the original intended research design.

The inter-organizational financial relationships section was later dropped (after the first few interviews) for two reasons: first, some individuals were reluctant to share information about their financial relationships with other organizations. Second, and the more determinative reason was that the length of time it took to get through the other sections did not allow asking the fourth section. In fact, it happened on several occasions that getting through the first two sections was not possible and questions had to be skipped.

Respondents were asked to discuss their primary organization’s mission and to talk about their personal aspirations for the kind of contribution they would like to make in the community. These two questions (question 2 and 3) served to set a mood for the interview, and while the responses to these two questions were fairly predictable and were intended to put the respondent at ease, that these were questions that they could answer and that there was little potential harm in answering them. Analysis of these two questions was skipped due to time constraints.

To ascertain who respondents associate with regardless of formal organizational relationships the following question was asked:

“If you wanted to get something done in the community, are there any specific individuals to whom you would go? In other words, who in the community would you consider contacting to influence a policy change or retain a policy you favor that is being challenged? I understand that your answer to this question would likely change depending on the issue, so can you give me a few examples?”
Respondents were also asked to think of anyone else that they network with on this question.

Respondents were asked “If you wanted to publicize a concern, to whom would you go?” The intention behind this question was to explore the extent or diversity of avenues through which respondents directly contact to get their agenda accomplished. Regrettably, analysis of this question and the questions that tap into the specific relationships respondents may have had with the local mass media (the second part of the interview) proved to be too time consuming to analyze adequately for this project. On the bright side, this data will be analyzed at a later date and a contribution can be made to the understudied relationships between community elites and the media.

The second part of the interview asked the respondent to reflect on possible relationships they (personally and professionally) might have with the local mass media. Initially, respondents were to be given lists of individuals affiliated with local newspapers, radio stations, and television stations. While this list was created and used in the first few interviews, I decided not to use it in the bulk of the interviews. This decision was made because in the interviews where it was used it tended to bog down the interview. Also, there are trade-offs associated with providing lists and not providing lists for respondents when asking them to recall their interactions. One the one hand, providing the lists may aid in recall, strengthening the reliability of respondent’s recall, getting name right, and triggering interchanges with the media they may have forgotten about. On the other hand, not providing the list sped up the interviews, which averaged over an hour. In hindsight, the cost of not providing the list of media personnel may have
been higher than I wanted, and possible would have yielded more interactions with the media.

The media section included a series of questions designed to capture the various relationships community leaders may have with the local media. When conceptualizing this section I first thought about how organizations might use the media for their purposes. I also thought about how an individual within the organization might use the media for both organizational and individuals purposes. The questions outline below roughly are oriented around the following dimensions: (1) individuals’ media agenda (attention to the media as representatives of their organization), (2) financial (either as advertisers—financial backers—of the media, or the media as sponsors of the organizations activities), (3) non-financial inter-organizational relationships (as sources for quotes, discussed in the news, contributing authors, or expertise called upon for validity, verification, or authority), (4) associational networks (shared memberships between non-media and media organizations, e.g., chamber of commerce, various societies, foundations, board of directors, and advocacy organizations), and (5) shared political agenda/project (a relationship between non-media organizations and media organizations based on a similar perceived—or authenticated—world view or political philosophy). While this portion of the interview has the potential to illuminate the relationships community elites have with the mass media, the analysis of this data must wait to be analyzed at a later date.
Appendix 5: Social Capital

In Chapter Five the concept of social capital was introduced to contextualize respondents’ discussion of social inequality. Below is a more extensive treatment of the concept in relation to its internal creation and function. Social capital is defined in this section as trust that arises during social interaction (Fukuyama, 2001). According to Fukuyama, social capital can be seen as ―radii of trust‖ (2001, p. 8). He defines a “radius of trust” as “the circle of people among whom co-operative norms are operative” (2001, p. 8). There are many radii of trust in any aggregate of people. For the purposes here we could say that there are many radii of trust that develop between actors at the community level. Where does social capital come from? According to Fukuyama, “if individuals interact with each other repeatedly over time, they develop a stake in a reputation for honesty and reliability” (p. 16). This seems to reflect the perceptions of some of the respondents in this study.

One respondent in particular drew on Fukuyama’s insights on trust to view the community:

...this area of ethics. I really spent some time reading Francis Fukuyama’s book “Trust,” and it struck a cord with me. The central premise of the book is that a society is based around trust: when trust erodes all kinds of problems creep up. [This company] is a recipient of the business and ethics award, and in 2002 I was an individual recipient. I have a strong affinity of high trust and good strong ethical base that cuts across the community. What we see in our society today is we don’t see a sector in our society that commands a high amount of trust: health care, politics, politics...

39 Social capital, Fukuyama explains “is an instantiated informal norm that promotes co-operation between two or more individuals. The norms that constitute social capital can range from a norm of reciprocity between two friends all the way up to complex and elaborately articulated doctrines like Christianity or Confucianism. They must be instantiated in an actual human relationship: the norm of reciprocity exists in potentia in my dealings with all people, but is actualised only in my dealings with my friends. By this definition, trust, networks, civil society, and the like, which have been associated with social capital, are all epiphenomenal, arising as a result of social capital but not constituting social capital itself.” (2001, p. 7).
media, you can’t find a sector that commands high trust. It has been replaced by isolation; we drop back to everyone looking out for themselves. We are inclined to trust only a select few that are close to us. We stay on our own islands. (Business CEO)

Two additional insights from Fukuyama and other writers that address the issue of social capital are necessary to fully comprehend the significance of this respondent’s message and his approach to the leadership community. The first insight is the use by Fukuyama of Alexis de Tocqueville’s phrase the “art of association” in reference to Americans’ tendency to form civil associations. To succinctly state the point, strength comes from associational living. Unfortunately, and the respondent touched on this point, Tocqueville also notes that “the vice of modern democracy is to promote excessive individualism, that is, a preoccupation with one’s private life and family, and an unwillingness to engage in public affairs” (2001, p. 11). Associational living, it is argued, is the countervailing force to the destructive individualistic tendency of modern capitalism. For this study I would like to argue that business organizations and board memberships serve as a sort of microcosm of an idealized version of a strong civil society, only this little civil society is restricted to those actors that have the economic and institutional resources to be participants. If civil society is embodied in the strength of civil associations and it “serves to balance the power of the state and to protect individuals from the state’s power” then what we see, from the perspective of the respondent quoted above, is that for the vast majority of civil society is, as he says, restricted to “our own islands.”

The initial point made about the cultural approach of the leadership in the community was that the non-elites in the community are largely an inattentive public who do not or should not factor into the decision-making or decision-influencing processes in the community. This sentiment is largely reflected in the absence of network links by
elites to non-elites. Tentatively, what appears to take shape among a portion of the elite in the community is a miniature version of an idealized civil society of Tocqueville in *Democracy in America*, Fukuyama (2001), or Putnam (2000).

The second insight from Fukuyama relevant to this discussion is that of Mark Granovetter’s, presented in "The Strength of Weak Ties" (1973). The influence of “bridges” which connect strongly tied groups of people to other strongly tied groups of people is a key theoretical development in network analysis over the past 30 years (Buchanan, 2003). These “weak ties” allow for new information to spread through the network and, incidentally, helps solve the small world problem of explaining how humanity appears to be so interconnected. The relevance of the strength of weak ties for this discussion goes back to another comment a respondent made concerning the way he approaches the community. He said, regarding his involvement in economic development,

*I can share with you two ways: I don’t major in economic development, [lists three community leaders, two of which were interviewed for this research] are more directly involved. I tend to be more in the area of a bridge, it seems to be a role for me; I make the connection. The [baseball] stadium and the team, because I am on the [Non-profit education organization board] and [cites name of] the venture capitalist that has over a billion dollars in assets, started the [Non-profit education organization board] in [Midwestern state], he and his wife own a working ranch in [this state], he brought that [organization] here [...], and I got to working with him. [He] came out here for a board meeting for the [Non-profit education organization board]and I brought him from the airport past the [old] stadium and he was shocked that we didn’t have a baseball team and he probed about that, he was a huge baseball fan. He called me a month later and told me that I can solve the baseball problem and asked to set up some secret meeting with leaders [...] about 25 people: put together a [...] baseball committee and the voters passed the 25 million dollar deal to build a new stadium and we met behind the scenes with the baseball league, and his consortium bought the [another city’s baseball team] here. In terms of economic development that is one example. When I was with [telecommunications company], I worked out the primary insurance carrier to move here, which added 400 jobs. Those are periodic, when it seems right and natural I get involved. (Business)*

This lengthy quote illustrates the role of bridges in communities. Through the respondent’s connections to others, others he does not interact with regularly but he can call associates, he can bring about changes in the community. In effect, this respondent,
through his associations, has built social capital that can be employed when the
opportunities arise.

Much in this study has been made of associational activity, particularly board
memberships. What has been largely neglected but can be addressed, albeit insufficiently,
is the role of religious groups and other non-business or political associations. The
respondent quoted above, as well as several other business leaders in the community, hit
on the religious bond between business leaders; Fukuyama (2001, p. 19) postulates that
religion is one of several sources of social capital. There is at least one, but perhaps
several, bible study groups that comprise members of the business leadership community.
The bonding and moral teaching that takes place among these leaders undoubtedly
translates to a form of social capital outside the religious context. If nothing else the
religiously based meetings offer for their participants another mechanism to network with
other members in the community. Fully understanding the extent of business and religion
are beyond the scope of the questions asked in this research, so much has to be left to
speculation with regard to this community.

In addition to this particular respondent, whose responses offered a useful way to
introduce and illustrate the concept of social capital, other respondents explicitly
emphasized respect, credibility, or trust as important components to getting things done
in the community. Across these respondents is the persistent theme that intentions matter.
What gets built through the social networks of leaders in the community is a non-tangible
but lucrative form of capital that translates into a higher likelihood of success for action.
The following passages summarize the notions of social capital expressed by the
respondents as *respect, credibility, and trust.*
"There are the politics of things, and a bunch gets done by the lobbyists and the good old boy system, but I am talking about the undercurrent who are not involved in the political life, you have to get involved in the power brokers, the respected leaders who join together to make a difference." (President and CEO of Engineering Firm)

"...generally speaking it is with relationships, relationships are critical in Albuquerque, having credibility, having logic on your side and a compelling argument." (Development Organization Executive)

"Generally things get done when credible and influential leaders can serve as a catalyst either individually or through organizations to raise awareness. I think a lot of times it takes raw persistence and being able to be convincing and somewhat of a salesman as to what needs to happen.... it is people that take something." (President, CEO, and Chairman of Medical Organization)

"My style is to figure out what needs to get done, collaborate, bring in people that are credible, then see if you can influence the political side of it. Bring logic to it." (President of Development Company)

"usually one person, almost always one person decides that it needs to be done and it can be done, and they are within this group, at a stage that their commitment is credible to a wide range of people." (Bank President and CEO)

"Networking and calling your list, it can’t be understated the value in our community of really getting to know people, beyond sitting on the boards with people, developing trust and that is the way things get done. That is the way you can get them to take your calls and lobby to get your support." (Bank President and CEO)

"Life is about relationships: who you like, who you trust, and who you respect. What ends up happening is those people that you like trust and respect those people get a little overwhelmed because they have built those relationships." (County Elected Official)

"you look for someone who will provide you credibility, someone who knows that city councilor very well, or whoever." In terms of direct action, the respondent has in the past written op-ed pieces where one must be an "honest critic. Don’t hesitate to be critical and come as a helping critic. Because of that you are a critical partner that can help." (Corporate Community Outreach)
Appendix 6: Grassroots Elites

- “It is called **grassroots**; people can form a committee to change it”
- “The pressures come from **grassroots**.”
- “A little bit of a **grassroots** and talking to peers and deciding that something needs to change.
- “Non-profits are **grassroots** and politics is about agendas....In one sense it [tax initiative] was **grassroots**; we emailed everyone we knew.”
- “I think it is **grassroots**, you have to take things up rather than push things down.”
- “If you are starting something new, a new program, you need to do a lot of **grassroots** stuff, you go through some traditional steps in making your case about what the problem is how to deal with it and asking for the financial and other kind of support to do that.”
- “The community at large, it is a combination of **grassroots** efforts and organized efforts led by business and government entities.”
- “It is important to have funds to keep culture and arts going. We don’t have large corporations to keep the arts going. We’ve had a **grassroots** effort.”
- “A lot of **grassroots** initiatives have faiured very well. Take this [tax initiative], a **grassroots** initiative.”
- “Leadership ends up with organizations like the United Way, but probably more **grassroots**.”
- “I see a lot of **grassroots** efforts. For example, if there is a law that is important that the legislature is considering, you will see the trial lawyers association out there lobbying and appearing before the legislature.”
Appendix 7: Power Broker/Business Schemas

In order to understand the ways in which respondents view the community, each respondent’s conception of the community can be investigated in turn. To this end, the president and CEO of a local engineering firm recognized that much gets done by lobbyists and the “good-old-boy system,” but instead wished to emphasize the non-political side of social change:

…it really goes back to the power brokers who lobby and make changes or keep things the same. I have found that for the majority, I would not be involved if I didn’t believe that most people didn’t believe in it…. There are the politics of things, and a bunch gets done by the lobbyists and the good-old-boy system, but I am talking about the undercurrent who are not involved in the political life, you have to get involved in the power brokers, the respected leaders who join together to make a difference. (Engineer)

He added the names of two local bankers who have been influential in bringing about changes. A local lawyer added another variable to local leadership, summarized as the second model. He outlined the process as follows:

Number one you have financial support, people who are willing to give money and time to a cause. You have to have enough interest that people will put money into it. Secondly, you have to have a recognizable face on the project. And they have to be willing. (Lawyer)

For the respondent, a combination of recognizable leadership and funders is crucial. He added, that

Those that are cynical might call them special interest groups. If it is school bonds those that will fund the bond initiative will be those industries that will benefit from the construction of that domain. I’m not cynical about that, if you want to build schools, that is how it gets done.” “The trick of doing good government kinds of projects that don’t have a direct and immediate economic benefit, is that you don’t have the special interests that help fund that kind of initiative. You need an identifiable leader and identifiable funders.

The next model, model three, was offered by a lawyer in the community, and boils down to making presentations to the two most powerful business organizations in the community and lobbying politicians. The fourth model, proposed by another lawyer, saw it necessary to first find a decision maker and then build a board of doers:
My MO is, find a decision maker who is well informed and cares about whatever it is you are dealing with.... I know who the leaders are and I go to them. Mostly I get asked. How do things get done? My focus has been in the private or non-profit [sector]. In the non-profit sector, you have to build a board of doers; committed, sophisticated, and understand that their job is to move the cause of that institution. All the boards I sit on my skill sets are as organizer and changer. Things get changed by likeminded people who make things happen.... Because it is a small state you can get things done. (Lawyer)

Yet another lawyer conceived change to occur in the community through the leadership that rises from within a problem area and is carried out through personal relationships.

Things get done in personal ways for the most part but in a much more open way. As issue will come up and people will start working on it. (Lawyer)

An engineer in the community saw coordinating the business community and crafting policy as the first steps for bringing about change in the community. The next step included exerting pressure on elected officials. (This respondent also believed that in some instances, working with government is advantageous; their view is discussed in the previous section on political leadership models.) The chairman of an insurance company felt that getting things done in the community requires articulating one’s goals, building from the ground up, and then bringing the cause to, or presenting it to, business organizations.

I guess the only way I’ve found is to go ahead and start doing it. Start with an idea and get people behind you. Refine it. People...we don’t live in a vacuum, and things aren’t done single handedly. There has to be buy in to get things done. People are very interested in getting things done. I think it’s human nature that says I need to do something for my community. If you can get buy in for whatever you want to do, or whatever is out there that needs a boost.... From my perspective I could go to a lot of people to get it done. I know a lot of people in the media. I would get the group together that are working on something.... You have to build your base, and awareness, like a pyramid, then you make your ask, whatever that is to [business organizations]. The ask is not necessarily is money, most of the time it is money. The key is that you have a plan. (Insurance)

The penultimate model mirrors the previous model. Where the chairman of the insurance company’s model began with articulating goals, this model, proposed by a banker, begins with a decision to act. Building a base of support is similar to the banker’s condition of forming groups. Where the models differ the most is in the final model.

While the chairman of the insurance company brings in the base to “ask” for support
from business organizations, the banker sees the necessity of paying attention to power brokers.

The ninth and final power brokers/business model was proposed by the director of a business organization in the community. The respondent said there are three parts: leadership, key advocates, and fighting. On leadership, the respondent said,

Things only get done when you have the right leadership at the table; that is people who want to move the ball down the field, as opposed to people who get stuck in process. Leadership is a huge component. You can put up a big group of people that are well respected but if they are overly cautious or the issues are too controversial they will not get it done. That is the first and most important piece. (Business Organization)

On key advocates, the respondent said,

The other part of it is the group is able to make the case for what the problem is and what the recommended solution is to key advocates, so that you bring on problem solving advocates and activists who are willing to stand up and be counted and support you. You don’t need a lot of people standing up and supporting you but you need some key people supporting you.

The third part of the process is fighting, about which the respondent said,

Then you begin the fight, and as long as you don’t lose anyone along the way, and that they understand that it will not be easy and will stay with you to the end, that is how things get done.

The respondent related this three-part process to efforts on part of the Chamber in the last five years to pass educational reform legislation.

I would say a level of a failure was our first attempt at reforming education when we moved forward an omnibus bill in 2001, and then we asked [the former governor] to veto the bill that came out because it didn’t do anything we wanted it to do. An example of success was the 2003 education reform bill which got out with increased accountability and more compensation. The difference between those two bills boiled down to the leadership of [the new governor]. In the second scenario, [the governor] signed on to what we wanted to accomplish, and he got key legislators to stand behind it and we got the business community around it. On the first bill we had to do a lot of educating of the business community, didn’t have a governor helping us, and arm wrestled with key legislators.

Concluding the discussion, the respondent rejoined an earlier comment by saying “You need 4 or 5 key persons of power to get behind it.”

This final model captures the fundamental relationship the politically motivated business elite have with the political process. This final model, from the director of one of the Chambers, underscores the necessity for the business elites to organize themselves
successfully around an initiative, but also to realize that without accommodating or amenable political leadership, very little can get done.
Appendix 8: Political Leadership Schemas

In addition to the two models that include only political actors and the most elaborate model that includes, in addition to political actors, six additional factors, are the five models offered by seven different respondent’s that fall in between these two extremes. Below is a brief elaboration of the various “political leadership schemas” by these respondents.

First, a lawyer and former elected official at the state level modifies the strong political leadership model of the educator’s to include relevant administrators and staffers as well as directly speaking with elected officials:

*I think that to get things done within city administration it is very important to know staffers at the different levels of the agency. I think it is easier to go to someone at the ground floor who knows what is happening, and knows what should be done, what shouldn’t be done, and how to do it and most of them are very ethical.* (Lawyer)

These first two models, the educator’s and the lawyer’s, circumvent the business elites and go straight to the politically relevant leadership. In the table this is demarcated by a thicker line around them. The rest of the models include some aspect of the business community.

Model three, offered by three respondents (a lawyer, a business consultant, and an engineer), argues that the best course of action in the community is the united efforts of receptive political leaders and business organizations. The lawyer summarizes the community in the following way:

*A lot of it is building consensus, joining common causes. Like there is a legislative package that is put out by the business community ([An economic development specialist] works on and gets support from business groups) and a lot of it passes every year. It is working together. It depends on your political leadership and [the mayor] is very interested in economic development, as is the governor. The political leadership has to be receptive.* (Lawyer)
The president of an engineering firm included elected officials and business organizations as well. The respondent, for instance, sits on taskforces established by politicians to ensure that building standards are aligned with the construction industry. According to the respondent, about 30 active people involved in other industry business organizations also help to coordinate with government on industry related issues.

The fourth model, offered by the director of a business organization, includes three variables, two of which divide the business community into business organizations and CEOs. The third factor is the governor, who alone sits on the political side. (The previous three models also specify specific political leaders, including the mayor, the city council, and certain federal delegates.)

The fifth model, offered by a retired regional bank executive, moves away from only considering economic and political actors and adds the role of education. He said, in reference to a large economic development initiative in the city, “That took the coming together of business and government and education and it always takes those things.”

The sixth model, offered by the owner of a public relations company, includes, again, strong political leadership, but also the alignment of financiers (banks), development groups, and the support of the media. In the absence of a strong media presence, he said that, “...you see inertia and people operating on the margins or behind the scenes.”

The seventh model, which includes legislators, business leaders, non-profit leaders, social networks, and financial backing, is characterized by a former regional executive of a national bank in the following way:

For things to change today it takes a vast network. It takes working with legislators, business leaders, and non-profit leaders. You have to “sell not tell.” It takes people, relationships, and
money: that is what drives everything. *Power in the community comes down to three things: political power... and economic connections.* (Banker)
Appendix 9: Areas for Future Research

Urban sociology is as old a field as any in sociology. As such, a great deal of scholarship has accumulated over the last hundred plus years. Within the numerous sub-topics that include social inequality, crime, diversity, planning, and urbanization, this study focuses on the persistent theme of defining, identifying, and explaining the urban power structure. Presently, urban political economy appears to be the dominant theoretical orientation. The linking of political and economic life with socio-cultural life (which includes attention to culture and actors) appears to be the most recent elaboration of this orientation. This development is not yet complete and a number of research opportunities still remain. Some of these future directions are briefly outlined below.

1. Focusing on Neighborhood Associations. Acting as a countervailing force to the growth machine are neighborhood associations and environmental groups. These opposition groups seek to enhance the city’s use value, something that is usually but not necessarily opposed by the local growth coalition. The complex relationship of local elites and neighborhood associations and citizen groups offers fertile ground for future research. Neighborhood associations and the citizens that they represent often times support economic growth. Although several representatives of the elites discussed the elemental differences between use-value oriented neighborhood groups and the exchange-value oriented business community, some of the elites are also members of neighborhood associations. Moreover, some of the elites contributed to the Democratic
Party, and supported use value causes. From a storytelling perspective it is tempting to draw a thick line of separation between the community elite and the neighborhoods, but the reality of the relationships between these two groups is, I feel, is more complicated. What is needed is a study of community neighborhood associations, their membership reach, and their ties to other organizations in the community, as well as their principles, activism, and politics. From the structural perspective of the growth coalition the relationship between local elites and neighborhood associations is adversarial. While the structural relationships within communities may confirm this hypothesis, a more nuanced cultural approach may find more convergence of views and policies between these two groups.

2. **Focusing on the Region.** If the focus on neighborhood associations can be seen as an intra-community direction, the focus on adjacent communities should be seen as an inter-community direction. In a cross-sectional and longitudinal panel study of communities in the Northeastern United States, Humphrey (2001, p. 99) found “that growth machine activities are intensifying and may be exacerbating social inequality between places.” A non-trivial number of interviewed elites concern themselves with regional economic development, political, and infrastructural linkages with neighboring municipalities. As one insurance banker commented, elites across cities in the state need to begin thinking about the state and its cities as being one unit which is in competition with other states and countries
for economic development (see also her comments in footnote 25 about efforts to bring about coordination among competitors across community boundaries within the insurance industry). To further illustrate the momentum among some of the local elites, the CEO of one of the state’s largest construction companies wishes to model the region’s economic development and inter-governmental cooperation on the Denver metropolitan model. Understanding the extent of intercommunity political, economic, and social coordination is increasingly important, especially in light of local elites’ awareness of the role global capitalism plays in locales. Further research into the complexities of regionalism from a socio-geographic perspective that utilizes a social network methodology is needed.

3. **Focusing on Non-Local Capital.** Humphrey (2001) and Logan and Molotch (1984) call attention to the trend of absentee-owned firms controlling local growth. Many of the benefits of having large national-level development corporations flow outside of the community, because their headquarters are in other cities. As this trend of large corporate land developments continues, Logan and Molotch hypothesize that local elites will begin to change their stance on local growth and begin to oppose it. The local elites in this community do not appear to have come around to this predicted conclusion. At least not yet. On the contrary, large non-local private land developments around the city are seen as vehicles for industrial recruitment, and hence a better quality of life for all. It will be
important to keep track of the dynamics of the increasing influence of non-local developers in local growth coalitions and local politics. Cities are not, and have never been, autonomous entities. They have been, and will continue to be, connected with regional, national, and global systems. Understanding how these macro and global level trends affect the city’s elites and citizens is essential.

4. **Focusing on Public Education.** What is the role of public education in the community? The short answer, from a growth coalition perspective, is as a mechanism for economic development. The local community college’s advertisement campaign is a poignant reminder of this. Billboards and printed advertisements around the city promote the following equation: 

\[ \text{Job} \rightarrow \text{Community College} \rightarrow \text{Career} \]

The message is obvious, that the community college is the path between dead-end jobs and rewarding careers. Although this is not new terrain, studies that enhance our knowledge of the linkages between institutions of public education and economic development organizations continue to be needed. Institutions of higher education are increasing their efforts to forge ties to the local business community, as is evidenced by the internships and externships they create, promote, and fund. From a growth machine perspective, however, the economic development departments and foundations of universities and colleges serve as additional points of coordination for local growth coalitions and public educators. For the sake of the strength of our civil society, are these linkages adversely impacting the citizenship
enhancing capacities of public education for the sake of narrow economic development (industrial recruitment) efforts? The central location of public education institutions in many of the issue networks and the overall interorganizational structure of the community substantiates this concern.

5. **Focusing on the Media.** An important component of the success of the local growth coalitions is the ideological construction of community (boosterism). Public education certainly plays a role in this construction, but so do the local mass media. In fact, unlike public education, the local mass media are also local businesses (or increasingly a subsidiary of a national media company that may or may not be owned by a non-media corporation). Regardless of its ownership structure, however, by the virtue of being a business the local media should naturally align itself with the local growth machine. For instance, a member of the local family that owns the last local daily newspaper in the community is also a land developer. The mass media, as private companies, occupy two roles in the community: they are growth oriented businesses and vehicles for civic coordination. Understanding these roles of the local print and broadcast mass media as well as how they relate to the local community elites has profound implications for how citizens come to understand their community. Structurally, the local mass media should appear as players in the local growth coalition. Anecdotally, the local media are diverse in their participation in the local growth coalition. Interestingly, the owners of the local newspaper appear completely absent from these elite networks.
Exploring systematically the relationship local elites have with the local media can be useful for understanding the cultural industry’s role in growth coalitions.

6. *Focusing on the Organizational Life of Prestigious Individuals.* Although some attention in this dissertation is paid to the relative importance of individuals and organizations, more work is needed to understand how they relate to each other. Key questions to focus on include: Are individuals important because of their organizational position or visa versa? How much influence do individuals carry from one sector with them to their new organizational positions? Does an organization become important when it becomes home to relocating prestigious leaders? Can actors transcend their organization and carry high levels of prestige with them when they leave the organization in which they established themselves and join new ones? How is it that organizations give individuals their prestige? Is it by the virtue of the organization’s position in the community that an actor has prestige? Chances are, actors use the assets of an organization that are available to them to establish an identity in the inter-organizational networks that are part of their organizational life and that some of those networks, especially smaller networks, transfer to new organizational affiliations. When a company in the community recruits a high prestige actor from another organization in the same community it might be an effort to, in effect, recruit the network as well. Understanding the strategies of organizations to recruit prestigious
community members, and the strategies of prestigious community
members to market themselves, can offer interesting insights into how
power flows through a community.

7. **Focusing on Population Density.** One of the unique contributions of this
study is the effort to capture the entire interorganizational structure of a
large urban community (rather than smaller communities or selected
predetermined powerful positions within them). Are community power
structures dependent upon population size? If so, to what extent? One
hypothesis offered is that as the population increases individuals recede in
importance and formal organizations grow in importance. As the city in
this study inches closer to a population of one million, is there a
population effect for the local power structure? In a related way, is a
population of one million or more a decisive moment in economic
development, as some of the local elites indicate?

This list tries to focus future research spatially and conceptually in both horizontal
and vertical directions. Cutting across the vertical dimension from the bottom to the top
are the various levels of social organization. At the bottom are interpersonal interactions
and the importance of individuals as agents of structural and cultural stability and change.
Research that does not take seriously the role of individuals will result in an incomplete
picture. Above the interpersonal level, where status and self-esteem are key determinates
of action, are the formal organizations that enable and constrain each other and enable
and constrain individuals. The interorganizational level remains a vital resource in
reproducing the community. The intercommunity level rests above the interorganizational
level. At this level the efforts of organizational actors from different communities seek to win the development war or raise a white flag and invite each other to think regionally. Regardless of the strategy, the regional level remains a vital component of urban studies. Finally, cities close enough to refer to each other as a region contend with other regions for economic development and government expenditures. At this highest level of social organization cities or regions must come to terms with national and global shifts in the political, economic, and socio-cultural realm.

Horizontally, across the community are the various types of organizations that seek out linkages with each other to increase their influence in the community. This horizontal dimension, as if to look across the urban topography, includes the mountain peaks of large private businesses, educational institutions, the media, business organizations, think tanks and foundations, as well as the various governments active in the city. Public education and the local mass media are highlighted above, but urban political economy would benefit from a more focused study on the contributions of the various organizations that make up this interorganizational mountain range.
References


