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Heidegger's perfectionist philosophy of education in *Being and Time*

IAIN THOMSON
Department of Philosophy, University of New Mexico, MSCO3-2140, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 87131-0001, USA (E-mail: ithomson@unm.edu)

Abstract. In *Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education*, I argue that Heidegger's ontological thinking about education forms one of the deep thematic undercurrents of his entire career, but I focus mainly on Heidegger's later work in order to make this case. The current essay extends this view to Heidegger's early magnum opus, contending that *Being and Time* is profoundly informed – albeit at a subterranean level – by Heidegger's *perfectionist* thinking about education. Explaining this perfectionism in terms of its ontological and ethical components (and their linkage), I show that *Being and Time*'s educational philosophy seeks to answer the paradoxical question: *How do become what we are?* Understanding Heidegger's strange but powerful answer to this original pedagogical question, I suggest, allows us to make sense of some of the most difficult and important issues at the heart of *Being and Time*, including what Heidegger really means by *possibility*, *death*, and *authenticity*.

1. *Being and Time's* philosophy of education?

In *Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education*, I seek to establish and build upon the hermeneutic thesis that Heidegger's concern to reform education spans his entire career of thought. According to the view I develop there, a radical rethinking of education – in a word, an *ontologization* of education – forms one of the deep thematic undercurrents of Heidegger's work, early as well as late. We will circle back to this "ontologization" of education at the end, but I want to begin by addressing a worry I did not previously thematize and confront.[1] The worry is this: If the interpretive thesis above is correct, then we should expect to find some sign of Heidegger's supposed lifelong concern with education in his early magnum opus, *Being and Time*. The fact, then, that little or nothing has been written on *Being and Time*'s "philosophy of education" might reasonably be taken to cast doubt upon my thesis that a philosophical rethinking of education was of great importance to Heidegger's work as a whole.[2] Such a worry, of course, does not arise deductively; even if *Being and Time* contained no philosophy of education, one might be able to explain such an omission in a way that would leave my general thesis intact. Rather than trying to preserve the thesis in the face of such a hermeneutic anomaly, however, I shall instead try to

demonstrate that no such anomaly exists: This paper will seek both to show that Heidegger's philosophy of education does deeply permeate *Being and Time* and to explain some of the context and significance of this fact.

Still, if I am right that Heidegger's educational views are integrally entwined with some of the most essential themes of *Being and Time*, some will wonder why these views have so long gone unheralded in the secondary literature. The short answer is that Heidegger does not present his philosophical views on education as such in *Being and Time*; in fact, he develops these views with an almost excessive subtlety.[3] As a result, if one does not already have a good sense for the shape Heidegger's views on education generally take in his work, their quiet presence in *Being and Time* is easy to miss. We thus need first to know something about the basic contours of Heidegger's broader philosophical views on education in order to be able to recognize these views in *Being and Time* and begin to understand the role they play there. This task is made trickier by the fact that Heidegger's philosophy of education did not remain static throughout his life; he developed and refined his educational views in important ways between 1911 and 1940, while working toward (what I have elsewhere described as) his "mature" philosophy of education (first presented in his 1940 article, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth").[4] Throughout this entire series of transformations, however, Heidegger's philosophy of education remains within the broad framework of what has come to be called philosophical *perfectionism* (not to be confused with psychological "perfectionism," that neurotic inability to bring anything to a satisfactory completion).[5] A brief outline of philosophical perfectionism will thus help us recognize Heidegger's perfectionist philosophy of education in *Being and Time*.

2. What is philosophical perfectionism?

Although its Western roots go back at least as far as Pindar, the lineage of philosophical perfectionism derives mainly from Aristotle, and perfectionists can still be recognized by their adoption of some version of three interrelated views Aristotle first set forth in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, views we could call the *ontological thesis*, the *ethical thesis*, and the *linking principle*. Perfectionism's ontological thesis holds that there is something importantly distinctive about the form of life we human beings embody, some set of significant skills or capacities that set us apart from (and, typically, above) all the other kinds of entities with which we are familiar. Perfectionism's ethical thesis maintains that our greatest fulfillment or flourishing follows from the cultivation and development (hence the *perfection*) of these significantly distinctive skills

or capacities. Finally, the linking principle characterizes more precisely the connection between the ontological and ethical theses, specifying the link between the relevant ontological skills or capacities that distinguish us and our greatest possible ethical fulfillment or perfection. Aristotle provides the archetypal versions of these three perfectionist views when he argues, first (his ontological thesis), that we are most importantly distinguished from other living beings by our ability to employ *nous* or active intellect (we are, in effect, that entity able explicitly to comprehend the web of connections implicitly governing all entities); second (his ethical thesis), that the greatest human fulfillment comes from perfecting our distinctive theoretical nature (for Aristotle, the greatest human fulfillment comes from maximally actualizing our distinctive theoretical capacities); and third (his linking principle), that our ethical fulfillment follows directly from the unimpeded cultivation and development of our distinctive ontological nature (since this nature endows us with a desire to understand which both sets us on and inclines us along the path leading to our ethical fulfillment).[6]

Aristotle casts a long shadow over the subsequent history of philosophical perfectionism, but conceptual space remains within the framework he established for disagreements concerning how best to understand and instantiate the three different perfectionist theses. Perfectionists thus disagree, first, about what are our importantly distinctive traits or capacities (the *ontological thesis*): Are human beings relevantly distinguished by our possession of reason, intellect, soul, spirituality, passion, freedom, culture, community, creativity, world-disclosure, self-interpretation, or merely by our continual supercession of each of our previous ontological self-understandings?[7] Second, perfectionists disagree about how to understand the "perfection" of these distinctive traits or capacities (the *ethical thesis*): What constitutes the greatest human fulfillment? Can such fulfillment ever be achieved? Permanently, or only episodically? By individuals, within the finite span of their lives, or only by an historically enduring human community, projected indefinitely into the future? Does the advancement of humanity simply piggyback upon the perfection of individuals, or does it instead happen despite them, "behind their backs" (as Kant suggests)? And, conversely, is individual development served by the development of humanity? Or does the development of the "essence" of humanity instead demand the supercession of humanity itself (as Nietzsche thought)?[8] Finally, perfectionists disagree about the connection between our importantly distinctive traits or capacities and our greatest possible ethical fulfillment (the *linking principle*): Is it the case, as Aristotle thought, that what distinguishes us also naturally impels us toward our perfection, or must we not instead struggle against other important aspects of ourselves in order to achieve our fulfillment? (The former view represents a *positive* version of

the linking principle, while the latter would be a *negative* version, in the terms I shall use.)

Thanks to the variety of perfectionist views that these three kinds of differences make possible, membership in the perfectionist lineage is quite diverse, cross-cutting better known philosophical divides. For example, perfectionism is often presented as if it were an ethical doctrine (Cavell and others write simply of "moral perfectionism"), but this can be misleading. It is true that perfectionism importantly includes what I have called the *ethical* thesis, but "ethical" is meant here in its original sense, having to do with what the Greeks called our *ethos*, our general comportment or way of being in the world, and not with the narrower contemporary understanding of "ethics" (or "morality") as centrally concerned with the formulation of action-guiding principles. Indeed, the perfectionist lineage cuts across all the major ethical schools, its membership including not only the foremost virtue theorist (Aristotle), but also the main deontologist (Kant), the most famous consequentialist (Mill), and the most important existentialists (Nietzsche and Heidegger).[9] This brings us back to the matter at hand.

3. Heidegger's perfectionism in *Being and Time*

3.1. Being and Time's *ontological thesis*

If the preceding sketch is correct, then we will understand what kind of perfectionist Heidegger is when we know what versions of the ontological and ethical theses he ascribes to, and how he understands their linkage. We thus need to know, first, what is *Being and Time*'s version of perfectionism's ontological thesis? What does Heidegger think makes Dasein, the human form of life, genuinely distinctive? (I should specify that I am using the neo-Wittgensteinian locution, "human *form of life*," in order to respect the conceptual space opened up by John Haugeland's admirably unorthodox argument that "Dasein" and "human being" are not coextensive. Haugeland suggests that not every Dasein need be a human being, while Dreyfus points out, conversely, that not every human being counts as a Dasein. These points are well taken, and remind us that we need to be careful to unpack the sense in which a human being *is* (or *becomes*) a Dasein in a way which will not undercut, in a single stroke, the force of Heidegger's perfectionist exhortation to "Become what you are!" – an injunction which, we will see, plays a crucial pedagogical role in *Being and Time*.)[10] In order to understand Heidegger's perfectionism, we will need to know, second: What is *Being and Time*'s version of perfectionism's ethical thesis? That is, how does Heidegger conceive of Dasein's greatest possible

fulfillment or perfection? Finally, how are Heidegger's answers to these two questions linked in *Being and Time* – positively or negatively? In other words, does Heidegger think Dasein's fulfillment follows directly from the development of the capacities that make our form of life distinctive, or that our perfection instead requires us to struggle against a kind of inertial resistance intrinsic to the human condition?

Let us take the ontological question first: What significantly distinguishes Dasein, the human form of life, from all other kinds of entities? Strikingly, Heidegger not only explicitly answers this perfectionist question in *Being and Time*, but does so *thrice over* in the space of a single paragraph. He writes:

> Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather [1] it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very being, that being is an issue for it. . . .[2] It is peculiar to this entity that with and through its being, this being is disclosed to it. . . . [3] Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it *is* ontological. (B&T 32/S&Z 12)[11]

Dasein is "ontically distinguished" – that is, distinguished from all other kinds of entities – in that: (1) its being is an issue for it (in its very being); (2) its being is disclosed to it (with and through its being); and (3) it *is* ontological. These, for Heidegger, are three interconnected ways of unpacking the significance of the fact that only Dasein "has an understanding of being" (ibid.). Now, one can "have an understanding of being" in two different ways – theoretically or practically – and, as the qualifications I have put in parentheses indicate ("in its very being," "with and through its being"), Heidegger is concerned *to ground the theoretical* (the analyzing, entertaining, or developing of an understanding of being*) in the practical* (the embodying, living, or existing of an understanding of being). To bring out this emphasis on *the primacy of the practical*, we could restate Heidegger's version of perfectionism's ontological thesis as follows. Only Dasein: (1) lives in an intelligible world implicitly structured by the stand it takes on its own identity; and so, conversely, (2) tacitly encounters this self-understanding in and through the structure of its intelligible world; and in this dual sense (3) exists in, through, or even *as* an understanding of being.

What this restatement seeks to make clear is that when Heidegger singles out Dasein as the unique possessor of an understanding of being, he is referring primarily to the fact that Dasein is the only kind of entity which takes a stand on its being practically (embodying an ontological self-understanding in its everyday practices), and only secondarily to the fact that Dasein alone can understand being theoretically (by formulating theses concerning what entities *are* – itself included). Put concretely, Heidegger's point is not just

that only a Dasein can formulate and entertain thoughts such as "Life is a self-replicating system," "Matter is composed of N-dimensional strings," "It is raining," or "I am a teacher" (although this is true). Rather, Heidegger is primarily concerned with the preceding fact that the very way reality shows up for us is filtered through and circumscribed by the stands we take on ourselves, the embodied life-projects which organize our practical activities and so shape the intelligibility of our worlds. For example, if the fundamental self-understanding implicitly organizing my practices (what Heidegger calls Dasein's ultimate "for-the-sake-of-which") is that of being a teacher, as opposed to, say, being a scholar, or a husband and father, then a student unexpectedly knocking on my office door in the late afternoon will tend to show up as an opportunity, rather than as an unwelcome distraction from my scholarship, or an impediment to my desire to get home early. Conversely, as this example illustrates, I implicitly encounter my self-understanding, the fundamental stand I take on myself, through the very ways in which entities and events show themselves to me. Nevertheless, I may only notice this tacit filtering of my experience when something goes awry, for instance, when my different life-projects, and so my "worlds," collide, or break-down entirely, encouraging me explicitly to confront, in a way I usually do not, the fundamental self-understandings organizing my experience.[12] When this happens, I must find some way to accede to and affirm (or else disown and transform or relinquish) these self-understandings, and so take responsibility for myself, answering for or owning up to myself, if I am ever to make myself my own. Such a fundamental confrontation with ourselves is at the heart of what Heidegger calls *Eigentlichkeit* – "authenticity" or "ownedness" – and there is, as we will see, an important sense in which these confrontations, however rare they may be, bring us explicitly into contact with what is implicitly a basic and constant structural characteristic of the human form of life, namely, the fact that (as Dreyfus succinctly states *Being and Time*'s version of perfectionism's ontological thesis): "To exist is to take a stand on what is essential about one's being and to be defined by that stand."[13]

3.2. Being and Time's *ethical thesis and linking principle*

With this reference to authenticity, we get a glimpse of what I will argue is *Being and Time*'s version of perfectionism's ethical thesis. To clarify this ethical thesis, and distinguish it from its main competitors in *Being and Time*, a contrast with Aristotle will again prove helpful. Aristotle holds that human beings are distinguished from all other entities by being that part of the structure of reality which is able to turn around and theoretically understand

the intelligible structure of this reality. Indeed, Aristotle calls this capacity to employ our theoretical intelligence "the true self of each," and maintains that our lives reach their highest peaks – attaining "perfect fulfillment" (*teleia eudaimonia*) – in such "intellectual or theoretical contemplation" (*theoretikê*). As Aristotle famously puts his perfectionist views:

> [T]hat which is best and most pleasant for each creature is that which is proper to the nature of each; accordingly, the life of the intellect is the best and most pleasant life for humanity, inasmuch as the intellect more than anything else is human, therefore this life will be the most fulfilled [*eudaimonestatos*]. The life of practical virtue, on the other hand, is fulfilled only in a secondary degree.[14]

Now, Heidegger would not deny Aristotle's thesis that we, alone among entities, are capable of developing an ontology and situating ourselves within it. (Aristotle's thesis is either empirically true, as far as we know, or else trivially true, if "we" means "we Dasein" rather than "we human beings.") Without denying the great importance of our theoretical capacities, Heidegger's phenomenological approach inverts the priority Aristotle assigns to the theoretical over the practical. For, as *Being and Time* provocatively maintains: "Higher than actuality stands *possibility*" (B&T 63/S&Z 38). The sense of "possibility" celebrated here is not "logical possibility," mere alternatives arrayed in a conceptual space, but rather existential possibility, "being possible" (*Möglichsein*), which is for Heidegger "the most primordial and ultimately positive way in which Dasein is characterized ontologically" (B&T 183/S&Z 247). Our existential possibilities are what we forge ahead into: The roles, identities, and commitments that organize, shape, and circumscribe our comportmental navigation of our lived environments. Dasein *exists* or "stands out" (*ek-sistere*) into intelligibility through such a charting of "live options," choices that matter and that are made salient for us by these fundamental life projects, this sense of self embodied and reflected in our worlds.[15]

For Heidegger, this practical embodiment of an understanding of our being both *precedes* and *makes possible* any explicit theoretical articulation or construction of an understanding of being. He thus clarifies his aforementioned ontological thesis – according to which "Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it *is* ontological" – by specifying that, strictly speaking, "ontological" should be heard here as "pre-ontological," since "being ontological is not *yet* tantamount to developing an ontology" (B&T 32, my emphasis/S&Z 12). This "not *yet*" is important; it indicates Heidegger's belief that the theoretical activity of developing an ontology does in fact follow from our "being pre-ontological" in the prior, practical sense. For he holds that:

> [W]henever an ontology takes for its theme entities whose kind of being is different than that of Dasein, this ontology has its own *foundation and motivation* in Dasein's own ontical structure, which includes a pre-ontological understanding of being as a definite characteristic. (B&T 33, my emphasis/S&Z 13)

If, like Aristotle, Heidegger believed that attaining a theoretical understanding of being fulfilled human existence, then he would be expressing here a positive version of perfectionism's linking principle, because he holds that the theoretical development of an ontology is founded in and motivated by the same ontological (or "pre-ontological") capacities that make Dasein, the human form of life, distinctive. Other passages in Division I reinforce the same point. Perhaps most clearly, Heidegger writes:

> [A]s an investigation of being, phenomenological interpretation brings to completion [*Vollzug*], autonomously and explicitly, that understanding of being which belongs already to Dasein and which 'comes alive' in any of Dasein's dealings with entities. (B&T 96/S&Z 67)[16]

Have we thus uncovered *Being and Time*'s versions of perfectionism's ethical thesis and linking principle? Does Heidegger conceive of the greatest fulfillment, completion, or perfection of Dasein in terms of our development of a theoretical understanding of being? If so, then he maintains a positive version of the linking principle, since he holds that the development of a theoretical understanding of being emerges "autonomously and explicitly" from the understanding of being which makes our form of life distinctive. Yet, if Heidegger does adopt such a positive version of the linking principle, then why does *Being and Time* so often stress the need to struggle against a kind of inertial undertow intrinsic to the human condition? Could it be that there are in fact two different sorts of ethical ideals at work in *Being and Time* – competing, practical and theoretical visions of Dasein's fulfillment? If so, how does Heidegger fit these ideals together, and which represents Dasein's greatest fulfillment?

The trick to answering these questions, it seems to me, comes from our previous recognition of the way Heidegger inverts Aristotle, elevating the practical above the theoretical without denying the great importance of the theoretical (no more than Aristotle himself denigrates the practical). Attaining a theoretical understanding of being is undeniably important in *Being and Time*. At one point, Heidegger even goes so far as to say that: "All our efforts in the existential analytic serve the one aim of finding a possibility of answering the question of the *meaning of being* in general." (B&T 424/S&Z 372) But Heidegger never fulfills *Being and Time*'s overarching theoretical aim (never

arriving at the "fundamental ontology" he pursues like a specter throughout the text), and I want to suggest that, despite the considerable influence Aristotle's intellectualist ideal exerts upon his thinking, Heidegger does not believe that human existence reaches its ethical apotheosis in the attainment of a theoretical understanding of being. Rather, *Being and Time* conceives of Dasein's greatest fulfillment practically, in terms of an embodied stand – "authenticity" – that each of us is capable of taking on our own being.[17]

Although Heidegger holds that Dasein's ontologically distinctive nature is fulfilled with the achievement of authenticity, it is his recognition of the difficulty we nevertheless have in attaining this practical ideal – the way we have to struggle against the inertial resistance of ubiquitous social norms which quietly enforce a kind of anonymous conformity (usually with our unnoticed complicity) if we are ever genuinely to repossess ourselves – that explains why *Being and Time* tends to maintain a positive version of the linking principle in Division I, and a negative version in Division II.[18] The remainder of this essay will delve a bit further into these complexities and explain their relation to Heidegger's philosophy of education in *Being and Time*.

4. How we become what we are: *Being and Time's* answer to the *Bildungsfrage*

The most direct intersection of perfectionism with the philosophy of education can be found in the *Bildungsfrage*, the question of how best to cultivate and develop our importantly distinctive skills and capacities. This question animates Plato's *Republic* and Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, and is kept alive in the Western tradition by philosophers as diverse as Plotinus, Aquinas, Spinoza, and Leibniz, but it gets its name from the German Idealist tradition, with which it enters the mainstream of philosophical modernity. Terry Pinkard glosses *Bildung* as "the self-determining self-cultivation and inwardly motivated love of learning and education."[19] This is a rather telegraphic gloss (Pinkard's rendering of one word by thirteen brings to mind some of Heidegger's own long-winded "translations" from Greek), and so suggests the telling lack of a synonym for *Bildung* in present-day English – despite Cavell's droll observation that the obsolete English "'upbuilding' ... virtually pronounces *Bildung*." "Building" and "*Bildung*" are not etymologically related, however, so this phonetic resemblance is merely fortuitous.[20] Indeed, there is no single word in English for the polysemic *Bildung* (even Pinkard leaves out such important meanings as "formation," "constitution," "culture," and "training"), but perhaps we can capture the perfectionist philosophy of education in a slogan. If so, it would be: "*How* we become what we are."[21]

Nietzsche borrows the exhortation to "Become what you are!" from the second of Pindar's *Pythian Odes* (incorporating it, most famously, into the subtitle of his philosophical autobiography, *Ecce Homo*); Heidegger, in turn, takes it over from Pindar, Goethe, as well as Nietzsche himself (and Oberst shows that this existential imperative can also be found in many of Heidegger's other important early influences, including Kierkegaard, Dilthey, and Husserl).[22] As you will no doubt have noticed, however, there is a paradox at work in the imperative to: "Become what you are!" It is as if one were being told: "(Leave here immediately and) Go to the place where you are!" (Or simply: "Catch up to yourself!") I may be able to become what I am not, but what sense does it make to instruct me to become what I am? (Haven't I done that already?)[23] The perhaps obvious answer, alluded to earlier, is that one can "become oneself" only if (and insofar as) one is not already oneself (in the relevant sense): If, for instance, one is alienated from oneself, living inessentially, under an illusion, in bad faith, caught up in the crowd (or even "the herd"), partaking in the tyranny of public opinion, or simply, as Heidegger puts it in *Being and Time*, acquiescing in "the real dictatorship of the one [*das Man*, the anonymous anyone]" (B&T 164/S&Z 126), a conformist hall of mirrors in which: "Everyone is the other, and no one is himself." (B&T 165/S&Z 128) The point, then, is that I can indeed become who I am if the who I am now is not my own self (a self I have made my own), but merely a borrowed self, a self-understanding appropriated piecemeal from "everyone and no one" (to unpack one Nietzschean subtitle with another). Yet, if that explanation dispels one paradox, it leaves another, deeper one in its place: What sense does it make for Heidegger to exhort me to become myself when, on his view, I ultimately have no self to become? For, as Blattner and Dreyfus have argued, Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation of death reveals the anxiety-provoking fact that (as Dreyfus puts it) "Dasein can have neither a nature nor an identity, . . . it is the constant impossibility of being anything at all."[24] If I cannot *be* anything, then what sense does it make to exhort me to become *myself*? What strange kind of self am I being urged to become? In order to answer this question, we will need to look more closely into some of the details of Heidegger's view.

I mentioned that Heidegger takes over Pindar's existential exhortation to "Become what you are!" not only from Pindar himself, but also from Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Dilthey, and Husserl. As is usually the case with Heidegger's critical appropriations of the thinkers who have influenced him the most, Heidegger's critiques takes the general form of going beyond (philosophically) by getting beneath (ontologically); that is, he articulates the ontological presuppositions conditioning the insights he is drawing on, thereby seeking to situate those insights within a broader and more encompassing

interpretive framework. In this case, Heidegger maintains that what makes the imperative to "Become what you are!" meaningful is precisely the view I presented earlier as his version of perfectionism's ontological thesis. We can see this if we unpack the following difficult but crucial passage (which I will refer to subsequently as *P*1):

> [P1] Only because the being of the there receives its constitution through understanding and its character as projection, only because Dasein *is* what it becomes (or does not become), can it say to itself with understanding: "Become what you are!" (B&T 186/S&Z 145)

Here Heidegger himself seems to answer one paradox with another: The exhortation to "Become what you are!" makes sense only because "Dasein *is* what it becomes." How, then, are we to comprehend this strange claim that *we can become what we are only because we are what we become*?

To answer this question, we need to remember that "understanding" is Heidegger's term for the basic stands we take on ourselves (the practical self conceptions we *stand under*, as it were), and that "projection" designates the way we press ahead into (or *project* ourselves upon) these roles, identities, and life-projects. When he says that "Dasein *is* what it becomes," then, Heidegger is drawing attention to the fact that the future constitutively informs my sense of self, because the roles, goals, and life-projects implicitly organizing my current experience stretch out into the future. In other words, "Dasein *is* what it becomes" does not record the truism that who I am now is a who I have become, but instead registers the phenomenologically interesting fact that my basic sense of self has an ineliminably *futural* dimension. As Heidegger provocatively puts it, who I am now is a who I am "not yet."[25] Indeed, who I *am*, I may in fact never become. (The parenthetical in P1 brings home precisely this paradox.) Now, put abstractly, it sounds more than a bit strange to claim that I might in fact never become the who I already am. Thought phenomenologically, however, Heidegger's point is perfectly clear: A student, for instance, can "understand" himself as a teacher by committing himself practically to this life-project, in which case this fundamental self-understanding will implicitly shape and organize much of what he does, notices, thinks about, remembers, plans for, cares about, and so the sorts of skills and capacities he develops. In short, understanding himself as a teacher will shape much of what he *is*, even while he is not yet in fact a teacher, and even if (for whatever reason) it should turn out that he never in fact becomes a teacher. Heidegger's "Dasein *is* what it becomes (or does not become)" calls attention to the important sense in which this student, who may never *in fact* become a teacher, nevertheless already *is* a teacher: Being a teacher is the

stand he takes on himself, and the intelligibility of his world is fundamentally shaped and structured by this self-understanding (and will always have been so shaped, come what may).[26]

To see that this is what Heidegger means, it helps to know that the immediate context for P1 is Heidegger's introduction of a subtle (and often overlooked) distinction between two senses of existential possibility, namely, "being-possible" (*Möglichsein*) and "ability-to-be" (*Seinkönnen*). This distinction turns on our "being-possible" stretching further into our lived sense of the future than our "ability-to-be" does. (The sentence immediately preceding P1 reads: "Dasein, as being-possible. . . *is* existentially that which, in its ability-to-be, it is *not yet*" (B&T 185-6/S&Z 145).) Our *being-possible* is composed of our long-term identities, goals, and life-projects, while our *ability-to-be* names the capacities and skills we exercise and develop precisely by committing ourselves to and pressing ahead into such life projects. As Blattner nicely puts it, "there are two functions here: opening up the range of possibilities, and pressing ahead into one of them."[27] We become what we are "not yet," then, by pressing ahead into (or projecting ourselves upon) our projects.

So, how does the fact that *we are what we become* (or do not become) make it possible to *become what we are*? One way to read this claim is as a fairly traditional answer to the *Bildungsfrage*, in which case Heidegger would be pointing out that we can meaningfully develop our defining skills and capacities only because our inherently futural life-projects constitutively inform our present self-understanding. In his terms, only because our being-possible enables us to exercise and develop our abilities-to-be, can we in fact become the who we already implicitly understand ourselves to be. *Being and Time* says things which clearly support this interpretation. For example, Heidegger writes that when Dasein makes the world discovered in the light of its self-understanding explicit, and so "works out" the possibilities implicitly disclosed by its self-understanding, Dasein "does not become something different. *It becomes itself*" (B&T 188-9, my emphasis/S&Z 148).[28] Such an interpretation fits well, moreover, with those passages in Division I quoted earlier, where Heidegger stresses that the theoretical activity of ontology building simply consummates the understanding of being implicit in our practical self-understanding. This interpretation is thus not so much wrong as incomplete. For it does not help us answer the crucial questions we posed earlier: If, for Heidegger, I cannot *be* anything (if there is nothing about Dasein's defining structure that can tell any of us which particular life-projects we should pursue), then what sense does it make to exhort me to become *myself*? What kind of self is Heidegger encouraging me to become? And how does the fact that my future constitutively informs my present make it possible to become that kind of self?

To see how Heidegger solves these problems, we need to recognize the functional independence of our being-possible (the overarching life-projects we press ahead into: Teacher, husband, father, son, brother, scholar, colleague, friend, and so on) from our ability-to-be (our pressing ahead into, or projecting ourselves upon, these projects). We have seen that "Dasein *is* what it becomes (or does not become)" makes sense, because we can press into possibilities, and so develop our abilities-to-be, even if we never in fact become the life-project we were pressing into. But is the converse true as well? Can we become what we are no longer? Think of the case of someone who (unlike the student we considered earlier) was in fact a teacher (or a husband, son, communist, pet owner, or any other identity-defining self-understanding), but who then experiences the catastrophic collapse of this life project. What is crucial to recognize is that, when such world collapse occurs, we do not instantly forfeit the skills, capacities, and inclinations that this identity previously organized. Indeed, in such a situation, we tend to continue projecting ourselves upon an absent project (for a time at least – the time it takes to mourn that project or else replace it, redirecting or abandoning the skills, capacities, and desires it organized). Even after that world collapses, we will keep pressing blindly ahead, although the project that previously organized this projection is no longer there for us to press ahead into. I submit that it is this paradoxical situation, in which we do indeed continue to become what we no longer are, that Heidegger calls "being toward death" – and it forms, as we will see by way of conclusion, a crucial part of what allows him meaningfully to exhort a self who cannot ultimately be *anything* to: "Become what you are!"

5. Authenticity: Philosophical education as preparation for death and rebirth

I mentioned earlier that "Dasein" and "human being" are not coextensive, and that we would need to unpack the sense in which a human being *is* (or *becomes*) a Dasein carefully, so as not to undercut, with one stroke, the force of the perfectionist injunction to "Become what you are!" Here, to cut to the chase, is how Heidegger does it: "Dasein becomes 'essentially' Dasein in that authentic existence which constitutes itself as anticipatory resoluteness." (B&T 370/S&Z 323) Put simply, we "become what we are" only by becoming *authentic*.[29] Now, authenticity is a complex and important notion (well deserving of the attention it has often received as a separate topic of study), but the distinction we have drawn between being-possible and ability-to-be can help us sketch the two basic components of Heidegger's full formal conception of "authenticity" as *anticipatory resoluteness*, and thereby get a sense for

the kind of self Heidegger exhorts us to become. I draw support for this reading from one of Heidegger's undated marginal comments to *Being and Time*, where he writes that "anticipatory resoluteness" is "[a]mbiguous: existentiell project and existential self-understanding projecting itself into that project belong together here" (B&T 372/S&Z 325; GA2 430 note a). In "anticipating" or, better, "running-out" (*vorlaufen*) toward death, I will now suggest, we experience ourselves as an existential projecting without any existentiell projects to project ourselves upon, and so come to understand ourselves as, at bottom, an existential *projecting*, a projecting which is more basic than and independent of any of the particular projects which usually give our lives content and meaning. This will take a bit of explaining.

The difference between being-possible and ability-to-be, we have seen, is the difference between our life-projects and our projecting ourselves upon those life projects. Usually we project ourselves upon our projects by skillfully coping through, rather than theoretically deliberating over, the live-options these projects delimit and render salient for us – except, for example, in cases when something goes wrong or breaks-down. Heidegger thinks it is possible, however, for all of my projects to break down simultaneously; indeed, this is precisely what he thinks will happen to anyone who endures a true confrontation with their existential *Angst*. If we endure our anxiety rather than fleeing it back into *das Man*'s "indifferent tranquility as to the 'fact' that one dies" – a flight by which we transform "this anxiety into fear in the face of an oncoming event" that remains somewhere off in the future (B&T 298/S&Z 254) – it becomes possible, *Being and Time* suggests, for us to trace this anxiety back to its source in our basic "uncanniness" (*Unheimlichkeit*), that existential *homelessness* which follows from the fact that there is no life project any of us can ever be finally at home in, since there is ultimately nothing about the ontological structure of the self which could even so much as suggest that we should become grief counselors rather than gossip columnists (as Dreyfus provocatively puts it). This scenario, in which I pursue my anxiety to the point where my life-projects all break down or collapse, is the first component of authenticity Heidegger calls "anticipating" or "running-out" toward death.[30]

To grasp what Heidegger thinks the self ultimately boils down to (in this, as it were, existential version of the phenomenological reduction), it is crucial to remember that when my projects all break-down or collapse, leaving me without any life-project to project myself upon, projection itself does not cease.[31] When my being-possible becomes impossible, I still am; my ability-to-be becomes blind, unable to connect to my world, but not inert. My projects collapse, and I no longer have a self to be, but I still *am* this inability to be. Heidegger calls this paradoxical condition revealed by running-out "the possibility of an impossibility," or *death*. In his words:

> Death, as possibility, gives Dasein nothing to be "actualized," nothing which Dasein could itself actually *be*. It is the possibility of the impossibility of every way of comporting oneself toward anything, of every way of existing. (B&T 307/S&Z 262)

We can see the phenomenon Heidegger has in mind if we again generalize from the breaking-down of one project to the catastrophic collapse of them all. A student can explicitly encounter her computer – a carpenter her hammer, a commuter her car – as a tool with a specific role to play in an equipmental nexus organized by her self-understanding when this tool breaks down: When the hard-drive crashes the night before a paper is due, the hammer breaks and cannot be fixed or replaced in the middle of a job, or the car breaks down on the way to an important meeting, leaving the commuter stranded by the side of the road. Just so, Dasein can explicitly encounter its structure as the embodiment of a self-understanding when its projects all break down in death. Dasein, stranded (as it were) by the global collapse of its projects, can come explicitly to recognize itself as, at bottom, not any particular self or project, but rather as a *projecting* into projects, as (to return to Heidegger's version of perfectionism's ontological thesis) a being who takes a stand on its being and is defined by that stand.[32]

This, moreover, helps us see why, for Heidegger, *death* (unlike "demise") *is something I live through*. Heidegger himself stresses the paradox that Dasein lives through its death when he writes: "Death is a way to be, which Dasein takes over as soon as it is." (B&T 289/S&Z 245) Heidegger's point, I take it, is that the projecting we experience when we are unable to connect to our projects is what is most basic about us; this existential projecting is implicit in all of our ordinary *projecting* upon projects, but it also inalienably survives the loss of Dasein's any and every particular project (which is why Heidegger frequently refers to death as Dasein's "ownmost ability-to-be" [B&T 303/S&Z 258]).[33] How, then, can we "live through" death? As Heidegger's quote above suggests, there is a sense in which we are unknowingly *living through death* all the time (as long as we *exist*, "standing-out" or *projecting* ourselves into our projects), but the actual experience of complete world-collapse and subsequent passage through death is what Heidegger calls "resoluteness," and it is the second structural moment in his phenomenological account of *authenticity*. Resoluteness is at least as complex a phenomenon as anticipation, but at its core is Dasein's accomplishment of a reflexive reconnection to the world of projects lost in death, a recovery made possible by an encounter of the self with itself in death. On the basis of the insight gained from this lucid self-encounter, it becomes possible for us to recover ourselves and reconnect to the practical world we are usually connected to effortlessly and unreflexively.

As I understand it, this reconnection turns on our giving up the unreflexive, paralyzing belief that there is a single correct choice to make, since recognizing that there is no such correct choice (because there is no substantive self to determine such a choice) is what gives us the *freedom* to choose. As Heidegger puts it:

> If Dasein, by running-out, lets death become powerful in itself, then, as free for death, Dasein understands itself in its own *greater power*, the power of its finite freedom, so that in this freedom, which "is" only in its having chosen to make such a choice, it can take over the *powerlessness* of abandonment to its having done so, and can thus come to see clearly what in the situation is up to chance [and, correlatively, what is up to Dasein]. (B&T 436/S&Z 384).

"Resoluteness" (*Entschlossenheit*) is Heidegger's name for such free decisions, by which we recognize that the self, as a (projectless) projecting, is more powerful than (that is, *survives*) death (the collapse of its projects), and so become capable of "choosing to choose," making a lucid reconnection to the world. The freedom of such meta-decisions is "finite" because it is always constrained – by Dasein's own *facticity* (our inherited talents, cares, and predispositions, which can be altered piecemeal but not simply thrown off in some Sartrean "radical choice"), by the pre-existing concerns of our time and "generation" (to which we cannot but respond in one way or another), by the facts of the specific situation we confront (and Heidegger stresses that we cannot fully appreciate which of these facts can be altered until we act and so enter into this situation concretely), as well as by that which remains unpredictable about the future (including the reactions of others). Nevertheless, it is by embracing this finitude – giving up our naïve desire for either absolute freedom or a single correct choice and instead accepting that our finite freedom always operates against a background of constraint (in which there is usually more than one "right" answer, rather than none at all) – that we are able to overcome that paralysis of our projects experienced in death. It is thus important that Heidegger sometimes hyphenates "*Ent-schlossenheit*" – literally, "un-closedness" – in order to emphasize that the existential "resoluteness" whereby Dasein freely chooses the commitments which define it does not entail deciding on a particular course of action ahead of time and obstinately sticking to one's guns come what may, but rather requires an "openness" whereby one continues to be responsive to the emerging solicitations of, and unpredictable elements in, the particular existential "situation," the full reality of which only the actual decision itself discloses.

In resolve's decisive "moment of insight," Dasein is (like a gestalt switch) set free rather than paralyzed by the indeterminateness of its choice of projects,

and so can project itself into its chosen project in a way which expresses its sense that, although this project is appropriated from a storehouse of publicly intelligible roles inherited from the tradition, it nevertheless matters that this particular role has been chosen by this particular Dasein and updated, *via* a "reciprocative rejoinder" (B&T 438/S&Z 386), to meet its particular ontic and factical aptitudes as these intersect with the pressing needs of its time and generation. Instead of simply taking over our projects from *das Man* (by going with the flow, following the path of least resistance, or simply doing what one should do), it thus becomes possible, through resolve, to take over a project reflexively, and thus to reappropriate oneself, to "become what we are" by breaking the previously unnoticed grip arbitrarily exerted upon us by *das Man*'s ubiquitous norms of social propriety, its pre- and proscriptions on *what one does*.[34] Indeed, *Being and Time* describes the perfectionist repossession of the self in just these terms:

> With Dasein's lostness in the one [*das Man*], . . .Dasein makes no choices, gets carried along by the nobody, and thus ensnares itself in inauthenticity. This process can be reversed only if Dasein specifically brings itself back from its lostness in the one. . . .When Dasein thus brings itself back from the one, the one-self is modified in an existentiell manner so that it **becomes *authentic* being-one's-self**. This must be accomplished [or fulfilled, *vollziehen*] by *making up for not choosing*. But "making up" for not choosing signifies *choosing to make this choice* – deciding for an ability-to-be [i.e., pressing into a particular possibility], and making this decision from one's own self. In choosing to make this [particular] choice, Dasein *makes possible*, first and foremost, its authentic ability-to-be. (B&T 312-3, my bold/S&Z 268)[35]

This literally "revolutionary" image of repossessing oneself by first turning away from and then turning back to the world is implicit in many of Heidegger's most direct descriptions of authenticity – as, again, when he emphasizes that in resoluteness we do indeed reconnect to the same public world we first turn against:

> The authentic existentiell understanding is so far from extricating itself from the way of interpreting Dasein which has come down to us, that in each case *it is in terms of this interpretation, against it, and yet again for it*, that any possibility one has chosen is seized upon in one's resolution.
>
> The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself discloses current factical possibilities of authentic existing *in terms of the heritage* which that resoluteness *takes over* as thrown. (B&T 435, first emphasis mine/S&Z 383)

As these passages indicate, it is through "becoming ourselves" in authenticity that we accomplish what Heidegger calls the "handing down of the

heritage," the "reciprocative rejoinder" by which we critically appropriate and so update select aspects of the "tradition" in order to meet the needs of the time, transforming an otherwise dying "tradition" into a living "heritage," and so helping to constitute the communal "destiny" of our "generation" (B&T 435-6/S&Z 384-5). It is thus that, as Young puts it, "*Being and Time* tries to mark out a conception of the flourishing life, the life lived in the light of an 'authentic' facing up to death and commitment to communal 'destiny.'" In other words, as Guignon writes, "To 'become who you are' ...is to identify what really matters in the historical situation in which you find yourself and to take a resolute stand on pursuing those ends."[36]

In sum, then, authenticity, as anticipatory resoluteness, names a double movement in which the world lost in anticipation is regained in resolve, a (literally) *revolutionary* movement by which we are involuntarily turned away from the world and then voluntarily turn back to it, in which the grip of the world upon us is broken in order that we may thereby gain (or regain) our grip on this world.[37] Let me conclude by quoting, as one last bit of textual support for the interpretation proposed here, an intriguing marginal note Heidegger appends to the exhortation to "Become what you are!" (in passage P1 above). The note reads: "But who are 'you'? He, as who you are *without* project – as who you *become*. [*Aber wer bist 'du'? Der, als den du dich* los*wirfst – als welcher du* wirst.]" (GA2 194, note a) I take this note to be an oblique reference to *authenticity*, understood in terms of its two constituent moments as *anticipatory resoluteness*. The words before the hyphen ("He, as who you are *without* project") designate *anticipating* (or *running-out*), which we have understood as projecting without a project. The words after the hyphen ("as who you *become*") suggest *resolution*, choosing to choose and so (re)appropriating oneself, *becoming* oneself (anew). The hyphen itself thus stands for the transition through death, the existential rebirth that resoluteness is as a reawakening to and reconnection with a world previously lost or rejected. Authenticity's double movement of death and rebirth has long been thought of as Heidegger's phenomenological version of conversion, since it is a movement in which we turn away from the world, recover ourselves, and then turn back to the world, a world we now see anew, with eyes that have been opened. What is crucial for our purposes here, however, is that this "conversion" – or better, this revolutionary return of the self to itself – is at the very heart of Heidegger's mature *ontologization* of education.[38]

Indeed, to come full circle myself, I argue at length in *Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education* that the later Heidegger seeks to effect nothing less than a re-ontologizing revolution in our understanding of education. As he puts it in 1940: "Real education lays hold of the soul itself and transforms it in its entirety by first of all leading us to the

place of our essential being and accustoming [*eingewöhnt*] us to it." This, for the mature Heidegger, is what it means to "become what we are." Genuine education leads us back to ourselves, to the place we *are* (the *Da* of our *Sein*), teaches us "to dwell" (*wohnen*) "here" and transforms us in the process. This transformative journey back to ourselves is not a flight away from the world into thought, but a reflexive return to the fundamental "realm of the human sojourn [*Aufenthaltsbezirk des Menschen*]."[39] The goal of this educational odyssey remains simple but revolutionary: To bring us full circle back to ourselves, by first turning us away from the world in which we are most immediately immersed and then turning us back to this world in a more reflexive way. I show, moreover, that the later Heidegger develops a surprisingly specific set of pedagogical suggestions concerning how teachers might actually help students effect such a revolutionary recovery of the self – a pedagogical question about which *Being and Time* says little directly, leaving us to wonder if Heidegger really thought teachers should actively seek to foment anxiety attacks, identity crises, or other forms of world-collapse in their students. That the answer to this question is "No" is strongly suggested by *Being and Time*'s primary pedagogical insight, namely, the distinction between a "leaping ahead" which "liberates" and a "leaping in" which "dominates" (B&T 158-9/S&Z 122), a distinction which for Heidegger maps onto the difference between authentic and inauthentic methods of pedagogical "being-together" (*Mitsein*). This distinction still leaves us wondering, however, what the early Heidegger thought teachers might do *directly* – as well as how far he thought they should go *indirectly* – to help students achieve authenticity. This pressing pedagogical problem may have encouraged Heidegger temporarily to shift his phenomenological focus from anxiety to *boredom*, an attunement he could seek to evoke in his students – as he undoubtedly does (for more than one hundred pages!) in his 1929-1930 lectures on *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* – without putting their psychological stability at risk.[40] This does not solve the problem, unfortunately, because Heidegger's short-lived evocation of boredom has a quite different pedagogical effect than anxiety; the phenomenology of boredom helps students step outside the totality of entities and so take up the perspective from which metaphysics becomes possible, the very perspective Heidegger decisively turns against in his later work.

Indeed, this brings us to the most important difference between Heidegger's mature philosophy of education and the views presented in *Being and Time*. Although both share the sense that the work of philosophical education turns, finally, on a kind of self-recovery, and both stress that this recovery must be won by recognizing, confronting, and overcoming a pre-existing source of resistance, in *Being and Time* this basic resistance to self-repossession is exerted by the inertial undertow of *das Man* (which encourages conformism

and so discourages individuality), whereas in the later work such resistance comes, ultimately, from the unnoticed effects exercised on us by a set of historically specific metaphysical or, more precisely, *ontotheological* presuppositions (which generate and entrench our ongoing transformation of reality into a pool of intrinsically-meaningless resources merely standing by to be optimized). Thus the philosophical goal of Heidegger's early educational views – an edifying, empowering, and liberating reconnection to the world (which is not without historically transformative aspirations) – becomes more precise in Heidegger's later work, which seeks to bring about the transformation of our particular historical self-understanding by teaching us to recognize, contest, and so work to transcend the nihilistic ontotheology that undergirds our age.[41]

Notes

1. *Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) does establish an important connection between Heidegger's philosophy of education and *Being and Time* by showing how his early magnum opus articulates the philosophical view of the relation between philosophy and the other sciences that motivated Heidegger's attempt to transform the German university in 1933–1934. I thus argue that the controversial connection between Heidegger's philosophy and his politics cannot be understood apart from his radical philosophical efforts to rethink and reform higher education. Instead of using this connection as an excuse to dismiss Heidegger's later views on education, however, I suggest that his prescient critique of the university has only become more relevant since he elaborated it, and that, with the important philosophical corrections to this philosophical research program suggested by his so-called "turn," the later Heidegger's mature vision for a reontologization of education merits the careful attention of those of us now seeking to understand the roots and implications of our own growing crisis in higher education.
2. Michael A. Peters overstates the matter when he recounts searching through two comprehensive digital archives in vain for "a single reference to [Heidegger's] educational thought or the educational significance of his philosophy" in August 2000 (see his "Introduction" to Michael A. Peters, ed., *Heidegger, Education, and Modernity* [Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002], 4). In fact, Peters's book makes an important contribution to a small but significant secondary literature on the topic of Heidegger and the philosophy of education by such leading thinkers as Michael Bonnett, David Cooper, Paul Standish, and Nigel Blake (a literature with which *Heidegger on Ontotheology* engages directly). This literature includes some important work on the educational significance of *Being and Time*'s notion of "authenticity," but Heidegger's *own* philosophy of education in *Being and Time* remains, as far as I can tell, unrecognized and so unexplored. This paper is conceived as the beginning of a response to this lacuna in the philosophical, hermeneutic, and educational literature on Heidegger. It also represents a kind of postscript to *Heidegger on Ontotheology* – or perhaps a "prequel," if we understand that term as designating a sequel the subject of which chronologically precedes the original (and thus a work which, although independent, remains connected to the "original" in a number of complex ways). I also hope it will stand as a preface to work underway and still to come.

3. Why did Heidegger choose to present his views of education in *Being and Time* with such subtlety? It is tempting to suppose that he was trying to fly beneath the radar here, not because the "philosophy of education" would have been seen as a less serious subject than ontology, even for a famous teacher such as Heidegger (such an explanation would be anachronistic, since the marginalization of the philosophy of education took place between Heidegger's time and our own), but for the opposite reason, namely, that the philosophy of education was so central and highly-charged a philosophical topic in 1920s Germany that Heidegger would not have wanted to look like he was jumping on the bandwagon. (I treat this historical background in *Heidegger on Ontotheology*, Ch. 3.) I suspect that the reason for Heidegger's subtlety (beyond general issues concerning the difficulty of his style, even in *Being and Time*) may be double: Both to shelter the content of the teaching from hostile (and so impatient) readers, and, conversely, to help ensure that these teachings would be received only by those willing to struggle with the ideas in order to make them their own, because only such an audience would be able to *understand* them in the immediate, practical sense in which, I will suggest, they are intended.
4. I present an historical genealogy of the development of Heidegger's philosophical views on education in *Heidegger on Ontotheology*, Ch. 3, and develop his mature philosophy of education in Ch. 4.
5. Neuroses, of course, come in varying degrees, and in colloquial use, "perfectionism" often connotes merely the tendency not to be satisfied by one's own work. Even in colloquial use, however, this dissatisfaction is taken to derive less from the merits of one's work than from features of one's psychology. By "psychological perfectionism," then, I mean more full-blown versions of this neurosis, in which one is *never* satisfied by one's work, no matter how good it may be. Because psychological perfectionism tends both (1) to impede the completion of particular tasks and (2) to distort an accurate appreciation of the relative successes and failures of these tasks, and because both 1 and 2 are required in order to fulfill the aim of philosophical perfectionism (viz., the development of our relevantly distinctive skills and capacities), *psychological perfectionism is in tension with philosophical perfectionism*. This tension remains even if the version of philosophical perfectionism under consideration abjures, or infinitely defers, the actual attainment of perfection (i.e., the final completion or fulfillment of our relevantly distinctive capacities), as is the case with Kant (for whom such goals as the kingdom of ends and the cosmopolis usually function as regulative ideals – unreachable, guiding stars by which we can chart our never-ending progress), Nietzsche (whose doctrine of the superman holds that "humanity [too] is something that must be superceded," since the one constant of "will-to-power," the essence of life, is to supercede all previous forms of itself), and Cavell (who treats "perfection [only] as *perfecting*"). Other perfectionists, however, do believe that the perfection of our distinctive nature is attainable (however episodically), as did Aristotle, with his conception of intellectual virtue (outlined below), and Heidegger, with his understanding of authentic resolve (which includes the resolution to keep repeating itself).
6. See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. H. Rachham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934), I.vii.9–16, 31–4 (1097b22–1098a20); and Jonathan Lear, *Aristotle: The Desire to Understand* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 160–4. For a detailed conceptual critique of the perfectionist tradition, and an innovative attempt to construct a naturalistically-defensible, contemporary version of perfectionism, see Thomas Hurka, *Perfectionism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
7. In cases such as the last, does it even makes sense to speak of our relevantly distinctive "essence" or "nature"? And if not, is Nietzsche really a perfectionist? Yes, I think, but a

perfectionist who focuses on the essence of *life* in general, not of human life in particular. As mentioned in note 5, Nietzsche thought that the cultivation and development of the essence of life in general (viz., "will-to-power") led inexorably toward the supercession of human life. This is his rightfully controversial doctrine of the "superman," his claim that "humanity too is something that must be superceded." (I discuss Nietzsche's call for the post-human in "Deconstructing the Hero," in Jeff McLaughlin, ed., *Comics as Philosophy* [University Press of Mississippi, forthcoming 2005], and in "Ontology and Ethics at the Intersection of Phenomenology and Environmental Philosophy," *Inquiry* 47:4 [2004], 380–412.) The penultimate doctrine on my list I associate with Rorty, an avowed "anti-essentialist" who nevertheless maintains a perfectionist view when he proclaims that we are basically self-interpreting animals (and so, he would have it, essentially inessential), and that we are at our best insofar as we maximally develop our interpretive capacities (letting "a thousand interpretations bloom" in order to replenish the field of historical intelligibility, in which even the brightest poetic blooms fade away with everyday use).

8. On Kant's argument concerning humanity's "*unsocial sociability*," see the "Fourth Thesis" of his "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent," in *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*, Ted Humphrey, trans. (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1983), 31–2.
9. Thomas Hurka suggests a distinction between "broad" and "narrow perfectionism," where the latter designates *moral* perfectionism, but this does not address the point that broad perfectionism cuts across – and, indeed, *undercuts* – the standard cartography of the competing moral traditions (*Perfectionism*, 4). Cavell does better to suggest that perfectionism "is not a competing theory of the moral life, but something like a dimension or tradition of the moral life that spans the course of Western thought," a tradition which itself suggests that "morality is not the subject of a separate philosophical study or field" (*Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism* [Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1990], 2, 7). Cavell's sprawling argument with Rawls over whether perfectionism is "elitist" rightly suggests that perfectionism possesses an ineliminable political dimension (see ibid., passim; and Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, section 50, on "the principle of perfection" [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971], 325–32), and the political implications of perfectionism are debated further in George Sher, *Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) and Steven Wall and George Klosko, eds, *Perfectionism and Neutrality: Essays in Liberal Theory* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003); the debate centers on the question of whether perfectionism's political demands conflict with the formal neutrality often thought to be required by political liberalism.

I suspect that in my short list of philosophical perfectionists, the inclusion of Mill will be most controversial (at least to those familiar with Kant's political philosophy, where his perfectionism is obvious). There are interesting tensions between Mill's consequentialism and his perfectionism, but a strong perfectionist streak undeniably animates his work (and probably better accounts for its enduring appeal than do his staid consequentialist views). Mill writes, for example, that: "Among the works of man which human life is rightly employed in perfecting and beautifying, the first in importance is surely man himself. . . . It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in themselves, but by cultivating it and calling it forth, within the limits imposed by the rights and interests of others, that human beings become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation; and as the works partake of the character of those who do them, by the same process human life also becomes rich, diversified, and animating, furnishing more abundant aliment to high thoughts and elevating feelings, and strengthening the tie which binds every individual to the [human]

race, by making the race infinitely better worth belonging to" (*On Liberty* [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978], 56, 60). Recall, too, that Mill opens this great work with an epigraph drawn from Wilhelm von Humboldt stressing "the absolute and essential importance of human development [almost certainly Mill's translation of *Bildung*] in its richest diversity" and approvingly quotes (again in his own translation) Humboldt's dictum that "the end of man... prescribed by the eternal and immutable dictates of reason... is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole" (55).

10. Haugeland famously suggests that the reference of "Dasein" is, in principle at least, broader than that of "human being." I am sympathetic to this strategy, and have argued elsewhere that *Being and Time*'s revolutionary reconception of the self not as a thinking substance, subject, ego, or consciousness, but as a *Dasein* – a "being-here," that is, a temporally-structured making-intelligible of the place in which I find myself – suggests how we might develop a philosophically-defensible and ethically-indispensable argument for awarding "rights" (understood as political protections intrinsically merited by all agents capable of reflexively pursuing life-projects) to every Dasein, that is, to every entity who has a temporally-enduring world that matters to it explicitly. See John Haugeland, "Heidegger on Being a Person," *Nous* 16 (1982), 6–26, and, for the argument that, Heidegger's intentions notwithstanding, his conception of Dasein promises us a philosophically-defensible, non-speciesist way of making ethically and politically indispensable distinctions between something like "lower" and "higher" forms of life (distinctions missing from other avowedly non-speciesist ethical views), see my "Ontology and Ethics."

Now, such a perfectionist approach does not *equate* Dasein with human being, but it does seek to ground our understanding of what is most significantly distinctive about *being* human in an understanding of Dasein as the ontological, world-disclosing entity, and some will worry that this strategy courts the old charge of "anthropologism" that has long haunted the reception of Heidegger's early work. Such a worry, however, remains groundless. For, as I explain in *Heidegger on Ontotheology*, one of the major motivations behind *Being and Time*'s quest for a "fundamental ontology" is Heidegger's ambition to unify and guide *all* of the "positive sciences" (his name for all academic disciplines other than philosophy, which are guided by an ontological understanding of the being of the classes of entities they study), anthropology thus included. The positive science of anthropology, Heidegger contends, cannot explicitly understand the being of the human (although the domain and methods of anthropological research remain guided by an implicit understanding of the "humanity" of the human being); anthropology must instead take over its guiding understanding of the being of the class of (human) entities that it studies from philosophy, conceived as a general inquiry into the being of entities. If fundamental ontology succeeded in discovering "the meaning of being in general," Heidegger believed, this would help anthropologists finally gain a clear and explicit understanding of the being of the human. The fact, then, that Heidegger thought his understanding of Dasein as the distinctively ontological entity would help clarify the understanding of the being of the human that guides anthropology does not make *Being and Time* objectionably *anthropological*, no more than the analogous fact that Heidegger thought his understanding of the "proper historicality" of the historical would help guide the research of historians makes *Being and Time* a merely *historical* work. I am thus inclined to believe that, as Heidegger himself always insisted, the charge of "anthropologism" has been a red herring from the start, one that fails to understand the way in which the ontological difference distinguishes the work of the positive sciences from that of philosophical ontology (as I explain in detail in Ch. 3 of *Heidegger on Ontotheology*).

11. "B&T" is, of course, an abbreviated reference to Heidegger, *Being and Time*, J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, trans. (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), while "S&Z" refers to its German counterpart (*Sein und Zeit*, [Tübingen: M. Niemeyer Verlag, 1993]); unprefixed page-numbers in what follows refer to these texts, although I have occasionally modified the translation.
12. Conflicts between our personal and professional lives provide ready examples of this. If, e.g., my daughter has just told me that she is unhappy with how late I have been coming home from the office, then that same unexpected student visit may show up in a kind of dual, conflicting light, reflecting an ambivalence in the embodied self-understandings in virtue of which I am being pulled in two different directions. Moreover, since I suggest (in passing) a conflict between the life projects of "teacher" and "scholar," I should perhaps explicitly state my belief that, at its best, being a teacher and a scholar function synergistically, like two mutually reinforcing aspects of the same life-project, in which research emerges from teaching and also feeds back into and informs it (and vice versa).
13. Hubert L. Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Being and Time*, Division I (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), 23. Dreyfus expresses the converse point on 15: "Dasein's activity – its way of being – manifests a stand it is taking on what it is to be Dasein."
14. See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, X.viii, 7, 623 (1178b8); X.vii.9-viii.1, 619 (1178a1-10). In order to emphasize the contrast with Heidegger's perfectionism, my presentation of Aristotle simplifies his internally contradictory and therefore controversial views on the relative merits of our intellectual and practical virtues in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. I do, however, take the passage just quoted – in which Aristotle emphasizes the great importance of the practical virtues even as he subordinates them to a conception of our greatest intellectual fulfillment – to represent his considered view.
15. I develop these points in "Can I Die? Derrida on Heidegger on Death," *Philos. Today* 43:1 (1999), 29–42.
16. Similarly, Heidegger maintains that: "If being-in-the-world is a kind of being which is essentially befitting to Dasein, then to understand being-in-the-world belongs to the essential content of its understanding of being." (B&T 118/S&Z 86) These passages (significant differences notwithstanding) show that Heidegger believed ontological theory-building to be an excrescence of the very capacities that make our form of life distinctive.
17. As several commentators have suggested, it is slightly misleading to say that Heidegger's conception of authenticity represents a practical *rather than* a theoretical ideal of Dasein's greatest fulfillment, for two reasons (having to do with the two interconnected components of authenticity, namely, anticipation and resoluteness, to which we will return below). First, because Heidegger's discovery of anticipation (or "running-out" toward death) as a basic "protopractical" level of existence presupposed by our *practical* as well as our theoretical endeavors risks undermining the use of the theory/practice dichotomy to characterize his views. (For the sake of clarity, I am bracketing this complex issue here.) Second, because, according to Heidegger's description of "resolution," Dasein attains practical fulfillment by incorporating a kind of insight – *which can in some cases be properly characterized as theoretical* – into its own being gained from its fundamental confrontation with itself in death. (On this point, see also note 35 below.) As Dreyfus puts the point, Dasein's "fully *authentic* way of acting [is] made possible by Dasein's understanding of its own *way of being*." (See Dreyfus, "Could Anything Be More Intelligible than Everyday Intelligibility? Reinterpreting Division I of *Being and Time* in

the Light of Division II," in Mark Wrathall, ed., *Appropriating Heidegger* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000], 166. Dreyfus's important essay also nicely sorts out the two different notions of *kairos* influencing Heidegger's conception of authenticity, viz., "the Greek act of seizing the occasion" and "the Christian experience of being reborn" [164]).

18. This also helps explain why (as Dreyfus objects) Heidegger seems to contradict himself methodologically in *Being and Time*, maintaining the necessity of a hermeneutic of suspicion for the most part only in Division II. (See Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World*, 35–8.)
19. See Hurka, *Perfectionism*, 4; Pinkard, *Hegel: A Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2000), 427.
20. See Cavell, *This New Yet Unapproachable America: Lectures After Emerson After Wittgenstein* (Albuquerque, NM: Living Batch Press, 1989), 9; Raymond Geuss, *Morality, Culture, and History: Essays on German Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 45, note 9: Geuss points out that *Bildung* comes from *Bild*, "sign or image" (as in *Einbildungskraft*, "the faculty for unifying images" or simply "imagination"), while "building" comes from "a completely different Indo-European root having to do with 'dwelling.'"
21. Hence the title of *Heidegger on Ontotheology*'s concluding chapter: "Heidegger's Mature Vision of Ontological Education, or How We Become What We Are."
22. See E. Capps et al., eds, *The Odes of Pindar*, J. Sandy, trans. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1915), 178–9; Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is*; Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments*, trans. D. F. Swenson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), 116. For a genealogy of this powerful perfectionist trope, see Joachim Oberst, "Heidegger's Appropriation of Aristotle's *Dunamis/Energeia* Distinction," *American Catholic Philosophical Quart.* 78:1 (2004), 28–32. See also Charles Guignon, "History and Historicity," in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark Wrathall, eds, *A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism* (Oxford: Blackwell, forthcoming 2006).
23. Given the fairly obvious solution I offer in the next sentence of the text, it seems strange that Sher should so precipitously take this paradox to be a standing refutation of any perfectionism that stresses the development of our *essential* defining traits or capacities: "The problem lies in the nature of the essential human properties: because these are properties that every human already has, . . . their possession by humans is not anything that anyone can bring about or prevent. And, for this reason, no theory that identifies the human good with their possession seems capable of telling us anything about what anyone should *do*" (*Beyond Neutrality*, 221). Perhaps Sher does not consider the solution I offer because he does not distinguish perfectionism's ontological and ethical theses, and because his strong communitarian adherence to the Hegelian view that "each person defines himself through the eyes of the others" (206) leads him to ignore perfectionism's traditional commitment to a *radically individualistic* notion of the "absolute responsibility of the self to itself"; for, as Cavell points out, perfectionism traditionally turns on some notion of "being true to oneself – or to the humanity in oneself, or of the soul as on a journey (upward or onward) that begins by finding oneself lost to the world, and requires a refusal of society" (*Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome*, xxvii, 1).
24. Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World*, 312. Dreyfus adds: "Dasein has no possibilities of its own and. . . can never have any" (ibid.). As Carman points out, this "sounds dangerously close to saying that Dasein cannot *be* its own, that is, cannot be authentic (*eigentlich*). But this is not what Dreyfus has in mind" (see Taylor Carman, *Heidegger's Analytic: Interpretation,*

Discourse, and Authenticity in Being and Time [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003], 286). See also William D. Blattner, "The Concept of Death in *Being and Time*," *Man and World* 27 (1994), 321–39, and *Heidegger's Temporal Idealism* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1999), 76–88.

25. "Dasein always exists in such a manner that its "not yet" *belongs* to it. . . . Dasein must, as itself, *become* – that is to say, *be* – what it is not yet." (B&T 287/S&Z 243) Indeed, although I cannot develop this here, Heidegger clearly believes that it is "anticipation" or "running out" toward death that reveals the original horizon of "futurity" as such. For, Dasein encounters the pure "to come" (*Zu-kunft*) when existence projects itself forward into a world with which it cannot identify, and, rebounding from this world, encounters *itself* as a temporally-ecstatic being-in-the-world. (I say more about death and futurity in "Can I Die? Derrida on Heidegger on Death"; see also note 32 below.)
26. Hermeneuts might consider another example: Heidegger understands himself in *Being and Time* as searching for a fundamental ontology, but this is a destination at which he in fact never arrives, and which later he will explicitly reject. Still, this fundamental textual self-understanding allows Heidegger to press forward into and develop all manner of phenomenological and hermeneutic analyses and insights, many of which remain meaningful and important even in the absence left by the collapse of the overarching project in the service of which they were originally presented. Combined with what I will argue below, this perhaps suggests the *authenticity* of the later Heidegger's work, with which he finds a way to reconnect to the world after the collapse of *Being and Time*'s fundamental project. (Indeed, there is a deep connection between the "nothing" encountered in death's projectless projecting and the later Heidegger's crucial notion of "being as such" in its *difference* from the metaphysically conceived "being of entities," as I argue in "The Danger and the Promise of Heidegger: An American Perspective," forthcoming in a French translation in Joseph Cohen, ed., *Heidegger – le danger et la promesse* [Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, January 2006]. See also note 38 below.)
27. See Blattner, *Heidegger's Temporal Idealism*, 41. Blattner suggests the further difference that as ability-to-be we always press into one possibility rather than another (S&Z 285), while our being-possible is always multiple, since "Dasein is never just one for-the-sake-of-which" (*Heidegger's Temporal Idealism*, 41, note 14). Blattner is certainly right about us late moderns, with our increasingly flexible, transient or fluctuating identities, but Heidegger – who was influenced by Kierkegaard's call for a single, defining existential commitment – would have criticized this fact about us, lamenting our loss of a robustly unified sense of self (esp. in his later work, as I suggest in *Heidegger on Ontotheology*).
28. "In interpretation, understanding does not become something different. It becomes itself." (B&T 188/S&Z 148). See also B&T 353/S&Z 305.
29. As Heidegger writes: "The meaning of Dasein's being is not something free-floating which is other than and 'outside of' itself, but is the self-understanding Dasein itself." (B&T 372/S&Z 325)
30. Heidegger's heroic image of "charging forward [*vorlaufen*] toward death" seems to have been drawn from Jünger's grim yet romantic description of German soldiers charging blindly from the trenches through clouds of poisonous gas meant to cover and aid the *Blitzkrieg* – gas attacks which Heidegger's own "weather service" unit helped plan. See Ernst Jünger, *Storm of Steel*, M. Hofmann, trans. (New York: Penguin, 2004) and Ch. 4 of my *Heidegger on Ontotheology*. I thank Taylor Carman for originally suggested this connection to me.

31. See Stephen Crowell, "Subjectivity: Locating the First-Person in *Being and Time*," *Inquiry* 44:4 (2001), 433–54.
32. Thus, qualifying his description of Dasein – radically individualized by its confrontation with anxiety – as a "self alone" (*solus ipse*), Heidegger writes: "But this existential 'solipsism' is so far from the displacement of putting an isolated subject thing [a jab at Descartes' oxymoronic conception of the self as *res cogitans*] into the undifferentiated emptiness of a worldless occurring, that in an extreme sense what it does is precisely to bring Dasein face to face with its world as world, and thus bring it face to face with itself as being-in-the-world." (B&T 233/S&Z 188) Heidegger also describes this "self" of pure "mineness" as "a naked 'that-it-is-*and-has-to-be*'" (B&T 173, my emphasis/S&Z 134). By anxiously "running out" toward death, the possibility of an impossibility, "Dasein is taken all the way back to its naked uncanniness, and becomes fascinated by it. This fascination, however, not only *takes* Dasein back from its '*worldly*' possibilities, but at the same time *gives* Dasein the possibility of an *authentic* ability-to-be" (B&T 394/S&Z 344).
33. If I put this point slightly more provocatively than Heidegger himself does, it is because I have found that the main stumbling block for understanding Heidegger's phenomenology of death stems from the fact that he is not talking about what we normally mean by "death," namely, the end of our lives, which he calls "demise" (B&T 291/S&Z 247), although it is important to notice that the phenomena of (ontic) demise and (ontological) death are related by shared formal characteristics in the same way that ontic and ontological guilt, although different, remain related by shared structural characteristics that can be "formally indicated." Of course, Heidegger's full formal characterization of death (B&T 303/S&Z 258–9) includes not only its being Dasein's "ownmost" ability-to-be, but also its being "non-relational" (hence individualizing), "non-surpassable" (we cannot get out of it – what I have called "living through" death does not put us beyond death, which we continue to live through – and Heidegger suggests that death's unsurpassability brings home Dasein's finitude, encouraging us to see other Daseins' projects as the work of potential collaborators or heirs rather than competitors), "certain" (indeed, the very paradigm of certainty, because it conditions every experience and remains indubitable), and "imminent" (as noted earlier, death's projectless projection constitutes the baseline temporal horizon, futurity, within which all our particular projects unfold, and this imminence, Heidegger suggests, leads Dasein to become aware of its vulnerability, the fact that none of its projects are ever finally complete or secure). There is no room here to develop the arguments for these sketchy claims, but what I take to be crucial is that these five structural features of death (that it is ownmost, non-relational, non-surpassable, certain, and imminent) are all descriptions drawn from a formal analysis of ontic *demise* (i.e., what we normally mean by "death"). Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation of death begins by isolating ("formally indicating") these structural characteristics of demise, and then gives them a phenomenological interpretation which will be compelling insofar as it resonates with and illuminates our own experience. This is important because it shows that, here as elsewhere, the ontic and the ontological are not *heterogeneous* domains (*pace* orthodox Heideggerians and influential critics like Habermas), but rather necessarily overlap and interpenetrate, and must, in order for the method of *Being and Time* (viz., phenomenological attestation) to work, i.e., to be convincing. (I develop this argument in "The End of Ontotheology: Understanding Heidegger's Turn, Method, and Politics," UCSD Ph.D. dissertation, 1999, Ch. 5.) A significant obstacle to checking Heidegger's analysis of death phenomenologically, then, comes from the fact that what Heidegger calls "death" (namely, the projectless projecting we experience in the wake of the global collapse of the inauthentic one-self we

continually accrue) seems to be an extremely difficult experience for most people to endure – a difficulty conveyed by *Being and Time*'s claim that the avoidance of a confrontation with our anxiety before death is the true engine of Western history. By *anxiety before death*, however, it is again crucial to recognize that Heidegger means the complete collapse of Dasein's world, *not fear concerning our eventual demise*; indeed, he considers such fear of demise – which "perverts anxiety into cowardly fear" (B&T 311/S&Z 266) – to be one of the main ways we flee from our anxiety before death. Heidegger's startling claim – that our fear of demise is really a way of fleeing our anxiety about the global collapse of projects he calls "death" (a flight by which we avoid assuming responsibility for our own fundamental life-projects and identities) – is so strange that, as far as I know, no interpreter has explicitly thematized and addressed it; instead, it is most often miscognized. On understanding Heidegger's strange claim, moreover, many will suspect precisely the opposite: That Heidegger himself has simply reinterpreted "death," transforming it into an event which can be survived, out of his own fear of his inescapable demise. Strong evidence for my reading can thus be found in the fact that Heidegger anticipates that very suspicion, and so goes out of his way to assert that: "Anticipatory resoluteness is not a way of escape, fabricated for the 'overcoming' of death" (B&T 357/S&Z 310). This, of course, does not settle this difficult matter, but only seeks to draw some attention to it.

34. Heidegger's understanding of "finite freedom" is bolstered by Williams's suggestive speculation concerning the roots of the very idea of "liberty," viz., that "it is a plausible guess at a human universal that people resent being, as they see it, arbitrarily pushed around by others." See Bernard Williams, "Liberalism and Loss," in Mark Lilla, Ronald Dworkin, and Robert B. Silvers, eds, *The Legacy of Isaiah Berlin* (New York: New York Review of Books, 2001), 95.
35. As this quote suggests, there are at least two ways in which one can achieve resoluteness, viz., explicitly or lucidly. Out of the confrontation with ourselves made possible by the total collapse of our ontic projects, we can become explicitly aware of our ontological structure as beings who implicitly take a stand on, and so shape, the meaning of our own existence. (Heidegger himself must have *explicitly* experienced authenticity in this way, in order to be able to describe the two moments of anticipatory resoluteness in *Being and Time*. We, moreover, also need to be able to experience authenticity explicitly, if we are to be able to reconnect to the reality Heidegger's analysis discloses, and so find it *phenomenologically* convincing, or not, rather than merely authoritative, suggestive, or fanciful.) On the other hand, this reconnection with one's everyday world can take place *lucidly* rather than *explicitly* – one need not have read *Being and Time* and explicitly understood the structure of existence in order to be able to shake off the arbitrary grip of unchosen ontic projects and sedimented social norms, lucidly repossess oneself, and so become authentic, however transiently. On this issue, see David Cerbone, "Distance and Proximity in Phenomenology: Husserl and Heidegger," *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* III (2003), 1–26.
36. See Julian Young, *Heidegger's Philosophy of Art* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 131; Charles Guignon, *On Being Authentic* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 134.
37. Of course, Heidegger's construal of this transition has seemed overly voluntaristic to critics ever since Levinas's *Time and the Other* (1946), hence the famous but, in my view, mistaken charge of *decisionism* (another issue for another time).
38. Is this the *same* "conversion" I recently argued (in "Ontology and Ethics") was required by Heidegger's "transcendental, eco-phenomenological ethical realism"? To answer this

question, we would have to delve further into the difficult matter of Heidegger's so-called "turn," specifically asking whether orthodox Heideggerians are right to follow Heidegger and insist upon a deep continuity between his early and later work, most convincingly, by postulating that the "nothing" uncovered phenomenologically in death (as well as in *Angst*) in *Being and Time* is the *same* as (1) the nothing revealed in 1929's "What Is Metaphysics?" and also (but more problematically) the same as (2) the nothing Heidegger recognizes *circa* 1937 as the way "being as such" appears to all of us when we view it through the unnoticed lenses of Nietzsche's metaphysics (since Nietzsche's ontotheology of eternally recurring will-to-power dissolves being into *nothing* but becoming). For an illuminating suggestion of such an orthodox Heideggerian argument, see Daniela Vallega-Neu, *Heidegger's* Contributions to Philosophy: *An Introduction* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 1–51.

39. See Heidegger, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth," in *Pathmarks*, William McNeill, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 168/*Gesamtausgabe* Vol. 9: *Wegmarken*, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed. (Frankfurt a. M.: V. Klostermann, 1976), 219. *Aufenthalte* ("halt, abidance, sojourn, stay, or stop-over") is an important term of art for the later Heidegger; it connotes the *finitude* of that journey through intelligibility which is human existence. Since *Aufenthalte* is also the title Heidegger gave to the journal in which he recorded his thoughts during his first trip to Greece in the Spring of 1962, it is tempting to render it as "odyssey" in order to emphasize Heidegger's engagement with the Homeric heritage and the crucial sense of coming full circle back to oneself.
40. See Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, W. McNeill and N. Walker, trans. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 78–167; *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed., *Gesamtausgabe* vols. 29–30 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1992), 117–249.
41. It is Heidegger's later project, just outlined, that I develop in *Heidegger on Ontotheology*. I presented earlier versions of this paper to the International Society for Phenomenological Studies in Asilomar, California, on 17 July 2004, and to the World Congress of Phenomenology in Oxford, England (Wadham College), on 20 August 2004. For insightful criticisms and suggestions, I would like to thank Anne Margaret Baxley, Kelly Becker, Bill Blattner, Taylor Carman, Dave Cerbone, Corbin Collins, Steve Crowell, Bert Dreyfus, Michael Eldred, Béatrice Han, Brent Kalar, Stephan Käufer, Cristina Lafont, Wayne Martin, Mark Okrent, John Richardson, Joe Rouse, Cap Thomson, Mark Wrathall, Julian Young, and several anonymous reviewers.