Appendix I

Note on the Black Notebooks (added June, 2017)

Although many of the more public details of Heidegger’s involvement with Naziism were already known, the beginning of the publication, late in the process of writing The Logic of Being (and after its first draft was already finished), of Heidegger’s Black Notebooks has confirmed the abysmal depths of his anti-Semitism, not only before and during the time of his official involvement with Nazism but for years after. They have also verified the deep and profound failings of personal, ethical, and intellectual integrity and honesty that many have long suspected in him. I certainly do not wish this book to be seen as a contribution either to the defense of these absolutely indefensible views or to that of Heidegger himself against the ongoing demonstration of these profound failings. Nor do I hold that these views and the moral failings that they involve can safely be ignored in the course of any critical evaluation of Heidegger’s thought as a whole. Instead, I hope the results of this investigation will themselves contribute to the ongoing critical discussion, conducted in the light of day and with all evidence on the table, of the problematic relationship between Heidegger’s own views and actions and the many unanswered questions his writings leave for us today.

As noted in the preface, in the argument of the book I draw centrally on some of Heidegger’s ideas in relation to problems about truth and time discussed by Heidegger but also by many other historical and contemporary philosophers. My view when writing the book was that the main ideas of Heidegger’s on which I draw there – chiefly those of ontological difference, the unconcealment conception of truth, the hermeneutics of facticity, and the critique of the onto-theo-logical conception of being as presence – can and should be separated from any of Heidegger’s own specifically ethico-political views, and are also not directly connected to the abhorrent racist and nationalist views so painfully evident in the pages of the Notebooks. This could, though, be disputed, and I do not want to prejudge, here or in the book, the results of an open critical and interpretive discussion on the question. Furthermore, especially in these times of the marked resurgence of nationalism, racism and fascism on the level of national and global politics, there is no task more urgent for intellectuals than to seek to understand the deep sources of these ideologies and the devastating violence they maintain and promulgate. It is my hope that, especially in its critical register, The Logic of Being might be seen by some as, in part, a contribution (however flawed) to this critical discussion, with relevance not simply to Heidegger’s philosophy or legacy but also to the deep and devastating social, ethico-practical, and political problems of the global situation today.
Heidegger, Truth, and Time

The remainder of this appendix comprises material that was cut from earlier versions of The Logic of Being. The material included here falls primarily into three categories: i) exegetical passages on Heidegger’s texts; ii) considerations of, and responses to, existing secondary literature on Heidegger; iii) clarifications of the relationship of the current project to Heidegger’s own stated views and commitments.

Supplemental to Chapter 1:

The Ontological Problematic

The suggestion made here, of a reconciliation of analytic methods of primary linguistical/logical analysis with Heidegger’s ontological inquiry into the truth of beings, will seem to some flatly incompatible with the criticism that Heidegger constantly makes of what he treats as a constitutive and misguided prejudice of traditional logic, namely its tendency to treat the linguistic assertion (Aussage) as the basic locus of truth. By contrast with this prejudice, as Heidegger recurrently emphasizes in Being and Time and elsewhere, for the ontological problematic truth is to be seen as aletheia, or unconcealment, and thus as primarily and essentially a phenomenon whose locus is the disclosure of beings rather than assertions, sentences, judgments, or anything linguistic in nature. Developing this criticism, some have interpreted Heidegger as attributing to Frege and much or all of the analytic tradition a “logical prejudice” that they share with the “logical tradition” since Aristotle. This prejudice consists, in particular, in seeing the logical structure of the predicative sentence as the “basic” or fundamental place of truth, as opposed to those non- or pre-linguistic sites at which entities first manifest themselves (perhaps paradigmatically in the course of engaged activity and non-theoretical practice).

This interpretation is, I think, overstated on the basis of Heidegger’s text and the implication of irreconcilability between the two conceptions of the basis of truth accordingly misguided. The suggestion that there is a basic disagreement about the “primacy” of the sentence as the “basic” locus of truth has little meaning, in particular, unless it is further specified what sense of “primary” and “basic” is at issue. And once this sense is disambiguated, the impression of a deep irreconcilability between the two conceptions can, as I argue in more detail in chapter 3, accordingly dissipate. In particular, if truth is not basically “logical” for Heidegger, it nevertheless remains that, as in the title of the 1925-26 course, the question of logic is in a basic sense the question of truth, and the problematic of truth is unthinkable without a constitutive reference to the problems of logic that unfold and point to it. This is not to say that developing a twofold conception of logic that takes account of the insights of Heidegger’s ontological interrogation as well as the analytic development of the truth-conditional structure of sentences does not involve broadening our understanding of logic. In particular, as we will

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1 This suggestion is made, e.g., by Dahlstrom (2001), pp. 23-28. In particular, Dahlstrom holds that various partisans of the “Fregean tradition” (p. 24) hold the “logical prejudice” of “conceiving truth primarily as a property of a proposition” (p. 17) insofar as they have conceived of “a ‘thought’ or ‘proposition’...as the truth-bearer” (p. 25) or insofar as they have held “redundancy,” “semantic,” or “pragmatic” theories of truth (pp. 25-28). Dahlstrom does not, however, does not discuss the implications of Frege’s argument for the indefinability of truth, which has, as we have seen, the consequence that truth is precisely not the property of a proposition or any other entity, and also that any definitional theory of truth is untenable.
see, we must broaden this conception beyond what is involved in the view of logic, dominant since Frege, on which it is simply or primarily a symbolic calculus. But it is to say that the critique Heidegger voices of the substantialist and representationalist assumptions underlying the traditional subject/predicate logic itself gives us simply no reason to suppose that the analytic problematic of the logic of language inaugurated by Frege must also be rejected on its basis.

Furthermore, the suggestion of a unitary hermeneutic configuration points to the possibility of deepening both approaches to sense and truth, each in ways suggested by the other. In particular, as I shall argue, on the one hand Heidegger’s ontological and temporal problematic suggests the possibility of an ontological interpretation of the specific conception of the being of language underlying the possibility of a Davidsonian and other structural accounts of linguistic meaning. But on the other, the problematic of the basis of number and mathematics that arises in Frege’s logicist project, and in particular becomes manifest with the constitutive problems of set theory in its dual reference to totality and infinity points the way to a deepening of the Heideggerian investigation into the ontotheological and metaphysical determination of the being of beings and its “historical” temporality.

The second suggestion may admittedly seem to fly in the face of Heidegger’s own self-description of his methods; for as is well known, he often and unequivocally rejects the applicability of “logic” in the sense of formal, mathematical logic or logistics to the ontological/hermeneutic problematic. The point of this rejection is not, as is abundantly evident from Heidegger’s own use of the terminology and methodology of “formal indication,” to reject the relevance of any and all formal methods to the problems of hermeneutics. Rather, it is to oppose what is here seen as the “empty,” merely calculative or “formalistic” technique of logical symbol manipulation to the substantiality of a concrete and disclosive indication or demonstration of the things themselves. The opposition has its roots in the distinction that Husserl adopts from Kant between a “formal” logic capable only of such empty calculation and a “transcendental” one capable of demonstrating the “truth” of beings in the sense of manifestation. But it is in fact overcome in Frege’s radical conception of senses as modes of presentation and as thereby constitutively linked to truth. On this conception, as we have seen, the constitutive nexus of sense is the domain of impersonal presentation, or of a presentation of beings and truths that founds and decomposes equally the identity of beings and the possibility of linguistic reference to them.

Frege’s conception is certainly not without its own constitutive problems, including eminently those involved in the possibility of the extensional reference to entities (or objects) as a whole. But I shall argue that these problems, including ultimately the problematic of the relationship between the finite and the infinite which the set-theoretical aporias of totality and infinity display in precise form, cannot ultimately be separated from an inquiry which interrogates the formal and ontological conditions for the possible presentation of entities in their being. As I argue there, these conditions range up to and include the formal conditions for the “metaphysical” determination of being as presence itself. It is, moreover, ultimately necessary in the context of this problematic to find terms and means structurally to indicate the place of truth as the anonymous, a-subjective and ineffectual structural “place” of unconcealment. To find these terms and means is not, as I shall argue, to dispute or cast doubt on Heidegger’s recurrently reiterated claim of the ultimate dependence of disclosive truth on Dasein. It is, though, to think Dasein itself, outside any reference to the biological or psychological nature of the human subject, as the impersonal structure of truth; and the place of unconcealment, outside any reference to entities, as the ineffective structure of being.
For this conception, there will be no privileged access to truth, not even one specified in terms of the privilege that determines Dasein within the limit of an “authentic” finitude whose individuating end is found in its capability of death.\(^2\) It is necessary, in other words, to follow out the ultimate consequences of the claim that Dasein is, independently of any human or subjective determination, a structure of being-in-the-world; and one that cannot any longer be thought as a subject of capacities in any sense. Such a conception will be, I shall argue, the one requisite to any legitimately realist conception of being and truth that also takes seriously the implications of Heidegger’s ontological interpretation of truth as unconcealment. It is such a conception of truth that is moreover needed, as we shall see, in order to overcome what has seemed to many commentators to be a significant limitation of Heidegger’s approach to truth in relation to ontological constitution: its apparent failure adequately to treat ahistorical events and occurrences in the realm of nature (up to, and decisively including, the natural origins of human beings themselves).

In criticizing the “metaphysical” conception of being as constant, standing presence, Heidegger often makes reference to the conception of time that he considers it to imply: a conception based ultimately on the domain of nature and the kind of (regular, countable, calculable and mathematizable) time characteristic of it. According to this conception, time is given as a constantly unfolding sequence of “nows”, each one thought, ultimately incoherently, as akin to a present entity – somewhat analogous, for instance, to the successive appearance of still movie frames in the course of the playing of a movie – that is itself existent and present for a moment before being destroyed in the appearance of the next one. For this conception, since the moments themselves are numerable, time is itself in general countable and calculable.\(^3\) Time itself, as the general form of the appearance of entities, also becomes here an essentially calculable and, thereby, manipulable quantity, thereby facilitating the ever-greater technological domination and acceleration of the manipulation and transformation of entities themselves.

This dominance of this conception of time can itself be closely linked to the contemporary dominance of technology and technological thinking that the late Heidegger often criticized. In the culmination of metaphysics, i.e. the contemporary regime of technological “enframing” correlative to the dominance of a “calculative thinking” that appropriates objects and resources as standing reserve, it is the calculability or mathematical form of natural science that ultimately co-determines the possibility of the technological regime of this handling and trafficking with beings. The two sides of this configuration – the dominance of calculative thinking modeled on mathematical computation, on one hand, and the treatment of beings as raw material for mechanistic manipulation and trafficking – converge, in a way that is predicted by Heidegger himself, though never developed in detail, in the pervasiveness of what is today called “information technology.” But the concrete development of information technology in our

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\(^3\) The conception in itself is generally either silent or obscure on the question of whether the numerability of moments is essentially discrete – which would make the individual moments of time, even if infinite in number, countable in the specific sense in which this term is used in transfinite mathematics – or rather continuous (as it will be if moments have unique real-number values). Viewed in light of the ontological problematic, however, this question of the discrete or the continuous which has long been pursued in investigations of the nature of time, and traces in this significance at least to the paradoxes of Zeno, is just one more of the deep and radical problems that the “ordinary” conception of time cannot easily resolve, since they are indices of the basic incoherence of this conception itself.
time has its determining conceptual basis in the extended implications of Frege’s logic—in particular, in the formalization of computability by Turing and others that yielded the basic architecture of the digital computer. For this reason, a re-posing of the ontological/temporal problem of logic with respect to these implications has, as I shall argue, the potential to yield renewed terms through which this contemporary regime of technological thinking and practice can be critically interrogated, and even perhaps transformed.

**Supplemental to Chapter 3:**

**Davidson and Heidegger on Transcendental Truth**

What grounds are there for thinking that Heidegger’s and Davidson’s specific conceptions of truth can indeed be brought together into such a single, hermeneutically oriented conception? To begin with, it is helpful to note that there are at least three general negative features of both philosophers’ accounts of truth on which they agree, in contrast with a variety of other contemporary theories and accounts. First, both philosophers reject correspondence theories of the basis of truth. Second, both philosophers reject coherence, anti-realist, and other epistemically based theories of truth. Third, both philosophers reject the existence of propositions, Fregian thoughts, ideal contents, or other timeless entities as the primary truth-bearers.

First, both argue against correspondence theories of the basis of truth. In *Being and Time* and elsewhere, Heidegger presents his account of truth as an alternative to what he sees as a still-dominant “traditional conception of truth.” The traditional conception, as Heidegger describes it, has two main substantive components: first, the claim that the primary ‘locus’ of truth is the assertion or judgment; and second, the claim that “the essence of truth lies in the ‘agreement’ [or correspondence] of the judgment with its object.” Both components are captured, according to Heidegger, in the scholastic motto according to which truth is *adequatio intellectus et rei*, which has its ultimate roots in Aristotle’s description of the soul’s experiences (*pathemata*) as *omoiomata* or “likenesses” of things (*pragmaton*), and continues to characterize conceptions of truth such as Kant’s and those of nineteenth-century neo-Kantians.

Heidegger asks after the “ontological character” of this supposed “truth-relation” of agreement: “With regard to what do *intellectus* and *res* agree?” On one view, the requisite agreement is one between an ideal content of judgment and a real thing about which a judgment is or can be made. This relationship, like the relationship between ideal contents and real acts of judgment, may be said to “subsist.” But Heidegger asks whether such “subsisting” has ever been clarified ontologically and what it can, basically, mean; this is, as he points out, nothing other than the question concerning the actual character of the relationship of *methexis* (or participation) between the real and the ideal, with which “no headway has been made ... in over two thousand years.”

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4 GA 2, p. 214.
5 GA 2, pp. 214-215.
6 Heidegger appears to have in mind Husserl’s view, though he does not say so explicitly here, and it is also not clear that the view that is sketched captures accurately all the aspects of Husserl’s actual discussions of the “synthesis of fulfillment” between the content of an significative intention and the content that may fulfill it (see chapter 2, above).
7 GA 2, p. 216.
More broadly, Heidegger considers how the relationship of agreement which is supposed by correspondence theories to hold between entities and judgments about them actually becomes manifest phenomenologically. In judging or asserting that “the picture on the wall is hanging askew,” Heidegger argues, one is not related primarily to “representations” or psychological processes, but rather to the picture itself. And in the act of perception that confirms the truth of the judgment, there is again no matching of representations to objects, but rather the phenomenon of the picture revealing itself “just as” it (truly) is. This is not, as Heidegger points out, a relation of representation between the picture and a representation of it; nor is it a comparison of various representations with each other. Rather, in the demonstration, the picture itself is uncovered as being a certain way; in the perceptual confirmation of the judgment, the entity that was judged about shows itself as being a certain way (indeed, just the way it was judged to be). If what takes place here is indeed the most basic and primary phenomenon of truth, it is clear that truth cannot be theorized as having a basis in the correspondence of subject and object, or of the psychical with the physical, or in any other relation of representation or agreement.

Davidson’s arguments against correspondence theories are differently motivated and situated, but their upshot is, in important ways, structurally similar. In particular, Davidson has essentially two reasons for holding that there is no tenable relation of “correspondence” between language and the world to be found at all, for “there is nothing interesting or instructive to which true sentences correspond.” The first is that, as Davidson argues drawing on an argument made in different forms by Frege, Church, Gödel, and Neale, if a sentence is said to correspond to one entity in the world, it must ultimately be said to correspond to all of them. The resulting picture evokes, in some ways, the Eleatic thesis according to which all that exists is the One of a total and ultimately undifferentiated reality; however, as Davidson notes, it is no longer in any important sense a picture of truth as correspondence at all.

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8 GA 2, p. 218.
9 Some commentators, e.g. Wrathall (2011), pp. 12-13 and Carman (2003), pp. 159-61, have read Heidegger as holding that correspondence theories actually provide an accurate account of propositional truth itself, in that an assertion can indeed be considered to be true just when it corresponds with a state of affairs it is “about,” provided this propositional truth is seen (as usual) as a limited phenomenon within the broader horizon of truth as unconcealment. (Wrathall cites as evidence for this a passage from Heidegger’s 1931 Plato lecture “On the Essence of Truth”). If the attribution of this position to Heidegger is exegetically correct (I take no position either way on this), it appears, especially in light of the Davidsonian arguments canvassed in the next paragraph, that he has overestimated rather than underestimated the prospects for a successful correspondence theory of specifically sentential truth. For as we shall see (section II below), even if we consider assertoric, linguistic truth to take place only on the condition of a prior holistic phenomenon of the unconcealment of entities, itself preconditioning the holistic phenomenon of linguistic meaning and reference, it is neither necessary nor probably possible to see each individual sentences as made true by its unique correspondence to any single distinct entity.
11 The argument, though perhaps already at least implicit in Frege’s arguments for the claim that the “reference” of a sentence is always one of the two truth-values (True or False), is sometimes called the “slingshot” and is given in (slightly different) classic forms by Church (1956) and Gödel (1944). For the discussion and further references, see Davidson (2005), pp. 126-30.
12 Davidson had earlier suggested in “True to the Facts” that the Tarskian truth-theory is understandable as a (special kind of) correspondence theory owing to its employment of a concept of reference or satisfaction; later on, he also called this “correspondence without confrontation.” In Truth and Predication (pp. 38-41), however, Davidson explains clearly and directly that to call the Tarskian theory a “correspondence” theory in any respect was a mistake.
Davidson’s second reason for rejecting correspondence accounts of the truth of sentences turns on the problem of predication, and in particular on the problem of accounting for the unity of sentences. As Davidson here suggests, any theory of the truth of sentences that treats it as a relational property will ultimately fail to account for the kind of truth-evaluable unity that sentences exhibit. This is because any such theory will advert to a relationship between a true sentence and some entity (be it a fact, state of affairs, situation, or whatever) that makes it true; and it will then be necessary to explain the unity of the sentence in terms of the unity of this entity. But this does not solve the problem of unity, but only reiterates it. The appeal to correspondence, or indeed to any relation between sentences and entities as the basis for truth, is shown to be idle and useless for its intended explanatory purposes.

*Both reject timeless truthbearers.* As we have seen, both Heidegger and Davidson apply arguments against correspondence and representationalist pictures of truth that resemble and descend from arguments made by their respective forebears, Husserl and Frege. Davidson’s application of the Slingshot, in particular, develops a line of thought that some have seen as at least implicit in Frege, and his more general argument linking correspondence truth to a problematic infinite regress echoes Frege’s own argument in “Thought” against correspondence theories. Somewhat similarly, at least one strand of Heidegger’s anti-correspondence position in *Being and Time* echoes Husserl’s own criticisms of “picture theories” of meaning and emphasizes the implications of the type of anti-representationalist direct realism that Husserl had long advanced. However, while both Husserl and Frege were led by their shared opposition to psychologistic and individualist-subjectivist accounts of meaning to embrace “ideal” contents as the ultimate bearers of truth, Davidson and Heidegger clearly reject any appeal to timeless or *a priori* entities or phenomena, including propositions, Fregean thoughts, extra-temporal “senses”, ideal contents, or the like. Instead of maintaining the privileged link between sense and such timeless phenomena that traces back to Plato, both thus theorize the nature of truth and the meaning of sentences as inherently temporal phenomena of actual human life.

*Both argue against epistemic, anti-realist, warranted assertibility, or coherence theories.* If there is a ‘transcendental’ concept or phenomenon of truth that hermeneutically conditions the structure of truth in particular situations and languages without being reducible to them, its structure, for both Davidson and Heidegger, is not to be found in a criterial or limitative consideration of its grounding in practices or capacities of knowing or asserting, but rather, prior to these, in its deeper interconnection with being itself. This implies, for both, that truth cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms of, any concept or

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13 Davidson (2005), chapter 4 (see esp. pp. 84-86).
14 In fact, as Tugendhat points out in his own critique (Tugendhat (1967), p. 331), Husserl himself had actually given a similar argument against “picture” theories already in the *Logical Investigations*, some 25 years before Heidegger’s writing of *Being and Time*, which makes the basis for some of Heidegger’s occasional criticisms of Husserl as a “correspondence” theorist rather mysterious. One version of Husserl’s own argument is given in *Logical Investigations*, vol. 2. See Husserl (1900/1901), Investigation V, chapter 2, § 21, “Appendix to § 11 and § 20. Critique of the ‘image-theory’ and of the doctrine of the ‘immanent’ objects of acts”.
15 In Heidegger’s case, this rejection is motivated by the larger critique he undertook over a period of several years prior to *Being and Time* of Husserl’s failure to pose the question of the ontological basis of the distinction, presupposed by Husserl and contemporary neo-Kantians alike, between the ideal and the real, a question whose most important aspect is the question of the temporality of both “realms” and their supposed interrelation (see chapter 2, above). In Davidson’s case, it is motivated largely by his inheritance of Quine’s devastating arguments against the intelligibility of any such notion of content; this inheritance has the consequence that Davidson, like Quine, insists upon the availability in principle of the evidentiary basis for a systematic theory of meaning in the empirical evidence available to a radical interpreter.
phenomenon of practice or knowledge grounded in, and limited to, the contingent reach of human abilities and practices. Davidson makes the point in the course of a critical discussion of recent anti-realist theories such as Dummett’s, which holds that the truth of sentences in a language is to be understood in terms of the possibilities of their verification, and Putnam’s “internal realism,” which characterized truth as warranted assertibility in an idealized sense:

We should not say that truth is correspondence, coherence, warranted assertibility, ideally justified assertibility, what is accepted in the conversation of the right people, what science will end up maintaining, what explains the convergence on final theories in science, or the success of our ordinary beliefs.  

Davidson’s basic reason for opposing all of the family of “anti-realist” accounts on which truth is dependent on standards of ascertainability, assertibility, or actual practice is that “antirealism, with its limitation of truth to what can be ascertained, deprives truth of its role as an intersubjective standard.” As Davidson suggests (adopting an objection originally made by Putnam) it is essential to this role of truth as a standard that truth cannot be “lost”; that is, it cannot be correct to hold that a sentence that is true at one time can ever become untrue later. But on an account like Dummett’s, which links truth to justified assertibility in the sense of the actual capabilities of an individual or community to verify or assert sentences, truth can be lost in this sense, for actual abilities develop in historical time and may also diminish or vanish. Conversely, as well, it must be possible to understand, believe, and assert some claims that can never be conclusively verified (Davidson gives the example: “A city will never be built on this spot,”) but Dummett’s anti-realist attempt to link truth to assertibility is that it makes this possibility obscure, since it denies that such a claim has a truth value at all.

The only alternative, while maintaining a constitutive link between truth and “human” practices or the epistemic abilities they are seen as embodying, is to idealize the requisite abilities. This is the alternative suggested by Putnam, as Davidson reads him, with his “internal realist” account, which identifies truth with idealized justified assertibility, or what reasonable belief would converge upon ultimately, given “good enough” epistemic conditions. The problem with this alternative is that the idealization deprives the appeal to abilities of any distinctive force. In particular, if we idealize away from any possibility of error, we are simply no longer making any important use of a concept of human abilities at all.

Heidegger’s own attitude toward the view that truth “presupposes” human abilities or practices is well expressed in a passage from *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*:

> It is not we who need to presuppose [voraussetzen] that somewhere there is “in itself” a truth in the form of a transcendent value or valid meaning floating somewhere. Instead, truth itself, the basic constitution of the Dasein [die Grundverfassung des Daseins]... is the presupposition for our own existence [setzt uns vorraus, ist die Voraussetzung für ihre eigene Existenz]. Being-true, unveiledness [Wahrsein, Enthülltheit] is the fundamental condition for our being able to be in

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18 Davidson (2005), p. 46.  
19 Davidson (2005), p. 47.  
20 Davidson (2005), pp. 44-46.
the way in which we exist as Dasein. Truth is the presupposition for our being able to presuppose anything at all. For presupposing is in every case an unveiling establishment of something as being [in jedem Falle ein enthüllendes Ansetzen von etwas als seiend].

Presupposition everywhere presupposes truth.21

For Heidegger, in other words, truth does not presuppose or rely upon our (individual or social) epistemic abilities or assertoric practices; rather, the phenomenon of truth as unveiledness is the basic phenomenon that conditions our “being able to be in the way in which we exist as Dasein” at all. As Davidson also suggests, this does not mean that truth is not to be understood as standing in a basic relationship to sense or meaning, as this is also manifest in our practices, but only that this relationship does not take the form of a reduction of truth or meaning to these practices. Rather, as Heidegger says, it is truth that itself preconditioned — as the transcendental phenomena underlying its particular cases — the sense of things as they can show up in them. In Being and Time, Heidegger describes this preconditioning in terms of the basic structural relation of Dasein to unconcealedness or disclosure, in terms of which Dasein is “primordially” structured by truth, and is “equiprimordially” both “in truth” and “untruth”. In later texts, for instance in the Beiträge, this conception of truth as a precondition for our ways of existing is further radicalized, in the context of the deepened problem of the truth of being/beyng (Seyn), into the problem of attaining Dasein by means of attaining a standing in the ontologically privileged region of what is now thought of as the open region of the “clearing” in which all truth (linguistic as well as non-linguistic) takes place. But in neither case does the basic and essentially important constitutive relationship thereby indicated between the structure of Dasein and that of truth provide any encouragement to the anti-realist idea of a grounding or foundation of truth in knowledge, assertion, or any practices or procedures thereof.22

22 As we shall see in subsequent chapters, this is not only because Heidegger’s concept of Dasein does not involve or encourage any foundational conception of “human” practices or abilities as criterial for being and its truth, but (more deeply) because of the way the constitutive idea of a practice or ability, whether individual or social, is itself problematized and undermined through the ultimate implications of an ontological analytic of truth and time. In terms of such an analysis, truth is constitutively related to sense, not because sense is itself rooted in human abilities or practices, but because sense is in turn linked to the being of beings, to their being in the sense of existence and to their being the ways that they are. In this way it is possible to see truth, resisting the anti-realist arguments, as essentially a realist structure touching on the very Being of beings itself, while at the same time refusing to construe this realism as “mind-independence,” correspondence, or any other ontically specified relation.

It is from this perspective that it is also possible to understand the true significance of superficially anti-realist remarks such as Heidegger’s, according to which “There is’ truth only in so far as Dasein is and so long as Dasein is.” (GA 2, p. 226) and Davidson’s that “Nothing in the world, no object or event, would be true or false if there were not thinking creatures” (Davidson 2005, p. 7) Both declarations can be upheld and maintained in a basically realist framework, if the underlying phenomenon of truth is seen in its genuinely ontological structural relationship to Dasein and to the structure of thought. It is not that the structure of Dasein, or the existence of thinking creatures itself, is for either philosopher intelligible quite independently of the link between these phenomena and truth; rather, as Heidegger and Davidson suggest, both Dasein and the characterization of any creature as “thinking” depend upon the structure of truth in its specific linkage with them. But the actual existence of Dasein or its activity of thinking is not, in either case, a sufficient or comprehensive condition for particular truths, but rather (at most) a necessary and structural condition for truth as such. The result of construing the dependence
Tugendhat’s Critique of Heidegger’s Concept of Truth

In considering the relationship of Heidegger’s views to the analytic tradition, it is important first to note that the “traditional conception” that Heidegger himself repeatedly criticizes fits many analytic (sentential or propositional) conceptions of truth only poorly. First, Heidegger generally characterizes the traditional conception as one on which the “assertion” [Aussage] or “act of judgment” is accorded primacy; but because of the anti-psychologistic basis of the sentential accounts of truth that originate with Frege and gain prominence in the analytic tradition, these accounts generally distinguish sharply (as Husserl himself did as well) between individual, datable acts of assertion, judgment or utterance and their contents, and so do not accord primacy to any individual linguistic act of assertion or psychological event of judging. Even in the context of a picture like Davidson’s, where the interpretation of meaning is the interpretation of the utterances of the speakers of a language or the speaker of an idiolect, these utterances are seen as having a significant logical structure of contents, shown in the recursive structure of the axiomatized T-theory, which independent of (and productive of) these actual utterances.

Second, Davidson’s account and at least some other analytic accounts (including, as we have seen in chapter 1, above, Frege’s) combine a sentential conception of the locus of truth with a non-correspondence conception of its nature. In fact, in critically considering the “logical” tradition, Heidegger does not generally argue against just this kind of view. Rather, his own discussions typically identify sentential theories with correspondence theories under the unified heading of the “traditional” conception of truth. As we have seen, in Being and Time, Heidegger discusses the “traditional” conception as committed both to the claim that the primary locus of truth is assertion or judgment, and the claim that truth consists in ‘agreement’, adequation, or correspondence.23 Heidegger does distinguish between these two components of what he sees as the “traditional” account of truth, but throughout Being and Time and in other texts dating from both before and after its composition, Heidegger repeatedly assumes that these two components must go together.24 In fact, Davidson and other philosophers in the analytic tradition have indeed often adopted a view of truth that holds that it is primarily sentential while clearly rejecting a correspondence account of (sentential) truth.25

this way is that while, as Heidegger and Davidson both emphasize, it is incoherent to suppose truth to be completely and constitutively independent of the actuality of life and practices, it is also not the case that truth can simply be seen as an outcome of these alone or as capable of full explanation in terms of them. For a similar conclusion, also reached through a comparison of Heidegger’s views with those Davidson expresses in Truth and Predication, see Okrent (2011); cf. also Wrathall (2011), pp. 53-56, for some partially similar suggestions about the upshot of the comparison.

23 GA 2, p. 214.
25 Thus, whereas the scholastic motto which Heidegger most often mentions in discussing the “traditional” conception of truth, according to which truth is the adequatio intellectus et rei, calls on its face for correspondence or “adequation” between the intellect and a thing or object (rei), and so does not immediately suggest any account of (specifically) sentential truth at all, on the other hand the conceptions of those twentieth-century philosophers who have held a propositional conception of truth can often be separated from the idea of truth as correspondence or adequation, and indeed in many cases involve conceptually devastating critiques of this idea.
This suggests that accounts of the sort that Davidson gives, which (as we saw above) decisively rejects any type of correspondence or any other ontic relation as the basis of truth while maintaining the primarily sentential form of truth, may capture important features of the phenomenon of truth that neither the “traditional conception” nor Heidegger’s own picture can capture as adequately. This suggestion is, at least in part, the basis of Tugendhat’s critique of Heidegger’s own views. At the heart of Tugendhat’s argument in the shorter article “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth” is the suggestion that Heidegger’s account of truth as unconcealment in section 44 of Being and Time fails to account for the central difference that all theories of truth must account for, if they are to be considered adequate at all: that between truth and falsity itself. For in reducing truth to the unitary phenomenon of unconcealment, Heidegger can consider it only as an event that either occurs or does not, and cannot therefore provide any basis for a distinction between true and false unconcealments. In particular, Tugendhat suggests, it is reasonable to suppose that we understand the claim that something is true only if we are also able to understand, as well, the claim that it is false: that is, if we have the actual concept of truth in view, it must include, as part of its basic structure both the possibilities of truth and falsehood. However, on the view that Heidegger argues for, the truth of an assertion consists in its disclosure or uncovering of an entity; it is this uncovering or disclosure that deserves the name “truth” in the primary sense.26 This “being-uncovered” (Entdeckend-sein) of the entity or entities thus appears to be simply something that either happens or does not happen.27 As Tugendhat argues, if Heidegger indeed considers truth to consist in uncovering, then he must apparently consider all uncovering to be in itself “true,” and thus must consider even a false proposition to depend on the uncovering of the entities involved in it.28 Indeed, Heidegger himself says that in a false assertion “the entity” is “already in a certain way uncovered.”29 But if this is right, and the concept of uncoveredness does not include or support a bivalent distinction between truth and falsehood, then it is also clearly insufficient to account for the bivalence of propositions, one of the key defining features of propositions on any reasonable view.

Heidegger’s formulation at the beginning of section 44b, that “Being true (truth) means being-uncovered” [“Wahrsein (Wahrheit) besagt entdeckend-sein”] is therefore, Tugendhat concludes, inadequate. Tugendhat suggests that Heidegger can reach this formulation, in fact, only through a crucial equivocation. In section 44a, he has moved from the claims that an assertion is true when it “uncovers the entity as it is in itself” to the simple claim that the assertion’s truth is simply its “uncovering” of the entity (full stop).30 With the first claim, we still have a bivalent distinction between truth and falsity; for an assertion can presumably disclose an entity (or perhaps, as Tugendhat suggests, a state of affairs) as it is in itself or otherwise; in the first case, it will be true, and in the second, false. But with the slide to the third claim, we have lost the possibility of any such distinction; uncovering either occurs or it does not, and we no longer have any ground to distinguish between a “true” and a “false” kind of uncovering. In failing to draw this distinction, according to Tugendhat, Heidegger has in fact equivocated between two concepts of “uncovering” or pointing out; according to the broader of the two, “uncovering” means pointing out or indicating entities in general, and includes true as well as false instances, while according to the second, narrower concept, it is limited to cases of truth and a false

26 GA 2, pp. 217-19.
29 GA 2, p. 222.
30 GA 2, p. 218.
assertion is, instead, a case of covering-up or concealing. Thus, although Heidegger has (quite rightly, on Tugendhat’s account) further developed the central strand of Husserl’s thought, already in fact hinted at by Plato and Aristotle, according to which truth is at bottom to be understood in terms of the phenomenon of givenness, he has nevertheless continued it in such a way that the particular differentiation that makes for a specific concept of truth as such becomes unavailable.

In Der Wahrheitsbegriff, Tugendhat offers several more specific articulations of the underlying objection that Heidegger’s identification of truth with disclosedness tout court must fail to account for the specific difference between the truth and falsehood of assertions. First, since Heidegger wishes to identify truth with what transpires in acts of disclosure or unconcealment rather than the contents of these acts, he essentially makes truth into the result of an (factual and “ontic”) event. But this results in seemingly implausible consequences about truth itself, including its ontic relativity to human acts of inquiry and discovery. For example, Heidegger says near the beginning of section 44c that Newton’s laws, like other truths including the “principle of contradiction,” “are true only as long as Dasein is”, and that “through Newton [his] laws became true…” while with them entities [Seiendes] became accessible to Dasein. 31 This suggests, according to Tugendhat, that according to Heidegger a being can become ‘true’ when and if it is factically indicated or pointed out. But:

If a state of affairs, so long as it is not generally known, is not true, then it would indeed seem appropriate to say as a consequence of this that it ceases being true when it is no longer observed by anyone, and that its truth grows greater the more people recognize it. 32

Similarly, according to Tugendhat, Heidegger’s identification of truth with acts or events of disclosure leaves mysterious the status of a sentence or proposition that is understood but not yet verified; such a sentence would seem indeed to disclose the entities treated by it, but would not by that token seem to be automatically characterizable as true. More generally, Tugendhat suggests, with the statement that “There ‘is’ truth only insofar and as long as Dasein is”:

Insofar as one can assume that Heidegger indeed has in mind [here] the specific sense of truth, the ontical and ontological levels are simply confused: on the ground of the indubitable ontological relativity of truth as such to the Dasein, the ontic independence of the occurring [jeweiligen] truth from its factually being known [Erkanntwerden] is denied. 33

Second, Tugendhat suggests that when Heidegger does characterize the truth of assertions, “the assertions of which Heidegger is thinking are primarily simple predications of individual objects … Only here is the talk of indication, uncovering and concealing clear without further ado.” 34 That is, if the truth of assertions is itself to be characterized in terms of the uncovering of entities, it is not immediately clear which entities should be thought of as uncovered (or discovered, disclosed, etc.) in any case but that of the attribution of a single property to a distinct individual. For example, it is not at all clear from this account what we are to do with even a simple relational sentence such as “Socrates is older than Plato.” Should we think of the truth of this as grounded in the disclosure only of Socrates (since he is the grammatical subject)? But then we must think of his being disclosed in terms of a relational

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31 GA 2, pp. 226-227.
property (being older than Plato) as his being disclosed as he is in himself. This would threaten to make all relations into internal properties of an individual, and since each object is related somehow or other to all others, it would imply that the full disclosure of an individual object also discloses the whole universe. Or should we think of the relevant disclosure here as that of Socrates and Plato jointly, as they are in themselves? But this too is inadequate, since in addition to the disclosure of Socrates, and that of Plato, we evidently need the disclosure of the relationship between them as well, which can hardly be attributed to either one of the “things” just as they are “in themselves.”

Third and finally, as Tugendhat suggests in passing, an even harder case is that of (true) negative judgments of existence, for instance the judgment “Santa Claus does not exist” or “there are no unicorns.” It is not at all clear how the truth of these judgments can be grounded in the “disclosure” (uncovering, etc.) of the entities mentioned, since these entities do not even exist. Here, as Tugendhat suggests, it is accordingly unclear what it could mean to speak of the “thing itself” or of the true proposition as disclosing it as it itself is.

Can Heidegger’s picture be defended or supplemented without modifying its basic structure, but in such a way as to respond adequately to Tugendhat’s objections? I shall now argue that it can, and that the defense indeed points the way to a reconciled, more comprehensive picture that can accommodate the best features of Heidegger’s “transcendental” position with respect to the givenness of entities as well as those of sentential theories such as Davidson’s.

To a large extent, such a defense can be formulated by considering the implications of Heidegger’s development of the hermeneutically basic “existential-hermeneutic” “as-structure,” which, as we have seen, Heidegger treats as the most basic structure underlying any possible understanding and unconcealment. The structure and implications of this basic “existential-hermeneutic as” are sketched only quickly in Being and Time; but Heidegger gives a much more detailed account in the 1925-26 course “Logic: The Question of Truth”. Here, Heidegger pursues a detailed analysis of the basis of the structure of the assertoric logos in Aristotle, including importantly the possibility of a logos being false. According to Aristotle in Metaphysics IX 10, in particular, the truth or falsity of sentences presupposes the necessary existence of certain non-composite beings about which falsehood and deception are impossible; these beings, the eide, are “always already in every being that is there [im jedem vorhandenen Seienden, sofern dieses ist, immer schon im vorhinein ist]” and thus are “constitutive for all beings” in determining “all beings in their being [alles Seinden in seinem Sein].” Thus Aristotle determines the possibility of truth and falsehood only on the basis of a privileged determination of the aei on – the beings that always are – and the possibility of a mode of uncovering that has no opposite. In this special kind of uncovering, “the being is present [vorhanden] simply in itself and ‘as’ itself”. (p. 152) In this sense, for Aristotle (as Heidegger reads him), an ultimate basis for assertoric truth and falsehood is to be found in the phenomenon of a privileged disclosure which itself does not admit of any possibility of falsehood, and thus does not provide an ultimate basis for the bivalence of assertoric truth. By contrast with this, Heidegger aims to show that the apparently synthetic structure of the logos has

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36 GA 21, section 13.
37 GA 21, p. 179.
real ontological and hermeneutic basis in the primary structure of the “existential-hermeneutic as,” which cannot be basically characterized as any synthesis of already existing entities.\(^3^9\)

This more general hermeneutic “as” structure is, Heidegger argues, the actual foundation of the more specific possibility of the kind of synthesis that occurs, according to Aristotle, in the explicit logos. It conditions the specific possibility of falsehood, as Heidegger goes on to say, through three structural conditions that it has as inherent aspects. First, there is a basic “tendency toward the uncovering of something” which amounts to a prior “meaning and having” of the subject matter [das Woruber], or an “always already prior disclosure of world”. Second, “within” this comportment of uncovering, there is a letting-be-seen [Sehenlassen] of the subject matter “from another;” it is on the basis of this moment, that there arises the “possibility of something’s giving itself out as something”. Third and finally, the encountering of something through the basic “as” structure always involves a possibility of the “togetherness” [Beisammen] of something with something; this possibility is itself always determined by the context of a particular “range of indications” that constrain what possibly can appear in a particular environment.

These three constitutive structures are precisely repeated, albeit more briefly and without explicit connection to the possibility of falsehood, as the three structural moments of fore-having [Vorhabe], fore-sight [Vorsicht] and fore-conception [Vorgriff] in Being and Time; there, as we have seen, they form the basic structure of interpretive understanding that is presupposed in any disclosure and in sense as such. Here, Heidegger argues that it is through this threefold structure that the possibility of error and illusion first arises, even in cases that do not involve anything like explicit assertion, as Heidegger illustrates by considering a simple case of mistaking a bush for a deer while walking in a dark forest. In this case, the first condition is fulfilled in that I indeed have something coming before me that I regard in some way; the second is fulfilled in that I encounter something as something (indeed, in this case, as a deer); and the third is fulfilled in that I understand in advance that something like “a deer” can indeed be present in this environment.\(^4^0\)

The intensionality of the basic hermeneutic “as” structure, through which anything that is intelligible is first “given,” should also help to underscore that the sense in which phenomena are “given” through it does not involve a problematic “Myth of the Given” in the sense of Sellars (1956). In particular, since entities, because of their relationship across the ontological difference to being itself, are always characterized through the basic “as” structure, there is no suggestion here that entities (or anything else) are ever given (in the language of McDowell (1994)) “from outside content” or outside the possibility of their (fully intensional) description. On the other hand, this does not mean that it is not the

\(^3^8\) GA 21, p. 180 (transl. slightly modified).

\(^3^9\) “This synthetic showing [synthetische Sehenlassen] is a showing on the basis of, and is preformed within, a focus on something else [aus und in der Hinblicknahme auf anderes] … The act of showing something [Sehenlassen] by focusing on something else that has the character of possible being-together-with… is what we have already characterized as the speaking about something as something [Besprechen von etwas als etwas] – logos as a determining assertion. This brings to light an inner connection between the ontological structure of synthesis [Seinsstruktur des Beisammen] and the as-structure, which we earlier characterized [angezeigt] as the basic hermeneutical structure.”  GA 21, pp. 186-87 (transl. slightly modified).

\(^4^0\) GA 21, pp. 187-190.
entities *themselves* which are thereby given, as if to say that they were not given “from outside content” meant that they could only be given in a conceptually or linguistically mediated or represented form.

There is an impression evident in some discussions of Sellars’ dilemma that an account of the form that Heidegger suggests, whereby entities are *themselves* given, but as characterized in an irreducibly intensional way, must invoke conceptual or linguistic mediation even at the basic level of (for instance) perception. This impression may arise from the prior assumption that only such a mediation of given “contents” in terms of or by (linguistic) concepts can endow them with intensional structure. Alternatively or conjointly, it may arise from a setting of the problem of the relationship of mind to world wherein that problem is seen primarily as one about the right way to characterize the “capacities” of a subject capable of perception and judgment. In *Mind and World*, John McDowell portrays the problem of envisioning the relationship by which the world constrains our thought about it as that of stopping a by-now familiar oscillation between, on the one hand, the Myth of the Given, and on the other, a “Davidsonian” coherentism which holds that beliefs can be justified only by other beliefs. The solution is to be found in part, according to McDowell, by reference to what he portrays as Kant’s idea that the (subjective) capacities drawn on receptively in perception are not to be ultimately distinguished from the capacities of spontaneity responsible for conceptualization and conceptual judgment. But while this form of solution does indeed allow for the dilemma to which McDowell points to be avoided, and the oscillation of which he complains halted, it nevertheless leaves in place the basic problem of the relationship of a subject of capacities to the sense of things in the world. Within the ambit of this problem as thus understood, there are many ways in which this relationship can be understood or theorized, but it will be (at least) difficult to avoid the familiar and insuperable alternative between an essentially subjective idealism, on the one hand, and a “Platonic” realism about formal categories and their problematic “availability” to us on the basis of the capacities thus adumbrated, on the other. If, however, intensional sense is seen, in accordance with the primacy of the hermeneutic “as” structure, as grounded ultimately in ontological difference itself, both the intelligibility of things “to us” and the basis of this intelligibility in the (ontic and ontological) characteristics of the things themselves can be accounted for at what is effectively a prior point. As Heidegger himself often emphasizes, there is then no need either to resolve or even to invoke the (supposed) problem of the relationship of a representational subject of capacities to its world.

With this, we are now in a position to see also how Heidegger’s development of the underlying “as-” structure provides at least the elements for satisfactory responses to each of Tugendhat’s objections to the general picture of truth as unconcealment. First, Heidegger’s account of the way that the possibility of falsehood is involved in this basic structure through the three fore-structures confirms that the distinction between truth and falsehood is itself a basic and irreducible feature of *any* unconcealment, on this account; in particular, the essential difference between something’s being uncovered as it is and its being uncovered otherwise is always coherently grounded, through the fore-structures, whenever it is possible to speak of a thing’s being uncovered at all. To say, as Heidegger does, that the apparently synthetic structure of the proposition depends ontologically upon the more basic and non-synthetic phenomenon of unconcealment is not to deny that a distinction between truth and falsehood is coherent and characteristic even at this more basic and non-synthetic level. In particular, since the basic structure of disclosure always is the structure of “something as something” the possibility of something’s being uncovered as it (actually) is or otherwise always characterizes it in a basic way. In this
respect, all levels of the specific phenomenon of truth, whether propositional or non-, retain the basic feature of bivalence for Heidegger. 41

It is also possible, on this basis, to respond to the more specific objections formulated in Tugendhat’s Der Wahrheitsbegriff. While it is true that, as Tugendhat suggests, the formulation that a truthful disclosure discloses something “as it is in itself” applies most directly only to cases wherein only one entity is obviously in question and one feature or property attributed to it, the broader hermeneutic “as” structure is nevertheless sufficiently general and structurally articulated to handle more complex cases of predication, as well as relational and multi-part predicates. In a case such as that of the relational “Socrates is older than Plato,” for example, the disclosure involved, if true, will be, in an obvious sense, characteristic of the beings involved, not necessarily “as they are in themselves” but nevertheless “as they are” (full stop). And since there is always a significant contextual and holistic dimension involved in every instance of the “as”-structure and thus in every disclosure, there is no problem with considering such a disclosure to be significantly co-determined by the relevant broader context, up to and including the “fore-having” of a world in which relations take place and are articulated.

In other cases, for instance that of Newton’s laws and other universally quantified statements, it will not necessarily even be clear that there are specific entities involved. But because of the holistic dimensions of the fore-having of world and the fore-conception which involves the availability of a totality of indications, these cases too can be treated at the level of the specific kind of generality they possess. The case of negative existentials, while difficult on anyone’s account, might be handled the same way or similarly. In fact, the cases are logically identical, since negative existentials (‘there does not exist...’) are, within a quantificational language, equivalent to universally quantified negative statements (‘for all x, x is not a...’). This case, like each of the other initially problematic cases is thus readily handled within the (narrower) context of a specific natural language by the quantificational apparatus that comes along with a Tarskian truth-theory, once the finitely many axioms which give basic satisfaction relations are provided. If we can indeed see Heidegger’s general account of truth in terms of the basic structure of unconcealment as clarifying the basis of this provision in a phenomenologically motivated way, there is no obvious obstacle to seeing it as co-articulating the structural possibilities of truth that emerge from such a language as it holistically characterizes entities and changes and develops over time.

Finally, it is now possible to turn to the objection that Heidegger makes truth an “ontic” event, and hence must deny the actual independence of a truth from the factual occurrence of its becoming known? On the basis of the objection, Tugendhat suggested that it would be necessary for Heidegger to hold, absurdly, that a truth grows more true when more people recognize it, or that something that is true can become false when everyone forgets it (despite Heidegger’s more or less explicit denial of the latter), were he not “protected” from these consequences by his vague use of the singulare tantum “Dasein”. Significantly, the objection in this form is just the one brought by Davidson against epistemic theories of truth: if truth is directly dependent upon acts of discovery or verification, it must be possible for it to wax and wane, and in particular for truths, once established, to be lost.

41 It is true that the formulation at the beginning of 44b, according to which “Wahrsein (Wahrheit) besagt entdeckend-sein” is from this perspective somewhat elliptical, and omits the necessary qualification. But this does not mean it represents an equivocation.
If Heidegger should be seen as an opponent of epistemic theories, as I have argued on the basis of his claims about the structural dependence of Dasein’s kind of being on truth rather than vice-versa, then his position should also not be interpreted as falling prey to this objection. In particular, it is essential to remember here the grounding of all unconcealment in the structure of the hermeneutic-existential “as”, and the further indication that this structure points to an ontologically deeper and more complex underlying temporality than that of individual, “ontic” events. We will take up the question of this temporality in more detail in part II of this work, where the specific question of the form of temporality characteristic of what is thinkable as such is taken up. For now, it is helpful simply to note that the dependence of concrete disclosure upon the broader structure of the hermeneutic “as” verifies that, on Heidegger’s account, any actual event of disclosure has several temporally distinct elements (including the “always already” availability of the world as such) and so cannot simply, in any case, be identified with a specific, datable factual event. Moreover, since the structure is explicitly one that essentially involves beings in their being, it is never simply an “ontic” or ontologically specifiable one, but one that is always ontic-ontological. Indeed, more broadly, as Heidegger emphasizes, in this it shares or even exemplifies the characteristic twofold ontic-ontological “priority” of Dasein, and is to be traced ultimately to Dasein as a formally indicated structure.42

What, then, of the broader motivational dispute that gives Tugendhat’s criticisms their conceptual and motivational point? Here it is important to consider that, as Heidegger himself suggests with respect to judgment, assertoric or sentential truth may be a phenomenon with “more than one kind of foundation”.43 In particular, it is not at all obvious that an ontological foundation in disclosure and in the more ultimate structure of the “as”, which is indeed, as we have seen, a structure characteristic of the “being of entities,” is not compatible with a different kind of structural semantic foundation for the truth of sentences in a language, one that comes into view much more clearly through structural accounts such as Davidson’s. It is sufficient to note the obvious sense in which, one the one hand, the truth or falsity of sentences can be seen as dependent upon the ways of being of the entities involved in them, whereas, on the other, particular entities are only intelligibly available as entities, even in unthematic praxis and everyday dealing, through and (partially) because of a language which yields terms for their consideration and description.

On this kind of picture, there is thus a twofold “grounding” of truth – understood both as the truth of sentences and the “availability” of entities – having both a “logical” and an “ontological” dimension. But both kinds of grounding have a deeper, unitary basis in the hermeneutical “as” structure itself. Specifically, as we have seen this structure grounds both linguistic predication – as the underlying phenomenological basis for the linguistic/predicative “is” – and (sometimes non-linguistic) unconcealment, the showing up or appearing of things as such. This twofold grounding is not simply ontic. It does not, for instance, point basically to the dependence of one entity or kind of entity on another; nor does it establish anything like ontic conditions of possibility (e.g. causal ones) for the existence of any entity or the taking place of any event. It is, rather, irreducibly ontic-ontological: it is grounding across the ontological difference, and is thereby grounding not simply of entities but also of their sense or intelligibility.

42 I am indebted to Iain Thomson for discussion on this point.
43 GA 2, p. 34.
How, though, should we understand the structure of such (ontic-)ontological grounding itself? Throughout the discussion so far, I have described (and will continue to do so) of various phenomena as more “basic,” foundational, original, etc. than others, or as ontologically “prior” to them. This kind of talk obviously involves invoking an order of priority that must itself be motivated in the terms of the ontological problematic, i.e. the question of the sense and truth of being, and hence terms of the structure of the ontological difference itself. Heidegger’s own understanding of ontological or phenomenological “grounding” and “founding” develops in part from Husserl’s. For Husserl, founding [\textit{Fundierung}] is a relation of ontological dependence: A is said to found B if B is dependent for its existence on A. However, since the ontology of founding is carried out wholly within the broader project of transcendental phenomenology, the dependence-structure of foundation applies not only to spatiotemporal objectivities, but just as well (and even more centrally, in fact) to senses and contents. As such, it has the significance not only of (what we might today call) metaphysical or ontological dependence, but also that of (what we might see as) formal-epistemological foundation: what is at issue in the question of the foundation of a specific sense or category is not only the ontological status of entities falling under it, but also the basis for the manifestation or possible \textit{presentation} of that sense or category itself. For Husserl, the broadest logical and formal-ontological categories are themselves founded (in this sense), as we have seen in chapter 2, in the related structures of categorial intuition and ideational abstraction. In later works, Husserl further developed the theory of transcendental-phenomenological founding in terms of the difficult and problematic ideas of transcendental \textit{genesis} and \textit{constitution}, whereby (as he also saw) it required still further explication by means of a theory of the constitution and givenness of “internal” time.

But according to Heidegger, both these structures and the temporal grounding Husserl proposed for them presuppose a being of consciousness which is not been clarified in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. In the development of the properly ontological problematic of being and beings – the problematic of the ontological difference – Husserl’s jointly metaphysical and formal-ontological idea of the grounding of the categories is replaced by the hermeneutic structure of formal indication as the interpretation of facticity. With this, ontological grounding is thought in terms of the ontological difference and as operating across it: that beings are grounded in “something” else – their being – means that this – their being -- is “responsible” for their presence and presentation as the kinds of beings they are.\textsuperscript{44} That A \textit{ontologically} grounds B then has, in general, the meaning that A is responsible for the \textit{presencing} or \textit{presentation} – the making-present -- of B as such.\textsuperscript{45} But it would not be sufficient to say simply that being \textit{makes} entities present or causes them to be present. For any such assertion of a concrete and active relationship between being and entities takes the form of an ontic assertion about

\textsuperscript{44} In the “preparatory analytic” of Being and Time (especially Division 1), this “across” is thought primarily in terms of the structure of Dasein, as marked by the ontic-ontological “priority” that is definitive of it: namely that of a being that has, in its being, a constitutive concern with being itself. As Heidegger would often suggest later, though, what is actually primary here is not Dasein itself but rather the ontic-ontological structure definitive of it; or (put another way) it is not the activity or experience of Dasein, but rather the ontic-ontological structure that conditions and grounds its (factual, ontic) existence that is most decisive here. For this reason, Heidegger will later conceive of dasein itself as conditioned by the deeper structure of the “open” that is granted by being, or Ereignis, itself, and of this “open” in or as which being – or \textit{Ereignis} – conditions a domain of presencing as the deeper structure of (being’s) truth. For further discussion, see chapter 4, below.

\textsuperscript{45} Here, as we have seen, “presence” irreducibly has both a temporal and a (quasi-)spatial meaning: it is for this reason that such an account of ontological grounding can ultimately (as we shall see in chapter 6) provide a unitary ontological form for the theorization of both \textit{sense} and \textit{given time}.
the relationship of entities, and being is not an entity. Rather, being grounds entities in that it opens a domain for their presencing. As such, it grounds both their existence and their sense. But beings are made present in a variety of ways. Some of these ways are directly linguistic: linguistic judgment, for example, is one kind of presencing. This kind of presencing is obviously conditioned by the specific structure of the language in which it takes place. But some are not, or not as directly so: there is, at any rate, no reason why an entity cannot (as Heidegger indeed emphasizes in Being and Time) show up as having a specific kind of character, understood in terms of its specific “in-order-to” relationality to other entities, without being the subject of any specifically linguistic judgment or predication.

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46 We should, again, not think of this as a matter of being instituting, creating, or mandating the conditions of possibility either for the existence of beings or for the (subjective) experience of them. For “opening” and “domain” here indicate not only the conditioning of beings, but also of their intelligibility or sense. As Heidegger suggests, in the judgment that A is B there is co-judged the possible being-B of A, or in other words that A has the sense of possibly being (a) B. But it is this sense that is ontologically grounded in the first instance, and the possible ways that A can be are subsequently grounded in it: it is only so far as A is intelligible as (something that can be a) B that A can be presented or uncovered as B. The possibilities of entities are thus ontologically grounded in their projective sense, rather than this sense being grounded in the possibilities. And still less are either the possibilities of beings or their sense grounded in the possibilities of the subjective experience of them (as they are, for instance, in Kant). It is not clear that Heidegger fully understood this point in Being and Time, where the discussion of being as “transcendental” sometimes involves also the residual Kantian language of “conditions of possibility.” However, he clearly comes to understand it later, as for instance in his complete repudiation of the use of the language of “transcendence” with respect to Being in the Beiträge. (For more discussion of this see chapter 4).

47 Mark Okrent (2006), responding critically to Brandom (2002), defends what he calls a “layer cake” model of the structure of intentionality. On this model, specifically linguistic intentionality is founded in and dependent on a more basic “layer” (or layers) of pre- or non-linguistic intentionality, of the sort exhibited according to Heidegger in practical comportment toward entities that are thereby unconcealed as Zuhanden, but which is “autonomous” in the sense that it can be exhibited even by “agents” that, lacking linguistic capacities, are incapable of making assertions (and thus incapable of indending entities as Vorhanden). Brandom argues against this thesis, both as an interpretation of Heidegger and in its own right, holding that any meaningful kind of intentionality is parasitic on the kind of intentionality that first made possible by our linguistic practices and the “normativity” instituted within them through linguistic (self-)interpretation, while Okrent defends the “layer cake” model, primarily on the ground that “non-linguistic agents” can intend things as tools in holistic contexts of use, even without the ability to speak or use language (p. 15). Within the ambit of the assumptions shared by Okrent and Brandom, Okrent is doubtless right about the possibility in principle of such “non-linguistic” intentionality. The consideration, drawn from Heidegger, that is most decisive in Okrent’s positive argument for this is that any kind of disclosure in understanding (be it of the Vorhanden or the Zuhanden) already has the ‘as which’ structure, at least implicitly, and indeed in such a way that it can later be made explicit. (p. 17). As we have seen, this structure is itself the basic structure underlying all kinds of intentionality, and it is this because it is itself the most basic structure of the ontic-ontological grounding of sense or intelligibility. Both Okrent’s and Brandom’s discussions are somewhat vitiating, however, and the basic ontological character of the “as” relation there obscured, by the assumptions that they jointly draw from other discourses – in particular from social pragmatism – that have no very clear presence in Heidegger’s text itself. In particular, within the ambit of these assumptions, the question of the underlying ontic-ontological structure of disclosure, understanding, interpretation and truth becomes instead a question of the implications of the various “capacities” of differing kinds of “agents” who are “capable” (or not) of language in a way also related to their social status within a community. It is not easy to see how these assumptions can be grounded in the ontological problematic itself; one wonders, for instance, how the (linguistic or non-linguistic) “agent” that is the common object of interest for both Okrent and Brandom could itself be explicated ontologically in terms that would not beg the very question at issue between the two. More generally, once it is clear how the “as” structure ontologically grounds both assertoric and non-assertoric modes of presencing, although not necessarily in such a way as always to allow the clean separation
On this picture, language itself has a way of being, and is thus also itself ontologically-temporally founded in a peculiar kind of way. The specific way in which entities can be presented in language is then doubly ontologically grounded: both in terms of the ways they themselves show up, for instance in the course of engaged activity, and also in terms of this particular ontological-temporal character of language. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, this implies that a full development of the problematic of the ontological difference will also involve integrally a consideration of the ontological status and temporality of languages. This question is (arguably at least) somewhat underdeveloped in Being and Time itself, where the focus is not generally on language but on Rede or discourse. But as we shall see (in chapters 4, 6, and 7 below), it is comprehensively developed in the later Heidegger’s consideration of the history of being, wherein it takes on the significance of the question of the specific “historical” temporality of languages in their institution and replacement according to the epochs in which being grounds beings successively, in different ways, by means of distinct conceptions of their underlying basic character.

Supplemental to Chapter 4:

Negation, Difference, and the “Nothing”

In various middle-period and late dialogues, Plato responds to the challenge posed by Parmenides’ problem about non-being, according to which it is apparently impossible to say or think what is not. As we have seen (chapter 1), above, Heidegger reads Plato, in the Sophist, as responding to this challenge with the Visitor’s theory of a series of interlinked dynamic koinonia or “commons” that ensure the correspondence of logical and psychological thinking with the properties of entities in themselves. This series, is, on Heidegger’s reading, ultimately unified by the single logical koinonia that allows for the regulated mixing of the great “genres” or types: being, stasis, kinesis, sameness and difference. Here, the relationships, and particularly the possibilities of mixing, between the great types ultimately account for the most general structures of thought itself in relation to being and becoming. If this solution is to be successful in answering Parmenides’ challenge and pointing to the actual reality of the sophist as the characteristic producer of falsehood, it will accordingly have to extend to the actuality of non-being itself: that is, there must be a way in which, as the Visitor says, non-being itself becomes manifest through the ultimately logical differentiation and mixing of types. As Heidegger argues in his interpretation of the Sophist, this means that the specific character of the me on – what is not – is here understood as its difference from being (or what is). According to Plato as Heidegger reads him, both negation and falsehood must be understood as essentially related, in each case, to some logically articulated positive content that is negated or falsified. For instance, that something is not in some way – for instance that Theaetetus is not flying – is understood in terms of Theaetetus’ difference from everything that is flying (or the difference of all of his properties from the property of flying), and the falsity of “Theaetetus flies” is similarly understood in terms of the fact that the property of “flying” is not
And because negation and falsehood are thus, in each case, constitutively related by means of differentiation to some specific positive content in this way, the meaningfulness of a simple nothing—a sense or meaning of nothingness as such—is explicitly denied.

By contrast with this, the idea of an intimate connection between the disclosure at the root of the truth of beings and the specific phenomenon of a “nothing”—one which is, however, explicitly prior to, and at the foundation of, “logical” negation—figures prominently in Heidegger’s 1929 Freiburg inaugural address, “What is Metaphysics”? The centerpiece of the address, in particular, is Heidegger’s claim for the possibility of a disclosure of “the nothing” in the fundamental mood or attunement [Stimmung] of Angst, and its relation as so disclosed with the possibility of a questioning about what is [das Seiende] in order to “recover” it for comprehension “as such and as a whole” [um es [das Seiende] als ein solches und im Ganzen für das Begreifen zurückzuerhalten]. The lecture begins by posing a question about the “nothing” that lies beyond the scope of scientific inquiry into beings, or beyond our pursuit of beings in science and the determinate orientation to research and to the existence of the world as a whole that characterizes this pursuit. This nothing, Heidegger argues, can in fact be made manifest in the attunement of Angst, in which “all things and we ourselves sink into indifference.” In this attunement, “beings as a whole [das Seiende im Ganzen] slip away” and it is thereby possible for the nothing to become manifest as such a “slipping away of the whole.” Such a manifestation itself allows, according to Heidegger, “the original openness of beings as such” [die ursprüngliche Offenheit des Seienden als eines solchen] to arise; here one grasps in particular that “there they are beings—and not nothing” [daß es Seiendes ist—und nicht Nichts]. This “nothing” is, Heidegger emphasizes, thus no superfluous addition, but points to an original ground for the manifestation of beings as such and as a whole. Dasein’s ability to “hold itself out into the nothing” in this manifestation is described as its specific structure of “transcendence,” whereby Dasein is “in each case already beyond beings as a whole [je schon über das Seiende im Ganzen hinaus].”

Heidegger goes on to argue that this possible manifestation of the nothing precedes and founds the “bare negation” that figures in logic as an act of the intellect, rather than the other way around:

What testifies to the constant and widespread though distorted [verstellte] manifestation of the nothing [Offenbarkeit des Nichts] in our Dasein more compellingly than negation [die Verneinung]? But negation does not conjure the not [das Nicht] out of itself as a means for making distinctions and oppositions to what is given [zum Gegebenen], in order, as it were, to insert itself in between it [um es gleichsam dazwischenzuschieben]. How could negation muster

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49 For a clear and very detailed analysis of both of these structures, see Crivelli ()
50 Reference to Sophist
51 GA 9, pp. 103-122.
52 GA 9, p. 118 (transl. modified).
53 GA 9, p. 111.
54 GA 9, p. 112, p. 113.
55 GA 9, p. 114.
56
the not [das Nicht] from itself when it can negate only [nur verneinen kann] when something negatable is already pre-given [vorgegeben] to it? But how could the negatable and what is to be negated [ein ... Zu-verneinendes] be able to be viewed as something susceptible to the not [als ein Nichthaftes] unless all thinking as such already has caught sight of the not? But the not can become manifest only [kann nur offenbar werden] if its origin, the nihilation of the nothing in general [das Nichten des Nichts überhaupt], and therewith the nothing itself, is extracted from concealment. The not does not originate through negation; rather, negation grounds itself in the not that springs from the nihilating of the nothing [das dem Nichten des Nichts entspringt].

Thus, while “the nothing” can be defined in its “common,” “obvious,” and “anemic” sense as “the complete negation of the totality of beings [die Vollständige Verneinung der Allheit des Seienden], it is conversely the disclosure of this “nothing” in the positive phenomenon of its “nihilating” that first makes possible a disclosure of “beings as a whole.”

Heidegger draws on this conclusion to raise questions about the treatment of negation within what he calls the “reigning and never-challenged doctrine of ‘logic’” [der herrschenden und nie angetasten Lehre der ‘Logik’]. According to this doctrine, Heidegger says, “negation is a specific act of the intellect [eine spezifische Verstandeshandlung.]” However, if negation, as an activity or accomplishment, indeed has a prior ontological basis in the phenomenon of the nothing, this “logical” doctrine must be questioned: far from producing the phenomenon of the nothing, negation as an intellectual activity is itself “somehow” dependent on and based in this phenomenon, as it is shown in a more penetrating questioning. In this questioning, Heidegger suggests, even the “commonly cited ground rule of thinking in general,” the law of non-contradiction as the “principle that contradiction is to be avoided [der Satz vom zu vermeidenden Widerspruch]” itself must be open to question. For if the application of this principle to the question “What is the Nothing?” threatens to “lay low” the question – specifically, by showing the contradiction inherent in any answer, according to which the nothing would have to be specified as being something or in some way – then the possibility of the questioning itself and the more original phenomenon it elicits themselves put into question the absolute authority or force of this rule.

Heidegger’s conception of the actual presentation of the nothing in “What is Metaphysics?” sharpens and deepens the conception he finds in Plato by exposing in detail the structural connection (only, at best) implicit in Plato’s own discussion, between the phenomenon of the nothing as such and the underlying structure of the pros ti or intentionality, and thereby to the broader phenomenon of the disclosure of beings (see chapter 1, above). This relationship is itself, as we have seen, essentially grounded for Heidegger in the possibility of a disclosive relationship to the totality of beings “as such and as a whole.” Plato’s partitive and topo-logical conception of the distinction between being and non-being with respect to individual properties or traits within the broader space of the logical koinonia as a

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57 GA 9, pp. 116-117 (transl. modified).
58 GA 9, p. 109; p. 117.
59 GA 9, p. 107.
whole is thus replaced with Heidegger’s picture of the nothing as set off against the totality of beings and as thereby providing an original foundation and broader horizon for negation and its force. This deepening of Plato’s picture results ultimately from Heidegger’s insistence on the implications of the ontological difference between beings and being, in terms of which, as set off against the totality of entities, the specific phenomenon of the nothing provides an indication of the form of their possible disclosure “as such and as a whole;” and thereby of their being itself.

Heidegger’s account in “What is Metaphysics?” further develops this conception of truth as involving the possibility of recovering a conceptually explicit understanding of being as an understanding of the totality of entities as such, in and through what he refers to here as “the Nothing”. If this conception of the ontological difference can indeed be considered basically illuminating with respect to the structure of the specific phenomenon of truth, it is also plausible that it stands to illuminate the logical structure of the totality of truth-evaluable contents which is the domain of Frege’s conception of the scope of quantificational logic. In particular, the structural interconnections that appear in the logical interrelations of the particular contents thereby involved themselves point to, if considered as characterizing the whole domain of possible content, the broad possibility of a constitutive even if not explicit reference to the totality, and thus by themselves pose the question of the position from which such a reference might be possible, either implicitly or explicitly. Heidegger’s picture addresses this question by pointing to the ontic-ontological structure of Dasein as the structure of truth as (ontic-ontological) disclosure, and as capable of gaining the position for an explicit retrieval of the implicit grasp of beings as a whole that is always already presupposed in factual life, through the fundamental possibility of an attunement to what is set over against this totality, the nothing that first emerges phenomenologically in the “totalizing” attitude of Angst.

This is also the basis on which it is possible to respond to a commonly formulated critical response to Heidegger’s position, on which it cannot be maintained that “the nothing” is the basis for negation, since Heidegger’s apparently nominative reference to “the nothing” is itself nonsensical or logically incoherent. On the position suggested by this response, it is rather supposed to be clear that negation is, rather, the foundation for “nothing,” in that “nothing” always has the meaning of “not any thing”, and demands completion, within a sentence, by binding the quantifier apparently involved and specifying its domain of application. For example, on this view, “nothing” has significance in contexts such as “There is nothing in the box” or “I found nothing to speak of”, but requires in these contexts such additional auxiliaries in order to make sense, and even there cannot have the significance of a noun or noun phrase.60

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60 The influential locus classicus of this objection is of course Carnap’s criticism of Heidegger, based primarily on his critical reading of Heidegger’s “Das Nichts selbst nichtet,” in the 1932 article “The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language” (Carnap 1932). For a similar set of objections to Heidegger’s apparently nominative use of “the nothing,” albeit from a position more broadly sympathetic to Heidegger’s project in general, see Tugendhat (1970). The episode of Carnap’s attack on Heidegger has been widely discussed, in part because it has seemed to many commentators to capture the differing philosophical styles or methods broadly characteristic of the “divide” between continental and analytic philosophy. For readings in this vein, see, e.g.,
We have already seen that it is implausible from the perspective of normal usage that existential and universal quantification can only be employed in restricted or previously delimited domains of quantification; what speaks against this is not only ordinary claims about the totality of things and negative existential judgments, but also the way that any such specification of domain presupposes, at least implicitly, a larger domain from within which it could intelligibly be carried out. So even if the meaning of “nothing” must indeed be logically connected with that of “not any thing,” it appears possible and trenchant to consider that at least in some cases this “not any thing” can be considered to have essentially unlimited scope, or at any rate to range over, and hence involve the intelligibility of, the totality of things or beings. From this perspective, the kind of “totalizing” experience involved in Angst as Heidegger describes it indeed might naturally be put as the experience that (for instance) “there is nothing”, i.e. there are really (in the most basic sense of “being” or “existence”) no beings. It is then certainly possible to nominalize what appears or becomes phenomenologically manifest in this kind of experience or phenomenon; and it is certainly not unreasonable to suppose that just this is what Heidegger himself has taken himself to have done with his nominative references to “the Nothing.” As Heidegger himself notes, the nominalization should not be taken as construing the Nothing “as an object”, since to do so would be to convert it “into something and not nothing”. But this is no reason to maintain that it is generally impossible, or that sentences involving the nominalized form may not be phenomenologically illuminating and ontologically indicative.

The situation is more closely analogous to Frege’s own usage in distinguishing between concept and object as logical types; drawing the distinction itself necessarily involves that concepts are referred to, at least in general, which violates the strict delimitation which Frege places on the logical functioning of concept- and object-words, according to which concept-words can only predicate and can never refer to objects. As Frege himself recognizes, such a usage is in fact necessary owing to the structure of language and indispensable in indicating logical distinctions. Here, ordinary language thus already, in a certain way, points beyond the domain of its constitutive strictures to provide the possibility of phenomenologically or ontologically indicating the basis of their logical force and application. In relation to this, the internal dynamics of specifically logical negation and logical contradiction with respect to the

Friedman (2000), Stone (2006), Gregory (2001), and Conant (2001). From the current perspective, these readings are indeed helpful in that they do point to large-scale methodological currents and divergences – for instance between the “rigorous” criteriological analysis of logical/linguistic structures, on one hand, and the phenomenological demonstration or elicitation of broad existential characterizations of the nature of our existential situation, on the other – between projects under the banner of which many have marched in later twentieth-century philosophy. However, if it is possible to integrate Heidegger’s distinctive methods of hermeneutic interpretation with some of those characteristic of logical and meta-logical reflection in the analytic tradition in something like the way I have indicated in the last chapter and this one, it is more helpful in the current context to consider how Heidegger’s striking turns of phrase here may indeed be seen as having a foundation in phenomena that are also independently indicated through reflection on logical structure and its own ontological basis. It is also worth noting in this connection that Heidegger’s own statements in “What is Metaphysics?” about the dissolution of the “idea of ‘logic’” in a more basic questioning (GA 9, p. 117) and the prospect of challenging the reign of “logic” over metaphysics (p. 120) always name “logic” in scare quotes and point only to (as Heidegger clarifies in marginal notes) the “traditional” or metaphysical conception of it, and so appear to bear no direct implications for Fregean or post-Fregean logics themselves.
totality of reference here become significant, both as characterizing the problems to be solved and as, themselves, indicators of the broader ontological (and, as we shall see, ultimately temporal) situation.

**Radicalization of the Ontological Problematic**

As we have seen, both Heidegger’s understanding of the “nothing” in 1929 and the implications of Russell’s paradox for Frege’s conception of sense thus point, at the limits of formalization that they indicate, to the deeper ontological site of the question of the basis of the totality of the space of meaningful contents, or the sense of beings as such and as a whole. The question of the ontological basis of sense is thereby ontologically clarified in terms of its structural relationship to the sense or meaning of beings as a whole, and can be further explicated as it is rooted in the ontological difference itself. Heidegger’s picture in 1929, in particular, already invokes Dasein as the being which is uniquely structured in such a way as to inhabit this site, and points to the phenomenon of Angst as a privileged indicative moment within Dasein’s structure, as so situated, capable of pointing to (what is there understood as) Dasein’s structural transcendence with respect to beings as a whole. But as the development of Heidegger’s thought in the 1930s witnesses, it is not obviously sufficient to conceive Dasein, in this way, simply as the entity which occupies the “between” of being and beings, without first clarifying more deeply the topographical or ontological structure of this “between” itself.

It is in connection with the question of this “between”, specifically that we can best understand the radicalization that Heidegger undertakes of the question of the sense of being into the question of its “truth” in the 1930s. In particular, this radicalization leads him to deepen the ontological problematic, and the meaning of the ontological difference itself, in such a way that he finally thinks the basis for the given totality of beings not as the simple positive presence of Dasein, but instead as the ultimately ontological/structural determining “instance” that he terms Ereignis. With this radicalization, there is no longer a single site for the unitary determination of the being of beings, but rather a temporally variable and discrete series of epochal determinations, recurrently produced in or by Ereignis itself. The basis for these determinations is an original difference that can now not simply be specified as the (static) difference “between” being and beings but rather arises from Ereignis as the event of the “truth” of being, or the production of successive principles for the intelligibility of beings as a whole, while meanwhile being itself retreats progressively into obscurity under the cover of the ontic determination of these principles. The formal/ontological indication of this more original difference, as I shall argue here, thus articulates the site at which thought recurrently poses the principles of its possible adequation to beings as a whole, thereby also recurrently posing (without resolving) the problem of its own existence among the total field of beings thus outlined.

But this is none other than the problem of the position of thought itself within the totality of beings it can think. Here, in other words, ontological difference emerges as the ultimately paradoxical basis for the positive structure of sense, and the structure of Ereignis as originary difference verifies the structural suggestion of inherent paradox and its dynamism already implicit in the set-theoretical and metalogical paradoxes of totality themselves. As Heidegger suggests, it thereby becomes the basis for a temporal and historical understanding of the meta-logical implications of negation and contradiction in relation to the sense of beings. This leads to the possibility of seeing the “negating” and the “not” involved in what Heidegger treats as the historical progression of nihilism as positively grounded in the historical process of being’s withdrawal, and thereby to the ontologically and metalogically posed question of the implications of the development of this progression to its own final or completed point.
In the 1935 Freiburg lecture course *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger returns to the question posed at the very end of the 1929 “What is Metaphysics?”, the question “Why are there beings at all, rather than nothing? [Warum ist überhaupt Seiendes und nicht vielmehr Nichts?]” This question, which inherently brings into question the ground of “beings as a whole,” and “as such,” is here treated as the “fundamental question of metaphysics [metaphysiche Grundfrage]” and thereby as at “the center and core that determines all philosophy [die bestimmende Mitte und den Kern aller Philosophie].” Nevertheless, Heidegger distinguishes it from a second, deeper question which he intends the course to pose, this time a question which is not about “beings” in the sense of “what is” [das Seiendes] or indeed about the nothing at all but rather “about Being as such [nach dem Sein als solchem].”

Although even the questioning of *Being and Time* still suggested (though, Heidegger says, misleadingly) the first question, in particular with its talk of Dasein’s structural transcendence, the second question has, he says, “a different essence and a different provenance” such that with respect to it the first, “metaphysical” question can only be, at best, an initial guideline. In particular, if the question “Why are there beings at all rather than nothing?” is posed with respect to beings alone, one then seeks a highest or most basic ground among beings for their being: here we are “beginning directly with beings as unquestionably given [fraglos vorgegeben]” and are thereby already presupposing the basis that we are supposedly seeking. Instead of posing the question with the accent on its first part, “Why are there beings at all?”, Heidegger suggests, we should accordingly emphasize the second part, “…rather than nothing,” and especially the “rather than” that links the question’s two substantive moments. If we emphasize the “rather than” [...und nicht vielmehr...] in this way, instead of seeking a ground among beings for beings, we rather question “the ground for the decision for beings over against Nothing,” or, “more precisely...the ground for the wavering of the beings that sustains us and unbinds us [das uns trägt und uns löst], half in being, half not in being [halb seind, halb nichtseindiend].” With this, our questioning about beings is thrown back, Heidegger suggests, to a still prior question presupposed in this and any question about why anything is, including any questioning of the being or selfhood of Dasein (which, Heidegger says, is “*itself* by virtue of its essential relation to Being in general.”) This prior question is the question of “how it stands” with being [“Wie steht es um das Sein?”] itself.

In the *Beiträge zur Philosophie: vom Ereignis* composed between 1936 and 1938, Heidegger further specifies this radicalization of questioning as the development from the “guiding question” of the “being of beings” to the “grounding question” of the *truth* of being itself. Early in the *Beiträge*, Heidegger announces, in connection with a thinking from and toward the essential happening of being, or *Ereignis*, this new question of the “truth of being” [*Wahrheit des Seyns*] in contrast to the “previous question of philosophy,” which has asked only about beings:

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64 GA 40, p. 21.
65 GA 40, p. 22.
The question of being [Die Seinsfrage] is the question of the truth of beyng. When grasped and worked out historically, it becomes the grounding question [Grundfrage], as opposed to the previous question of philosophy, the question about beings (the guiding question [Leitfrage]).

This question of the “truth of beyng” is further understood as the question of an “openness for essential occurrence [Wesung] as such” (p. 60/76) and as the question of the ultimate ground for anything existent to be. Thus thought as the ground of all possible appearance, this “essential swaying” of beyng [Wesung des Seyns selbst] is designated as Ereignis and a preliminary and transitional “thoughtful speaking” of, and from, it is attempted. This attempt at thinking and speaking is, according to Heidegger, to be understood as a “directive” [Weisung] that indicates the “necessity” of the “sheltering of the truth of beyng within beings” [der Bergung der Wahrheit des Seyns in das Seiende] on the way to a possible “leap” from the previous question of beings to the new question of the truth of beyng in itself, without reference to beings. Nevertheless, the task toward which it is directed remains, as in Being and Time, related to the specific question of the grounding of domains of beings, including that of beings as a whole. Here, for example, this task is specified as that of the “retrieval of beings out of the truth of beyng. [Die Wiederbringung des Seienden aus der Wahrheit des Seyns].” In particular, this “task” is carried out by means of a distinctive questioning about “sense” [Sinn] as “the grounding of the projected domain”

The question of ‘sense,’ i.e., according to the elucidations in Being and Time, the question of the grounding of the projected domain [des Entwurfsbereichs], or, in short, the question of the truth of beyng, is and remains my question and is my unique question, for at issue in it is indeed what is most unique [den sie gilt ja dem Einzigsten] ...

The question of the ‘sense of beyng’ [“Sinn des Seyns”] is the question of all questions. In the development of its unfolding, the essence of what is here called “sense” determines itself, that within which the question as meditation [Besinnung] persists [sich hält], that which it opens up as a question: the openness for self-concealing, i.e. truth.

The new “grounding” question of the truth of Beyng thus results from a historical and ontological deepening of the problematic of sense and truth already pursued in Being and Time. As we have seen, for Heidegger in Being and Time, sense is fundamentally Dasein’s temporal projection of possibilities onto what are thereby constituted as intelligible entities; the possibility of this projection is itself closely related to that of disclosive truth in that both take place on the ground of Dasein’s fundamental hermeneutical structure of interpretation, that of the “hermeneutic-existential” as. Here, Heidegger deepens the linked question of the basis of sense and truth into the question of the basis of projection itself, or of the kind of opening and concealing that is characteristic of Dasein as such. Dasein is itself, accordingly, no longer seen as a positive given phenomenon to be described or illuminated; rather, it is

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68 GA 65, p. 6.
69 GA 65, p. 76, p. 7.
70 GA 65, p. 7.
71 GA 65, p. 7 (transl. slightly modified).
72 GA 65, p. 7 (transl. slightly modified).
73 GA 65, pp. 10-11 (transl. slightly modified).
to be achieved or accomplished by way of a transformative *grounding* of Dasein itself in the truth of beyng. This is, in particular, to be achieved by way of a thoughtful meditation on this truth, which also has the significance of an “appropriation” of Dasein by, and into, *Ereignis* as beyng’s event.

Despite the obvious differences in the tone of their metaphors, Frege’s logical inquiry may be seen, along similar lines, as posing the question of the basis of sense by means of a radicalized inquiry into the structure of truth. Here, Frege’s insistence, in “Negation,” on the integrity and priority of the possibility of posing propositional *questions* prior to our knowing the truth of the propositions interrogated about should be seen as decisive, and as parallel to Heidegger’s own privileging of questioning and the structure of the question in general as a structural basis for ontological inquiry. In particular, that it must be possible to pose questions in advance of performing any act of assertion, denial, or positive judgment means, for both philosophers, that sense must be able to be given in its original structure along with and in questioning itself. For this reason, it must precede and can possibly outstrip the sense of propositions, determined as univocally either true or false. In Frege’s conception, this structure of the question as prior already points, as we have seen, to the structural basis of logical negation in the prior constitution of a total realm of thoughts. But the identification of this basis ultimately elicits, as we have seen, the constitutive structure of paradox and dissymmetry between thought and beings which is shown in Russell’s paradox. To produce the paradox as a basic indication of the underlying structure of sense, it is in fact sufficient to insist upon the priority of the question that is developed by both Frege and Heidegger: in particular, it is sufficient to insist that questions about the totality of beings, or about truth, or about the basis of sense, *also* must have interrogative sense, even as they take themselves up within their own scope. With this, as we have seen, there is also indicated the specific structural basis of the sense of entities in general in the underlying structure of paradox whose prohibition has historically determined the topo-logical conception of the sense of beings as coherent and consistent in general. The indication thus provides a demonstrative basis on which this conception can be exposed as incoherent, and thereby marks a specific limit of the regulative principle, formulated most directly as the law of non-contradiction, which has held it in force.

In the *Beiträge*, in developing the “grounding” question in contrast to the previous “guiding” question, Heidegger points toward a “leap” which prepares for an “other beginning”, outside the ambit of the traditional interpretation of being in terms of beings which has determined its conception, according to Heidegger, from Plato to Nietzsche. Within this traditional determination, according to Heidegger, the question of being takes the form of a questioning of beings as beings (*on e on*) whose most general form is the question “what are beings? [was ist das Seiende?]” (*ti to on*) and whose answer is given by a determinate conception of the being of beings, for instance (in the most characteristic example) by Aristotle in determining the overarching categories of *ousia* or substance. In the scope of this traditional questioning, being, according to Heidegger, is always understood as “beingness”, or as the most *general character* of beings as such.\textsuperscript{74} Here (for Aristotle and the whole subsequent tradition up to Nietzsche), in particular, “being (as beingness) is always and only meant as the *koinon*, the common and thus what is common to every being.”\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{74} GA 65, p. 75.
\textsuperscript{75} GA 65, p. 75.
The traditional understanding of being as beingness, in other words, characteristically operates by looking to the specific characteristics of beings and locating them within a more general structure. This structure identifies their ultimate essence or most generally definitive characteristic as the basis for their unity within a *koinon* or “common” that ultimately encompasses all that is. The specific determination of this structure takes various historical forms, but in each case the overarching structure of logical and ontological characteristics is determined on the guideline of specific characteristics of beings in accordance with the “guiding” question about beings:

For the guiding question, the *being* of beings, the determination of beingness (i.e. the providing of the “categories” for *ousia*) is the *answer*. The various realms of beings become important in various ways in later, post-Greek history. The number and the type of the categories as well as their “system” change, but the approach remains essentially the same, whether based immediately in *logos* as assertion or following determinate transformations in consciousness and in the absolute spirit. From the Greeks to Nietzsche, the *guiding question* determines the same mode of asking about “being” [*dieselbe Weise der Frage nach dem “Sein”*] The clearest and greatest example for this unity of the tradition is Hegel’s *Logic*.  

By contrast, in the transition to the grounding question of the historical truth of being, what is sought is not the general character of beings but the deeper underlying conditions for the possibility of *any* appearance of beings whatsoever. Accordingly, for the grounding question as opposed to the guiding question, the “starting point” [*Ansatz*] is no longer “this or that being;” nor, indeed, is it “beings as such and as a whole.” It is rather the possibility of a “leap” into truth as the “clearing and concealing” [*Lichtung und Verbergung*] of *being* itself. This questioning accordingly extends to the question of the underlying ground of *any* of the various historical *determinations* of what is seen, through shifting historical categorizations, as their total or general character, and of the more basic ground for *all* of these determinations in being itself. Thus, the kind of basic positionality recurrently involved in the traditional interpretation of the basic character of beings, which makes possible determinate conceptions of beings as a whole, is here subjected to a deeper historical questioning of the ground of its possibility. This historical questioning takes in the “entire history of the guiding question” [*das Ganze der Leitfragengeschichte*] on the ground of its more basic historical determination by being itself:

The guiding question, unfolded in its structure, always allows the recognition of a *basic position* toward beings as such [*eine Grundstellung zum Seienden als solchen*], i.e., a position of the questioner (human being) on a ground which cannot as such be fathomed [*nicht ... er-gruündbar ... ist*] or known at all from out of the guiding question but which is brought into the open through the grounding question.  

In this way, the question of positionality that is implicit in the history of the guiding question and its determinate conceptions of the generality of beings, and implicitly answered in advance with each such conception, can only be unfolded explicitly with the leap to the deeper grounding question that asks

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76 GA 65, p. 76 (transl. slightly modified).
77 GA 65, pp. 75-76.
78 GA 65, p. 76.
79 GA 65, p. 77.
after the underlying truth of beyng. The result of this unfolding is the historical questioning of the way being is determined as beingness in the context of each of these determinations of beingness as generality or koinon, and the correlative delimitation of the history of these determinations as a whole against the anticipation of the transition to the “other” beginning from Ereignis.

For this reason, the transition from the “guiding” to the “grounding” question itself implies a radicalization and partial overcoming of what was earlier thought as the “ontological difference” between being and beings. In particular, according to Heidegger, it is here necessary to understand the question of the being of beings as pointing toward the deeper, grounding question of the “truth of beyng” rather than as it has been understood within metaphysics, wherein it is answered in terms of beingness, generality and the koinon:

In accord with the Platonic interpretation of beings as such as eidos – idea and of the idea as koinon, the being of beings overall [das Sein des Seiendenden überhaupt] becomes the koinon. To be the “most general” [Generellste] becomes the essential determination of being itself. The question of the ti estin [“what it is”] is always the koinon-question, and thereby is given for the entire thinking of beings as such the framework of the highest genus [obersterGattung] (highest universality [höchster Allgemeinheit]) and specification. The main realms of beings are precisely sheer specialia of the universality [Allgemeinheit] of beings, i.e. of being. And in this way the character of the guiding question is reflected in the distinction between metaphysica generalis and metaphysica specialis. Here, there is no longer any question about a possible coupling of metaphysica generalis and metaphysica specialis, since they are indeed coupled in the way just named, a way that is very external to beings and a fortiori external to beyng [in der genannten, dem Seienden und erst recht dem Seyn sehr äußerlichen Weise]. Utterly groundless pseudo-questions [Scheinfragen] arise here as long as the unrecognized basis of the guiding question and the distinction between the disciplines are from the start taken to be self-evident [im Ansatz festgehalten worden].

The confusion increases altogether if a solution to the question is sought with the help of the “ontological” difference developed in fundamental ontology. For this “difference” is indeed only a way of approach, not in the direction of the guiding question, [ist ja nur Ansatz nicht in Richtung auf die Leitfrage], but to the leap into the basic question [zum Sprung in die Grundfrage]. And it does so not in order to play vaguely with henceforth fixed terms (beings and being) but, rather, in order to go back to the question of the truth of the essential occurrence of beyng [der Wahrheit der Wesung des Seyns] and thus to grasp in a different way the relation between beyng and beings [den Bezug von Seyn und Seiendem], especially since also the interpretation of beings as such [das Seiende als solches] undergoes a transformed interpretation [eine verwandelte Auslegung ... erfährt] (sheltering of the truth of the event) and no possibility any longer exists unexpectedly to smuggle “beings” [das Seiende] in as “represented objects,” [“vorGestellten Gegenstand”] “things objectively present in themselves,” [“Vorhandenes an sich”] or the like.  

80 GA 65, p. 207.
For Heidegger in the *Beiträge*, the questioning attempted in *Being and Time* is itself at best “transitional,” and can only prepare the way for a “grasping” of the “truth of beyng out of [its] own essence”, namely, as *Ereignis*. On the way to the posing of the more basic question of this truth, a thinking of the ontological difference is, according to Heidegger, both necessary and “disastrous” [verhängnisvoll]. In particular, because it itself arises from the inquiry into “beings as such” in their “beingness,” it does not without further ado lead to the attainment of the question of beyng. Indeed, Heidegger suggests, insofar as the ontological difference suggests an inquiry into the “unity” of its terms (being and beings), the question is quixotic and can never lead to the deeper position “from which it could be seen that the distinction no longer is primordial”. Foregoing this conception of unity, it is necessary instead, Heidegger suggests, to “leap over” the distinction and indeed over the “transcendence” that was earlier thought as the surpassing of beings by being in order to achieve the “creative grounding [Er-gründung] of the truth of beyng” which is the “leap into the event [Ereignis] of Da-sein”.

As we have seen (in chapter 1, above), in Plato’s *Sophist* the debate between the materialists and friends of the forms over the mutual relationship between being and becoming, which forms the crux of the “gigantomachia” over being, is apparently resolved by the Eleatic visitor with his suggestion of the series of logical and structural *koinonia* that link the great types in the soul, in the articulate structure of the spoken *logos*, and in the overarching logical grammar that is seen as presiding over both. The specific problem of non-being, which is both logical and temporal, is resolved, in particular, by the

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81 GA 65, p. 250.
82 GA 65, p. 250.
83 GA 65, p. 250.
84 GA 65, p. 250.
85 GA 65, p. 251. In his doctoral dissertation (Thomson 1999), pp. 106-111, Iain Thomson draws on this passage to suggest that the ontological difference itself is ultimately split or overcome by Heidegger in identifying a substantially different structure, what he later sometimes calls simply “the difference” or “difference” rather than “ontological difference;” this structure is no longer that of the difference between entities and their being, but rather the difference of both from being (or beyng) thought in itself. On this picture, there is thus ultimately a three-fold distinction to be drawn: first, between i) beings and ii) their ‘being’ (as in Heidegger’s earlier picture of ontological difference) in any given historical epoch, but also second, between both and iii) beyng itself as it determines the various epochs trans-historically. However, without disputing the significance of the development that occurs when Heidegger recognizes in the early 1930s the possibility of a deepening of the inquiry into sense and truth to involve the consideration of beyng “in itself” and without primary relationship to beings – the deepening I have treated here, following Heidegger’s suggestion, as that from the “guiding” question of the being of beings to the “grounding” question of the truth of beyng – I think there are many reasons to see the ‘ultimate’ difference at the heart of *Ereignis* as more a radicalization than an abandonment of ontological difference. One is that the problem of truth that it addresses is explicitly, according to Heidegger, to be understood as a development of the problem of sense as projection (see above) and not in terms of its abandonment. Another is that it appears to be ultimately implicit in the ontological difference itself – though Heidegger presumably did not recognize this prior to the 1930s – that any ultimate specification of it in terms of the opposition of “beings” or “what is” to what is nevertheless again relationally determined as “their being” must betray the real sense of the difference by reinscribing it as a difference between two positive terms (thus presupposing but leaving mysterious the “of” in “the being of beings” itself): the overcoming of this conception toward a radicalized one in which the difference is not specifiable is this way is thus at least implicit in the ontological difference (as originally specified) itself (which may be why Heidegger says here that in its original formulation it is not only “disastrous” but also “necessary”). I am indebted to Prof. Thomson for some discussion of the issue.
suggestion of a phenomenalization of non-being in the person of the Sophist. This phenomenalization is itself made possible by the koinon or mixing of the great types, and in particular by the mixing of difference with being to produce non-being as differentiation from what is. On this conception, which itself prepares the way for Aristotle’s conception of logical categorization as the structure of differentia of genus and species, the appearance of non-being, illusion, and falsehood is thus itself understood as a phenomenal presencing of non-being whose specific condition of possibility is the superior structure of the logical/ontological/psychological koinon. This then invites the question of the ground for the distinction between the true and the false logos by pointing to the structural correspondence or non-correspondence of logoi with the overarching structure of types and forms in their determinate possibilities of mixing or combination. The characteristic “ti estin” question of identity is thus answered in terms of the articulate structure of the logos and its correspondence to the superior grammar of types or forms. As we have seen, the solution depends ultimately on the necessary a priori existence of the types or forms with their determinate possibilities of mixing and combination, and it does not explain or account for this structure. Additionally, it fails ultimately to clarify, particularly in the case of non-being, the ultimate basis of the possibility of the requisite structural correspondence itself.

In the Beiträge, Heidegger further suggests that the determination of beings in terms of identity plays an early and essential historical role in the development of the relationship of thinking and being from the Pre-Socratics to the characteristic modern configuration of “lived experience” [Erlebnis] and “machination” [Machenschaft] or technology. This determination is, according to Heidegger, simultaneous with a “collapse” of truth as aletheia into truth as “correctness” [Richtigkeit] which itself pre-determines the modern and contemporary interpretation of thinking as representation and truth as correspondence. This early development is marked, according to Heidegger, by the interpretation of noein as “nous of the idein of an idea” and “koinon and logos as apophansis [“assertion”] of the kategoraii [“categories”].” In this development, “thinking, as a faculty, falls prey to the ‘psychological’ – i.e. ontic – interpretation.” Here, the “relation already prepared by Plato between psyche and aletheia (on) as zugon [yoke]” becomes, as it does explicitly in Descartes, “the ever-sharper subject-object relation.” In this development, in particular, “Thinking becomes the I-think” and the unity of thinking and being becomes the unity of the unifying function of synthetic thought in the “transcendental unity of apperception” (as in Kant) or in the absolute self-identity of the self-positing “I” (as in Fichte). In this way, “identity becomes the essential determination of beings as such.”

A particularly decisive early moment in this development, according to Heidegger, is Plato’s determination of the idea on the basis of a mimetic or representational relationship between it and sensible particulars. Here, the idea is originally thought as the look of something in which it comes to presence and which supplies its constancy in presencing. This look is then understood as a “unifying One,” as being itself (on) is thought as unifying, and “as a consequence” the idea is now interpreted as

87 GA 65, p. 198.
88 GA 65, p. 198.
89 GA 65, p. 198.
90 GA 65, pp 197-98.
91 GA 65, p. 199.
koinon and being itself as the “most general.” The idea is now thought, with respect to individual beings, as having a koinon character, that of gathering them into unity, and accordingly as what best “satisfies the essence of beingness” and is therefore qualified, over against the many sensible entities, as the “ontos on” or “what is most eminently” [das Seiendste]. With this, whatever is individual or changeable is thought as me on or non-being, in that it does not fully satisfy this standard set by the pre-eminent being of the ideas. This determination of beingness as koinon also has the implication that the many ideas themselves “can be only in the manner of the koinon”, that is, in a koinonia among themselves. This leads to the determination of the gene as supreme or highest unities, self-unifying [sich einigende] and thereby generative [Her-künfte], which will later yield the Aristotelian system of categories.

A number of recent commentators (see, e.g., Figal (2000), Gonzalez (2009), and Ralkowski (2009) have considered the implications of the apparent difference in Heidegger’s tone and attitude toward Plato between his treatment in the Sophist lectures of 1924–25—which is very often sympathetic to Plato and presents his methodology as in many ways congruent to Heidegger’s own—and his apparently much less sympathetic treatment in such later texts as “The Essence of Truth” (GA 34, 1931) and “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth” (GA 9, 1931–32), where the cave allegory of the Republic is rather treated as the fundamental moment of the decline of truth as aletheia into homiosis or correctness. As commentators have noted, a significant question to raise here is that of the basis of Heidegger’s own generally negative attitude toward dialectic (which may underlie his describing the Platonic dialectic, in Being and Time, as a “genuine philosophical embarrassment” (GA 2, p. 25) and seeing Aristotle’s abandonment of it as fundamental philosophical progress (see also Gonzalez (2002)). It may be suggested here, in particular, that there are grounds for a partial or substantial rapprochement to be found between Plato and Heidegger by emphasizing the actual methodological commitments underlying Heidegger’s questioning about being, early and late, and Plato’s dialectic, provided only that the overdetermining force of Heidegger’s assumption that Plato always and only interpreted being as presence is modified or constrained on the basis of Plato’s actual texts. (Thus, e.g., Figal (2000, p. 108) argues that by interpreting the sense of dunamis in the Sophist as meaning only presence, Heidegger “already … distances himself” from Platonic dialectic and that the reason for this distancing may ultimately be “that he is so committed to the notion that ‘being’, for the Greeks, means the same as ‘presence’… that he always returns to it, even when his hermeneutical ingenium should know better.” Along partially similar lines, Gonzalez (2009, pp. 105-106) sees in Heidegger’s later treatment of Plato an avoidance of the essential dialogical and mythical elements which might have, if brought out, provided a counter-narrative to that of the “metaphysical” identification of being with presence and the fall of truth into correctness which Heidegger identifies here.

On the basis of the present reading, it is certainly not to be denied that there are many elements in Plato’s dialogues which contain the germs or even the actual suggestion of an overcoming of the Platonic “metaphysics of presence” which might be seen as embodied in the “official” theory of ideas (most completely in its middle-period form). In particular, later dialogues such as the Sophist, the Philebus and (massively) the Parmenides point again and again to the irreducible inherence of unresolved paradoxes and aporeatic structures at the very heart of this (middle-period) theory, and we will develop some of the important implications of this for the contemporary closure and possible overcoming of the “metaphysics of presence” in part II of this work. On the other hand, though, it is important to note in the present context that finding these resources in the Platonic text, over against some of Heidegger’s suggestions about the “metaphysical” character of Platonism (if not always of Plato himself), does not require that we see Heidegger as simply missing the real implications of Plato’s dialectical or dramatic method, or of regressing in his Plato interpretation from the period of the Sophist lectures to the 1930s and 1940s. Instead, what is to be seen as decisive here, indeed for Plato as well as for Heidegger, is just the way in which the intrinsic problems of an interpretation of the force of logic and logical thought communicate with those of an

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92 GA 65, p. 209.
93 GA 65, p. 209.
94 GA 65, p. 209
95 GA 65, p. 209.
96 GA 65, p. 209.
97 A number of recent commentators (see, e.g., Figal (2000), Gonzalez (2009), and Ralkowski (2009) have
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In this determination of the idea as the *koinon*, according to Heidegger, we can also see the condition by which the *khorismos* or gap between thinking and being becomes “a sort of being”; here is to be found the origin of “transcendence’ in its various forms” as well as the specific sense of the representation of the *a priori*.98 Subsequently, transcendence is understood in an “ontic” sense as the surpassing of one being over all others (as in Christianity), in an “ontological” sense whereby it refers to the surpassing that “resides in the *koinon* as such,” namely in a system of categories “beyond” and “prior to” beings, or, finally, in the sense of the fundamental ontology of *Being and Time*, where it is understood as Da-sein’s structural surpassing of itself on the basis of its prior understanding of being.99 Through the conception there developed of understanding as “thrown projection”, Heidegger says, transcendence as it is treated in *Being and Time* already indicates a standing of Dasein “in the truth of beyng” [im Offenen des Seienden]. Nevertheless, even that conception is here to be overcome, along with every sense of transcendence, in favor of a deeper consideration of the ultimate basis for projection itself in Da-sein’s “enduring” of the “open realm of concealment.” [das Offene der Verbergung].100

The history of the interpretation of being as presence which Heidegger describes as the history of the determination of being as beingness (and hence in terms of beings) is, by contrast, one in which beyng itself increasingly withdraws, obscures itself, or abandons beings. This abandonment [Verlassenheit] is nevertheless not, according to Heidegger, simply an indifferent occurrence with respect to beyng but rather determines its history in the sense of “Geschichte,” what is elsewhere designated in Heidegger’s *corpus* as the “history of being” itself.101 In this progressive withdrawal, *alethethia* is understood as correctness and finally as universal representability, and thinking more and more takes on the character of uniform representation and availability for a total regime of “lived experience.” This regime stands over against “machination” or the technological manipulation of beings as paired and mutually supplementary expressions of the contemporary understanding of the basic character of being.102 In close connection with the contemporary dominance of a reign of “calculative thinking”, “machination” is here specified, more basically, as the interpretation of all beings as “representable and represented” and as such “on the one hand, accessible in opinion and calculation [in Meinen und Rechnen], and, on the other hand, providable in production and implementation [vorbringbar in der Herstellung und Durchführung].” 103 It correlates with, on the side of the experiencing subject, the comprehensiveness of a regime of “lived experience” understood as a “basic form of representation” which “promotes and

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_ontological_ inquiry into the meaning of being and presence: thus Heidegger’s interpretation of the *Sophist* already in 1924-25 can elicit these problems as limitations of the Visitor’s official theory (whether or not it is actually to be identified with Plato’s own views), while his later suggestion that the conception of the *idea* that comes to the fore in the Cave allegory marks an important development in the history of the interpretation of being as presence can itself be retained. It should be kept open, as well, whether there are or may be methodological virtues of Plato’s dialectic, with respect to the posing and development of these problems, that Heidegger partially or completely misses.

98 GA 65, pp. 216-17.
99 GA 65, pp. 216-17.
100 GA 65, p. 217.
101 “What sort of happening, and of which history [Geschehnis welcher Geschichte] is this *abandonment*? Is there a history of beyng? And how seldom and how little does this history come to light in a veiled way [kommt sie verhüllt ans Licht]?” (GA 65, p. 116).
entrenches” a humanist or “anthropological” way of thinking rooted in the conception of the human being as animal rationale and intimately connected to the dominance of the categories of “culture” and “worldview” as prevailing ways of thinking and representing beings.104

In this way of thinking, all that counts as “being” [als “seiend”] is “what is or can be the object of a lived experience” [das Er-lebte und Er-lebbare] in being able to be brought before one in representation.105 To this conception of being as what is representable corresponds the apparently unlimited representability of beings in machination; here, there is no limit to what can be given for representation, since there is “nothing that is, or could be, given” to representation “as a limit.”106 Instead, “everything is humanly possible [menschen-möglich], as long as everything is calculated [in Rechnung Gestellt] in every respect and in advance and the conditions are provided.”107 This unlimited calculability means that “the incalculable is merely that which has not yet been mastered in calculation [das in der Berechnung noch nicht Bewältige] but is in itself also to be captured some day [an sich aber einst auch Einzufangende];” there is, accordingly “in no way …anything outside all calculation [also keineswegs das Außenhalb jeder Rechnung].”108 And because of the certainty about beings which this in-principle calculability of everything provides, “the question of the essence of truth” is itself “no longer needed”.109 Accordingly, “there is no problem that is not solvable, and the solution is merely a matter of number applied to time, space and force.” (p. 98)

This universal calculability is, according to Heidegger, an indicative aspect of the “abandonment by being” [Seinsverlassenhheit] which is the “ground” and “more original” essential determination of what is grasped (though dimly) by Nietzsche as the world-historical process of nihilism.111 What Nietzsche grasps under the heading of “nihilism” is now rejected and warded off, with increasing desperation, by the unlimited elevation of what were at first only means to goals into goals in themselves; for instance, the elevation of a people, their “cultural assets”, and all “cultural politics” here become elevated to absolute ends.112 This elevation, however, is itself “the most insidious form of nihilism and therefore its highest form.”113 Here, nihilisms of different forms battle with each other, as, for instance, Heidegger says, in the battle between the nihilism of Christianity and the “crude nihilism” of Bolshevism.114 Nevertheless, the “abandonment by being” which the growth of nihilism, in all of its forms, at last expresses is itself the determining basis of a “unique era [einzigartiges Zeitalter] in the history of the truth of being.”115 In this era, “of long duration,” “truth hesitates to put its essence into clarity” and “what is” [das Seiende], named as “the actual,” [das “Wirkliche”] “life,” or “values,” is accordingly

105 GA 65, p. 129.
106 GA 65, p. 136.
107 GA 65, p. 136.
108 GA 65, p. 121 (transl. slightly modified).
109 GA 65, p. 120.
110 GA 65, p. 125.
111 GA 65, p. 119
112 GA 65, pp. 138-140.
113 GA 65, p. 140.
114 GA 65, pp. 139-140.
115 GA 65, p. 120.
“disappropriated of beyng [des Seyns enteignet].”[^116] The process culminates with Nietzsche’s way of understanding truth; in it “truth deterioriates into a necessary illusion” and the “unavoidable stabilization introduced into beings themselves [das Seiende selbst],” determined as the will to power.[^117] But although, in this culmination and end, the Western metaphysics of presence is “furthest from the question of the truth of beyng” it is, Heidegger says, nevertheless “closest” to it in that “it has prepared the transition to this question as [its] end.”[^118] In this final configuration, machination itself ultimately “withdraws” and tends to hide itself behind determinations such as “actuality,” [“wirklichkeit”] objectivity and constancy.[^119] Both this withdrawal and the actual dominance of machination that it obscures are, however, aspects of the ongoing withdrawal of beyng itself, and in bringing this withdrawal to completion, the linked configuration of machination and lived experience ultimately provide the condition under which it can finally reverse itself. Indeed, in its own withdrawal, the dominance of machination is the “essential occurrence of beyng [die Wesung des Seyns]].”[^120] In this sense, “Machination as the essential occurrence of beingness [als Wesung der Seiendheit] provides a first intimation of the truth of beyng itself [gibt einen ersten Wink in die Wahrheit des Seyns selbst].”[^121]

### Undecidability and the Critique of the Present

I have argued that Heidegger’s conception of the history of being can be defended from the charge of conceptual relativity, and understood on the level of its real structural problematic, only if we see it as unfolding a specifically temporal structure of undecidable sense. This structure is also separately motivated by a metalogical reflection on the structure of axiomatic principles in relation to the totality of a language that they institute and maintain. Seeing it in this way involves acknowledging that the shifting configurations of epochal economies of presence, each constituted by a particular determination of the being of beings, themselves have a larger determinative unity in the itinerary of what Heidegger calls the epoch of “metaphysics” itself. Heidegger’s understanding of the history of these determinations, as a whole, is itself directional. It is oriented by the growing gap between an original or inceptual determination of being as presence and the ever-greater obscurity, forgetting or withdrawal of being itself in the sway of the successive epochal principles. For Heidegger, this history, moreover, has a culmination and an end. Specifically, it ends in the contemporary configuration of the metaphysics of technology and the unchallenged sway of a universal calculability and ordering of beings in which being itself no longer appears at all. I have argued that in order to understand the specific kind of temporality that is constitutive of, and constituted by, metaphysics as the history of presence, we need also to see the unifying basis of the entire regime or epoch of metaphysics in the self-differentiation of being as it both grants the possibility of presence, and holds itself back, in the epochal constitution of each specific economy of beings. This involves, as well, comprehending in the contemporary condition of universal technology and “enframing” the closure and specific boundary of the metaphysics of presence itself. In this final section, I shall consider how the specific phenomenon of the undecidability of sense itself points to and articulates this closure, and also in a certain way intimates or indicates its “beyond”.

[^116]: GA 65, p. 120.
[^117]: GA 65, pp. 200-201.
[^118]: GA 65, p. 201 (transl. slightly modified).
[^119]: GA 65, p. 127.
[^120]: GA 65, p. 128.
[^121]: GA 65, p. 127.
If Heidegger sees in the contemporary configuration of advanced technology a culmination or end of the metaphysical interpretation of being in terms of presence that also begins to indicate a specific “beyond” to metaphysics, then the structure of this indication itself can be clarified by reference to the differential structure, between presence and presencing, that lies at the basis of any constituted discursive realm of sense. As Schürmann points out near the end of his own analysis of the contemporary closure of metaphysics, this “middle term” of difference is not itself any human or sociological construction, but rather the underlying differential structure of “originary” time. Specifically, if Heidegger does not interrogate the contemporary situation “as a historian of culture” or “in order to gain further information about man,” but rather to locate in it, like all the other historical configurations of the interpretation of being, the threefold difference between beings, their determining being (or beingness), and being itself, the final significance of this location must be the illumination of time as the original basis which also ultimately refuses any epochal determination:

If it is admitted that the starting point of the deconstruction is one particular economy, it becomes clearer why the ontological difference unites the three terms I have just sketched and not two (e.g. *ta onta*, “entities” and *to einai*, “the to-be”). The middle term is that order which, following Heidegger, other authors have located in discourse and called *episteme* or discursive regularity. In Heidegger, the three-tiered difference is generally described as between ‘entities’, their ‘beingness’ and ‘being’ (as a verb, as ‘to-be’). This way of formulating it, however, passes in silence over the decisive factor, time. In his last writings, he therefore characterizes beingness and being with some subtlety as two moments of ‘letting’, as “letting-be-present” and as “letting-be-present.” Originary time has ‘letting’ as its essence, which is to say that it remains unintelligible within any metaphysical quest for ultimate causes, grounds, or principles.122

As I have argued, the undecidability of sense which appears necessarily to characterize the logical structure of any instituted language or discursive regime itself structured according to the ontological differentiation of entities and their being, and thereby evinces the “middle term” which is the ontological difference or originary time itself. This undecidability is thus itself nothing other than a structural manifestation of the inherently differential “self-regulation” of the event of presencing of which Schürmann speaks. In this differential self-relation, the event both grants the specific conditions under which entities can be phenomenalized in particular configurations of intelligibility, and also withdraws in itself, hiding the ultimate evental and differential bases of presencing beneath the assumption of a stable ontic referent. Heidegger himself thinks this originary self-differentiation of presence and the ground of presence in increasingly radical terms. At first, he conceives it as the ontological difference between beings and their being; later it is the self-differentiation of being in itself through which it grounds its truth as event, outside and prior to any reference to beings. In the context of any particular principal economy constituted by reference to assumed standards and principles, as I have argued, this original temporal differentiation or “differend” introduces both the possibility of a determinate configuration of sense and also the essential undecidability that also characterizes each such configuration. But as Schürmann points out, grasping this temporal difference as the ultimate basis

for instituted sense can also point to the specific closure of the metaphysics of presence itself and its possible opening to a transformed condition.\textsuperscript{123}

The thought of this original differentiation and the structure of paradox and undecidability in which it is manifest can become the basis for a renewed critique of ideology that draws on the methods and forms of post-Kantian critique but radicalizes them on formal grounds. In particular, for the contemporary critique of technological society, the interlinked positive phenomena of structural paradox, undecidability, and ultimate ineffectivity thus have a determinate and rigorous formally indicative significance. They can be structurally interpreted as pointing to the broader conditions for systematization as such, and to the inescapable double bind of systematic regulation that characterizes the underlying structure of any specifically constituted system of meaning, communication, or social regularity or practice.

In an essay on “Tautology and Paradox in the Self-Descriptions of Modern Society,” Niklas Luhmann suggests from the perspective of a “second-order cybernetics” and reflexive theory of systems the way in which the inherently paradoxical structure of societal self-description can suggest terms for this positive critique. As Luhmann notes and as we have seen here, the unrestricted self-reference that is apparently involved in any language in its specific capacity to capture truth leads inevitably to tautologies and paradoxes.\textsuperscript{124} According to Luhmann, the characteristic response of a social system to this situation is to “unfold” self-reference by interpreting it in a hierarchical or ordered configuration that allows its “deparadoxicalization,” or its self-description without apparent paradox. This operation of unfolding is specifically related to the constitution of a temporality in which the society is either conserved or seen as an object of possible progressive transformation. In either of these ways, the unfolding of paradox that is needed to avoid contradiction gains the significance of the constitution of an ordered temporality of conservation or transformative action. But this operation of temporal unfolding only takes place at the cost of obscuring the basis of this operation itself, as well as the underlying structural problematic to which it ultimately responds.\textsuperscript{125} Undecidable sense is thus, according to Luhmann, rendered decidable by the unfolding of paradox along a temporal dimension that rationalizes the activity of society to itself. But the basis of this operation is the obscuration of the structural ground of paradox in the very constitutive structure of social self-reference. This process of deparadoxization is in fact identical, according to Luhmann, with the transformation of descriptions of society into “ideologies” which then come to play a privileged role in “directing and justifying social action” while at the same time insulating themselves from global critique by appearing to be contestable only by means of the competing “holistic systems” of their specific ideological opposites.\textsuperscript{126}

\textsuperscript{123} One should also compare here Derrida’s (1968) conception of \textit{différance} as a more originary differentiation related to, but not the same as, the ontological difference. According to Derrida, \textit{différance} as the more basic condition for the differentiation of being and beings cannot itself be understood in positive terms as any entity or positively described phenomenon; it is visible, rather, in its trace, or in the erasure of its own “withdrawal” from the text of metaphysics. Elsewhere, Derrida connects this play of \textit{différance} to the specific phenomenon that he describes as the “undecidable” of specific texts or textual regimes. For some discussion of the relationship between undecidability in this sense and undecidability in the sense demonstrated by Gödel and Turing, see Livingston (2010).

\textsuperscript{124} Luhmann (1990), p. 137.
\textsuperscript{125} Luhmann (1990), p. 127.
\textsuperscript{126} Luhmann (1990), p. 128.
that, according to Luhmann, the concept of ideology itself comes to display a “particular reflexivity that appears immune to empirical evidence and criticism” which results in the outcome that “descriptions of societal self-descriptions face the antagonism of ideologies instead of reflecting on the more fundamental problems of tautology and paradox.”  

If Luhmann is correct in seeing an actual basis for the whole structure of positive ideologies, including their holistic systems and mutual antagonisms, in the socially constitutive function of de-paradoxicalization, then the only rigorous ground for their critique must rest in pointing out on logical, systematic, and metalogical grounds this underlying necessary structure of paradox itself. In this way, the elaboration on metalogical grounds of the underlying paradoxical structure of sense and the structural necessity of paradoxical foundations that it evinces can thus provide a specific and concrete metalogical basis for a renewal and reinvigoration of the traditional critique of ideology. For any ontologically grounded critique of the present, the interlinked positive phenomena of structural paradox, undecidability, and ultimate ineffectivity thus have a determinate and rigorous formally indicative significance. They can be structurally interpreted as pointing to the broader conditions for systematization as such, and to the inescapable double bind of systematic regulation that characterizes the underlying structure of any specifically constituted system of meaning, communication, or social regularity or practice. As such, and as I have tried to elaborate here, pointing out their specific structure and their relationship to the ontological conditions of presence and presencing can thus provide rigorous grounds for a critique of the technological present. At the same time, this indication points to the underlying ontological situation of the positive grounding of constituted regimes and languages in the arche-original structure of a self-differentiating difference at the root of all possible presencing. Heidegger’s thought of originary “Being itself” thus involves an underlying self-differentiation that is at the very basis of the possibility of any economy of presence. This points to the specific significance of the purported contemporary “closure” of the whole epoch of presence, or the history of metaphysics, itself. The significance of this indication is as much temporal, or rather arche-temporal, as it is ontological. As Schürmann says, beyond the epoch of the various principal economies, it points to the plural temporalities of a condition that no longer stabilizes presence in terms of “causes, grounds, or principles”. Seeing the possibility of transition to such an an-archic condition in the contemporary configuration of advanced technology involves grasping the specific ways in which this contemporary configuration itself points, at the boundaries of the totality of its claim over beings, to the paradoxes underlying its own structural constitution. This involves, in particular, seeing the concrete basis for a demonstration of this underlying paradoxical structure in the actual structure of the technologies and techniques that constitute and make possible the contemporary regime of unlimited technology, both in ways that Heidegger himself pointed out and in ways he did not.

In particular, Heidegger sometimes suggests that the “end of metaphysics” is determined not only by the universal mechanical or instrumental enframing and manipulation of beings but also, and perhaps even more deeply, by the totalization of calculability, information exchange, or cybernetics as a “regulating-regulated” technology of the exchange of information. In connection with this, the

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129 Cf., e.g. Heidegger’s description of this contemporary condition in “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking”: “It suffices to refer to the independence of psychology, sociology, anthropology as cultural
conditions of the contemporary existence and predominance of what are called “information technologies” gains a particular and telling indicative significance. Here, the interrelated problems of self-referential paradox, axiomatic incompleteness and metalogical undecidability themselves prove decisive in pointing to the specific constitution of these concrete conditions as well as their specific limitations. For the very demonstrations that yield the contemporary sense of an algorithmic procedure that thus underlies all communicative and computational information technologies also decisively limit the claim of such procedures to total effectivity by demonstrating the actual necessity of undecidability and incalculability with respect to any such procedure. In an ontological perspective suggested by Heidegger but also separately motivated by the theoretical and technical problematic of logic and its foundations in the twentieth century, this amounts to an immanent critique of effectivity that demonstrates, at the basis of any constituted procedural realm of the application of regular procedures of calculation or information processing, a more basic ineffectivity. As I shall argue, this mobilizes the critical reserve of what, in any effectively regulated system of meaning, resists the force of its constitutive rules and standards. With respect to the regime of assumed technological effectivity (as “actuality”) that is the culmination and fulfillment of the history of metaphysics, this critique then takes the form of the articulation of the interlinked problems of logic, force, and being that surround and condition this history as a whole, and insist at its beginning and end. It is to this critique and some of its contemporary consequences that we will turn over the next two chapters.

anthropology, or to the role of logic as symbolic logic and semantics [als Logistik und Semantik]. Philosophy turns into the empirical science of man, of all that can become for man the experiential object of his technology [was für den Menschen erfahrbarer Gegenstand seiner Technik werden kann], the technology by which he establishes himself in the world by working on it in the manifold modes of making and shaping. All of this happens everywhere on the basis of and according to the criterion of the scientific discovery of the individual areas of beings [der wissenschaftlichen Erschließung der einzelnen Bezirke des Seienden].

No prophecy is necessary to recognize that the sciences now establishing themselves will soon be determined and regulated by the new fundamental science that is called cybernetics.

This science corresponds to the determination of man as an acting social being [als des handelnd-gesellschaftlichen Wesens]. For it is the theory of the regulation of the possible planning and arrangement of human labor. Cybernetics transforms language into an exchange of news [bildet die Sprache um zu einem Austausch von Nachrichten]. The arts become regulated-regulating instruments of information.” GA 14, p. 71-72.
Supplemental to Chapter 5

Formalism and the Question of Being

I have suggested that what I have called meta-formal realism provides a rigorous and appropriate basis for a development of Heidegger’s own problematics of sense and time. Besides providing for an underlying realism with respect to these structures and indeed to the question of givenness itself, it relates them to some of the most significant developments of contemporary formal reflection. The question may here arise, though, whether any such application of formal methodology (or methodology developed in accordance with the results and techniques of modern, symbolic logic) can really be made with respect to what Heidegger calls “fundamental ontology” or (later) “the history of Being” at all. For did not Heidegger himself resolutely and repeatedly oppose the application of the “empty” and “merely calculative” methods of formal, symbolic logic or “logistics” to the question of being itself? As I have noted, my attempt in this book is not primarily to develop an exegetically faithful reading of Heidegger, but rather to contribute to the development of several interrelated problems that he first pointed out, so it is a matter of relative indifference whether the specific kind of position that I have summarized as metaformal realism can indeed be attributed to Heidegger himself. Nevertheless, it is worth briefly considering the substance of his critique of the application of formal methods to ontology in order to more completely specify the underlying problematics.

It is certainly true that Heidegger often, and throughout his career, opposes any conception according to which the techniques and methods of formal/symbolic logic, for instance of the kind developed by Frege, Russell and Whitehead, can by themselves determine ontological questions or clarify ontological problems. Already in the very early 1912 article “Recent research in logic,” for example, Heidegger suggests that calculative “logistics” of the sort developed by Russell in The Principles of Mathematics is characterized by inherent “limits” in that it tends to “conceal the meanings of concepts and their shifts in meaning,” thus leaving “the deeper sense of principles...in the dark”.¹ Logistics in this sense, according to Heidegger, is “simply not familiar with the problems of the theory of judgment” and its “mathematical treatment of logical problems” thus reaches “limits at which [its] concepts and methods fail, more precisely, there where the conditions of [its] possibility lie.”² In Heidegger’s subsequent work, the dominance of logistics (sometimes identified or associated with “positivism”) and its substitution for “true” logic is often seen as, more broadly, representative of a broader regime of “calculative thinking” which is characteristic of the contemporary epoch of technology and its privileging of the real in the sense of “actuality” [Wirklichkeit]. A passage from the 1941 text “Recollection in Metaphysics” may be considered typical of this:

The precedence of what is real [der Vorrang des Wirklichen] furthers the oblivion of Being [betreibt die Vergessenheit des Seins]. Through this precedence, the essential relation to Being which is to be sought in properly conceived thinking is buried. In being claimed by beings [in der

¹ GA 1, p. 42.
² GA 1, p. 42. Nevertheless, in the article Heidegger praises Frege’s work, especially in “On Sense and Reference” and “On Concept and Object” as “not yet appreciated in their true significance, let alone exhausted,” and as essential not only for “any philosophy of mathematics” but also for “a universal theory of the concept.” (GA 1, p. 20).
Beanspuchung durch das Seiende], man takes on the role of the authoritative [maßgebende] being. As the relation to beings, that knowing suffices [genügt das Erkennen] which, according to the essential manner of beings [Wensensart des Seienden] in the sense of the planned and secured real [des planbar gesicherten Wirklichen] must issue into objectification and thus to calculation [in der Vergegenständlichung aufgehen und so zum Rechnen werden muß]. The sign of the degradation of thinking [Herabsetzung des Denkens] is the elevation of logistics [Hinaufsetzung der Logistik] to the rank of the true logic. Logistics is the calculable [rechenhafte] organization of the unconditional lack of knowledge [der unbedingten Unwissenheit] about the essence of thinking, provided that thinking, essentially thought, is that projecting knowledge which issues from Being in the preservation of truth's essence [das in der Bewahrung des Wesens der Wahrheit aus dem Sein auf geht].

Heidegger thus connects the “elevation” of logistics in the sense of calculation to the status of a “true logic” with the more general “precedence” of the real which involves a conception or interpretation of all that is real in being in terms of its capacity to act on and affect beings. This regime is prepared, according to Heidegger, from long ago by the metaphysical interpretation of being in terms of entities and by the privileging of “thatness”, “reality,” or “actuality” as the basic character of entities. Within this interpretation, Heidegger suggests, the techniques of mathematical “calculation” or “construction” attain the significance of demonstrating the existence of “something effective within a context of calculative proof.”

These techniques of calculation and construction thus become the basis for the constitution of the idea of effective causality that underlies “modern” physics and technology and thereby comes to dominate the knowledge and practices of the modern age. With this dominance of the actual in the sense of causally acting and effecting, the “essential determination” of the history of being is “carried out to its prefigured completion.”

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4 GA 6, p. 419.

5 GA 6, p. 419. The passage in full (from “Metaphysics as the History of Being”): “The usual name for thatness [das Daβ-sein], existence, testifies to the precedence of Being as actualitas in this interpretation. The dominance of its essence as reality [Wirklichkeit] determines the progression of the history of Being, throughout which the essential determination once begun is carried out to its prefigured completion. The real is the existing. [Das Wirkliche ist das Existierende]. This includes everything which through some manner of causality [Verursachung] constituitur extra causas. But because the whole of beings is the effected and effecting product of a first producer [die Gewirkte-Wirkende eines ersten Wirkers ist], an appropriate structure enters the whole of beings [kommt in die Ganze des Seienden ein eigenes Gefüge] which determines itself as the co-responding of the actual produced being [des jeweilig Gewirktem] to the producer [zum Wirker] as the highest being. The reality [Wirklichkeit] of the grain of sand, of plants, animals, men, numbers, corresponds to the making of the first maker [entspricht dem Wirken des ersten Wirkers]. It is at the same time like and unlike his reality [Wirklichkeit]. The thing which can be experienced and grasped with the senses [handgreifliche] is existent, but so is the object of mathematics which is nonsensuous and calculable [der nichtsinnliche errechbare Gegenstand der Mathematik]. "M exists" means: this quantity can be unequivocally constructed [ist … eindeutig konstruierbar] from an established point of departure of calculation with established methods of calculation [mit festgelegten Rechnungsmitteln]. What is thus constructed [Das so Konstruiert.e] is thus proven as something effective within a context of calculative proof [als das innerhalb eines Begründungszusammenhanges der Rechnung Wirksam.e]. "M" is something with which one can calculate [womit man rechnen kann], and under certain conditions must calculate. Mathematical construction [Die mathematische Konstruktion] is a kind of constitution of the constitutur extra causas, of causal effecting [des verursachendes Erwirkens.] (GA 6, p. 419, transl. slightly modified).
Heidegger thus sees the calculative techniques of symbolic and mathematical logic as, on the one hand, “empty” with respect to the actual structure and nature of presence and presencing themselves and, on the other, symptomatic in their growing dominance of the “metaphysical” conception of being in terms of beings as it moves toward completion. The position is in a certain way overdetermined with respect to the actual “content” of the techniques of mathematical logic themselves: though these techniques are in themselves empty and incapable of supporting “thinking, essentially thought”, nevertheless their contemporary dominance, in connection with the regime of technology that they make possible, points in an important and even privileged way to what is most preeminently to be thought today. Despite this air of overdetermination, though, one might easily conclude from what Heidegger says that no methodology or result that essentially depends on formal or mathematical logic can play any positive role in furthering the ontological problematic itself, either in the sense of the “fundamental ontology” of Dasein or in the later sense of the history of being.

The methodology of meta-formal reflection that I have discussed, and which is modeled by Gödel’s reasoning about the implications of his own results, does in fact depend essentially and in an obvious sense on the techniques of symbolic logic and mathematical proof; and so it might be thought, along these lines, that it just cannot be applied to the ontological problematics with which Heidegger is concerned. But in fact, none of the considerations that Heidegger introduces bear in any substantive way against the application of metaformal reasoning that I have suggested here.

First, as we have seen, what is in view with the kind of metaformal reasoning that I have discussed is not at all simply the mechanical application of a “formal” technique of symbol-manipulation, but rather a reflective illumination of the very conditions under which any such logical technique is possible and gains any possible relationship with truth. This reflective illumination, as we saw also in connection with the twofold consideration of truth and meaning in chapter 3, may more closely be compared to the task of what was traditionally called “transcendental” (rather than formal) logic in its evincing of the structure of the givenness of things themselves. But second, and more importantly, far from simply applying an effective technique of empty calculation that is assumed to have universal scope in itself, the “limitative” results of Gödel and Turing point exactly to the formally inherent limits of the actual effectiveness of any such technique. As such, they are themselves formally diagnostic of the configuration of thought and practice that simply assumes in advance the unlimited applicability of calculative techniques. Indeed, by demonstrating the necessary existence of the undecidable, the uncalculable, and the ineffective that accompanies any formal definition of technical or regular effectiveness, they also provide formally motivated terms for the fundamental critique of this configuration. In reference to Heidegger’s 1941 statement about the way that the “elevation of logistics” corresponds to the assumption of the unlimited calculability of beings, it is particularly significant that Turing’s result in 1937 demonstrates the existence and ubiquity of (uncountably many) real numbers that are uncomputable in a precise sense: that is, numbers that are wholly determinate but which cannot be determined by any finite procedure of calculation. More generally, these result of formally based reflection on formal methods – whereby these methods are inherently limited, in their relationship to truth, by an essential ineffectivity that necessarily accompanies them wherever they are applied – is anticipated in detail (as we have seen in chapter 1, above) by Frege’s own conception, in opposition to the dominant psychologism, of logic as the site of an insistence of what is (precisely) real without being actual in the sense of “effective.” But the inherent ineffectivity accompanying any total or calculative regime of thinking is only really rigorously demonstrated and positively verified, as we
have seen, by the paradoxical and limitative results (including Russell’s paradox, Gödel’s theorems, and Turing’s argument) that follow in quick succession from the completion of the “foundationalist” project itself.

In this respect, again, far from being opposed to Heidegger’s consideration of the role of the dominance of “calculative” thought and its assumption of unrestricted applicability in the history of being, the metaformal results of Gödel and Turing in fact confirm Heidegger’s critique and point in a formally rigorous way to the very “closure” of the metaphysical regime of “actuality” that Heidegger himself attempts to describe. Here, it is thus not necessary to oppose the thinking that emerges from reflection on the scope and limits of formal/symbolic logic to the Heideggerian ontological problematic; rather, given the specific positive character of the limitative results that arise from this reflection, they can be seen as directly contributing to the development of this problematic and even confirming it by other means. Heidegger’s own animadversions against the usefulness of symbolic logic (or the assumption of its unlimited applicability) are thus no reason to reject the application of metaformal reasoning I have suggested here. Aside from this, though, are there any positive arguments to be found in Heidegger’s corpus that suffice to establish that formal reasoning of a “logical” or “mathematical” character cannot shed light on phenomenological or ontological issues?

By contrast with statements simply asserting the “emptiness” of formal/symbolic logic, or genealogical/historical descriptions of what Heidegger sees as the role of “logic” as such (and primarily in its Aristotelian or Hegelian forms) in the development and fixation of the metaphysical tradition, such positive arguments are much harder to find in Heidegger’s texts. One such, however, is suggested in the course of a critical discussion of Husserl’s phenomenology in Heidegger’s (early) Freiburg lecture course, “Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity,” from the summer of 1923. Here, Heidegger challenges what he sees as Husserl’s presupposition of “mathematics and the mathematical natural sciences” as a model “for all sciences,” which according to Heidegger suggested, in the earlier development of Husserl’s phenomenology, that phenomenological description itself be “[elevated]...to the level of mathematical rigor.”

Nothing more needs to be said here about this absolutizing [of mathematical rigor]. This is not the first time it has surfaced, but rather it has for a long time dominated [beherrscht] science, finding an apparent justification in the general idea of science as it appeared among the Greeks, where one believed that knowledge was to be found as knowledge of the universal [das Allgemein] and - what is seen to be the same thing - knowledge of what is universally valid [des Allgemeingültigen]. But this is all a mistake. And when one cannot attain such mathematical rigor, one gives up.

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6 This attribution of this position to Husserl is in fact puzzling in at least two ways. First, of course, given Husserl’s longstanding and decisive critique of naturalism and the natural attitude, it can hardly be said (whatever the role of mathematics itself in serving as a model for phenomenological description) that he generally privileged “mathematical natural science” as a model for phenomenological investigation. But second, although it is indeed suggested in the Logical Investigations that mathematics in the sense of a “mathesis universalis” can serve as a formal structure for all logical theory, by 1923 Husserl had already clearly rejected the idea that the phenomenological structure of experience itself could always be mathematized in a formally exact way: see, e.g. Ideas I (1913) section.
Fundamentally, one does not even realize that a prejudice lies here. Is it justified to hold up mathematics as a model for all scientific disciplines? Or are the basic relations between mathematics and the other disciplines not thereby stood on their heads? Mathematics is the least rigorous of disciplines, for the access is here the easiest [der Zugang ist hier der allerleichteste]. The human sciences [Geisteswissenschaft] presuppose much more scientific existence than could ever be achieved by a mathematician. One should approach a scientific discipline not as a system of propositions and grounds for justifying them [Begründungszusammenhängen], but rather as something in which factual Dasein critically confronts itself and explicates itself [mit sich selbst auseinandersetzt]. This pre-establishment of a model [Einsetzung eines Vorbildes] is unphenomenological- the meaning of scientific rigor needs rather to be drawn [zu erheben] from the kind of object [being investigated] [aus der Gegenstandart] and the mode of access appropriate to it [der ihr angemessenen Zugangsart].

According to this argument, in other words, it is inappropriate to treat mathematics as the “model” for the phenomenological description of what is given in experience, or methodologically to impose the kind of rigor that is characteristic of it here. This is because, as Heidegger argues, phenomenology is not a topical area or a categorical field but rather a method of developing the “how” of access into what is present in intuition, just as it gives itself to experience there. Since it is concerned with the mode of access in this way, phenomenological description has to be developed according to the kind of access that is characteristic of the particular field or kind of object being investigated in each case, and it is accordingly a mistake to take the characteristic universality and universal transmissibility of mathematical knowledge as a methodological or thematic model for all “scientific” inquiry. In this respect, in fact, Heidegger suggests, this characteristic universality and accessibility of mathematics makes it in fact the “least rigorous” of disciplines, in that it means that it fails to involve the complexity or singularity of the “scientific existence” that the human sciences themselves presuppose and attempt to theorize.

From the perspective of meta-formal reflection that I have suggested here, it should be said, first, that there is no need to presuppose the purported “universality” and accessibility of mathematical objects in order to apply the lessons of “metalogical” or “metamathematical” reflection to the problems of (phenomenological) access and givenness. As we have seen, the attitude of meta-formal realism should, on the one hand, be sharply distinguished from the (vulgar) “Platonist” attitude of assuming or presupposing the timeless existence of a range of mathematical objects universally accessible due to their privileged residence in a kind of topos ouranous quite alien to anything specifically involved in “our” form of life; while, on the other, the positive results on which meta-formal realism turns provide grounds for a formally based reconsideration of what is involved – in the theory of proof, the force of rules of inference, and the provision of axioms themselves – in anything that can reasonably be seen as the “accessibility” of mathematical “objects” to begin with.

Second, though, and along the same lines, it should also be asked what kinds of accessibility do characterize mathematical knowledge, and what is the form underlying these kinds of accessibility in the facticity of a life, here determined not simply in terms of any factual-anthropological conception of the “human” but in a way structurally corresponding to its proper modes of givenness and presence themselves. For mathematics is after all, among other things, an activity undertaken in the course of

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7 GA 63, p. 72. Transl. slightly modified.
such a life among other activities of theoretical reflection and practice; and without yet assuming anything determinate about the ontological mode of existence of its objects, it is certain that the problem of access here raises quite specific and difficult problems which must be confronted by any phenomenological or ontological theory of givenness or presence as such. Especially in connection with the idea of the infinite, which receives (as we have seen) a fundamental and transformative articulation in the work of Cantor and the developments which follow him, these are problems of “access” that are not in fact limited to the “philosophy of mathematics” in a narrow sense, but rather raise questions bearing on the structural form of “our” mode of life (for instance, the nature and meaning of its long-discussed “finitude”) itself. As I have tried to argue here, there are also not distinct from the problems constitutively involved in any account of “our” access to meaning or sense and indeed of its own basic constitution, insofar as this basic constitution always involves the “infinite” character of the one over the (unlimited) many. These are the problems visibly taken up in an original fashion (although not resolved) by Plato in the heroic dialectics of his late attempts at a revision of the classical “theory of forms;” and, as I have tried to show (especially chapter 2) they are also problems that can by no means be avoided by an ontological hermeneutics in its own development of the question of access and accessibility, most of all where this question overlaps with the problem of truth. Here, indeed, as I shall attempt to demonstrate over the next several chapters, the insistence of these problems points in a basic structural way to the original problem of the givenness of time, insofar as it can be experienced or measured at all.

**Supplemental to Chapter 6:**

**Temporal Idealism and World-Time**

In a trenchant and comprehensive analysis focusing mainly on *Being and Time*, William Blattner (1999) reads Heidegger as there holding a position of temporal idealism. According to Blattner, this position is itself based on an “ontological idealism,” according to which being is dependent on Dasein, in the sense that (drawing out what Blattner sees as a parallel with Kant) “If Dasein (Kant: the subject) did not exist, time would not obtain.” (p. 246). According to Blattner, both idealist attitudes are part of a broader “transcendental idealism” that corrects (as Blattner argues) certain problematic aspects of Kant’s own conception of subjectivity and time. Nevertheless, Blattner argues, the temporal idealism espoused (on his reading) by Heidegger in *Being and Time* ultimately fails. One reason for the failure is that Heidegger is ultimately unable to give a coherent account of how sequential and infinite world-time, and with it the “ordinary” time of publicity and intersubjective practice, itself emerges from the ostensibly more basic (and indeed, according to Blattner, essentially nonsequential) temporization of temporality by (the individual or quasi-subjective) Dasein.

Since my aim here is not primarily to characterize Heidegger’s own position but rather to develop partial alternatives to it within the broader horizon of the ontological problematic itself, Blattner’s interpretive argument is not here in competition with my own, not primarily interpretive one. However, whatever position Heidegger might have held with respect to these issues in *Being and Time* itself, it is also significant that he later disavows, as we have seen (chapter 4 above), any essential or constitutive conception of the “transcendental” itself. In the *Beiträge*, for example, as we have seen, the idea of Dasein as (something like) a constitutive position from which the ontic-ontological difference (and hence temporality) can be thought, cedes to the “deeper” question of the prior constitution of the position of
Dasein itself, now thought in the “more original” terms of clearing, *Ereignis*, and the question of the truth of Being itself, without reference to beings. This, by itself, already suggests strongly that, whatever the degree or kind of the (residual) “transcendental idealism” involved in Heidegger’s account of temporality in *Being and Time*, the later position is not to be characterized in any kind of subjective idealist, transcendental idealist, or (more broadly) anti-realist terms at all. But even if this is disputed, and whatever Heidegger himself thought (early or late), it is still clearly relevant to the issues themselves to consider the prospects for an ontologically grounded temporal realism of the type I have sketched: one, that is, grounded in a (metaformally based) ontological realism about being itself and capable of accounting in realist terms for the time of the world. As we have also already seen, one of the primary questions that such an account must nevertheless still answer is that of the *relationship between* this infinite thinkable time and the finite and experienced time of a temporal life. For even if this relationship is not one of constitution or derivation – as Heidegger himself may have thought it was, at least in *Being in Time* – it is still relevant and essential to the ontological/temporal problematic to ask how infinite world time is given: how, that is, it is “accessible” in a twofold way, both to experience and to thought. Indeed, the clarification of this givenness in its ontologically and metaformally indicated structure, as I shall argue, points to the original structure of temporality as such, above or before its metaphysical or ontotheological determination in terms of the noncontradiction of thought and the presence of the present.

One way in which the “finite” resources of a temporally and spatially limited subject have been thought to allow the attainment “infinite” capacities is on the basis of an internalized symbolic *representation* of finitely representable *rules*. On this picture, the internalization of such a representation in learning or its previous presence as ‘hard wired’ in neural architecture provides the basis for an underlying linguistic or cognitive ‘competence’ which then accounts for an actor’s actual performance. This conception finds expression in projects of explaining and analyzing natural-linguistic grammar and meaning such as Chomsky’s and (on one interpretation) Davidson’s, wherein it is finally overcome (as we shall see) by jointly meta-logical and ontological considerations: first, by the ultimate *undecidability* of semantic meaning and second by the aporia of “application”, raised by the late Wittgenstein, which appears to require that every interpretation of a symbolic rule itself presuppose another one. With this overcoming, the symbolic-recursive picture of linguistic competence gives way to a broader problematic of the constitutive role of the infinite dimension of sense in the form of a ‘human’ life.

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In *Being and Time*, Heidegger notoriously argues that Dasein is essentially structured by the possibility that is most ultimate and unavoidable for it, namely that of death. As our “ownmost, non-relational possibility... not to be outstripped [unüberholbar],” the “indefinite” certainty of death includes and encompasses all other possibilities for the individual Dasein, including the possibility of becoming certain, Heidegger says, of the *totality* of one’s own potentiality-for-being [*eines eigentlichen Ganzseinkönnens*]. In particular, in “anticipation” or “authentic being-toward-death,” Dasein achieves an individualizing freedom in which it comes “face to face,” in the attunement or mood of anxiety, with the “possible impossibility” of its own existence. It thereby can liberate itself from an ordinary or “inauthentic” mode of fleeing into a “lostness” and neglect wherein possibilities are pre-determined by

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8 GA 2, p. 264; p. 266.
the claims of the “they” [Das Man] which have always already decided the appropriate “tasks, rules and standards” for one’s actions and motivations. 9

By contrast with the “inauthentic” temporality determined as an infinitely continuing sequence of homogenous “now” moments, the finitude of Dasein in relation to death constitutes a “primordial” and “authentic” temporality. This temporality is primarily directed toward the future in its creation and engagement of possibilities. 10 This primacy of the futural relation to one’s own possibilities, as well as the “Being-already-in...” which characterizes authentic Dasein’s present and the “being-already-in” in which Dasein has the possibility of “taking over” its own “having been” together articulate the unified structure of temporality as “ecstatic,” or as “the primordial ‘outside-of-itself’ in and for itself.” 11 Though temporality is thus separated into the three interlinked “ecstases” of the past, present and future, the future in the sense of the “anticipatory resoluteness” of Dasein in relation to death retains a priority which allows it to unify the three. 12 This unity is not the unity of an extant thing or an entity which would thus “emerge from itself”; rather, its unity is that of a “process of temporalizing [Zeitigung] in the unity of the ecstases” (329). Through this temporalizing of temporality, it is possible that there arises as a secondary structure the “‘time’ which is accessible to the ordinary understanding” and in which the basic ecstatic character of primordial time is “levelled off,” namely that of the “pure sequence of ‘nows’, without beginning and without end.” 13 This is a conception of time, as Heidegger sometimes suggests, on which it is constantly “running away” or flowing, like a set of movie frames “playing out” as sequentially projected. About this ‘infinite’ time, it is always possible to say (for instance) “time goes on” or “time keeps passing away.”

But this “infinite” world time is itself “derived” [“abgeleitete”], Heidegger suggests, from the more basic structure of essentially finite “primordial” time insofar as it “temporalizes itself” in a certain way. 14

In particular, through the possibility of counting and measuring time, which is itself grounded more basically in Dasein’s primordial temporality, it becomes possible that a kind of time that is understood as “public” on the basis of the countable availability of the “now” gains the character of a “world-time.” 15 This “world time” is knowable as the time “wherein” entities within-the-world are encountered [“worinnen” innerweltliches Seiendes begegnet].” 16 Nevertheless, because of its underlying “ecstatico-horizontal” constitution, this world-time basically retains “the same transcendence” as that of the “world” itself; as transcendent in this way, it is both “‘more Objective’ than any possible Object” and “‘more subjective’ than any possible subject.” 17 As, in this way, the “earlier” condition of possibility for anything either objective or subjective, time itself is thus neither, since it itself constitutes, Heidegger says, this “earlier” itself. 18

9 GA 2, p. 268.
10 GA 2, pp. 330-331.
11 GA 2, pp. 325-26; p. 329.
13 GA 2, p. 309.
15 GA 2, pp. 417-19.
16 GA 2, p. 419.
17 GA 2, p. 419.
18 GA 2, p. 419. .
Heidegger thus claims that infinite and sequential world-time is derived from a more basic phenomenon of time (or temporality) that is essentially finite, and not in itself sequential. He also suggests that world-time, understood in this way, is essentially based on or derived from the temporal characteristics attributed to innerworldly entities within a conception on which these are treated as primary, and simply as objectively present [Vorhanden]. On the face of things, though, each of these claims, as well as their conjunction, is somewhat puzzling. How can an open infinity of moments of “objective” world-time be produced out of an essentially finite structure? And how can such a structure then come to characterize the totality of entities in the world – treated as Vorhanden – if it does not already do so, prior to and independently of any factually existing individual agent or subject? To pose these questions – as we apparently must in order to assay the prospects for a realism about world-time at all – is not to preclude any possibility of grounding the structure of world-time in a more primitive or basic one, indeed one that shares many or most of the temporal (or pre-temporal) characteristics that Heidegger himself attributes to Dasein. But it is to raise the possibility of a somewhat different way of locating this underlying structure in its relation to the totality of what is as such.

In particular, in these passages, Heidegger sometimes describes the “ordinary” way of interpreting time as the publically available, “levelled-off” sequence of present “nows” which, he says, obscures its actual “origin in the temporality of the individual Dasein.” But nothing he says appears categorically to exclude the possibility and relevance of an alternative development of the specifically infinite structure of world-time. For even if the infinity of world-time is seen, as Heidegger suggests, only as the negative and merely potential infinity of the un-limited – and thus as derived from the originally finite time under the privative condition that its definitive limit is forgotten or obscured – there still arises the question of the positive basis for this “unlimited” capable of its continuation, its character of always “going on” and containing an unlimited number of things in the future, even despite my own “no-longer existing” (des Nicthmehrdaseins meiner selbst) then. Heidegger does not deny these phenomena of unlimitedness. Indeed, he says that they must be affirmed, although they cannot imply objections to the idea of the finitude of primordial temporality because they no longer ‘deal with it’ at all [sie nicht mehr von dieser handeln].

How, then, is the infinity of world-time as always going on, as never giving out, or as allowing for the unlimited possibility of events and possibilities “to come,” both beyond and without me, itself positively constituted? The question is sharpened if one considers the specific relationship of the infinite structure of world time to linguistic sense and truth. For it must be the case that a truth, once captured in a linguistic proposition, is available in general and continuously for all those who speak the language and have actual access to it. And it must be the case that the senses of terms and claims in a shared language, once they themselves are available, are temporally continuous and iterable as long as that language is itself spoken and “alive”. This is not to say, of course, that linguistic truths or senses should or can be conceived as eternal existents. It is just to say that the structure of linguistic truth itself points to an essentially infinite possibility of repetition of them beyond the boundaries of an individual or the temporal limit of her death. The problem of the temporal structure which makes this repetition possible, and which thereby also bears the whole structure of the givenness of time itself as “never

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19 Cf. Blattner for the argument.
20 GA 2, p. 425 (emphasis added in quotation).
22 GA 2, p. 330.
giving out,” is thus one which will ultimately have to be handled by the existential analysis of world-time, even if the structural priority of Dasein as the ontico-ontological ‘place’ of all disclosure is not thereby denied.23

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What, then, if the formal structure of any givenness of time – including that which is given as the endless series of the constantly iterated “now” which Heidegger calls “world-time” – is then referred back to a more basic structure of reflexive paradox in essential relation to the ontological difference?

One consequence is a partially altered picture of the ontological origin and character of this “world-time” itself. If, in particular, the domain of ontotheological closure in which original temporal paradox and contradiction are structurally prohibited is that in which the rule can appear to apply itself indefinitely as the infinite repetition of the same, then it is just this domain in which time as a whole can accordingly seem to take the form of an indefinite and pure series of identical “nows” whose form is this infinite repetition of the same itself. The identification of the originally paradoxical/reflexive structure of given time in its relation to the ontological difference thus provides the basis for a formally based understanding of the ontological genesis of this series. In particular, it results from the imposition of consistency and the correlative delimitation and foreclosure of the original paradoxical structure itself to produce a domain in which identity and becoming are always consistently thinkable. The force of this imposition is marked, as early as Parmenides, in the force of the law of noncontradiction and the structure of correspondence that it institutes between identity in the world and identification in thought. The underlying and ultimate image of the basis of the correspondence is the schema of the persistence of thinkable substance, or the image of time itself as the infinite rule of repetition of the same. With the imposition of this schema and its maintenance in logical force, time as it is accessible “for everyone”, “in general” and “as such” can indeed only seem to have the form of the empty repetition of the “now” as determined by the universal rule. But this appearance, and the ontic totality it constitutes as the “general,” “objective,” and “universal,” is itself possible only on the basis of the partial obscuration and suppression of the original structure of temporal/reflexive paradox itself.

Further: if, as Heidegger suggests, the “objective” time of the world, such as it is presupposed in the mathematical natural sciences and employed in the “scientific” description of objects and events on a purely ontic level, is itself based in this image of time as the constantly unfolding series of nows, then the illumination of such an underlying formal structure, far from being opposed to a “realist” doctrine of world-time (in this sense), is actually the positive ontological-hermeneutic precondition for such a doctrine. As Heidegger himself is at pains to point out in his reading of Kant, this image of time does not just come from nowhere, but also results from a particular interpretation of the being of the world and a particular schematization of the unfolding of being as time. Given Kant’s underlying picture of the origin

23 There are some indications that Heidegger himself sees the problem here: “Has [‘time’] then any ‘Being’? And if not, is it then a mere phantom, or is it something that is ‘more being’ [seiender] than any possible entity? Any investigation which goes further in the direction of questions such as these, will come up against the same ‘boundary’ which has already set itself up to our provisional discussion of the connection between truth and Being. In whatever way these questions may be answered in what follows – or in whatever way they may first of all get primordially formulated – we must first understand that temporality, as ecstatico-horizontal, temporalizes something like world-time, which constitutes a within-time-ness of the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand.” (419-420) (transl. slightly modified).
of time in the representing subject, he cannot but propose the ultimately incoherent idealist doctrine of a world-time that is itself created or produced, as if from “outside” time or the temporal, by the spontaneous-receptive and constituting-constituted activity of this subject. But if Heidegger’s intention were only to replace this constituting/constituted subject with a structurally similar constituting/constituted Dasein as the ultimately substantial basis for the real constitution of world-time (albeit one now located “in” rather than (seemingly) “outside” time as with Kant) he would by no means have resolved the many temporal paradoxes involved in such an idealism. There would still be, for example, the question of how to conceive of the actuality of temporal events occurring before the empirical (intra-temporal) existence of a particular Dasein, or indeed before the existence of any Dasein at all. But if Heidegger’s intention were only to replace this constituting/constituted subject with a structurally similar constituting/constituted Dasein as the ultimately substantial basis for the real constitution of world-time (albeit one now located “in” rather than (seemingly) “outside” time as with Kant) he would by no means have resolved the many temporal paradoxes involved in such an idealism. There would still be, for example, the question of how to conceive of the actuality of temporal events occurring before the empirical (intra-temporal) existence of a particular Dasein, or indeed before the existence of any Dasein at all.

If, however, as Heidegger at least suggests, world-time has an original basis in a purely reflective ontic-ontological structure that is also at the formal basis of the very structural possibility of (any) Dasein, then there is no longer any obstacle to considering the “objective” world time that is based on the schematism of the constantly unfolding series of nows to be fully “real” as one possible manifestation of the character of the world itself. As we have seen, the character of the “world” as totality is already involved in the original structure of paradox; what is involved in its “modification” into “objective” world-time is then just the structural/temporal condition under which the “world” itself appears to be consistently thinkable as a whole. This condition is the schematization of time as “world-time” in Heidegger’s sense: as the empty and general time of the iteration of the “now”. This is then a time that can be seen as fully characteristic of objects, events and processes as they are discussed in the natural sciences, as “objective” and real occurrences, and furthermore, as such, as inherently capable of mathematical measurement and treatment because of their own formal constitution. There is now no bar to seeing “world-time” as genuinely and fully “objective,” and as indeed essentially and constitutively accessible “to anyone” and “in general.” But it remains the case that it has a deeper ontological basis in the original structure, neither subjective nor objective, by which anything like time and presence are first given at all.

It is not clear that Heidegger sees this, at least not in the full scope of its implications, in Being and Time itself. There, as we have seen, the “world-time” of the abstract and unlimited succession of now-moments is understood as the outcome of what is essentially a privation of the more “original” ecstases, whose primary site is the individual Dasein in its structure of projection on possibilities, the final and highest of which is the individuating possibility of death. On Heidegger’s official account, the possibility of this privation, and the specific kind of infinitude that it apparently produces as the endless form of the repetition of the “now”, results from the modification of Dasein’s original structural finitude, articulated by death, into the publicly available world-time that then becomes known as the time wherein innerworldly entities are encountered. Through the modification, time gains a “public character” (or rather, as Heidegger says, has “already been given” one) through which “several people” can say “now” together; thereby it becomes, according to Heidegger, “the time with which “they” reckon.”

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24 Quentin Meillassoux (2006) has recently resurrected this old problem as the problem of the “arche-fossil” and used it to raise a very broad critique of what he sees as a “correlationism” characteristic of much recent philosophy.

25 GA 2, p. 411.
sense, the regular world-time of the series of nows is ontologically understood on the basis of the specific structure of the public or of the “they” – Das Man – which is for Heidegger the mode of Dasein in its falling.

This basis emerges, according to Heidegger, when the counting or measuring of time is made possible by the general availability of a common standard, for example the observed regularity of the movements of the heavens (for “primitive Dasein”) or, later, the availability of the clock. Such a standard is one that must, in order to be useable, unchanging and permanently available as “present-at-hand” for everyone at any time. Temporal measurement in general is constituted in the “making-present of a presented standard in the presented span [im Gegenwärtigen des anwesenden Maßstabes in der anwesenden Strecke].”26 Through this constitution of the possibility of measurement, Heidegger suggests, the temporality that is originally “Dasein’s” gains instead the character of a kind of time that is accessible, in principle and in general, to everyone, as a “present-at-hand multiplicity of “nows” [vorhandene Jetztmännigfaltigkeit].”27

The possibility of world-time as a constantly available stream of subsequent “nows” “available” for measuring and dating in general and to everyone is thus understood as conditioned both by the publicity of the “they” and by the factual existence of regular standards of measurement. But it can be objected here that Heidegger does not clarify either the relationship between these two conditions or the ontological/temporal status of the entities (e.g. clocks, sundials, or originally the heavenly bodies) that also provide a basis for the “public” possibility of the measurement of time itself, on the account. In particular: the dating of things according to the motion of the heavenly bodies is such as to make possible a “publicly available” measure, in such a way that “everyone can ‘reckon’ on [it] simultaneously.”28 This is, in the first instance, a dating by means of the motions of objects in the heavens; as such it can be done “with one another” and for ‘Everyman’ “at any time” and “in the same way”, insofar as we are with another ‘under the same sky.’”29 Through this and along with Dasein’s essentially “thrown” temporality, Heidegger, says, “something like a ‘clock’ is also discovered – that is, something ready-to-hand which in its regular recurrence has become accessible [das in seiner regelmäßigen Wiederkehr ...zügunglich geworden ist].” Dasein’s temporality is here both the “condition for the possibility of the clock’s factual necessity [der faktischen Notwendigkeit der Uhr]” but also the condition of possibility for “its”, i.e. the clock’s, “discoverability [Entdeckbarkeit].”30 Furthermore, the “natural” clock of the heavens further conditions the possibility of the measuring by means of “artificial” clocks which are a feature of more technologically advanced Dasein.31 In the regularity of this “natural” clock is thus to be found, according to Heidegger, the basic regularity that conditions both the existence of the “artificial” clock and Dasein’s ability to measure by means of it.

But then it must be asked how this accessible regularity of the original, “natural” clock is first constituted. On Heidegger’s official account, it is itself constituted by Dasein (or Dasein’s original temporality) and indeed through and by means of Dasein’s actual activities of ‘reckoning’ with it. It is then mysterious, though, how the time of reckoning is here related to the time reckoned. If we

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26 GA 2, p. 417 (transl modified).
27 GA 2, p. 417.
28 GA 2, p. 413.
29 GA 2, p. 413.
30 GA 2, p. 413.
31 GA 2, pp. 413-414.
consider this question in the light of the distinction between constituting and constituted time that Heidegger draws as the distinction between authentic and “vulgar” time, it appears to yield the paradox that the regularity of the movement of the heavens must be ontologically subsequent to Dasein’s “own” time, but is nevertheless as such available to “anyone” at “any time”. The regularity of the original, “natural” clock would then seem already to be able to serve as a standard in advance of any particular Dasein or Dasein in general, whereas (on Heidegger’s account) this possibility of its serving as a standard is itself a constituted possibility of Dasein’s “own” temporality itself. This raises not only the aporia of the pre-existence of countable, measured time in relation to objects and events taking place before the advent of any empirical Dasein, but (more deeply), how the “for everyone” and “at every time” of measured time is itself first given. Here, it is not sufficient simply to claim that it arises from a modification or development of the individual Dasein whereby it lives in the mode of falling which Heidegger elsewhere identifies with the “they-self”. For if it were only this, it would remain mysterious how the regularity of natural time first becomes available to Dasein in general (or to “everyone”) at all.

If, on the other hand, the ultimate origin of world-time is seen, not in the privation by which an individual Dasein “falls” into publicity but rather in a formal/structural paradoxical configuration of the type I have suggested above, then there is no problem with explaining this “for everyone” and “at every time”. For the “general” character of time as given in this way is already co-included in the original paradoxical structure of the present and of the world itself. To see it as included in this way is not, as we have also seen, to diminish or exclude the sense in which time is irreducibly given “in this moment” or “now”, but rather to explicate more fully the metalogical/ontological basis of this givenness itself. It is not here disputed that the objectivity of clock-time, to be clarified ontologically, must itself be related back to an underlying “formal” condition of reflexive (self-)givenness. It is also not necessary to deny, as we have seen, the actual structure of the ecstases in which time “temporalizes itself,” since these have, themselves, the formal structure of reflexivity which is, on this analysis, the deeper unified root of both a Dasein’s “individual” time (if such there be) and world-time itself. What is apparently to be denied, or at least questioned, is just the particular claim that such possibilities as can stand at the basis of any possible givenness of world-time, must originally be (only) “mine”. On the suggested analysis, the way in which world-time is given is indeed conditioned by the possibility of its being measured or counted, and this possibility must be so constituted that it is “for anyone” or “general”. But this character of “universal” availability is not to be understood simply as a privative mode or modification of a process or activity which is, in the first instance, that of an individual agent or actor. Rather, there emerges here the deeper question of the formal/structural conditions for the very possibility of counting time, both on the side of the being “able” to count and on the side of the original possibility of the counted as it is rooted in the original ideas of number (such as limit, finitude, and infinitude) themselves.

What, then, of death, which familiarly is, for Heidegger in Being and Time, the “highest ownmost” possibility of the individual Dasein, and which officially defines the original structure of finitude in which all of “Dasein’s temporality” must be rooted? Without disputing that there is a specific conception of finitude that comes to light here and which is indeed indispensable in any ontological inquiry into time (indeed, the very conception that is developed in much more detail and with greater clarity in the Kant book) it is nevertheless possible to raise questions about whether death must be seen as prior in its relation to any possible constitution of time, as Heidegger indeed suggests in Being and Time. As we
have seen, Heidegger’s critique of Kant in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* ultimately provides grounds for disputing any conception of the givenness of time as rooted in the capacities of a subject capable of producing its specific unity in the scope of a subjective “I can”; these grounds are in fact brought out even more fully by considering the implications of Wittgenstein’s critique of rule-following. On this basis, and applying the terms of this critique, now, to Heidegger’s position in *Being and Time* itself, it is possible to ask whether the original givenness of time can always be grounded in anything like a capacity that is distinctively “mine” at all, even if it be the “highest ownmost” capacity of death.

In an obvious way, there is an immediate but also deep structural aporia that is involved in this characterization itself, whereby death is *simultaneously* “my” highest and most individuating possibility and also, as the condition of “possibility of impossibility,” the one possibility that “I” cannot attain. The paradoxical dynamics of this aporia do not simply prove that death is not the ultimate possibility “for me” that Heidegger says it is. But they do suffice to permit the question of the relationship of sense to the “finitude” of Dasein to be posed in a deeper way. If sense is indeed to be accessible to me as an essentially “finite” being, it must be accessible in a way that is conditioned by this finitude. But this conditioning does not and cannot simply mean that it is limited by death. On the contrary, communication in general and writing in particular inherently involve, as Derrida has suggested, the structural iterability whereby a (written) communication is as such legible, even under the condition of the death of the author or her non-presence in general. What is at issue here is really the distinction between possibilities “for me” and possibilities as such; and what is to be, at any rate, further clarified is the way that such inherent structural possibilities as the infinite iterability which appears to be a fundamental feature of language articulate (already and as such) “possibilities” which are also evidently rooted in what must be seen as the more “basic” structures of (experienced or experiencable, but also “representable” or “measurable”) time.

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33 Cf. Derrida (1994); also Thomson (1999b).