Heidegger on Truth and *Logos*

This paper is part of a larger project whose overall aim is to consider the relationship between being, on one hand, and *logos* and language on the other. For this project, it is indispensable to consider Heidegger’s investigation into the question of being (both the question of the “meaning of being” in *Being and Time* and, later, what he will call the “grounding question,” the question of the historical “truth of Being” in his work after 1933). However, at the same time, we can hardly afford to ignore the definitive experience of the analytic tradition in the twentieth century, which, as I have argued elsewhere, can be understood as amounting to a philosophically transformative experience of *logos.*

One of the primary manifestations of this experience is certainly what has been called the “linguistic turn,” although I think it has other dimensions as well, signaled in the essential plurivocity of the term “*logos.*” These dimensions run, for instance, the unprecedented breakthrough of techniques of formal-logical symbolization in Frege to the ongoing legacy of the ancient Greek definition of “man” as the *zoon logon echon*, the animal having *logos*.

In the course of the “being-historical” project of his later work, Heidegger often considers the implications of this traditional definition of man, as part of an ongoing reflection on the possible closure, or end, of the tradition of metaphysics. In the later work, the question of the *being* of language (as something with, for instance, an origin and something which can undergo transformations over historical time) becomes more decisive, as does the special kind of relationship that we might see to exist between language and being itself. But although Heidegger does not really thematize language as such in his earlier work, it is nevertheless already possible to see some of the most significant themes of *Being and Time* itself as determined by a reflection on *logos*. For instance, early in the text of *Being and Time*, its overall project is specified as one of a “destruction of ancient ontology,” (section 6) involving a fundamental reflection on the meaning and significance of *logos* (section 7). This essential concern with *logos* is massively verified, as well, by the focus of a whole series of lecture courses leading up to *Being and Time*, for instance the comprehensive *Logic: The Question of Truth* of 1926 and the lectures on Plato’s *Sophist* of 1924-25, determinative for Heidegger’s way of posing the question of Being in *Being and Time* itself.

The concept of *logos* further plays a determinative role in one of the central theoretical innovations of *Being and Time*, the account of truth as *aletheia* or unconcealment [Unverborgenheit]. In *Being and Time*, this account largely takes the form of a description of the “original” phenomenon of truth as uncoveredness [Entdeckendheit]. In defending this conception, Heidegger also wishes to contest in its

---

1 For the transition from the “guiding question” to the “grounding question” see GA 65: *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, hg. V. F.-W. v. Hermann, 2., durchgesehene Auflage, 1994.
3 *Sein und Zeit*. Neunzehnte Auflage (Max Niemeyer Verlag: Tubingen, 2006) (henceforth: SZ). I have generally used the translation by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Harper and Row, 1962) but have cited the pagination of the original German.
4 I shall discuss both of these texts in the next chapter of this work.
very “ontological foundations” what he sees as a “traditional conception of truth.” According to this traditional conception: i) the primary locus of truth is the assertion or judgment; and ii) the essence of truth lies in the ‘agreement’ or correspondence of the judgment with its object.⁵ According to Heidegger, this conception develops from Aristotle. Aristotle uses *apophansis* in the original Greek meaning of a “showing-from” or demonstration, but in *Peri Hermeneias* he also uses it in connection with the first definition of an assertoric or propositional statement, what Aristotle terms a *logos apophantikos*.⁶ This definition nevertheless, according to Heidegger, gives a clue to “what was primordially surmised in the oldest tradition of ancient philosophy and even understood in a pre-phenomenological manner.” (p. 219). This “oldest” tradition, as Heidegger glosses it (p. 219), holds that the “being-true” [*Wahrsein*] of *logos* (or of a *logos*) is “*alethenein* in the manner of *apophinesthai*.” This means it is a matter of “taking entities out of their hiddenness [*Verborgenheit*] and letting them be seen in their unhiddenness (their uncoveredness).” Thus, for Heidegger, *logos* is *primarily* *apophansis* in the sense of showing or uncovering of entities; and only *secondarily*, and derivatively, is it something structured like a sentence, judgment, assertion, or proposition. This decisive distinction is announced already in the Introduction (section 7b)⁷ and plays an essential role in many of the further structures of *Being and Time*, for instance in the analysis of the worldhood of the world (which is supposed to be “revealed” by truth in its more primordial sense as *aletheia*, although it cannot be revealed by propositions) (Div I, chapter 3), the analysis of “Being in as such” (Div I, chapter 5), the care structure (Div I, chapter 6), and Dasein’s attestation of authenticity and resoluteness (Div II, chapter 2).

---

⁵ According to this conception, truth consists in the *adequatio intellectus et rei*, or the adequation or agreement of judgments, representations, or assertions with objects or states of affairs. Heidegger identifies this conception in Aquinas, Avicenna, Kant, and nineteenth century neo-Kantianism. (pp. 214-215).


⁷ “Even if *logos* is understood in the sense of “assertion”, but of “assertion” as ‘judgment’, this seemingly legitimate translation may still miss the fundamental signification, especially if “judgment” is conceived in a sense taken over from some contemporary ‘theory of judgment’. *Logos* does not mean “judgment”, and it certainly does not mean this primarily — if one understands by “judgment” a way of ‘binding’ something with something else, or the ‘taking of a stand’ (whether by acceptance or rejection),” (p. 32); “Furthermore, because the *logos* is a letting-something-be-seen, it can therefore be true or false. But here everything depends on our steering clear of any conception of truth which is construed in the sense of ‘agreement’. This idea is by no means the primary one in the concept of *aletheia*. The ‘Being-true’ of the *logos* as *alethienein* means that in *legein* as *apophainenesthai* the entities of *which* one is talking must be taken out of their hiddenness; one must let them be seen as something unhidden (*alethes*); that is, they must be *discovered* (*entdeckt*). Similarly, ‘Being false’ (pseudesthai) amounts to deceiving in the sense of *covering up* [*verdecken*]: putting something in front of something (in such a way as to let it be seen) and thereby passing it off as something which it is not.

But because ‘truth’ has this meaning, and because the *logos* is a definite mode of letting something be seen, the *logos* is just not the kind of thing that can be considered as the primary ‘locus’ of truth. If, as has become quite customary nowadays, one defines “truth” as something that ‘really’ pertains to judgment, and if one then invokes the support of Aristotle with this thesis, not only is this unjustified, but, above all, the Greek conception of truth has been misunderstood.” (p. 33) “When something no longer takes the form of just letting something be seen, but is always harking back to something else to which it points, so that it lets something be seen as something, it thus acquires a synthesis-structure, and with this it takes over the possibility of covering up. The ‘truth of judgments’, however, is merely the opposite of this covering-up, a secondary phenomenon of truth, with more than one kind of foundation. Both realism and idealism have — with equal thoroughness — missed the meaning of the Greek conception of truth, in terms of which only the possibility of something like a ‘doctrine of ideas’ can be understood as philosophical knowledge.” (p. 34)
The distinction between the “primordial” and the tradition’s “derivative” sense of logos is, indeed, so prominent in Heidegger’s thought up to and including Being and Time that one recent commentator (Daniel Dahlstrom) has treated Heidegger’s whole project at this time as arising out of the critique of what he (Dahlstrom) calls the “logical prejudice.” This is the view that the primary locus or bearer of truth is something structured like a predicative sentence (that is, something that, minimally, attributes on or more properties or relations to at least one object). But is this ‘logical prejudice’ really just a prejudice? And how should we evaluate the merits of Heidegger’s project thus defined against those of the very different approaches taken almost universally by the analytic tradition in the twentieth century, for which (despite their own large-scale rejection of many elements of “traditional” theories of judgment and assertion) truth is (almost universally) understood as a feature of sentences, judgments, propositions, or beliefs rather than of objects or entities?

In this paper, I shall be posing these questions as a way of critically evaluating the success of Heidegger’s analysis of truth, meaning, and language in Being and Time, including the specific way he poses the question of the meaning of being itself there. But, I hasten to say at the outset, I do not intend to put into question (as many analytic commentators, unfortunately, have) the validity of the question itself. That is, I shall take it that any analysis that fails to render the question of the meaning of being intelligible or substantive is also one that fails as a critical interpretation of Heidegger.

Indeed, the possibility that motivates me here (although it can only be a hunch at this stage, I hope to provide some justification of it here) is precisely that the analytic philosopher’s propositional understanding of truth, as articulated for instance in claims like the first two propositions of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus:

The world is all that is the case.

And

The world is the totality of facts, not of things. actually provides a better and more direct route of access to the question of the meaning of being than does Heidegger’s conception of apophansis as primordial truth. This would be the case, roughly, if it

---


9 Assertions, propositions, sentences, and beliefs all have this structure.

10 Unfortunately, many analytic interpreters have followed Carnap in presupposing the specific (regulative and verificationist) conception of logical analysis that Carnap wields against Heidegger’s remarks in "What is Metaphysics?"; however, as I have argued elsewhere (Philosophy and the Vision of Language, esp. chapters 6 and 7) this conception of the proper methods and results of logical/linguistic analysis is not at all exhaustive of the analytic tradition, even at its early stages. Indeed, as James Conant has recently argued, we can find in the early Wittgenstein an alternative to Carnap’s conception of the line between sense and nonsense which, if applied to Heidegger, would have resulted in a much more sympathetic and helpful response to his remarks. See Conant, J.: 2001, ‘Two Conceptions of Die Überwindung der Metaphysik: Carnap and Early Wittgenstein’. In: T. McCarthy and S. C. Stidd (eds.): Wittgenstein in America. Oxford: Clarendon, pp. 13–61.

were necessary to recognize that the ‘copulative’ or ‘veridical’ “is” of a statement asserting that something is the case evinces the Being of beings in a way that is more revealing, or at any rate more closely connected to the underlying phenomenon of truth, than the simple “is” of existence can do. This would, in turn, be the case, if (again roughly) there were an essential connection between what is said by the copulative or veridical “is”, in contributing to the unity of a sentence or proposition, and the structure of what is in being, or the world, itself.\textsuperscript{12} And this would, finally, be the case if there were an important or even essential sense in which the world is indeed structured logically like a language, something first articulable as a totality into meaningful sentences rather than (primarily at least) simply into words. The question of the meaning of being would then be intelligible, at least in part, as that of the structural, ontological, and logical conditions for the possibility of the meaning of sentences, as these conditions themselves define the structure of the world and our relationship to it.

I will thus consider whether a view of truth as primarily propositional may indeed be better suited than Heidegger’s “aletheiac” conception to formulate the main question he wishes to pose in *Being and Time*, the question of the meaning of being. On such a propositional view, truth and falsehood are primarily and most essentially features of items that have the structure of declarative sentences, for instance actual sentences or perhaps mental states like beliefs. The essential thing here is that the items that are candidates for truth have, at least, the structure of a subject and predicate, and operate by saying what is the case (if they are true). Other senses of “truth,” for instance the sense in which we speak of a thing or entity or substance being true, are derivative, on this view, of this primarily propositional sense of truth. For instance, to say of a sample that it is “true gold” (as opposed to, say, fool’s gold or silver) is just to say that it is (really) gold, that is, to assert the (content of) the sentence “that stuff is gold.” Something similar goes for talk of a “true picture” or a “true account”; to say that the picture or account is true is just to say that it presents things as they are, i.e. that what it presents as being the case is indeed the case.\(^{13}\)

Since the propositional view is the basis for a series of objections made by Ernst Tugendhat to Heidegger’s aletheaic conception of truth, I shall discuss his critique of Heidegger in detail.\(^{14}\) But before we can begin to get clear on what is at stake between the propositional view and Heidegger’s own, it is important to make a few conceptual distinctions and clarifications.

1) The first and most important point is that a propositional view of truth need not imply a correspondence theory of truth. In the discussion I have glossed above, Heidegger does indeed separate these two components of what he sees as the “traditional” account of truth, but throughout *Being and Time* and his other writings on truth that criticize the “traditional” account Heidegger assumes that they must go together. In fact, this is not so; and philosophers in the analytic tradition have indeed very often adopted a view of truth that holds that it is primarily propositional while clearly rejecting a correspondence account of (propositional) truth. An early example of this is Frege. In “The Thought,” he gives a powerful and general argument against correspondence theories:

> But could we not maintain that there is truth when there is correspondence in a certain respect? But which respect? For in that case what ought we to do so as to decide whether something is true? We should have to inquire whether it is true that an idea and

\(^{13}\) At least one other preliminary reason for thinking that predicative usages of “true” in relation to an object are indeed derivative in this sense is that, like object-predicative usages of its cousin “real”, they exhibit the feature that J. L. Austin called “substantive-hungriness.” (Austin, *Sense and Sensibilia*, New York: Oxford U. Press, 1964), pp. 68-70. That is, unlike the use of a predicate like “red” or “tall,” the object-predicative demonstrative locution “This is true” (like “this is real”), when applied to an object (and not, say, a sentence) invites the question, “A true what?”, which must have a substantive answer if the initial locution is to have sense. Thus, it apparently makes no sense to speak of something’s simply being true, unless we can also speak of its being a true *something* (for instance a “true picture” or a “true diamond”), in which case we can always reformulate this claim as the claim that the something possesses certain further properties (for instance accuracy, or a certain chemical composition).

\(^{14}\) This critique is given in Tugendhat’s *Habilitationsschrift: Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger* (henceforth: DW), Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin, 1967, as well as in a shorter article entitled “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” i Truth’” in: C. Macann (Ed.) *Critical Heidegger* (New York: Routledge) p. 228. All translations from the first work are my own.
a reality, say, correspond in the specified respect. And then we should be confronted by a question of the same kind, and the game could begin again. So the attempted explanation of truth as correspondence breaks down. For in a definition certain characteristics would have to be specified. And in application to any particular case the question would always arise whether it were true that the characteristics were present. So we should be going round in a circle. So it seems likely that the content of the word ‘true’ is sui generis and indefinable.  

Frege’s argument against ‘picture’ theories of truth here indeed strongly resembles arguments that Heidegger gives against correspondence pictures at several places, including in the course of reconsidering Husserl’s account of intentionality. Notwithstanding this, as Tugendhat points out in his own critique which we will consider shortly, Husserl himself had actually given a similar argument against “picture” theories already in the Logical Investigations, some 25 years before Heidegger’s writing of Being and Time. In any case, although he thus very clearly and in general terms rejects the correspondence (or perhaps any) account of truth, Frege himself goes on in the very next paragraph to hold that “the only thing that raises the question of truth at all is the sense of sentences.” (p. 327). That is, what for Frege makes a sentence more than just a collection of words or sounds is just this, that it has what he calls a sense, which is to say that it is a candidate for truth or falsity. This is closely connected, as well, with the famous “context principle,” adopted by Frege years earlier, which holds that “a word has meaning only in the context of a sentence.” In other words (and glossing over many details and much argument), truth is systematically connected, for Frege, to sense or meaning; and the fact that words alone are not candidates for truth or falsehood, but that truth emerges first on the level of the sentence, points strongly to the suggestion that any systematic understanding of meaning must be dependent, in the first instance, on propositional truth.

In any case, Frege’s argument is enough to show that we can hold a propositional view of truth quite independently of any correspondence (or indeed any) theory of what truth consists in. Indeed, in sketching positively the general propositional view of truth that is held in common by many thinkers in the analytic tradition, it is probably best to hold off, for the moment at least, on giving any positive explanation or account of truth at all. Frege’s argument, after all, already tends to suggest that there may not be any such account to give; for any such account will always involve, circularly, the question of its own truth. What we can say, however, as a general characterization of the propositional view of truth

16 DW, p. 331. One version of Heidegger’s argument against the correspondence or ‘image’ theory is given at SZ, pp.217-18. Husserl’s own version is given at in the Logical Investigations, vol. 2, p. 421ff. See Husserl, The Shorter Logical Investigations, Investigation V, chapter two, “Appendix to sections 11 and 20.” (transl. by J. N. Findlay, ed. and abridged by Dermot Moran. London: Routledge and New York, 2001), pp. 238-41. Husserl’s formulation of the argument bears comparison to Frege’s: “Since the interpretation of anything as an image presupposes an object intentionally given to consciousness, we should plainly have a regressus in infinitum were we again to let this latter object be itself constituted through an image, or to speak seriously of a ‘perceptual image’ immanent in a simple percept, by way of which it refers to the ‘thing itself’. (p. 239)
17 The context principle is already suggested implicitly in Frege’s Begriffsschrift of 1879 and is explicitly formulated as a methodological maxim in the Grundlagen der Arithmetik of 1884. For some discussion, see Livingston, Philosophy and the Vision of Language (Routledge, 2008), chapter 2.
shared by much of the analytic tradition is that the primary sense of “truth” is characterized by Tarski’s disquotational convention T, which implies that, for each assertoric sentence, X, of a language,

“X” is true if and only if X.

Thus, for instance, Tarski’s convention T holds that

“Snow is white” is true if and only if snow is white.

And

“Snow is red” is false if and only if snow is not red.

This is not yet an account of truth, for it says nothing about what truth is or in what it consists. However, it expresses a constraint which will plausibly be satisfied by any understanding of truth as primarily propositional.\(^{18}\) As such, we may take it to express the core of any propositional view of truth, without prejudice to the question of correspondence or any other account of what truth consists in.\(^ {19}\)

Since he often argues as if the propositional view of truth must go along with a correspondence account, Heidegger often takes his arguments against a correspondence theory also to refute the propositional view. But if anything like Frege’s view is remotely tenable, it is clear that this strategy is not justified. An argument against the tenability of a correspondence theory is not an argument against a propositional view of truth, since it is possible to hold the propositional view of truth without a correspondence theory of truth.

Should it still seem in any way doubtful that it is possible to hold a propositional view of truth that does not imply a correspondence theory, it is noteworthy that Husserl himself can be read as holding just such a combination of commitments. In the *Formal and Transcendental Logic* of 1929, Husserl combines a view of “formal” logic as based in the structure of judgments with a non-correspondence “transcendental” logic of truth. Formal logic itself is seen as defining a purely “analytic apophantics” whose main and primary task is to discover the possible forms of judgments and their possibilities of rational combination and interrelation. According to Husserl, it was Aristotle who first brought out the possibility of a formal logic through his analysis of the syllogisms as pure forms of the relations of

\(^{18}\) Indeed, if we may take ‘is’ to have the veridical sense (of ‘is the case’), it seems to capture rather well the intuition expressed by Aristotle’s famous definition or criterion of truth in *Metaphysics* 1011b25: “To say of what is [the case] that it is not [the case], or of what is not [the case] that it is [the case], is false, while to say of what is [the case] that it is [the case], and of what is not [the case] that it is not [the case], is true”; cf. also formulations in Plato (*Cratylus* 385b2, *Sophist*263b).

\(^{19}\) Is it a weakness, in the present context, of the propositional view (*vis à vis* others, for instance the aletheiac view) if it does not give or involve giving any specific account of what truth consists in? I think it is not, for two reasons. First, as we have seen from Frege’s argument, there may be no such account to give. That is, it may be the best we can do is give a criterion for truth, rather than an account of what it consists in. Second, in the present context the most general relevant question is not which view gives the most accurate or plausible account of truth, but rather which view best allows the question of the meaning of being to be formulated and pursued. It is not at all obvious that in order to settle this, it is necessary first to determine which kind of view gives the best or most accurate account of what truth consists in.
possible judgments. With new developments in logical techniques and symbolism, it is now possible to develop what Husserl already called in the *Logical Investigations* a “theory of the pure forms of significations (or grammar of pure logic)” (p. 50). According to Husserl, this theory of the pure forms of judgments is the intrinsically first discipline of formal logic, implanted….” Its aim is to consider “the mere possibility of judgments, as judgments,” identifying their primitive forms such as “the form of the determining judgment, “S is p” (where p designates a determination, and S its substrate)…” (p. 51). This leads to what Husserl calls “the fundamental question of pure analytic,” which can be formulated as follows: “When, and in what relations, are any judgments – as judgments and so far as mere form is concerned – possible within the unity of one judgment?” (p. 64).

As far as formal logic is concerned, therefore, Husserl consistently sees the task of analysis as an investigation of structures that inherently have, at least, a minimal propositional structure – here, predicatively structured forms of judgments, the simplest of which is the “determining judgment” “S is p.” Although this analysis of forms of judgment abstracts from their actual truth or falsity, which is to be treated separately under the heading of transcendental rather than formal judgment, Husserl nevertheless makes it clear that the analysis of propositional structures is the basis for any possible further analysis of truth, for “the predicate truth does indeed relate to judgments and only to judgments” (p. 65) and:

*Truth* and falsity are predicates that can belong only to a judgment that is distinct or can be made distinct, one that can be performed actually and properly. Logic has never made clear to itself that this concept of the judgment is at the basis of the old thesis that truth and falsity (in the original sense) are predicates of judgments. Thus, in a mediated fashion, a pure analytics, by virtue of its essence, is at the same time a fundamental part of a formal logic of truth. (p. 66)

This does not mean, however, that the subsequent theory of the actual truth and falsity of judgments, what Husserl discusses under the heading of a “transcendental logic” but is in many ways closer to what we might today call epistemology, is in any sense a “correspondence” theory. The main question for this transcendental logic is not that of the correspondence of a mental or subjective entity to something in the “objective” world but of the givenness of states of affairs or “predicatively formed affair complexes” (*Sachverhalten*). As is familiar from many other texts in Husserl’s corpus, such propositionally structured objectivities can be “given” with various degrees and manners of adequacy and certainty (or apodicticity), and it is the burden of the phenomenological theory of “evidence” to describe these possibilities of givenness. The theory of evidence yields an account of the possible “verification” of

---

20 “Aristotle was the first to bring out the idea of form which was to determine the fundamental sense of a “formal logic”, as we understand such a discipline today and as Leibniz already understood it in effecting his synthesis of formal logic (as apophantic) and formal analysis to make the unity of a *mathesis universalis*. Aristotle was the first, we may say, to execute in the apophantic sphere – the sphere of assertive statements (“judgments” in the sense expressed by the word in traditional logic) – that ‘formalization’ or algebraization which makes its appearance in modern algebra with Vieta and distinguishes subsequent formal “analysis” from all material mathematical disciplines (geometry, mechanics, and the rest).” (p. 48)
judgments, in the form of the possible “fulfillment” of intentions directed toward states of affairs; these intentions may be at first purely “significative” and if so, must be “fulfilled” in various degrees by givenness of the states of affairs themselves. However, this is in no case, as Husserl makes clear with his own arguments against “picture” and “image” theories of truth, a question of the comparison or correspondence of a “mental” or “subjective” item with a “physical” or “objective” one.

2) The propositional view of truth is consistent with there being non-propositional preconditions of truth. The core idea of the propositional view of truth is that truth and falsity, in their most basic senses, apply primarily to items structured like sentences, and not to anything with a simpler structure. Of course, just as the existence of individual words is a precondition for the existence of sentences, truth in this sense may have some simpler pre-conditions. These preconditions might be of either of two types. First, there may be preconditions for the possibility of an individual act of judgment or assertion. For instance, in order for me to make a certain assertion, it may be necessary that I know that certain words mean certain things, or that I may use them in certain ways. Or there may also be preconditions for the possibility that utterances, sentences, judgments, or propositions mean what they do. For instance, it may be necessary in order for a sentence in the language to mean what it does that the constituent words or elements of thought make reference to the particular objects that they do. Here, where we are talking about “sentence meaning” rather than an individual’s “speaker meaning” on an occasion, it is not a question simply of preconditions for the success of one particular act or utterance, but for all the acts or utterances of that type in the language (as we might say, all of the acts or utterances that express the “same” content or meaning).

It is actually precisely here, indeed, that Heidegger’s penetrating analysis of the constitutive structure of Dasein in Division 1 of Being and Time may have the most, in general, to teach us. For as is well-known, this analysis involves a radical critique of the epistemological, theoretical conception of the pre-conditions of truth or knowledge according to which truth is always grounded in something that can itself be given a complete theoretical account, for instance in a structure of simply present objects with properties. This is why Heidegger distinguishes, early in the analysis of being-in-the-world, between different possible ways or modes of being of “innerworldly” objects or entities, for instance being ready to hand (Zuhanden) or present at hand (Vorhanden). These are both to be distinguished, again, from the being of Dasein, which has its own kind of being as a concern. Indeed, a large part of the analysis of being-in-the-world and indeed of the worldhood of the world itself consists in showing how the activity of Dasein can transform beings initially given, in larger contextual networks of “references-to” and “significance”, into present-at-hand beings relatively cut off from these contexts and made the object of explicit judgment or predication (and hence of possible theory). Understanding the being of innerworldly beings, prior to their being decontextualized and made into objects of possible theory, thus depends on understanding how they can be given, always already as the beings they are, in pre-propositional structures of Dasein’s everyday understanding, comportment, and “engaged coping.”

21 Indeed, since the content of the intentional judgment as such, whether “merely significative” and not in any respect verified or fully verified by the actual presence of the state of affairs intended, is already, (by contrast with the act of judgment) fully objective, there can be no question of any such comparison.
What is important to preserve in each of these conceptions of the way that the being of Dasein pre-conditions the possibility of truth is that there is an apophantic or disclosive dimension of the givenness of beings that is plausibly in some sense prior to the possibility of making explicit (true or false) judgments or assertions about them. In one sense, to insist upon this kind of pre-conditioning is just to assert a truism: that in order for us to make true or false judgments or assertions about entities, they must (first) be available to us in some way or other. However, since the question of this availability is simultaneously the question of the very possibility of their givenness, and the question of intentionality or “aboutness” itself, it is clear that our accounts of it will go to the very deepest issues of any interconnected account of the natures of truth, intelligibility, and meaning.

Now, we might of course understand these structures of the pre-propositional givenness of objects, and the kind of knowledge that is involved in their being given, in various different ways. They are clearly to some degree holistic structures: that is, the pre-propositional givenness of a single object, for instance the hammer as I am hammering with it, also inherently involves the pre-propositional givenness of other objects (for instance, as we may suppose in this example, the nail and the board). They may be understood, largely or wholly, as rooted, largely or wholly in practical, rather than theoretical, activities. And it may, furthermore, be the case that they are to be understood, largely or wholly, as articulated or defined only within intersubjective or collective structures of practice or action. The currently fashionable “social pragmatist” interpretation of Heidegger has generated a significant literature, and I shall not examine it in depth here. However, without denying the importance of Heidegger’s description of such holistic, background networks as conditions for the possibility of judgment and predication, there are a few questions that it is helpful to bear in mind before we too readily simply assimilate these conditions to “social practices,” as this interpretation tends to do.

---

22 Cf. SZ, section 15, pp. 69-71.


24 Despite its popularity, moreover, the textual basis for the “social pragmatist” reading of Division I is actually quite thin. According to the index to Being and Time, Heidegger uses the term praxis (or “practice”) only twice in Division I, once in Greek (on p. 68) and once in German (on p. 193). The first of these uses is parenthetical and simply mentions the connection between this term and the Greek pragmata or “things.” The second comes in the course of Heidegger’s analysis of the structure of care and in connection with Heidegger’s insistence that the phenomenon of care “by no means expresses a priority of the ‘practical’ attitude over the theoretical.” (p. 193). A related claim that is sometimes attributed to Heidegger (e.g. by Dreyfus) is that our access to contextual systems of reference depends on our initiation or upbringing within a specific culture; such initiation or upbringing might then define a specific cultural “world” within certain kinds of objects can appear and become visible, whereas certain other kinds cannot (though they might become visible in other, different cultural worlds). However, Heidegger seldom uses the term “culture” in the text, and the analyses of being-in-the-world as grounded in the structure of the grammatically singular “Dasein” tend to suggest that there is indeed only one
First, it is not obvious what constitutes a “practice” in the relevant sense. Heidegger’s example of the disclosure of the hammer suggests that the background conditions for propositional givenness typically involve skill; if this is right, then our knowledge of the background conditions may then be understood, largely or wholly, as consisting in special or general kinds of “know-how.” This would presumably include, for instance, skills such as the skill of building, or playing football, or socializing to one’s advantage; but does it also include such “practices” as contemplating the blueness of the sky, trying to maintain one’s well-being, or wondering at the existence of the world? Here, with these examples, it is not at all clear what specific kinds of skills or “know-how” are involved, or even that there is anything identifiable as a (single, unified) “practice” underlying our activity. In each of these cases, however, propositional claims and beliefs are obviously relevant, and their formation and consideration is an integral part of the way that the activity in question may be said to arrive at “truth” or truths, if it does indeed do so.25

Second, even if we consent to regard the background conditions as “practices” in some sense, it is unclear whether (or why) such practices must necessarily be “social.” For instance, activities such as contemplating the meaning of life, riding a bicycle, or building a birdhouse are characteristically undertaken in solitude, and it is not obvious that they could not be undertaken by someone who had not grown up in a society or in contact with others at all.

25 This is not to say that all skills or practices involve such claims and beliefs. Clearly, there are a wide variety of human practices that do not essentially involve the speaking of language. And many of these practices embody much “tacit knowledge” in the form of know-how; skill at basketball or riding a bicycle, for instance, involves a huge body of competence and skill that is not regularly, and probably could not even possibly, be formulated in explicit propositions by their practitioners. Some commentators, e.g. Dreyfus, have made much of the way that such non-formulable know-how and the practical forms of comportment it permits underlie our ordinary capacity to navigate through the world and relate to its objects. However, without disputing this point, it is important in the present context to consider more closely the relationship between this kind of “know-how” and (anything that can legitimately be called) “truth.” The competence of a star basketball player, for instance, might indeed be considered a kind of “knowledge,” at least in the extended sense of “know how” that is categorically different from, and irreducible to, “knowledge that.” (Compare, however, Ryle’s classic discussion of this distinction, which argues that these two senses of “knowledge” are deeply heterogeneous, in “Knowing How and Knowing That” (Gilbert Ryle: Collected Papers, Volume 2 (New York: Barnes and Nobles, 1971): 212-225.) But it is clear, in any case, that it does not in any sense embody a distinctive knowledge of “truths.” Such distinctive truths as there are to know about the practice of basketball are known already to the average player who understands the rules and strategies, or to the specialist who studies the physiology of athletes or the physics of the game. As important as it may be to the “pre-theoretical” possibility of our engaged behavior, therefore, it is clear that this kind of competence does not yet amount to knowledge of truths.
Third, though, and most decisively, however, it is important to keep open (at this stage, at least) the question of the extent to which such practical activities as underlie the possibility of the disclosure and description of entities are themselves (necessarily, as it may be) grounded in the structure of language or logos itself. For instance, most (though not all) of the “skills” and “practices” routinely cited by proponents of a “social practices” reading of Heidegger are ones that, fairly obviously, could not be performed by an organism lacking (human) language, for instance by a non-human animal. This gives reason to suggest that the structure of language – whatever is involved in knowing and being able to speak a language – plays an essential role in preconditioning and making possible these practices (even those that don’t directly involve speaking or writing), and thus that the ultimate conditions for the possibility of the disclosure and description of entities are not to be understood except through an analysis of the structure of language itself.

Recently, there has been some debate as to whether Heidegger’s conceptions of Interpretation or Auslegung and Discourse or Rede in Being and Time indeed presuppose language as a total structure, or whether these structures may indeed be seen as in some sense partially “extra-” or “pre-” linguistic. One frustrating aspect of the debate so far is that different parties presuppose differing conceptions of what it is for a condition of practice to be “linguistic” and thus disagree about the status of linguistic structure itself. In any case, it can hardly be simply presupposed at this stage that language is itself a “social practice” or is analyzable as such. The specific relation of the structure of language to the disclosure and description of entities, like the question of truth itself, one that cannot be answered simply on the basis of a ready-made conception of “social practices” alone, but must be addressed through a rigorous ontological analysis of the being of language itself.

3) Contents may be “pre-propositional” without being “non-propositional.” It is sometimes taken as just self-evident that there are candidates for truth or falsity – “contents” as we may call them – that must be non-propositional, since they are held or enjoyed prior to any application of language or any explicit act of judging, conceiving, or bringing objects under concepts. For instance, my perceptual experience may present the wall as being a certain shade of blue – in fact, celadon – even though I do not conceive it as such or even know the word “celadon.” In this sense at least, my experience has the content that the wall is celadon, even though I am in no position to formulate this explicitly or put it in the form of a proposition. I might have only a very vague concept of the specific color of the wall, or no concept at all; nevertheless my perceptual experience presents it as having the very, specific color that it does. It has thus seemed to some that this content of my experience is “nonconceptual” and, since it doesn’t (yet)

---

26 Thus, for instance, Christina Lafont has argued (in Heidegger, Language, and World Disclosure, transl. by Graham Harman, Cambridge U. Press, 2000) that world-disclosure is, for Heidegger, always linguistic and presupposes something like the detailed structure of language. Taylor Carman (in Heidegger’s Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse, and Authenticity in Being and Time) has disputed this “linguistically idealist” conception on the basis of a more ontically “realist” position, interpreting Discourse as a structure of “hermeneutic salience” that is “not essentially linguistic” (p. 5). For Interpretation, see SZ, section 32; for Discourse, see section 34.

27 Notably, Heidegger discusses language (Sprache) itself, as distinct from Rede, only briefly and in passing in Being and Time (section 34). However, when he does, he indicates the need for a deeper ontological analysis of the Being of language, which is not provided here; see especially p. 166. The position of language in Heidegger’s analysis, of course, shifts profoundly after 1933, becoming deeply linked with the question of Being itself. For a very helpful analysis of some of these shifts, see Mark Wrathall, “Conversation, Language, Saying and Showing” in Unconcealment: Heidegger on Truth, Language, and History (forthcoming, Cambridge U. Press).
amount to bringing an object under a concept, that it offers a counterexample to the claim that all truth-evaluable instances of content are propositional in form.

The important point to make here, however, is that for a content (for instance a content of my experience) to be pre-propositional is not the same as for it to be non-propositional in a logical sense. That is, it will still have the logical structure of a proposition, as long as it could be put in the form of a proposition. Logically, it doesn’t matter whether I actually do so or even can do so; the important point is that there is something that is truth-evaluable – namely the proposition “the wall is celadon” – and that it is this that is the primary candidate for truth or falsity, even if I am in no position to determine it. That which is not yet conceptualized may still very well be conceptualizable, and if so, it will have the logical structure of a proposition, even if it is not explicitly or actively conceptualized yet. Thus, we must distinguish between contents that are “pre-conceptual” in the sense that, although propositionally structured in themselves, they have not yet been the content of a specific act of assertion or judgment, and those that are (if any such exist) genuinely “non-conceptual.”

Here we can again look to Husserl for an instructive alternative to the sort of assumption that Heidegger tends to make. In Experience and Judgment, Husserl develops an elaborate theory of “pre-predicative” judgment and experience. That such experience is conceived as pre-linguistic and both temporally and conceptually prior to the actual formation of explicit judgments does not prevent it from already being articulate and structured. As objects and states of affairs are given in pre-predicative experience is already structured into parts and dependent and independent moments. For instance (to use an example of Peter Simon’s) the cup before me might be presented in pre-predicative experience as having the color blue. This experience, which already ascribes the object a moment, or an individual property-instance, may later (although it does not have to) become the basis of the explicit judgment or linguistic sentence “the cup is blue,” and this judgment may then, once formed, become the basis for further inferences and judgments. All of these further judgments and inferences, however, will remain grounded in the structure of what was given in the initial, pre-predicative experience itself, the presentation of the cup as blue; it is just this grounding that qualifies the pre-predicative experience as the basis of the judgment that is subsequently made explicitly. Logically speaking, this intentional experience was already propositional in the relevant sense, that of attributing a single individual property to an individual object: it was conceptually pre-propositional without being structurally non-propositional.

4) The propositional view of truth need not assume that a proposition is a synthesis of a subject term and a predicate term. The logical conception of sentences as composed of subject term and a predicate term or terms (together, perhaps, with the “copula,” a form of the verb “to be”) is a fixture of logical thought since Aristotle, and constantly presupposed in discussions of logic, meaning and truth from his time into the twentieth century. It was first overcome by Frege, who discovered both the symbolism and the logical conceptualization needed to portray the sentence as a locus of “multiple relations,” that is, a structure more complex and fluid than that of subject and predicate. In particular, instead of treating

---

the sentence as divided between subject and predicate, Frege treats it as composed of a conceptual function term and one or more object or variable terms, which it takes in order to be “full” or “saturated.” Important in this discovery was the consideration that the surface grammatical form of a sentence is not a good indication of its underlying logical form; for instance, the two sentences “The Greek army attacked Troy” and “Troy was attacked by the Greek army” certainly have the same logical form, even though subject and predicate are reversed. Even more decisive here, though, was Frege’s consideration of mathematics. For instance, whereas the sentence “Eight is greater than six” is unhelpfully portrayed by the subject-predicate conception as a predication of the property of “being greater than six” of eight, Frege’s conception can much more accurately portray it as asserting a relation (greater then) to hold between two elements, eight and six.

In virtually all of his discussions of propositions and logic in *Being and Time* and the texts and courses leading up to it, Heidegger seems to assume the subject-predicate conception of what a sentence is. In this, he is no different from the vast majority of philosophers of his time; but if Frege’s view is indeed right, this is unfortunate.³⁰ It is especially so if Heidegger is himself an unwitting victim of a kind of mistake that analytic philosophers, armed with Frege’s conception of the difference between superficial subject-predicate form and underlying logical form, quickly diagnosed in traditional philosophers ranging from Plato to Leibniz.³¹ One typical form of this mistake is the assumption, induced by the assumption of subject-predicate form, that the basic work of the proposition is to predicate some property of some underlying object or substance. This assumption tends to lead to the postulation of substances, ultimately perhaps to the postulation of underlying substances that have no intrinsic properties except for that of serving as a substrate for predication. However, that this is an illusion of grammar can be seen from the alternative, Frege’s theory of function and object.

II

With these preliminaries in place, we can now turn to what is still the most comprehensive critical reflection on Heidegger’s concept of truth, the classic critique by Heidegger’s student Ernst Tugendhat. Tugendhat developed his critique of Heidegger in his dissertation completed in 1966, “Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger,” and in a shorter lecture, “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” delivered in 1964. Interestingly, there is some evidence (although it is contested) that Heidegger in fact

³⁰ In a recent, comprehensive analysis, Michael Steinmann has considered the contrast between Heidegger’s understanding of the meaning of the copula and the “synthetic” unity of the proposition and Frege’s own very different understanding of these issues. (Steinmann: *Die Offenheit des Sinns*, Mohr Siebeck, 2008; see, esp., pp. 33-37). As Steinmann rightly notes, Frege’s function-object conception means that the proposition can be seen as a unity in a very different sense than Heidegger ever allows; for instance, this conception allows the proposition to be seen as a case of what Strawson (e.g. in *Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics* (London: Methuen 1959)) would later call a kind of “non-relational tie” in which “subject” and “predicate” are not conceived as distinct objects standing in substantial relation, but simply as logically distinct features of one and the same object. However, Steinmann stops short of assaying the dramatic implications of this distinct conception for the problem that, as he notes, most concerns Heidegger from an early stage: that of the real nature of the connection or “mathexis” that binds an “individual” to a “universal” and, hence, of the real connection between both.

changed his view of truth at least partly in response to Tugendhat’s critique, admitting in 1966 in “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” that “it was immaterial and therefore misleading to call *aletheia*, in the sense of clearing, ‘truth’.”

As William Smith has recently argued, one question at the center of Tugendhat’s critique is that of with “what right” and with “what meaning” Heidegger can use the term ‘truth’ to characterize the phenomena of disclosedness, uncovering (*Entdeckenheit*), or aletheia, which, on Heidegger’s account, are preconditions for propositional truth. This is not a question, I hasten to emphasize, about the extent to which Heidegger’s suggested usage matches the *ordinary* usage of the term “truth.” Philosophers are, after all, free to invent new terms or usages, and to use old terms as they wish. At the same time, however, as Christina Lafont has emphasized, it is inadequate simply to answer Tugendhat’s question by restating Heidegger’s own claim to “extend” the traditional concept of truth by means of a new usage; before we can be satisfied by any such claim we must be convinced that the new, extended usage indeed is legitimated by the phenomena themselves under consideration. The real question here is, thus, whether the phenomena of disclosedness that Heidegger identifies are indeed both i) at the basis of propositional truth, as he says, and ii) enough like other examples of truth to be characterized using the same concept. Part of the second question is the question whether they are indeed similar enough, in relevant respects, to cases of propositional truth (to which everybody agrees the concept “truth” does indeed apply). And the first part of Tugendhat’s argument attempts to show that, in fact, they are not. In particular, on the view that Heidegger argues for, it is only *because* an entity that has been uncovered that it is first possible to assert something (true or false) about it. (*SZ*, pp. 217-19). However, this “being-uncovered” (*Entdeckend-sein*) of the entity is, apparently, simply something that either happens or does not happen; it is not something that itself can happen “truly” or “falsely”, or that admits of a distinction between truth and falsehood. Thus the concept of truth as uncovering or uncoveredness is missing something that, according to Tugendhat, is essential to any real concept of truth: it is missing, namely, the property of *bivalence*, the capability of being true or false.

34 Mark Wrathall (in “Heidegger and truth as correspondence” *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 7/1 pp. 69–77) has argued, quite correctly, that Tugendhat has not succeeded in showing that Heidegger wishes to replace propositional (or even correspondence) truth with a disclosive or alethea-based conception. However, as Smith (2007) points out, this is not really the issue that is most central to Tugendhat’s critique: the relevant issue is not whether there is such a thing as propositional truth at all – Heidegger indeed agrees that there is – but rather whether unconcealedness is in fact a phenomenon that is both i) at the ontological basis of propositional truth and ii) itself rightly characterized as a kind of “truth.”
36 What general reasons are there for supposing that bivalence must indeed characterize any genuine truth-concept? I think the most general and telling consideration in favor of this requirement is that we just do not understand what it means for something to be “true” unless we understand how it *could* also be “false.” As Tugendhat makes clear, especially in the article “Heidegger’s Idea of Truth,” part of his own motivation for pursuing the critique of Heidegger is that he (Tugendhat) suspects that a notion of truth that lacks bivalence also forfeits an essential dimension of “normativity,” and hence cannot be used for the critical purposes to which we would normally like to put a concept of truth. Although I agree with these claims about normativity and the
In this sense, all uncovering is in itself “true,” and even a false proposition depends upon the uncovering of the entities involved in it (DW, p. 333); and indeed Heidegger says that in a false assertion “the entity” is “already in a certain way uncovered.” (SZ, p. 222). But if this is right, and the concept of uncoveredness does not include a bivalent distinction between truth and falsehood, then it is also insufficient to account for the bivalence of propositions, one of their key defining features of propositions on any telling. Heidegger’s formulation at the beginning of section 44b, that “Being true (truth) means being-uncovered” [“Wahrsein (Wahrheit) besagt entdeckend-sein”] is therefore inadequate. Tugendhat suggests, as well, that Heidegger reaches this formulation only through a crucial equivocation. In section 44a, he has moved from the claims that an assertion is true when it “indicates or discloses the state of affairs as it is in itself” or when it “discloses the state of affairs in itself” to the simple claim that the assertion’s truth is simply its “uncovering” of the state of affairs (as in the formulation that “Being true (truth) means being-uncovered.”) With the first two claims, we still have bivalence; for an assertion can presumably disclose a state of affairs as it is in itself or otherwise; in the first case, it will be true, and in the second, false. But with the slide to the third claim, we have lost the possibility of bivalence; uncovering either occurs or it does not, and we no longer have any ground to distinguish between a “true” and a “false” kind of uncovering.

What is at stake here is really the relationship between the givenness of entities and the possibility of making true or false assertions about them; that is, true assertions that characterize the thing as it is in itself or false assertions that fail to do so. The problem is that Heidegger, in simply identifying the givenness of an entity with truth, fails to make room for the possibility that an entity can indeed be given, although not “as it is in itself,” and this possibility is crucial to the preservation of bivalence. As Tugendhat emphasizes, Husserl is, in this respect, on much better ground than his student. For according to Husserl’s account of intentionality and evidence, first worked out in the Logical Investigations, it is possible for an object to be given in a bare, immediate act of intention – what he sometimes calls a “merely significative intention” without it yet being given “with evidence” or in such a way as to allow one to make a justified judgment as to how the object actually is as it is in itself. Thus, with the difference between a merely significative intention (which only amounts to being directed toward or indicating the object) and a “fulfilled” intuition which gives the object itself as it is in itself, Husserl can preserve (as Heidegger cannot) bivalence, which is seemingly essential to anything that we can indeed call a concept of truth:

This internal difference with respect to “unconcealedness” between a direct and as it were presupposed givenness – Husserl’s “pure intention” – and the thing itself is not observed by Heidegger. It is, however, precisely this difference from which the word “truth” in general first gains its sense. If the “uncovering” were simply a matter of bringing the entity out of “concealedness” and into the light, then there would be, on the whole, no reason to speak of truth or untruth. (DW, p. 335)

It follows that, at least if we agree with Tugendhat in taking bivalence to be an essential feature of any candidate concept of truth, Heidegger’s conception of “originary truth” in section 44b as simply

[Critical utility of a concept of truth, they go significantly beyond the issue of bivalence itself, so I have not pursued them any further here.]
consisting in the “being-uncovered” of entities must be rejected. There is no possibility of seeing the simple phenomenon of “being-uncovered” as already itself amounting to truth, and hence no possibility of seeing the truth of propositions about particular objects as grounded simply in the uncoveredness or disclosure of those objects themselves. For the simple uncoveredness of objects does not yet introduce a distinction between truth and falsity, and so cannot by itself account for the possibility of making true or false judgments about an object. Since it cannot do so, the simple uncoveredness of objects deserves, as Tugendhat argues, no claim to be called “originary truth”; indeed, since uncoveredness in this sense is equally at the ground of false propositions, we might as well call it “original falsehood” (DW, p. 336). With the simple concept of the uncoveredness of entities, we have not so far identified so much as a plausible candidate for any kind of truth-concept, much less an “originary” and foundational type.

It thus seems clear that, at least if we wish to preserve bivalence as a feature of any concept that is specifically a concept of truth, we cannot follow Heidegger in the equivocation of which Tugendhat accuses him. That is, we cannot hold the apophantic and primordial meaning of truth to be simply the “being-uncovering” of individual entities. We must therefore at least, it seems, preserve the definition of truth that leads to this final definition by way of equivocation, the definition according to which the truth of any proposition is grounded in the uncovering of some entity as it is in itself (rather than as it is not in itself). In this way, we can indeed include bivalence as a fundamental aspect of truth: for a proposition to be true is for the entity to show itself as it is in itself, and for it to be false is for the entity to show itself in some other way.

At some points, Heidegger suggests that this is indeed the conception he intends. For instance, in section 44b, in explaining why the primordial concept of truth should be conceived privatively (as a-letheia) rather than simply as a positive concept, he says that “The uncovering of anything new … takes its departure from uncoveredness in the mode of semblance. Entities look as if … That is, they have, in a certain way, been uncovered already, and yet they are still disguised.” (SZ, p. 222). This suggests, contrary to what is suggested in section 44a, that the primary concept of disclosive truth for Heidegger is indeed the disclosure of something either as it is in itself (uncoveredness as truth) or as something else (“uncoveredness in the mode of semblance” or falsehood).

This suggestion gains support, as well, from Heidegger’s identification in sections 32 and 33, of a basic and fundamental “‘as’- structure” grounded in the totality of our involvements with the world and underlying any possibility of the disclosure or uncoveredness of entities whatsoever. This primary “as” structure – what Heidegger calls the “existential-hermeneutical ‘as’” to differentiate it from what he now calls the “apophantical ‘as’” of assertions – always characterizes, in a fundamental way, any possible understanding or interpretation of entities.37 According to Heidegger, this “as” structure does not subsequently articulate an entity that could otherwise be given without it, but indeed characterizes the givenness of any innerworldly entity at all. Thus, anything that is given (with whatever degree of explicitness, and with or without our forming any propositions about it) is always given as something or other.

This basic “as” structure, as it operates in “everyday circumspective interpretation” (with or without an explicit, thematic focus) itself breaks up into three “fore”-structures that jointly connect the individual

---

37 SZ, p. 150, p. 158.
entity to the total context of involvements that articulate, for Heidegger, its basic character. First, there is a “fore-having” whereby this totality of involvements is always already (in some sense) “understood.” Second, there is a “fore-sight” which begins to separate from this total context of involvements the specific entity in question and makes it capable of being conceptualized. Finally, there is a “fore-conception” which “decide(s) for a specific way of conceiving” the entity, and thus “can be drawn from the entity itself, or . . . can force the entity into concepts to which it is opposed in its manner of Being.” (p. 150). Together, these three structures relate (or possibly, as it seems, fail to relate) the entity itself to the larger context of involvements that first gives it an identifiable character as such.

Thus, what is suggested here is that even the most primordial form of disclosure (the so-called “existential-hermeneutical” ‘as’) is already a matter of taking something as something, for instance taking the entity as having the structure or properties it in fact does, or taking it as something else, and thus falling into semblance and falsehood. With this modification, we can thus indeed regain the bivalence that is missing from the simple conception of truth as being-uncovered that was suggested at the beginning of 44b; so it might seem as if we have, by means of a relatively minor alteration, already solved the problem that Tugendhat insists upon.

However, for the suggested analysis that sees originary, pre-propositional truth as already exhibiting the “as-structure” that allows us to take something either as it is in itself or in some other way, there are still at least two major problems. One is that it is not clear that this conception does not simply reinstate the structure of propositional truth after all. For the content of an act of taking something as something is, in general, readily convertible to the content of a proposition which says that something is something, i.e. has some property or feature. For instance, on the suggested analysis, I may uncover the necktie (which is in fact red) either as red or (if the light is bad, for instance) as orange. In the first case, I uncover the entity as it is in itself (namely, red); whereas in the second case I fail to do so and uncover it otherwise than it is in itself (namely, as orange). The problem is that what I have seen in each case is precisely equivalent to the content of some proposition, namely the content of the propositions “the necktie is red” (which is true) and “the necktie is orange” (which is false). Thus, I have seen or perceived in each case something which is best, and indeed probably only, expressible by a proposition; even if I do not explicitly formulate or utter such a proposition, it captures precisely what has happened in my act of disclosing. So it seems as if we, indeed, again have no understanding of what happens in the “primordial” act of uncovering other than that which is dependent, precisely, on an understanding of it as propositionally structured. We have indeed re-introduced bivalence, but at the significant cost, it seems, of also re-introducing the structure in which it is most directly at home: the structure, namely, of articulated propositions, evaluable as true or false according to whether what they assert is or is not the case.

However, this consideration, though general and powerful, is not necessarily completely decisive. For it may indeed be possible to construe the supposedly primary “hermeneutic” as-structure, even if it indeed results in propositions, as something other, in itself, than simply a structure of propositions; and there are considerations of indexical reference (as, for instance, when I take “that thing over there as a necktie”)

38 Indeed, Heidegger suggests as much when he holds, on p. 159, that the unity of the individual logos or proposition is to be understood as based on the more basic structure of the “something as something” and that in the explicitly formulated sentence, the copulative “is” indeed bears the significance of this “as”.
that also complicate the issue. We will have to come back to those issues later. But to this general though perhaps not decisive objection we can add another one that, though more specific, is indeed decisive at this stage. For any theory which is to account for propositional truth in general must be capable of accounting for the truth (or falsity) of any assertoric proposition whatsoever. However, as Tugendhat suggests, “the assertions of which Heidegger is thinking are primarily simple predications of individual objects … Only here is the talk of indication, uncovering and concealing clear without further ado.” (DW, p. 342). And it is not at all clear that such a theory, whose most basic model involves relations to individual objects rather than facts, propositions, or states of affairs, can indeed account for the possible truth or falsity of any assertoric proposition.

For instance, if we begin with sentences such as “Socrates is tall” simply predicating a property of an individual object, we may indeed readily be led to an account of the truth of this sentence as consisting in the uncoveredness of Socrates as he is in himself (namely as tall). However, it is not at all clear from this account what we are to do with even a simple relational sentence such as “Socrates is taller than Plato.” Should we think of the truth of this as grounded in the disclosure only of Socrates (since he is the grammatical subject)? But then we must think of his being disclosed in terms of a relational property (being taller than Plato) as his being disclosed as he is in himself. This would threaten to make all relations into internal properties of an individual, and since each object is related somehow or other to all others, it would imply that the full disclosure of an individual object also discloses the whole universe. Or should we think of the relevant disclosure here as that of Socrates and Plato jointly, as they are in themselves? But this too is inadequate, since in addition to the disclosure of Socrates, and that of Plato, we evidently need the disclosure of the relationship between them as well. And this relationship can hardly itself be attributed to either of the “things” as they are “in themselves.”

An even harder case is that of (true) negative judgments of existence, for instance the judgment “Santa Claus does not exist” or “there are no unicorns.” It is not even remotely plausible that the truth of these judgments is grounded in the disclosure of the entities mentioned, since these entities do not even exist.

III

As we have seen, then, Tugendhat’s basic argument against Heidegger’s conception of truth can best be understood as posing a dilemma. The dilemma bears on the claim that the phenomenon of uncoveredness or disclosure is both at the basis of propositional truth (and hence distinct from it) and also, itself, entitled to be described as a phenomenon deserving the name “truth.” On the first horn of the dilemma, bivalence is denied to uncoveredness; uncoveredness simply occurs or does not, and there is no sense in talking of a “true” or a “false” uncoveredness. Then it is clear (at least if we indeed agree that bivalence is a necessary feature of any legitimate “truth” concept) that uncoveredness is not a kind of truth at all. On the second horn of the dilemma, however, uncoveredness is seen as bivalent; that is, it is held possible for an entity to be uncovered “as it is in itself” or not “as it is in itself,” for instance according to whether uncovering operates in its normal mode or in a privative mode “as semblance.” The problem now, however, is that we seemingly have no grasp of what this difference between true and false modes of unconcealing could possibly consist in, other than one that amounts to a difference in the truth-values of claims, or propositions, about the entity itself. By opting for bivalence on the primary
level of uncoveredness itself, therefore, we seem to necessarily re-introduce propositional structure and articulation, even at this basic level.

As Smith (2007) suggests, existing interpretations of Tugendhat’s critique that are sympathetic to Heidegger tend to fall on one side or the other of this dilemma, without ever really solving it. For instance, Carman (2003) argues in response to Tugendhat that unconcealing must be understood as grounded in a dimension of “hermeneutic salience” that makes “entities intelligible to us in virtue of our tacit understandings and practices … and yet beneath the threshold of explicit assertions and beliefs whose contents we take to be correct or incorrect.” (p. 261). This is, essentially, to take the first horn of the dilemma, holding that there exists a primary level of the disclosure of entities articulated on the level of “our local discursive community” that is not, as such, subject to evaluation as true or false. However, as Smith notes, even if there is indeed such a cultural or community-based kind of precondition for the disclosure of entities, it is not at all clear why this precondition should be called “truth” at all. Moreover, such standards or preconditions as are determined by such “discursive communities,” if they are indeed not capable of being captured by “explicit assertions and beliefs” are then not open to criticism (or apparently even definition!) at all in terms of their characteristic commitments and assumptions, and so it becomes unclear that we can use them as the basis for an understanding of truth that can distinguish at all between the contingent commitments of a community and what is indeed true or false in a culture-independent sense.

By contrast, in his own response to Tugendhat, Dahlstrom (2001) emphasizes the “transcendental” nature of Heidegger’s claims about the possibility of disclosedness, claims which, as Dahlstrom emphasizes, bring out his deep indebtedness and similarity to the Kantian critical project and its transcendental idealism. For Dahlstrom, however, these claims about the foundations for truth and the possibility of disclosure are indeed genuine claims – that is, they can be evaluated as true or false and have their own determinate truth-conditions. Thus, Dahlstrom concludes that Heidegger indeed does not give up on bivalence: with respect to these “transcendental” claims, “propositional truth or, more precisely, the bivalency criterion of meaningful talk about truth, on which Tugendhat rightly insists, remains in force”’ (p. 423; quoted in Smith, p. 171). But then, of course, what we have is not really a non-propositional sense for primary truth at all; we have, rather, a theory of both ordinary truth and its “transcendental” conditions that is, apparently, propositional through and through.

It seems, then, that the strong claim suggested by Heidegger’s formulation at the beginning of section 49b -- that the truth of any assertoric proposition about an entity is grounded solely in the disclosure of that very entity (either simpliciter or as it is or is not in itself) -- cannot be upheld, consistently with his claim to show that such propositions are grounded in a more primordial level of non-propositional truth. However, although Heidegger certainly suggests this strong claim (most explicitly in the example of the picture given on pp. 217-218)39, it is not clear that it represents his most general view of propositional truth or its more general apophantic or disclosive grounding. Indeed, as section 49b goes on to explain, what is really important to Heidegger about the disclosive dimension of truth is to evince a primary level of disclosure at which, not an individual entity, but rather entities in the plural, are disclosed:

39 E.g. p. 218: “Asserting is a way of Being towards the Thing itself that is. And what does one’s perceiving of it demonstrate? Nothing else than that this Thing is the very entity which one has in mind in one’s assertion.”
If *logos as apophansis* is to be true, its Being-true is *aletheuien* in the manner of *apophanesthai* -- of taking entities out of their hiddeneness and letting them be seen in their unhiddenness (their uncoveredness). The *aletheia* which Aristotle equates with *pragma* and *phainomena* in the passages cited above, signifies the ‘things themselves’; it signifies what shows itself – *entities in the ‘how’ of their uncoveredness*. (SZ, p. 219).

Heidegger points here, in other words, to the possibility that the truth of an individual proposition is to be seen as preconditioned, not primarily or simply by the uncovering of the *particular* entity that is its grammatical subject, but rather, in each case, by a more general structure that underlies the uncovering of *several or many* entities. This would be, then, a *holistic structure* of entities, one whose disclosure in *general* preconditions the formation or possible truth of particular propositions. And indeed, Heidegger now makes it clear how the analysis of truth here is connected to the overall analysis of division I of Being and Time, and indeed to the whole of the “Preparatory Fundamental Analysis” of the structure of Dasein itself:

Moreover, the ‘definition’ of “truth” as “uncoveredness” and as “Being-uncovering”, is not a mere explanation of a word. Among those ways in which Dasein comports itself there are some which we are accustomed in the first instance to call “true”; from the analysis of these our definition emerges. …

Uncovering is a way of Being for Being-in-the-world … What is primarily ‘true’ – that is, uncovering – is Dasein …

Our earlier analysis of the worldhood of the world and of entities within-the-world has shown, however, that the uncoveredness of entities within-the-world is *grounded* in the world’s disclosedness. But disclosedness is that basic character of Dasein according to which it *is* its “there”. (SZ, 220).

In other words, Heidegger is here concerned with a “most primordial” phenomenon of truth as uncoveredness that has two holistic aspects. First, the most primordial phenomenon of truth is grounded in (or even identifiable with) the “basic character of Dasein.” Second, this basic character – the disclosedness of Dasein – is also identifiable with the disclosedness of the world, what underlies the possibility of any uncoveredness or showing of entities within the world.

Together, these two features of primordial truth significantly raise the stakes of Heidegger’s invocation of a pre-propositional level of disclosive truth. For they connect the phenomenon of disclosive truth (as world-disclosure) directly to the analyses of worldhood and Being-in (chapters 2-5) and finally to the summative analysis of the care structure in chapter 6. (“To Dasein’s state of being, disclosedness in general essentially belongs. It embraces the whole of that structure-of-Being which has become explicit through the phenomenon of care.” (SZ, 221)). This relationship of disclosedness to the basic structure of Dasein is further broken down into Dasein’s thrownness or faiticity (which makes disclosedness “essentially factical” (SZ, 221)); Dasein’s capacity for projection or “disclosive Being towards its potentiality-for-being” (“the most primordial … disclosedness in which Dasein, as a potentiality-for-Being, can be, is the *truth of existence*”); and Dasein’s tendency to falling (wherein “that which has been uncovered and disclosed stands in a mode in which it has been disguised and closed off by idle talk,
curiosity, and ambiguity.”) With the last two features, Heidegger also forges a definitive connection between disclosedness as the basic character of Dasein and Dasein’s possibility of being authentic or inauthentic, with the result that “Dasein is equiprimordially both in truth and untruth.” (SZ, p. 223).

In this way, the analysis of primordial truth as Dasein’s capacity for disclosure unifies the whole preceding analysis of Division I; at the same time, through its connection of disclosedness to Dasein’s being in truth or untruth according to whether it discloses itself in authenticity or not, it connects disclosedness directly also to the analysis of temporality in Division II. Indeed, the determinative conception of Dasein as the “clearing” (and so as defined by its capacity for apophantic disclosure) introduced in section 69 of Division II, is a fixture of all of the early Heidegger’s analyses of Dasein. This conception is itself dependent upon the capacity of Dasein to disclose entities (in the plural) and indeed itself either as they are or as they are not in themselves, which we must again take as absolutely definitive and determinative for each of the constitutive structures of Dasein. This capacity is also at the basis of any possibility of world-disclosure at all, both the disclosure of any entities within the world and of any and all aspects of the phenomenon of world as such.

We have, then, to deal with a “primordial” phenomenon of disclosure that is both i) a capacity of Dasein and ii) in some sense holistic or systematic, a disclosure not simply of individual entities but of systems or structures of entities, up to the structure of the world itself. Since the structure of the world is fundamentally linked to that of Dasein itself, this primordial phenomenon of disclosure may also be intelligible as, in some sense, iii) a capacity of Dasein to disclose itself.

How should we, then, understand the holistic structure of this most primordial phenomenon of disclosure? As we saw above, it is indeed possible to avoid the first horn of Tugendhat’s dilemma – the horn on which primordial truth, lacking bivalence, does not qualify as a legitimate truth-concept – by construing primordial truth as already including the possibility of an entity’s being disclosed either “as it is in itself” or not “as it is in itself.” We may do so, in particular, by following Heidegger in his insistence on an originary “as-structure” which characterizes any disclosure of an entity as, necessarily, the disclosure of something as something; in this way, we can readily make sense of bivalence and the possibility of error. However, as we saw above, anything understandable in terms of this “as” structure is also apparently synthetic; even if it is “not yet” a proposition, it has the complex structure of taking something as something, and so can indeed, apparently, be expressed by some proposition or propositions. If this is the case, though, than Heidegger’s description of primordial truth does not, after all, avoid the second horn of Tugendhat’s dilemma. For however clearly we may distinguish between the disclosure of an entity itself and the subsequent formulation of explicit claims or assertions about it, if the disclosure itself already has the structure of a proposition, it will apparently be impossible to avoid construing its truth or falsehood as propositional truth or falsehood.

In section 33, Heidegger describes the process by which the original, primordial “as”-structure of hermeneutic understanding can become transformed into the explicit formation of a proposition or an assertion. Assertion itself is defined as having the three functions of “pointing out” [Aufzeigen] an entity, ‘asserting’ a ‘predicate’ of a subject’, and communication [Mitteilung] in the sense of letting some entity be seen. Each of these functions is accomplished by relation to some entity, for instance the

---

40 SZ, pp. 154-55.
hammer which I describe as “too heavy.” Accordingly, each of them results from a modification of the more primordial way in which this entity is given, and the formation of the assertion itself is to be understood as a “derivative” mode of interpretation.\textsuperscript{41}

How, though, does this process of modification actually occur? To begin with, as we have seen, entities are disclosed in “concernful circumspection” \textit{[besorgenden Umsicht]} as ready to hand. This disclosure is prior to the formation of any explicit judgment, but already includes, as Heidegger says, a certain, determinate interpretation:

In concernful circumspection there are no such assertions ‘at first’. But such circumspection has of course its specific ways of interpreting, and these, as compared with the ‘theoretical judgment’ … may take some such form as ‘The hammer is too heavy’, or rather just ‘Too heavy!’, ‘Hand me the other hammer!’ (p. 157)

This primary interpretation may, indeed, not be expressed as a proposition; it need not yield explicit words at all, but indeed can be “carried out” in mute action, for instance the action of laying aside the tool and replacing it with another. Nevertheless, as Heidegger makes clear in this passage, it retains the form of something like a proposition (or, as it may be, an injunction or complaint) which, precisely, takes \textit{something as something}: here, the hammer \textit{as} too heavy.

According to Heidegger, the modification that results in an explicitly formulated assertion then depends essentially on a transformation in our way of being “given” the object. In particular, the “fore-having” which already characterized the hermeneutical disclosure of the hammer as hammer is changed over into the “having” of something present at hand, which can now be the “about which” of an explicit assertion.\textsuperscript{42} The most significant aspect of this “change-over” is that the object is effectively wrenched from the context of involvements that first defined its character and way of being (for instance in the engaged practice of hammering) and singled out as an object about which it is possible to say something about. This involves, Heidegger says, a modification of the original “as-structure” itself. Through this modification, “the ‘as’ no longer reaches out into a totality of involvements”; instead, it ‘gets pushed back into the uniform plane of that which is merely present-at-hand.”\textsuperscript{43} The primordial ‘existential-hermeneutical ‘as” of circumspective interpretation is thus modified into the ‘apophantical’ ‘as’, which makes it possible to formulate any explicit assertion about the object.

\textbf{IV}

Summing up, there are two features of Heidegger’s account of the derivation of explicitly formulated assertions from the original, hermeneutical “as”-structure that are worthy of note. First, as we have seen, the synthetic unity of the assertion or proposition as explicitly formulated – its capacity to unify what there appears as a “subject term” with a “predicate term” – is founded upon a more original unity which is already present in the most basic phenomenon of disclosure, the primary hermeneutic disclosure of

\textsuperscript{41} SZ, p. 157.
\textsuperscript{42} SZ, p. 158
\textsuperscript{43} SZ, p. 158
something as something. Whether or not it is explicitly formulated in assertions or even in words, this disclosure, we may well suspect, already has the synthetic structure of a proposition; and Heidegger’s analysis of the derivation of the explicit assertion from the more basic disclosure has, as we have seen, done little to counter this suspicion. Second, though, and equally importantly, Heidegger construes both the articulation of assertions and the more originary disclosure on which it depends as resulting from acts or processes performed by Dasein itself. This construal is the basis for the connection that Heidegger wishes to draw between the primordial phenomenon of truth and the being of Dasein, in virtue of which it is correct to say that the primordial phenomenon of truth as uncoveredness is simultaneously a disclosure of world as such and of Dasein to itself.

As we saw, the first feature of Heidegger’s account threatens to land us on the second horn of Tugendhat’s dilemma; on this horn, original, disclosive truth is indeed bivalent, but it seems to be difficult or impossible to separate its logical structure from that of propositional truth itself. Nevertheless, Heidegger does give a very detailed and illuminating account of the transformation of original disclosure, so construed, into explicit propositions and judgments; and we might perhaps take this account itself as defining what Heidegger means by the distinction between “original” and “propositional” truth to begin with. To do so would be, essentially, to take Tugendhat’s dilemma in stride; we would acknowledge the deep structural kinship between “original” and “propositional” truth as phenomena, without disputing that there are importantly different processes involved in both, and leading from one to the other. However, there is another line of objection here (more prominently in Tugendhat’s untranslated dissertation than in the short article from 1964) that cuts at least as deeply against the expanded, holistic conception of truth as world-disclosure as the original objection does against the original conception. At the center of this second line of critique is the distinction, with respect to propositions themselves, between the act, event, or occurrence of asserting a proposition and the content of the proposition itself.

As we saw earlier, the problem with the simple account of primordial truth according to which it was simply “being-uncovering” or the simple uncoveredness of the entity, was that this account lacked the resources to distinguish between the truth or falsity of propositions supposedly grounded in such an uncoveredness. To remedy this, we had to construe the proposition as capable of disclosing the entity (or entities) either as it is in itself or otherwise; and for this, it was necessary to think of both the proposition and the disclosure underlying it as grounded in an “as” structure, as a disclosing of something as something. Now, if something can be disclosed as it is in itself, it can also be disclosed as it is not in itself; and so here we gain, again, bivalence and thus what Tugendhat calls the “specific sense of truth.” But such a structure, as Tugendhat points out, indeed has “objects” in two different senses. First, there is of course the simple object that is the grammatical subject of the proposition; but second, the whole structure has as its “object” in a different sense a state of affairs, the Sachverhalt or fact, the synthetic unity that is (as Husserl might put it) first “constituted” when that object is shown as what it is shown (truly or falsely) as being.44 Thus, the disclosive as-structure does not simply show, for instance,

44 The distinction between objects (which are correlative, on the level of language, to names) and states of affairs, facts, or Sachverhalten (which are, by contrast, correlative to sentences and propositions) is of cardinal importance the logical projects of early analytic philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Russell, and Frege, who tend to draw it quite sharply and centrally (indeed, it is closely linked to Frege’s decisive “context principle”; see above). However, as Tugendhat has pointed out elsewhere, it is not applied nearly as centrally anywhere in the
the necktie, but also shows (or purports to show) the necktie as orange, and hence has as an “object” (in the second, complex sense) the state of affairs that the necktie is orange. This state of affairs is not just an amalgam of an object and a property, but has a synthetic structure that may not be reducible to anything simpler (indeed, this is precisely the most basic as-structure). And it is with this unity that we first gain, as we saw before, the possibility of bivalence.

But if truth or falsity is indeed to be understood only in connection with this second kind of object, the state of affairs, then we must ask what it indeed is that has the state of affairs as its object, in this sense. And here a crucial distinction, ignored by Heidegger, emerges. For:

... one can also not simply say, as Heidegger often seems to suggest, that the entity (the subject of assertion) is uncovered or concealed; the qualification that it is indicated as something is, here, essential, and not as harmless as it seems. In particular, it is implied by this that what is uncovered or concealed … does not lie outside the uncovering or concealing and above all is not to be grasped otherwise than within an assertion …

If the content of the assertion is not thinkable outside the assertion, this naturally does not mean that it first comes to exist with the actually occurring assertion and thereby becomes true or false. For “the assertion” that is true as uncovered or false as concealed can only be understood as the assertion in specie, as the complete type of the occurring assertion. The difference between the assertion in specie and the occurrant assertion is, if one intends to follow Heidegger correctly from his starting point, also and directly indispensable … since it belongs to the sense of truth and falsehood that they pertain to the assertion in itself, independently of whether it is verified or not and also independently of whether they are in any sense factically asserted by anyone or not.

So it may be said, summarily: The primary bearer of the determinations true and false is “the assertion” understood as the act of assertion in specie. (DW, pp. 342-43)

That is, regardless of whatever may occur in the actual demonstration of something, that is in the pointing out or disclosure of something out as something, the truth or falsity of what is demonstrated is not first determined during this actual demonstration, but characterizes equally any demonstration of the same type or species. So it is, as Tugendhat notes, the assertion in specie, and not the individual act, that is the primary bearer of the determination “true” or “false”; it is because of this that we can speak of the “content” of an assertion, meaning not only what is asserted on a particular occasion, but what would be asserted by any assertion of that type.

phenomenological tradition of Husserl and Heidegger. There is thus reason to suspect that phenomenology misses the opportunity to avail itself of a fundamental logical distinction which could otherwise have significantly improved the scope and bearing of its results. Thus, in Traditional and Analytical Philosophy (Cambridge U. Press, 1982), Tugendhat can criticize both Husserl and (in passing) Heidegger for their adherence to a primarily “object-oriented” conception of language that compares unfavorably to the propositionally-oriented tradition deriving from Frege and Wittgenstein.
Although Husserl draws the distinction between act and content very clearly and rigorously, beginning in the *Logical Investigations*, Heidegger fails to draw it at all. The result, according to Tugendhat, is that Heidegger implausibly makes truth the result of an actual, factual event of disclosure:

Heidegger himself obviously fails to make the distinction between the factual act of uncovering and the uncovering *in specie*. In that the failure to make this distinction is connected with the ambiguity in the concept of uncovering, a conception results according to which truth does not distinguish an adequate showing from an inadequate one, but rather a shown being from a hidden one: the being *becomes* true, when it is factically shown. (DW, p. 344)

This leads to what are, according to Tugendhat, highly implausible consequences. For instance, Heidegger holds in section 44c that “Newton’s laws … are true only as long as Dasein *is*” and that “Before Newton’s laws were discovered, they were not ‘true’” and that “Through Newton the laws became true…” But:

If a state of affairs, so long as it is unrecognized, is not true, then it would indeed seem appropriate to say as a consequence of this that it stops being true when it is no longer recognized by anyone, and that its truth grows greater the more people recognize it. But Heidegger is protected from these possibilities by his *singulare tantum* “das Dasein.” (DW, p. 344)

Lacking a distinction between the individual act of assertion and the content of acts *in specie*, Heidegger must, according to Tugendhat, simply identify the truth of an assertion with something occurring when this truth is first asserted or recognized. This then leads Heidegger to assert that “‘There is’ truth only insofar as and so long as ‘there is’ Dasein.” However,

Insofar as one can assume that Heidegger indeed has in mind in this section the specific sense of truth, the ontical and ontological levels are simply confused: on the ground of the indubitable ontological relativity of truth as such to the Dasein, the ontic independence of the occurrent truth from its factually being known is denied. (DW, p. 345).

That is, according to Tugendhat, because Heidegger fails to see the kind of propositional structure that is already involved in the very disclosure of anything as anything at all, he fails to make the distinction

---

45 One reason that Heidegger fails to draw this distinction is presumably that, as Michael Steinmann (2008, p. 194) argues, Heidegger always considers the “assertion” primarily as an *act* of theoretical specification rather than, in the first instance, as a conceptual or logical structure. According to Steinmann (p. 195) this leads Heidegger to “displace” the problem of the logical structure of the proposition, as well as the question of the underlying structure of the “something as something” itself, and the question of the basis of the objective form of logical relations accordingly never comes into focus. Rather, “Das Logische verschwindet gleichsam in der Lücke zwischen der ontologischen Deutung der Auslegung und dem theoretischen Akt, auf den die Aussage zugespiitzt wird.” (p. 195) Accordingly, the objectivity of logical form is covertly presupposed, as Steinman says (pp. 195-96), even at the (supposedly primary) level of hermeneutic Interpretation (*Auslegung*) and receives no further explanation. Thus, we must conclude that Heidegger’s project of the analysis of the constituent structures of objectivity remains unfulfilled, at least in one of its most important aspects: “Sein fundierungstheoretischer Anspruch erweist sich damit als nicht einlösbar, zumindest insofern, als er die Fundierung der Logik betrifft.” (p. 196).
between the content of acts of disclosure individually, and their content *in specie*. In so doing, he essentially makes truth into an (ontic) event: that is, he makes it seem (with respect to Newton’s laws, for instance) that the truth of these laws – whether they are true, false, or neither – depends on the event of their disclosure. And since such events of disclosure are indeed ontic – they happen at one time and one place to one person (in this case, Newton) – we then would have to raise the difficult question, as Tugendhat points out, whether something like Newton’s laws become more true when disclosed to more people, or would become untrue if everyone forgot about them.

Thus, Heidegger’s conception, if taken straightforwardly and in its most direct application, seems to lead directly to a conception according to which truth is dependent upon (ontic) events of disclosure, revealing, or verification. And such a view seems untenable, at least if we wish to uphold the distinction between the event of disclosure and what is disclosed in that event. Do we indeed wish to uphold this distinction, in general? We may indeed wish to do so, for various reasons.

One reason would be to preserve a realist view of truth. On such a view, what is true or false is completely independent of human minds and human beings – there is no sense in which truth, or the reality of what is true, is dependent upon us. It may be, moreover, that realist instincts indeed play a role in Tugendhat’s critique, especially in motivating what he sees as the untenability of the view according to which the truth of, for instance, Newton’s laws is (in some sense) dependent on us.

However, one might object, there is a robust and venerable idealist tradition in the history of philosophy as well as a realist one; and if we are going to gain clarity about the underlying issues here, it is probably best at this stage not to beg the question of realism vs. idealism (or indeed of realism vs. any of the different possible varieties of what has been called, for instance by Dummett, anti-realism). So even if we agree that we do not want, even on Heidegger’s own terms, a conception of truth that makes it dependent *simply* on individual, ontic events, we also should not simply leap to the conclusion that truth does not depend in any way or form on the activity or structures of Dasein as a whole.

---

46 This notwithstanding that Heidegger nevertheless allows that the entities “such ... as have been uncovered and pointed out by [Newton’s] laws” (SZ, p. 227) are indeed revealed as having pre-existed the act of the discovery of the laws. Tugendhat’s response shows how much Heidegger’s analysis is here crippled by the failure to connect truth essentially to propositional structure: “Heidegger indeed allows that something be presupposed to the factual production of the expression, except that he no longer can conceive this as truth: ‘That Newton’s laws were, before him, neither true nor false, cannot mean that before him there were no entities such as have been uncovered and indicated by those laws ... With the uncoveredness of the being it shows itself directly as the being that already was before.’ One would like, here, to ask: is, then, what Newton’s laws show “a being”? How can one conceive of what Newton uncovered otherwise than precisely as Newton’s laws? One sees that since Heidegger locates the sense of truth in factual showing, he can now also no longer maintain (as seems to be implied by his conception of the assertion as a showing) that the shown and the showing are not to be distinguished as separate things; what preconditions the factual showing cannot carry the showing structurally in itself, in that the individual assertion and the assertion in specie are not distinguished, but rather is “a being.”
Moreover, it seems possible that, even allowing that the manifestation of an entity is in some sense an “ontic” event, it may be possible to resist on Heidegger’s behalf Tugendhat’s accusation that this conception is simply dependent upon a “confusion” between the “ontic” and the “ontological” levels. This is because, as is very clear from Heidegger’s initial definition of Dasein itself, all of the important structures of Dasein’s being and comportment are in fact both “ontic” and “ontological.” Thus, “Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological” (SZ, p. 12) and this “ontico-ontological” priority of Dasein means that Dasein’s understanding of the world (for instance, in performing concrete actions of world-disclosure) is always “reflected back ontologically” (SZ, pp. 15-16) into an (ontological) understanding of the structure of Dasein itself. This raises the possibility that we may understand the “ontic” event of the disclosure of an individual entity as always simultaneously ‘ontological’ (in particular, as it is ontologically “reflected back” into the disclosure of world as such); and if this is correct, then Heidegger’s analysis in these regards is not in fact grounded, as Tugendhat says, in a “confusion,” but rather expresses a deep structural insight into the connection of the ontic and the ontological levels in the structure of Dasein itself. In that case, “disclosure” would be an event that is simultaneously ontic in that it discloses an entity, and ontological in that it provides or illuminates the holistic basis for the disclosure of all entities as such by revealing world as such. There are indeed some external indications that this is precisely what Heidegger intends. And in an interesting and suggestive way, this conception of the “ontic-ontological” event clearly presages the theme of Ereignis, which the later Heidegger will understand as the disclosive event that fundamentally articulates the history of Being into its fateful epochs by making possible particular ways of understanding (ontic) beings on the basis of an (ontological) disclosure of their Being.

Nevertheless, we must also admit that the attribution of an event of disclosure, whether ontic or ontological (or both), to the activity of “das Dasein” itself has, as yet, no clear sense; if we are to make sense of it, we must understand what such an event is and how its possibility is grounded in the general structure of Dasein itself, what is shared by all instances or (as Heidegger sometimes says) “cases” of Dasein. If we can make sense of this, we may indeed be able to preserve the very plausible thought that truth, and in particular its apophantic dimension, depends in general and in detail on Dasein; and we may

47 I owe this objection to Iain Thomson.
48 For instance, in the 1929 text “On the Essence of Ground,” which draws the ontological difference between beings and Being more clearly than Being and Time itself, Heidegger distinguishes between “ontic truth” and “ontological truth.” (in Pathmarks, ed. by William McNeill, Cambridge U. Press, 1998). Here, the originary manifestation of individual beings (for instance in the hermeneutical “as-structure”) is termed “ontic truth,” whereas “ontological truth” is identified as the “unveiledness of being” that first makes possible such ontic disclosure. (p. 103). However, the two levels of truth are essentially interdependent in that “Unconcealment of being, however, is always truth of the being of beings, whether such beings are actual or not” and “Conversely, in the unconcealment of beings there already lies in each case an unconcealment of their being.” (p. 105). This demonstrates, according to Heidegger, a necessary “forking” of the essence of truth in general into the two dimensions of the ontic and the ontological.

Rufus Duits has recently argued for a similar structure in Being and Time itself, holding in direct response to Tugendhat that truth in the most general sense depends on certain ontological structures of Dasein; the most important of these is the structure of falling or Verfallen which confirms that Dasein is always already “in untruth” as deeply as it is in truth. See “On Tugendhat’s Analysis of Heidegger’s Concept of Truth,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Vol. 15(2), 207–223.
yet be able to do so without committing the “confusion” between ontic and ontological levels of which Tugendhat accuses Heidegger.

Why, then, does Heidegger refuse to recognize a distinction between the occurrence of the individual act and the general content that all acts of the same type share, the content of the act in specie? The answer is not difficult to find, and in fact is at the center of Heidegger’s critique of what he sees as the traditional account of truth itself:

According to the general opinion, what is true is knowledge. But knowledge is judging. In judgment one must distinguish between the judging as a Real psychical process, and that which is judged, as an ideal content. It will be said of the latter that it is ‘true’. The Real psychical process, however, is either present-at-hand or not. According to this opinion, the ideal content of judgment stands in a relationship of agreement. This relationship thus pertains to a connection between an ideal content of judgment and the Real Thing as that which is judged about. Is this agreement Real or ideal in its kind of Being, or neither of these? How are we to take ontologically the relation between an ideal entity and something that is Real and present-at-hand? Such a relation indeed subsists [besteht]; and in factual judgments it subsists not only as a relation between the content of the judgment and the Real Object, but likewise as a relation between the ideal content and the Real act of judgment. And does it manifestly subsist ‘more inwardly’ in this latter case?

Or is the ontological meaning of the relation between Real and ideal (methexis) something about which we must not inquire? Yet the relation is to be one which subsists. What does such ‘subsisting’ [Bestand] mean ontologically?

Why should this not be a legitimate question? Is it accidental that no headway has been made with this problem in over two thousand years? Has the question already been perverted in the very way it has been approached – in the ontologically unclarified separation of the Real and the ideal?

And with regard to the ‘actual’ judging of what is judged, is the separation of the Real act of judgment from the ideal content altogether unjustified? Does not the actuality of knowing and judging get broken asunder into two ways of Being – two ‘levels’ which can never be pieced together in such a manner as to reach the kind of Being that belongs to knowing? Is not psychologism correct in holding out against this separation, even if it neither clarifies ontologically the kind of Being which belongs to the thinking of that which is thought, nor is even so much as acquainted with it as a problem? (SZ, pp. 216-17)

Although Heidegger puts his critique, here, in the form of a series of increasingly radical and penetrating questions, at least part of his reason for resisting the distinction between act and content is very clear. It is the claim that, on the traditional view, this distinction can only be drawn as a distinction between two levels or kinds of entities. One the one side there is the real psychological act of judging; on the other, the ideal content, what is judged. And traditional theories, in thus treating these as two separate kinds of beings or entities, indeed do invite the correspondence theory according to which the truth of a judgment amounts to its correspondence to an ideal content which is itself true in that it corresponds to the objects.
And this, then, indeed does raise the question on which, as Heidegger suggests, no progress has been made for two thousand years. It is the question of the relationship between what the philosophical tradition grasps as real (for instance individuals or particulars) and what it characterizes as ideal (for instance forms, universals, or ideas). The problem of truth, grasped according to the conditions for its phenomenon, is thus none other than the problem of the kind of being of ideality, Plato’s problem itself.

Against the suggestion that the act/content distinction leads inevitably to the (presumably insoluble) problem of the relationship between real and ideal beings, however, it must be objected that it is by no means obvious that the distinction must in fact be understood as involving any such relationship. For instance, as Tugendhat points out, Husserl himself seems to offer an alternative. In the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl distinguishes very clearly between the act, which has content as an individual, and the content of the act in *specie*, the content borne in common by all acts of the same type. Truth is, in the first instance, again to be understood as the content of the act in *specie*; but this (the act in *specie*) is by no means simply another entity, either present at hand or existing in any other simple way. It is, rather, to be understood simply in terms of the *type* or *kind* of the (individual) act itself. If we can make sense of this, we can indeed make sense of the truth of an act in *specie* as the truth of what is asserted (or judged) in *all* acts of that type; and we can then understand the truth of an individual act in terms of its being an act of the type that has (in specie, or as a type) a true content. Nowhere in this story is there obviously any “correspondence” between two kinds or levels of entities, and it is not obvious that the question which Heidegger rightly finds so problematic—the question of the “being of the relationship” between entities at the two levels—must indeed arise at all.

Frege’s way of thinking about the difference between the act of judgment and its content offers another instructive example of an alternative to what Heidegger seems to assume here. Frege also draws, very clearly and emphatically, a distinction between act and content. The content of a sentence or proposition—what he calls its *sense*—is sharply and rigorously to be distinguished from what goes on in any individual act of judging, asserting, or verifying it.49 This is the precondition, according to Frege, for anything’s being objectively true or false at all: it is only the sense of a proposition that is a candidate for possible truth or falsity. Now, what kind of thing, then, is a Fregean sense, (if it is any kind of thing at all)? This is a difficult question, both conceptually and interpretatively. However, although Frege sometimes uses metaphors of spatiality to characterize the kind of existence of senses—for instance that they exist in a “third realm” beyond the first realm of spatiotemporal existence and the second realm of subjectivity—it is not at all clear that we must construe senses as “ideal entities” in some sort of problematic relationship to real ones.

Indeed, we can see that this need not be the case, again, by considering Wittgenstein’s view in the *Tractatus*, which draws on and extends Frege’s conception of sense (while also partially modifying it). For Wittgenstein as for Frege, the primary bearer of sense is a sentence or proposition; and a sentence or proposition with a sense is, in the first instance, what is indeed a candidate for truth or falsity. However, for Wittgenstein, the sense of a sentence is not a separate entity, but is a *structural feature* of the sentence itself in its application to the world, a matter of what he calls its logical form or structure. The possibility of truth or falsity is itself dependent on logical form, in particular on whether the logical

49 See, e.g., “The Thought” in *The Frege Reader*. 
structure of the sentence matches or fails to match that of a state of affairs. However, this identity or non-identity of logical form does not imply a matching or correspondence between two kinds of entities, for two reasons: first, as we have discussed, the state of affairs is not, logically or conceptually, in any sense an entity or being; and second, as Wittgenstein also emphasizes, the sentence is itself a state of affairs (namely the state of affairs that the simple words in it are arranged in the specific way that they are). So we have, here, in Wittgenstein’s conception of truth, neither two present-at-hand entities which must be related in some mysterious way, nor two types of items whose kinds of being must themselves be further explained. What we do have, however (and what may indeed need substantially more explaining) is a single kind of logical form or structure that, according to Wittgenstein, “permeates the world,” thereby making it possible for anything to be true or false at all.

All of these conceptions – Husserl’s, Frege’s, and Wittgenstein’s – indeed tend to suggest that there are possible alternatives that Heidegger leaves out when he simply assumes that a theory committed to the act/content distinction in some form must also be one that reifies both act and content into real and ideal entities, respectively, and then faces the (probably unanswerable) question of the relation between entities of these radically different types. However, it is nevertheless clear that Heidegger’s questioning here goes to the heart of some of the most decisive issues in the history of philosophy. For even if there may be possible alternatives to construing the distinction between act and content as the distinction between real and ideal entities, this latter distinction is pervasive in the history of philosophy since Plato and even today may well condition our thinking in manifold domains, many of which seem at first unconnected, or only tangentially connected, to the problem of truth itself. For instance, the difference between what is sensible and what is (only) intelligible is itself often construed according to the difference between reality (in the sense of spatiotemporal reality) and what is ideal.

Additionally, as Heidegger often points out, the distinction between ideal and real beings is pervasively connected, since Plato, with a temporal distinction: whereas real beings are understood as transitory and changing, as passing in and out of existence, ideal beings are understood as timeless and unchanging, and our knowledge of them as a priori in the sense of being temporally “prior” to the time of that which is changing and transitory. Moreover, it is not obvious that the supposed alternative theories, which at least ostensibly avoid understanding the act/content distinction, indeed entirely avoid invoking at least some of these aspects of the real/ideal distinction as it has been construed by philosophers since Plato. This is perhaps especially clear with respect to Husserl, who often invokes by name the distinction between idealities and (spatiotemporal) realities, and who clearly, at least after the Logical Investigations, understands idealities as unchanging beings unaffected by change and becoming. And for Frege and Wittgenstein as well as for Husserl, senses are indeed timeless or sempiternal, and if they are indeed given in some sense to human cognition, the temporal mode of this givenness will again be the a priori.51

50 See TLP 1.1, 2.01, and 3.14.
51 Indeed, the later Heidegger often criticizes the traditional concept of the “a priori,” suggesting that it is itself one of the primary conceptual bases of the ontologically unclarified traditional determination of Being as temporal presence. For an anticipation of this line of critique in connection with the question of the priority of the hermeneutical “as” structure, see SZ, pp. 150-51.
It is in the light of these distinctions, and ongoing tendencies to invoke oppositions that have plausibly
governed philosophical thinking as such since at least Plato, that Heidegger’s radical posing of the
question of the ground of truth already amounts, in Being and Time, to an unprecedented deconstructive
inquiry into the very foundations of the history of the western tradition as such. Indeed, taken in the
light of this history, the question that Heidegger puts in italics in the passage above: How are we to take
ontologically the relation between an ideal entity and something that is Real and present-at-hand? is
simply a historically determined and indeed essential version of the question to which both Being and
Time and Heidegger’s whole effort at this time is directed: the question of the being of beings, of the
ground and meaning of their types and ways of being. This question of the ground of the possibility of
truth, here asked with respect to the tradition as the hitherto unasked question about the relationship
between the ideal and the real, is just an inflection of Heidegger’s radical question about the meaning of
being, and its placement here foreshadows the more explicit development of the question of the
determination of being as presence that will underlie the entire “being-historical thinking” project of his
later thought. It is clear, then, that the question of the ground and structure of truth is, here, no accidental
addition to the question of the meaning of being itself; but rather that, in dialogue with such alternative
possibilities and accounts as may exist, including but not limited to the tradition’s identification of
ideality with eternal, standing presence, we must be prepared to follow Heidegger in this questioning,
whatever we think of the success of his own results.

V

As we have seen, Heidegger’s understanding of the structure of the logos in Being and Time is deeply
dependent upon his attempt to distinguish it from a more primordial structure that is the ultimate locus
of truth, conceived as the disclosure of entities. As we have also seen, Tugendhat’s critique shows that this
attempt is not really successful; the dilemma of bivalence forces us to see the more originary disclosive
structure, if it is indeed to form a basis for truth and falsehood, as already exhibiting the logical structure
of propositions and assertions. However, in suggesting that the specific concept of truth may not apply
to anything prior to the propositional, at the same time, we should not lose track of the disclosive
dimension of truth, the sense in which the truth of propositions is grounded in preconditions involving
the disclosure of entities or their contexts, up to the disclosure of the world itself. These preconditions
may indeed involve the activity of Dasein, or the structure of its being. Again, they may involve a more
general or comprehensive structure that we may ultimately take as the structure of the world itself (the
worldhood of the world). The challenge is going to be to understand what, exactly, these preconditions
are, and how they simultaneously accomplish disclosive demonstration – the showing of beings – and
also precondition the possibility of propositional truth.

The question is none other than the question of the possibility of meaning itself. It is standardly
answered, in the metaphysical tradition since Plato, by the invocation of ideal entities that are conceived
as transcendent and eternal existents. In invoking such a solution, however, one raises a question that, as
Heidegger says, has never been adequately answered within the tradition, but which is then unavoidable.
This is the question of the actual relationship between an ideality and a reality and the mode of existence
of such a relationship. And although, as we have seen, propositional views of truth need not necessarily
be cashed out as correspondence theories, we still face, on any of the accounts on offer, the question of the being of propositional structure itself. If it is not the ideality of an eternal object, what is the being or mode of existence of that structure that pre-articulates the structure of the world as that which can be described in (true or false) propositions?

It seems, thus, that even despite Tugendhat’s criticism, we may now pose the question of the ground of truth in a way that is very much in accordance with both the letter and the spirit of Heidegger’s guiding question of the meaning of the being of beings. In fact, if anything, we will be able, by taking Tugendhat’s critique on board, to ask this question in a way that is even more specific and articulated than Heidegger’s own. The question is that of the being of that which pre-conditions truth by pre-articulating meaning, the being of that which makes it first possible for anything to be true or false at all. We may agree, moreover, with Heidegger (as well as with Frege!) that simply taking this being to be a kind of eternally existing present-at-hand entity, something like an “ideal object” or a platonic form, will not do; for this will simply invite the further question of the relationship between the ideal and the real, which has not been explained. Having taken Tugendhat’s critique on board, additionally, we can also see, though, that it will not suffice simply to answer this question of the being of meaning (or of the pre-conditions for truth) by referring simply to the disclosure of entities, either individually or collectively. We will need, instead, a way of posing the question of the being of the structure that pre-articulates the world as such, that first makes it possible for anything to be true or false at all. This structure may indeed involve disclosure, but it is not exhausted by it; in any case, we are looking for the specific structure, wherever it may enter, that first makes for the possibility of truth or falsehood (in Tugendhat’s sense of bivalence) at all.

The question is thus the same as that of the articulation of the world, what Heidegger answers with great inventiveness through his description of the structures of the worldhood of the world, being-in-the-world, and being-in as such. However, it is clear by now from the upshot of Tugendhat’s critique, that at least one of the central theses of the analysis of the last phenomenon (of being-in), namely the thesis that “Assertion [is] a Derivative Mode of Interpretation” cannot stand simply and as such. Instead of simply seeing the logos of assertion and propositions as derivative of a more primordial level whose own structure (that of the hermeneutic “as”) is left largely unexplained, we may accordingly seek in Heidegger’s own account an understanding of the structural basis of meaning that is common to both of the levels he distinguishes.

In order to do so, we must apparently revisit Heidegger’s conception of the determination of the propositional logos, both on a local and a global (historical) level. As we have seen, according to section 33, what is grasped and understood by the Greeks as the logos is already understood at that time as “the only clue for obtaining access to that which actually is…” However, according to Heidegger, this structure of the logos is already with the Greeks understood, as it will be universally within the Western tradition as a present-at-hand entity.53

\[\text{P. 154.}\]

52 With respect to the claim mooted here, to the effect that the logos (and hence the structure underlying the possibility of assertion) is universally interpreted, within the philosophical tradition, as a being present-at-hand, for instance as a totality of words that are ontologically interpreted simply as things, it must be objected that this
This conception of the *logos* may ultimately be mistaken, but it is grounded, according to Heidegger, in a fundamental way in the more primary, hermeneutic “as” structure itself. Within this ancient and traditional conception, in particular, the *logos* is identified with the structure of the apophantical (rather than the more primordial hermeneutical) ‘as,’ and *both* the logos and its structure are seen as objectively present or present-at-hand. For instance, Heidegger says, the initial search for the logos as present-at-hand yields an understanding of the sentence or proposition as the “Being-present-at-hand-together of several words.” Thus, the “togetherness” of the sentence or proposition is understood, already in Plato, as a *synthesis*, or (as in Aristotle) as the unity of the two possibilities of synthesis or diareasis, putting-together or taking-apart. Thus: “every logos is both synthesis and diareasis, not just the one (call it ‘affirmative judgment’) or the other (call it ‘negative judgment’).” (SZ, p. 159). However, Heidegger says, Aristotle himself did not pursue to its depths the more basic question of what makes any such synthesis or diareasis possible.

According to Heidegger, the answer to this question is to be given, again, in terms of the original structure of the hermeneutical ‘as’:

> Along with the formal structures of ‘binding’ and ‘separating’ – or, more precisely, along with the unity of these – we should meet the phenomenon of the ‘something as something’, and we should meet this as a phenomenon. In accordance with this structure, something is understood with regard to something….If the phenomenon of the ‘as’ remains covered up, and, above all, if its existential source in the hermeneutical ‘as’ is veiled, then Aristotle’s phenomenological approach to the analysis of the *logos* collapses to a superficial ‘theory of judgment’, in which judgment becomes the binding or separating of representations and concepts. (SZ, p. 159).

In other words, it is, according to Heidegger, again the original structure of the hermeneutical ‘as’ that forms the ultimate basis of the possibility of synthesis and diareasis that we encounter again in the explicit proposition. It is only because of this original structure, by means of which anything may first be understood as what it is, or as anything else, that we are subsequently able to form assertions and propositions that explicitly attribute properties or predicates to objects. The complex, synthetic

---

54 SZ, pp. 158-59.
55 SZ, p. 159.
structure of the hermeneutic ‘as’, originally given in complex contexts of reference and involvement, thus underlies at its basis the entire logical structure of articulated propositions.

As we saw above, there is good reason to suspect that this synthetic unity is already, essentially, that of the proposition; in any case, we do not have, as yet, any structural criteria for distinguishing the synthetic unity of the hermeneutical “as” from the articulated unity of the proposition. This may provide grounds for suspecting, further, that we do not yet have a viable account of what structurally underlies the unity on both levels, both that of the hermeneutical taking of something as something and the unity of the explicit assertion. Further pursuing the question of the actual basis of this unity, and hence finding alternatives to the prevailing conception of the assertion as a synthesis (for instance of subject and predicate) will require, as Heidegger notes, a closer interpretation of what is involved in the meaning and function of the so-called “copula.” Heidegger promises to carry out this interpretation in the (actually unwritten) division III (he does in fact carry out some of this interpretation, however, in the Basic Problems of Phenomenology of 1928):

How far this problematic [i.e. that of the ‘relation’ in judgment] has worked its way into the Interpretation of the logos, and how far on the other hand the concept of ‘judgment’ has (by a remarkable counter-thrust) worked its way into the ontological problematic, is shown by the phenomenon of the copula. When we consider this ‘bond’, it becomes clear that proximally the synthesis-structure is regarded as self-evident, and that it has also retained the function of serving as a standard for Interpretation. But if the formal characteristics of ‘relating’ and ‘binding’ can contribute nothing phenomenally towards the structural analysis of the logos as subject-matter, then in the long run the phenomenon to which we allude by the term “copula” has nothing to do with a bond or binding. The Interpretation of the ‘is’, whether it be expressed in its own right in the language or indicated in the verbal ending, leads us therefore into the context of problems belonging to the existential analytic, if assertion and the understanding of Being are existential possibilities for the Being of Dasein itself. When we come to work out the question of Being (cf. Part I, Division 3), we shall thus encounter again this peculiar phenomenon of Being which we meet within the logos. (SZ, pp. 159-160)

Heidegger’s pursuit, here, of an alternative, non-synthetic conception of the proposition along the line of a re-interpretation of the meaning of the copula (and hence of what is, on the propositional account of truth, a primary and irreducible meaning of the verb “to be”) is more a promissory note than a completed analysis.56

Does Heidegger indeed have, at the time of the composition of Being and Time, a clear and unified conception of what is actually involved – existentially and ontologically -- in the “peculiar phenomenon of Being” that is represented by logos? We may already suspect that he does not, given his failure to recognize already extant alternatives to the “traditional” conception of the logos as a being present-at-hand that is under critique here. This impression is indeed confirmed by section 34, which offers the

---

56 However, it should also be noted that Freges conception of the unity of the proposition, as expressed in the Context Principle that he first suggested already in 1889, already suggests just such a conception of the non-synthetic unity of a proposition as understood as articulated by its underlying logical form.
only explicit theory of language\textsuperscript{57} in the whole of \textit{Being and Time}. According to this theory, language is ontologically founded upon discourse or \textit{Rede} (p. 160), a phenomenon of Dasein’s disclosedness which has in fact been presupposed (though not explicitly mentioned) in the previous analyses of state-of-mind, understanding, interpretation, and assertion itself. Discourse is then expressed in “language,” which is understood as a “totality of words” (p. 161) which “accrue” to pre-existing “significations.” This totality may then also “be broken up into word-Things which are present-at-hand.” (p. 161) Here, Heidegger’s conception of the positive being of language is thus completely dependent upon its being secondary to the supposedly pre-existing disclosive phenomenon of \textit{Rede}; of course, to the extent that Tugendhat’s critique has suggested we must call into question the existence of a clear-cut \textit{logical} distinction between a primary disclosive, and a secondary propositional, level of meaningfulness and truth, this tends to suggest as well that the supposed distinction between \textit{Rede} and language may not be as clear-cut as Heidegger maintains. In any case, it is clear that Heidegger’s assumption that language \textit{must} be ontologically secondary to \textit{Rede} largely prevents him, here, from seeking an alternative to the tradition’s (ostensibly non-originary) \textit{conception} of language as a being present-at-hand or a totality of such beings, for instance a totality of “word-things.”

Nevertheless Heidegger \textit{does} recognize the need for a further ontological investigation directed toward clarifying the being of language:

Attempts to grasp the ‘essence of language’ have always taken their orientation from one or another of these items; and the clues to their conceptions of language have been the ideas of ‘expression’, of ‘symbolic form’, of communication as ‘assertion’, of the ‘making-known’ of experiences, of the ‘patterning’ of life. Even if one were to put these various fragmentary definitions together in syncretistic fashion, nothing would be achieved in the way of a fully adequate definition of “language”. We would still have to do what is decisive here – to work out in advance the ontological-existential whole of the structure of discourse on the basis of the analytic of Dasein. (SZ, p. 163)

Even if this further investigation primarily took the form – as Heidegger thinks it should – of an investigation into the detailed structure of \textit{Rede}, it would necessarily yield something which is so far lacking, an understanding of the actual definition and structure of language itself. This understanding would presumably replace and improve upon the “traditional” understanding of language as a totality of word-things. But what it would reveal about the nature of language in its overall structure is by no means clear at this time. Indeed, Heidegger ends section 34a with an impassioned plea for a further inquiry devoted to “re-establishing the science of language on foundations which are ontologically more primordial” than those of the traditional logic:

In the last resort, philosophical research must resolve to ask what kind of Being goes with language in general. Is it a kind of equipment ready-to-hand within-the-world, or has it Dasein’s

\textsuperscript{57} This is not to say that there is not a detailed and well-worked out interpretation of phenomena related to language, such as discourse (\textit{Rede}), articulation, and Interpretation itself. What I mean by “language” here is the totality of the phenomenon of (what the Greeks understood as) \textit{logos}, and what provides (not incidentally) the basis for the ancient definition (Aristotle’s) of the human as the \textit{zoon logon echon}, which Heidegger suggests here (p. 165) is “not indeed ‘false’”.

36
kind of Being, or is it neither of these? What kind of Being does language have, if there can be such a thing as a ‘dead’ language? What do the “rise” and “decline” of a language mean ontologically? We possess a science of language, and the Being of the entities which it has for its theme is obscure. Even the horizon for any investigative question about it is veiled. Is it an accident that proximally and for the most part significations are ‘worldly’, sketched out beforehand by the significance of the world, that they are indeed often predominantly ‘spatial’? Or does this ‘fact’ have existential-ontological necessity? And if it is necessary, why should it be so? Philosophical research will have to dispense with the ‘philosophy of language’ if it is to inquire into ‘the ‘things themselves’ and attain the status of a problematic which has been cleared up conceptually. (SZ, p. 166)

Heidegger does not, at least at this time, have answers to the questions he radically poses here about the Being of language itself; but many of them may indeed be seen, at least, as addressed – if, admittedly, not completely answered – by elements of the analytic tradition’s transformative consideration of the logical structure and nature of language, just being undertaken at the time of Heidegger’s writing. Once we overcome Heidegger’s own tendency to reject these investigations as simply committed to a “derivative” propositional sense of truth and meaning, we may come to see them as directly relevant to just the questions he poses here. In a different sense, as well, the question of the Being of language will enter Heidegger’s own thought much more directly and explicitly later, especially with the turn to “being-historical thinking” in the 1930s. In any case, it is clear that Heidegger is marking here the possibility and even necessity of a future inquiry into the being of logos and language, one without which we cannot consider these phenomena to have gained, in Being and Time, any substantial degree of clarity.

It seems, as well, that we may take elements of the analytic tradition, in its radical turn to language, as posing (although admittedly in an obscure way) something like on the very same question of logos, on the basis of a clarified understanding of the structure of logic itself. Here the question of the possibility of meaning is itself (though perhaps obscurely) the question of the being of language, of what defines its large-scale structure or unity as a whole, and of how this unity defines our relations to things and to ourselves. If this is right, then pursuing further the question of the determination of the being of beings along the line of a fundamental inquiry into the meaning and structure of the phenomenon of logos would almost necessarily involve, as well, reflection on the upshot of these (admittedly partial) results of the analytic tradition, in parallel with the results of Heidegger’s thought, both early and late, for the larger and still very much open question of the Being of language itself.58

---

58 I wish to thank Günter Figal, Iain Thomson, Mark Wrathall, Walter Brogan, and Friederike Rese for their role in preliminary discussions leading to the composition of this paper. I would also like to thank the participants in a UNM graduate proseminar session in October, 2009, at which an earlier version of this paper was presented, for their helpful comments and responses.