EXPLOSION IN TURRET TWO
Investigation Continued

            due course, to be of no consequence with respect to bore safety.  But by user safety standards, a grossly unsatisfactory number are for defects with respect to design safety features which were incorporated for good cause.

16.       Of particular significance are the rejections for defects directly related to the causes (paragraph 9) to which previous in-bore prematures have been attributed.  Specifically:

    a.     Eighteen are for defects in ADF safety features designed to prevent premature functioning.  Six of these rejections are for ADF rotors found in the armed position.

    b.     621 are for defective gas check seals in the projectile base.

    c.     1686 are for excessive gaps between explosive filler and projectile base plug.  The maximum allowable gap, .125”, was that found by firing tests to be safe for A3-loaded 5” (paragraph 12), but irregular gaps up to at least 1.5” maximum depth have been found during this re-certification program.

17.       The fuze involved in this casualty was designed in 1944 by the Carnegie Institute of Technology: NOL White Oak is now the design agent for it.  It was manufactured and delivered in 1968 or 1969 on a contract let by the Ship’s Parts Control Center (NAVSUPSYSCOM) with the Bermite Powder Company.  It was accepted after inspection by the Defense Contract Administration Services (Defense Supply Agency), in accordance with a basic specification published in 1955 by the Bureau of Ordnance.  COMNAVORDSYSCOM now controls that specification, but has command control over none of the other agencies here named; this contrasts notably with the direct command control formerly exercised by the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance over all Naval gun ammunition technical matters.

NEWPORT NEWS OPERATIONS

18.       In this deployment NEWPORT NEWS had been in Southeast Asia since May 1972, and before the casualty had fired 24,161 rounds of 8”.  This had required two complete relinings of the 8” battery.  Under the conditions of firing encountered she had experienced 1100-1200 equivalent service rounds (ESR) 8” barrel life, and had fired some 730 ESR from the gun here concerned since its most recent relining.

19.       The ship was numerically well manned.  Her 8” firing in this deployment alone was the equivalent of on the order of a half century of normal peacetime 8” experience for a single ship.  The rank and rating structure was somewhat below the seniority levels which might be desired, and commissioned turret officers were not assigned.  But in our judgment the personnel situation was not an adverse factor in this casualty.

(page 5)