EXPLOSION IN TURRET TWO
Investigation Continued

29.       Various mechanisms for early premature firing of the primer in a pre-armed fuze rotor can be visualized.  The first thing that happens after propellant ignition in this gun is that the heavy plastic front plug of the cartridge is blown forward and impacts the projectile base with a substantial shock.  The shock wave from this impact, transmitted to the projectile nose and reflected, may subject the ADF to significant accelerations, positive followed by negative.  A primer capsule improperly seated in the rotor, or improperly fixed in its seat, or a primer mixture not firmly held in its capsule, could be fired by the resultant set-forward against an unarmed firing pin.  Or other assembly or dimensional errors could produce similar results from this initial cartridge plug shock; or if not from it, then from other transients in the initial projectile acceleration.  In any case, we understand that tests have indeed confirmed that the primer in the Mk 54/Mk 55-type ADF can fire upon shock of the gun firing, if in the rotor-armed condition, in an otherwise-normal fuze.  The timing of NEWPORT NEWS projectile detonation would be consistent with initial shock phenomena.

Further Fuze Implications 

30.           The discovery of armed fuze components in service projectiles (paragraph 16) emphasizes the question of how such a situation could be permitted to exist.  Navy standards enforced for half a century required total, absolute, and unvarying adherence to the most rigorous standards of explosive safety, reflected among other things in ordnance safety precautions long ago described as having been written in blood.  Somewhere in recent years those standards have been defaulted, and the lives of a turret crew have been added to the cost.

31.           Where that malfeasance occurred in this case is not hard to find.  The auxiliary detonating fuzes here concerned have been identified by manufacturer, lot number, and date.  All thus far discovered with safety defects, as well as all those known to be in NEWPORT NEWS ammunition, were manufactured under two contracts with the Bermite Powder Company in 1968 and 1969, and were “inspected” by the Defense Contract Administration Services (DCAS), specifically DCASD, Van Nuys, in accordance with technical requirements which are the responsibility of COMNAVORDSYSCOM assigned by him to the Naval Ammunition Production Engineering Center (NAPEC), Crane, Indiana.

32.       Reference (k) reviews the manufacturer’s quality control and the DCAS-administered inspection processes applicable to the two contracts.  Basic government document controlling the quality of the product was reference (l), and the contractor’s was reference (m).  These three references document an unsatisfactory situation with respect to safety (amongst other things), all too consistent with what’s being found relative to the ADF by the re-inspections directed by reference (i).

            (page 10)